Academic literature on the topic 'James, William, 1842-1910 – Contributions in psychology'

William James was an original thinker in and between the disciplines of physiology, psychology and philosophy. His twelve-hundred page masterwork, The Principles of Psychology (1890), is a rich blend of physiology, psychology, philosophy, and personal reflection that has given us such ideas as “the stream of thought” and the baby’s impression of the world “as one great blooming, buzzing confusion” (PP 462). It contains seeds of pragmatism and phenomenology, and influenced generations of thinkers in Europe and America, including Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. James studied at Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School and the School of Medicine, but his writings were from the outset as much philosophical as scientific. “Some Remarks on Spencer’s Notion of Mind as Correspondence” (1878) and “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879, 1882) presage his future pragmatism and pluralism, and contain the first statements of his view that philosophical theories are reflections of a philosopher’s temperament.

Affect then and now: The heritage of Herder, Schleiermacher and William James. The heritage of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744�1803), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768�1834) and William James (1842�1910) is of significance for practical theology. In present-day pastoral care, affect, emotion, feeling and experience are explored by means of, amongst others, narrative theories. In his aesthetics, Herder linked music and literature. Schleiermacher, in his aesthetics, linked his theology of feeling with biography as narrative. Narrativity is central to present-day are theories and praxis in pastoral care. The variety of forms of affect, namely emotion, experience, feeling and mood, has been explored by present-day psychology and psychiatry. These insights can enrich narrative pastoral theories and praxis.

Realizou-se um estudo comparativo entre os conceitos de eu tal como formulados pelos psicólogos William James (1842-1910) e B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). No caso de James, a fonte foi o capítulo “The consciousness of self” de sua obra The principles of psychology, a partir do qual se relataram os constituintes do eu empírico, a reflexão do autor sobre o ego puro e a descrição dos sentimentos, emoções e ações do eu. No caso de Skinner, as fontes foram a seção “The individual as a whole”, da obra Science and human behavior, e o capítulo “Thinking”, da obra Verbal behavior, além de alguns outros artigos. Traduziu-se o conceito de eu de James em referência a contingências de reforço: o eu material em termos de filogênese e ontogênese, o eu social em termos de controle de estímulo, o eu espiritual como repertório modelado pela comunidade verbal e o ego puro no contexto dos três níveis de seleção do comportamento humano. Palavras-chave: eu, William James, B. F. Skinner, behaviorismo radical, fluxo de pensamento.

(Uncorrected OCR) Abstract of thesis entitled 'William James' Psychological Philosophy' submitted by Kwok Hang Wah Yvonne for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong in November 2002 The aim of this thesis is to suggest a way to better understand William James' philosophy by recognising its relation with his evolutionary psychology. In order to clarify James' version of 'evolutionary psychology', I will present it in contrast to Herbert Spencer's biological psychology. In Chapter Two, I will discuss how Spencer establishes his development hypothesis and how he understands the mind as a biological product being modified by environmental changes. In Chapter Three, I will interpret James' argument against Spencer's ideas that the mind operates passively, and that Spencer has overlooked the subjective factors in mental development. Through the discussion, we can understand the main difference between James' and Spencer's evolutionary psychologies. The fourth chapter will focus on James' psychology of the active mind. I will offer a more detailed explanatory account of James' views of three important mental functions, namely 'discrimination', 'association' and 'conception', as well as how they operate to construct experiences. In the last chapter, I will interpret one of the topics in James' philosophical discussions, so as to illustrate his psychological view in his philosophy. The discussion will show James' views of the different i roles of perception and conception in life, and his evolutionary concern of the functional use of concepts for experience. I will then explain how these views are related to James' argument against rationalism and his position in his radical empiricism. Through these discussions, I hope to shed light on the connection between James' evolutionary psychology and his philosophical ideas, which ultimately offers a better understanding to James' philosophy. ii
abstract
toc
Philosophy
Master
Master of Philosophy

My study concerns the works of William James (1842--1910) and the Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu (circa fifth c.). In both cases there is a detailed examination of consciousness which looks at its physiological concomitants. Where James is concerned, this physiological study is found mainly within his Principles of Psychology (1890). In Vasubandhu's case the physiological preconditions of conscious life is inherited from traditional Buddhist psychology (skandhas), but are expanded into the Yogacara concept of the alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness). This novel form of consciousness has been interpreted as both a soul theory in Buddhism, and a form of metaphysical idealism. It is these elements that I juxtapose with similar notions found in Jamesian studies (self and idealism). Thus, Chapter One examines consciousness from the isolated perspective of each thinker, Chapter Two moves to an examination of self, and Chapter Three looks at the possibility of Idealism which is explicitly rejected by James, and is rejected also by many interpreters of the alaya-vijnana.

