Journal articles on the topic 'Jamaat-e-Islami'

Since the turn of the 20th century, a broad range of Islamic revivalist movements have sprung up in Muslim societies around the globe, especially where Muslims have formerly experienced, primarily through European colonisation, a gradual decline in key Islamic institutions and threats to their identity. Islamic revivalist movements have consequently emerged to inculcate religious principles en masse in the Muslim World through institutional developments, socio-political activities, missionary preaching, and propagation. Movements such as Ilyas’s Tabligh Jama’at and Maududi’s Jama’at-e-Islami are at the forefront of this enterprise and have both demonstrated their potential for bringing about important spiritual and social changes, particularly in Muslim-majority societies. Having been initiated in the Indian subcontinent, both movements currently have global and transnational influence. These two movements, however, have some fundamental differences with regard to their attitude towards polity and social development. In this paper, we compare and contrast the major characteristics of the two movements. A comparative appraisal of these two significant revivalist movements is expected to contribute to an understanding of the socio-religious discourse surrounding the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. With this comparison, we argue that the differences in their methods are complementary rather than antagonistic, and generally pursue a similar greater goal: reviving Islam and returning society to a stable and harmonious state.

The Islamic missionary movement Dawat-e Islami is headed by the Memon business man and Barelwi scholar Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri Attar and aims to confront the Deobandi-affiliated Tablighi Jamaat in spreading Sunnah, the lifestyle of the Prophet and the Salaf. Since 2008 Dawat-e Islami has used its own TV station—the Madani channel—to advertise Sunnah-centric Sufism and popular piety through Sunnaization: the Islamization of clothing style, speech and behaviour. Fostering lay leadership and missionary journeys, the brotherhood reinforces a more general trend of making Islamic lifestyles market-worthy, i.e. capable of catching attention and attracting demand, thereby standardizing Sunnah, individualizing Islamic mission, and branding Barelwiyat. Its strategies of mobilization are thus described by applying the metaphors of religious economics.

AbstractIslamists' ideas about the position of women are readily invoked to portray them as ‘anti-modern’. The operating assumption is that Islamism (mutatis mutandis Islam) sanctions gender hierarchy. In this paper, drawing on ethnographic research and written sources of the Jamaat-e-Islami of India, founded in 1941, I question such assumptions. While defending Islam against the ‘epidemic’ of westernization, Maududi (b. 1903), the Jamaat's founder, called women ‘the mightiest fortress of Islamic culture’. Invoking the Quran and Prophetic traditions, he argued that women should not step outside of the home, and must veil themselves from head to toe. He stood against any political role for women. For decades, Maududi's interpretation went uncontested. However, from the 1970s onwards many members of the Jamaat began to critique Maududi and offered an alternative reading of Islam. They argued that women could indeed leave the home, assume key economic and political roles, unveil their faces, as well as act in films. By highlighting such voices and analysing the sociological coordinates of the contestations within the Jamaat, I underscore the transformation in the Jamaat's discourse. I conclude by discussing whether the critiques of Maududi by his own followers inaugurate an alternative discourse of Islamic feminism.

In Pakistan, as in many other societies, politico-religious movements or so-called Islamist fundamentalist movements are becoming an important site for women's activism as well as the harnessing of such activism to promote agendas that seem to undermine women's autonomy. This has become a concern for a growing feminist literature which from a variety of political and theoretical positions seeks to understand and explain the subject-position of Muslim women as politico-religious activists. This paper attempts a deconstructive reading of texts by leading Pakistani feminist scholars as they attempt the difficult process of steering between fundamentalism and Orientalism in their accounts of ‘fundamentalist’ women in the political ideological space of Pakistan.

The dominant debate on Islam and democracy continues to operate in the realm of normativity. This article engages with key literature showing limits of such a line of inquiry. Through the case study of India’s Islamist organization, Jamaat-e-Islami, I aim at shifting the debate from textual normativity to demotic praxis. I demonstrate how Islam and democracy work in practice, and in so doing offer a fresh perspective to enhance our understandings of both Islam and democracy. A key proposition of this article is that rather than discussing the cliché if Islam is compatible with democracy, or Islam should be democratized, we study the ‘hows’ of de-democratization in Muslim societies.

