Journal articles on the topic 'Japanese schools of Pure Land Buddhism'

In this paper I will offer an analysis of what it means to be a ‘historical tradition’. My purpose in undertaking this analysis is to apply the result to a problem of modern Buddhology, namely, the important question as to whether the Sino-Japanese ‘Pure Land School’ of Buddhism is to be considered as part of the Buddhist Historical Tradition. Before defining the term ‘historical tradition’, let me remark that I shall be seeking a descriptive or ‘empiricist’ view of what constitutes a given historical tradition. I shall not deal with any particular theory of history containing non-empirical elements, such as for example the Marxist View of history. My view could also be described as the Earl‘ Buddhist View of history. One might ask, is there such a thing as ‘Early Buddhism’? I take it as having been demonstrated by Dr David J. Kalupahana that there is such a thing as ‘Early Buddhism’. His method is to compare those same suttas occurring in the Pali Nikayas and Chinese Āgamas. Since these sources are most likely the earliest historical material available to us, then it is reasonable for us to take any common and consistent doctrines we might find in them as the ‘Early Buddhist View’. As Dr Kalupahana very ably demonstrates, we do indeed find such a common doctrine, which amounts to a form of empiricist philosophy. Thus, we can label this as the Early Buddhist View.

The popularization of Japanese Buddhism in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is generally equated with the development of independent religious movements such as the Pure Land and Lotus schools, which emphasized salvation by faith and simple invocations. Although these movements were indeed at the heart of Buddhism's transformation from an aristocratic to a popular religion, there are problems with an approach that focuses on them alone. To begin with, such an approach ignores the considerable contribution of the older schools—Tendai, Shingon, and those centered in Nara—to the popularization of Buddhism. In addition, it becomes tempting to see the spread of Buddhism as only the result of innovations in doctrine and religious practice, the most obvious differences between new schools and old, and to ignore the role played by monasteries as social and economic institutions.

Abstract This essay discusses how Orthodox Christianity and Mahāyāna Buddhism understood the acts of both seeing and being seen by the divine, and how such ideas affected the making and use of icons in these two religious traditions. I focus on the visual culture of the Byzantine and Russian Orthodox churches between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, and that of the East Asian Pure Land and Esoteric schools between the ninth and fourteenth centuries, respectively. I interpret the function of the iconostasis as an enduring remnant of the Jewish veil used to obstruct God’s vision. Here, Jacques Lacan’s concepts of the gaze and the screen provide a thought-provoking rationale. In turn, I investigate the mandala and icon in Japanese Esoteric Buddhism, in which both seeing and being seen by the divine were deemed spiritual blessings granted by the divine being. This thematic comparison brings to light the less discussed aspects of Christian and Buddhist visual experiences.

Abstract The recent emphasis on materiality in religion has encouraged a good deal of attention to materiality in Buddhism, but that attention has fallen entirely on Buddhist traditions with conventional monastic orientations. Yet the major Japanese Buddhist school known as True Pure Land Buddhism (Jōdo Shinshū) has also historically possessed a highly important, if different, material dimension, for which one touchpoint has been its merchant members called Ōmi shōnin who flourished in later premodern Japanese history. After alluding to the difficulty of isolating the ‘material’ in any religious culture, the article sketches the transition in Christian materialities in Europe which marked a cognitive shift from medieval modes of thinking (exteriorized, animistic-monistic, oriented to relics and ancestor religion) towards modern modes (interiorized, oriented to abstraction and the psychological individual). Against that paradigm, almost all premodern Buddhist materialities, including those in Japan, can be seen as medieval in nature. However, Jōdo Shinshū was a departure employing an innovatively interiorized doctrine. From that perspective, both Europe and Japan were highly complex civilizations displaying a long-term medieval-to-modern shift, which impacted the material manifestations of religions by gradually replacing older economies of ritual exchange with more modern-looking economies of preaching, religious publication and commercial life. Western scholarship has resisted appreciating these issues in an Asian setting.

