Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Judicial review, europe'

This thesis investigates the reasons for the change in decision-making patterns in abstract judicial review in Germany, Italy and Austria in the last three decades. The literature on constitutional courts suggests that there are six factors influencing the decision-making of a constitutional court judge: personal political attitudes of the judges, direct influence by political institutions, Black Letter of the Law, Precedent, changes in public opinion and the harmonisation of national law with European law. The empirical data shows that throughout the last three decades the conditions in which legislation is formulated has become more complex through the harmonisation of national law with European Law. This causes the courts to react in three distinct ways: 1. The style of decisions is more interpretative 2. More laws are, at least in part, found unconstitutional 3. The pattern of decisions is leaning towards more unconstitutionality rulings so as to clarify the political framework for future legislation. Worry is expressed by the courts that not all the cases reaching them are referred to them in good intention. Politicians are increasingly using the complexity of the political system to refer cases to the courts on which they would prefer not to take a decision.

The Swedish government is legally obliged to conduct climate policy work that will protect nature and humanity from the harmful effects of climate change. Obligations related to the environment arise under Swedish domestic law, European law and international law. This thesis investigates the possibilities for the Swedish public to initiate climate change litigation against the Swedish government due to insufficient climate actions. I examine three climate change litigation approaches from selected jurisdictions, including Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. By transposing the three litigation approaches into the Swedish legal order I seek to discuss the possibilities for the public to challenge the Swedish state's responsibility in climate matters. This thesis claims that the possibilities for the concerned public to address climate change are restricted. International obligations derived from the European Convention on Human Rights and the Aarhus Convention have given individuals substantive rights and procedural rights in matters related to the environment. However, the implementation of the international obligations are not always enshrined in the national law.

This thesis is an attempt to analyse the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in the review of safeguard measures in the European Community. The safeguard measures considered are the Community's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules under Regulation 2423/88, safeguard measures under Regulation 288/82 and rules to combat illicit commercial practices under Regulation 2641/84. These instruments are part of the European Community's arsenal designed to counteract unfair trade practices of Third Countries. Emphasis is placed on the anti-dumping rules given that the measures imposing anti-dumping duties are most frequently challenged before the Court. The thesis begins with a synopsis of the Community's competence to deal exclusively with these matters. The respective roles of the Community authorities and the Member States in the adoption of protective measures is also considered. In order to understand the rationale of the Court's rulings in cases involving safeguard measures each of the instruments are viewed from an international and European perspective. The latter involves an analysis of the Community's legislation with respect to the substantive and procedural rules governing the imposition of protective measures to combat unfair trade practices of Third Countries. Having placed the safeguard measures in their proper perspective, judicical review by the Court is viewed first from the standpoint of an applicant's <i>locus standi</i> or standing to challenge a Community act imposing protective measures. If an applicant has <i>locus standi</i> he may apply to the court for an award of interim measures pending the outcome of the main application. The rules relating to such awards are considered and the Court's rulings in cases involving safeguard measures are analysed. Judicial review 'proper' in the sense of the Court's review of the merits of the cases that have come before it to date are considered in the light of the grounds of review in Article 173 of the EEC Treaty. This final chapter attempts to determine the extent to which the Court is prepared to review the findings of the authorities upon which the measures were adopted.

The work analyses the characteristics of the ‘limited’ standard of judicial review exercised by the EU Courts in the competition field, its evolution over time, and the main criticisms which have been advanced against its alleged shortcomings, in order to understand whether a system of more intense or full judicial review is necessary and warranted at the EU level.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the EPPO), established under enhanced cooperation by a Council Regulation (the Regulation), will be the first supranational criminal law enforcement body in the European Union (the EU) with direct powers visà-vis individuals. It will be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgments the perpetrators of offences against the Union’s financial interests. Measures taken by the EPPO may therefore seriously interfere with fundamental rights of individuals. As the EU is based on the rule of law, an effective judicial review of the acts produced by the EPPO is essential in order to allow individuals to protect their rights and legitimate interests against unlawful and arbitrary decision-making. In accordance with the Treaty framework of judicial review, the main rule in EU law on the division of jurisdiction between national courts of the Member States and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) is that acts adopted by Union institutions and bodies are to be reviewed by Union courts, while acts adopted by national institutions and bodies are to be reviewed by the national courts. Although the EPPO is an indivisible Union body, the judicial review of the procedural acts of the EPPO will first and foremost be a task for the national courts according to Article 42 of the Regulation. Since it follows from the hierarchy of norms that secondary law must comply with primary law, this thesis examines whether the system of judicial review of procedural acts of the EPPO, as prescribed in Article 42 of the Regulation, complies with the Treaty framework of judicial review and the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union (the Charter). The main finding of the thesis is that the system of judicial review of procedural acts of the EPPO, as prescribed in the Article 42 of the Regulation, does not comply with the Treaty framework of judicial review or the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.

The aim of the thesis is to address the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict between the Court of Justice and national courts with constitutional jurisdiction. It seeks to determine how the principle of primacy of EU law works in reality and whether the jurisprudence of the courts under analysis supports this concept. In so doing, the goal is to determine if the theory of constitutional pluralism can explain and guide the application of the principle of primacy of EU law in the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict. The analysis has been carried out on two levels. First, by exploring sovereignty claims by the courts under analysis, as well as reconciliatory vocabulary they employ to manage and contain constitutional conflict. Second, by further studying the three areas of constitutional conflict - ultra vires review, identity review, and fundamental rights review - to provide more nuance in the analysis of the way the Court of Justice has expanded the self-referential system of the Treaties; the different limits that constitutional adjudicators have placed on the principle of primacy as a result; and what possible solutions they envisage in the event of a constitutional conflict. All the courts under analysis have employed the vocabulary of mutual respect and self-restraint as principles guiding the resolution of constitutional conflict. Constitutional conflict is managed through incremental and permanent contestation and accommodation of their opposing claims to sovereignty (the auto-correct function of constitutional pluralism) that results in the uniform interpretation and application of Union law, but keeping in line with conferral as its defining principle. The analysis demonstrated the existence of a heterarchical constellation - the potential of all the courts involved for being ranked in a number of different ways at different times - grounded in mutual respect and self-restraint.

