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1
Nakamura, K. "Party Politics and Defense Budget: US-Japanese Negotiations over Defense Contribution, 1953-55." Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association 49 (1998): 195–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.7218/nenpouseijigaku1953.49.0_195.
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Schmid, Andre. "Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch'aeho and the Politics of Territorial History in Korea." Journal of Asian Studies 56, no. 1 (February 1997): 26–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2646342.
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In the years immediately prior to Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, the historian Sin Ch'aeho posed a fundamental challenge to conventional assumptions about the limits of Korean territoriality: was the nation bound to the peninsula or did it more properly extend into the lands of Manchuria? For Sin, the answer was straightforward. Despite writing during the waning years of the Chosŏn dynasty—a time when the court could neither defy Japan's imposition of a protectorate nor resist Japanese pressure for Emperor Kojong to cede the throne, and when thousands in the Righteous Armies (Ŭibyŏng) were dying at the hands of the Japanese military in defense of the peninsula—Sin nevertheless called brazenly for a Korean Manchuria.
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Stratford, Jean Slemmons, Juri Stratford, and Helen Heitmann Ives. "The politics of Japanese defense: Managing internal and external pressures." Journal of Government Information 21, no. 6 (November 1994): 657–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1352-0237(94)90089-2.
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Noble, Gregory W. "The Decline of Particularism in Japanese Politics." Journal of East Asian Studies 10, no. 2 (August 2010): 239–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800003453.
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Particularistic spending has played a storied role in Japanese politics, but during the last decade of LDP rule, expenditures on roads, bridges, agricultural projects, and the like steadily lost ground to more programmatic outlays on social welfare, science and technology, and public order (but not defense or foreign aid). Prime Minister Koizumi played an important role in this shift, but the trends preceded him and continued under his much weaker successors. The end of the Cold War, increasing foreign investment, and the weakness of the domestic economy probably played mostly minor roles in the decline of particularism. The aging of Japanese society, not least in rural areas, created direct pressure for programmatic spending, while partisan upheaval, the growing share of floating voters, and reforms to the electoral and administrative systems created both an incentive and a greater capacity to redirect attention to the concerns of median voters.
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KAGOTANI, KOJI. "National Security Environments, Patriotism, and Japanese Public Opinion." Japanese Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (February 10, 2015): 96–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109914000401.
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AbstractThis study examines Japanese reactions to neighboring countries’ behavior by addressing possible micro-motives, such as patriotism, the rational demand for national defense, and retrospective policy evaluation. This theoretical development leads to distinctive hypotheses from different motivations and directly tests them using macro-data (not survey data). This research will apply this framework to Japanese politics and will show that foreign threats stimulate patriotism in the public mind and enhance political support for national leaders. It will also demonstrate that the Japanese public has no optimistic view of the new prime minister and that the honeymoon effect in previous research may be confounded with the patriotic effect because the new leader is less experienced and is often challenged by foreign countries.
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Pempel, T. J. "Japan in 2016." Asian Survey 57, no. 1 (January 2017): 79–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.1.79.
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Japanese domestic politics, foreign policy, economics and society continued along well-established paths in the year 2016. And long-term demographic trends remained a major unresolved challenge. Yet three exceptions to continuity stood out: first, controversial legislation that expanded the legality of collective self-defense; second, the likely collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); and third, the election of Donald Trump.
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Hofmann, Reto. "What's Left of the Right: Nabeyama Sadachika and Anti-communism in Transwar Japan, 1930–1960." Journal of Asian Studies 79, no. 2 (November 12, 2019): 403–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911819000688.
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This article examines the thought and career of Nabeyama Sadachika (1901–79) from communist militant in 1920s Japan to his conversion to the emperor system in the 1930s and, finally, to his role in shaping the postwar anti-communist movement. Using Nabeyama's recently released private papers, the article shows how he brokered his anti-communist expertise to a range of postwar actors and institutions—the police, the Self-Defense Forces, business circles, politicians—as well as to foreign states, especially the Republic of China (Taiwan). These networks indicate that important sections of Japan's postwar establishment rallied behind anti-communism in the face of reforms that threatened their power at home and their vision for Japan in the world order after 1945. As a transwar history, this article adds to our understanding of Japan's transition from the age of empire to that of liberal democracy by qualifying narratives about the “progressive” nature of postwar Japanese politics. It argues that the vitality of anti-communism is symptomatic of the durability of particular political traditions, and reveals that, despite the significant reforms that Japan underwent after 1945, the Right was able to claim a space in the country's political culture that has been neglected by historians.
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Clausen, Daniel. "Examining Japanese Defense Policy and Politics Through Failures of Leadership: The Case of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio." Asian Politics & Policy 4, no. 4 (October 2012): 507–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01371.x.
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Inoguchi, Takashi. "Nambara Shigeru (1889–1974): how a Japanese liberal conceptualized eternal peace, 1918–1951." Japanese Journal of Political Science 19, no. 4 (December 2018): 612–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109918000373.