Monk Genshin (942-1017) went down in the history of Japanese Buddhism not only as a teacher of the Tendai school, who for the first time substantiated the teaching of Buddha Amida and the Pure Land, as a compiler of interpretations of sutras, treatises, sermons and many other works, but also as a hero of setsuwa didactic tales. Stories about him appear in the collection of legends about the miracles of the Lotus Sutra in the middle of the 11th century, then in the book of stories about the rebirth in the Pure Land and in the Konjaku monogatari shū of the early 12th century. Then, in almost all major collections of setsuwa, tales about Genshin are found, with the early detailed narratives being replaced by brief descriptions of individual episodes from his life. The stories talk about how Genshin from a temple monk became a hermit, about his relationship with his mother, about the works of the Buddhist scribe and his meetings with other monks and lay people, about miracles at the hour of his death. The peculiarity of these tales is that Genshin does not always appear in them as the main character: he often plays the more modest role of waki wanderer, a guest of other monks, priests and laity: in response to his questions, they reveal their understanding of the Buddhist path.

Abstract Drawing on archival research and interview data, this paper discusses the historical development as well as the present configuration of the Japanese Buddhist panorama in Austria, which includes Zen, Pure Land, and Nichiren Buddhism. It traces the early beginnings, highlights the key stages and activities in the expansion process, and sheds light on both denominational complexity and international entanglement. Fifteen years before any other European country (Portugal in 1998; Italy in 2000), Austria formally acknowledged Buddhism as a legally recognised religious society in 1983. Hence, the paper also explores the larger organisational context of the Österreichische Buddhistische Religionsgesellschaft (Austrian Buddhist Religious Society) with a focus on its Japanese Buddhist actors. Additionally, it briefly outlines the non-Buddhist Japanese religious landscape in Austria.

Abstract The writings of German missionary Hans Haas (1868–1934) were seminal texts which greatly influenced how many Europeans came to understand Japanese Buddhism. Haas became a significant actor in this early reception of Japanese Buddhism after he began working as an editor for the journal Zeitschrift für Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft while stationed in Japan from 1898–1909. Haas covered all areas and aspects of Japanese Buddhism, from editing and translating texts such as Sukhavati Buddhism (1910a) into German to cross-religious comparisons of Buddhist songs and legends. This paper seeks to identify various elements which contributed to the development of Japanese Buddhism in Europe, paying special attention to the role of Haas’s work. In particular, it seeks to reconstruct his understanding of Pure Land Buddhism by demonstrating how a Protestant interpretative scheme, particularly that of Lutheran Protestantism, dominated much of the early reception of Japanese Buddhism in Europe.

The subject of this research is the soteriology of Amidism as a single formative force that contributed to the spread and acquisition of new features of the doctrine. The object of this research is the theory of salvation and rebirth in the Pure Land, which undergoes modification and adopts the elements of other schools and denominations. This article examines soteriology of the School of Amidism as a driving force that develops and promotes the doctrine of the Pure Land in the Far Eastern region during the Middle Ages. Comprehensive approach towards studying the system of soteriological aspects of Amidism allows comprehending the patterns of the process of establishment and strengthening of the doctrine in new sociocultural realms. An attempt is made to trace the peculiarities of the impact of other schools of Buddhism upon soteriology of Amidaist doctrine. The scientific novelty lies in the original approach towards examining the soteriological representations of the Buddhist direction. The soteriological aspects of Amidism are viewed as a single substrate, linking element, foundation for the doctrine of the Pure Land, which promotes its development and distribution on the Asian continent and neighboring states. Amidaist teaching has walked a long path, since conception of the idea of Pure Land to development of the complex doctrinal system. In the spatial context, Amidism transcends the boundaries, growing from the local belief to a major trend of Mahayana Buddhism. Soteriology of the doctrine has become the foundation, formative force, which contributed to strengthening and development of doctrine.

This paper analyses the Japanese influence upon Taiwanese Buddhist communities during the Colonial Period. I will discuss the interplay between monasticism, education, and politics by examining the process of institutionalisation of monastics and Buddhist educational programs in Taiwan between 1895 and 1945. In accord with pertinent historical developments, this paper is divided into five sections: (1) the Sōtō Zen lineage, (2) the Rinzai Zen lineage, (3) the Pure Land (Jōdo) lineage, (4) Taiwanese monastics who studied in Japan, and (5) Taiwanese nuns. Based on the strong Japanese sectarian tradition, different sects had disparate strategies in Taiwan. The Sōtō lineage arrived first, engaged in precept ceremonies, and started up a well-run Buddhist college. The Myōshinji Sect of Rinzai took Kaiyuansi in Tainan as the main headquarters in southern Taiwan for teaching Buddhist classes as well as holding monumental precept-conferral ceremonies. As for the Pure Land lineage, they came slightly later but eventually established 37 branches across Taiwan, implementing social-educational programs actively. Finally, the nuns and monks who went abroad to study Buddhism in Japan matured and took important roles in advancing Buddhist education in Taiwan. All of these cases demonstrate a profound Japanese influence upon Taiwanese Buddhist education and monastic culture.

