Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / JEL D82, J31, J44 / Journal articles

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: JEL D82, J31, J44.

Journal articles on the topic 'JEL D82, J31, J44'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'JEL D82, J31, J44.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Bartling, Björn, Ernst Fehr, and Klaus M. Schmidt. "Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs." American Economic Review 102, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 834–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.834.

Full text

Abstract:

High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: “bad” jobs with low discretion, low wages, and little rent-sharing, and “good” jobs with high discretion, high wages, and substantial rent-sharing. Good jobs are profitable only if employees can be screened, and labor market competition fosters their dissemination. (JEL D12, D82, J24, J31, J41, M12, M54)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 191–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170192.

Full text

Abstract:

Sönmez (2013) and Sönmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sönmez and Sönmez–Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sönmez and Sönmez-Switzer. (JEL C78, D82, D86, J31, J45)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Kahn, Lisa B. "Asymmetric Information between Employers." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 165–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.5.4.165.

Full text

Abstract:

This study explores whether potential employers have the same information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction made by incumbent firms. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Arcidiacono, Peter, Patrick Bayer, and Aurel Hizmo. "Beyond Signaling and Human Capital: Education and the Revelation of Ability." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 76–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.2.4.76.

Full text

Abstract:

We provide evidence that college graduation plays a direct role in revealing ability to the labor market. Using the NLSY79, our results suggest that ability is observed nearly perfectly for college graduates, but is revealed to the labor market more gradually for high school graduates. Consequently, from the beginning of their careers, college graduates are paid in accordance with their own ability, while the wages of high school graduates are initially unrelated to their own ability. This view of ability revelation in the labor market has considerable power in explaining racial differences in wages, education, and returns to ability. (JEL D82, I21, I23, J24, J31)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Waldman, Michael, and Ori Zax. "Promotion Signaling and Human Capital Investments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, no. 1 (February 1, 2020): 125–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180285.

Full text

Abstract:

In a world characterized by asymmetric learning, promotions can serve as signals of worker ability, and this, in turn, can result in inefficient promotion decisions. If the labor market is competitive, the result will be practices that reduce this distortion. We explore how this logic affects human capital investment decisions. We show that, if commitment is possible, investments will be biased toward the accumulation of firm-specific human capital. We also consider what happens when commitment is not possible and show a number of results including that, if investment choices are not publicly observable, choices are frequently efficient. (JEL D82, J24, J31, M12, M51)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Fredriksson, Peter, Lena Hensvik, and Oskar Nordström Skans. "Mismatch of Talent: Evidence on Match Quality, Entry Wages, and Job Mobility." American Economic Review 108, no. 11 (November 1, 2018): 3303–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160848.

Full text

Abstract:

We examine the impact of mismatch on entry wages, separations, and wage growth using unique data on worker talents. We show that workers are sorted on comparative advantage across jobs within occupations. The starting wages of inexperienced workers are unrelated to mismatch. For experienced workers, on the other hand, mismatch is negatively priced into their starting wages. Separations and wage growth are more strongly related to mismatch among inexperienced workers than among experienced workers. These findings are consistent with models of information updating, where less information is available about the quality of matches involving inexperienced workers. (JEL D83, J24, J31, J41, J63, J64)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Hornstein, Andreas, Per Krusell, and Giovanni L. Violante. "Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Assessment." American Economic Review 101, no. 7 (December 1, 2011): 2873–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.7.2873.

Full text

Abstract:

We propose a new measure of frictional wage dispersion: the meanmin wage ratio. For a large class of search models, we show that this measure is independent of the wage-offer distribution but depends on statistics of labor-market turnover and on preferences. Under plausible preference parameterizations, observed magnitudes for worker flows imply that in the basic search model, and in most of its extensions, frictional wage dispersion is very small. Notable exceptions are some of the most recent models of on-the-job search. Our new measure allows us to rationalize the diverse empirical findings in the large literature estimating structural search models. (JEL D81, D83, J31, J41, J64)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Jayaraman, Rajshri, Debraj Ray, and Francis de Véricourt. "Anatomy of a Contract Change." American Economic Review 106, no. 2 (February 1, 2016): 316–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141122.