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AbstractNambara Shigeru was a rara avis of Japanese liberal academics at hard times in that he survived difficult times without being punished by the oppressive government in the pre-war Japan and the occupation authorities in the immediate post-war Japan. He specialized in Western political philosophy especially in Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, known as proponents of German idealism and nationalism. His magnum opus was published, without being punished, in 1944, arguing that the Nazi politics was totally against the Western political tradition. In 1945–46, he made clear his opposition to the draft new Constitution in which the emperor be symbolic and the armed forces be abolished. In 1949–1950, he made clear his view that Japan, once Japan admitted to the United Nations, what would become Japanese Self-Defense Forces should donate portions to what would become United Nations Peace Keeping Operations. On the basis of his writings in the war period and the occupation period, comparisons of his positions with Roger Scruton, Vladislav Surkov, Yanaihara Tadao, Akamatsu Kaname, Nitobe Inazo, and Yanagida Kunio on such concepts as democracy promotion, national self-determination, peace keeping are attempted to see the extent to which the pent-up Wilsonian moment burst in the immediate post-war period.
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Shaikh, Khalil ur Rehman. "FOREIGN POLICY OF JAPAN." Asia-Pacific - Annual Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia 38 (February 5, 2021): 167–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.47781/asia-pacific.vol38.iss0.2333.
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In post war era, Japan emerged as a pacifist country. The constitution of Japan restrained from developing armed forces for offensive but permitted only for defensive purpose. Thus, Japan raised Self Defense Force. This posture greatly contributed in its emergence as world economic power. In post-cold war period, Japan appeared with advanced step in its foreign policy and sent its forces abroad as a part of UN Peace Keeping Force abroad. It little questioned the objective of creating SDF. 9/11 incidents changed the global politics. Japanese citizens also fall prey to it. Japan joined coalition on War on Terror and helped to fight against terrorism. In post 9/11, Japan has improved its relations with China despite territorial dispute. However, it plays its role in global political, economic, cultural and strategic areas.
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Hayashi, Mahito. "Democracy Against Labor Movement: Japan’s Anti-Labor Developmental State and Aftermaths." Critical Sociology 47, no. 1 (June 14, 2020): 37–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0896920520921216.
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This paper investigates the labor-controlling orientation of the Japanese developmental state and its consequences today. Developmental state studies has given us a robust epistemological grid whereby we can make non-Western state formation intelligible. Yet, mainstream authors have tended to treat the working class as a mere appendage to state– business relations, relegating labor politics at the analysis of state– society relations. By using democratic Japan—a prime example of this sort of obfuscation—in combination with Marxian state theory, this paper outlines the difficulties, addresses them, and extends the scope of developmental state studies to labor. After identifying main tenets of the literature, the author constructs a theory of labor control as a stabilizer of relative state autonomy. The author applies this to Japanese labor movements since 1945 and interprets events and processes of labor oppression/regulation through which Japanese capitalism subsumed the working class under the aegis of the developmental state. Labor control, emerging out of an “exceptional state” (Poulantzas, 1974), evolved into a refined socio-relational system that insulated developmental goals from labor movements. This Japanese trajectory keenly mobilized big business and elite labor, which transformed labor control into a bilateral and then a tripartite league in defense of industrial policy and its deskilling/reskilling intervention. By the 1970s, this achieved the famous docility of Japanese labor. The historically constructed character of docile labor force was exploited once again when Japan made a neoliberal turn in its post-development phase.
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Xu, Jian. "Body, Discourse, and the Cultural Politics of Contemporary Chinese Qigong." Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 4 (November 1999): 961–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2658492.
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Many asian cultures have rich traditions of self-cultivation that exercise mind and body through physical and meditational training. Research and scholarship with respect to those traditions have focused fruitfully on how the body is cultivated to serve as an agent of resistance against various forms of social control. Of these many writings on this subject, I will here name only a suggestive few: Joseph Alter's study of Indian wrestling (1993), for example, tracks the wrestlers' self-conscious reappropriation of their bodies from the power of the state through a regimented discipline aimed at resisting docility. John Donohue's study of the Japanese martial art karate (1993) explores how, in the West, karate's symbolic and ritual functions create a psychological dynamic that counters the prevalent fragmentation of urban life. Douglas Wile's research on Chinese taiji quart (1996) similarly reconstructs the cultural/historical context in which this martial art was created. He shows that what motivated nineteenth-century literati to create taiji quan was its representational function rather than its practical utility. That is, Taiji quan “may be seen as a psychological defense against Western cultural imperialism” (p. 26) insofar as it produced a secure sense of the national self that helped China adapt to a new international environment (p. 29). All of these studies place the body-in-cultivation in a specific historical context; they maintain that the individual, physical body both registers and reveals the national sociopolitical landscape.
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Suvorov, Valery Vladimirovich. "Perception of the East and the tasks of Far Eastern policy of Russia in the views of V.N. Kokovtsov and P.A. Stolypin." Samara Journal of Science 6, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 201–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/snv201764219.
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Activity of V.N. Kokovtsov and P.A. Stolypin, associated with the situation of Russia in the Far East after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, was held in the conditions of the need to solve the tasks of restoring the fighting capacity of the Russian army, improving the defense capability of the Far East and integrating this region within the empire. Under these conditions, the understanding of the importance of supporting the eastern regions of the Russian Empire was expressed, in which there was great potential for socio-economic development, while recognizing the need to avoid military clashes in Asia. V.N. Kokovtsov was involved in the Far Eastern and became Wittes successor as finance minister, since this ministry continued to play a decisive role in Eastern politics. Witte focused on the development of external relations between Russia and the Asian states and the desire to strengthen Russias influence in the Far Eastern region, and then the eastern policy after the Russo-Japanese War was more oriented toward the development of the eastern territories of Russia. With the growing awareness of the importance of the internal eastern regions of Russia, the negative attitude towards the eastern states with which Russia bordered was strengthened. In general, the governments program for the economic development of the Far East gave impetus to the development of the region.