The article examines Orikuchi Shinobu’s novella, Shisha no sho [The Book of the Dead] (1939), as a discursively constructed amalgamation of multiple cultural and historical sources. Whereas Orikuchi tends to be considered the exponent of cultural nativism, the novella resists a nationalist impulse of extolling the legend of Taima Mandala and Princess Chūjō (Chūjōhime) as a paragon of the Japanese reception of Buddhism. According to the widely-known legend, Princess Chūjō, a member of the politically powerful Fujiwara clan in the Nara period, had woven in a day the mandala out of lotus threads shortly after completing one thousand copies of Shōsanjyōdo Busshōjukyō (the Amida sutra). Further the legend tells that she was welcomed to the Pure Land by Amida Buddha upon her death at the age of twenty nine. In The Book of the Dead her legendary labor opts out of simple appraisal for her devotional response to Buddhism, as though implicitly refuting the Yamato state’s political advocacy of the religion. In turn, Orikuchi’s modernist revisionism reanimates a spectacle of the antiquity, contextualizing the legend in the socio-political periphery of the Taima village. To this end, the novella calls forth a number of historical episodes, topographical images of the locality, and the transculturation of Buddhism in ancient Japan. Concretely, the narrative interweaves the tragedy of Prince Ōtsu who was executed for the treason plotted against the imperial government, a cult of Mount Futakami (today’s Nijōzan in Nara Prefecture), pre-Buddhist practice of worshipping the Sun, and the formation of Nissōkan in Japan’s early Buddhism. Through the dialogic unity of these motifs, Orikuchi deconstructs the legend of Princess Chūjō and the Taima Mandala, transforming it into a visionary narrative devoid of a single cultural and religious root.

The purported absence of a highest god who creates and governs the universe in the Buddhist worldview has often been regarded as an obstacle to dialogue and mutual understanding between Buddhists and Muslims. However, there has emerged a trend among contemporary Buddhist scholars to discuss a Buddhist equivalent of such a god in order to relate to Islam doctrinally. This article examines three examples of such an attempt, respectively representing the Theravāda, Tibetan, and Japanese Pure Land traditions, as endeavors in the theology of religions. The article demonstrates that these accounts all seek to overcome the psychological gap between Buddhists and Muslims created by perceived doctrinal remoteness between the two traditions, by drawing parallels between the Islamic concept of God and Buddhist notions of the ultimate reality, be it the dhamma, emptiness, Adi Buddha, or Amida Buddha. It will be argued that, although highly unconventional, this line of approach has been motivated by the agenda shared among these Buddhist scholars to promote interreligious harmony and understanding on a global scale. Such agendas tend to be developed in reaction to interreligious conflicts or through personal involvement with Muslims.

