Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'John Finnis'

John Finnis is one of the seminal contemporary jurisprudential thinkers working within the natural law tradition. His Natural Law and Natural Rights, first published in 1980, has had a significant impact and stands as a centerpiece of modern natural law theory. It is at once a work of ethics, political philosophy as well as jurisprudence. The starting point of his theory of natural law con­sists in concepts such as basic human goods, practical reasonableness and the common good. These concepts provide the foundation for his analysis of communities and society as well as the legal system. This thesis sets out to expound on his theory of natural law by exploring Finnis’ understanding of the basic human goods, practical reasonableness and the common good and the way they interact with his ideas of law and justice. Some of the more controversial or contentious aspects of his theory will also be addressed; such as the supposed self-evident nature of the basic goods and their incommensurable status. Some critics allege that his theory is lacking some of the defining characteristics of a natural law theory and that it thus fails as a theory of natural law, while others have claimed that his theory lends itself to the justification of an authoritarian society. Some of these criticisms carry more strength than others and I conclude by granting that Finnis’ theory contains some weaknesses. However, these should not weaken our appreciation of his vision of the good that law can do and the interrelatedness of law and morality.

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da justiça desenvolvida por John Finnis na obra “Natural Law and Natural Rigts” está em consonância com a tradição aristotélicotomista. Para tanto, primeiro é desenvolvida a teoria da justiça apresentada por Aristóteles na obra “Ética a Nicômaco”, na qual Aristóteles faz a divisão da justiça em duas partes: justiça legal e justiça particular e, depois, subdivide esta última espécie em justiça distributiva e justiça corretiva. Após é apresentada a teoria da justiça de Tomás de Aquino, extraída das obras “Suma Teológica” e “Comentários à Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles”. Para a análise das duas teorias, o trabalho observou a estrutura do conceito de justiça social identificada pelo professor doutor Luis Fernando Barzotto no artigo “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito”. Assim, são especificadas as partes componentes do conceito: a relação regulada pela justiça; a identificação do bem a ser alcançado pela justiça; a atividade, ação humana que é realizada; o sujeito beneficiado na relação de justiça; o dever oriundo dessa relação; sua adequação, formulação e fundamentação ética. A segunda parte do trabalho apresenta a teoria da justiça de John Finnis, ressaltando a importância do conceito de razoabilidade prática em sua exposição. São identificados os elementos da justiça, a importância do conteúdo do bem comum em sua análise, bem como a sua divisão da justiça. Por fim, é feita uma breve exposição sobre o que Finnis disse na obra “Aquinas”, em que o referido autor, analisando a obra de Tomás de Aquino, faz suas conclusões a respeito da justiça na ótica do filósofo medieval. Questões às quais Finnis entende como relevantes para serem analisadas sob a luz da justiça são discutidas.<br>This dissertation tries to answer the question of knowing whether the theory of justice developed by John Finnis in his work “Natural Law and Natural Rights” is in accordance with the Aristotelic-Thomist tradition. For the consecution of this objective, the theory of justice presented by Aristotle in his work “Ethics to Nicomacus” is first developed. Aristotle divides justice in a twofold view: legal justice and private justice and then, he subdivides the latter in distributive justice and corrective justice. Thomas of Aquinas’ theory of justice is then presented, taken from the works “Suma Theology” and “Comments to Aristotle’s Ethics to Nicomacus”. For the analysis of theories, this work followed the structure of the concept of social justice identified by the Prof. Dr. Luis Fernando Barzotto in the article “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito” (“Social Justice – Genesis, Structure and Implementation”). So then, the parts of the concept are specified: the relation regulated by justice; the identification of the wealth to be reached by justice; the activity, performed human action; the benefited subject in the relation of justice; the duty resulted from this relation; its adequateness, formulation and ethic theoretical support. The second part of the work presents John Finnis’s theory of justice, highlighting the importance of the practice reasonableness concept in his exposition. The elements of justice, the importance of the common wealth content in his analysis, as well as his division of justice are identified here. At last, a brief exposition about what Finnis said in the work “Aquinas” is made, where the author, analyzing the works of Thomas of Aquinas, draws conclusions about the justice through the eyes of the medieval philosopher. The questions Finnis understands as relevant for being analyzed through the scope of justice are discussed here.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)<br>El trabajo que comenzamos más adelante es una respuesta a la interrogante, siempre vigente, del grado en que es absoluto el valor de la justicia, su naturaleza, características y clases, mirado desde la óptica de un autor actual. Para determinarlo, analizamos estos temas desde la perspectiva del profesor de Derecho y Filosofía de la Universidad de Oxford, John Finnis , sin dejar de hacer un repaso histórico por diferentes concepciones que le precedieron. La obra que ha servido de referencia y guía en esta Memoria, es un extenso trabajo publicado por el profesor Finnis en el año 1980, y que fuera intitulado "Ley Natural y Derechos Naturales". En dicha obra el autor en comento elaboró una interesante teoría acerca de diversas instituciones relacionadas con el Derecho, como ser la teoría de los valores, el bien común, los derechos naturales, la autoridad, la obligación, la naturaleza, la razón, Dios y el tema que pretendo analizar en esta Memoria: la justicia y las leyes naturales. El tema de la justicia, abordado en la perspectiva del profesor John Finnis, recoge una fuerte corriente histórica: la aristotélico-tomista, pero en moldes intelectuales propios de la filosofía analítica inglesa en la que fue formado, lo que le otorga un enfoque pragmático a su estudio.