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Shibata, Ria. "Identity, Nationalism and Threats to Northeast Asia Peace." Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 13, no. 3 (December 2018): 86–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2018.1516157.
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The escalating public debate over amendment of the Japanese constitution centres on the war-renouncing principles of Article 9 — the symbol of Japan's pacifist identity. Since elected to power, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his supporters have been steadfastly pushing to revise the constitution to remove pacifist constraints on the nation's Self-Defense Forces. In the face of growing insecurities generated by long economic stagnation, regional threats posed by North Korean missiles and rising Chinese hegemony, Japanese conservative politicians feel it is time to overhaul Japan's humiliating postwar regime represented by the pacifist constitution and restore Japan's pride and independence. This article examines the resurgence of nationalist discourse in Japan as a response to Japan's threatened identity and esteem. As the Japanese people become increasingly exposed to nationalist narratives and realistic threats, how have these affected their desire to maintain a pacifist identity? This paper further examines the pacifist attitudes of today's Japanese youth and to what extent they are in favour of changing the constitution to adopt a stronger military defence.
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Komine, Yukinori. "Whither a “Resurgent Japan”: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense Build-up, 1969–1976." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 3 (July 2014): 88–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00447.
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This article analyzes a broad range of U.S. and Japanese perspectives on Japan’s defense buildup in the 1970s, a buildup that simultaneously showed assertiveness and caution. President Richard M. Nixon announced what soon became known as the Nixon Doctrine, under which the United States began pressuring Japan to take on greater defense and regional responsibilities. U.S. officials assessed the extent to which Japan’s security role might affect U.S.-Japan burden sharing within the quadrilateral interactions in East Asia involving the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Japanese leaders considered whether Japan should develop an autonomous defense posture (including the controversial question of Japan’s nuclear weapons program) or should seek qualitative improvements of its conventional self-defense force capabilities (within the context of its domestic institutional and normative restraints). The article concludes by assessing the political-security implications of the institutionalization of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.
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BIBIK, OLEKSANDRA. "TRANSFORMATION OF THE JAPANESE MEMORY POLITIC IN THE II HALF OF XX-XXI CENTURIES IN THE CONTEXTS OF PAN-ASIAN AMBITIONS." Skhid, no. 1(2) (July 1, 2021): 27–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.21847/1728-9343.2021.1(2).236141.
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The article is devoted to the analyses of the role of Pan-Asianism in the formation of the Japanese policy of memory in the period after World War II. Since the Meiji period, Japan has had a dual relationship with Asia: on the one hand, as a region of high spirituality and culture, on the other, as a region lagging behind the West or Europe in terms of economic, political and technological development. In the 1950s, when Japan was experiencing a period of economic crisis caused by the defeat of the war, the occupation regime, and the formation of military memory, we see a trend of Japanese intellectuals classifying Japan as "Asia". If during World War I Pan-Asian ideology was used to correct imperial ideology and colonialism, modern Pan-Asian concepts tend to create a union of Southeast Asian countries for support and mutual development. The further development of these sentiments depends on the implementation of existing ASEAN projects and the specifics of the adopted political and economic strategies of the Asian Commonwealth.
The articles provide the first comprehensive analysis of the constitutional documents, editions and speeches of Japanese politicians, which show the transformations of Japanese memory politic. The main terms of development of this policy, which consist in patient orientation and gradual formation of new Asianism, are separated. Discussions around Yasukuni-jinja and Japanese history textbooks as examples of these trends in Japanese politics are analyzed.
Provided that Japan's pacifist position is enshrined in the constitution, there are conservative and nationalist views on the Japanese war in Asia. As part of Japan's policy of remembrance, Pan-Asianism fosters an ambivalent attitude toward Japanese expansion in Asia. Subject to Japan's official admission of guilt to neighbouring countries, condemnation of expansionism and colonialism, and the transition to pacifism, there are conservative and nationalist views on the Japanese war in Asia. Within the conservative position, Japanese guilt is questioned and the need to recognize the heroic participants in the war is proclaimed, the "Great East Asian War" is interpreted as a war of self-defence, or the correctness and truth of Pan-Asian ideals of Taisho and Showa Japan are recognized.
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Bazanini, Roberto, Mauricio Donato, Denis Donaire, and Ademir Antonio Ferreira. "POSICIONAMENTO ESTRATÉGICO DOS AGENTES FOMENTADORES NA IMPLANTAÇÃO DA TV DIGITAL NO BRASIL: DISPUTAS, NEGOCIAÇÕES E ESTRATAGEMAS RETÓRICOS." Revista de Negócios 14, no. 3 (March 1, 2010): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.7867/1980-4431.2009v14n3p11-34.