Abstract Claiming and representing “True” Islam has been a major preoccupation among the Muslim groups in Kerala in recent times. In a way, this has augmented the Muslim public sphere in which active debates happen, and also breaks with the general understanding of Islam as monolithic in its ideology and practice. This paper attempts to bring precisely this dynamics of Muslim public sphere in Malabar where prominent groups like the Sunni, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen debate constantly over the representation and following of what is called “True Islam.” The claim towards a true Islam is done by each of the groups by claiming authenticity over what they preach and practice. This paper highlights these debates in the context of the academic debates over “True” and “Authenticated” Islam.

This article aims to examine the legacy and policy of AK Party in Turkey, Ennahda’s political movement in Tunisia, and Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) in Bangladesh, which is ostensibly identified with Islamic political ideology and acquainted with the world as a ‘moderate-conservative political Islam party.’ The study interrogates the nature, processes, and the characteristic features of the three countries’ administrative system, comparatively from three regions of the world, particularly from the Middle East and Europe region, Africa and Arab region, and the South Asian region. This study also highlights these political parties’ history, political ideology differences, and their practices reflective of democratic principles from a theoretical perspective on politics, policy, and philosophy. It also acknowledges whether the political development of Turkey from 2002 onward is feasible for Bangladeshi and Tunisian Islamic political parties to accept as a role model in their political arena.

AbstractThis paper will build on my ethnographic engagement with the Jamaat-e-Islami to explore aspects of a shift in Islamist practice and imagination from the ‘state’ as the inspiration for projects and movements to the ‘market’. In doing so I hope to investigate not just what this might tell us about Islamism in Pakistan, but also about the ability of the state to manage religion more generally. My aim is three-fold: first, to record the particular modalities of changes within Islamism in Pakistan; second, to show that these shifts betray a closer alignment between the global political imagination and Islamism than has previously been acknowledged; and third, in discussing these issues, to explore the implications of the idea of market as an important contender to the dominance of the idea of the state in political mobilizations. While recent discussions about secularism, following Talal Asad,1have tended to focus on the disciplinary force exerted by the state, this paper suggests that the market has emerged as a potentially more significant, though under-recognized, disciplinary force.

There is a problem of persistence of anti-Sufi image of Syed Abū al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī owing its genesis partly to tangential engagement with key doctrinal issues of Sufism and certain ambivalence regarding it in him and, more significantly, due to Mawdūdī’ scholarship’s atomistic reading of his key statements. For addressing this key problem, this paper critiques atomistic reading and explores certain background methodological issues and reflections on definitions of Sufism besides key points in his life and work. Our analysis of his work shows he entered into a dialogue with Sufism, acknowledged his debt to it, and we better approach him a contributor to the debate on Sufism and not its simplistic denier/outsider. Evidences include, among others, his moral mysticism, his respect for major Sufi Masters and celebration of his Sufi ancestry, his attempt to visit Sufi Masters, his early poetry in Sufi vein, his involvement with (and influence from) the al-Asfār al-Arba‘a of Mulla Sadra, and his reworking/appropriation of certain key Sufi themes and Sufi organizational structure in the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Religio-Political parties are an integral part of the politics of Pakistan. Theyhave played a vital role in political mobilization, be it inside or outside theparliament, both during civilian and military rule. The military rulers of thecountry have never transferred power to the civilians, until a struggle fordemocracy has been made. That has led to compromise of transition frommilitary to civilian governments. It mainly focuses on the role of Jamiat-iUlema-i-Islam- (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan in the revival of people’spower in the country. It also aims to see how religio-political parties work todevelop pressure on the rulers for democratic transition in Pakistan. Despitediverse sectarian and political backgrounds, how the leadership of religiopolitical parties brought political parties on one junction against dictatorship.Furthermore study explains that how religio-political parties eitherencouraged or discouraged the aspect of dynastic politics in Pakistan.Building and analyzing this argument in the dynamics of structuralfunctionalism and role theory, the organizational structure of religio-politicalparties is studied and evaluated to see connection in the role of JUI and JIPtowards democratic transition.