Full text

Abstract:

We study a contract change for tea pluckers on an Indian plantation, with a higher government-stipulated baseline wage. Incentive piece rates were lowered or kept unchanged. Yet, in the following month, output increased by 20 to 80 percent. This response contradicts the standard model and several variants, is only partly explicable by greater supervision, and appears to be “behavioral.” But in subsequent months, the increase is comprehensively reversed. Though not an unequivocal indictment of “behavioral” models, these findings suggest that nonstandard responses may be ephemeral, and should ideally be tracked over an extended period of time. (JEL D82, D86, J33, J41, J43, O13, Q12)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Huck, Steffen, Andrew J. Seltzer, and Brian Wallace. "Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model." American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 819–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.819.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relation ship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. (JEL D86, J22, J31, J33, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Rudanko, Leena. "Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk in a Frictional Labor Market." American Economic Review 101, no. 6 (October 1, 2011): 2823–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2823.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper develops a tractable extension of a Mortensen-Pissarides style matching model that allows for risk averse workers with limited ability to smooth consumption. I show that this leads to a form of equilibrium wage rigidity, as the inability of workers to smooth their consumption across unemployment and employment spells changes how unemployed workers value wage offers, and hence also the offers that employers find profitable to make. In the model risk-averse entrepreneurs use optimal long-term contracts to attract risk averse workers facing limited access to asset markets. A simple analytic representation for the equilibrium is derived. JEL: D81, E21, E24, E32, J31, J41, J64

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Mohanan, Manoj, Katherine Donato, Grant Miller, Yulya Truskinovsky, and Marcos Vera-Hernández. "Different Strokes for Different Folks? Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 13, no. 4 (October 1, 2021): 34–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20190220.

Full text

Abstract:

A central issue in designing incentive contracts is the decision to reward agents’ input use versus outputs. The trade-off between risk and return to innovation in production can also lead agents with varying skill levels to perform differentially under different contracts. We study this issue experimentally, observing and verifying inputs and outputs in Indian maternity care. We find that both contract types achieve comparable reductions in postpartum hemorrhage rates, but payments for outputs were four times that of inputs. Providers with varying qualifications performed equivalently under input incentives, while providers with advanced qualifications may have performed better under output contracts. (JEL D82, D86, I12, J13, J16, J41, O15)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Fudenberg, Drew, and Luis Rayo. "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship." American Economic Review 109, no. 11 (November 1, 2019): 3780–812. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20171939.

Full text

Abstract:

A principal specifies time paths of effort provision, task allocation, and knowledge transfer for a cash-constrained apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In the optimal contract the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and by working inefficiently hard. The apprentice can work on both knowledge-complementary and knowledge-independent tasks. We study the optimal time path of effort distortions and their impact on the knowledge transfer, and analyze the effect of regulatory limits on the length of apprenticeships and on how much effort apprentices are allowed to provide. (JEL D82, D86, J24, J41, M53)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Jovanovic, Boyan. "Misallocation and Growth." American Economic Review 104, no. 4 (April 1, 2014): 1149–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1149.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper models growth via on-the-job learning when firms and workers are heterogeneous. It is an overlapping generations model in which young agents match with the old. More efficient assignments lead to faster long-run growth, more inequality, and less turnover in the distribution of human capital. Constant-growth paths are characterized for general functional forms and then, for the Cobb-Douglas case, the transition dynamics are solved analytically when the skill of the young is log-normally distributed and the initial human capital of the old generation is also log-normal. Growth and inequality move together on the transition to the balanced growth path. ( JEL D83, J24, J31, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Echenique, Federico. "Contracts versus Salaries in Matching." American Economic Review 102, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 594–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.594.

Full text

Abstract:

Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. JEL: C78, D86, J31, J41

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Holmström, Bengt. "Pay For Performance and Beyond." American Economic Review 107, no. 7 (July 1, 2017): 1753–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.107.7.1753.

