Journal articles on the topic 'Justice – Administration – Canada'

This paper examines the use of juries in criminal cases in Canada and the United States. It is part of a larger study of the administration of criminal justice in Niagara County, Ontario and Niagara County, New York. The basic question examined is why persons accused of serious crimes in the United States usually select a jury, whereas persons in similar circumstances in Canada normally select trial by a judge alone. An investigation of this question will enable us to see some significant differences between the administration of criminal justice in the United States and Canada. It will also show how changes in specific procedural rules may affect other practices. There is a complex interplay between procedural rules. The paper concludes by showing that the widespread use of juries in the United States is consistent with the more populist grass-roots approach in American society which tends to distrust government, compared with the traditional respect for authority, including the authority of judges, in Canada.

The debate over the collection of justice statistics by race continues to hinge on the same key issues that were central to the debate when it arose in the early 1990s. There has been one major change, however: whereas racial minority groups were once vehemently opposed to the collection of justice statistics by race, for fear that such statistics would be used to justify discriminatory policies, many minority groups are now advocating for the collection and publication of this data as a means to redress racial discrimination in the administration of justice. Having discussed the lack of available data on racial and ethnic statistics in the Canadian justice system, the authors sought support from the Canadian Law and Society Association (CLSA). At the 2009 annual general meeting of the CLSA, a motion for the association to take an official position in support of the collection of justice statistics by race was put forth by the authors and accepted by the association. At this time it was also decided that a committee would be established to conduct relevant research and to lobby for the collection of pertinent data. At present we are asking interested individuals or organizations who fall into one or more of the following categories to contact the first author:(1) Those with arguments relating to the collection of justice statistics by race that have not been articulated in the debate that has taken place over the past two decades.(2) Those with information pertaining to the collection of justice statistics by race that is not readily available or that has not been documented in the academic work referenced herein.(3) Those who are interested in participating in the work of the committee outlined at the end of this paper.

Purpose: This study is to investigate how principals promote social justice to redress marginalization, inequity, and divisive action that are prevalent in schools. Research Method: This study employs a qualitative research design with semistructured interviews. Twenty-two elementary and secondary school principals were interviewed in the Greater Toronto Area, Ontario, Canada. Research Findings: Principals who are social justice advocates exercise their influence by focusing on people in an effort to build a socially just community. Their people-centered leadership practice focuses on: putting students at the center, positioning as a social justice leader, developing people for social justice, building school climate through social justice, and fostering positive relationships with families and communities. Social justice leadership is grounded in a very proactive way in bringing about the changes that such a paradigm demands. Implications: This study generates discussions among participants on the dynamics associated with social justice practice and helps practitioners navigate tactically entrenched power structures for the well-being of their students. It also deepens our understanding of social justice leadership by providing empirical evidence how social justice advocates take risks and innovative approaches to social change that embraces the value of democracy, inclusion, representation, and difference.

The author examines the legal status of the aboriginal people of North America in the USA and Canada as well as the protection of their rights. The article explores the legislation of these countries which provides protection of aboriginal people at the administration of justice.

AbstractThe administration of the justice system within Native communities went through several transformations in Canada. Under the pressures of First Nations' claims, the model of imposition has left room for others based on adapation of practices, participation, consultation and partial power transfers towards Native communities. Such processes of power transfers within the justice field, which started in the 1990's, are part of a more general movement of communitarisation of the penal system or diversion of some conflicts. They are not specific to native communities and limited by several factors, particularly by the founding premisses of the relations between the State and the First Nations, meaning the principle of incorporation of Native Peoples into the law of the State and the socio-economic conditions of Native communities.

Employer-employee relations in the Federal Public Service of Canada entered a new era with the proclamation on March 13, 1967, of three Acts— The Public Service Staff Relations Act ; The Public Service Employment Act ; and anAct to Amend the Financial Administration Act. The employees have been guaranteed the right to organize, the right to bargain, the right to strike and the right to get grievances adjudicated by an independent tribunal. The statutory right to grieve and get the grievances adjudicated have provided to the federal public employees a sense of justice and « fairplay ». The adjudication system has made the private sector of industrial jurisprudence applicable to the federal public services with a remarkable success. This article deals with the function and operation of the statutory Grievance Process and Adjudication.