Au-delà de l’instabilité qui la caractérise, la mise en état des affaires pénales s’illustre par sa métamorphose. A mesure de la multiplication des modes de traitement de la délinquance et de l’enrichissement des possibilités d’investigation en enquête de police, celle qui ne devait être qu’un préalable à l’ouverture d’une information judiciaire s’impose comme le cadre ordinaire dans un système qui n’avait pas été pensé pour elle. En résultent un recul des droits de la défense et du juge auxquels ni une vision d’ensemble de la procédure, ni les dernières réformes, pour une large partie inspirées des droits européens, n’ont pleinement pallié. Mettre les implications de la montée en puissance de l’enquête de police à l’épreuve des droits européens fait ressortir différents motifs d’inquiétude sur la pleine compatibilité du système actuel avec les standards supranationaux. Ils viennent ainsi au soutien d’aménagements promus tant par la doctrine que par des praticiens pour remédier au déséquilibre constaté. Si la mise en conformité du droit interne doit servir de guide aux ajustements préconisés, ces derniers doivent néanmoins être examinés à la lumière de leur simplications sur le système vu dans son ensemble. Le souci de cohérence encouragerait à promouvoir des solutions plus mesurées, combinant à un renforcement relatif des droits durant l’enquête de police, une articulation des cadres procéduraux d’investigation centrée sur le renforcement du contrôle du juge. La perspective de l’intégration d’un Parquet européen, dont la création a été formellement actée le 12 octobre 2017, et qui se caractérise par sa perméabilité avec les ordres juridiques nationaux, rend ces propositions précaires. Les ajustements que son intégration supposera soulèveront à court ou moyen terme, la question d’une recomposition de la mise en état des affaires pénales, favorable à la restauration de son équilibre et de sa cohérence<br>Beyond the inconstancy which defines the pre-trial phase of proceedings, it is characterised by its metamorphosis. Because of the multiplication of ways of dealing with delinquency and the increasing possibilities of police inquiry, the pre-trial phase of proceedings, which should have been just a precondition to the preliminary judicial investigation, turns out to be the common framework, in a system not built for it. It leads to the decline of the rights of defence and of the judge. Neither a global perspective of the procedure nor the last reforms, for the most part inspired by European laws, fully overcame it. Confronting the consequences of police inquiry increasing with European rights, highlights several concerns on the full compatibility of the current system with the supranational standards. They support accommodations, encouraged by the searchers as well as the professionals, to solve observed imbalances. If the compliance of French law must guide the recommended adjustments, they should be reviewed in the light of their impacts on the global system, where inquiry and information still coexist. The will of consistency may encourage to promote more measured solutions, combining a moderate strengthening of the rights during police inquiries to an articulation of the investigation proceedings frameworks, focused on a reinforced control of the judge. The perspective of the integration of an European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which creation was formally acknowledged October 12th 2017, characterised by its openness to other national legal systems, makes these propositions uncertain. At short or medium term, adjustments ensued by its integration will lead to rethink the pre-trial phase of proceedings, to ensure its balance and consistency

This comparison has shown that the traditionally divergent positions, which are taken in the control of administrative action in England and Germany, display some common ground in very general terms on which decisions are being taken. The formulation of these general observations is valuable in the preparation of a transnational approximation of judicial review mechanism for the establishment of comparable levels of judicial protection in Europe. These results may be useful for future developments of a common system of judicial review across Europe, even though these results may only represent two pieces in the jigsaw. The comparison has also identified major differences and assessed the reasons for the diverging developments in a historical perspective. The identification of these differences is equally important because of the need to find compromises between divergent systems. Secondly, the thesis was concerned with an analysis of the degree of Europeanisation of the national judicial review systems and the concept of public liability as it is currently emerging. Here, some changes can be noted in both legal systems, which have led to a slow convergence of the systems. The changes in England are marked by an increasing openness for more transparency in the decision-making and the development of a more rights based culture. The substantive review of administrative decision through the application of sharper tools such as proportionality and substantive legitimate expectation mark a new era. Germany, on the other hand displays very high standards of review. The changes in Germany which were provoked mainly by case law of the European Court of Justice indicate the need to reduce the standard of review in some areas, such as the protection of substantive legitimate expectation in the context of the recovery of, state aid. The neglect of procedural protection which is illustrated by generous provisions which allow the in-trial curing of procedural effects displays an approach in Germany which is very focused on the substantive correctness of decisions. This attitude might, in the future lead to controversies in the context of European laws. Nevertheless, limitations to a convergence are inherently set by each national systems constitutional framework. The reasons for the different developments of both legal systems in the nineteenth and early twentieth century can not be ignored and will remain to an extent to preserve the national character of both systems. The variety of results, which have been identified in the four main chapters of this thesis were concerned with issues dealing with the institutional aspects as well as systematic aspects of judicial review and public liability in England and Germany. However, the nature of this comparison required the analysis of institutional contexts as well of the substantive and procedural judicial review mechanisms. The questions asked were concerned with identification of common principles and differences in a historical context, the degree of Europeanisation, which has led to an approximation of nationally divergent positions and the limitations, which are provided by each system's constitutional framework in which judicial review operates. The comparison focused on the development of a system of judicial review of administrative action in a historical perspective, the judicial control of the exercise of discretionary powers, fair procedures and their judicial review and the liability of public authorities in tort.

L'existence de mécanismes efficaces de contrôle de l'activité administrative est une problématique commune aux pays européens. Le contrôle des juges y apparaît fondamental. Il est un gage de la soumission de l'administration au droit, via le respect du principe de légalité. Le rôle qu'ils jouent ne selimite toutefois pas à cette simple fonction. C'est ce que tend à démontrer une étude comparée globale du recours pour excès de pouvoir français et la judicial review anglaise. Alors que chacun de ces deux mécanismes apparaît comme une forme limitée de contrôle de la légalité, ils ont en réalité une portée plus étendue. Sous l'effet du développement des contraintes pesant sur l'action administrative, conséquence de l'enrichissement normatif des ordres juridiques, le rôle des juges s'accroît. La place qu'ils occupent au sein des institutions nationales doit être clairement définie, afin d'en assurer la légitimité.N'étant plus uniquement les garants de la volonté d'un Parlement de plus en plus contraint, les juges voient les fondements de leur rôle être renouvelés. La liberté dont ils disposent va croissante. Ce mouvement révèle leur double figure : tantôt acteurs du contrôle de légalité, et principal outil de soumission de l'administration à un droit en constant développement, ils sont également un moteur de ce mouvement. Cela leur permet d'en fixer les limites afin de ne pas scléroser l'activité administrative, elle aussi porteuse d'une légitimité propre. L'étude comparée du recours pour excès de pouvoir et de la judicial review permet la mise en lumière de cette dualité : les juges en définissent les différentes facettes et participent ainsi activement à la définition de leur propre rôle<br>The existence of efficient mechanisms of control for administrative activity is a common problem in European countries. Judicial control is of primary importance. It is a guarentee of the respect of law by public authorities, through the principle of legality. But, the role of judges is not only defined by this function. This can be demonstrated by a global comparison of the French recours pour excès de pouvoir and the English judicial review. While both mechanisms seem to allow a limited control of legality, the picture is not as simple. Because of the development of the strains on administrative action, due to the normative enrichment of legal orders, the role of the judiciary is extending. The position of judges within national institutions has to be clearly defined, in order to guarantee their legitimacy.As they can no longer be described as protectors of the will of Parliament, the foundations of their role is reassessed. Their discretionary power is increasing. It reveals their dualiaty: they are active in the control of legality, and as such they are the main instrument of the submission of public authorities to a developing legality, and they are also actors of this movment. As such, they draw limits in order not to ossify administrative activity, which is also legitimate. The comparision between the recours pour excès de pouvoir and judicial review can reveal this duality : the judges define its various aspects and actively participate to the definition of their own role

