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Journal articles on the topic 'Juristic persons (Hindu law)'
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1
Pienaar, Gerrit. "Konstitusionele voorskrifte rakende regspersone." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 1, no. 1 (July 10, 2017): 166. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/1998/v1i1a2901.
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The interim Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 contain specific provisions applicable to juristic persons. Juristic persons are also entitled to the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights to the extent that these rights are applicable to them. It must be kept in mind that juristic persons have peculiar characteristics and that the fundamental rights of juristic persons differ from those of natural persons. Juristic persons are also under the obligation to respect the fundamental rights of natural persons and other juristic persons to the extent provided for in the Bill of Rights. In the case of juristic persons acting as organs of state the vertical application of the Bill of Rights safeguards the fundamental rights of persons against state action or interference. The circumstances where juristic persons act as organs of state are discussed with reference to case law. Difference of opinion exists regarding the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, that is the application of the Bill of Rights to private law relationships. In terms of the interim Constitution the Bill of Rights was applied horizontally in an indirect manner. Section 35(3) provided that the common and customary law must be developed by both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court to promote the values underlying an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, without completely abolishing the common and customary law. The final Constitution provides in section 8(2) that natural and juristic persons in private law relationships are also bound by the Bill of Rights if, and to the extent that, such rights are applicable, taking into account the nature of the rights and the nature of any duty imposed by such right. The direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is, however, limited by section 36. The extent of the rights of juristic persons and limitations on them in private law relationships are investigated, taking into account the right of freedom of association in terms of section 18. The variousprinciples to be taken into consideration in the case of clubs, religious organisations, educational institutions, political organisations and trading and professional institutions are discussed.
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Beran, Karel. "How Criminal Liability of Juristic Persons Depends on the Concept of Juristic Persons in Private Law." European Criminal Law Review 5, no. 2 (2015): 161–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/2193-5505-2015-2-161.
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Mujuzi, Jamil Ddamulira. "Protecting Animals from Mistreatment through Private Prosecutions in South Africa: A Comment on National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2016 1 SACR 308 (SCA)." Journal of African Law 61, no. 2 (May 8, 2017): 289–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855317000146.
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AbstractThe general rule in South Africa is that, when an offence is committed, the suspect has to be prosecuted by a public prosecutor. However, there is an exception whereby a victim of crime is permitted to institute a private prosecution if the prosecutor has declined to prosecute. South African law allows natural, but not juristic, persons to institute private prosecutions. In the case examined in this note, the appellant argued that the law prohibiting juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions is discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Appeal held that private prosecutions are only permitted on grounds of direct infringement of human dignity. This note argues that section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act is unconstitutional for excluding juristic persons from instituting private prosecutions and recommends steps the appellant could take to institute private prosecutions against those who mistreat animals.
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Ondrejek, Pavel. "Can positive obligations of States serve as a remedy for human rights violations committed by juristic persons?" Espaço Jurídico Journal of Law [EJJL] 19, no. 1 (April 26, 2018): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.18593/ejjl.v19i1.16511.
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Abstract: Positive obligations of States to protect and implement human rights are considered a part of various effects of human rights in legislations. In this article, it is argued that a crucial problem arises from the inconsistent practice of addressing violations of human rights committed by juristic persons together with a lack of underlying general theory of liability for human rights violations committed by private entities. Without a major change in the legal doctrine and case-law, we will need to remain focused on the role of the State as a guarantor of human rights, rather than on the imposition of human rights obligations on private-law entities. In this article, it is argued that the nature of the relationship between a juristic person and the State is not the only relevant aspect, as we should also examine the activity of the juristic person in question.Keywords: Positive obligations of States. Juristic persons. State-juristic person nexus. Fundamental rights. Horizontal effect.Resumo: Obrigações estatais positivas de proteger e de implementar direitos humanos são parte dos vários efeitos dos direitos humanos nas legislações nacionais. Neste artigo, argumenta-se que um problema crucial decorre da prática de abordar violações de direitos humanos cometidas por pessoas jurídicas sem uma teoria geral da responsabilidade por violações de direitos humanos cometidas por entidades privadas. Sem uma mudança importante na doutrina e na jurisprudência será preciso permanecer olhando apenas para o papel do Estado como garantidor de direitos humanos. Neste artigo argumenta-se que a natureza da relação entre uma pessoa jurídica e o Estado não é o único aspecto relevante. É preciso examinar também a atividade da pessoa jurídica em questão.Palavras-chave: Obrigações positivas dos Estados. Pessoas jurídicas.