Restorative justice (RJ), which is a concept of criminal justice focused on the needs of victims and the community affected by the criminal act rather than on the punishment of the offender, is becoming an integral part of criminal justice in many developed Western countries. Russia, however, is just taking the first steps in the development of restorative justice with the focus on mediation for juvenile delinquents. Using the theory of the (de)civilization process by N. Elias, the authors suggest that a weak state, characterized not so much by inefficient economy as by underdeveloped social institutes, could be an obstacle for a more active use of RJ in Russia. Specifically, the authors claim that corruption undermining the legitimacy of public administration, a lack of trust in law enforcement, suppression of small business and hatred towards some groups of people all strengthen punitive sentiments that contradict the principles of RJ. A comparative criminological analysis of RJ in Canada and Germany reveals the unique history of its emergence and use in these countries in comparison with Russia. As for Germany, the moments of de-civilization in this country in the first half of the 20th century and in the recent years (connected with the uncontrolled influx of migrants) are slowing down the development of RJ. The absence of any significant social upheavals in Canada could explain a strong support for RJ among the local population and a comparatively successful integration of its principles in traditional Canadian criminal justice. In conclusion, the authors debunk some myths regarding RJ, which could constrain its implementation in these countries. In particular, the authors argue, that the traditional paradigm of punishment should not be abolished, but could be supplemented by the paradigm of reconciliation and restoration.

The highest courts in both Canada and South Africa have expressed themselves in favour of an approach of deference as respect in the review of administrative action. The notion of deference as respect derives from the thinking of David Dyzenhaus, who has developed a theory of democracy in support of this approach to judicial review. Dyzenhaus’ model of review attempts to steer clear from the problems he associates particularly with positivism and liberalism. Dyzenhaus’ model of review furthermore attempts to allow space for the administration to play a significant role in giving effect to democratic values, on the understanding that all such decisions need to be reasonably justifiable. In this article the views of Dyzenhaus are contrasted with those of Jacques Derrida, especially insofar as the latter has reflected on the relation between law and justice, as well as concepts such as the gift and democracy. The argument developed in this article is that Dyzenhaus’ model of review, despite its many positive features, needs to be rethought with reference to the perfect gift, unconditional justice and democracy to come. Such a rethinking is required because of the limited conception of justice – as simply ‘our’ justice – in Dyzenhaus’ model.

Résumé Le droit au service d’un interprète dans le cadre de procédures de cour est consacré dans les Chartes des droits canadienne et québécoise et, par conséquent, constitue donc un élément important de l’administration de la justice au Canada. Les tribunaux ont interprété les dispositions de ces chartes et ont développé des normes d’interprétation auxquelles nous sommes confrontés et dont le respect n’est pas sans poser certains problèmes. Bien sûr, ce droit constitutionnel n’a pas le même impact d’une région à l’autre. La région de Montréal, par exemple, présente un portrait multiethnique particulier puisque environ 90 % de la population immigrante du Québec y résident. Cette diversité culturelle qui caractérise la région vient donc nécessairement teinter les services judiciaires qui y sont offerts. La conjugaison évolutive de ces droits, de ces normes et de ces réalités socioculturelles se présente donc, pour une cour comme celle de Montréal, comme un défi constant à relever dans le cadre d’une saine administration de la justice.

The traditional objective of a costs award in general civil litigation was to indemnify the successful party for the legal and other costs incurred to defend an unproven claim or pursue a valid legal right. However, Canadian courts have recognized that the traditional view of costs is outdated and that an additional and more important use of costs awards is promotion of the efficient and orderly administration of justice. Costs awards at the Tax Court of Canada have generally followed a similar path of development, but at a slower pace. Historically, costs were awarded only in accordance with the tariff annexed to the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) unless "reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct" was present. More recently, however, Tax Court judges have expressed concerns about the inadequacy of the tariff. These concerns have led the court to adopt a "principled" approach to costs, similar to that used in modern general civil litigation, by applying specific factors set out in rule 147(3) ("the 147(3) factors") rather than relying solely on the tariff. This article reviews the recent jurisprudence relating to costs awards at the Tax Court, with a particular focus on the manner in which the 147(3) factors have been interpreted and how the application of those factors could evolve to further promote the new objectives of costs awards recognized in general civil litigation. The authors argue that costs awards by the Tax Court could be used more effectively to promote the efficient and orderly administration of justice by (1) taking into consideration the unique features of a tax dispute, and (2) placing additional emphasis on the purposes of costs awards adopted in general civil litigation.

