Academic literature on the topic 'Judgment (Logic) Philosophy'

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Journal articles on the topic "Judgment (Logic) Philosophy"

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Kubinjec, Janko. "Modality of judgments on justice." Glasnik Advokatske komore Vojvodine 79, no. 9 (2007): 287–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/gakv0709287k.

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Definition of the concept of justice comes from apodictic judgments, while definition of its individual validity comes from assertoric judgments. Argumentation as an element of justice in a logical sense is an assertoric judgment. Its definition brings light to the search for the logical nature of assertoric judgment - it is a contribution the philosophy of law may offer to the logic. In the argumentation assertoric judgment does not transform to problematic judgment and for this reason the justice can never be arbitrary.
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Wen, Xuefeng. "Judgment aggregation in nonmonotonic logic." Synthese 195, no. 8 (March 31, 2017): 3651–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1391-2.

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Wiedebach, Hartwig. "Logic of Science vs. Theory of Creation: The “Authority of Annihilation” in Hermann Cohen’s Logic of Origin." Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2010): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/147728510x529009.

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AbstractThe difference between Hermann Cohen’s systematic philosophy and his philosophy of religion can be determined via the logical “Judgment of Contradiction,” viewed as an “Authority of Annihilation.” In Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge the “Judgment of Contradiction” acts as a “means of protection” against “falsifications” that may have arisen on the pathway through the previous judgments of “origin” and “identity.” Cohen thematizes these operations in his Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, too. However, there they do not form the grounding for natural science but rather for the knowledge of nature as creation in a strict correlation to God’s uniqueness. Any admixture between God and nature is the falseness that must be excluded via the “Authority of Annihilation.” The Being of God places the world over against the possibility of its own radical Non-Being. Yet at the same time, a second mode of Negation, a relative Nothing providing continuity for the world’s being-there (Dasein), grounded in the “Logic of Origin,” retains its validity. In Cohen’s view a Creation “in the beginning” stands side by side with a continuous “renewal of the world” (hiddush ha-‘olam).
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Willard, Dallas. "Review: Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology." Mind 116, no. 464 (November 1, 2007): 1146–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm1146.

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Kracht, Marcus. "Judgment and consequence relations." Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 20, no. 4 (January 2010): 423–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3166/jancl.20.423-435.

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Lacour, Philippe. "Le jugement et sa logique dans la philosophie de Ricœur (Première partie)." Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 7, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): 187–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/errs.2016.364.

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In this article, I underline the profound link existing between Ricœur’s practical philosophy and language. Indeed, the latter bestows unity upon the former, because it constitutes its main axis, for methodological reasons. First of all, I recall Ricœur’s definition of discourse and explain its various transphrastic dimensions. I then show how this philosophy of language is carefully used to build a very coherent logic of judgment, which underlies all Ricœur’s epistemological reflections about normative disciplines (ethics, law, politics). I particularly insist on the logic of legal judgment.
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Stock, Guy. "Negation: Bradley and Wittgenstein." Philosophy 60, no. 234 (October 1985): 465–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100042510.

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There are two main claims that Bradley makes concerning negative judgment in the Principles of Logic:(i) Negative judgment ‘stands at a different level of reflection’ from affirmative judgment.(ii) Negative judgment ‘presupposes a positive ground’.I will consider what Bradley means by these claims, and draw comparisons with Wittgenstein's views on negation as they developed between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Remarks.
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Wilson, Eric Entrican. "On the Nature of Judgment in Kant’s Transcendental Logic." Idealistic Studies 40, no. 1 (2010): 43–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies2010401/24.

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Pasquerella, Lynn. "INTENSIONAL LOGIC AND BRENTANO’S NON-PROPOSITIONAL THEORY OF JUDGMENT." Grazer Philosophische studien 29, no. 1 (August 13, 1987): 59–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000309.

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Joll, Nicholas. "Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology - Wayne M. Martin." Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 240 (October 10, 2009): 658–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.660_8.x.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Judgment (Logic) Philosophy"

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Klimmek, Nikolai F. "Kants System der transzendentalen Ideen /." Berlin [u.a.] : de Gruyter, 2005. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=013107619&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Justi, Vicente de Paulo 1950. "Kant e a musica na Critica da Faculdade do Juizo." [s.n.], 2009. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280006.