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The quarrels on the model of implanted digital TV in Brazil in 02 of December of 2007, lasted thirteen years more than. In virtue of the dynamism of the debates, in the defense of its respective interests, the actors had been modifying its initial position in reply to a new rhetorical situation that to each new phase presented decurrent of the correlation of forces gifts in the environment. The objective of the work is in investigating the negotiations and the strategies of positioning used by the main involved agents in the process of implantation of the digital TV in Brazil and, concomitantly, to analyze and to argue the interests of each one of these actors envolved of the decision technique/politics of the choice of the standard of digital TV in the perspective of three theoretical referenciais: The Determined Strategy Continuously; The New Rhetoric and the Rhetorical Criticism. According with of exploratory research, qualitative nature, analysis after-factum, with job of instrument of collection of data directed toward content analysis, as Bardin considers (1997), the technique of the interview in depth next to the main Responsible Actors searched to confirm hypothesis proposal initially, according to which, the interests of the different groups in the implantation of the digital TV that made possible the choice of the Japanese standard causes small diversity the programming and minors possibilities of democratization of the communications. The results of the research point with respect to the adoption of the Japanese standard (in perfect accord with the interests of the Broadcasters and the Federal Government) in detriment of the interests of the civil society (searched the democratization) and of the Industry of Telecom (favorable to the European standard).
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Oren, Eitan, and Matthew Brummer. "Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan." Journal of Cold War Studies 22, no. 4 (December 2020): 71–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00948.
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This article discusses whether Japanese military and political elites perceived the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) as threats during the Cold War. Realist scholars have argued that Japan's security alliance with the United States and the global balance of power were such that most Japanese officials did not perceive either of the Communist giants as a serious military threat. Reaching a similar conclusion but for starkly different reasons, constructivist scholars have argued that cultural, normative, and identity factors explain why Japanese elites did not perceive the Soviet Union or China as militarily threatening. Neither of these arguments holds up. Archival data and oral history collections from Japan's Self-Defense Force and National Diet Library reveal that Japan's defense establishment and political leaders perceived both the Soviet Union and the PRC as extremely threatening and that these perceptions fluctuated in intensity over time, across sectors, and among actors. Psychological factors, including affect, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive beliefs (the ABC model), may better explain why Japanese judged the intensity and source of perceived threats in the manner that they did. These findings underscore why threat perception in the international system is best evaluated by aggregating individual judgments and their distribution among larger groups.
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IRIYE, AKIRA. "Japan's Defense Strategy." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 513, no. 1 (January 1991): 38–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716291513001004.
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In 1940, Japan's wealth, estimated in terms of national income, may be said to have been roughly one-tenth of that of the United States, and yet Japanese military power—the number of aircraft and warships in the Pacific—surpassed that of America. Japan had a well-defined strategy, albeit a disastrous one, for conquering Asia in order to establish a more self-sufficient empire. Today, fifty years later, Japan has caught up with the United States in economic indicators, but it spends far less than the latter on defense, and it cannot be said to have developed more than a rudimentary notion of defense strategy. This article contrasts these two periods in recent Japanese history and discusses possible factors for this dramatic reversal. It argues that defense strategies must be seen as conscious choices by a country's leaders; who they are and how they perceive international affairs are of crucial importance.
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Santoso, Ria Putri, and Anak Agung Banyu Perwita. "The Shift and Continuity of Japanese Defense Policy: Revolutionary Enough?" JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies) 4, no. 2 (April 25, 2017): 156. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/jas.v4i2.1906.
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The security environment in East Asia has continuously evolved, particularly, China’s maritime expansion and DPRK’s provocative behavior. Japan, with its military being limited by its Peace Constitution, has been steadily shifting its defense policy to respond to its strategic environment for the past three of its Prime Ministers: Naoto Kan, Yoshihiko Noda, and Shinzo Abe. Historical enmities, military capability, as well as territorial disputes have increased the threats of Japan’s neighbors to Tokyo’s national security. Since 2010, Japan has established a National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), shifted its defense strategy from the Basic Defence Force (kibanteki boei ryoko) to Dynamic Defense Force (doeki boei ryoko), revised its Three Principles on Arms Exports, created the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the Medium Term Defense Program (MDTP), and revised its article 9 of its Peace Constitution. While the NSC, NSS, MDTP, and article 9 are under the Abe administration, the claim that the steps Abe have undertaken to be revolutionary is in fact, a continuity from his predecessors despite coming from opposing political backgrounds. Despite of several significant changes in its defense policy, Japan still abides to its Constitution and its military is still limited.
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La Ode, M. Dahrin, Adnan Madjid, and Ridwan Ridwan. "Ethnicity Political Power in East Asia." Jurnal Pertahanan 2, no. 3 (December 29, 2016): 213. http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/jp.v2i3.96.
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The purpose of this study to analyze the strategy of the political power of ethnicity, political objectives ethnicity, and the US response to the political power of ethnicity East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China). This type of qualitative research, data collection techniques interviews, and literature, and data using the analytical techniques and models Miles Hubberman. The findings of this study the map of the political power of ethnicity in East Asia they are all on the Natives. Japan's defense system was originally “Self Defense” to “Collective Self Defence”, South Korea's defense system shifts from “Defense Ambrella” into the system “Extended Nuclear Deterrence”; China shifted from “Continental Defense” to “Opensive Defense”. Political objectives etnisistas East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China) to realize “Bonum Publicum”. US response to the political power of ethnicity in East Asia are routed through the strength of the economic, political, military and East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China), using a system of “persuading, the protection system and pressing system. However, in the light of “persuasion”, “protection” and “pressure” varies between countries. Map of the political power of ethnicity in East Asia “base on power” Yamato indigenous groups, Hangukin, and Chung Hua.