To allow Court orders to be disobeyed would be to tread the road towards anarchy. If the orders of the Court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought into scorn. Daily, thousands of Canadians resort to our Courts for relief against the wrongful acts of others. If the remedies that Courts grant to correct those wrongs can be ignored, then there will be nothing left but for each person to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the Courts will quickly result in the destruction of our society. [O'Leary J, in Canada Metal Co. Ltd v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1975) 48 DLR 3d 641, 669 (High Court of Ontario)]

For more than 50 years the United States and Canada maintained illegal-drug policies that followed the same course: a long period of punitive prohibition followed by moderation and an emphasis on drug abuse as a public health problem. Then in the 1980s, the USA reverted to a punitive model while Canada increased its commitment to a health-based approach. Why this divergence after following the same path for so long? In this paper I argue that one factor was Canada's adoption of national health insurance, which guaranteed universal access to health care, including addiction treatment. As the country's most popular policy it was protected against budget cuts during a period of welfare-state retrenchment in the 1980s. In the USA, on the other hand, public health insurance was limited to the elderly and the poor, and addiction treatment services were isolated and stigmatized. Thus the public health side of drug policy was poorly positioned to resist welfare cutbacks and ascendant criminal-justice interests. The experiences of the USA and Canada have implications for policy reformers and for the study of how institutional interests cross policy domains.

RésuméLa prolifération de périodes relativement courtes d'emprisonnement, de 30 jours ou moins, au Canada est un sujet peu traité. Une analyse des données de determination de la peine suggère que les infractions contre l'administration de la justice sont le plus souvent reliées à des périodes d'emprisonnement de un à 15 jours. Les données suggèrent que les tribunaux répondent à la sévérité des infractions, ou selon un modèle de proportionnalité. Au-delà de l'analyse quantitative cependant, très peu est connu des objectifs et significations que ces sentences revêtent pour les procureurs de la Couronne et les juges. L'analyse se penche sur ces acteurs, qui forment ce que Eisenstein et Jacob ont appelé uncourtroom workgroup, en tant que producteurs de discours et de significations, dans le cadre de la littérature existante, des theories de determination de la peine et des contraintes organisationnelles. Je suggère que la valeur explicative des theories existantes – notamment celles voulant que la Couronne et les juges réagiraient à la sévérité des infractions contre l'administration de la justice, et visent la dissuasion générale et la dénonciation – est limitée. Les entrevues et l'observation des négociations de culpabilité, révèlent que la gestion du risque ainsi que le travail sur le caractère sont des objectifs importants tant pour les procureurs que les juges. L'étude démontre aussi que que le processus de plea bargaining ne devrait pas être analysé séparément du résultat de la determination de la peine.

This article considers the relationship between rights and federalism in the Supreme Court of Canada's review of cases invoking the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It considers whether the Supreme Court of Canada has compromised provincial autonomy by establishing Canada-wide standards in provincial areas of jurisdiction. It suggests that the centralization thesis associated with judicial review on Charter grounds is inconclusive, and combining several processes under the rubric of centralization, it misrepresents the Charter's effect on Canadian federalism and provincial autonomy. Further, the centralization thesis has lost much momentum during the course of Charter review, and, as a result, is a limited approach to understanding the relationship between rights and federalism in Canada. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Canada has demonstrated sensitivity to federalism in its Charter jurisprudence, most evident in a complex jurisprudence that has served to offset the centralization thesis and its implications for provincial autonomy. This threepart federalism jurisprudence is federalism as gatekeeper, an explicit federalism jurisprudence and an implicit federalism jurisprudence, which is most evident in the relationship between criminal rights and provincial responsibility for the administration of justice. This article demonstrates that the Court's approach to Charter review has seen a reconciliation between rights and federalism, most evident in the declining importance of the centralization thesis and the growing importance of the three-part federalism jurisprudence during Charter review. This sensitivity to federalism has existed since the beginning of the Court's Charter jurisprudence but has largely been overshadowed by the dominance of the centralization thesis in the Charter debate.

