Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Jaegwon

Contents

Journal articles
Dissertations / Theses
Books
Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Jaegwon'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 8 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Jaegwon.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Jaegwon"

1

Griffin, David Ray. "Reply to Jaegwon Kim." Process Studies 28, no. 1 (1999): 35–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/process1999281/223.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Sachse, Christian. "Physicalism, or Something Near Enough ? Jaegwon Kim." dialectica 60, no. 4 (December 2006): 508–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01074.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Crisp, Thomas M., and Ted A. Warfield. "Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World." Nous 35, no. 2 (June 2001): 304–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00299.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Pavesi, Pablo. "Jaegwon, Kim. “El fisicalismo no reduccionista y su problema con la causalidad mental.” Trad. Juan Diego Morales. Ideas y Valores 63.155 (2014): 235-259." Ideas y Valores 64, no. 157 (April 29, 2015): 292–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v64n157.48600.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Post, John F. "Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Jaegwon Kim." Philosophy of Science 62, no. 2 (June 1995): 338–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289863.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

McIntosh, Jillian Scott. ""Philosophy of Mind," 3rd edition, by Jaegwon Kim." Teaching Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2013): 193–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil201336226.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Walter, Sven. "Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim." European Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (April 2008): 157–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00296.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

이선형. "Jaegwon Kim on Action Explanation and Explanatory Realism." CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas ll, no. 62 (November 2016): 117–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss..62.201611.005.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Noordhof, P. "Mind in a Physical World, by Jaegwon Kim." Mind 121, no. 484 (October 1, 2012): 1080–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs094.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

LOEWER, BARRY. "Comments on Jaegwon Kim's Mind and the Physical World." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, no. 3 (November 2002): 655–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00229.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Jaegwon"

1

Lacroix, Christian. "Causalité mentale et réductionnisme chez Jaegwon Kim." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0007/MQ44704.pdf.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Tu, Chia-Lin. "The Tale of Mental Causation: Fact or Fiction?" OpenSIUC, 2010. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/125.

Full text

Abstract:

Mental causation is with us all the time. Being a table is different from being a human---although we are composed of physical particles, we have understanding, reason, or perception, which are able to make a difference in the physical world. In this dissertation, I have detail discussions of contemporary substance dualism, the mind-brain identity theory, and Jaegwon Kim's functionalism, and thus conclude that none of them can provide an appropriate account to the problem of mental causation. By distinguishing the mind from the body, substance dualists face the pairing problem: How does this particular mind unite with this particular body and thus interact? With the pairing problem, more and more philosophers accept physicalism. However, it is surprising that the problem of mental causation arises again from the heart of physicalism. It means that accepting physicalist ontology does not make this problem go away. On the contrary, basic physical assumptions can even be seen as the source of the current difficulties with mental causation. My preferred idea is that mental properties emerge from physical properties, and both of them together make an occurrence to cause an effect. Emergence makes mental causation autonomous and also avoids epiphenomenalism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Robinson, Brian Craig. "Not near enough: Kim, physicalism, and property dualism (Jaegwon Kim, David Chalmers, John Perry)." Diss., Connect to online resource, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:1435241.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Skogholt, Christoffer. "An Evolutionary Argument against Physicalism : or some advice to Jaegwon Kim and Alvin Plantinga." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-232893.

Full text

Abstract:

According to the dominant tradition in Christianity and many other religions, human beings are both knowers and actors: beings with conscious beliefs about the world who sometimes act intentionally guided by these beliefs. According to philosopher of mind Robert Cummins the “received view” among philosophers of mind is epiphenomenalism, according to which mental causation does not exist: neural events are the underlying causes of both behavior and belief which explains the correlation (not causation) between belief and behavior. Beliefs do not, in virtue of their semantic content, enter the causal chain leading to action, beliefs are always the endpoint of a causal chain. If that is true the theological anthropology of many religious traditions is false. JP Moreland draws attention to two different ways of doing metaphysics: serious metaphysics and shopping-list metaphysics. The difference is that the former involves not only the attempt to describe the phenomena one encounter, it also involves the attempt of locating them, that is explaining how the phenomena is possible and came to be given the constraints of a certain worldview. For a physicalist these constraints include the atomic theory of matter and the theories of physical, chemical and biological evolution. Mental properties are challenging phenomena to locate within a physicalist worldview, and some physicalists involved in “serious metaphysics” have therefore eliminated them from their worldview. Most however accept them, advocating “non-reductive physicalism” according to which mental properties supervene on physical processes. Even if one allow mental properties to supervene on physical processes, the problem of mental causation remains. If mental properties are irreducible to and therefore distinct from physical properties, as the non-reductive physicalists claim, they cannot exert causal powers if one accepts the causal closure of the physical domain – which one must, if one is a “serious physicalist” according to physicalist philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim. Alvin Plantinga, in his Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, shows that if mental properties, such as the propositional content of beliefs, are causally inefficacious, then evolution has not been selecting cognitive faculties that are reliable, in the sense of being conducive to true beliefs. If the content of our beliefs does not affect our behavior, the content of our belief is irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint, and so the content-producing part of our cognitive faculties are irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint. The “reliability” – truth-conduciveness – of our cognitive faculties can therefore not be explained by evolution, and therefore not located within the physicalist worldview. The only way in which the reliability of our cognitive faculties can be located is if propositional content is relevant for behavior. If we however eliminate or deny the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then we have abandoned any chance of making a rational case for our position, as that would presuppose the reliability that we are denying. But if propositional content is causally efficacious, then that either – if we are non-reductive physicalists and mental properties are taken to be irreducible to physical properties – implies that the causal closure of the physical domain is false or - if we are reductive physicalists and not eliminativists regarding mental properties - it shows that matter qua matter can govern itself by rational argumentation, in which we have a pan-/localpsychistic view of matter. Either way, we have essentially abandoned physicalism in the process of locating the reliability of our cognitive faculties within a physicalist worldview. We have also affirmed the theological anthropology of Christianity, in so far as the capacity for knowledge and rational action is concerned. Keywords: Philosophy of mind, mental causation, reductionism, physicalism, the evolutionary argument against naturalism, the myth of nonreductive materialism, Alvin Plantinga, Jaegwon Kim

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Vaught, J. R. "Kim's pairing problem and the viability of substance dualism." unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-07172008-171702/.

Full text

Abstract:

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.
Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, Andrea Scarantino, committee co-chairs; Sebastian Rand, committee member. Electronic text (42 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed September 17, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-42).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Beckman, Emma. "Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-8770.

Full text

Abstract:

Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.

This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Vaught, Jimmy Ray. "Kim's Pairing Problem and the Viability of Substance Dualism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2008. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/43.

Full text

Abstract:

Mental causation between the material and the immaterial has been problematic for interactionist substance dualism ever since its first major proponent René Descartes. The contemporary philosopher Jaegwon Kim believes he has found an argument that shows exactly why an immaterial event cannot be said to cause a material event; he calls this the pairing problem argument. This thesis will argue that there is actually sufficient empirical evidence to suggest that Kim’s argument is unsuccessful due to one of its premises being false. Furthermore, this thesis will also argue that interactionist substance dualism is actually a philosophically viable alternative, and lastly ways are sketched of how one might go about constructing such a view responsibly.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Oguamanam, Eugene Ezenwa. "An Encounter Between Aristotle And Contemporary Philosophy of Mind The Case of Reductive Physicalism As Espoused By Jaegwon Kim." Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/74925.