L'existence de mécanismes efficaces de contrôle de l'activité administrative est une problématique commune aux pays européens. Le contrôle des juges y apparaît fondamental. Il est un gage de la soumission de l'administration au droit, via le respect du principe de légalité. Le rôle qu'ils jouent ne selimite toutefois pas à cette simple fonction. C'est ce que tend à démontrer une étude comparée globale du recours pour excès de pouvoir français et la judicial review anglaise. Alors que chacun de ces deux mécanismes apparaît comme une forme limitée de contrôle de la légalité, ils ont en réalité une portée plus étendue. Sous l'effet du développement des contraintes pesant sur l'action administrative, conséquence de l'enrichissement normatif des ordres juridiques, le rôle des juges s'accroît. La place qu'ils occupent au sein des institutions nationales doit être clairement définie, afin d'en assurer la légitimité.N'étant plus uniquement les garants de la volonté d'un Parlement de plus en plus contraint, les juges voient les fondements de leur rôle être renouvelés. La liberté dont ils disposent va croissante. Ce mouvement révèle leur double figure : tantôt acteurs du contrôle de légalité, et principal outil de soumission de l'administration à un droit en constant développement, ils sont également un moteur de ce mouvement. Cela leur permet d'en fixer les limites afin de ne pas scléroser l'activité administrative, elle aussi porteuse d'une légitimité propre. L'étude comparée du recours pour excès de pouvoir et de la judicial review permet la mise en lumière de cette dualité : les juges en définissent les différentes facettes et participent ainsi activement à la définition de leur propre rôle<br>The existence of efficient mechanisms of control for administrative activity is a common problem in European countries. Judicial control is of primary importance. It is a guarentee of the respect of law by public authorities, through the principle of legality. But, the role of judges is not only defined by this function. This can be demonstrated by a global comparison of the French recours pour excès de pouvoir and the English judicial review. While both mechanisms seem to allow a limited control of legality, the picture is not as simple. Because of the development of the strains on administrative action, due to the normative enrichment of legal orders, the role of the judiciary is extending. The position of judges within national institutions has to be clearly defined, in order to guarantee their legitimacy.As they can no longer be described as protectors of the will of Parliament, the foundations of their role is reassessed. Their discretionary power is increasing. It reveals their dualiaty: they are active in the control of legality, and as such they are the main instrument of the submission of public authorities to a developing legality, and they are also actors of this movment. As such, they draw limits in order not to ossify administrative activity, which is also legitimate. The comparision between the recours pour excès de pouvoir and judicial review can reveal this duality : the judges define its various aspects and actively participate to the definition of their own role

Le droit de la concurrence connaît une évolution fondamentale. Le contentieux prouve incontestablement que le débat initial sur l’existence d’une infraction a été remplacé par celui sur l’amende. Or, au centre du débat sur l’amende, se trouve la pleine juridiction du juge de l’Union sur les décisions de la Commission européenne infligeant une amende. En droit de l’Union, cette compétence est donnée au juge dans le droit primaire, par l’article 261 TFUE et dans le droit dérivé, par l’article 31 du règlement n°1/2003. Le juge peut supprimer, réduire ou majorer l’amende infligée. D’un côté, les pouvoirs conférés au juge par les textes sont vastes, ce qui laisse place à une jurisprudence imprécise, qui divise, tant à propos des conditions que de l’exercice de la pleine juridiction. D’un autre côté, alors qu’en droit de l’Union, la pleine juridiction renvoie à une compétence du juge sur le montant de l’amende, en droit du Conseil de l’Europe, la pleine juridiction correspond à un standard de contrôle qu’exerce le juge sur la décision adoptée. La question qui innerve cette étude reste celle de savoir si, en droit de l’Union, la compétence de pleine juridiction exercée par le juge satisfait-il au standard de contrôle de pleine juridiction, au sens de la Convention ? C’est, d’une part, le constat que la pleine juridiction, en droit de l’Union, souffre d’une conception désormais faussée. D’autre part, parce que la jurisprudence n’est pas uniforme, c’est une application dynamique de la pleine juridiction qui est encouragée, à travers un modèle de solutions pratiques applicable de manière systématique, dans un but de plus de cohérence et de sécurité juridique<br>EU competition law has fundamentally changed. The developments in competition litigation prove clearly that the initial debate about breaches of substantive competition law has now been replaced by a debate over the fine. The EU courts’ unlimited jurisdiction is now central to the debate over fines. In EU law, unlimited jurisdiction of the Court of justice regarding the penalties is granted by article 261, TFEU and by article 31, regulation no1/2003. On one hand, the powers granted to the EU courts are broad and vague. Which means unlimited jurisdiction results from a case-law construction of an evolutive and open nature. On the other hand, under human rights law, unlimited jurisdiction is a standard of control while under EU law, unlimited jurisdiction is merely a competence over the level of the fine. Therefore, the underlying question remains whether the judicial review in EU law does comply with the criteria of unlimited jurisdiction as established by the ECtHr? The objective of this study is to bring light to the fact that the definition of unlimited jurisdiction in EU law is blurred based on the misapprehension of its nature and more importantly, given the conflicting case law in this matter, we would like to promote a dynamic approach of the EU courts’ unlimited jurisdiction through practical solutions in a systematic perspective in the interests of legal certainty and judicial coherence

Il n'existe pas de principe général de proportionnalité en droit américain. Un contrôle est néanmoins présent dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême, bien qu'il ne soit pas toujours reconnu comme tel. Au vu des techniques utilisées à cette fin, une partie de la doctrine évoque une expérience exceptionnelle tandis qu'une autre relativise ce point de vue dans le domaine de la limitation des droits. La décision US c Carolene products de 1938 marque la fin d'une période d'interventionnisme judiciaire et constitue le point de départ de cette étude. Sous l'ère Lochner, l'invalidation quasi automatique des lois restreignant les libertés économiques valut à la Cour le qualificatif de « Gouvernement des juges ». Afin d'asseoir sa légitimité, elle élabora la doctrine des « degrés du contrôle » selon laquelle le standard de justification des atteintes dépend de la nature du droit restreint. Son travail est depuis lors rationalisé par la « contrainte substantielle » des droits fondamentaux qui participa à l'émergence d'une nouvelle théorie du contrôle de constitutionnalité. On peut observer que plusieurs juridictions s'autolimitent d'une façon comparable à leur homologue américain, à travers l'analyse des techniques du contrôle de proportionnalité. En particulier la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour constitutionnelle sud-africaine et la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, bien que chacune d'entre elles présente des spécificités en ce domaine. Les deux grands modes de « mise en balance » permettent alors de souligner les convergences et les divergences entre les systèmes<br>There is no general proportionality principle in the United States but, if not always recognized, the review appears in the Supreme Court's case law. For most part of the legal community its techniques reveal american exceptionalism. Other ones say this remark deserves some qualification in view of right's limitation. This study historically begin with the US v Carolene products case ending a period by which the Court invalidated most statutes restricting economic liberties. Thus, the Lochner Era was called « Government by the judiciary ». By the « levels of review » doctrine she found a way to prove her legitimacy, making the standard of justification depends on the nature of the right limited. This « substantial fundamental rights'constraint » rationalized her work and contributed towards a new theory of judicial review. However many jurisdictions share the same self-restraint as their american neighboor. With regard to the techniques of proportionality review, the canadian Supreme Court, the south african Constitutional Court and the European Court present several common characteristics in spite of their specific experience. Two modes of « balancing » highlight convergence and difference between those four legal systems. Stare decisis especially conditions methodological and normative coherence in the United states, having an influence on the fundamental right's constraint. It curbs differently the judicial expanding power of interpretation. According to a comparative perspective the american particularism should be revealed by their definition and their effect on a differentiated right's guarantee

Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des révisions n’est pas encore accepté en France. Il s’agit d’une position qui fait consensus en doctrine depuis les débuts de la IIIème République. Dans sa décision du 26 mars 2003, le Conseil constitutionnel a également rejeté sa compétence en matière de lois constitutionnelles. Pour autant, la situation française reste, à l’aune du droit comparé, si ce n’est exceptionnelle, du moins isolée par rapport à ses proches voisins allemands et italiens. En outre, il existe dans le texte de la Constitution de 1958 une disposition formellement non-révisable. L’article 89 alinéa 5 dispose ainsi : « La forme républicaine du Gouvernement ne peut faire l’objet d’une révision ». Loin des débats sur la supraconstitutionnalité, il est donc possible d’envisager un contentieux spécifique des lois de révision constitutionnelles sur le fondement même de la Constitution. On désigne ces normes comme des normes à constitutionnalité renforcée. Il s’agit d’envisager d’abord s’il existe en théorie une hiérarchie entre les normes à constitutionnalité renforcée et les normes à constitutionnalité simple. Cette recherche ne peut se fonder que dans le cadre d’une analyse positiviste et kelsénienne du droit. Elle montre bien que le pouvoir constituant pose des normes spécifiques lors de la production de la constitution que le pouvoir de révision, mais aussi tous les autres pouvoirs constitués de l’État, doit respecter. Ensuite, il convient de vérifier que cette théorie est effective dans la pratique. L’étude des « changements de constitution », lors de transitions constitutionnelles ou des révisions totales conforte cette posture théorique. L’analyse de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle comparée démontre enfin que, loin d’être la prémisse d’un « Gouvernement des juges », le contrôle des révisions constitutionnelles permet le parachèvement de l’État de droit<br>Judicial review of constitutional amendments is not yet accepted in France. The legal community quasi-unanimously agreed on that solution since the early days of the III Republic. In its decision dated from march 26th, 2003, the Constitutional Council has explicitly denied its power concerning constitutional amendments. In view of the situation in neighboring countries Germany and Italy, the French situation remains singular, if not exceptional.The Constitution contains a provision which cannot be amended. Article 89 para 5 thus states: The republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment.” Far from the debate on supraconstitutionaliy, it is therefore possible to envisage a specific action of constitutional amendment, based on the Constitution itself. These norms are called constitutionally enforced. The idea is to determine whether a hierarchy exists between “enforced constitutionally norms” and “simple constitutionally norms”. This research must be conducted under a positivist and kelsenian approach. It demonstrates that the constituent power creates specific norms that the amending power, along with all delegated power must respect. It should then be assessed if this theory is effective. The analysis of “constitutions changes” during constitutional transition reinforces the theoretical analysis. Comparative constitutional law studies demonstrate that judicial review of constitutional amendments is not a “Government by judiciary”; it further advances the rule of Law

Le droit des aides d’Etat est un domaine singulier du droit de l’Union européenne (UE). Sonobjectif le rend même unique au monde et pourtant il demeure en partie méconnu et seseffets sous-estimés. La crise économique et financière débutée en 2007 l’a remis sur ledevant de la scène. Dans ce contexte, un outil s’est révélé comme central dans la gestiondes évènements : la conditionnalité. Longtemps ignorée, cette technique, présente depuisles origines en droit des aides d’Etat, s’avère être d’une influence insoupçonnée sur lemécanisme de contrôle des soutiens étatiques. D’une part, elle autorise la Commission àexiger des modifications substantielles, tant du projet d’aide que des bénéficiaires, afin d’enautoriser la mise en oeuvre. D’autre part, la conditionnalité permet à la Commissiond’avancer un agenda politique, de manière indirecte, au service de l’approfondissement del’UE. Son incidence ne se limite pas seulement à la question de la compatibilité desfinancements publics. Elle s’exprime également dans le cadre du suivi des décisionsconditionnelles, et des éventuels recours juridictionnels. De nouvelles techniques basées surla conditionnalité ont fait leur apparition à tous les stades de l’examen des aides. Plusencore, elle joue un rôle considérable, en amont, dans le processus de création du droit desaides d’Etat et de sa soft law. Compte tenu de sa portée, cette étude s’est attachée àmesurer l’ampleur de ce phénomène, à définir ses concepts, à identifier ses formes et àévaluer ses conséquences. Il en résulte que la conditionnalité est à l’origine d’une nouvelleapproche du droit des aides d’Etat<br>State aid law is a unique area of European Union (EU) law. Its objective makes it evenunique in the world and yet it remains partly unknown and its effects underestimated. Theeconomic and financial crisis, which began in 2007, has brought it back to the forefront. Inthis context, a tool has proved to be central in the management of events: conditionality. Thistechnique, which has long been ignored, has always had an unsuspected influence on themechanism of control over state support. On the one hand, it authorizes the Commission torequire substantial changes, both in the aid project and for the beneficiaries, in order toauthorize its implementation. On the other hand, conditionality allows the Commission to putforward a political agenda, indirectly, to service the deepening of the EU. Its impact is notlimited to the question of the compatibility of public funding. It is also expressed in the contextof the monitoring of conditional decisions, and possible judicial review. New techniquesbased on conditionality have emerged at all stages state aid control. Moreover, it plays aconsiderable role, upstream, in the process of creating state aid law and its soft law. Givenits scope, this study focused on measuring the extent of this phenomenon, defining itsconcepts, identifying its forms and evaluating its consequences. As a result, conditionality isat the origin of a new approach to state aid law

Le droit des aides d’Etat est un domaine singulier du droit de l’Union européenne (UE). Sonobjectif le rend même unique au monde et pourtant il demeure en partie méconnu et seseffets sous-estimés. La crise économique et financière débutée en 2007 l’a remis sur ledevant de la scène. Dans ce contexte, un outil s’est révélé comme central dans la gestiondes évènements : la conditionnalité. Longtemps ignorée, cette technique, présente depuisles origines en droit des aides d’Etat, s’avère être d’une influence insoupçonnée sur lemécanisme de contrôle des soutiens étatiques. D’une part, elle autorise la Commission àexiger des modifications substantielles, tant du projet d’aide que des bénéficiaires, afin d’enautoriser la mise en oeuvre. D’autre part, la conditionnalité permet à la Commissiond’avancer un agenda politique, de manière indirecte, au service de l’approfondissement del’UE. Son incidence ne se limite pas seulement à la question de la compatibilité desfinancements publics. Elle s’exprime également dans le cadre du suivi des décisionsconditionnelles, et des éventuels recours juridictionnels. De nouvelles techniques basées surla conditionnalité ont fait leur apparition à tous les stades de l’examen des aides. Plusencore, elle joue un rôle considérable, en amont, dans le processus de création du droit desaides d’Etat et de sa soft law. Compte tenu de sa portée, cette étude s’est attachée àmesurer l’ampleur de ce phénomène, à définir ses concepts, à identifier ses formes et àévaluer ses conséquences. Il en résulte que la conditionnalité est à l’origine d’une nouvelleapproche du droit des aides d’Etat<br>State aid law is a unique area of European Union (EU) law. Its objective makes it evenunique in the world and yet it remains partly unknown and its effects underestimated. Theeconomic and financial crisis, which began in 2007, has brought it back to the forefront. Inthis context, a tool has proved to be central in the management of events: conditionality. Thistechnique, which has long been ignored, has always had an unsuspected influence on themechanism of control over state support. On the one hand, it authorizes the Commission torequire substantial changes, both in the aid project and for the beneficiaries, in order toauthorize its implementation. On the other hand, conditionality allows the Commission to putforward a political agenda, indirectly, to service the deepening of the EU. Its impact is notlimited to the question of the compatibility of public funding. It is also expressed in the contextof the monitoring of conditional decisions, and possible judicial review. New techniquesbased on conditionality have emerged at all stages state aid control. Moreover, it plays aconsiderable role, upstream, in the process of creating state aid law and its soft law. Givenits scope, this study focused on measuring the extent of this phenomenon, defining itsconcepts, identifying its forms and evaluating its consequences. As a result, conditionality isat the origin of a new approach to state aid law