Full text

Abstract:

Incentives are often associated with narrow financial rewards such as bonuses or executive stock options. But in general such rewards are just a small part of the design of incentives. Properly designed incentive systems have to take into account the full portfolio of activities that the agent can engage in, the array of instruments, many nonfinancial, that are available to influence individuals and consider the factors that motivate them in different settings. Thinking about incentives as a system of interacting instruments and influences has been a major advance in the economics of incentives in recent years. In this lecture I will describe the path from pay for performance to the broader view of incentive systems. (JEL D21, D82, D86, J33, J41, M12, M52)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Niederle, Muriel. "Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts." American Economic Review 97, no. 5 (November 1, 2007): 1957–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.5.1957.

Full text

Abstract:

Following the recently dismissed antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP), Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin (2006) propose a simple matching model in which firms set impersonal salaries simultaneously before matching with workers, which leads to lower aggregate wages than any competitive outcome. I model a feature of the NRMP, ordered contracts, that allows firms to set several contracts while determining the order in which they try to fill them, which has different properties than standard models with multiple contracts. Furthermore, the low wages of Bulow and Levin are no longer an equilibrium, but competitive wages are. (JEL D86, J31, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Miller, David A., and Kareen Rozen. "Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 4 (November 1, 2014): 326–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.326.

Full text

Abstract:

We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with underperformance, forgiving sanctioning schemes, and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally take on more assigned tasks than they intend to complete, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility in the hands of one or two agents. (JEL D82, D86, J41, M12, M54)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Herweg, Fabian, Daniel Müller, and Philipp Weinschenk. "Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 1, 2010): 2451–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2451.

Full text

Abstract:

We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Kőoszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold. (JEL D82, D86, J41, M52, M12)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Maestri, Lucas. "Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 34–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.3.34.

Full text

Abstract:

We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent model with subjective evaluations. We compare the surplus in efficiency-wage equilibria and in bonus-payments equilibria. The agent receives a constant wage and is motivated by the threat of dismissal in efficiency-wage equilibria. The agent receives a bonus and quits the relationship after disagreements between his self-evaluation and the principal's performance appraisal in bonus-payments equilibria. We construct a class of equilibria with bonus payments that approach efficiency as patience increases. In contrast, payoffs from efficiency-wage equilibria are bounded away from the Pareto-payoff frontier for any discount factor. (JEL D82, J33, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Park, Yena. "Constrained Efficiency in a Human Capital Model." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 10, no. 3 (July 1, 2018): 179–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20160405.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper investigates whether capital and human capital are over-accumulated in an incomplete market economy. As in Dávila et al. (2012), whether capital is over-accumulated depends on how the pecuniary externalities affect insurance and redistribution. In a human capital economy, however, not only capital but also human capital generates externalities and an additional channel arises that has implications for the overaccumulation (under-accumulation) of capital (human capital). The income sources of the poor and the correlation between wealth and human capital are crucial for the implication of pecuniary externalities. Realistically calibrated models exhibit under-accumulation (overaccumulation) of capital (human capital). (JEL D52, D62, I26, J22, J24, J31)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 1, 2010): 2261–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2261.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents “choose to work” for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns. (JEL D82, D86, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Bubb, Ryan, and Patrick L. Warren. "An Equilibrium Theory of Retirement Plan Design." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 12, no. 2 (May 1, 2020): 22–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180605.

Full text

Abstract:

We develop an equilibrium theory of employer-sponsored retirement plan design using a behavioral contract theory approach. The operation of the labor market results in retirement plans that generally cater to, rather than correct, workers’ mistakes. Our theory provides new explanations for a range of facts about retirement plan design, including the use of employer matching contributions and the use of default contribution rates in automatic enrollment plans that lower many workers’ savings. We provide novel evidence for our theory from a sample of plans. (JEL D86, G51, J26, J32, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Gautier, Pieter A., and Christian L. Holzner. "Simultaneous Search and Efficiency of Entry and Search Intensity." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9, no. 3 (August 1, 2017): 245–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160088.

Full text

Abstract:

We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially efficient. Finally, we show that a sequential auction under incomplete information can establish the social optimum and discuss some alternative mechanisms that can, under complete information of the entire network, also deliver social efficiency. (JEL D12, D44, D83, J23, J31, J64, M51)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Li, Jin, and Niko Matouschek. "Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts." American Economic Review 103, no. 6 (October 1, 2013): 2328–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2328.