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Samuels, Richard J. "“New Fighting Power!” Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security." International Security 32, no. 3 (January 2008): 84–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.84.
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Japanese leaders struggled for decades to overcome legal, political, and normative constraints on the expansion of the Self-Defense Forces so that Japan could field a robust military. Their progress was steady and significant, but slow. Now, having reframed the nature of the threat Japan faces and having borrowed creatively from the U.S. model, they have found new traction by empowering the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). Today's JCG has what its publicists, citing capabilities explicitly banned by Japan's constitution, call “New Fighting Power!” Remarkably, however, JCG modernization and expansion are being achieved without much objection from Japan's neighbors or from the domestic public. Although the JCG is not a “second navy,” it is already a fourth branch of the Japanese military. Tokyo is now able to project additional diplomatic influence as well as “fighting power.” Japan's “new fighting power” is thus greater than the sum of its military parts.
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Arisaka, Yoko. "Beyond “East and West” Nishida's Universalism and Postcolonial Critique." Review of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 541–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500027716.
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During the 1930s and 1940s, many Japanese intellectuals resisted Western cultural imperialism. This theoretical movement was unfortunately complicit with wartime nationalism. Kitaro Nishida, the founder of modern Japanese philosophy and the leading figure of the Kyoto School, has been the focus of a controversy as to whether his philosophy was inherently nationalist or not. Nishida's defenders claim that his philosophical “universalism” was incompatible with the particularistic nationalism of Japan's imperialist state. From the standpoint of postcolonial critique, it is argued that this defense is insufficient. Philosophical universalism is not in itself anti-imperialist, but can in fact contribute to imperialist ideology.
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Voda, K. "Sino-Japanese Relations on the Brink of Another “Cold War”?" World Economy and International Relations, no. 10 (2014): 84–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-10-84-92.
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Up to beginning of the XXI century political contradictions in Sino-Japanese relations had little influence on strong economic ties. However, since early 2010s several unstable elements that existed between the countries have been tending to discharge from political sphere into economics complicating bilateral cooperation. One of the sources of contradictions in Sino-Japanese relations is referred to differences in perception of each others’ strategies and intentions. China and Japan view each other as potentially offensive while depicting themselves as defensive. The growth of defense capabilities on one side is perceived as a potential threat on the other side. Another reason for deterioration of political situation is Japan’s efforts to give a proper reaction to the rapid rise of China’s economical and political might. On the other hand, it is China’s willingness to defend its growing interests. The escalation of nationalism in both countries adds to instability in Sino-Japanese relations. Sino-Japanese contradictions in economical, political, ideological and military spheres became intertwined in the territorial dispute of the East China Sea. Different expectations towards the US involvement in the potential conflict around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands makes the situation even more difficult as it leads to the growth of military spending in both countries. Low levels of trust, the absence of clear dispute settlement and preventive diplomacy mechanisms, narrow opportunities for negotiations increase the probability that the cooling of Sino-Japanese relations will continue in future.
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Aoi, Chiyuki. "Beyond "Activism-Lite"?: Issues in Japanese Participation in Peace Operations." Journal of International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1-2 (2009): 72–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187541109x402990.
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AbstractThis article discusses legal, political, and institutional issues arising out of Japan's past involvement in international peace and stability missions. Seeking to identify potential strengths and limitations, it focuses on the experience and features of the international missions of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Although the JSDF has proved successful in conducting its assignments on a tactical level, some of the limitations inherent in the JSDF modus operandi—to a large extent imposed by domestic legal system—are nonetheless serious in light of changing operational environments. These limitations are due to lack of consensus in the Japanese political debate on what constitutes the strategic priorities of Japanese security, as well as the indeterminate public attitudes towards these issues. It should be noted, however, that the resulting "activism lite" approach is increasingly untenable if Japan is to remain a credible ally and partner in the international community.
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Paramonov, O. G. "Military-technical cooperation of Japan with foreign countries and the interests of Russia." Journal of International Analytics, no. 2 (June 28, 2017): 52–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2017-0-2-52-62.
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Nowadays military-technical cooperation is considered by many states as one of the effective tools for ensuring national security, as well as accomplishing a broader range of foreign policy objectives. Under a crisis of regional security environment, the Japanese government also concluded that further refusal to participate in international cooperation in the development and production of weapons begins to negatively affect its own defense capabilities. Nevertheless, Shinzo Abe-led Government’s plans to put an end to Japan’s self-isolation from external arms markets and thus strengthen relations with the United States in the military-and political fields are likely to lead to certain problems in Japan’s relations with such powerful regional actors as Russia and China.
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Ono, Teppei. "The Right to Confidential Communication with Defence Counsel in JapanRecent Legal Disputes Over Mail Censorship and Photography in Visiting Rooms." Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 20, no. 2 (December 4, 2019): 159–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718158-02002002.