Pakistan's confessional parties are re-inventing themselves. The Parties that are carrying a legacy from the time before partition are struggling to keep themselves relevant in mainstream political discourse. Pakistan's political landscape is changing because of the rise of Tehreek-i-Insaf, a progressive center-right political party that has altered the electioneering environment in Pakistan. Two main confessional parties Jamaat Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulma e Islam Fazal Ur Rehman (JUI-F) are trying to develop an inclusive and pluralist political agenda. JI is a hierarchical Islamic party whereas JUI-F is a network Islamic party. Political Islam is in the process of shrinking in Pakistan because of the rise of political alternatives and outdatedness of the political and electoral discourse of confessional parties. Political Islam in Pakistan is changing by improving its ideological, political, and organizational structure in relation to its contemporary rivals. Changes in political Islam are not because of intellectual diversity and growth within confessional parties but to manage and compete for the rise of competing domestic political perspectives. Transnational connections with like-minded Islamist groups have scaled-down as the like-minded religio-ideological partners are termed as extremists and terrorists.

Despite its global recognition as a moderate Muslim country, Bangladesh has been experiencing increasing bouts of religious fundamentalism and militant activities since 2005. This phenomenon is not altogether novel to the country. During the Liberation War of 1971, Bengali freedom fighters faced staunch opposition from the Pakistani armed forces as well as Islamist militias under the control of Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist political party. Even after attaining its independence, Bangladesh has struggled to uphold the pillars of democracy and secularism due to political, social and religious drivers. Between January 2005 and June 2015, nearly 600 people have died in Islamic terrorist attacks in the country. These militant outfits either have close ties to or are part of Al Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State (ISIS). Despite such troubling signs and the fact that it is the fourth largest Muslim majority country in the world, Bangladesh has generally received little attention from academics of security studies. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the drivers and trends of Sunni Salafi jihadist groups operating in Bangladesh to ascertain the implications for counterterrorism activities. Political, social and religious interventions that go beyond the hard approach must be undertaken to control the mounting threat of Islamist terrorism to the security and stability of the nation.

<p>This article explores the Islamic home-film movement in Kerala, India, a video film movement by amateur filmmakers of the Muslim Community. These films circulate in VCD and DVD format in retail outlets in both Kerala and the Gulf Council Countries (GCC). These films are important for their supporting group, Jamaat-e-islami, one of the most powerful Islamist groups in the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, as they try to gain hegemony among Kerala’s Sunni Muslims through an alternative Islamic public culture. Home-films now circulate beyond their original audience of Muslim women in Kerala, among Keralite migrants in the Arab Gulf, who organize public screenings in social gatherings and labour camps. Indeed, the large-scale migration of labor to the GCC has led to a re-imagination of the moral geography of Kerala Muslim households to account for changing gender norms and family structures. The films, concerned with social reform among the Muslim Community of Kerala, also refract the experience of migration to the GCC, particularly in narrating an emotional landscape characterized by precarious conditions of labour, racialised hierarchy and the kafala (the specific employment system in many GCCs, that is a combination of a contract and patronage) through specific tropes of precarity and philosophy of risk in these films.</p>

Abstract Ahlul Quran movements introduced the debates on the question of the authority of tradition as the second source of Islamic knowledge and critiqued the existing notions of Islam among the Malabar Muslims in Kerala. These intra-Islamic factions attempted to reinterpret Islam according to their interpretations solely based on the Quran and developed their take on what constitutes 'authentic Islam'. This article uses Ahlul Quran as a generic term for the two main Ahlul Quran movements that developed in the Malabar Coast during the early and late half of the twentieth century. These two movements were the Ahlul Quran movement of Pazhayangadi by B. Kunjahamed Haji and Khuran Sunnath Society of Abul Hasan (popularly known as Chekanur Moulavi). They initiated numerous oral debates and discussions with various Islamic groups existing in the Malabar region such as Sunnis, Mujahids, Ahmediyyas and Jamaat-e-Islami, challenging and contesting different notions of 'authentic Islam'. Along with oral debates, it also gave birth to textual contestations, with voluminous books, articles and pamphlets challenging each other. This article traces the intra-religious debates that developed among the Malabar Muslims after the emergence of Ahlul Quran thoughts. It analyses how the existing Islamic groups upholding different versions of 'authentic Islam' in the Malabar region, located in the northern part of Kerala, South India, challenged the growth of these Ahlul Quran movements. In short, during the numerous debates and contestations that happened between the Islamic groups within the Malabar region the article explores how these debates are a constant performance of Islam and its tradition.