Full text

Abstract:

A manager and a worker are in an infinitely repeated relationship in which the manager privately observes her opportunity costs of paying the worker. We show that the optimal relational contract generates periodic conflicts during which effort and expected profits decline gradually but recover instantaneously. To manage a conflict, the manager uses a combination of informal promises and formal commitments that evolves with the duration of the conflict. Finally, we show that liquidity constraints limit the manager's ability to manage conflicts but may also induce the worker to respond to a conflict by providing more effort rather than less. (JEL C73, D74, D86, J33, J41, M12)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Rothenberg, Naomi R. "Communication and Information Sharing in Teams." Accounting Review 90, no. 2 (September 1, 2014): 761–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50910.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRACT This paper studies whether dissemination of private, pre-decision signals about productivity is valuable to the principal when agents work sequentially and observe each other's effort. The benefit of dissemination is that when productivity states are correlated, each agent's signal is useful as a performance measure for the other agent and for making efficient production choices. The more informative the signal is about agents' efforts, the greater the benefit of the additional performance measure, but there is a cost due to higher information rents. With no dissemination, the downstream agent learns about the upstream agent's productivity state by observing that agent's effort. The upstream agent's rents are lower because he has no incentive to free-ride on the downstream agent, who follows his effort, but there is less information on which to base the payments. The choice between dissemination and no dissemination depends on the informativeness of the signal about agents' efforts. JEL Classifications: D82; D83; J41; M41.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Dranove, David, and Christopher Ody. "Employed for Higher Pay? How Medicare Payment Rules Affect Hospital Employment of Physicians." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 4 (November 1, 2019): 249–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170020.

Full text

Abstract:

Hospitals employ an increasing number of physicians and bill for a growing share of outpatient procedures. We exploit a plausibly exogenous increase in Medicare prices for hospital-employed physicians relative to Medicare prices for other physicians to show that payer reimbursement rules explain part of this trend. The shock we study explains 20 percent of the increase in physician employment and 75 percent of the increase in hospital-billed outpatient procedures between 2009 and 2013.(JEL G22, I22, I13, J23, J31, J44)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Niehaus, Paul, and Sandip Sukhtankar. "Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5, no. 4 (November 1, 2013): 230–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.4.230.

Full text

Abstract:

Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents—for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this “golden goose” effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter. (JEL D73, D82, H83, J41, K42, O17, O21)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Haltiwanger, John C., Henry R. Hyatt, Lisa B. Kahn, and Erika McEntarfer. "Cyclical Job Ladders by Firm Size and Firm Wage." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 10, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 52–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20150245.

Full text

Abstract:

We study whether workers progress up firm wage and size job ladders, and the cyclicality of this movement. Search theory predicts that workers should flow toward larger, higher paying firms. However, we see little evidence of a firm size ladder, partly because small, young firms poach workers from all other businesses. In contrast, we find strong evidence of a firm wage ladder that is highly procyclical. During the Great Recession, this firm wage ladder collapsed, with net worker reallocation to higher wage firms falling to zero. The earnings consequences from this lack of upward progression are sizable. (JEL D22, E24, E32, J31, J63, J64, L25)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Alvarez, Jorge, Felipe Benguria, Niklas Engbom, and Christian Moser. "Firms and the Decline in Earnings Inequality in Brazil." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 149–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20150355.

Full text

Abstract:

We document a large decrease in earnings inequality in Brazil between 1996 and 2012. Using administrative linked employer-employee data, we fit high-dimensional worker and firm fixed-effects models to understand the sources of this decrease. Firm effects account for 40 percent of the total decrease and worker effects for 29 percent. Changes in observable worker and firm characteristics contributed little to these trends. Instead, the decrease is primarily due to a compression of returns to these characteristics, particularly a declining firm productivity-pay premium. Our results shed light on potential drivers of earnings inequality dynamics. (JEL D22, D63, J24, J31, L25, M52, O15)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Caicedo, Santiago, Robert E. Lucas, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. "Learning, Career Paths, and the Distribution of Wages." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 49–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20170390.

