Academic literature on the topic 'Juristic persons (Hindu law)'

The interim Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 contain specific provisions applicable to juristic persons. Juristic persons are also entitled to the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights to the extent that these rights are applicable to them. It must be kept in mind that juristic persons have peculiar characteristics and that the fundamental rights of juristic persons differ from those of natural persons. Juristic persons are also under the obligation to respect the fundamental rights of natural persons and other juristic persons to the extent provided for in the Bill of Rights. In the case of juristic persons acting as organs of state the vertical application of the Bill of Rights safeguards the fundamental rights of persons against state action or interference. The circumstances where juristic persons act as organs of state are discussed with reference to case law. Difference of opinion exists regarding the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, that is the application of the Bill of Rights to private law relationships. In terms of the interim Constitution the Bill of Rights was applied horizontally in an indirect manner. Section 35(3) provided that the common and customary law must be developed by both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court to promote the values underlying an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, without completely abolishing the common and customary law. The final Constitution provides in section 8(2) that natural and juristic persons in private law relationships are also bound by the Bill of Rights if, and to the extent that, such rights are applicable, taking into account the nature of the rights and the nature of any duty imposed by such right. The direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is, however, limited by section 36. The extent of the rights of juristic persons and limitations on them in private law relationships are investigated, taking into account the right of freedom of association in terms of section 18. The variousprinciples to be taken into consideration in the case of clubs, religious organisations, educational institutions, political organisations and trading and professional institutions are discussed.

AbstractThe general rule in South Africa is that, when an offence is committed, the suspect has to be prosecuted by a public prosecutor. However, there is an exception whereby a victim of crime is permitted to institute a private prosecution if the prosecutor has declined to prosecute. South African law allows natural, but not juristic, persons to institute private prosecutions. In the case examined in this note, the appellant argued that the law prohibiting juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions is discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that private prosecutions are only permitted on grounds of direct infringement of human dignity. This note argues that section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act is unconstitutional for excluding juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions and recommends steps the appellant could take to institute private prosecutions against those who mistreat animals.

Abstract: Positive obligations of States to protect and implement human rights are considered a part of various effects of human rights in legislations. In this article, it is argued that a crucial problem arises from the inconsistent practice of addressing violations of human rights committed by juristic persons together with a lack of underlying general theory of liability for human rights violations committed by private entities. Without a major change in the legal doctrine and case-law, we will need to remain focused on the role of the State as a guarantor of human rights, rather than on the imposition of human rights obligations on private-law entities. In this article, it is argued that the nature of the relationship between a juristic person and the State is not the only relevant aspect, as we should also examine the activity of the juristic person in question.Keywords: Positive obligations of States. Juristic persons. State-juristic person nexus. Fundamental rights. Horizontal effect.Resumo: Obrigações estatais positivas de proteger e de implementar direitos humanos são parte dos vários efeitos dos direitos humanos nas legislações nacionais. Neste artigo, argumenta-se que um problema crucial decorre da prática de abordar violações de direitos humanos cometidas por pessoas jurídicas sem uma teoria geral da responsabilidade por violações de direitos humanos cometidas por entidades privadas. Sem uma mudança importante na doutrina e na jurisprudência será preciso permanecer olhando apenas para o papel do Estado como garantidor de direitos humanos. Neste artigo argumenta-se que a natureza da relação entre uma pessoa jurídica e o Estado não é o único aspecto relevante. É preciso examinar também a atividade da pessoa jurídica em questão.Palavras-chave: Obrigações positivas dos Estados. Pessoas jurídicas.

SummaryThis article reviews C.J.H. Jansen’s attempt to write the history of Private Law (except for Commercial Law) doctrine in The Netherlands during the 19th Century. Regrettably, Jansen’s book does next to nothing discuss academic and other scholarly writings on the Law of Property and of Obligations, and does not at all discuss such writings on the Law of Persons and the Family, of Juristic Persons and of Succession. It only deals with aspects of methodology, of sources of law and of extra-legal factors which inspired some authors, apart from pouring out over the reader lots of facts unconnected with Private Law doctrine. The book’s title is misleading.