Though Pakistani politics is heavily influenced by religion assumed to be the reason d'etat of the creation of Pakistan, prior to 2002, religious, political parties had never achieved effective electoral results. The October 2002 elections for the National and Provincial Assemblies were a turning point for the religious, political parties in the history of Pakistan. It was the first time that a conglomeration of six religious, political parties, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-iPakistan (JUP-N), Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadith (JAH-S), the Jamiat-Ulema-iIslam (JUI-F), Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-S), and the Tehrik-i-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) swept the polls under the umbrella of the Muttahida Majlise-Amal (MMA) (United Council for Action) due to the active support of the Army and America. The alliance emerged as the third-largest political force in the country, with 45 out of the 272 National Assembly general seats. Moreover, the MMA got an overwhelming mandate in the KhyberPakhtunkhwa (KP) and Baluchistan, allowing it to form a government in the KP and became a coalition partner in Baluchistan. The present study is an attempt to answer the question, "what were the causative factors of MMA's emergence and whether it achieved what it promised during the election campaign?".

Christianity was the religion of spirit (and freedom), and critiqued Islam as a religion of flesh (and slavery); later, Christianity was the religion of reason, and critiqued Islam as the religion of fideism; later still, Christianity was the religion of the critique of religion, and critiqued Islam as the most atavistic of religions. Even now, when the West has critiqued its own Chris- tianity enough to be properly secular (because free, rational, and critical), it continues to critique Islam for being not secular enough. In contrast to Christianity or post-Christian secularism, then, and despite their best ef- forts, Islam does not know (has not learned from) critique. This sentiment is articulated at multiple registers, academic and popular and governmen- tal: Muslims are fanatical about their repressive law; they interpret things too literally; Muslims do not read their own revelation critically, let alone literature or cartoons; their sartorial practices are unreasonable; the gates of ijtihād closed in 900CE; Ghazali killed free inquiry in Islam… Such claims are ubiquitous enough to be unremarkable, and have political traction among liberals and conservatives alike. “The equation of Islam with the ab- sence of critique has a longer genealogy in Western thought,” Irfan Ahmad writes in this book, “which runs almost concurrently with Europe’s colonial expansion” (8). Luther and Renan figure in that history, as more recently do Huntington and Gellner and Rushdie and Manji.Meanwhile in the last decade an interdisciplinary conversation about the stakes, limits, complicities, and possibilities of critique has developed in the anglophone academy, a conversation of which touchstones include the polemical exchange between Saba Mahmood and Stathis Gourgouris (2008); the co-authored volume Is Critique Secular? (2009), by Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Mahmood; journal special issues dedi- cated to the question (e.g. boundary 2 40, no. 1 [2013]); and Gourgouris’s Lessons in Secular Criticism (2013), among others. At the same time, the discipline of religious studies remains trapped in an argument over the lim- its of normative analysis and the possibility of critical knowledge.Religion as Critique: Islamic Critical Thinking from Mecca to the Mar- ketplace seeks to turn these debates on their head. Is critique secular? Decidedly not—but understanding why that is, for Ahmad, requires revising our understanding of critique itself. Instead of the object of critique, reli- gion here emerges as an agent of critique. By this account, God himself is the source of critique, and the prophets and their heirs are “critics par ex- cellence” (xiv). The book is divided into two parts bookended by a prologue and epilogue. “Formulation” comprises three chapters levying the shape of the argument. “Illustration” comprises three chapters taking up the case study of the South Asian reformer Abul-A‘la Maududi and his critics (es- pecially regarding his views on the state and on women) as well as a fourth chapter that seeks to locate critique in the space of the everyday. There are four theses to Ahmad’s argument, none of them radically original on their own but newly assembled. As spelled out in the first chap- ter (“Introduction”), the first thesis holds that the Enlightenment reconfig- uration of Christianity was in fact an ethnic project by which “Europe/the West constituted its identity in the name of reason and universalism against a series of others,” among them Islam (14). The second thesis is that no crit- ic judges by reason alone. Rather, critique is always situated, directed, and formed: it requires presuppositions and a given mode to be effective (17). The third thesis is that the Islamic tradition of critique stipulates the com- plementarity of intellect (‘aql, dimāgh) and heart (qalb, dil); this is a holistic anthropology, not a dualistic one. The fourth thesis is that critique should not be understood as the