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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T05:15:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Justi_VicentedePaulo_D.pdf: 1436170 bytes, checksum: df13abd731e3bf77576a57604166fbd6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009
Resumo: A proposta deste trabalho é verificar o tratamento dado por Immanuel Kant na Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo à música. Sob a aparente desconsideração do autor neste tema, encontra-se uma filosofia densa que provoca reflexões e contribui decisivamente para a discussão sempre atual sobre a apreensão, compreensão e classificação da música. A possibilidade de reconhecermos a música como agradável, bela e sublime constitui-se o núcleo central dos problemas analisados. No primeiro capítulo discutimos os conceitos kantianos apresentados na Terceira Crítica como sensação, sentimento, comoção, afeto, prazer, forma, conformidade a fins, intuição, juízos e reflexão. O problema é verificar se estes conceitos, tal como apresentados por Kant, podem ainda contribuir para a nossa compreensão do fenômeno musical. No segundo capítulo verificamos o mecanismo de funcionamento das faculdades de conhecimento kantianas na apreensão e compreensão do fenômeno musical. O terceiro capítulo é reservado à discussão da possibilidade de classificarmos a música como agradável e as condições desta proposição. A música bela é o tema do quarto capítulo, onde além da discussão do problema que dá nome ao capítulo, analisamos o objeto belo, a teleologia da natureza, a arte mecânica e arte estética, a música bela e a poesia e a teoria kantiana do gênio na produção musical. O quinto capítulo discute a possibilidade e as condições de falar-se em música sublime e as incontornáveis ligações desta classificação com o domínio prático (moral). As conclusões estão centralizadas na questão de que a música bela é a única categoria realmente estética, enquanto a agradável é parcialmente estética e parcialmente prática e a sublime é totalmente prática. A beleza fundada na forma exige a cognição, no sentido de utilização do entendimento sem conceitos. A comoção é aceita na experiência estética se ligada, no sublime, à representação prática (moral) que a arte apresenta ao homem.
Abstract: The aim of this dissertation is to examine Immanuel Kant's treatment of music in his Critique of Judgment. Beneath his apparent neglect for the subject one can find a dense philosophical reflection that decisively contributes to the always current discussion about music perception, understanding and categorization. The possibility of recognizing music as being agreeable, beautiful and sublime is the central interest of the problems I analyze. In the first chapter I discuss Kantian concepts presented in the third Critique such as sensation, sentiment, commotion, affect, pleasure, conformity to ends, intuition, judgment and reflection. My aim here is to decide whether these concepts can still be of use in understanding music as a phenomenon in the way Kant presents them. In chapter two I examine how Kant understands the function of our cognitive capacities in the perception and understanding of music. Chapter three deals with the possibility and conditions for classifying music as being agreeable. Beautiful music is the topic of the fourth chapter, in which I not only discuss the concept of beauty in music, but also analyze the problem of what is a beautiful object, how does teleology work in nature, what is mechanical art as opposed to aesthetic art, beautiful music in its relation to poetry, and the role of Kant's theory of genius in musical creativity. The fifth chapter discusses the possibility and conditions of the sublime in music and the unavoidable links of this category to the domain of morality. My conclusions are that beautiful music is the only really aesthetic category, while the agreeable is only partially aesthetic and partially moral, and the sublime is totally moral. Beauty based on form requires cognition, in the sense of a non-conceptual use of the understanding. Commotion is acceptable in aesthetic experience if it is connected, in the sublime, to a moral representation that art presents to human beings.
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Purser, David Thurman. "A Leibnizian Approach to Mathematical Relationships: A New Look at Synthetic Judgments in Mathematics." University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1264612988.

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Loftus, Stephen Francis. "Language in clinical reasoning learning and using the language of collective clinical decision making /." Faculty of Health Sciences, School of Physiotherapy, University of Sydney, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1165.