This study aimed to characterize lifetime criminal involvement among homeless people with mental illness in Canada ( N = 1,682). A latent profile analysis yielded five classes. Most participants fell within the Fewer Needs (75.5%) group, characterized by less complex psychosocial histories and few criminal charges. Participants with Extensive Criminogenic Needs (5.0%) and Acute and Extensive Criminogenic Needs (5.0%) had more charges for justice administration, violent, and mischief/public order offenses and were more likely to have been charged before their first homelessness episode. Participants with Needs Associated with Homelessness (10.6%) and Needs Associated with Drugs (3.8%) were similar, although the former had the longest history of homelessness and the latter had more drug-related charges and were most likely to have drug use disorder. This typology, which sheds light on the cumulative needs associated with different patterns of lifetime criminal involvement among homeless people with mental illness, could guide prevention initiatives and intervention strategies.

This article utilizes the lens of disposability to explore recent conditions of low-wage temporary migrant labour, whose numbers and economic sectors have expanded in the 21stcentury. A central argument is that disposability is a discursive and material relation of power that creates and reproduces invidious distinctions between the value of “legitimate” Canadian settler-citizens (and candidates for citizenship) and the lack of worth of undesirable migrant populations working in Canada, often for protracted periods of time. The analytical lens of migrant disposability draws upon theorizing within Marxian, critical modernity studies, and decolonizing settler colonial frameworks. This article explores the technologies of disposability that lay waste to low wage workers in sites such as immigration law and provincial/territorial employment legislation, the workplace, transport, living conditions, access to health care and the practice of medical repatriation of injured and ill migrant workers. The mounting evidence that disposability is immanent within low-wage migrant labour schemes in Canada has implications for migrant social justice. The failure to protect migrant workers from a vast array of harms reflects the historical foundations of Canada’s contemporary migrant worker schemes in an “inherited background field [of settler colonialism] within which market, racist, patriarchal and state relations converge” (Coulthard, 2014, p. 14). Incremental liberal reform has made little headway insofar as the administration and in some cases reversal of more progressive reforms such as guaranteed pathways to citizenship prioritize employers’ labour interests and the lives and health of primarily white, middle class Canadian citizens at the expense of a shunned and racialized but growing population of migrants from the global South. Transformational change and social justice for migrant workers can only occur by reversing the disposability and hyper-commodification intrinsic to low-wage migrant programs and granting full permanent legal status to migrant workers.

A distinctive feature of modern Canada is the dualism of its legal system. This means that in the country there are two systems of law - continental (Roman-German) and Anglo-Saxon (precedent). Each of these systems differ in their approaches to the understanding of law and justice implementation. However, the main difference is due to the fact that each of these systems relies on its own sources of law. If the basis of the criminal and private law in general, and the federation of nine provinces in particular is common (case) law of England, in the province of Quebec are used English (basically) criminal law and French civil law in its origin. Historically, this was due to the fact that at the time of the conquest of the colony of New France (now Quebec) in the XVIII century it had a relatively developed legal system, including the system of administration of justice. At the heart of the local sources of law were kutyums of Paris, supplementing ordinances of the French kings. Inclusion of New France in the possession of the English Crown was for the new authorities a precedent - the first time in the history of the British colonial empire it acquired a part of the territory with a Christian population and European law. In fact, the British colonial authorities had to make a choice, which was to determine the vector of further legal development of not only the newly conquered colony, but the whole of British North America. According to the rules of English case law the medieval English monarch (as sovereign) could either admit the law to of its new ownershipin force at the time of the conquest, or introduce there English law in force at the time. In view of the prevailing circumstances of the specific historical issue of the replacement of French law (including sources and the administration of justice) in English it turned out to be extremely difficult from the socio-political and a formal legal point of view. This article analyzes the problems encountered during the initial stage of the legal system of the British colony of Quebec and, in particular, of the sources of its territorial law.

Mr. DiRosa obtained a Master’s in Public Administration (MPA), with a focus on managing federal agencies, from The George Washington University in 2002. While at GWU, Andy served as editor of Policy Perspectives, and was awarded the Leadership Award and was inducted into the Pi Alpha Alpha public administration honor society. Andy obtained a BA from Old Dominion University (Norfolk, VA) in English and Political Science in 1987. While at ODU he was elected to two terms on the student senate.Presently, Andy is the assistant section chief of the Executive Intelligence Section in the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence at FBI Headquarters. In this capacity he helps oversee daily operation of 24-hour units that prepare the daily intelligence briefing materials for the FBI Director, US Attorney General, and other senior executives. Andy has also worked in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, as an intelligence analyst and supervisor, and in the FBI’s training division and office of public affairs, as managing editor of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, a widely read criminal justice journal. He authored book reviews and journal articles, including features on street gangs and the impact of the Second World War on US law enforcement. While in the Counterterrorism Division Andy served in an international intelligence cell at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Mr. DiRosa has also represented the FBI at bilateral intelligence exchanges with Canada and the United Kingdom. (Views expressed are those of Mr. DiRosa and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FBI.)