exclusive purview of intellectuals (especially when arguing about literature) or as simply a theoretical exercise. Instead, cri- tique should be approached as part of life, practiced by the literate and the illiterate alike (18).The second chapter, “Critique: Western and/or Islamic,” focuses on the first of these theses. The Enlightenment immunized the West from critique while subjecting the Rest to critique. An “anthropology of philosophy” approach can treat Kant’s transcendental idealism as a social practice and in doing so discover that philosophy is “not entirely independent” from ethnicity (37). The certainty offered by the Enlightenment project can thus be read as “a project of security with boundaries.” Ahmad briefly consid- ers the place of Islam across certain of Kant’s writings and the work of the French philosophes; he reads their efforts to “secure knowledge of humani- ty” to foreclose the possibility of “knowledge from humanity” (42), namely Europe’s others. Meanwhile, ethnographic approaches to Muslim debates shy away from according them the status of critique, but in so doing they only maintain the opposition between Western reason and Islamic unrea- son. In contrast to this view (from Kant through Foucault), Ahmad would rather locate the point of critical rupture with the past in the axial age (800-200BCE), which would include the line of prophets who reformed (critiqued) their societies for having fallen into corruption and paganism. This alternative account demonstrates that “critical inquiry presupposes a tradition,” that is, that effective critique is always immanent (58). The third chapter, “The Modes: Another Genealogy of Critique,” con- tests the reigning historiography of “critique” (tanqīd/naqd) in South Asia that restricts it to secular literary criticism. Critique (like philosophy and democracy) was not simply founded in Grecian antiquity and inherited by Europe: Ahmad “liberates” critique from its Western pedigree and so allows for his alternative genealogy, as constructed for instance through readings of Ghalib. The remainder of the chapter draws on the work of Maududi and his critics to present the mission of the prophets as critiquing to reform (iṣlāḥ) their societies. This mandate remains effective today, and Maududi and his critics articulate a typology of acceptable (tanqīd) and unacceptable (ta‘īb, tanqīṣ, tazhīk, takfīr, etc.) critiques in which the style of critique must be considered alongside its object and telos. Religion as Critique oscillates between sweeping literature reviews and close readings. Readers may find the former dizzying, especially when they lose in depth what they gain in breadth (for example, ten pages at hand from chapter 2 cite 44 different authors, some of whom are summarizing or contesting the work of a dozen other figures named but not cited di- rectly). Likewise there are moments when Ahmad’s own dogged critiques may read as tendentious. The political purchase of this book should not be understated, though the fact that Muslims criticize themselves and others should come as no surprise. Yet it is chapters 4–6 (on Maududi and his critics) which substantiate the analytic ambition of the book. They are the most developed chapters of the book and detail a set of emerging debates with a fine-grained approach sometimes found wanting elsewhere (espe- cially in the final chapter). They show how Islam as a discursive tradition is constituted through critique, and perhaps always has been: for against the disciplinary proclivities of anthropologists (who tend to emphasize discon- tinuity and rupture, allowing them to discover the modern invention of traditions), Ahmad insists on an epistemic connection among precolonial and postcolonial Islam. This connection is evident in how the theme of rupture/continuity is itself a historical topos of “Islamic critical thinking.” Chapter 4 (“The Message: A Critical Enterprise”) approaches Maududi (d. 1979) as a substantial political thinker, not simply the fundamentalist ideologue he is often considered to be. Reading across Maududi’s oeuvre, Ahmad gleans a political-economic critique of colonial-capitalist exploita- tion (95), a keen awareness of the limits of majoritarian democracy, and a warning about the dispossessive effects of minoritization. Maududi’s Isla- mism (“theodemocracy”), then, has to be understood within his broader project of the revival of religion to which tanqīd (“critique”), tajdīd (“re- newal”), and ijtihād (“understanding Islam’s universal principles to de- termine change”) were central (103). He found partial historical models for such renewal in ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad Sirhindi, and Shah Wali Ullah. A key element of this critique is that it does not aim to usher in a different future. Instead it inhabits a more complicated temporality: it clarifies what is already the case, as rooted in the primordial nature of humans (fiṭra), and in so doing aligns the human with the order of creation. This project entails the critique and rejection of false gods, in- cluding communism, fascism, national socialism, and capitalism (117). Chapter 5 (“The State: (In)dispensible, Desirable, Revisable?”) weaves together ethnographic and textual accounts of Maududi’s critics and de- fenders on the question of the state (the famous argument for “divine