Full text

Abstract:

We develop a theory of career paths and earnings where agents organize in production hierarchies. Agents climb these hierarchies as they learn stochastically from others. Earnings grow as agents acquire knowledge and occupy positions with more subordinates. We contrast these and other implications with US census data for the period 1990 to 2010, matching the Lorenz curve of earnings and the observed mean experience-earnings profiles. We show the increase in wage inequality over this period can be rationalized with a shift in the level of the complexity and profitability of technologies relative to the distribution of knowledge in the population. (JEL D83, E24, J24, J31)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Matsusaka, John G. "Direct Democracy and Public Employees." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 1, 2009): 2227–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.2227.

Full text

Abstract:

In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Gaggl, Paul, and Greg C. Wright. "A Short-Run View of What Computers Do: Evidence from a UK Tax Incentive." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 262–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20150411.

Full text

Abstract:

We study the short-run causal effect of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) adoption on employment and wage distribution. We exploit a natural experiment generated by a tax allowance on ICT investments and find that the primary effect of ICT is to complement nonroutine, cognitive-intensive work. We also find that the ICT investments led to organizational changes that were associated with increased inequality within the firm and we discuss our findings in the context of theories of ICT adoption and wage inequality. We find that tasks-based models of technological change best fit the patterns that we observe. (JEL D22, J23, J24, J31, M15, O33)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Larkin, Ian, and Stephen Leider. "Incentive Schemes, Sorting, and Behavioral Biases of Employees: Experimental Evidence." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 184–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.2.184.

Full text

Abstract:

We investigate how the convexity of a firm's incentives interacts with worker overconfidence to affect sorting decisions and performance. We demonstrate, experimentally, that overconfident employees are more likely to sort into a nonlinear incentive scheme over a linear one, even though this reduces pay for many subjects and despite the presence of clear feedback. Additionally, the linear scheme attracts demotivated, underconfident workers who perform below their ability. Our findings suggest that firms may design incentive schemes that adapt to the behavioral biases of employees to “sort in” (“sort away”) attractive (unattractive) employees; such schemes may also reduce a firm's wage bill. (JEL D03, D83, J24, J31, M12)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Sliwka, Dirk. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes." American Economic Review 97, no. 3 (May 1, 2007): 999–1012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.3.999.

Full text

Abstract:

An explanation for motivation crowding-out phenomena is developed in a social preferences framework. Besides selfish and fair or altruistic types, a third type of agent is introduced. These “conformists” have social preferences if they believe that sufficiently many of the others do as well. When there is asymmetric information about the distribution of preferences (the “social norm”), the incentive scheme offered or autonomy granted can reveal a principal's beliefs about that norm. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or granting autonomy, trust in a favorable norm may be signaled. (JEL D64, D82, J41, Z13)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Arcidiacono, Peter, and Michael Lovenheim. "Affirmative Action and the Quality–Fit Trade-off." Journal of Economic Literature 54, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 3–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.54.1.3.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper reviews the literature on affirmative action in undergraduate education and law schools, focusing especially on the trade-off between institutional quality and the fit between a school and a student. We discuss the conditions under which affirmative action for underrepresented minorities (URM) could help or harm their educational outcomes. We provide descriptive evidence on the extent of affirmative action in law schools, as well as a critical review of the contentious literature on how affirmative action affects URM law-school student performance. Our review then discusses affirmative action in undergraduate admissions, focusing on the effects such admissions preferences have on college quality, graduation rates, college major, and earnings. We conclude by examining the evidence on “percent plans” as a replacement for affirmative action. (JEL I23, I26, I28, J15, J31, J44, K10)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Michaud, Amanda M. "A Quantitative Theory of Information, Worker Flows, and Wage Dispersion." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 10, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 154–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20160136.