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne est aujourd’hui l’institution judiciaire qui fait l’objet de toutes les attentions de la part du monde scientifique. Elle serait même, derrière la Cour suprême des États-Unis, l’organe judiciaire le plus étudié au monde. Notre recherche propose de démontrer que la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne est une juridiction constitutionnelle. Tout d’abord, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne dispose d’une légitimité qui peut être qualifiée de constitutionnelle tant au regard de ses composantes humaines que de sa procédure. La procédure de nomination ainsi que l’office des membres de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne caractérisent sa légitimité constitutionnelle subjective. L’étude des règles de procédure amène au constat que le procès à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne à les attraits d’un procès constitutionnel. Elles caractérisent la légitimité constitutionnelle objective de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne.La Cour de justice dispose ensuite d’une compétence qui peut être qualifiée de constitutionnelle car elle exerce des attributions qui sont traditionnellement dévolues au juge constitutionnel. Ceci se vérifie tout d’abord dans le contrôle de la régularité des normes étatiques et européennes au droit de l’Union européenne lato sensu qui évoque le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois devant les juridictions constitutionnelles nationales. Cela se vérifie, ensuite, dans le contrôle de la répartition horizontale et verticale des compétences qu’exerce le juge de l’Union européenne et qui constitue l’une des attributions des juges constitutionnels dans les États fédéraux ou régionaux. Cela se vérifie, enfin, à l’aune de la garantie des droits fondamentaux, que le juge de l’Union européenne veille à préserver au sein de l’ordre juridique dont il est l’interprète authentique<br>The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial institution that nowadays garners the most attention from scholars. One could even claim that, after the Supreme Court of the United States, it is the most studied judicial organ in the world. This research aims to demonstrate that the CJEU is a constitutional court. First of all, the CJEU enjoys constitutional legitimacy that extends to its Members as well as its procedure. The appointment procedure and the function of the Members of the CJEU shape its subjective constitutional legitimacy. A thorough exploration of the rules of procedure leads to the finding that the process before the Court of Justice of the European Union has the trappings of a constitutional process. The latter give form to the objective constitutional legitimacy of the CJEU.The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice can be qualified as constitutional because it has powers which are traditionally vested in the constitutional judge. The CJEU reviews the conformity of both national and European acts with European Union law lato sensu, which is analogous to the constitutional review exercised by national constitutional courts. Secondly, it scrutinizes the horizontal and vertical distribution of powers, which is a typical attribute of constitutional judges in federal states. Finally, the constitutional similarities can be found in the realm of fundamental rights protection: the judge of the European Union ensures that these rights, of which he/she is the authentic interpreter, are upheld within the legal order

« L’Europe ne se fera pas en un jour, ni sans heurts.», dixit Monsieur Robert Schuman. Tel est le constat qui peut encore être fait à l’heure actuelle avec l’adoption, après trente ans d’intenses débats au niveau européen, de la Societas Europaea, introduite en droit français avec la loi du 26 juillet 2005 pour la confiance et la modernisation de l’économie, complétée par les décrets du 14 avril 2006 et du 9 novembre 2006. La même analyse peut s’appliquer à la proposition du règlement de la commission européenne relatif au statut de la société privée européenne faite le 25 juin 2008, en cours d’examen devant le Parlement Européen. Il s’agit de démontrer l’existence de normes communautaires flexibles propices au développement des normes statutaires, à l'image de celles applicables à la société privée européenne (SPE) d'origine communautaire et d'essence contractuelle. La SPE doit être analysée comme structure sociétaire, symbole de l’émancipation du droit communautaire et vecteur du principe de libre établissement des sociétés, à la fois par rapport à sa « grande cousine », la société européenne, et à travers l’étude des normes communautaires comme éléments nécessaires au bon fonctionnement des structures européennes.La question est enfin de savoir si le recours à la SPE constitue un instrument pertinent dans les opérations de restructuration intra-communautaire. Deux axes de réflexion semblent s’imposer : l’aménagement des relations contractuelles intragroupe via le modèle de la SPE et la SPE comme élément moteur dans le cadre des opérations de fusion intracommunautaire<br>“Europe will not be made in a day, nor without any clashes,” according to Mr Robert Schuman. The statement proved to be true with the adoption, after thirty years of intense debates at the European level, of Societas Europaea, introduced into French law with the bill of July 26, 2005 for the confidence and modernization of the economy, supplemented by the decrees of April 14, 2006 and November 9, 2006. The same analysis can be made of the European Commission proposals for the regulations relating to the statute of the European private company made on June 25, 2008, and now under consideration before the European Parliament. The question is to show the existence of flexible Community standards favourable to the development of statutory standards, in the image of those applicable to the European Private Company of Community origin and which is contractual in essence. The European Private Company should be analysed as a member structure and a symbol of the emancipation of Community legislation as well as a vector of the principle of free establishment of companies both in relation to its “big cousin,” the European Company, and through the study of Community standards as necessary elements to the correct operation of European structures. The next step is to question if resorting to the European Private Company constitutes a relevant instrument in the operations of intracommunitarian reorganization following two main lines of investigation: the adjustment of contractual intragroup relations via the model of the European Private Company and the European Private Company as a mainspring within the framework of intracommunitarian fusion operations