sov- ereignty”). In doing so the chapter demonstrates how the work of critique is undertaken in this Islamic tradition, where, Ahmad writes, “critique is connected to a form of life the full meaning of which is inseparable from death” (122). (This also means that at stake in critique is also the style and principles of critique.) The critics surveyed in this chapter include Manzur Nomani, Vahiduddin Khan, Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi, Amir Usmani, Sadrud- din Islahi, Akram Zurti, Rahmat Bedar, Naqi Rahman, Ijaz Akbar, and others, figures of varying renown but all of whom closely engaged, defend- ed, and contested Maududi’s work and legacy in the state politics of his Jamaat-e Islami. Chapter 6 (“The Difference: Women and In/equality”) shows how Maududi’s followers critique the “neopatriarchate” he proposes. Through such critique, Ahmad also seeks to affirm the legitimacy of a “nonpatri- archal reading of Islam” (156). If Maududi himself regarded the ḥarem as “the mightiest fortress of Islamic culture” (159)—a position which Ahmad notes is “enmeshed in the logic of colonial hegemony”—he also desired that women “form their own associations and unbiasedly critique the govern- ment” (163). Maududi’s work and legacy is thus both “disabling” and “en- abling” for women at the same time, as is borne out by tracing the critiques it subsequently faced (including by those sympathetic to his broader proj- ect). The (male) critics surveyed here include Akram Zurti, Sultan Ahmad Islahi, Abdurrahman Alkaf, and Mohammad Akram Nadwi, who seriously engaged the Quran and hadith to question Maududi’s “neopatriarchate.” They critiqued his views (e.g. that women were naturally inferior to men, or that they were unfit for political office) through alternative readings of Islamic history and theology. Chapter 7 (“The Mundane: Critique as Social-Cultural Practice”) seeks to locate critique at “the center of life for everyone, including ordinary sub- jects with no educational degrees” (179). Ahmad writes at length about Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (d. 1988), the anticolonial activist who led a massive movement against colonial domination, and whose following faced British brutality with nonviolence. The Khudai Khidmatgār movement he built was “a movement of critique” (195), Ahmad writes, composed of or- dinary men and women, peasants and the unlettered. The brief remainder of the chapter suggests that the proverbs which punctuate everyday life (for example, in the trope of the greedy mullah) also act as critiques. By the end of Religion as Critique it is difficult not to see critique na- scent in every declaration or action. This deflates the analytic power of the term—but perhaps that is one unstated aim of the project, to reveal critique as simply a part of life. Certainly the book displaces the exceptional West- ern claim to critique. Yet this trope of exposure—anthropology as cultural critique, the ethnographer’s gaze turned inward—also raises questions of its own. In this case, the paradigmatic account of critique (Western, sec- ular) has been exposed as actually being provincial. But the means of this exposure have not come from the alternative tradition of critique Ahmad elaborates. That is, Ahmad is not himself articulating an Islamic critique of Western critique. (Maududi serves as an “illustration” of Ahmad’s ar- gument; Maududi does not provide the argument itself.) In the first chap- ters (“Formulation”) he cites a wide literature that practices historicism, genealogy, archeology, and deconstruction in order to temper the universal claims of Western supremacists. The status of these latter critical practices however is not explored, as to whether they are in themselves sufficient to provincialize or at least de-weaponize Western critique. Put more directly: is there is a third language (of political anthropology, for example) by which Ahmad analytically mediates the encounter between rival traditions of cri- tique? And if there is such a language, and if it is historically, structurally, and institutionally related to one of the critical traditions it is mediating, then what is the status of the non-Western “illustration”? The aim of this revision of critique, Ahmad writes, is “genuinely dem- ocratic dialogue with different traditions” (xii). As much is signalled in its citational practices, which (for example) reference Talal Asad and Viveiros de Castro together in calling for “robust comparison” (14) between West- ern and Islamic notions of critique, and reference Maududi and Koselleck together in interpreting critique to be about judgment (203). No matter that Asad and de Castro or Maududi and Koselleck mean different things when using the same words; these citations express Ahmad’s commitment to a dialogic (rather than dialectical) mode in engaging differences. Yet because Ahmad does not himself explore what is variously entailed by “comparison” or “judgment” in these moments, such citations remain as- sertions gesturing to a dialogue to come. In this sense Religion as Critique is a thoroughly optimistic book. Whether such optimism is warranted might call for a third part to follow “Formulation” and “Illustration”: “Reckoning.” Basit Kareem IqbalPhD candidate, Department of Anthropologyand Program in Critical TheoryUniversity of California, Berkeley

