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Journal articles on the topic 'Jeu à information incomplète'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 7 July 2024

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Malin, Éric. "Dynamique de reseau : hétérogénéité, rationalité et inertie." La Revue Internationale des Économistes de Langue Française 5, no. 1 (2020): 242–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/rielf.2020.1.11.

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Revisitant les travaux de Farrell et Saloner (1985, 1986) sur les processus d ' adoption technologique ou de choix de standard, cet article analyse les problèmes liés au timing des décisions et approfondit l ' étude de l ' effet d ' inertie dans ces situations. Nous centrons notre analyse sur l ' interaction des effets de réseau et des externalités informationnelles pour montrer que la révélation d ' information, par ses effets backward et forward, peut dans certain cas éliminer l ' inertie inefficiente alors que toute la littérature sur les réseaux a majoritairement mis l ' accent sur les eff

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Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel, Kirill Rudov, and Leeat Yariv. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information." American Economic Review: Insights 4, no. 1 (2022): 18–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210123.

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We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others’ preferences. (JEL C78, D11, D21, D47)

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Forges, Françoise. "Coopération en information incomplète : quelques modèles stratégiques." Revue d'économie politique 127, no. 4 (2017): 467. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/redp.274.0467.

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Schummer, James, and Rodrigo A. Velez. "Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, no. 1 (2021): 116–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180065.

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Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others’ preferences. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equiva

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de Clippel, Geoffroy, Jack Fanning, and Kareen Rozen. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information." American Economic Review 112, no. 5 (2022): 1522–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201026.

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We study bargaining over contingent contracts in problems where private information becomes public or verifiable when the time comes to implement the agreement. We suggest a simple, two-stage game that incorporates important aspects of bargaining. We characterize equilibria in which parties always reach agreement, and study their limits as bargaining frictions vanish. Under mild regularity conditions, we show all interim-efficient limits belong to Myerson’s (1984) axiomatic solution. Furthermore, all limits must be interim efficient if equilibrium beliefs satisfy no-signaling-what-you-don’ t-k

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Hanany, Eran, Peter Klibanoff, and Sujoy Mukerji. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, no. 2 (2020): 135–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180302.

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We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player’s strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents’ strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness

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Jong-Hee Hahn. "Monopoly Pricing of Congestible Resources with Incomplete Information." Journal of Economic Research (JER) 12, no. 2 (2007): 243–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.17256/jer.2007.12.2.005.

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Liu, Crocker H., Adam D. Nowak, and Patrick S. Smith. "Asymmetric or Incomplete Information about Asset Values?" Review of Financial Studies 33, no. 7 (2019): 2898–936. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz096.

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Abstract We provide a new framework for using text as data in empirical models. The framework identifies salient information in unstructured text that can control for multidimensional heterogeneity among assets. We demonstrate the efficacy of the framework by reexamining principal-agent problems in residential real estate markets. We show that the agent-owned premiums reported in the extant literature dissipate when the salient textual information is included. The results suggest the previously reported agent-owned premiums suffer from an omitted variable bias, which prior studies incorrectly

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Nisticň, Rosanna. "I contratti di programma: una questione di multitask?" ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, no. 1 (April 2009): 93–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/poli2009-001007.

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- In the light of the results from a wide empirical investigation, this essay examines some crucial characteristics of the Italian policy measure called Contratti di programma through both the analytical framework of the incomplete contracts literature and the multi-task Principal-Agent theory. The Contratti di programma policy is based on a formal agreement between the Italian Government and private firms to carry on an investment programme comprising a number of different projects (industrial investments; workers training programs; research centres and projects). The essay also provides a nu

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Chahrour, Ryan, and Robert Ulbricht. "Robust Predictions for DSGE Models with Incomplete Information." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 15, no. 1 (2023): 173–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20200053.

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We provide predictions for DSGE models with incomplete information that are robust across information structures. Our approach maps an incomplete-information model into a full-information economy with time-varying expectation wedges and provides conditions that ensure the wedges are rationalizable by some information structure. Using our approach, we quantify the potential importance of information as a source of business cycle fluctuations in an otherwise frictionless model. Our approach uncovers a central role for firm-specific demand shocks in supporting aggregate confidence fluctuations. O

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Laffont, Jean-Jacques. "Collusion et information asymétrique." Articles 73, no. 4 (2009): 595–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/602242ar.

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RÉSUMÉ Après avoir justifié l’intérêt empirique et l’intérêt théorique des recherches sur la collusion dans les organisations et les marchés, l’article présente les deux méthodes disponibles aujourd’hui pour l’analyse théorique de la collusion en information incomplète. Ensuite, un bref tour d’horizon de la littérature est proposé et on montre comment la prise en compte de la collusion est un obstacle à la réalisation de l’optimum de premier rang dans la théorie principal-agents lorsque les caractéristiques des agents sont corrélées.

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Co, Catherine Y. "Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade with Incomplete Information." Journal of Economic Integration 11, no. 2 (1996): 196–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.1996.11.2.196.