Cette thèse aborde la question de la continuité de la conscience chez William James, en vue de ses possibles actualisations. En particulier, la tentative est de délimiter, de façon critique, les réflexions et les influences principales qui caractérisent le discours de James. Dans le sillage de la théorie de l'évolution de Darwin, les réflexions de James émergèrent dans le champ de la psychologie physiologique de la fin du 19ème siècle, où il développa de plus en plus intensément l'exigence d'une épistémologie renouvelée et d'un nouveau cadre métaphysique pour comprendre les théories et les découvertes scientifiques les plus intéressantes sur l'esprit humain. L'analyse du thème de la continuité permet de saisir, tant d'un point de vue historique que théorique, l'importance du passage graduel de James des observations de la psychologie expérimentale sur la continuité de la pensée vers une perspective ontologique selon laquelle la continuité constitue une caractéristique de la réalité. En outre, une telle analyse permet de clarifier la position de James par rapport à son contexte historique, et en même temps, de mettre en évidence les résultats les plus originaux de son travail.L'aspect de la continuité, bien que reconnu par les critiques de James, n'a jamais été proprement analysé jusqu'à présent. Cela est dû, d'une part, à la grande attention que les commentateurs ont communément prêté à la dimension individuelle chez James, et donc, à l'aspect tychistique et variant de la réalité ; d'autre part, il est important de garder à l'esprit que le principal courant interprétatif a réduit la confrontation entre James et Charles S. Peirce à une polarisation paradigmatique, où James était considéré comme un philosophe nominaliste et individualiste, alors que Peirce était étiqueté comme le réaliste à la recherche d'un continuum mathématique qui soit compatible avec sa théorie de la sémiose infinie.Toutefois, James fut immédiatement intrigué par la contradictoire unité synthétique des états mentaux, qu'il avait pu dériver de sa description de la continuité des états de conscience, où ceux-là préservaient à la fois une réelle continuité et une réelle divisibilité. Le vague aspect de l'expérience n'était pas pleinement reproductible en termes conceptuels, et en termes logiques il constituait une contradiction. L'élaboration d'une telle problématique de la part de James doit être considérée au sein du changement de paradigme de l'époque qui eut lieu dans la première moitié du 20ème siècle. Un tel changement influença l'élaboration de James, particulièrement à travers les progrès théoriques et méthodologiques réalisés dans le champ de la physiologie et de la biologie du 19ème siècle
This thesis addresses the issue of the continuity of consciousness in William James, considering also its possible actualization. In particular, this work aims at outlining critically the various theoretical perspectives that influenced James’s philosophical discourse. On the wave of the Darwinian theory of evolution, James’s reflections originate in the field of late 19th century physiological psychology where he develops more and more intensely the exigency of a renewed epistemology and a new metaphysical framework for gathering the most interesting scientific theories and discoveries about the human mind. The analysis of the theme of continuity allows us to capture, from the historical and the theoretical point of view, the importance of James’s gradual translation of psychological experimental observations of the continuity of thought into an ontological perspective according to which continuity constitutes a feature of reality. Indeed, such an analysis clarifies James's position within his own historical context, as well as highlighting the most original outcomes of his work. The aspect of continuity, although mentioned by James’ scholars, has not been properly analyzed to date. This is firstly due to the great attention that interpreters have commonly paid to James’s individualist attitude, hence to the tychistic or variant features of reality. Secondly, it is important to consider that the main interpretative stream of pragmatism narrowed the comparison between James and Charles S. Peirce into a paradigmatic polarization, so that James was mainly considered as the philosopher of nominalism and individuality, while Peirce was labeled as the realist in search of a mathematical continuum.But James was immediately intrigued by the contradictory synthetic unity of mental states that he could draw from his description of the continuity of the states of consciousness, in so far as they preserved both real continuity and real divisibility. The vague aspect of experience was not fully reproducible in conceptual terms, and in logical terms it resulted in a contradiction. James’s elaboration of this problematic issue should be considered within the shift of paradigms that was taking place in the first half of the 20th century. Such an epochal change affected James’s elaboration, particularly through the theoretical and methodological advancements that were made in the fields of physiology and biological sciences throughout the 19th century