No autorizada por el autor para ser publicada a texto completo.<br>Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)<br>El presente trabajo se encuentra compuesto fundamentalmente de dos partes. En la primera, se analiza el concepto de ley natural de John Finnis y las propiedades sustanciales más importante de de los valores básicos o primeros principios de la razón práctica (capítulo I). Se enuncia el concepto de ley natural propuesto por el autor australiano (a) y se estudian las principales propiedades de los valores básicos (b). Entre las propiedades de los valores básicos veremos: (b.1) la notoriedad y evidencia, (b.2) la indemostrabilidad, (b.3) la pre-moralidad, y, (b.4) el mismo carácter de fundamental. En la segunda parte se analizan los valores básicos en particular: la vida (capítulo II), el conocimiento (capítulo III), el juego (capítulo IV), la experiencia estética (capítulo V), la amistad (capítulo VI), la razonabilidad práctica (capítulo VII), y, la religión (capítulo VIII). Se hace presente que, no obstante enunciar todos los valores básicos propuestos por John Finnis y presentar sus características y propiedades fundamentales, se pondrá especial atención en el valor básico de la vida. Posterior al planteamiento de todos los valores básicos, se analizará críticamente (aspectos negativos y positivos) la obra de John Finnis (capítulo IX).

Esta dissertação expõe a fundamentação do conceito de bem comum no pensamento de JOHN MITCHELL FINNIS. Este jusfilósofo tem como ponto de partida para sua reflexão uma reinterpretação da ética tomista. Dela interessa o tratamento dado à separação das quatro ordens de conhecimento, particularmente a separação entre ordem natural e prática. A ordem prática de conhecimento tem suas próprias diretrizes. Logo, assim como na ordem natural de conhecimento a primeira diretriz é o princípio da não contradição, na ordem prática o primeiro princípio é o bem é para ser feito e buscado e o mal evitado. Estes postulados não são imperativos e nem indicativos, mas diretivos; e, no caso da ordem prática, uma diretiva para ação. A implicação epistemológica está em que a fundamentação imediata do agir humano não reside na natureza humana, mas na percepção prática de bens a serem realizados e dos males a serem evitados. Há um número determinado de bens humanos básicos, que são as razões primeiras para o agir humano. Eles são objetivos, incomensuráveis, auto-evidentes e pré-morais. O rol que FINNIS propõe é vida, conhecimento, matrimônio, excelência na realização, sociabilidade/amizade, razoabilidade prática e ‘religião’. O conteúdo da moral resulta destes bens humanos e tem como princípio supremo toda a escolha deve favorecer e respeitar o bem humano integral. Além de sintetizar a correção para o agir individual, a moral também fundamenta e demanda um agir social correto, que está expresso no conceito de bem comum. FINNIS define bem comum nos seguintes termos: um conjunto de condições que tornam aptos os membros de uma comunidade a alcançar por si mesmos objetivos razoáveis, ou realizar razoavelmente por si mesmos o(s) valor(es) pelos quais eles têm razão em colaborar uns com os outros (positiva e/ou negativamente) em uma comunidade. O conteúdo específico do bem comum da comunidade política é constituído pela justiça. O direito é o objeto da justiça e, assim, meio pelo qual o Estado a realiza e, por conseqüência, o bem comum.<br>This work explains the basis of the common good concept in John Mitchell Finnis’ thought. This legal philosopher has as a starting point to reflexion a reinterpretation of thomistic ethics. Its importance lays on the treatment given to the separation of four orders of knowledge, specially the separation between natural and practical order. The latter has its own directives. Therefore, such as in the natural order of knowledge the first directive is the principle of no contradiction, in the practical order the first principle is that good is to be done and pursued, and bad is to be avoided. These postulates are not imperatives or indicatives, but directives; in the case of practical order, a directive to action. An episthemological implication is that the immediate foundation of human action is not in human nature, but in the practical perception of goods to be achieved and of the bads to be avoided. There is a determined number of basic human goods, which are the primary reasons of human action. They are objective, incommensurable, self-evident and pre-moral. The list proposed by Finnis is life, knowledge, marriage, excellence