Designating rights for nature is a potentially powerful way to open up the dialogue on nature conservation around the world and provide enforcement power for an ecocentric approach. Experiments using a rights-based framework have combined in-country perspectives, worldviews, and practices with legal justifications giving rights to nature. This paper looks at a fusion of legal traditions, religious worldviews, and practices of environmental protection and advocacy in the context of India. It takes two specific legal cases in India and examines the recent high-profile rulings designating the rivers Ganga, Yamuna, and their tributaries and glaciers as juristic persons. Although the rulings were stayed a few months after their issuance, they are an interesting bending of the boundaries of nature, person, and deity that produce Ganga and Yamuna as vulnerable prototypes. This paper uses interview data focusing on these cases and document and archival data to ask whether legal interventions giving rights to nature can become effective avenues for environmental activism and spiritual ecology. The paper also assesses whether these legal cases have promoted Hindu nationalism or ‘Hindutva lite’.

In this contribution the focus falls on the capacity to act of majors who, due to mental or physical disabilities lack the ability to make sound decisions in respect of their estate, conclude juristic acts that lead to undue harsh consequences for themselves. The question that arises is how to apply the boni mores as the concept has been developed constitutionally to protect such persons. In this respect it is shown that Dutch law may fruitfully be consulted to comply with courts' discretion to consult foreign law. Mentorskap and the beschermingsbewind qua measures that are aimed specifically at the protection of the non-patrimonial interests of (typically) patients and the patrimonial interests of such people are of specific relevance.

Liability issues related to corporate activities are primarily regulated by general and special rules of the Civil Law in Russia that are mainly dispositive. The general liability rules consist of tort and contract liability provisions of the Civil Code. Special corporate norms are, in turn, included in the Civil Code provisions on juristic persons and legislation regulating corporate forms, and they concern liability of founders, shareholders and corporation as well as executives of corporation. The main form of civil liability is compensation for damages, the award for which generally requires that the illegal action and the caused damages as well as their causal relationship and the fault for causing the damages is proved in accordance with the rules on presumptions and burden of proof provided by the procedural rules. Traditionally, Russian civil liability rules have relied on the concept of illegality of an action (or breach of an obligation) that is to cause liability, which reflects the dominant role of legal supervision in the Russian legal system. However, in the event of liability of corporate executives, a breach of fiduciary duties could be regarded sufficient as a ground to qualify their actions as illegal without particular reference to concrete legal norms. Keywords: Civil liability; Corporation; Corporate executives; Illegality

The different models for the criminal liability of juristic persons reveal a tension between individualist and realistic approaches. For individualists a corporation is the product of a union of individuals. This means that a juristic person can only be held criminally responsible if the conduct and fault of an individual involved in the entity are attributed to the juristic person. For realists a corporate entity has an existence independent of its individual members. The juristic person is blameworthy because its corporate identity or corporate ethos encouraged the criminal conduct. A study of organisational theory reveals that corporate crime may not necessarily be traced to the fault of specific individuals. Corporate criminality often is the result of complex decisions on different levels of the corporate hierarchy and furthermore is encouraged by the manner in which the organisation is structured. Prominent scholars such as the American philosopher Peter A French and the Australian Brent Fisse rejected an individualist approach and attempted to develop models of corporate fault based on the corporate identity idea. The failure of a corporation to take preventative or corrective measures in reaction to corporate criminal conduct is regarded as the basis for corporate fault by these authors. French calls this the "principle of responsive adjustment" whilst Fisse names it the concept of "reactive fault." A more sophisticated model (the "corporate ethos" model), which is also more reconcilable with the basic notions of criminal law, was developed by the American legal scholar Pamela Bucy. * A corporation will be held criminally responsible if its corporate ethos has encouraged the criminal conduct. The corporate ethos can be established with reference to numerous factors such as the corporate hierarchy, corporate goals, the existing monitoring and compliance systems and the question whether employees are rewarded or indemnified for inappropriate behavior.* Pieter du Toit, B Iuris LLB (UOVS) LLM (UJ). Senior Lektor, Fakulteit Regte Noordwes-Universiteit. pieter.dutoit@nwu.ac.za. Hierdie by[1]drae is gedeeltelik gebaseer op dié skrywer se proefskrif getiteld Die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid van en straftoemeting aan regspersone (LLD-proefskrif NWU 2010).** Gerrit Pienaar, B Jur et Com LLB LLD (PU vir CHO). Professor, Fakulteit Regte Noordwes-Universiteit. gerrit.pienaar@nwu.ac.za.