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In spite of the common global position of protecting the right to confidential communication, the Japanese prison authorities create barriers to communication between pre-trial inmates and defence counsel. Any correspondence, including correspondence between pre-trial inmates and defence counsel, may be opened and read by prison staff. In addition, prison authorities have established regulations to prohibit any visitors from bringing in cameras or mobile phones. They do not allow counsel to take photos in visiting rooms, claiming that these regulations are equally applicable to lawyers. This article examines the legality of the current practice regarding mail censorship and the prohibition of photography in visiting rooms, taking into consideration international human rights standards. It concludes that the current practice diverges from the international human rights standards including the Nelson Mandela Rules, which protects the full confidentiality of communication between inmates and lawyers, and access to effective legal aid. Since the arrest of Nissan’s former chairman Carlos Ghosn in November 2018, Japan’s ‘hostage justice’ system – in which suspects are held for a long period in harsh conditions to coerce a confession – has encountered a barrage of criticism. It should be noted, however, that interruption of inmates-defence counsel communication constitutes another dark side of Japanese criminal justice. This article will shed light on the everyday issues which Japanese defence counsel face in actual criminal cases.
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LAM, Peng Er. "Japan's Politics: Crossing the Rubicon." East Asian Policy 08, no. 01 (January 2016): 71–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930516000064.
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In 2015, an unprecedented set of security bills was passed in Japanese parliament, permitting Tokyo to engage in collective security by aiding allies against third parties and to loosen the tight restrictions on the Self-Defence Force in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations, its rules of engagement and other multilateral deployment abroad. With these bills, Japan has crossed the Rubicon and evolved into a “normal” state in international affairs.
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Drucker, Peter F. "In Defense of Japanese Bureaucracy." Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (1998): 68. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20049051.
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Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. "The Soviet Factor in U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation, 1978–1985." Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 2 (April 2013): 72–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00338.
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In the crucial period from 1978 to 1975, Japan jettisoned its “omnidirectional” foreign policy and embraced a closer and more integrated defense alliance with the United States. Concern about the Soviet threat was the chief motive for this shift. The deployment of Soviet troops in the Northern Territories (Southern Kuriles), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the deployment of Soviet Backfire bombers and SS-20 nuclear missiles in the Far East all provided impetus toward closer U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation. As Japan closely aligned its defense policy with the United States, Soviet-Japanese relations correspondingly deteriorated. Normal channels of communication were broken off. As the Japanese government elevated the Northern Territories issue to the forefront of Soviet-Japanese relations, Soviet criticism of Japan escalated. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985, Soviet-Japanese relations had sunk to their lowest point.
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Ehrhardt, George. "Administrative Reform in East Asia: The Importance of Multiple Principals." Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (July 1, 2009): 625–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.625.
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This paper looks at how recent Japanese prime ministers have counterintuitively limited political control over the bureaucracy. It uses conflicts at the foreign and defense ministries to illustrate how the presence of multiple principals alters principal-agent theory and its implications for the politician-bureaucrat relationship. This study integrates the Japanese case into comparative scholarship on Taiwan and Korea.
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ISHIZUKA, KATSUMI. "The Crisis Management Capability of Japan's Self Defense Forces for UN Peacekeeping, Counter-Terrorism, and Disaster Relief." Japanese Journal of Political Science 14, no. 2 (May 10, 2013): 201–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109913000030.
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AbstractThis article examines the crisis management capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) in the areas of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief. The three types of overseas operations were all initiated by Japan as a response to international crises. While SDF crisis management capabilities for UN peacekeeping operations have steadily evolved, room for improvement remains. For example, Japan's commitment to logistic and rapid deployment missions could be strengthened. Regarding the second type of operations, counter-terrorism, Japan's crisis management capabilities were enhanced by the passing of a novel Anti-Terrorism Law in October 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. The law legalized a SDF oil-fuelling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan. Compared to the first two types of missions, SDF crisis management capabilities in disaster relief are the least controversial. This is due to the nature of the SDF as politically neutral and their humanitarian and non-military activities. This article highlights and compares the strengths and weaknesses of Japan's capabilities in the three types of SDF overseas operations. It demonstrates that a number of problem areas remain, including the need for legal amendment as well as the enhancement of public support and political consensus. The Japanese government and the SDF should face up to these challenges so that Japan can become better positioned to react quickly to crisis situations that require the dispatch of the SDF.
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Hidayat, Syafril. "Japan’s Renaissance and Its Effect to ASEAN." JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies) 2, no. 1 (July 31, 2014): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/jas.v2i1.83.
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Japan has developed a new security policy against China in East China Sea, which has increased tension in that region. Japan’s new leadership under Shinzo Abe, who has conservative political view, has unbeatable policy against China’s hegemony. Abe revised Japan Self-Defence Forces role in the Japanese Constitution by making critical amendments on particular articles, which should be seen as Japan’s bargaining power against China. The two major powers in East China Sea can be seen as security dilemma of other states. Pursuit of power and hegemony will influence other major actors in the global world system and also small states. Japan’s new security policy is as a renaissance of Japan’s hegemony or pursuit of power in East China Sea. By using bargaining model of war, Japan’s security policy will determine overall situation in South China Sea or particularly in East China Sea: whether it will remain of high threat or balance of threat rather than balance of power, or it will face possible conflict in the future.
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Togo, Kazuhiko. "Greater Self-Assertion and Nationalism in Japan." Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 21 (March 10, 2005): 8–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v21i0.38.