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Doctor of Philosophy
The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to come to a deeper understanding of clinical decision making from within the interpretive paradigm. The project draws on ideas from a number of schools of thought which have the common emphasis that the interpretive use of language is at the core of all human activity. This research project studied settings where health professionals and medical students engage in clinical decision making in groups. Settings included medical students participating in problem-based learning tutorials and a team of health professionals working in a multidisciplinary clinic. An underlying assumption of this project was that in such group settings, where health professionals are required to articulate their clinical reasoning for each other, the individuals involved are likely to have insights that could reveal the nature of clinical decision making. Another important assumption of this research is that human activities, such as clinical reasoning, take place in cultural contexts, are mediated by language and other symbol systems, and can be best understood when investigated in their historical development. Data were gathered by interviews of medical students and health professionals working in the two settings, and by non-participant observation. Data analysis and interpretation revealed that clinical decision making is primarily a social and linguistic skill, acquired by participating in communities of practice called health professions. These communities of practice have their own subculture including the language game called clinical decision making which includes an interpretive repertoire of specific language tools and skills. New participants to the profession must come to embody these skills under the guidance of more capable members of the profession, and do so by working through many cases. The interpretive repertoire that health professionals need to master includes skills with words, categories, metaphors, heuristics, narratives, rituals, rhetoric, and hermeneutics. All these skills need to be coordinated, both in constructing a diagnosis and management plan and in communicating clinical decisions to other people, in a manner that can be judged as intelligible, legitimate, persuasive, and carrying the moral authority for subsequent action.
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Martin, Craig Edward. "Policing public/private borders religion, liberalism, and the 'private judgment of the magistrate' /." Related electronic resource:, 2007. https://login.libezproxy2.syr.edu/login?qurl=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1441187521&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=3739&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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Crawley, Karen. "Limited ink : interpreting and misinterpreting GÜdel's incompleteness theorem in legal theory." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=101814.

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This thesis explores the significance of Godel's Theorem for an understanding of law as rules, and of legal adjudication as rule-following. It argues that Godel's Theorem, read through Wittgenstein's understanding of rules and language as a contextual activity, and through Derrida's account of 'undecidability,' offers an alternative account of the relationship of judging to justice. Instead of providing support for the 'indeterminacy' claim, Godel's Theorem illuminates the predicament of undecidability that structures any interpretation and every legal decision, and which constitutes the opening to justice. The first argument in this thesis examines Godel's proof, Wittgenstein's views on rules, and Derrida's undecidability, as manifestations of a common concern with the limits of what can be formalized. The meta-argument examines their misinterpretation and misappropriation within legal theory as a case study of just what they mean about meaning, context, and justice as necessarily co-implicated.
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Simonetta, David. "Histoire de l'idée d'intuition intellectuelle à l'âge classique (1600-1770, France et Angleterre)." Thesis, Paris 1, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA010525.

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Dans les Règles pour la direction de l’esprit, Descartes fonde sa première théorie de la science sur deux « actes de l’intellect » : intuitus et deductio. Au moment de définir le concept d’intuition, Descartes précise qu’il en fait un « usage nouveau », qui ne doit pas être confonduavec la signification courante qu’on lui a donnée dans les Écoles. L’exposition de ses premières découvertes scientifiques impliquerait donc une noétique différente de celle que lui ont enseignée ses maîtres jésuites. Reprenant un mot ancien, Descartes lui donne une signification neuve et un rôle inédit dans l’édifice de la connaissance humaine. Mais on n’a pas toujours compris le sens historique et philosophique de cette démarcation : de qui et de quoi Descartes entend-il se démarquer ? Et qu’y avait-il au juste de nouveau dans l’usage qu’il proposait ? Notre enquête propose de retracer l’histoire de cette idée d’intuition intellectuelle au cours de l’âge classique, chez les premiers lecteurs des Regulae, Malebranche, Locke, dans les entrées des dictionnaires et des encyclopédies du XVIIIe siècle,dans les nouveaux manuels de logique inspirés de Locke. Nous retraçons cette histoire jusqu’à ce que Kant, en 1770, semble y mettre le point final, en affirmant qu’il n’y a pas en l’homme de connaissance intuitive intellectuelle. Pourtant, et c’est tout le paradoxe, lorsque Kant formule ce constat d’échec, le mot même d’intuition s’est enfin, et pour la première fois,imposé dans le vocabulaire philosophique européen
In the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes grounds his first theory of knowledge upon two "acts of the understanding" : intuitus and deductio. When he explains what he means by intuition, he warns the reader that he intends to make a "new use" of this word, which shall not be confused with the way the "schoolmen" understood it in the past. Descartes' first scientific discoveries seem to imply a new noetic, different from the one his Jesuit masters taught him while he was a student at La Fleche. But what, exactly, was new about the way Descartes used this ancient word ? The present inquiry is an attempt to give this question an answer, and also to trace this concept of intuition through the whole early modern period; in the works of the first readers of the Regulae (Baillet, Port-Royal, Malebranche), in the theory of knowledge of John Locke, in the dictionaries, lexicons and encyclopedias of the 18th century, in the new textbooks of Logic, inspired by Locken in some theological discussions over the nature of beatific vision.Our inquiry ends in 1770 when Kant declares that there's no such thing as "intellectual intuition" in man's mind, and that the only kind of intuition man's capable of is a sensitive one. Kant seems to put an endpoint to this chapter of European philosophy. But, on the other hand, when Kant writes this sentence, the word" intuition" has fully entered the European philosophical vocabulary, for the first time with its new meaning
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Books on the topic "Judgment (Logic) Philosophy"