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Chorus, Jeroen M. J. "De 19e-eeuwse geschiedenis van de Nederlandse wetenschap van het burgerlijke recht? Helemaal niet!" Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 87, no. 1-2 (June 27, 2019): 163–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15718190-08712p06.
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SummaryThis article reviews C.J.H. Jansen’s attempt to write the history of Private Law (except for Commercial Law) doctrine in The Netherlands during the 19th Century. Regrettably, Jansen’s book does next to nothing discuss academic and other scholarly writings on the Law of Property and of Obligations, and does not at all discuss such writings on the Law of Persons and the Family, of Juristic Persons and of Succession. It only deals with aspects of methodology, of sources of law and of extra-legal factors which inspired some authors, apart from pouring out over the reader lots of facts unconnected with Private Law doctrine. The book’s title is misleading.
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Alley, Kelly D. "River Goddesses, Personhood and Rights of Nature: Implications for Spiritual Ecology." Religions 10, no. 9 (August 26, 2019): 502. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10090502.
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Designating rights for nature is a potentially powerful way to open up the dialogue on nature conservation around the world and provide enforcement power for an ecocentric approach. Experiments using a rights-based framework have combined in-country perspectives, worldviews, and practices with legal justifications giving rights to nature. This paper looks at a fusion of legal traditions, religious worldviews, and practices of environmental protection and advocacy in the context of India. It takes two specific legal cases in India and examines the recent high-profile rulings designating the rivers Ganga, Yamuna, and their tributaries and glaciers as juristic persons. Although the rulings were stayed a few months after their issuance, they are an interesting bending of the boundaries of nature, person, and deity that produce Ganga and Yamuna as vulnerable prototypes. This paper uses interview data focusing on these cases and document and archival data to ask whether legal interventions giving rights to nature can become effective avenues for environmental activism and spiritual ecology. The paper also assesses whether these legal cases have promoted Hindu nationalism or ‘Hindutva lite’.
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Robinson, Robbie. "Die Status en Beskerming van Meerderjariges met Beperkte Handelingsbevoegdheid / The Status and Protection of Majors with Impaired Capacity to Act." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 23 (April 9, 2020): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2020/v23i0a7341.
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In this contribution the focus falls on the capacity to act of majors who, due to mental or physical disabilities lack the ability to make sound decisions in respect of their estate, conclude juristic acts that lead to undue harsh consequences for themselves. The question that arises is how to apply the boni mores as the concept has been developed constitutionally to protect such persons. In this respect it is shown that Dutch law may fruitfully be consulted to comply with courts' discretion to consult foreign law. Mentorskap and the beschermingsbewind qua measures that are aimed specifically at the protection of the non-patrimonial interests of (typically) patients and the patrimonial interests of such people are of specific relevance.
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Orlov, Vladimir. "Liability in Russian Corporate Law." ATHENS JOURNAL OF LAW 7, no. 1 (December 31, 2020): 9–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajl.7-1-1.
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Liability issues related to corporate activities are primarily regulated by general and special rules of the Civil Law in Russia that are mainly dispositive. The general liability rules consist of tort and contract liability provisions of the Civil Code. Special corporate norms are, in turn, included in the Civil Code provisions on juristic persons and legislation regulating corporate forms, and they concern liability of founders, shareholders and corporation as well as executives of corporation. The main form of civil liability is compensation for damages, the award for which generally requires that the illegal action and the caused damages as well as their causal relationship and the fault for causing the damages is proved in accordance with the rules on presumptions and burden of proof provided by the procedural rules. Traditionally, Russian civil liability rules have relied on the concept of illegality of an action (or breach of an obligation) that is to cause liability, which reflects the dominant role of legal supervision in the Russian legal system. However, in the event of liability of corporate executives, a breach of fiduciary duties could be regarded sufficient as a ground to qualify their actions as illegal without particular reference to concrete legal norms. Keywords: Civil liability; Corporation; Corporate executives; Illegality
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Du Toit, Pieter, and Gerrit Pienaar. "Korporatiewe Identiteit as Grondslag van die Strafregtelike Aanspreeklikheid van Regspersone (1): Teoretiese Grondbeginsels." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 14, no. 1 (June 6, 2017): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2011/v14i1a2544.
