Relevant bibliographies by topics / JEL D82, J31, J44

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses

Academic literature on the topic 'JEL D82, J31, J44'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "JEL D82, J31, J44"

1

Bartling, Björn, Ernst Fehr, and Klaus M. Schmidt. "Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs." American Economic Review 102, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 834–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.834.

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High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: “bad” jobs with low discretion, low wages, and little rent-sharing, and “good” jobs with high discretion, high wages, and substantial rent-sharing. Good jobs are profitable only if employees can be screened, and labor market competition fosters their dissemination. (JEL D12, D82, J24, J31, J41, M12, M54)
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2

Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 191–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170192.

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Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sönmez and Sönmez–Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sönmez and Sönmez-Switzer. (JEL C78, D82, D86, J31, J45)
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3

Kahn, Lisa B. "Asymmetric Information between Employers." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 165–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.4.165.

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This study explores whether potential employers have the same information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction made by incumbent firms. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12)
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Arcidiacono, Peter, Patrick Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo. "Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 76–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.2.4.76.

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We provide evidence that college graduation plays a direct role in revealing ability to the labor market. Using the NLSY79, our results suggest that ability is observed nearly perfectly for college graduates, but is revealed to the labor market more gradually for high school graduates. Consequently, from the beginning of their careers, college graduates are paid in accordance with their own ability, while the wages of high school graduates are initially unrelated to their own ability. This view of ability revelation in the labor market has considerable power in explaining racial differences in wages, education, and returns to ability. (JEL D82, I21, I23, J24, J31)
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5

Waldman, Michael, and Ori Zax. "Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, no. 1 (February 1, 2020): 125–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180285.

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In a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12, M51)
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6

Fredriksson, Peter, Lena Hensvik, and Oskar Nordström Skans. "Mismatch of Talent: Evidence on Match Quality, Entry Wages, and Job Mobility." American Economic Review 108, no. 11 (November 1, 2018): 3303–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160848.

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We examine the impact of mismatch on entry wages, separations, and wage growth using unique data on worker talents. We show that workers are sorted on comparative advantage across jobs within occupations. The starting wages of inexperienced workers are unrelated to mismatch. For experienced workers, on the other hand, mismatch is negatively priced into their starting wages. Separations and wage growth are more strongly related to mismatch among inexperienced workers than among experienced workers. These findings are consistent with models of information updating, where less information is available about the quality of matches involving inexperienced workers. (JEL D83, J24, J31, J41, J63, J64)
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7

Hornstein, Andreas, Per Krusell, and Giovanni L. Violante. "Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Assessment." American Economic Review 101, no. 7 (December 1, 2011): 2873–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.7.2873.

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We propose a new measure of frictional wage dispersion: the meanmin wage ratio. For a large class of search models, we show that this measure is independent of the wage-offer distribution but depends on statistics of labor-market turnover and on preferences. Under plausible preference parameterizations, observed magnitudes for worker flows imply that in the basic search model, and in most of its extensions, frictional wage dispersion is very small. Notable exceptions are some of the most recent models of on-the-job search. Our new measure allows us to rationalize the diverse empirical findings in the large literature estimating structural search models. (JEL D81, D83, J31, J41, J64)
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8

Jayaraman, Rajshri, Debraj Ray, and Francis de Véricourt. "Anatomy of a Contract Change." American Economic Review 106, no. 2 (February 1, 2016): 316–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141122.

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We study a contract change for tea pluckers on an Indian plantation, with a higher government-stipulated baseline wage. Incentive piece rates were lowered or kept unchanged. Yet, in the following month, output increased by 20 to 80 percent. This response contradicts the standard model and several variants, is only partly explicable by greater supervision, and appears to be “behavioral.” But in subsequent months, the increase is comprehensively reversed. Though not an unequivocal indictment of “behavioral” models, these findings suggest that nonstandard responses may be ephemeral, and should ideally be tracked over an extended period of time. (JEL D82, D86, J33, J41, J43, O13, Q12)
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9

Huck, Steffen, Andrew J. Seltzer, and Brian Wallace. "Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model." American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 819–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.819.

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This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relation ship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. (JEL D86, J22, J31, J33, J41)
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10

Rudanko, Leena. "Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk in a Frictional Labor Market." American Economic Review 101, no. 6 (October 1, 2011): 2823–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2823.

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This paper develops a tractable extension of a Mortensen-Pissarides style matching model that allows for risk averse workers with limited ability to smooth consumption. I show that this leads to a form of equilibrium wage rigidity, as the inability of workers to smooth their consumption across unemployment and employment spells changes how unemployed workers value wage offers, and hence also the offers that employers find profitable to make. In the model risk-averse entrepreneurs use optimal long-term contracts to attract risk averse workers facing limited access to asset markets. A simple analytic representation for the equilibrium is derived. JEL: D81, E21, E24, E32, J31, J41, J64
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "JEL D82, J31, J44"

1

Oberhofer, Harald, and Marian Schwinner. "Do individual salaries depend on the performance of the peers? Prototype heuristic and wage bargaining in the NBA." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2017. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5553/1/wp247.pdf.

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This paper analyzes the link between relative market value of representative subsets of athletes in the National Basketball Association (NBA) and individual wages. NBA athletes are categorized with respect to multiple performance characteristics utilizing the k-means algorithm to cluster observations and a group's market value is calculated by averaging real annual salaries. Employing GMM estimation techniques to a dynamic wage equation, we find a statistically significant and positive effect of one-period lagged relative market value of an athlete's representative cluster on individual wages after controlling for past individual performance. This finding is consistent with the theory of prototype heuristic, introduced by Kahneman and Frederick (2002), that NBA teams' judgment about an athlete's future performance is based on a comparison of the player to a prototype group consisting of other but comparable athletes.
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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