Abstract Dennis Hirota is a modern master of Shin Buddhism who for several decades has explicated the role of natural language in fostering Buddhist awakening. At the core of his oeuvre is the claim that Shin Buddhism’s founder, Shinran Shonin (1173-1263), accepted the earlier Mahayana teaching of nondual awareness as a necessary condition for awakening. Shinran’s unique contribution was to insist that ordinary persons were, as a matter of historical circumstance, incapable of the disciplines required to arrive at non-dual awareness. It was just this circumstance that the historical Buddha foresaw when he taught the Larger Pure Land Sutra, in which the mind of the Buddha Amida, perfect wisdom and compassion, became available to ordinary people who call his Name in joyful sincerity. This is a difficult teaching of “non-practice” that embraces many subtleties. As a heuristic to ease the way into Shinran as Hirota presents him, this paper introduces a painting by the modern Japanese scientist and artist, Iwasaki Tsuneo. This is not a “Shin painting,” but certainly a “Mahayana painting” that connects the aspiration of an ordinary person to ultimate truth through the text of the Heart Sutra, arguably the quintessential Buddhist teaching of non-dual awareness.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在本文筆者要逐一檢討在西方四個常見的贊成安樂死的論據（仁是在、生命贊素、尊嚴、自決），並且指出這四個論據分別與中國儒家的價值觀（仁、所欲有甚於生、士可殺不可辱、泰山與鴻毛）有不同程度的共鳴及相通之處。由於這些共鳴及相通之處只是在某程度上，而非徹底相通，所以透過中國古代的價值觀的相對照，也可以更清楚看出這四個西方論據之性質及其可能限制。筆者的結論是，從儒家的價值觀來看，除了在某極端的情況中，一般來說這四個支持安樂死的論據都是說服力不足。This paper attempts to analyze four major arguments in favor of the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia (including physician-assisted-suicide) as found in the West, and tries to assess these arguments through Chinese Confucian ethics and its perspectives on life and death. Through such a cross-cultural dialogue the author concludes that there is some similarity as well as difference in Chinese and western values. The western moral values appealed to in advocating voluntary euthanasia, to a certain extent, can strike an echoing chord in Confucian ethics. In other words, though the debate on euthanasia is a contemporary phenomenon, the arguments and their underlying values in favor of its moral acceptability are not entirely foreign to premodern Confucian ethics. This resonance notwithstanding, the Confucian echoes are also limited. Behind some general agreements are some significant disagreements as well. Hence this cross-cultural dialogue can reveal in a clearer manner the salient traits and possible flaws of the western moral arguments in favor of euthanasia, and can contribute to a multicultural reflection on some contemporary moral controversies.This paper begins by clarifying the etymological meaning of "anle si," the phrase for "euthanasia" in Chinese as well as in Japanese. The root of the phrase can be traced to either Mencius or Pure Land Buddhism. The latter possibility seems more probable, and "anle si" then means a death or dying free of suffering. In this paper, I shall restrict the term "anle si" or "euthanasia", to voluntary, active euthanasia and physician-assisted-suicide.The first common western argument in favor of euthanasia is the argument of mercy. For some patients the dying process is accompanied by such excruciating pain that euthanasia is a good way of release from suffering. Since the patient is on the way to die anyway, such suffering is pointless and is not worth-enduring. Euthanasia for such dying patients is to spare them from such pointless suffering and is therefore a manifestation of mercy. This argument can find an echo in Confucian ethics. The fundamental value in Confucianism is "ren," and one of its meanings is benevolence. According to Mencius, the root of "ren" or benevolence lies in compassion, i.e., feeling intense pain in seeing others suffer. Traditional Chinese medicine also adopts this cardinal Confucian virtue as its fundamental guiding norm, hence the dictum that medicine is "renxin renshu" (benevolence and benevolent art). Thus if the premise "Euthanasia is the only way or best way to eliminate pain in the dying process" is empirically true, one can infer that euthanasia can be justified by Confucian ethics of ren. However, in light of the recent progress in palliative medicine and hospice care, the aforementioned premise can be empirically true only in very limited circumstances, which are analogous to a torture scene in the recent Chinese novel, then turned into movie, The Red Sorghum. (The author also observes that the hospice philosophy is more in consonance with the Taoist philosophy of Zhuangzi.)The second common western argument in favor of euthanasia is the argument of the quality of life. It has been argued that some sufferers of disease and accidents do not want to live anymore not because of intractable pain, but because of the irreversible and unacceptable low level of the quality of life (e.g., in Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, ALS, MS, quadriplegic, etc.). Since the condition is incurable, and the persons involved would rather die than to endure this "living hell," euthanasia is liberation from this bondage. Confucianism does not subscribe to the doctrine of the sanctity of biological life either, and places heavy emphasis on the quality of life, to be defined with reference to ren and yi (i.e., in the wide sense of supreme virtue), rather than on the quantity of life (i.e., longevity). To live out one's life to its natural limit is not in itself desirable. In order to secure a high quality of life, in some circumstances, one has to be prepared to die, even by taking matters into one’s hand, lest what is going to transpire in the natural life span will decrease the quality of life. However, the limit of the Confucian echo is that Confucianism cares largely the moral quality of life, and cares very little about the biological quality of life. As long as the low quality of biological life is not to affect adversely one’s moral quality of life, there is no good reason to terminate one’s biological life.The third common western argument in favor of euthanasia is the argument of death with dignity. According to this argument, our biological condition can be so bad (e.g., loss of control, being brought back to the infant condition, in a state of zombie) that it is a humiliation to our sense of dignity. Such an assault on our dignity can be more intolerable than physical pain. Euthanasia can therefore deliver us from such an undignified state of existence. In Confucianism, especially since the Han Dynasty, to commit suicide in order to avoid humiliation, disgrace, and dishonor is not only desirable, but also obligatory. Such an idea of "a man of integrity prefers death to humiliation" is even accepted by a number of Chinese intellectuals during the so-called "Cultural Revolution." However, historically the Confucian endorsement of death with dignity is largely limited to the cases in which the assault on human dignity came from an external source (from enemies, emperor, government), and such an assault is not a universal predicament. Furthermore, in those circumstances in which to commit suicide is the only way to avoid humiliation it happens because one’s destiny is controlled by hostile forces; there is no friendly force at hand to make one feel better. In the contemporary case of euthanasia, in contrast, the assault on human dignity comes from an internal source (disease, old age, bodily and mental decay all stem from our mortal and corruptible body) and is therefore a universal human phenomenon. Unless we conceive disease and sickness as an enemy, Confucian ethics would not view our deteriorating biological condition as an assault on human dignity. If we accept that our mortal embodied life is a part of our human condition, we can hardly say that bodily and mental decay is undignified. Besides, especially when palliative and hospice care are available, a patient is not captured and isolated in a maleficent environment, but is surrounded by health care professionals who are there to help us. After all, one purpose of hospice care is to help patients to maintain their dignity while they are travelling in this last stage of the journey of life. Hence the Confucian endorsement of euthanasia as death with dignity is quite limited.The fourth common western argument in favor of euthanasia is the argument of self-determination. According to the cherished western value of autonomy, an individual should be given the liberty to decide on things that matter much to him or her. Like the decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, education, etc., the decision on how and when to die is one of the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime. Hence we have the right to die; some even claim that this is a human right, both a negative right (whose correlative duty is nonintervention in suicide attempts) and a positive right (whose correlative duty is suicide assistance). After all, whose life is it anyway? In Confucian values, individual autonomy has never been a cherishedvalue; nor has there been any human rights thinking. That one can decide on the time and circumstances of one’s death is only implied. According to Confucian values one should choose a good death (good in the moral sense) even by actively bringing it about. Since "ought" implies "can," that in some circumstances a person ought to commit suicide implies that the person is morally permissible to commit suicide. However, the Confucian echo of pro-euthanasia argument is the weakest here. The western argument is concerned with the permissibility of suicide and euthanasia, whereas Confucian ethics is concerned with the impermissibility of not committing suicide. In other words, the western argument is concerned with the permissibility of all suicide, regardless of its worth. Confucian ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with only the permissibility of some suicide, those that are deemed morally worthy. The western argument is concerned with the right of euthanasia, but Confucian ethics is only concerned with the rightness, the right conduct, or the right exercise of the right, of euthanasia. Furthermore, the ideas of self-ownership and individual sovereignty are entirely foreign to Confucian values.To conclude, the Confucian echo of these four western arguments varies. The resonance is most prominent in the first argument and weakest in the last argument. This cross-cultural comparison should be instructive to Chinese as well as to the people in the West because it shows which values are universal and which are not. For example, the western society has the tendency to view the value of autonomy as self-evident ("We hold these truths to be self-evident......"), but this value is obviously not self-evident to the Confucian mind. Who is right, and who is wrong? That the Confucian endorsement of euthanasia is only limited should give something to every member of the global village to ponder about.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 220 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