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Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Michel Moreaux, Marcel Boyer, and Philippe Mahenc. "Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète." Revue économique 42, no. 6 (1991): 1047–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/reco.1991.409329.

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Boyer, Marcel, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Philippe Mahenc, and Michel Moreaux. "Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète." Revue économique 42, no. 6 (1991): 1047. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3502023.

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Mahenc, Philippe, Marcel Boyer, Michel Moreaux, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète." Revue économique 42, no. 6 (1991): 1047–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.p1991.42n6.1047.

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Chen, Yi-Chun, and Gaoji Hu. "A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15, no. 1 (2023): 288–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200411.

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We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a

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Chatterjee, Rittwik, Srobonti Chattopadhyay, and Tarun Kabiraj. "Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information." Studies in Microeconomics 6, no. 1-2 (2018): 50–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022218800183.

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Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses the R&D incentives of a firm when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to each firm. We construct a two-stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that while R&D spillovers reduce R&D incentive

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18

Forges, Françoise. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information." Revue économique Vol. 74, no. 1 (2023): 529–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.744.0529.

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Aumann [1974] a introduit un nouveau concept de solution pour les jeux sous forme stratégique, l’équilibre corrélé. Aumann [1987] a montré que les actions de joueurs qui sont rationnels au sens de Bayes (c’est-à-dire qui maximisent leur utilité individuelle espérée en fonction de leurs croyances) et qui partagent la même croyance a priori sont distribuées conformément à un équilibre corrélé. Plusieurs extensions du concept de solution ont été proposées pour les jeux à information incomplète. Cet article en fait un bref compte rendu.

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Kohler, Philippe, and Michael O. Moore. "Design of an Antidumping Rule with Incomplete Information about Material Injury." Journal of Economic Integration 13, no. 1 (1998): 62–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.1998.13.1.62.

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Crettez, Bertrand. "Le système d'informations économiques d'une Banque centrale européenne et le principe de subsidiarité." Revue économique 49, no. 4 (1998): 989–1003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.p1998.49n4.0989.

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Résumé La question analysée dans cet article est : une Banque centrale européenne doit-elle disposer de son propre système de collecte et de traitement de l'information économique ou bien peut-elle se reposer sur les États membres de l'Union économique et monétaire ? Autrement dit, le principe de subsidiarité doit-il s'appliquer à la collecte des informations économiques ? Le principal inconvénient d'un système décentralisé est que les États membres ont la possibilité de manipuler les informations qu'ils transmettent à la banque en vue de modifier son comportement. Nous modélisons les relation

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21

Li, Hao, and Xianwen Shi. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure." American Economic Review 107, no. 11 (2017): 3363–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151743.

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A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure—releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types—dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, i

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22

Laffont, Jean-Jacques. "Des règles inflexibles contre la discrétion politique." Économie appliquée 54, no. 3 (2001): 255–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ecoap.2001.1778.

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Cet article propose un modèle d'échange en information incomplète pour analyser l’arbitrage entre des règles constitutionnelles imposées ex ante à des hommes politiques et une large discrétion qui leur serait accordée. L’avantage des règles est de limiter la poursuite d’objectifs privés des hommes politiques. Leur inconvénient est le manque de flexibilité pour s’ajuster aux circonstances.

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23

Cavagnac. "Le "Dilemme des prisonniers": Les arguments d'une coopération en information incomplète." Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, no. 35 (1994): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20075957.

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Loertscher, Simon, and Leslie M. Marx. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration." American Economic Review 112, no. 2 (2022): 616–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201092.

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We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. We show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase s

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Gibbons, Robert. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 1 (1997): 127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.1.127.

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This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but

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Detemple, Jérôme. "Demande de portefeuille et politique de couverture de risque sous information incomplète." L'Actualité économique 69, no. 1 (2009): 45–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/602096ar.

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RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article, nous considérons le problème de choix de portefeuille sous information incomplète lorsque l’investisseur maximise l’utilité de sa richesse terminale. Le portefeuille optimal est obtenu de manière explicite en utilisant la formule de représentation d’Ocone et Karatzas (1991) sous changement équivalent de mesure. Lorsque la richesse terminale découle uniquement de la politique d’investissement dans les actifs financiers, le portefeuille optimal a deux composantes : la première est un terme d’espérance-variance pur relatif à l’information de l’investisseur, la seconde un

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Bhaduri, Amit. "Chaotic targeting on the market clearing price." Économie appliquée 47, no. 1 (1994): 197–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ecoap.1994.1060.

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Supposant une information incomplète sur la demande et un flux constant de l'offre, l'article montre comment un ajustement chaotique par les prix peut résulter d’un effort d’égaliser la demande avec l'offre. Dans un modèle en temps discret la révision du prix en pourcentage de chaque période est supposée être déterminere par la variation non planifiée des stocks en proprtion de l'offre totale dans un état d’échange hors de l’équilibre.

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Phelps, Charles E. "Diffusion of Information in Medical Care." Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, no. 3 (1992): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.3.23.