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The different models for the criminal liability of juristic persons reveal a tension between individualist and realistic approaches. For individualists a corporation is the product of a union of individuals. This means that a juristic person can only be held criminally responsible if the conduct and fault of an individual involved in the entity are attributed to the juristic person. For realists a corporate entity has an existence independent of its individual members. The juristic person is blameworthy because its corporate identity or corporate ethos encouraged the criminal conduct. A study of organisational theory reveals that corporate crime may not necessarily be traced to the fault of specific individuals. Corporate criminality often is the result of complex decisions on different levels of the corporate hierarchy and furthermore is encouraged by the manner in which the organisation is structured. Prominent scholars such as the American philosopher Peter A French and the Australian Brent Fisse rejected an individualist approach and attempted to develop models of corporate fault based on the corporate identity idea. The failure of a corporation to take preventative or corrective measures in reaction to corporate criminal conduct is regarded as the basis for corporate fault by these authors. French calls this the "principle of responsive adjustment" whilst Fisse names it the concept of "reactive fault." A more sophisticated model (the "corporate ethos" model), which is also more reconcilable with the basic notions of criminal law, was developed by the American legal scholar Pamela Bucy. * A corporation will be held criminally responsible if its corporate ethos has encouraged the criminal conduct. The corporate ethos can be established with reference to numerous factors such as the corporate hierarchy, corporate goals, the existing monitoring and compliance systems and the question whether employees are rewarded or indemnified for inappropriate behavior.* Pieter du Toit, B Iuris LLB (UOVS) LLM (UJ). Senior Lektor, Fakulteit Regte Noordwes-Universiteit. pieter.dutoit@nwu.ac.za. Hierdie by[1]drae is gedeeltelik gebaseer op dié skrywer se proefskrif getiteld Die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid van en straftoemeting aan regspersone (LLD-proefskrif NWU 2010).** Gerrit Pienaar, B Jur et Com LLB LLD (PU vir CHO). Professor, Fakulteit Regte Noordwes-Universiteit. gerrit.pienaar@nwu.ac.za.
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Bouckaert, Boudewijn. "Corporate Personality: Myth, Fiction or Reality?" Israel Law Review 25, no. 2 (1991): 156–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700010347.
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1. When touching upon the question of the nature of corporate personality most lawyers will at best make a link with some paragraphs from the introduction to their commercial law course. They will remember that during the nineteenth century fierce theoretical battles were fought on questions such as whether we should treat supra-individual and non-individual entities as “persons”, under what conditions we should recognize their personality and what should be the legal consequences of such recognition. But no matter how interesting this debate must have been, to revive it is tantamount to becoming a public menace. Already in 1953 H.L.A. Hart, certainly an authority on legal theory, declared that “the juristic controversy over the nature of corporate personality is dead”. In many respects this assessment is correct. Despite the numerous differences about the conditions of recognition, about the possible types of corporations and associations which are subject to corporate personality, about the solidity of the corporate veil, we can observe that nearly all legal systems in the world adopt the notion of corporate personality as such. We may assume the notion will become even more important in the former socialist world, as these countries try hard to reshape their economies along the lines of the market economies in the Western world.
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Leach, Hugh. "From the Himalayas to the Hindu Raj The Society's First “Young Persons'” Tour July 18–August 16, 1992." Asian Affairs 24, no. 2 (July 1993): 145–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714857115.
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Swartz, Nico, and Eric Ozoo. "An Appraisal of the Vicarious Liability of Juristic Persons (Minister of Police) in the Law of Delict with a Constitutional Developmental Imprint of K. v Minister of Safety and Security." Journal of Scientific Research and Reports 9, no. 1 (January 10, 2016): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.9734/jsrr/2016/19190.