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Edmund Husserl's phenomenological theory of judgment: The sole logically coherent epistemology in the history of western philosophy. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2016.

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Kant, Immanuel. Critique of judgment. Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub. Co., 1987.

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Reich, Klaus. The completeness of Kant's table of judgments. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992.

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Point de passage. Paris: Editions Kimé, 1994.

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Kant, Immanuel. The critique of judgment. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 2000.

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Casson, Douglas. Liberating judgment: Fanatics, skeptics, and John Locke's politics of probability. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

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Liberating judgment: Fanatics, skeptics, and John Locke's politics of probability. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

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Maria Sandra van der Schaar. G.F. Stout's theory of judgment and proposition: Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van Doktor ... [Leiden?]: M.S. van der Schaar, 1991.

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Augier, Felipe Schwember. Libertad, derecho y propiedad: El fundamento de la propiedad en la filosofía del derecho de Kant y Fichte. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2013.

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Lemaître, Fernando Atria. On law and legal reasoning. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002.

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Book chapters on the topic "Judgment (Logic) Philosophy"

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Bohnet, Clayton. "Truth and Judgment in Hegel’s Science of Logic." In Logic and the Limits of Philosophy in Kant and Hegel, 187–253. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137521750_7.

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Suppes, Patrick. "The Logic of Clinical Judgment: Bayesian and Other Approaches." In Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays, 201–12. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2300-8_15.

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Anderson, Elizabeth. "Situated Knowledge and the Interplay of Value Judgments and Evidence in Scientific Inquiry." In In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 497–517. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0475-5_8.

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Kreidik, Leonid G., and George P. Shpenkov. "Philosophy and the Language of Dialectics and the Algebra of Dialectical Judgements." In The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 118–26. Philosophy Documentation Center, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/wcp20-paideia19988191.

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Subjective science, as a pattern of an objective science, is based on a dialectical triad: language-logic-philosophy, which is the language of dialectics. The first level of language is its grammar, whose basis constitutes lexemes (name-words) and lexas (relation-words). Dialectical logical factor sets (logical parts of speech) are the basis of dialectical logic and logical morphology. They form the second level of the language of dialectics. The logical factor sets are represented by dialectical forms of thinking, reflecting the contradictory nature of reality. In the first approximation, any face of a state or a phenomenon of nature has at least two sides of comparison. All variety of these sides are joined together by the common name oppositi. Dialectical philosophy is the third generalized level of language. The main qualitative postulates of dialectical philosophy constitute two postulates: a postulate of existence and a postulate of evolution. A simple description of an object of thought usually contains a statement and a judgment. In this paper, we consider the simplest meanings of judgments, namely, some dialectical combinations-judgments of Yes and No. Judgments are postulated on the basis of a material-ideal dialectical field.
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Fisher, Saul. "‘Probabilist’ Deductive Inference in Gassendi’s Logic." In The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 58–64. Philosophy Documentation Center, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/wcp20-paideia19988181.

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In his Logic, Pierre Gassendi proposes that our inductive inferences lack the information we would need to be certain of the claims that they suggest. Not even deductivist inference can insure certainty about empirical claims because the experientially attained premises with which we adduce support for such claims are no greater than probable. While something is surely amiss in calling deductivist inference "probabilistic," it seems Gassendi has hit upon a now-familiar, sensible point—namely, the use of deductive reasoning in empirical contexts, while providing certain formal guarantees, does not insulate empirical arguments from judgment by the measure of belief which we invest in their premises. The more general point, which distinguishes Gassendi among his contemporaries, is that the strength shared by all empirical claims consists in the warrant from experience for those claims we introduce in their support.
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Cooper, Brigitte Dehmelt. "European Philosophy and Religion in Millenniums lasting Dispute." In The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 53–58. Philosophy Documentation Center, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/wcp20-paideia199836615.

