Academic literature on the topic 'Just Pre-emptive war'

This article attempts to establish a connection between the practical legitimation of war and the theories of international law, examining Sweden's efforts to justify her intervention in the Thirty Years War in 1630. Swedish argumentative strategy is analysed in the light of two major traditions of thinking about war: theological and humanist ‘just war’ traditions. The article argues that Swedish leaders did not appeal to the more belligerent humanist arguments which would have enabled them to describe their campaign as a just war either on the grounds of pre-emptive defence or humanitarian intervention. Instead, they tried to interpret it as being within the limits set by the more restrictive theological tradition. This strategy eventually forced them to relinquish attempts to present their intervention as a genuine war and to develop an argument of ‘police-action’, even though it resulted in a loss of credibility. The case study suggests that in the early seventeenth century the prevailing normative language of just war was that of the theologians.

The following remarks are intended to help clarify Kant's position on international right and, specifically, the so-called ‘right of war’. They are part of a more general study of Kant's politics; but I also make them here in the hope that Kant's view of international law (or right) can furnish us with some much-needed practical help and guidance. More specifically, I will try to show that Kant is less averse to the use of force, including resort to pre-emptive war, and far more attuned to possibilities for political catastrophe, than he is often taken to be. A greater appreciation for Kant's actual position can, I hope, make a small contribution toward mending the growing rift between so-called ‘Kantians’ who underrate the need for force, and self-styled ‘Hobbesians’ who underestimate the power of moral principle.

In the article, I examine the relevance of Just War Doctrine to contemporary conflicts. Just War Doctrine, which grew out of Western Christian thinking, presupposes that evil might be confronted with force, if there is no alternative way to restore a just order. But modern trends call into question the certainty and universality of this doctrine. On the one hand, ideas of moral relativism and comparative justice have become more widespread, potentially undermining the use of the notions “just” and “justified” in relation to military conflicts. On the other hand, the nature of war is changing, as warfare is no longer only kinetic in character. I offer examples of how the evolving character of warfare challenges the traditional understanding of Just War Doctrine. For example, there is the growing threat of cyber warfare, but the ethical criteria for its use are not defined. In relation to Just War Doctrine, questions of whether and when pre-emptive cyber attack is permissible arise, what should constitute legitimate targets of cyber warfare and to what degree collateral damage could be acceptable. Another challenge to the traditional understanding of Just of War Doctrine was the putative doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Prima facie, humanitarian interventions do not comply with ius ad bellum criteria of Just War Doctrine, because of the absence of a direct military threat to the intervening state. The justification of humanitarian intervention is based on the assertion of an intolerable violation of accepted values. The weakness of such approach, as discussed in the article, is that it implicitly assumes that one protagonist’s values are superior to others. A further example of emerging challenges to Just War Doctrine is the phenomenon of hybrid war, a term used to describe a type of conflict that is multi-faceted and in which kinetic warfare is not dominant. The orchestration of several strands of conflict, each designed to be below the threshold to provoke a military response, exploits the absence of legal and ethical norms regulating such activity. I conclude the article by suggesting that, firstly, for Just War Doctrine to remain relevant, it should be expanded to include harms caused by non-kinetic actions, and, secondly, the distinctions between the states of war and peace should be redefined to reflect the changing character of war more accurately.

In her essay (in Kantian Review 10 (2005), 82–111), Shell wants to demonstrate that 1. Kant's theory of the right of nations ‘can furnish us with some much needed practical help and guidance’, and 2. ‘Kant is less averse to the use of force, including resort to pre-emptive war… than he is often taken to be’ (p. 82). The first claim is unconvincing. The second one is in need of clarification. Shell turns Kant into a kind of realist and just-war theorist, into a liberal who is prejudiced against illiberal regimes. In the end, her Kant is closer to Locke, Vattel and other early liberal international lawyers than to himself. Almost all that is unique in Kant's theory of the right of nations gets lost. In this, Shell follows a general trend among some Kant interpreters: the interpretation is only loosely based on Kant; it claims to follow his ‘spirit’ and offers creative ‘Kantian perspectives’. Amidst interpretational creativity, Kant's texts more or less disappear in the mist.