Full text

Abstract:

Employer learning provides a link between wage and employment dynamics. Workers who are selectively terminated when their low productivity is revealed subsequently earn lower wages. If learning is asymmetric across employers, randomly separated high-productivity workers are treated similarly when hired from unemployment, but recover as their next employer learns their type. I provide empirical evidence supporting this link, then study whether employer learning is an empirically important factor in wage and employment dynamics. In a calibrated structural model, learning accounts for 78 percent of wage losses after unemployment, 24 percent of life-cycle wage growth, and 13 percent of cross-sectional dispersion observed in data. (JEL D83, E24, J23, J24, J31, J62)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Leonardi, Marco. "The Effect of Product Demand on Inequality: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7, no. 3 (July 1, 2015): 221–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20130359.

Full text

Abstract:

Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data this paper shows that more educated workers demand more high-skill-intensive services and, to a lesser extent, more very low-skill-intensive services (such as personal services). Additional evidence at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level shows that this “education elasticity of demand” mechanism can explain part of the correlation between the share of college-educated workers in a city and the employment share of service industries. The parametrization of a simple model suggests that this induced demand shift can explain around 6.5 percent of the relative demand shift in the United States between 1984 and 2002. Similar results are provided for the United Kingdom. (JEL D12, J24, J31, L84)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Belloc, Marianna, and Samuel Bowles. "Persistence and Change in Culture and Institutions under Autarchy, Trade, and Factor Mobility." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9, no. 4 (November 1, 2017): 245–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160079.

Full text

Abstract:

Differences among nations in culture (preferences including social norms) and institutions (contracts) may result in specialization and gains from trade even in the absence of exogenous differences in factor endowments or technologies. Goods differ in the kinds of contracts that are appropriate for their production, and so strategic complementarities between contracts and social norms may result in a multiplicity of cultural-institutional equilibria. The resulting country differences in culture and institutions provide the basis for comparative advantage. In our evolutionary model of endogenous preferences and institutions, transitions among persistent cultural-institutional configurations occur as a result of decentralized and uncoordinated contractual or behavioral innovations by employers or employees. We show that the gains from trade raise the cost of deviations from the prevailing culture and institutions. As a result, trade liberalization impedes decentralized transitions, even to Pareto-improving cultural-institutional configurations. International factor mobility has the opposite effect. (JEL D02, D86, F11, F21, J41, O43, Z13)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Bertrand, Marianne, Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. "Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 228–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.2.3.228.

Full text

Abstract:

The careers of MBAs from a top US business school are studied to understand how career dynamics differ by gender. Although male and female MBAs have nearly identical earnings at the outset of their careers, their earnings soon diverge, with the male earnings advantage reaching almost 60 log points a decade after MBA completion. Three proximate factors account for the large and rising gender gap in earnings: differences in training prior to MBA graduation, differences in career interruptions, and differences in weekly hours. The greater career discontinuity and shorter work hours for female MBAs are largely associated with motherhood. (JEL J16, J22, J31, J44)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Ketel, Nadine, Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek, and Bas van der Klaauw. "The Returns to Medical School: Evidence from Admission Lotteries." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 225–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20140506.

Full text

Abstract:

We exploit admission lotteries to estimate the returns to medical school in the Netherlands. Using data from up to 22 years after the lottery, we find that in every single year after graduation doctors earn at least 20 percent more than people who end up in their next-best occupation. Twenty-two years after the lottery the earnings difference is almost 50 percent. Only a small fraction of this difference can be attributed to differences in working hours and human capital investments. The returns do not vary with gender or ability, and shift the entire earnings distribution. (JEL D44, I11, I26, J24, J31, J44)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Parsons, Christopher A., Johan Sulaeman, Michael C. Yates, and Daniel S. Hamermesh. "Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation." American Economic Review 101, no. 4 (June 1, 2011): 1410–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1410.