As a result of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (or TRCC, 2015a, 2015b), calls to action concerning education and law reform have been made. Currently, there is an increase in reconciliation discourse in law, healthcare and education policy, curricula and pedagogy. In Canada, efforts to decolonize institutional structures compel scholars and activists to highlight the imperative of critical analysis of identity and place in answering the calls to action. Although it was developed by the Ministry of Education for the province of Ontario, more than a decade ago, prior to the TRCC, the First Nations, Métis, and Inuit Education Policy Framework continues to inform policy and administrative procedures. Informed by Indigenous knowledge systems embedded in restorative justice and peace-building practices, this paper presents a critical analysis of the First Nations, Métis, and Inuit Education Policy Framework (2007) and finds evidence resembling discursive settler-colonial patterns of Indigenous erasure through the practice of silencing Indigenous participation and voice. Through this critical analysis, several themes emerged including colonialism, survivance, patriarchy, self-identification, notions of education, assessment, and “us versus them” binary narratives. In response, this paper argues for a trans-systemic and transdisciplinary approach to the critical analysis of discursive patterns of silencing and erasure in policy, law reform, and administrative processes. Further, through deepening interpretations and understandings of Indigenous theory and knowledge systems, it may be possible for settler-colonial stakeholders to more acutely discern the impact of settler-colonialism embedded in education, policy, administration, and legal discourses. These findings have implications for educators and administrators as well as administrative, law and policy reform.

Videoconferencing has generated ambivalence in the legal community.Some have heralded its promise of unprecedented access to justice,especially for geographically remote communities. Others, however, havequestioned whether videoconferencing undermines fairness. The authorsexplore the implications of videoconferencing through the case studyof the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Tribunal, which is one of thebusiest adjudicative bodies in Canada. This analysis highlights concernsboth with videoconferencing in principle and in practice. While suchconcerns traditionally have been the province of public administration,the authors argue that a tribunal’s allocation of resources and thesuffi ciency of its budget are also core concerns of administrative law.Administrative law reaches beyond conventional doctrines of proceduralfairness on the one hand and substantive rationality on the other. Howthe legislature structures and funds decision-making bodies is not just amatter of political preference but also of legal suffi ciency. The commonlaw, the Charter of Rights, and unwritten constitutional principles suchas the rule of law and access to justice all provide potential constraintsboth on governments and tribunals as to the organization and conductof adjudicative hearings, especially in settings like the Landlord andTenant Tribunal, where the rights of vulnerable people are at stake.While a challenge to the videoconferencing practices of the Landlordand Tenant Tribunal has yet to be brought, the authors conclude thateventually the intersection of tribunal resources with the fairness andreasonableness of that tribunal’s decision-making will reach the courts.How the courts resolve these challenges may represent the next frontierof administrative law.La vidéoconférence a suscité de l’ambivalence au sein de la communautéjuridique. Certains ont proclamé sa promesse d’un accès sansprécédent à la justice, surtout pour les communautés géographiquementéloignées. D’autres, cependant, ont soulevé la question à savoir si lavidéoconférence mine l’équité. Les auteurs explorent les conséquencesde l’utilisation de la vidéoconférence en faisant une étude de cas duTribunal du logement de l’Ontario, un des organismes juridictionnelsles plus occupés au Canada. Cette analyse met en lumière despréoccupations en rapport avec la vidéoconférence en principe et enpratique. Quoique de telles préoccupations ont traditionnellement été du ressort de l’administration publique, les auteurs soutiennent quel’allocation des ressources par un tribunal et la suffi sance de son budgetsont également des préoccupations centrales du droit administratif.Le droit administratif va au delà des doctrines conventionnellesd’équité procédurale d’une part et de la rationalité substantive d’autrepart. La façon dont le législateur organise et fi nance les organismesdécideurs n’est pas simplement question de préférence politique maisaussi de suffi sance légale. Le common law, la Charte des droits etles principes constitutionnels non écrits tels que l’autorité de la loiet l’accès à la justice imposent tous des contraintes potentielles auxgouvernements et aux tribunaux quant à l’organisation d’audiencesadjudicatives et la façon de les mener, surtout dans un cadre tel que leTribunal du logement de l’Ontario, où sont en jeu les droits de gensvulnérables. Quoique les pratiques de vidéoconférence du Tribunaldu logement de l’Ontario n’aient pas encore été contestées, les auteursconcluent qu’éventuellement la conjoncture des ressources du tribunalet de l’équité et l’aspect raisonnable du processus de décision de cetribunal va parvenir à la cour. La façon dont les cours règleront cescontestations pourrait devenir le prochain domaine d’exploration dudroit administratif.*