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Out of the deep spiritual vacuum from defeat in the Second World War, two fundamental rifts emerged in Japan. First, on the foreign policy front, the realism embraced by the conservative government was opposed by strong idealistic pacifism advocated by opposition parties and media, and this rift continued until the end of the Cold War. Second, with regard to the war in Asia, the Japanese gradually learned of atrocities committed, for which Japan owed an apology. However, views prevailing at the time to totally reject the past caused discomfort aming many Japanese, and the issue of lost identity was left unanswered during the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, Japan began to move towords a more responsible and self-assertive security and defence policy. A series of initiatives toward clearer apology and reconciliation were confronted by a strengthened nationalism, and the issue of lost identity remained unresolved at the end of the 1990s. Koizumi has done well to implement a more responsible, proactive, realistic and self-assertive security and defence policy; moreover relations with the US have been considerably strengthened. But in East Asia, the issue of lost identity has reappeared and foreign policy towards Russia, Korea and China has resulted in a hardning of Japan's position in the region. Japan needs to have the courage to overcome this unresolved issue, while other countries' greater understanding of Japan's move toward a re-established identity will facilitate this process. Genuine dialogue is needed on all fronts.
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Noble, Gregory W. "What Can Taiwan (and the United States) Expect from Japan?" Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 1 (April 2005): 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s159824080000624x.
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In the 1990s and into the new century, increased Japanese sympathy toward Taiwan and antipathy toward mainland China led to a series of moves to improve treatment of Taiwan, including enhanced transportation links, a higher level and frequency of official contacts, posting of a military attaché, and expressions of support for Taiwan's participation in regional and international organizations. Nevertheless, Japan remains firmly wedded to a One China policy that opposes both the use of force by the mainland and a declaration by Taiwan of independence from China. Japan's willingness to cooperate with the United States to defend Taiwan is increasingly in doubt. The sources of Japan's supportive but restrained policy include the decline of traditional ties with Taiwan, the increasing size of the mainland market, and above all a perception of security risks that ultimately diverges sharply from that of Taiwan. Serious cooperation in defense and diplomacy requires shared (or complementary) threats, not just shared adversaries.
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Monten, Jonathan, and Mark Provost. "Theater Missile Defense and Japanese Nuclear Weapons." Asian Security 1, no. 3 (September 2005): 285–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799850500341957.
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Johnson, Chalmers. "Reflections on the Dilemma of Japanese Defense." Asian Survey 26, no. 5 (May 1, 1986): 557–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2644482.
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Johnson, Chalmers. "Reflections on the Dilemma of Japanese Defense." Asian Survey 26, no. 5 (May 1986): 557–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.1986.26.5.01p03827.
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Paramonov, O. G. "Russia-Japan Security Dialogue." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 12, no. 1 (April 1, 2019): 102–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2019-12-1-102-116.
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In the face of deteriorating the regional security environment in East Asia, a noticeable growth of Japan’s defense capabilities and Tokyo’s departure from most self-restraints in the field of security policy look quite expected and natural process. At the same time, Japan continues to rely on the alliance with the United States. On the other hand, relations between Washington and Moscow are now at their lowest point since the Cold War. Japan itself has territorial claims to Russia. This means, based on confrontational logic that returns to the international agenda, that Japan’s traditionally reserved attitude towards Russia should be maintained. However, today we are witnessing a different situation. After the start of regular personal meetings between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the dialogue is intensified on a wide range of issues, including those related to international security, and especially its regional aspect. Although certain background for that was noted before the Sochi meeting between V. Putin and S. Abe, this foreign policy turn, and, in particular, its speed, came as a surprise not only for Tokyo’s Western partners, but also for many Japanese politicians and experts. This article is devoted to the analysis of its possible causes, as well as the search for an answer to the next question.Is the dialogue between Russia and Japan a situational political maneuver or a step towards cooperation on security issues?
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Kawashima, Midori. "The Records of the Former Japanese Army Concerning the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27, no. 1 (March 1996): 124–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400010729.
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One field of study which still remains unexplored in connection with the Japanese occupation is to examine the Japanese army's view of events by using Japanese military records. This paper gives an outline of records relating to the occupation of the Philippines found at the Military Archives of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, and discusses their historical significance.
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Hasim, Hasanuddin. "PERKEMBANGAN POLITIK KETATANEGARAAN ISLAM DI INDONESIA." Bilancia: Jurnal Studi Ilmu Syariah dan Hukum 12, no. 2 (December 31, 2018): 279–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.24239/blc.v12i2.371.
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The development of Islamic constitutional politics in Indonesia from time to time starting from the Dutch colonial period, the Japanese colonial period, the independence period, the old order period, the new order era and Islamic politics during the reformation era experienced different turmoil, not only in the form of structural reform government but to the grassroots of the community. Then over time, the scholars realized that their struggle would not succeed if they continued traditional methods. Therefore there needs to be a change which, although originating from its own colonial influence, is struggling through social education organizations or constitutional political movements. The presence of scholars in the political field should have a positive impact, contributing to the creation of a moral structure of political structures, because ulama are moral symbols. However, when the Ulama was polarized in such a way, that often between a cleric and other scholars faced each other and defended their respective parties. This condition will lead to division and the impact will confuse the people, so that it will weaken the strength of the Muslim community itself, which is often used by other party groups.
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Cruz De Castro, Renato. "Exploring a 21st-Century Japan-Philippine Security Relationship: Linking Two Spokes Together?" Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (July 1, 2009): 691–715. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.691.