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese RRK.pdf: 1980749 bytes, checksum: 6057f03ea22122a242035262340d3bb3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004-04-02
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
William James’s scientific psychology was developed in order to surpass precedent approaches such as both Rationalism and Associationism. His masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology (1890), has been a mark in the history of psychological science because James already took cognitive processes as relations between the organisms and their environments. In this doctoral work, three contemporaneous cognitive theories are interpreted through James’s ideas: Artificial Intelligence, Connectionism and Dynamical Systems. This analysis, however, neither concerns scientific psychology nor philosophy of mind — in precise terms, the former examines psychological facts, and the later categorizes mental phenomena. Notwithstanding, we have done a conceptualcomparative study that categorizes the explanations proposed by those three cognitive theories. To be sure, this work should be labelled as a Philosophy of Cognitive Science. It examines theories concerned with cognition; so it is a philosophical analysis on cognitive science
A psicologia científica de William James procurava superar perspectivas precedentes oriundas do Racionalismo e do Associacionismo. Sua obra-prima, conhecida como Os Princípios de Psicologia, de 1890, é um marco na história da psicologia porque nesse livro James já toma os processos cognitivos como relações entre o organismo e seu meio ambiente. Nesta tese de doutoramento, três teorias cognitivas modernas — a saber, Inteligência Artificial, Conexionismo e Dinamicismo — são interpretadas via as idéias de James. Tal análise, entretanto, não deve ser tomada como sendo ciência psicológica no sentido positivo, nem tampouco deve ser enquadrada no que se convenciona chamar de filosofia da mente. No primeiro caso, fatos psicológicos propriamente ditos seriam examinados. Já no segundo, ou seja, se este fosse um trabalho em filosofia da mente, então se deveria estabelecer as categorias dos fenômenos mentais. Aqui, o que se procura formular, mediante uma espécie de estudo comparativo-conceitual, é uma categorização das explicações propostas pelas três linhas teóricas a serem examinadas. Então, para sermos precisos, esta tese se enquadra no que se poderia chamar de Filosofia das Ciências Cognitivas, pois discorre sobre como diversas teorias científicas explicam a cognição. Trata-se de um exame de teorias, uma categorização das explicações científicas sobre a cognição

Nous nous opposons dans cette thèse à la tentative de Maurice Merleau-Ponty pour réduire toute forme de "qualia" à des prédicats structuraux, tentative par laquelle nous comprenons l'ontologie de la « chair » qu'il nous semble mettre en place dès ses premiers travaux sur « l'expression ». Nous visons cependant à travers lui plus généralement toute théorie « structurale» de la sensation, désignant par là toute théorie qui soutient qu'on ne peut pas déterminer relationnellement un contenu de sensation sans le modifier intrinsèquement. La tâche est cependant rendue difficile par le grand nombre de faits empiriques que Merleau-Ponty convoque à l'appui de sa théorie structurale. En particulier, il s'appuie sur l'interprétation structurale de ces faits qui avait déjà été réalisée avant lui par Kurt Koffka au sein de la psychologie de la forme. Nous commençons donc par examiner cette interprétation et les faits sur lesquels elle repose, en montrant qu'ils ne peuvent paraître corroborer une théorie structurale que si l'on confond « abstraire » et « séparer réellement » une qualité de son contexte. Nous convoquons alors William James à l'appui de ces conclusions, en rappelant qu'il avait déjà montré contre les théories néo-hégéliennes de son époque l'illégitimité de leur prétention à se réclamer de faits psychologiques similaires, et qu'il avait soutenu contre eux une théorie de la connaissance par accointance que nous cherchons à reprendre à notre compte, pour esquisser une défense de l'introspection pure et simple
We are trying here to object to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's attempt to reduce qua/ia to structural predicates, which is the way we understand his ontology of the "flesh", as he seems to us to develop it already in his first works on "expression". We are more generally objecting through him to any kind of "structural" theory concerning sensation, meaning by this any theory which claims that one cannot attribute a relation to a sensorial content without intrinsically altering it. Our task is complicated by the great number of empirical facts that Merleau-Ponty calls for to prove his structural theory. He notably finds great help in the structural interpretation Kurt Koffka had already laid down for these facts as a Gestalt psychologist. Consequently, we begin with the examination of this theory and of the facts that support it, showing that they cannot seem to corroborate a structural theory unless one confuses "abstraction" and "real separation" of a qua/e from its context. We then call for William James to support these conclusions, reminding that he had already showed the illegitimacy of the claim by the neo-Hegelian writers of his time to find empirical proof for their own structural theories in similar psychological data. He had also suggested a "knowledge by acquaintance" theory against those writers that we are trying to use in defense for introspection pure and simple