La première partie de l’étude est consacrée à l’invocation, intra et extra muros, du droit à un procès équitable. Sont analysés ainsi, dans un premier temps, l’applicabilité directe de l’article 6 et la subsidiarité de la Convention par rapport au droit national et de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme par rapport aux juridictions nationales. Le droit à un procès équitable étant un droit jurisprudentiel, l’étude se focalise, dans un second temps, sur l’invocabilité des arrêts de la Cour Européenne et plus précisément sur l’invocabilité directe de l’arrêt qui constate une violation du droit à un procès équitable dans une affaire mettant en cause l’Etat et l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme à l’arrêt qui interprète l’article 6 dans une affaire mettant en cause un Etat tiers. L’introduction dans l’ordre juridique français et hellénique de la possibilité de réexamen de la décision pénale définitive rendue en violation de la Convention a fait naitre un nouveau droit d’accès à la Cour de cassation lequel trouve son terrain de prédilection aux violations de l’article 6 et constitue peut-être le pas le plus important pour le respect du droit à un procès équitable après l’acceptation (par la France et la Grèce) du droit de recours individuel. Quant au faible fondement de l’autorité de la chose interprétée par la Cour Européenne, qui est d’ailleurs un concept d’origine communautaire, cela explique pourquoi un dialogue indirect entre la Cour Européenne et la Cour de cassation est possible sans pour autant changer en rien l’invocabilité de l’interprétation conforme et le fait que l’existence d’un précédent oblige la Cour de cassation à motiver l’interprétation divergente qu’elle a adoptée.La seconde partie de l’étude, qui est plus volumineuse, est consacrée aux garanties de bonne administration de la justice (article 6§1), à la présomption d’innocence (article 6§2), aux droits qui trouvent leur fondement conventionnel dans l’article 6§1 mais leur fondement logique dans la présomption d’innocence et aux droits de la défense (article 6§3). Sont ainsi analysés le droit à un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi par la loi, le délai raisonnable, le principe de l’égalité des armes, le droit à une procédure contradictoire, le droit de la défense d’avoir la parole en dernier, la publicité de l’audience et du prononcé des jugements et arrêts, l’obligation de motivation des décisions, la présomption d’innocence, dans sa dimension procédurale et personnelle, le « droit au mensonge », le droit de l’accusé de se taire et de ne pas contribuer à son auto-incrimination, son droit d’être informé de la nature et de la cause de l’accusation et de la requalification envisagée des faits, son droit au temps et aux facilités nécessaires à la préparation de la défense, y compris notamment la confidentialité de ses communications avec son avocat et le droit d’accès au dossier, son droit de comparaître en personne au procès, le droit de la défense avec ou sans l’assistance d’un avocat, le droit de l’accusé d’être représenté en son absence par son avocat, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat lorsque la situation économique de l’accusé ne permet pas le recours à l’assistance d’un avocat mais les intérêts de la justice l’exigent, le droit d’interroger ou faire interroger les témoins à charge et d’obtenir la convocation et l’interrogation des témoins à décharge dans les mêmes conditions que les témoins à charge et le droit à l’interprétation et à la traduction des pièces essentielles du dossier. L’analyse est basée sur la jurisprudence strasbourgeoise et centrée sur la position qu’adoptent la Cour de cassation française et l’Aréopage<br>The first party of the study is dedicated to the invocation of the right to a fair trial intra and extra muros and, on this basis, it focuses on the direct applicability of Article 6 and the subsidiarity of the Convention and of the European Court of Human Rights. Because of the fact that the right to a fair trial is a ‘‘judge-made law’’, the study also focuses on the invocability of the judgments of the European Court and more precisely on the direct invocability of the European Court’s judgment finding that there has been a violation of the Convention and on the request for an interpretation in accordance with the European Court’s decisions. The possibility of reviewing the criminal judgment made in violation of the Convention has generated a new right of access to the Court of cassation which particularly concerns the violations of the right to a fair trial and is probably the most important step for the respect of the right to a fair trial after enabling the right of individual petition. As for the weak conventional basis of the authority of res interpretata (“autorité de la chose interprétée”), this fact explains why an indirect dialogue between the ECHR and the Court of cassation is possible but doesn’t affect the applicant’s right to request an interpretation in accordance with the Court’s decisions and the duty of the Court of cassation to explain why it has decided to depart from the (non-binding) precedent.The second party of the study is bigger than the first one and is dedicated to the guarantees of the proper administration of justice (Article 6§1), the presumption of innocence (Article 6§2), the rights which find their conventional basis on the Article 6§1 but their logical explanation to the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence (Article 6§3). More precisely, the second party of the study is analyzing the right to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, the principle of equality of arms, the right to adversarial proceedings, the right of the defence to the last word, the right to a public hearing and a public pronouncement of the judgement, the judge’s duty to state the reasons for his decision, the presumption of innocence, in both its procedural and personal dimensions, the accused’s right to lie, his right to remain silent, his right against self-incrimination, his right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation and the potential re-characterisation of the facts, his right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, including in particular the access to the case-file and the free and confidential communication with his lawyer, his right to appear in person at the trial, his right to defend either in person or through legal assistance, his right to be represented by his counsel, his right to free legal aid if he hasn’t sufficient means to pay for legal assistance but the interests of justice so require, his right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him and his right to the free assistance of an interpreter and to the translation of the key documents. The analysis is based on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and focuses on the position taken by the French and the Greek Court of Cassation (Areopagus) on each one of the above mentioned rights

Defence date: 19 September 2018<br>Examining Board: Prof. Bruno De Witte, Maastricht University/EUI (Supervisor); Prof. Loïc Azoulai, Sciences Po Paris; Associate Prof. Jacco Bomhoff, LSE; Prof. Guillaume Tusseau, Science Po Paris<br>The author was awarded the Mauro Cappelletti Prize for the best doctoral thesis in the field of comparative law (June 2019)<br>Proportionality increasingly dominates legal imagination. Initially conceived of as a principle that regulates police action, today it is progressively established as an advanced tool of liberal constitutional science. Its spread, accompanied by a global paradigm of constitutional rights, appears to be an irresistible natural development. This thesis was inspired by the intuition that even though courts and lawyers around the world reason more and more in proportionality terms, proportionality can mean very different things in different contexts, even within the same legal system. While the relevant literature has paid little attention to differences in the use of proportionality, identifying the local meanings of proportionality is crucial to making sense of its spread, to assessing its success, and to appraising the possibility of convergence between legal systems. Through an in-depth study and comparison of the use of proportionality by legal actors in France, England and Greece, this work shows that the local meanings of proportionality are not simply deviant applications of a global model. Instead, they reflect the legal cultures in which they evolve, local paths of cultural change and local patterns of Europeanisation. La proportionnalité a progressivement pris une place centrale dans l’imaginaire juridique. Initialement conçue comme un principe qui régit l’utilisation des pouvoirs de police, elle est aujourd’hui considérée comme un outil avancé de science constitutionnelle. Sa généralisation, accompagnée par le paradigme du droit constitutionnel global, est perçue comme irrésistible et naturelle. Cette recherche a été guidée par l’intuition que, même si les juristes à travers le monde raisonnent de plus en plus en termes de proportionnalité, celle-ci peut avoir des sens très différents, et ce, même au sein d’un seul système juridique. Les différentes utilisations du langage de la proportionnalité sont rarement étudiées en tant que tels. Pour autant, l’identification des sens locaux de la proportionnalité est cruciale si l’on veut comprendre sa propagation, apprécier son succès et évaluer les possibilités de convergence entre systèmes juridiques. Ce travail consiste en une étude approfondie et comparative de l’utilisation du langage de la proportionnalité parmi les acteurs juridiques en France, en Angleterre et en Grèce. Il cherche à montrer que les sens locaux de la proportionnalité ne sont pas simplement des applications imparfaites d’un modèle global. Au contraire, ils reflètent les cultures au sein desquelles ils évoluent, des chemins d’évolution culturelle propres à chaque système et des trajectoires locales d’européanisation.

Dissertação de mestrado em Ciência Política<br>Os Tribunais, para além de representarem um pilar de qualquer Estado soberano, são também instrumentos fulcrais para o estabelecimento e evolução de organizações regionais no panorama internacional. Especialmente o caso da União Europeia (UE), a posição assumida pelo seu Tribunal de Justiça (TJUE) é o reflexo de como as decisões judiciais podem consolidar e/ou redesenhar o rumo integrativo em qualquer processo de integração regional. Tendo em atenção que o processo de integração europeu é encarado atualmente como um modelo passível de influenciar outros (pelas suas “boas práticas”), nomeadamente as levadas a cabo pelo seu TJUE, a presente dissertação visa explorar o alcance do modelo europeu nas dinâmicas integrativas de outros projetos regionais, nomeadamente na América do Sul. Com base na análise da estrutura jurídica e institucional do Mercosul, é discutida a possibilidade de uma aproximação à realidade europeia. Mais recentemente, a posterior criação de uma entidade judicial exclusivamente direcionada para as controvérsias e dúvidas em torno das normas do Mercosul- o Tribunal Permanente de Revisão, bem como a sua possível proximidade com alguns dos contornos da justiça europeia, abre caminho à hipótese de inspiração do modelo integrativo europeu, e sobretudo judicial, pelas entidades internas sul-americanas. O contexto de criação de cada um dos processos de integração, a sua estrutura institucional e as suas entidades judiciais serão os dados mais relevantes para a averiguação da hipótese levantada nesta investigação. A contraposição do espírito integrativo e do caminho trilhado pelas suas instituições judiciais serão um dos principais instrumentos para a comprovação ou refutação da hipótese de emulação do modelo judicial europeu pelo Mercosul. A incerteza e controvérsia em torno desta hipótese tornam a contraposição de modelos integrativos e judiciais europeu e sul-americano o ponto de discussão central e um valor acrescentado da Emulação enquanto ferramenta analítica, para futuras investigações e debate.<br>In addition to representing a pillar of any sovereign state, the Courts are also key instruments for the establishment and evolution of regional organizations in the international arena. Particularly in the case of the European Union (EU), the position taken by European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a reflection of how judicial decisions can consolidate and / or redraw the way forward in any regional integration process. Bearing in mind that the European integration process is currently regarded as a model that can influence others (through its "good practices"), in particular those carried out by its ECJ, this dissertation aims to explore the influence of the European model on the integrative dynamics of other regional projects, particularly in South America. Based on the analysis of the legal and institutional structure of Mercosur, the possibility of an approximation to the European reality is discussed in academic terms. More recently, the creation of a judicial body exclusively focused on the controversies and doubts surrounding Mercosur's rules - the Permanent Review Court, as well as its possible proximity to some of the contours of European justice, opens the way for the hypothesis of inspiration of the European integration model, and above all judicial, by South American internal entities. The context of creation of each of the integration processes, its institutional structure and its judicial entities will be the most relevant data for the investigation of the hypothesis raised in this investigation. The contraposition of the integrative spirit and the path taken by its judicial institutions will be one of the main instruments for proving or refuting the hypothesis of the European judicial model by Mercosur. The uncertainty and controversy surrounding this hypothesis make the integration of European and South American integrative and judicial models the central point of discussion and an added value of Emulation as an analytical tool for future research and academic debate.