Full text

Abstract:

I argue in this thesis that Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics, supported by his theory of causality and his theory of the soul (De Anima), holds the key to solving the problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind. A core aspect of the contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of mental causation (how does the mind interact with the body to cause actions in humans). Without mental causation, in the realist sense of the word, it is difficult to see how humans are held responsible for their actions. There have been different approaches to solving the mind-body problem, but each has met with its own set of problems, except, I argue, Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Jaegwon Kim argues that Davidson’s anomalous monism cum supervenience renders mental causation epiphenomenal, and that a mental state is causally efficacious only when reduced to the physical properties. I argue that it is the phenomenal consciousness that accounts for our actions, and while neither Davidson’s nor Kim’s accounts of action can adequately deal with phenomenal consciousness, Aristotle’s metaphysics can. I argue that the ancient and neo-Aristotelian notion of self-knowledge is akin to our contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness and that Aristotle saves the notion of autonomous mental causation through his theory of hylomorphism that holds every substance is a composite of matter (body) and form (soul). My thesis is thus a novel invitation to rethink Aristotle’s psychology and philosophy of mind in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind.
Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria 2020.
University of Pretoria(Postgraduate Bursary (2017-2018)
Philosophy
DPhil
Unrestricted

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Fournier, Laure. "Les problèmes de la causalité mentale." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013AIXM3058.

Full text

Abstract:

Quel type de choses sont les raisons que nous donnons pour expliquer nos comportements ? Sont-ce des entités dans nos cerveaux causalement responsables de nos actions ? Sinon, doit-on accepter le dualisme cartésien ? Faut-il croire avec Davidson que les raisons sont des entités physiques pourtant impossibles à identifier en termes physiques ? Nous proposons une réponse alternative : les raisons sont des choses dont nous ne faisons pas l’expérience. Elles peuvent être dites guider nos actions, en vertu d’une cohérence que nous acquérons à travers le temps, en même temps qu’une identité personnelle claire. On défend donc ici la thèse wittgensteinienne selon laquelle les raisons ne sont pas des causes, et l’on cherche ce qu’elles sont positivement. Car il y a bien une différence, dans la réalité physique, entre agir pour une raison ou l’autre. Mais c’est une réalité que l’on recherche et construit, et non que l’on observe et nomme. En parlant de nos raisons, on parle avant de savoir, pour faire advenir quelque chose –quelque chose de physique, comme toute chose.On soutient ainsi contre Kim qu’il est possible de croire à la pertinence propre des raisons, tout en restant moniste, sans dommage pour la rationalité humaine.Tout ceci a d’importantes conséquences éthiques : l’évaluation des raisons et intentions n’est sensée que si elle est une tentative pour bien agir ; elle sera toujours non pertinente pour définir les actions passées, et cela remet gravement en cause la notion de mérite. Ainsi proposons-nous de concevoir la morale de façon dynamique, comme étant ce que l’on cherche toujours à rendre possible
What kind of things are the reasons we use to explain our behavior? Are they material entities in the brain, causing actions? Are they, as Davidson says, physical entities that we cannot identify in physical terms? Are we forced to accept Cartesian dualism? This thesis proposes another answer. Reasons are not experienced. They are sought through action and conceptualization. They may be said to guide our actions, but not as events which cause actions; rather, they serve, over time, to construct coherent behavior and stable personal identity.We defend here the Wittgensteinian thesis that reasons are not causes. We show that it is consistent with monism. The difference between acting for this or that reason does exist in reality, but it is a reality that we construct and pursue, not one that we experience and name. This is because when we give reasons, we speak before knowing, in order to make something exist.Thus we argue, against Kim, that it is possible to be a monist, to defend the importance of rational explanations, and to deny the possibility of reducing reasons to causes. Indeed, the knowledge necessary to do so would be far beyond the knowledge we require to speak the language of reasons.This conception of reasons as things that we seek rather than thing that we experience has important consequences in ethics. Namely, that the evaluation of reasons or intentions only makes sense when one attempts to act appropriately; it is irrelevant in defining past actions. This means that the very idea of merit is problematic, and that morality itself is something we must constantly work to make possible

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Delic, Nebojsa. "Jaegwon Kim on mental causation." 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1993/15802.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Jaegwon"

1

Feldmann, Christian. Triers heimlicher Heiliger: Hieronymus Jaegen, Bankier, Parlamentarier und Mystiker. Trier: Paulinus, 1996.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Jaegen, Hieronymus. Der Kampf um das höchste Gut: Anleitung zur christlichen Vollkommenheit inmitten der Welt von Hieronymus Jaegen, mit dem Text der vierten Auflage (1908). Trier: Paulinus, 2005.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Sosa, David, Terence Horgan, and Marcelo Sabates. Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim. University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations, 2016.