William James came of age at a time of great social and intellectual change in the United States. During this period, new professional identities proliferated, and a new culture of professionalization developed with important ramifications for conceptions of individual and social identity. Professionalization was also closely related to key intellectual developments of the time, such as the application of scientific methods to social and human questions and the consolidation of intellectual work within the university. This thesis chronicles James's struggle to find a place within this society that both satisfied his personal desire for individual growth and freedom and established him within the context of professional academia, arguing that James's difficulties in finding a professional identity were inseparable from his development of a unique intellectual voice. The thesis then explores how James expressed his personal identity and insights in his work as professional academic and psychologist.
Graduation date: 2003

Situated at the crossroads of literary studies, ecocriticism and political theory, Active Enchantments explores a strain of thought within American literature that understands life in all of its forms to be generated not by self determined identities, but by interconnectedness and self abandonment. I argue that this interest led American writers across the nineteenth century to develop theories of subjectivity and of politics that not only emphasize the entanglement of the self with its environment, but also view this relationship as structured by self overcoming. Thus, when Emerson calls such interconnectedness "active enchantment," he means to signal life's inherent ability to constantly surpass itself, to never fully be identical with itself. My dissertation brings to the fore the political and ecological stakes of this paradox: if our selves and communities are molded by self abandonment, then the standard scholarly account of how nineteenth century American literature conceptualized politics must be revised. Far from understanding community as an organic production, founded on a teleological and harmonizing principle, the writers I study reconceive it around a sense of a commonality irreducible to fixed identity. The politics emerging out of such redefinition disposes with the primacy of individual or human agency, and becomes ecological in that it renders inoperative the difference between the social and the natural, the human and the non human, ourselves and what comprises us. It is the ecological dimension of what seems like a properly political question that brings together writers as diverse as Emerson and Sarah Orne Jewett, Margaret Fuller and Henry and William James. I argue, for example, that in Jewett's The Country of the Pointed Firs, racial minorities emerge from geological strata as a kind of natural archive that complicates the nation's understanding of its communal origin. When she sets her romances on Native American shell mounds in Maine, or makes the health of a New England community depend on colonial pharmacopoeia and herbalist healing practices of the West Indies, Jewett excavates from history its silent associations and attunes us not only to the violent foundation of every communal identity, but to this identity's entanglement in a number of unacknowledged relations. Her work thus ultimately challenges the procedures of democratic inclusiveness that, however non violent, are nevertheless always organized around a particular notion of identity. The question of the self's constitutive interconnectedness with the world is as central to Margaret Fuller's work. Active Enchantments documents how Fuller's harrowing migraines enabled her to generate a peculiar conception of the "earthly mind," according to which the mind is material and decomposable, rather than spiritual, incorruptible or ideal. This notion eventually led her to devise a theory of the self that absolves persons from self possession and challenges the distinctiveness of personal identity. My concluding chapter argues that Henry James's transnational aesthetics was progressively politicized in the 1880s, and that what scholarship celebrates as the peak of his novelistic method develops, in fact, out of a network of surprising and heretofore unexplored influences, William James's concurrent theories of corporeal emotion, Mikhail Bakunin's anarchism, and Henry James's friendship with Ivan Turgenev, which inflamed James's interest in British politics, the Russo Turkish War, and the Balkan revolutions.

William James (1842–1910) contributed groundbreaking ideas to empirical philosophy, metaphysics, and psychology, and influenced some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century, including Edmund Husserl, Alfred North Whitehead, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This chapter explores James’s contributions to management studies. Focusing on James’s first major work, Principles of Psychology (1890), the chapter traces his influence on three major streams of social research––process philosophy, phenomenology, and functionalism––and follows these streams as they flowed into research on organizations and management. James believed that experience could not be forced into static systems or grand unified theories, but was ‘a snowflake caught in the warm hand’. For social scientists, his work shows the virtues of embracing human experience in all its pluralism, and reawakening the mind to forgotten potentialities.