AbstractWalzer has recently updated his just war theory to take account of terrorism, humanitarian military intervention and new interpretations of the doctrine of self-defence, pre-emptive and preventative warfare The ethical considerations that underwrite Walzer's most recent work invite us beyond the routine citation of his work to a proper consideration of the moral parameters of international politics. Beyond Just and Unjust Wars Walzer has a wealth of insight into the key questions of international theory. His work on toleration, the nature of universality or on the role of social criticism has always been the basis of his insight in to the hard questions of international ethics. Despite being heavily criticised for being communitarian or conservative (both charges that need serious re-evaluation) Walzer's ideas offer a real alternative to the dominant neo-Kantian cosmopolitan tradition and a workable ethical framework for thinking about the challenges of contemporary international politics and international law. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the final essay of Arguing About War. The essay, entitled ‘Governing the Globe’ offers a radical vision of a reformed international society inspired by the principles that underpin Walzer's development of his just war theory and it is vital that we take notice.

An extremely interesting read can be had by any reader who buys Professor Donald Stoker’s most recent book Why America Loses Wars – Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), which analyzes the wars and conflicts fought by the United States of America since the Korean War. After the provocative title of the book, the reader begins to read with some suspicion, as it does not fit into the image of the United States as the world's leading power, one which can persuade almost all the countries of the world to deal with it either in political or economic or military cooperation. This is why it is shocking to face how differently the leaders of American and Western countries think about war; in many cases they do not even know exactly what it means, and what the consequences of its outbreak and the fighting can be. In several conflicts it can be seen that in the world’s leading power, the political decision-makers thought in a completely different way in a given situation, often leading to conflicting decisions. This is not primarily due to political affiliation, but to the fact that the various actors involved in conflicts – politicians and soldiers – do not have a common vision of the goals and the results to be achieved or the strategies to be used. In many cases, it has led to unnecessary losses and wars that have gone on far longer than they needed to – see Iraq and Afghanistan. Policymakers are often unaware of the old wisdom of Carl von Clausewitz – often quoted by Stoker – formulated in his book On War, “War as Politics by other Means”. This assumes that politicians start a conflict with clear objectives, knowing exactly what results they want to achieve. In addition, they are aware that the success of a war, however short-term or limited, may be influenced by factors such as the geographical environment, economic background, logistical capabilities, social support, historical and cultural background, and so on. However, some of these factors may change during the conflict, so the objectives and strategies need to be reviewed from time to time and, if necessary, redesigned according to the realities of the time. Jordan Ellenberg took a similar view of these old truths in his book, How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical Thinking; he said “Countries don’t win wars just being braver than the other side, or freer, or slightly preferred by God. The winners are usually the guys who get 5% fewer of their planes shot down, or use 5% less fuel, or get 5% more nutrition into their infantry at 95% of the cost. That’s not the stuff war movies are made of, but it’s the stuff wars are made of. And there’s math every step of the way” . Even so, these things are constantly forgotten by most political decision-makers who lead their countries into endless wars, the consequences of which are suffered by the soldiers fighting the battles and the civilian population in the areas affected. Therefore, Stoker can rightly hold these decision-makers accountable for their lack of the proper application of strategic thinking. This is particularly important in view of the fact that the period of “limited war” which has characterized the last two decades is coming to an end, and the US may face increasingly equal opponents like China or Russia. The conflict against them is expected to be conventional, for which the American political and military leadership, accustomed to anti-insurgency operations and rapid success, is unlikely to be properly prepared. From this point of view, the book could even act as an alarm bell, so that leaders can begin preparations for the later period, although the author did not suggest how what he had articulated could be put into practice. One of the major strengths of the book is that it clarifies commonly used political and military concepts such as unilateralism, multilateralism, types of political objective, strategy, tactics, objectives, operations, pre-emptive and preventive war, gray zone war, limited war, little war, nested war, victory and peace. The other serious strength of the book is that it almost fanatically emphasizes the need for more active, effective dialogue and cooperation between the political and military sides, as a result of which interpretation problems between different groups and actors can be significantly reduced and cooperation can be improved. It was particularly interesting to me that the author presented several political and military events – not only from American but also from international environments – and the decision-making processes leading to them and their background, which many historians and military historians are not fully aware of. In addition to describing historical events, the author lists a large number of military and political strategists, such as Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, or Bernard Brodie (better known in the United States), and others, and he also outlines their thoughts – even if he disagrees with some of them – which in some way still have an impact on warfare to this day. However, in addition to the many positives, I missed the fact that although the author presented almost every American conflict in recent decades, he only talked about the US “getting into endless wars”, and not how on several occasions the war – as in Grenada, Panama, or the Balkans – also achieved its goal. Here, perhaps, it would have been worthwhile to take a closer look at what these successes were due to and to draw conclusions from them. However, this does not detract from the value of the book. I especially liked that Stoker stayed true to his university teaching past and built his book in a way that even those who are less familiar with the subject could profit from. This is aided by clear explanations and extensive discussions of the various concepts. This helps readers from different backgrounds get a unified picture of how political decision-making takes place, what a war is, how to fight it and, most importantly, how to finish it, what the different actors think about it, and the differences in the way of thinking of politicians and soldiers involved in war. On the other hand, it could also be extremely useful to political and strategic decision-makers, who often make decisions that have a very serious impact with minimal knowledge and a lack of adequate background information. As a veteran of 31 years as a professional soldier, one who began his career as a sergeant in the troops and finished as a colonel on the General Staff, I fully agree with the author's book, which should be read not only by American but all other countries' political and military leaders, as a kind of basic strategic course material to know how to make informed decisions on military issues, how to communicate successfully and intelligibly between political decision-making and the military communities implementing them, and what the consequences of the decisions they make may be.