My presentation is based on my personal experience of a psychology professor and a long-term leader of the “Shinchu Counseling” group. There are three reasons for this presentation. First, within themselves, Buddhism and PCs are inextricably linked with each other. Secondly, I would like to present at this international forum a Buddhist school to which I belong. In Japan, it is called Jodo Shinshu, or simply Shinshu. In English, it was introduced as Buddhism by Jodo Shinshu, Buddhism, Shin, or True Buddhism of Pure Land. Jodo Shinshu is the most influential Buddhist school in Japan; She has the largest following and more deeply rooted in the spiritual life of the Japanese than Zen Buddhism, which is more widely known outside of Japan. Thirdly, my sincere desire is to deepen the link between Shinshu and SPS at the levels of theory and practice so that the “counseling of Shinshu” helped create a new look at humanity and new human relationships for the 21st century. I believe that the term “Buddha Dharma” better reflects the religious system, which is commonly called Buddhism. The reason is that it is a way of life for all mankind, and not simply “ism”, which is a system of thinking. Buddha Shakyamuni has achieved an ideal awakening to the truth and reality of human suffering, and this awakening is called “wisdom”. From condolence to people, he decided to share his realization with them in order to free them from suffering. Since it came from the highest awakening of the Buddha and contains the dynamic power of human salvation based on its wisdom and compassion, I want to call Buddha's doctrine the “Dharma Buddha” in order to help people, solve their suffering and torture. I believe that the Dharma Buddha can be closely linked to psychotherapy, counseling and other activities aimed at helping people in a difficult position.