Dissertação de Mestrado em Direito apresentada à Faculdade de Direito<br>A proliferação de acordos internacionais nas últimas décadas destacou o problema da sua integração nas ordens jurídicas internas. No entanto, a integração de um tratado na ordem jurídica interna não permite, só por si, que as suas provisões sejam invocáveis pelos indivíduos em seio de disputa judicial, como norma aplicável à resolução do litígio. Consequentemente, são exploradas as duas construções jurisprudenciais que mais influenciaram a aplicação judicial de tratados – os conceitos da aplicabilidade direta e dos tratados self-executing. Desta forma, estabeleceremos os mecanismos que determinam o estatuto, hierarquia e aplicabilidade direta dos tratados nos ordenamentos jurídicos internos. Também na União Europeia (UE) esta integração tem encontrado desafios. Revelando-se os Tratados vagos quanto à integração, hierarquia e efeitos dos acordos da UE na ordem jurídica comunitária, coube ao Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia (TJUE) consolidar estas questões. A jurisprudência do TJUE não se tem mostrado, no entanto, como um bloco sólido, persistindo várias críticas à forma como permite a invocabilidade dos acordos, quer através do efeito direto, quer para fiscalização dos atos das instituições. Esta dissertação pretende, por conseguinte, produzir uma análise crítica da jurisprudência do TJUE quanto à invocabilidade dos acordos na UE. No final, destacam-se ainda as consequências de questões que em breve poderão ser abordadas pelo TJUE. Ganham aqui especial relevância a prática recente de inserção de cláusulas contra o efeito direto nos acordos celebrados pela UE, com o potencial de diminuir brutalmente os casos de efeito direto dos acordos, e o possível reconhecimento do efeito direto horizontal dos acordos, que, pelo contrário, alargaria o número de casos abrangidos por este efeito.<br>The proliferation of international agreements in the last decades has drawn attention to the problems regarding its incorporation into domestic legal orders. However, the sole incorporation of agreements in the domestic legal orders, by itself, does not individuals to rely on the provisions of the agreements in court, has an applicable rule to that case. Consequently, we explore the two judicial constructions that have shaped the judicial application of international agreements – the concept of direct applicability of self-executing treaties. This way, we will determine the mechanisms that determine the status, hierarchy and direct applicability of treaties in domestic legal orders. In the European Union (EU), this incorporation has also run into some challenges. The Treaties are vague about the incorporation, hierarchy and effects of EU agreements in the EU legal order. Hence, this task has fallen on the EU Court of Justice. However, the case law of the Court has not presented itself has a solid body and many criticize the way it applies direct effect and the judicial review of EU legislation. Consequently, this dissertation aims to make a critical analysis of the Court of Justice case law regarding the application of EU agreements. At last, attention will also be drawn to the possible outcomes of new questions that will soon reach the Court. These questions include the recent practice of including “no direct effect clauses” in EU agreements and in the Council decisions approving their conclusion, and the possible recognition of horizontal direct effect of EU agreements by the Court. While the first would dramatically limit the number of direct effect cases, the second would increase the reach of direct effect.