Find full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Pettit, Philip. The Program Model, Difference-makers, and the Exclusion Problem. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0012.

Full text

Abstract:

How do the notions of programming and difference-making relate to one another? A higher-level property programs for an effect just in case, intuitively, the actual realizer of the property at any lower level gives rise to a realizer of the effect and any possible realizer at that level would also have done this. A higher-level property makes a difference to the effect just in case its presence programs for the effect and, in addition, its absence programs for the absence of the effect. Christian List and Peter Menzies argue for the capacity of the difference-making model to explain away the exclusion problem raised for physicalists by Jaegwon Kim. But the program model, developed in earlier work by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, offers a simpler and more straightforward way of handling the challenge.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Jaegwon"

1

Cavanna, Andrea Eugenio, and Andrea Nani. "Jaegwon Kim." In Consciousness, 43–47. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44088-9_8.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

"Portrait: Jaegwon Kim." In American Philosophical Association Centennial Series, 636. Philosophy Documentation Center, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/apapa2013186.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Hull, Richard T. "Biography: Jaegwon Kim." In American Philosophical Association Centennial Series, 637–40. Philosophy Documentation Center, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/apapa2013187.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Kim, Jaegwon. "Making Sense of Emergence Jaegwon Kim." In Emergence, 127–50. The MIT Press, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262026215.003.0009.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

"Jaegwon Kim, “Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism”*." In Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings, 77–90. Routledge, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203987698-12.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

"Jaegwon Kim, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”*." In Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings, 171–96. Routledge, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203987698-22.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Campbel, Neil. "Reviving Psychophysical Supervenience." In The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 63–67. Philosophy Documentation Center, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/wcp20-paideia199835581.

Full text

Abstract:

Many philosophers has lost their enthusiasm for the concept of supervenience in the philosophy of mind. This is largely due to the fact that, as Jaegwon Kim has shown, familiar versions of supervenience describe relations of mere property covariation without capturing the idea of dependence. Since the dependence of the mental on the physical is a necessary requirement for even the weakest version of physicalism, it would seem that existing forms of supervenience cannot achieve that for which they were designed. My aim is to revive the concept of supervenience. I argue that if we construe supervenience along Davidsonian lines — as a relation connecting predicates rather than properties — then it avoids the shortcomings of the more familiar varieties.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Corry, Richard. "Emergence and the Failure of Reduction." In Power and Influence, 186–215. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840718.003.0010.

Full text

Abstract:

This chapter explores the different ways in which the reductive method of explanation might fail, and asks what such failures might tell us about the world. In particular, the chapter investigates possible situations in which one or more of the assumptions identified in previous chapters fails. It is argued that the failure of one of these assumptions will give rise to something that is recognizable in the traditional notion of ‘ontological’ or ‘strong’ emergence. This understanding is then used to defend the conceptual possibility of such ontological emergence against the influential arguments of Jaegwon Kim. It is further argued that the failure of a different assumption gives rise to a relatively unrecognized form of ontological emergence related to the way that causal influences combine. Thus, an understanding of the reductive method gives us a way to grasp the notoriously slippery metaphysical concept of emergence.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Kistler, Maximilian. "Chapitre 21. Jaegwon Kim et le renouveau du problème du rapport entre corps et esprit." In Matériaux philosophiques et scientifiques pour un matérialisme contemporain. Volume 2, 726. Editions Matériologiques, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/edmat.silber.2013.02.0726.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

"Chapter 2: Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years (A Reply to Jaegwon Kim's "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction")." In In Critical Condition. The MIT Press, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3696.003.0004.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!