This article focuses on three instances of the use of armed force in international relations. The three instances that are explored are the intervention by NATO in Kosovo, the armed attack by mainly the USA and the UK against Afghanistan and the war against Iraq in 2003. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in relation to article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ and these are carefully scrutinized against the jus ad bellum as to determine the legality of the attacks. The notion of humanitarian intervention was used as a ground for justification by various international scholars to explain the use of force in Kosovo, but this concept is not recognized in terms of international law. The attack on Afghanistan was based on article 51 of the UN Charter. The attacks were directed at Afghanistan as this state harboured the terrorists responsible for the attacks on the USA. The mere harbouring of terrorists does not give rise to the use of armed force on the basis of article 51 and as such the use of coercive measures against Afghanistan was illegal. The use of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-emptive force which is alien to international law. The USA and its coalition partners also acted in contravention with the jus ad bellum in this regard. The author poses certain proposals in relation to the jus ad bellum and stresses the importance of article 2(4) which must ensure that international relations are not once more regulated by the use of armed force.

The resurgence of a deterministic mode of representation mythologizing Arabs as figuring (threatening) Saracen by judging their epistemological commitments as hostile to Enlightened reason-based ideals is demonstratively identifiable after 9/11, and more so following the Arab uprisings in 2011, when we notice that the Arab in general, and Muslim in particular, was historicized as the “new barbarian” from which (liberal-secular) Westphalian society must be defended. Such neo-Orientalist representations disseminate powerful discursive (symbolic) articulations (i.e., culture talk) —in tandem with the (re)formulation of legal concepts and doctrines situated in jus gentium (i.e., sovereignty, immanence, and pre-emptive defense strategy)—legally adjudicating a redemptive war ostensibly to “moralize” a profane Arabia. Proponents of neo-Orientalism define their philosophical theology as not simply incompatible with Arab epistemology (Ar. العربية المعرفة نظرية), but that Arab-Muslims are an irreconcilable threat to Latin-European philosophical theology, thus, accentuating that neo-Orientalism is constituted by an ontological insecurity constituting Arab-Islamic philosophical theology as placing secular modern logic under “siege” and threatening “civil society”. This legal-historical research, therefore, argues that neo-Orientalism not only necessitates figuring the Arab as Islamist for the ontological security of a “modern” liberal-secular mode of Being, but that such essentialist imaginary is a culturalist myth that is transformed into a legal difference which proceeds to argue the necessity of sanctioning a violent episode transforming a supposed lawless “Middle East” receptive to terror, into a lawful “New Middle East” receptive to reason. This sacrilegos process reveals the “inclusive exclusion” temporal ethos of (a positivist) jus gentium which entails maintaining a supposed unbridgeable cultural gap between a (universalized) sovereign Latin-European subject, and a (particularized) Arab object denied sovereignty for the coherence of Latin-European epistemology.

The thesis argues that, as a tradition, the concept of just war is socially and contextually sensitive and revisable. It explores the relevance of theory according to the dynamic changes in the nature of threats in the international arena and concludes that the just war tradition is still relevant to the contemporary modern threats that require an act of pre-emptive warfare. However, it needs some revision to be comprehensively applicable to the dynamic of modern threats and the nature of pre-emptive war. Due to the nature of pre-emptive war a nation launches the attack before the aggression from the other nation-in-conflict erupts. The author, therefore, proposed several theoretical and procedural revisions in both the principle of “Jus Ad Bellum” and “Jus In Bello” using the method of reflective equilibrium to create a comprehensive “just” pre-emptive war doctrine as part of the development and dynamic in just war tradition.