This dissertation deals with the old topic of EU law regarding access by individuals to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to challenge the validity of Union acts. The study is based in two landmark judgments rendered by the CJEU in 1986, i.e. Les Verts and Johnston, and it argues that the bridge between these two decisions has not been fully built in the CJEU’s case-law, which has left room for uncertainties, ambiguities and insufficiencies in what concerns the judicial protection of private parties vis-à-vis the EU. In light of the Les Verts judgment, the dissertation argues that the CJEU’s case-law is dominated by an objectivist, institutional and systemic approach which has given rise to gaps of judicial protection of private parties in the Union legal order and underlies the inability of the CJEU to fill in such lacunae. In this context, the dissertation stresses (i) the restrictive interpretation of standing requirements of private parties to bring an action for annulment; (ii) the irrelevance of the finding of a breach of the right to effective judicial protection at the Union level; (iii) the generous view to other objective and institutional dimensions of the Union system of judicial review; and the (iv) systemic concerns regarding the docket control of the CJEU combined with a certain view of the Union judicial architecture said to be fundamentally anchored in national judiciaries. Furthermore, it is submitted that the alternative routes to the direct access by individuals to the Union courts put forward by the CJEU have proved inadequate and ineffective, because of the objectivist, institutional and systemic conceptual approach underlying to the CJEU’s case-law on the scope and nature of such avenues. At this point, the dissertation discusses the issue of national procedural autonomy, the nature of preliminary references, and the TWD doctrine. Additionally, it is argued that the CJEU’s case-law regarding judicial review in the field of the former intergovernmental pillars suggests an institutional and objectivist trend as well. In drawing attention to the objective elements, the institutional preference and the systemic views enshrined in the CJEU’s case-law the dissertation brings to the fore institutional guarantees, as a reflex of the objective dimension of fundamental rights. In contrast with the previous approach, it is argued that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty requires the CJEU to adopt a more subjectivist approach to the issues of judicial protection of individuals in the EU. Such an approach is anchored in the Johnston verdict which laid the first stone regarding such issues in the Union legal order. It is submitted that the new Article 6 TEU involves a paradigm shift regarding fundamental rights protection in the EU. In this context, the dissertation discusses the procedural impact of the formal constitutionalization of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of the accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty regarding judicial review of Union acts at the initiative of individuals are discussed in light of said constitutional shift. The dissertation puts forward several proposals regarding the interpretation of Article 19 TEU and Articles 263(4) and 275 TFEU — taking into consideration the recent GC’s decision in the case of Inuit — in light of the pro actore approach which should arguably underlie to the CJEU’s case-law in this regard. Lastly, the issue of a more generous approach to direct access by individuals to the Union courts is discussed in view of the CJEU’s workload concerns. The possibility of a European certiorari, among other possible judicial reforms, is analysed therein.<br>A presente dissertação, que tem por objeto o acesso dos particulares ao Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia (TJUE) — um tema clássico de Direito da União Europeia — assenta em duas decisões fundamentais proferidas pelo TJUE, em 1986, nos casos Les Verts e Johnston. Considera-se aqui que a “ponte” entre os dois referidos acórdãos não foi totalmente estabelecida na jurisprudência do TJUE, abrindo espaço para incertezas, equívocos e insuficiências no que diz respeito à tutela jurisdicional dos particulares na União Europeia. À luz do acórdão Les Verts, a dissertação começa por considerar que a jurisprudência do TJUE adota uma abordagem objetivista, institucional e sistémica que tem dado origem a lacunas na proteção jurisdicional dos particulares, e justifica a incapacidade do mesmo tribunal no suprimento das referidas lacunas. Neste contexto, chama-se a atenção para (i) a interpretação restritiva das condições em que aos particulares é permitido intentar uma ação de anulação; (ii) a irrelevância do argumento fundado na violação do direito fundamental à tutela jurisdicional efetiva na apreciação da admissibilidade de ações de anulação; (iii) a abordagem generosa que o TJUE tem adotado relativamente a outras dimensões objetivistas e institucionais do sistema de controlo jurisdicional da validade de atos da União; e (iv) as preocupações sistémicas relativas ao controlo do volume de processos que o TJUE tem de decidir, associadas a uma certa visão da arquitetura judiciária europeia, considerada fundamentalmente ancorada nas jurisdições nacionais. A acrescer a estas considerações, chama-se ainda a atenção para o facto de os meios de tutela alternativos ao acesso direto dos particulares aos tribunais da União se demonstrarem inadequados e ineficazes, precisamente em virtude da abordagem objetivista, institucional e sistémica que subjaz à jurisprudência do TJUE no que diz respeito ao âmbito e à natureza jurídica dos referidos meios de tutela. A este propósito, a dissertação discute, em particular, o princípio da autonomia processual dos Estados-membros, a natureza jurídica do mecanismo do reenvio prejudicial e o sentido e alcance da doutrina TWD. Acrescenta-se ainda que a jurisprudência do TJUE relativamente ao controlo jurisdicional da validade de atos da União no domínio dos chamados “pilares intergovernamentais” sugere igualmente uma tendência objetivista e institucional. Salientando os elementos objetivos, a preferência institucional e a visão sistémica que decorrem da jurisprudência do TJUE nesta matéria, a dissertação chama à colação a figura das garantias institucionais, enquanto reflexo da dimensão objetiva dos direitos fundamentais. Rompendo com a abordagem anterior, considera-se então que a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Lisboa impõe que o TJUE adote uma orientação dita subjetivista relativamente à tutela jurisdicional dos particulares na União Europeia. Esta nova abordagem funda-se em primeira linha no acórdão Johnston que lançou a primeira pedra nesta matéria na ordem jurídica da União. Na verdade, o novo artigo 6.º do Tratado da União Europeia implica uma mudança de paradigma constitucional no que diz respeito à proteção dos direitos fundamentais na União Europeia. Neste contexto, a dissertação discute o impacto processual da constitucionalização formal da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União, e bem assim da adesão à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem. À luz da referida mudança de paradigma constitucional, analisam-se as alterações introduzidas pelo Tratado de Lisboa no que respeita ao controlo da validade de atos da União por iniciativa dos particulares. A este propósito, tomando em consideração a recente decisão do Tribunal Geral no caso Inuit, a dissertação propõe diversas soluções relativas à interpretação dos artigos 19.º do Tratado da União Europeia e 263.º § 4 e 275.º do Tratado relativo ao Funcionamento da União Europeia à luz do princípio pro actore que deverá alegadamente orientar a jurisprudência do TJUE nestas matérias. Por último, é discutida a questão do alargamento do acesso dos particulares ao TJUE tendo em conta as preocupações veiculadas pelo tribunal relativamente ao aumento do volume de processos que pode ameaçar comprometer o adequado funcionamento do sistema judicial da União. Aqui, analisa-se a possibilidade de criação de um mecanismo europeu de certiorari, juntamente com outras reformas jurisdicionais que têm sido objeto de debate e reflexão na comunidade jurídica.

La tesi di dottorato affronta anzitutto - attraverso un'analisi di carattere storico della vicenda inglese di common law - la questione dei tratti specifici che hanno caratterizzato la concezione dei diritti fondamentali nell'esperienza del Regno Unito nonché la loro applicazione ad opera delle corti. La parte centrale del lavoro riguarda l'influenza che su tale assetto costituzionale ha esercitato il processo di integrazione sovranazionale, con particolare riferimento alla incorporazione della Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell'Uomo nell'ordinamento nazionale attraverso lo Human Rights Act (HRA). Il tema della relazione tra tradizione di common law e principi europei viene svolto esaminando la giurisprudenza della Corte Europea riguardante il Regno Unito e l'applicazione nelle fattispecie della nozione del margine di apprezzamento. Si esamina altresì l'applicazione da parte delle corti domestiche delle regole dello Human Rights Act con particolare riferimento alla regolala del "taking into account". Particolare attenzione è dedicata altresì alla disposizione della sezione 4 dello HRA che introduce lo strumento della "declaration of incompatibility". Si da conto del dibattito scientifico in ordine al rafforzamento che tali strumenti decisionali avrebbero determinato sul ruolo dei giudici nell'ambito della tutela dei dritti a discapito dello stesso postulato fondamentale della sovereignty of parliament. In questo contesto si inserisce l'istituzione della Uk Supreme Court che - anche in forza delle innovazioni normative volte a sancire l'indipendenza dal potere legislativo- ha portato ad un progressivo accostamento dell'ordinamento inglese agli ordinamenti a costituzione scritta. Si evidenzia infine, con riferimento alla più recente giurisprudenza della Supreme Court, il perdurante attaccamento dei giudici inglesi ai principi di common law in materia di diritti fondamentali che in qualche caso sostituiscono il richiamo ai principi di matrice convenzionale convenzionali.<br>This ph.D dissertation stresses the consequences of the incorporation of the ECHR into Uk law effected by the Human Rights Act (HRA). The first part of the research concern with the historical development of british common law relating protection of the liberties and rights until the conceptualization of the rule of law principle and the differences with continental tradition. The second part consider the subscription of the European Convention on Human rights by the Uk and the debate about the incorporation from the first proposal until the approval of the HRA 1998. Therefore, the aim of the research is to determine if the incorporation realizes a homogenization between english constitutional system and european constitutional tradition, with special attention to the traditional features of british common law tradition as the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament. The relationship between common law and european principles is also examined through the decisions of the European Court relating the UK and the application of the Human Rights Act by english courts. Especially the relationship between European Court and english courts is taken into consideration due to the application of section 2 HRA, which establishes the duty to “take into account” the decisions of the European Court when a convention right is concerned. The focus is then on section 4 which introduces a mechanism similar to a constitutional review of legislation (the declaration of incompatibility) which gives courts the power to declare the incompatibility between a statute or an act of parliament and a right protected by the Convention. Also the institution of the Uk Supreme Court seems to lead to a convergence with written constitution countries. Though the incorporation had a very important impact on the british constitution, the most important cases decided by the Uk Supreme Court show that common law is still the preferred instrument used by the courts.

The Court of justice of the European Union as an Administrative Court The aim of this thesis is to analyse the role of the Court of Justice of the EU as an administrative court with respect to the defined characteristics of administrative justice. The issue of administrative justice at the EU level is defined in relation to individuals (natural or legal persons) as non-privileged applicants. The first introductory chapter defines theoretical concepts and specifications of administrative justice which are necessary for further analysis. After a short introduction, the second chapter is focused on the analysis of the historical development and ongoing reforms of the Court of Justice of the EU in relation to its function as administrative court (institutional aspect), while identifying the French administrative justice model as a key inspiration for the initial model of judicial review. The issues of the ongoing reforms are important not only to describe the development of the Court of Justice as an administrative court, but can also serve as an inspiration for solving current problems of national administrative courts. The third chapter deals with the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of EU with regard to proceedings initiated by individuals' actions (material aspect). Furthermore, actions for...