Full text

Abstract:

Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination. (JEL J15, J31, J44, J71, L83)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Agarwal, Nikhil. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match." American Economic Review 105, no. 7 (July 1, 2015): 1939–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20131006.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Zinovyeva, Natalia, and Manuel Bagues. "The Role of Connections in Academic Promotions." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 7, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 264–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20120337.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper analyzes how evaluators' private information and subjective biases affect evaluations in academia. We use evidence from centralized selection exams in Spain, where evaluators are randomly assigned to promotion committees. Candidates are significantly more likely to be promoted when they are evaluated by an acquainted evaluator, but the source of the premium depends on the nature of this relationship. Our findings suggest that, when candidates are evaluated by their PhD advisor, a colleague or a coauthor, evaluation biases dominate the potential impact of informational gains. Weaker links, on the other hand, may improve the efficiency of the selection process. (JEL D82, I23, J44, M51)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Iizuka, Toshiaki. "Physician Agency and Adoption of Generic Pharmaceuticals." American Economic Review 102, no. 6 (October 1, 2012): 2826–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.6.2826.

Full text

Abstract:

I examine physician agency in health care services in the context of the choice between brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals. I examine micro-panel data from Japan, where physicians can legally make profits by prescribing and dispensing drugs. The results indicate that physicians often fail to internalize patient costs, explaining why cheaper generics are infrequently adopted. Doctors respond to markup differentials between the two versions, indicating another agency problem. However, generics' markup advantages are short-lived, which limits their impact on increasing generic adoption. Additionally, state dependence and heterogeneous doctor preferences affected generics' adoption. Policy makers can target these factors to improve static efficiency. (JEL D82, I11, J44, L65)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Zeltzer, Dan. "Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12, no. 2 (April 1, 2020): 169–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20180201.

Full text

Abstract:

I assess the extent to which the gender gap in physician earnings may be driven by physicians’ preference for referring to specialists of the same gender. Analyzing administrative data on 100 million Medicare patient referrals, I provide robust evidence that doctors refer more to specialists of their own gender. I show that biased referrals are predominantly driven by physicians’ decisions rather than by endogenous sorting of physicians or patients. Because most referring doctors are male, the net impact of same-gender bias by both male and female doctors generates lower demand for female relative to male specialists, pointing to a positive externality for increased female participation in medicine. (JEL H51, I11, J16, J31, J44)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Moldovanu, Benny, and Aner Sela. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests." American Economic Review 91, no. 3 (June 1, 2001): 542–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.3.542.

Full text

Abstract:

We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the second-highest effort wins the second prize, and so on until all the prizes are allocated. The contest's designer maximizes expected effort. When cost functions are linear or concave in effort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single “first” prize. When cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal. (JEL D44, J31, D72, D82)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Hatfield, John William, and Fuhito Kojima. "Matching with Contracts: Comment." American Economic Review 98, no. 3 (May 1, 2008): 1189–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.1189.

Full text

Abstract:

Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts phrased in terms of hospitals and doctors, which subsumes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models. They show that a stable allocation exists if contracts are substitutes for each hospital. They further claim that if a hospital's preferences violate the substitutes condition, there exist singleton preferences for the other hospitals and doctors such that no stable allocation exists. We show this last claim does not hold in general. We further present a weaker condition that is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable allocations. (JEL C78, D86, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Morgan, John, and Felix Várdy. "Diversity in the Workplace." American Economic Review 99, no. 1 (February 1, 2009): 472–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.1.472.

Full text

Abstract:

We study minority representation in the workplace when employers engage in optimal sequential search and minorities convey noisier signals of ability than mainstream job candidates. The greater signal noise makes it harder for minorities to change employers' prior beliefs. When employers are selective, this leads to minority underrepresentation in the workplace. Diversity improves when the cost of interviewing, the average skill level of candidates, or the opportunity cost of not hiring increases. Reducing the cost of firing also increases minority representation. When employers are sufficiently unselective, the rigidity of employers' beliefs leads to overrepresentation of minorities. (JEL D83, J15, J24, J71, M12, M51)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Fehr, Ernst, Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder. "Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 493–525. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.493.

Full text

Abstract:

Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts—which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions—cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. (JEL D44, D86, J41)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Bursztyn, Leonardo, Thomas Fujiwara, and Amanda Pallais. "‘Acting Wife’: Marriage Market Incentives and Labor Market Investments." American Economic Review 107, no. 11 (November 1, 2017): 3288–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170029.

Full text

Abstract:

Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real-stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences. Other groups' responses were unaffected by peer observability. A second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers. (JEL C93, D82, J12, J16, J31)

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!