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Hassan, Muhammad, and Johan Shamsuddin bin Sabaruddin. "Jurisdiction of Military Courts over Civilian Terrorists in Pakistan: A Miscarriage of Justice." IIUM Law Journal 27, no. 1 (June 29, 2019): 63–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.31436/iiumlj.v27i1.415.
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The jurisdiction of military court was extended over alleged terrorists under the Constitution (Twenty-first Amendment) Act, 2015, in order to permanently wipe out terrorism from Pakistan. The amendment was challenged and petitioners contended that jurisdiction of military courts could not be extended over alleged civilian terrorists because of their peculiar nature. Further, the presiding officer of the military court is a member of the executive, which contradicts the principle of judicial independence, an utmost essential element of safeguarding the due process of law. However, the apex court of Pakistan held that terrorism has a direct nexus with the safety and integrity of Pakistan, therefore, the Parliament was competent to expand the jurisdiction of military courts over civilian terrorists in order to secure the country’s safety and integrity and thus consistent with the recognized criminal justice system. This research critically analyzes the jurisdiction of military courts over civilian terrorists in accordance with the principle of judicial independence. It also identifies the breach of the fundamental rights of alleged civilian terrorists. This study also determines the capability of existing criminal law statutes of ensuring peace whilst maintaining justice for the accused persons. In order to achieve these objectives, this paper adopts a doctrinal research method and carries out an in-depth analysis of the amendments and judgments relating to the issue while also highlighting the constitutionality of the subject matter. Aside from that, juristic literatures and judgments of the superior courts are also analysed. The study concludes that an independent judicial tribunal is absolutely essential in order to ensure that justice is dispensed to the accused. It is further argued that the scope of the military justice system is limited to military personnel, which therefore cannot and should not be expanded over civilian terrorists.
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Botes, Anri. "The History of Labour Hire in Namibia: A Lesson for South Africa." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 16, no. 1 (April 26, 2017): 505. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2013/v16i1a2320.
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Labour hire, the practice of hiring out employees to clients by a labour broker, has been a part of Namibia’s history since the early 1900s in the form of the contract labour system. This form of employment was characterized by inhumanity and unfair labour practices. These employees were subjected to harsh working conditions, inhumane living conditions and influx control. The contract labour system continued until 1977, when it was abolished by the General Law Amendment Proclamation of 1977. It was during the 1990s that the hiring out of employees returned in the form of labour hire. It continued in this form without being regulated until it was banned in the Namibian Labour Act of 2007. In 2009 Africa Personnel Services, Namibia’s largest labour broker, brought a case before the court against the Namibian Government in an attempt to have the ban nullified on grounds of unconstitutionality. It argued that the ban infringed on its right to carry on any trade or business of its choice as contained in section 21(1)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. APS triumphed. It was not until April 2012 that new legislation was promulgated in order to officially lift the ban and to regulate labour hire in its current form. This new legislation came into force in August 2012. Various very important provisions are contained in the Labour Amendment Act 2 of 2012 concerning labour brokers. Part IV of the Employment Services Act 8 of 2011, containing provisions for the regulation of labour brokers as juristic persons per se, was also introduced and came into force in September 2012. The aim of this note is to serve as a lesson to the South African government as to what could happen if labour brokers continue without legislation properly addressing the pitfalls associated with labour brokers. Also, it could serve as an example as to how the employees of a labour broker should be protected. In this regard the history of labour hire and the current strides in Namibia cannot be ignored.
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Al-Qassaymeh, Maen Mohammad Ali S. "THE EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT OF THE ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT UNDER JORDANIAN LAW: AN OVERALL COMMENT." IIUM Law Journal 19, no. 2 (June 23, 2012). http://dx.doi.org/10.31436/iiumlj.v19i2.11.
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It is submitted that electronic commerce has become factual truth as it creates legal relations among persons, whether they are natural or juristic persons. It has become an important part of internal and international trade when merchants negotiate and conclude contracts without regard to their place of residence. The conventional written document which is deemed the most important instrument that performs an evidential role in conventional contracts is disappearing in this cyberspace commerce. This phenomenon has led to the generating of an alternative instrument, which is the electronic document that performs the same evidential role as the conventional document. This article analyses the evidential weight of the electronic document in Jordanian Law and the extent to which this document satisfies the basic requirements to achieve its evidential role. It also discusses the simultaneous extent of compliance of Jordanian Electronic Transaction Law (JETL)1 to the international criteria and the internal conventional criteria.