1. When touching upon the question of the nature of corporate personality most lawyers will at best make a link with some paragraphs from the introduction to their commercial law course. They will remember that during the nineteenth century fierce theoretical battles were fought on questions such as whether we should treat supra-individual and non-individual entities as “persons”, under what conditions we should recognize their personality and what should be the legal consequences of such recognition. But no matter how interesting this debate must have been, to revive it is tantamount to becoming a public menace. Already in 1953 H.L.A. Hart, certainly an authority on legal theory, declared that “the juristic controversy over the nature of corporate personality is dead”. In many respects this assessment is correct. Despite the numerous differences about the conditions of recognition, about the possible types of corporations and associations which are subject to corporate personality, about the solidity of the corporate veil, we can observe that nearly all legal systems in the world adopt the notion of corporate personality as such. We may assume the notion will become even more important in the former socialist world, as these countries try hard to reshape their economies along the lines of the market economies in the Western world.

El presente trabajo plantea una modificación al artículo 14 de la Ley del Impuesto a la Renta, sobre los contribuyentes, distinguiendo a los sujetos con personalidad jurídica respecto de los cuales existe algún ánimo de organización para constituirse en un ente distinto al de sus partes del grupo de entes en los que prima alguna consideración de orden económico o patrimonial para su elección como contribuyente.
Trabajo de investigación

La responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas en España se introdujo con la reforma del Código Penal operada por la Ley Orgánica 5/2010, de 22 de junio. Tras diez años de desarrollo legal, doctrinal y jurisprudencial, aún quedan bastantes interrogantes, si bien ya se cuenta con elementos suficientes como para empezar a hacer las primeras valoraciones acerca de su funcionamiento práctico. En la presente investigación se abordan las principales problemáticas que presenta la regulación actualmente vigente en este ámbito, analizándose, desde una perspectiva práctica, el funcionamiento de las distintas figuras que conforman la responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas en España y las fricciones con la práctica que más frecuentemente se dan. Más en detalle, las exposiciones y argumentaciones de esta investigación se dividen en dos partes: una sobre el análisis en profundidad del estado actual de la cuestión y otra sobre la propuesta de soluciones como consecuencia del análisis anterior. La primera parte se subdivide, a su vez, en tres capítulos. En el primero se describen las características principales de la economía española desde el punto de vista de lo que interesa a la presente investigación. Naturalmente, sería inabarcable (y quedaría totalmente fuera de nuestro objetivo) hacer un estudio en profundidad de la economía española actual, pero sí resulta interesante conocer, siquiera brevemente, cuál es el contexto económico en el que se está desarrollando la regulación en materia de responsabilidad penal de personas jurídicas. El segundo capítulo analiza los artículos de la Parte General del CP que versan sobre esta materia, haciéndose especial hincapié en las cuestiones que, en la práctica, resultan más relevantes (esto es, la regulación de los arts. 31 bis-31 quinquies CP, los PCN junto con sus elementos adyacentes y el sistema de penas). El tercer capítulo analiza con detenimiento los delitos por los que pueden responder las personas jurídicas que resultan de más común observación (con independencia de lo habitual de su comisión, aunque lo cierto es que coincide en la mayor parte de casos). En este análisis, tanto doctrinal como, sobre todo, jurisprudencial, se han examinado los mismos puntos por cada delito o grupo de delitos, siempre desde un punto de vista práctico. La segunda parte de esta investigación pretende dar respuesta a todos aquellos puntos que, en los tres primeros capítulos, se ha descubierto que más friccionan con la realidad. Así, se proponen las bases de un Código Penal dirigido a las personas jurídicas, pero no en forma de artículos dentro del actual CP, sino como un cuerpo legal totalmente nuevo. Estas propuestas de lege ferenda están orientadas a adaptar la regulación actual a la realidad económico-empresarial española, huyendo de modelos teóricos y centrándonos en las características de nuestra economía. Se propone, además, la redacción de un Reglamento que desarrolle la pena de la intervención judicial, tal como apunta el actual art. 33.7 CP in fine, como solución a la desproporción punitiva del sistema español de responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas. Con todo, se pretende dar respuesta a la pregunta de si la regulación que ha previsto el legislador en este ámbito se adecua a la realidad o si, por el contrario, requiere de modificaciones (y, en tal caso, cuáles serían), llegándose a la conclusión de que no se trata de una regulación verdaderamente coherente con nuestro sistema económico y que se debería modificar, centrándola en la realidad económico-empresarial española.
La responsabilitat penal de les persones jurídiques a Espanya es va introduir amb la reforma del Codi Penal donada per la Llei Orgànica 5/2010, de 22 de juny. Després de deu anys de desenvolupament legal, doctrinal i jurisprudencial, encara queden força interrogants, si bé ja es tenen prou elements com per a començar a fer les primeres valoracions sobre el seu funcionament pràctic. En la present recerca s'aborden les principals problemàtiques que presenta la regulació actualment vigent en aquest àmbit, analitzant-se, des d'una perspectiva pràctica, el funcionament de les diferents figures que conformen la responsabilitat penal de les persones jurídiques a Espanya i les friccions amb la pràctica que més sovint es donen. Més detalladament, les exposicions i argumentacions d'aquesta recerca es divideixen en dues parts: una sobre l'anàlisi en profunditat de l'estat actual de la qüestió i una altra sobre la proposta de solucions com a conseqüència de l'anàlisi anterior. La primera part se subdivideix en tres capítols. En el primer, es descriuen les característiques principals de l'economia espanyola des del punt de vista del que interessa a la present recerca. Naturalment, seria inabastable (i quedaria totalment fora del nostre objectiu) fer un estudi en profunditat de l'economia espanyola actual, però sí resulta interessant conèixer, si més no breument, quin és el context econòmic en el qual s'està desenvolupant la regulació en matèria de responsabilitat penal de persones jurídiques. El segon capítol analitza els articles de la Part General del CP que versen sobre aquesta matèria, posant-se l'accent principalment en les qüestions que, en la pràctica, resulten més rellevants (és a dir, la regulació dels articles 31 bis-31 quinquies CP, els Programes de Compliment Normatiu juntament amb els seus elements adjacents i el sistema de penes). El tercer capítol analitza amb deteniment els delictes pels quals poden respondre les persones jurídiques que resulten de més comuna observació (amb independència de l'habitual de la seva comissió, tot i que la veritat és que coincideix en la major part de casos). En aquesta anàlisi, tant doctrinal com, sobretot, jurisprudencial, s'han examinat els mateixos punts per cada delicte o grup de delictes, sempre des d'un punt de vista pràctic. La segona part d'aquesta recerca pretén donar resposta a tots aquells punts que, en els tres primers capítols, s'ha descobert que més friccionen amb la realitat. Així, es proposen les bases d'un Codi Penal dirigit a les persones jurídiques, però no en forma d'articles dins de l'actual CP, sinó com un cos legal totalment nou. Aquestes propostes de lege ferenda estan orientades a adaptar la regulació actual a la realitat econòmic- empresarial espanyola, fugint de models teòrics i centrant-nos en les característiques de la nostra economia. Es proposa, a més, la redacció d'un Reglament que desenvolupi la pena de la intervenció judicial, tal com apunta l'actual art. 33.7 CP in fine, com a solució a la desproporció punitiva del sistema espanyol de responsabilitat penal de les persones jurídiques. Amb tot, es pretén donar resposta a la pregunta de si la regulació que ha donat el legislador en aquest àmbit s'adequa a la realitat o si, per contra, requereix de modificacions (i, en tal cas, quins serien), arribant-se a la conclusió que no es tracta d'una regulació veritablement coherent amb el nostre sistema econòmic i que s'hauria de modificar, centrant-la en la realitat econòmic-empresarial espanyola.
The criminal liability of legal persons in Spain was introduced with the reform of the Criminal Code given by Organic Law 5/2010, there are still a few questions, although there are already enough elements to begin to make the first assessments about its practical operation. This research addresses the main problems presented by the regulations currently in force in this area, analysing, from a practical perspective, the functioning of the different figures that make up the criminal liability of legal persons in Spain and the friction with the practice that occurs most frequently. In more detail, the presentations and arguments of this research are divided into two parts: one on the in-depth analysis of the current state of the art and the other on the proposal of solutions as a consequence of the previous analysis. The first part is further subdivided into three chapters. In the first, the main characteristics of the Spanish economy are described from the point of view of what is of interest to the present investigation; naturally, it would be unembraceable (and totally outside our objective) to make an in-depth study of the current Spanish economy, but it is interesting to know, even briefly, what is the economic context in which the regulation of criminal liability of legal persons is being developed. The second chapter analyses the articles of the General Part of the Penal Code that deal with this matter, placing special emphasis on the issues that are most relevant in practice (i.e. the regulation of articles 31 bis-31 quinquies of the Criminal Code, the Regulatory Compliance Programmes together with their related elements and the system of penalties). The third chapter analyses in detail the crimes for which the most commonly observed legal persons can be held liable (regardless of the habitual nature of their commission, although it is true that it coincides in most cases); in this analysis, both doctrinal and, above all, jurisprudential, the same points have been examined for each crime or group of crimes, always from a practical point of view. The second part of this research aims to respond to all those points which, in the first three chapters, have been found to dislodge with reality. Thus, the bases of a Criminal Code aimed at legal persons are proposed, but not in the form of articles within the current Criminal Code, but as a completely new legal body. These lege ferenda proposals are aimed at adapting the current regulation to the Spanish economic and business reality, avoiding theoretical models and focusing on the characteristics of our economy. It is also proposed the drafting of a Regulation that develops the penalty of judicial intervention, as pointed out in the current art. 33.7 of the Criminal Code in fine, as a solution to the punitive disproportion of the Spanish system of criminal liability of legal persons. However, the aim is to answer the question of whether the regulation given by the legislator in this area adapts to reality or whether, on the contrary, it requires modifications (and, if so, what they would be), reaching the conclusion that it is not a regulation that is truly coherent with our economic system and that it should be modified, focusing it on the Spanish economic-business reality.