Time and Fantasy in Narratives of Jihad: The Case of the Islami Jamiat-I-Tuleba in KarachiThis article proposes an analytical framework for thinking about violence in the Islami Jamiat-i-Tuleba (IJT), the student organization of Jamaat e Islami (JI), Pakistan's longstanding Islamist party. It prioritises the intersection of the psychic and the social, and the role of politics, history and biography in mediating the modalities, narration and praxis of violence in the city of Karachi. The dominant explanations tend to emphasise political instrumentalism, and structural and ideological factors, and to "Islamicise" the violence, collapsing Islamic rhetoric into an extemporization of conditions, ignoring the deep affective appeal of violence to individuals, and leaving unelaborated the role of intersecting national, local and individual contexts and temporalities in structuring political subjectivity and violent action.

The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) is the largest Islamist Party in Bangladesh. It was founded in 1941 in British-India, by Maulana Mawdudi, a prominent South Asian Islamist leader. The BJI has undergone political vicissitudes during its eight-decade-long political history. The most notable political success of the Party was to have a couple of cabinet positions as a coalition partner in the Nationalist–Islamist Government between 2001 and 2006. Since the beginning of the 2010s, the Party has been in severe crisis: most of its national leaders were convicted of war crimes and put to death in the period 2011–2016. This article aims to examine the BJI’s growth and development and role in political Islam in Bangladesh. It also explores the challenges to, and responses of, the Party and their sociopolitical implications for the future of political Islam in Bangladesh. The methodology of the article is a critical analysis based on an exhaustive review of published secondary literature about the Party. The author argues that the BJI has generated a massive Islamic movement and made an enormous contribution to political Islam in Bangladesh. Yet it has failed to reform its almost-century-old organizational structure and modus operandi and effectively respond to the changed social and political contexts of Bangladesh, which has affected its organizational mobility and success.

AbstractThe transatlantic field of global media ethics is premised on a search for the conceptual foundations of plurality. This article is a critique of this very endeavor. I offer this critique through works authored by moral anthropologists of Islam and through a close reading of the Urdu text Cyberistan: Muslim Naujavan Aur Social Media (Cyberistan: Muslim Youth and Social Media) authored by Sadatullah Husaini, the current president of the Indian reformist Islamic organization Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. My article is a post-foundational critique of the implicit foundationalism through which “Islam” and “plurality” are related to each other within inquiries into the ethics of digital communication. I take on digital communication because of its increasingly global and synchronic nature that rendered questions concerning plurality in media ethics particularly urgent. I argue that even though it is important to ask what difference means conceptually for a global media ethics today, it can only make space for radical plurality via the negative, by way of its contradictions and structural constraints. If a global media ethics is supposed to be based on openness and plurality, it can be so only by limiting and weakening its own ontological claims – beyond positive metaphysical groundings, cultures, civilizations, Islam, etc. In other words, it requires a reflexivity to its own position as an academic discipline that produces knowledge under certain historical conditions and an understanding of its own political practice.