in performance, sociability/friendship, practical reasonableness and ‘religion’. The content of morality results of this human goods. It has as supreme principle that every choice should favour and respect integral human well-being. Beside to synthesize the correction to individual action, morality also bases and demands a correct social action, which is expressed in the concept of common good. Finnis well defines common good in the following terms: a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves to reasonables objectives, or to realise reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in the community. Justice is the specific content of the common good of political community. Law is the object of justice and, therefore, the means through which the State attains it and, hence, the common good.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006.<br>Title from title screen. Andrew Altman, committee chair; Timothy Renick, Peter Lindsay, committee members. Electronic text (62 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed May 3, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p.57-62).

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO<br>A presente dissertação é um trabalho de teoria do direito. Como o título sugere, seu objetivo é expor alguns aspectos da contraposição entre o jusnaturalismo e o positivismo jurídico no cenário contemporâneo. Utiliza como referência a reinterpretação da teoria jusnaturalista por John Mitchell Finnis e seu diálogo com positivismo jurídico contemporâneo. Ressalvo que aqui não se tem a pretensão de demonstrar que o debate entre as duas correntes esteja definitivamente encerrado, mas de esclarecer concepções e tentar afastar alguns equívocos que o permeiam.<br>This works is a legal theory one. As the title suggests, its goal is to expose some aspects of the opposition between natural law theory and legal positivism in the contemporary scenario. It take as reference the reiterpretation of the natural law theory by John Mitchell Finnis and his dialogue with the contemporary legal positivism. Indeed, it does not pretend to demonstrate that the debate between the two currents is definitely closed, but its purpose is to clarify concepts and attempt to remove some misconceptions that permeate it.

A presente dissertação de mestrado visa responder afirmativamente a seguinte questão: existe um direito moral ao casamento homossexual? Para tanto, analisa o tema a partir da Filosofia Moral e Política, o que demonstra a necessidade de se conceituar o casamento antes de verificar se este constitui ou não um direito moral. Parte-se das concepções de casamento formuladas por John Finnis e Ronald Dworkin, analisando-as criticamente, propondo-se após uma que seja capaz de tratar o casamento enquanto um conceito interpretativo. Somente então é possível verificar se o casamento corresponde a um direito moral dos homossexuais, o que se faz primordialmente a partir das críticas desenvolvidas por Herbert Hart e Dworkin à posição de Patrick Devlin, e da concepção dworkiniana de igualdade e dignidade humana. Conclui-se que o dever do Estado de tratar os indivíduos com igual respeito e consideração implica no reconhecimento do casamento como direito moral dos homossexuais, e que a análise da questão sob a ótica da moralidade pública implica na discussão de seus limites, bem como no debate mais amplo acerca dos direitos das minorias em geral.<br>This dissertation aims to answer affirmatively the following question: is there a moral right to gay marriage? To do that, it analyzes the theme from the perspective of the Philosophy and Political Morals, which demonstrates the need to conceptualize marriage before checking whether it constitutes a moral right or not. It starts with the conceptions of marriage made by John Finnis and Ronald Dworkin, analyzing them critically, and after proposing the treatment of marriage as an interpretive concept. Only then it is possible to verify if marriage represents a moral right of homosexuals, which is made primarily from the critiques developed by Herbert Hart and Dworkin to the position of Patrick Devlin, and the dworkinian conception of equality and human dignity. It concludes that the state\'s duty to treat individuals with equal respect and consideration implies the recognition of marriage as a moral right of homosexuals, and that the analysis of the issue from the standpoint of public morality involves the discussion of its limits in the wider debate about the rights of minorities in general as well.