The Indian subcontinent is inhabited by three principal communities, namely the Hindus who are in the majority, followed by Muslims and Christians. The Christians, though numerically in the minority, enjoyed the support of the British rulers for them to claim a separate legal status. Hindu law did not permit divorce, whereas Muslim law allowed divorce only the male spouse and Christian law allowed divorce to both the male and the female spouses. Conversion to Islam by the Hindus and the Christians brought about inter-personal law conflicts. The Regulating Act, 1781, enacted by the British rulers, introduced the rule that in a court action, where the parties professed different religions, the applicable law was the law of the defendant. As this rule failed to produce a satisfactory result where a Hindu wife, who got converted to Islam, could not get divorce that she sought because Hindu law did not permit divorce, Ormond, J. introduced the norm of justice, equity, and good conscience. Recent reforms in the Hindu law, coupled with enactment of the Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, brought about relief to wives who embraced Islam and sought relief. Courts played a significant role by giving a divorced Muslim wife maintenance right for life.

This chapter deals with the law relating to marriage and divorce, as interpreted and applied by courts in India. Marriage involves many topics/processes such as celebration, divorce, nullity, etc., and each one is accorded a different treatment by the concerned law. The following topics/processes under each matrimonial law are discussed: pre-solemnization requisites; solemnization; divorce; marriages solemnized under the Foreign Marriages Act, 1969; the conversion of spouses of the Hindu, Christian, and Parsi marriages to Islam, and right to polygamy after such conversion; conversion of Muslim women from Islam after dissolution of marriage under Muslim Law; and rights of a Muslim woman to seek divorce and maintenance.