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Wojtczak, Sylwia. "Endowing Artificial Intelligence with legal subjectivity." AI & SOCIETY, February 16, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01147-7.
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AbstractThis paper reflects on the problem of endowing Artificial Intelligence (AI) with legal subjectivity, especially with regard to civil law. It is necessary to reject the myth that the criteria of legal subjectivity are sentience and reason. Arguing that AI may have potential legal subjectivity based on an analogy to animals or juristic persons suggests the existence of a single hierarchy or sequence of entities, organized according to their degree of similarity to human beings; also, that the place of an entity in this hierarchy determines the scope of subjectivity attributed to it. Rather, it is participation or presence in social life, whatever the role, that is the true criterion of subjectivity. In addition, it is clear that even if AI is not currently a significant participant in social life, it will be in the nearest future. Despite the potential dangers associated with endowing AI with some kind of subjectivity, such a course is inescapable, and should be considered sooner rather than later.
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Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley. "INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND THE SURVIVOR OF AN UNFORMALISED SAME-SEX CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP: Laubscher No v Duplan 2017 (2) SA 264 (CC)." Obiter 39, no. 1 (April 30, 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/obiter.v39i1.11408.
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When a person dies intestate his or her heirs are determined by the provisions of section 1(1) and (2) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. Included amongst the heirs is the deceased’s surviving spouse, who either takes the entire estate or shares it with the deceased’s descendants (if any). Historically, the reference to “spouse” in the Act was taken to mean a person to whom the deceased was married in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. Accordingly, persons who were married to the deceased merely by religious rites and persons with whom the deceased was in a long-term conjugal relationship that was unformalised by marriage were excluded.The advent of constitutional democracy in South Africa resulted in a number of challenges to this status quo through reliance on the equality clause of the Bill of Rights. As a result of these challenges it has now been recognised that the survivor of a Hindu marriage, a monogamous Muslim marriage, and a polygynous Muslim marriage all have the right to inherit on intestacy as a “spouse”. Furthermore, in a groundbreaking decision in Gory v Kolver NO (Starke and others intervening) (2007 (4) SA 97 (CC)) the Constitutional Court recognised that the exclusion of the surviving partner of a gay or lesbian relationship from the right to inherit on intestacy was unconstitutional, and directed that the relevant sections of the Intestate Succession Act be amended by a reading-in of additional words to remedy the unconstitutionality. These words conferred the right to inherit on intestacy on the survivor of a monogamous permanent same-sex partnership in which the partners undertook reciprocal duties of support. At the time of writing no survivor of an unformalised opposite-sex relationship has challenged his or her exclusion from intestate succession. Possibly this reticence has been influenced by the decision in Volks NO v Robinson (2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC)) (hereinafter “Volks”). In Volks the Constitutional Court held that it is not unconstitutional for the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 to distinguish between married and unmarried persons by giving the survivor of a marriage a claim for reasonable maintenance against the estate of the deceased spouse but not giving a similar claim to the survivor of a relationship in which the parties did not marry.Paleker has raised the question whether the Gory order “must still be applied in light of the Civil Union Act” but he comes to no firm conclusion, and states tentatively that “if marriage … is a precondition for inheriting, persons in same-sex unions who have not solemnised their relationship after the coming into force of the Civil Union Act … may be precluded from inheriting intestate from each other”. On the other hand De Waal and Schoeman-Malan are clearly of the view that the order in the Gory case still operates and – whilst regarding the current position as “anomalous” – they state that it “will probably continue until the Domestic Partnerships Bill [GN36 in GG 30663 of 2008-1-14] eventually does become law”. This has also been the interpretation accepted by the Master’s office acting on advice from the Senior State Law Advisor. The different treatment accorded same-sex couples by the continued retention of the benefits conferred by Gory has been defended on the grounds of substantive equality, since many practical obstacles still stand in the way of same-sex couples formalising their relationships.The question of the continued applicability of the reading-in order in Gory has now come before the Constitutional Court in Laubscher NO v Duplan (2017 (2) SA 264 (CC)) and it is this case which is the focus of this note.