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The article examines Tokyo's efforts to link the Philippine and the Japanese security spokes in the face of Beijing's moves to widen the cleavage between both countries' alliances with the U.S. and render them irrelevant. The article concludes that Manila and Tokyo must first reconfigure a defense relationship that is not merely a military aggregation but a political apparatus enabling them to constructively engage an emergent China.
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Takenaka, Harukata. "Evolution of Japanese security policy and the House of Councilors." Japanese Journal of Political Science 22, no. 2 (June 2021): 96–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109921000086.
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AbstractJapanese security policy has undergone a significant degree of evolution since the early 1990s. As a result, the range of responses Japan can make in international crisis has significantly expanded. The gradual evolution and expansion of the Japanese security policy culminated in the legislation of security-related bills under the second Abe administration in September 2015. The security-related bills dramatically transformed Japanese security policy as it allowed Japan to exercise the right of collective defense when certain conditions are met. The gradual change of Japanese security policy has so far gathered much academic attention. There is a strong claim in the existing literature on Japanese security policy that changes in security policies became possible because of reforms in domestic institutions, which had expanded the Japanese prime minister's power. It is the contention of this article that the Japanese prime minister is still faced with severe constraints from the Diet, in particular from the House of Councilors even after a series of institutional reforms has empowered Japanese prime ministers to significantly alter Japanese security policy. It demonstrates that as the House of Councilors has significant power in the Japanese political system, some Japanese prime ministers had to have the implementation of some security policies delayed or was driven to revise some policies they had originally envisioned through several case studies.
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Jordan, Donald A. "The Place of Chinese Disunity in Japanese Army Strategy during 1931." China Quarterly 109 (March 1987): 42–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100001746x.
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The aggressive action of Japan's Kwantung Army in 1931 is widely known. Its armed takeover of most of Manchuria from a conglomeration of Chinese forces which greatly outnumbered the Japanese, points to a weakness in China's defences other than that of numbers. None of the various Chinese armies was as modern in firepower or as well supplied logistically as Japan's crack army in Manchuria. The disarray within the Chinese Government of Nanjing (Nanking) that was obvious in mid 1931 also tempted the adventurous field officers of the Kwantung Army (KA). These veteran officers with years of duty in China, decided, from their reading of the situation in China as well as in Japan and the West, to act on 18 September 1931 rather than make further preparations as recommended in Tokyo.
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Ong, Donna. "Liu Na'ou: The Fate of “Middling Modernity” and the Global Pure Film Movement in Republican-Era Shanghai." Film Quarterly 72, no. 2 (2018): 26–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/fq.2018.72.2.26.
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The Pure Film movement to elevate cinema as an art form enjoyed a global following amongst commercial to avant-garde filmmakers and theorists during the interwar period. In East Asia, the influence of this vibrant discourse is perhaps best represented by the widely studied Japanese Pure Film movement, but little is known about its presence in China or the enigmatic figure Liu Na'ou who imported these discourses from the West, via Tokyo to Shanghai. Intended to improve the quality of Chinese films, these modernist film theories inevitably became embroiled in Liu's political campaign to protect freedom in the arts and entertainment against leftist political dogma of national defense and rising proletarianism. Following Liu's violent assassination for treason during the Sino-Japanese war, what is now considered Western Classical film theory became subject to the same stigma and taboo that has plagued the writing of Republican-era Chinese film history.
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Langdon, Frank, and S. Javed Maswood. "Japanese Defence: The Search for Political Power." Pacific Affairs 64, no. 3 (1991): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2759514.
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Kohno, Masaru. "Japanese Defense Policy Making: The FSX Selection, 1985-1987." Asian Survey 29, no. 5 (May 1, 1989): 457–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2644532.
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Kohno, Masaru. "Japanese Defense Policy Making: The FSX Selection, 1985-1987." Asian Survey 29, no. 5 (May 1989): 457–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.1989.29.5.01p0271y.
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Kameyama, Yasuko, and Keishi Ono. "The development of climate security discourse in Japan." Sustainability Science 16, no. 1 (September 25, 2020): 271–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00863-1.
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AbstractAs the level of understanding about climate change has increased, the term “climate security” has been increasingly used in the rapidly growing literature on this subject. Although Japan has officially acknowledged the importance of tackling climate change, discussion of climate security has been almost nonexistent among Japanese governmental officials, politicians, and academics. Our aim was to trace discourses related to climate security in Japan to determine why so little exists in Japan and whether or not such discourse could suggest new areas for consideration to more comprehensively respond to the climate change problem. Because of different interpretations and uses of the term “climate security” in the existing literature, we first categorized existing approaches to climate security into four types and used this categorization to examine Japan’s discourse from these perspectives. Two of the approaches, namely “long-term irreversible planetary changes” and “short-term abrupt risks to individuals”, had been considered in Japan previously but without specific reference to the term climate security. The other two, “cause of conflict and violence” and “impacts to military and defense organizations”, however, had not been used and need to be included in discussions of climate change in Japan. Some of the topics not discussed in Japan include indirect economic losses of Japanese industries via supply chains, loss of Japan’s exclusive economic zone due to sea-level rise, and the potential inflow of refugees resulting from extreme weather patterns outside of Japan.
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Sakhuja, Vijay. "Japanese maritime self defence force: Kata and Katana." Strategic Analysis 24, no. 4 (July 2000): 807–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700160008455248.
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