A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible.

Syftet med denna uppsats är att genom ett möte mellan befrielseteologi, ekoteologi och ekologi bidra till ett teologiskt tänkande och en möjlig attitydförändring inför det klimathot och den förändring som mänskligheten måste genomföra för sin biologiska överlevnads skull. Uppsatsen diskuterar befrielseteologi och förvaltarskap och svarar på frågor om människans uppgift och ansvar, vem människan är i förhållande till skapelsen, vem den förtryckte är idag samt vem som har mandat att föra skapelsens talan.

Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka den didaktiska potentialen i Majgull Axelssons Aprilhäxan (1997) och John Ajvide Lindqvists Låt den rätte komma in (2004) vid värdegrundsarbete i svenskämnet på gymnasiet, samt diskutera skräckgenrens användbarhet i undervisningen i allmänhet. Verken har tolkats utifrån en värdegrundskontext för att finna lämpliga uppslag till undervisningssituationer. Resultatet visar att både Axelssons och Lindqvists romaner har didaktisk potential då de tematiserar utanförskap och utsatthet på grund av diskriminering och kränkande behandling av funktionsnedsatta och vid gränsöverskridande identitet och uttryck. Eftersom dessa konflikter och tematiska uttryck kan vara användbara vid problematisering och diskussion i värdegrundsarbete. Även genretypiska egenskaper pekar på att verken lämpar sig för undervisningssituationer. Båda verken är lämpliga och skulle kunna bidra till värdegrundsarbetets syfte att främja förståelse och medmänsklighet till andra människor och förmåga till inlevelse.

Romanerna som ligger till grund för uppsatsens analys är Thomas Bailey Aldrich The story of a bad boy, Mark Twains Tom Sawyers och Huckleberry Finn samt Richmal Cromptons Just William. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka de litterära gestalter som tar sig skepnad i företeelsen "bad boys" och de frågor som ställs i uppsatsen är: Hur och varför uppkom företeelsen "bad boys"? Hur växte genren "bad boys" fram? Vad karaktäriserar "bad boys" företeelsen? Uppsatsens narratologiska utgångspunkter bygger bland annat på Mieke Bals teori om fabelns och de textanalytiska begrepp som Maria Nikolajeva redogör för: tid och plats, författarens och läsarens föreställning av författaren, samtid och tidsperspektiv. Uppsatsen tar även stöd i R.W. Connell, John Stephens och Kenneth B. Kidds teorier. Uppsatsen visar att "bad boys"-genren har sitt ursprung under en period då bilden av mannen var under förändring och romaner för pojkar blev allt mer robusta."Bad boys" – genren karaktäriseras av driftiga pojkgestalter som delvis formar sin identitet i pojkgänget. "Bad-boys"- genren är även en konsekvens av de ändrade förhållandena för unga pojkar i USA. Dessa pojkar sågs ofta som små vandaler och det är dessa som återspeglas i "bad-boys" genren.