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The disputes between philosophy and religion can be avoided and solved not by the contemporary separation of their conclusions but because Socrates-Plato taught us how valid judgments are established. Plato is the founder of "scientific logic", because he discerned the instantaneous relations of similar, different, equal through the intelligibility between ultimate distinctions. This relation, not very accurately called "like" by Socrates, holds too for the intelligence in its relation to the intelligibility of the distinctions of "can" and "must", of which every person is "implicitely" aware, and both "can" and "must" are known as "real possibilites". Final, ultimate distinctions are perceived since they are "evident per-se ". They cannot be doubted by the person which is conscious of itself. These immediate relations are distinguished from relations in which one term is "in the likeness of" the other, which expresses a judgment due to an active comparison, established by man through thinking and through physical actions, placing those relations into the region of time and space. They are the relations of kinship that are in the "likeness of"- (syggenes called in Greek). It will be shown why Aristotles criticism of Plato's use of the word "partaking" has fanned the dispute among the students of Plato, who consider the timeless, eternal reality of distinctions - called ideas by Plato- of highest, ultimate importance. It justifies the validiy of human insights and judgments. This is also not correctly understood by the Christian theologians, who hide behind supernatural revelations and dogmas. Plato did not jutify his metaphysical insights with "transcendental moonshine" as the follower of Aristotle accuse him.
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Ng, Karen. "Introduction." In Hegel's Concept of Life, 3–22. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190947613.003.0001.

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This chapter provides an introduction to the main arguments and themes of the book. It presents three central claims: first, that the core tenets of Hegel’s philosophy, and in particular Hegel’s “Concept,” should be understood as developing around a purposiveness theme deriving from Kant’s third Critique; second, that the speculative identity thesis is key for Hegel’s overarching philosophical method and can be understood as a relationship between life and self-conscious cognition; and third, that Hegel’s Subjective Logic can be read as his version of a critique of judgment. This chapter also provides arguments against two prominent interpretations of the trajectory from Kant to Hegel: one that revolves around a self-consciousness theme, and one that revolves around the importance of the intuitive understanding. It then provides chapter outlines for the remainder of the book.
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Shaffer, Michael J., and James R. Beebe. "Folk Judgments about Conditional Excluded Middle." In Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350039049.0014.

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"validity of adopting the outcome suggested. In the court room, both parties put forward arguments and the judge chooses the argument that is either the most persuasive or that is the closest to the judge’s own belief concerning the outcome of the case. So far, in this text, there have been opportunities to read judgments and the judges have presented their decisions in the form of reasoned responses to the questions posed by the case. In the classroom, students are constantly called upon to practise and refine their skills in legal problem solving by engaging in reasoning processes leading to full scale argument construction. For the practising lawyer, a valid argument is of the utmost importance. Decisions as to right action can only be made by people who are able to distinguish between competing arguments and determine that, in a given set of circumstances, one argument is more valid than another. Judges are, of course, the ultimate arbiters of the acceptable decision. Sometimes, this decision is quite subjective. 7.7.1 Logic It is generally believed that academic and professional lawyers and, indeed, law students, are well skilled in the art of reasoning. Furthermore, it is believed that they are people who argue ‘logically’. To most, the term ‘logical’ indicates a person who can separate the relevant from the irrelevant, and come to an objective view, based often on supposedly objective formula. Colloquially, people accuse others, who change their mind or who are emotional in their arguing, of allowing their emotions to get the better of them, of ‘not being logical’. The dictionary defines logic as the science of reasoning, thinking, proof or inference. More than that, logic is defined as a science in its own right—a subsection of philosophy dealing with scientific method in argument and the uses of inference. Hegel called logic the fundamental science of thought and its categories. It certainly claims to be an accurate form of reasoning: its root is found in the Greek word logos meaning reason. Figure 7.7: a definition of logic." In Legal Method and Reasoning, 227. Routledge-Cavendish, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781843145103-172.

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