The thesis examines the international law pertaining to the use of force by states, in general, and to the use of force in self-defence, in particular. The main question addressed is whether the use of force, which was purported to be in self-defence, by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was lawful. The thesis focuses not only on this specific use of force, but also on the changing nature of conflict, the definition of terrorism and on the historical evolution of limitations on the use of force, from antiquity until 2006. In the six chapters which trace the epochs of international law, the progression of five inter-related concepts is followed: limitations on the resort to force generally, the use of force in self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, the use of forcible measures short of war, and the use of force in response to non-state actors. This historical analysis includes a particular emphasis on understanding the meaning of the 'inherent right of self-defence', which was preserved by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter. This analysis is then applied to the use of force against Afghanistan which occurred in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US and the UK notified the United Nations Security Council of their resort to force in self-defence under Article 51. Each element of Article 51 is analysed and the thesis concludes that there are significant doubts as to the lawfulness of that decision to employ force. In addition to the self-defence justification, other possible grounds for intervention are also examined, such as humanitarian intervention, Security Council authorisation and intervention by invitation. This thesis challenges the common assumption that the use of force against Afghanistan was an example of states exercising their inherent right to self-defence. It argues that if this particular use of force is not challenged, it will lead to an expansion of the right of self-defence which will hinder rather than enhance international peace and security. Finally, this thesis draws on recent examples to illustrate the point that the use of force against Afghanistan could become a dangerous precedent for the use of force in self-defence.

This contribution discusses Israel’s 1981 air strike against the nuclear reactor of Osiraq, Iraq. It sets out the facts and context of the operation, the legal arguments invoked by Israel and the reactions within the international community. It then tests the legality of the Israeli intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force, having regard in particular to the right of self-defence, as well as to potential alternative legal bases. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum, focusing in particular on its relevance for the debate on the permissibility of pre-emptive self-defence.

The final chapter extends Chapter 6’s examination of consolation itself as a source of dread in an extended reading of David Grossman’s epic anti-war novel, To the End of the Land (English trans. 2010) and Falling Out of Time (English trans. 2014). To the End of the Land dramatizes the trepidation surrounding solace, focalized as it is by an Israeli mother, Ora, for whom intimations of respite are shot through with jeopardy. Analysing Ora’s pre-emptive stance on solace, this chapter reveals just how differently consolation applies to situations facing persons who fear for those who are very much living (but whose lives could be cut short), in contrast to the compensations available to persons who know they are dwindling and who become the eulogizing subjects of their own conciliations. Grossman’s Ora mounts a lyrical defence against death’s imminence, writing to repel the oncoming moment when elegy will undoubtedly be the most fitting mode of address.

Isabel V. Hull uses the German declarations of war in 1914 to examine three issues: 1) the role of customary international law (CIL) in statesmen’s decision to go to war (using Germany as an example); 2) the assumptions that state actors held a jus ad bellum; and, especially, 3) how they distinguished self-defence, prevention, pre-emption, and aggression. Hull uses not the claims of jurists, but the arguments and actions of civilian and military leaders, i.e. those who actually made the decisions for war. With this, she continues Anuschka Tischer’s and Hendrik Simon’s examination of the question whether there was a transformation of war discourses in (early) modernity that led to overcoming the need to justify war. The chapter confirms that, even as Germany began a ‘preventive war’, the European state consensus held that, on the continent, preventive war was illegal, pre-emptive war was severely restrained, and genuine self-defence – meaning both fending off armed attack against one’s territory, independence, or sovereignty, and defending the treaty-structure that guaranteed the inter-state order – was the only justification for war acceptable to the community of states.

This chapter evaluates what the Europeans call Americanization. For many, this was more or less equivalent to the end of times or, at least, the end of everything sacred. What America was exporting to Europe was not just its manufacturing prowess. It was a whole way of life, fundamentally antithetical to European civilization because the only goals it recognized were profit and efficiency. Taste would be sacrificed because everything must be produced for the greatest number according to the maxims of the assembly line. Leisure would disappear and be replaced by the divine cult of work and productivity. Tradition must be uprooted because tradition is full of wasteful or inefficient practices. There was the accusation of Puritanism as well, but even here no European would dream of blaming America of excessive spirituality: Puritan prohibitions concerning alcohol or sex were seen as pre-emptive measures to create the most efficient workers, and reduce human beings to machines. Indeed, in America, the rationalization of work and prohibition were undoubtedly connected. The chapter then looks at the American model of production, which was an engine of standardization, and the rising anti-Americanism.