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This paper presents evidence that doctors behave very differently in making treatment recommendations depending on the region where they work, creating large variations in the quantities of care delivered to seemingly standardized populations. This evidence on “variations” (and the failure of normal explanations of the variations) leaves almost by default the idea that incomplete diffusion of information about the efficacy of medical information must be largely responsible. The paper then discusses reasons why this problem might occur: difficulties in collecting information about the success o

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Bergemann, Dirk, and Stephen Morris. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective." Journal of Economic Literature 57, no. 1 (2019): 44–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181489.

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Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction t

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Chassang, Sylvain. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (2010): 448–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.1.448.

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This paper studies how agents with conflicting interests learn to cooperate when the details of cooperation are not common knowledge. It considers a repeated game in which one player has incomplete information about when and how her partner can provide benefits. Initially, monitoring is imperfect and cooperation requires inefficient punishment. As the players' common history grows, the uninformed player can learn to monitor her partner's actions, which allows players to establish more efficient cooperative routines. Because revealing information is costly, it may be optimal not to reveal all t

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Arve, Malin, and David Martimort. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts." American Economic Review 106, no. 11 (2016): 3238–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150275.

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We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics

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Mordret, Solenn, Jenna MacKinnon, Susana A. Breglia, Claudio H. Slamovits, and Caroline Chénard. "An Update on the Morphology and Phylogeny of the Nanoplanktonic Dinoflagellate Prorocentrum nux." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 72, no. 4 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1111/jeu.70019.

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ABSTRACTThe Prorocentrales are a diverse group of dinophytes found in a wide range of marine environments. However, species delimitation in the genus Prorocentrum still remains a challenge, especially for nanoscale species where morphological and molecular information is often incomplete. Prorocentrum nux is an example where information is sparse and efforts are needed. In this study, we present a detailed description of the morphological features and molecular information for a Northwest Atlantic strain (AGSB‐0131). Using Scanning Electron Microscopy, additional morphological features from th

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Renault, Jérôme. "Jeux répétés à information incomplète." Journées mathématiques X-UPS, August 6, 2024, 45–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5802/xups.2006-03.

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MISSIÉ, Jean Gervais. "Incomplétude de l'information comptable et évaluation de la valeur boursière d'une entreprise : Le cas d'Air Liquide." November 17, 2022. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7329874.

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L’information comptable est indispensable à la prise de décision des actionnaires. Cependant, elle est incomplète. Notre réflexion dans ce travail porte sur la détermination de la valeur de l’entreprise en situation d’incertitude. Elle est une contribution en matière d’évaluation de la valeur boursière de l’entreprise en situation d’information incomplète. Elle peut ainsi aider les décideurs financiers à mieux déterminer la valeur boursière de l’entreprise. Notre démarche permet également une meilleure prise en compte du temps dans l’évaluation d

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Heikkilä, Jussi T. S. "Classifying economics for the common good: a note on the links between sustainable development goals and JEL codes." Journal of Documentation ahead-of-print, ahead-of-print (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jd-08-2020-0146.

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PurposeThis brief note sheds light on the links between Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations.Design/methodology/approachThree alternative methods based on keyword overlap to establish links between SDGs and JEL codes are presented.FindingsThese simple linkages illustrate that the themes of SDGs have corresponding closely related JEL classification codes.Research limitations/implicationsThe mappings presented in this note are based on simple keyword overlap and are therefore necessarily imperfect and incomplete. There is p

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Adams, Suellen S. "Information at Play: The Role of Information Behaviour and Meaning-Making." Proceedings of the Annual Conference of CAIS / Actes du congrès annuel de l'ACSI, October 21, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/cais344.

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This paper relates to the conference in the area of user studies. It examines the similarities of information behaviour and meaning making in 4 studies of adult play environments. It will also make a case for the importance of studying information behaviour and meaning-making in play environments. One of these studies is now complete, the other three are ongoing, though two of these are nearly complete.Cette communication porte sur l'étude des utilisateurs et examine les similitudes entre le comportement informationnel et la formulation de sens dans quatre études sur les environnements de jeu

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Aguirregabiria, Victor, and Erhao Xie. "Identification of Non-Equilibrium Beliefs in Games of Incomplete Information Using Experimental Data." Journal of Econometric Methods, March 27, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jem-2019-0029.

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AbstractThis paper studies the identification of players’ preferences and beliefs in discrete choice games using experimental data. The experiment comprises a set of games that differ in their matrices of monetary payoffs. The researcher is interested in the identification of preferences (utility of money) and beliefs on the opponents’ expected behavior, without imposing equilibrium restrictions or parametric assumptions on utility and belief functions. We show that the hypothesis of unbiased/rational beliefs is testable as long as the set of games in the experiment imply variation in monetary

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 2 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12657.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 1 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12656.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 4 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12659.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 4 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12734.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 5 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12735.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 3 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12733.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 6 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12662.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 1 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12731.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 5 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12660.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 3 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12658.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 2 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12732.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 61, no. 1 (2014): i—ii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12073.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 61, no. 2 (2014): i—ii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12074.

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