Precipitated by important work in recent natural law political theory, this research revisits the relationship between political association and human flourishing. Does the political community itself realize some aspect of human sociability intrinsic to our full flourishing or is it simply an instrumental good? The inquiry begins with a thorough examination of the merits of John Finnis’s influential argument for an instrumental political common good, pointing to a significant lacuna in his inattention to the value of political activity, as opposed to the operation of government and law. In building an alternative positive account the argument relies upon both formal and substantive considerations, generally employing an Aristotelian methodology of understanding the whole via a consideration of its constitutive parts. First, drawing from Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries to unpack the basic structure of part/whole relationships within the “body politic,” I argue that political community is partially defined by the nature of its basic constitutive parts. The next chapter considers the substantive good of familial association, particularly in light of longstanding concerns with the family’s particularity and inequality. I argue that the intrinsically liberal and educative character of parental love rightly orients children to virtuous activity and invests familial association with an intrinsic rationality. The final two chapters bring direct focus onto the political common good: First, I argue that a normatively compelling account of the political common good must be both inclusivist, i.e., including within its purpose the irreducibly diverse goods of every individual and basic association within the community, and distinctive, i.e., including within the calculus of practical reason the good of the political association as such. Lastly, I argue that the political common good is intrinsically—though only partially—constitutive of the human social good. Aquinas makes a crucial shift away from Aristotle’s political primacy in his more pluralistic account of human sociability and emphasis on the extensiveness of the political good over the superiority of political activity per se. Nevertheless, there are essential human virtues—justice, love, generosity—that are uniquely, if not exclusively, fostered in political community and potentially realized in civic friendship.<br>text

This study presents a hybrid concurrent programming model combining the previously developed Fork-Join model (FJM) and Actor model (AM). With the advent of multi-core computers, there is a renewed interest in programming models that reduce the burden of reasoning about and writing efficient concurrent programs. The proposed hybrid model shows how the divide-and-conquer approach of the FJM and the no-shared mutable state and event-driven philosophy of the AM can be combined to solve certain classes of problems more efficiently and productively than either of the aforementioned models individually. The hybrid model adds actor creation and coordination to into the FJM, while also enabling parallelization within actors. This study uses the Habanero-Java and Scala programming languages as the base for the FJM and AM respectively, and provides an implementation of the hybrid model as an extension of the Scala language called Habanero-Scala. The hybrid model adds to the foundations of parallel programs, and to the tools available for the programmer to aid in productivity and performance while developing parallel software.

Author's name: Magdalena Hošková School: Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts Department: Institute of Linguistics and Finno-Ugric Studies Title: Spells as a Part of Finnish Folklore Supervisor: Mgr. Jan Dlask, Ph.D. Number of pages: 77 Key words: spell, Finnish spells, Finnish folklore, Kalevala, Finnish mythology, tietäjä, shaman, prayer, healing magic, homoeopathic magic, John Abercromby, James Frazer, neoshamanism, neopaganism This thesis deals with spells as a part of Finnish folklore. It depicts the circumstances of the spells' genesis, as well as their structural features and different purposes of their use. It is considered that most spells were created during the era of late paganism and early Christianity. This is true not only of Finland but also of Europe in general. The thesis also analyses the role of the shaman as the spiritual leader of Finnish people living in the era before the spells' creation and thereafter analyses the role of the shaman's successor: the tietäjä, the charmer who created spells and used them to help people in his community. So the tietäjä used his spells for the same purpose as his predecessor, the shaman, used trance states, which he entered via drumming, chanting and dancing. In the trance state, he talked to animal spirits and ancestors' spirits and...

ENGLISH SUMMARY This master thesis focuses on swan symbolism in Finnish poetry, from the oldest folk poems of oral tradition to the first decades of the 20th century. Firstly a swan is described from the zoological and etymological point of view, and its position in the contemporary Finnish culture is clarified. The next chapter is dedicated to swan symbolism in European culture, from antiquity till presence, and it focuses on mythology, folk traditions and the most common motives in visual art, music and literature. The key part of the thesis describes the swan symbolism in Finnish oral tradition and especially in poetry of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The thesis focuses in particular on Johan Ludvig Runeberg's, Aleksis Kivi's, Elias Lönnrot's, Juhani Aho's, Eino Leino's, Otto Manninen's and Aarni Kouta's poetry. A special chapter is devoted to the myth of the Swan of Tuonela. Following the swan symbolism throughout literature and culture history, I have been looking for connections to Finnish national as well as European traditions and intertextual relations.

American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.