Frequently in the past, attempts have been made to systematize the notion of judicial review of administrative action. Thus, the Donoughmore Commission proposed the judicial, quasi-judicial, purely administrative model of analysis. The Commission was severely criticized, especially after the implementation of certain recommendations of the Franks Report which, in improving the quality of the control exercised on administrative tribunals, underscored the ridiculous character of that existing in other fields. The most violent criticisms came certainly from Griffith and Street, and also from Professor Wade who denounced the progressive atrophy of natural justice, the latter being the main topic of the present article. That concept, distinguished from "procedural ultra vires" in that a judge may look beyond the law for rules he himself has set establishing certain procedural guarantees, goes back a long way in time. Nevertheless, it is not a panacea. Its scope is limited to the study of the means whereby a decision is reached; it does not examine the conclusion, but rather how that conclusion is determinded. The usefulness of the notion was diminished when a condition of its application, the duty to act judicially, was added. Ridge v. Baldwin put the pieces of the puzzle back into place by discarding the decisions which gave the concept a much too restrictive interpretation. These first steps of the fairness concept were rapidly followed in matters concerning the allocation of licences. Judicial intervention here dates back to the last century. Yet, the Nakkuda Ali and Parker decisions restrained the spread of control through an erroneous interpretation of an opinion by Lord Atkin. Both decisions were overturned by the Ridge case. Later on, it seems that Lord Denning took the lead in a movement aimed at extending the scope of the duty to act fairly. That principle received its modem da consecration in the Crockford's decision and was used later in other decisions of a like nature. The late professor de Smith remarked this new tendency to go beyond the words to see, in the matter at issue, what is fair and what is not. Domestic tribunals, not in union matters alone (Breen) but also in sports problems (Machin), have also had this obligation to act fairly imposed on them, even though, strictly speaking, they do not have judicial powers. The question is rather to know whether a legitimate expectation of the person involved in the decision is brought into play, although the extend of the obligation varies depending on the circumstances of the case. It would appear that there is continued refusal to intervene in matters of labour contracts when faced with a purely master and servant relation (Sylva). But now the complete absence of statutory guarantees is required (Malloch). Procedural guarantees have continued to evolve since then. More and more, in different areas, thanks to the initiative of judges like Lord Denning, a system of English administrative law has developed. The principle of the existence of more or less defined minimal procedural guarantees has been established, no matter whether the administrative act implies the exercise of judicial power or not. Yet, British courts still refuse to intervene in legislative functions, including regulations issuing from statutory committees, even should the legislative instrument result from false representations. Control over immigration matters has become increasingly tightened, even though, at one time, there was an apparent desire to sanctify the absolute character of the discretion exercised in that field. The widening ofthat control came about as much from legislative changes as from judicial decisions. Thus it is that in the Re H.K. decision, there was established the duty to act fairly on the part of an immigration officer who might wish to turn a person back at the border whom he considers to be inadmissible. Soon (if it has not already happened) Britons will also benefit from procedural guarantees in matters of land planning. A recent decision made use of the fairness concept in that field. English courts have undertaken to sanctify fundamental procedural guarantees. The name, the scope and the extent of these rules has varied and continues to vary. It would seem, however, that there is a desire to leave the categorization of the act of administration to one side in favour of dealing with the consequences of an act for the individual. If a decision touches an interest, an vested right, or a legitimate expectation, the citizen is entitled to have certain minimal procedural guarantees respected, which may vary according to the circumstances, but which always involve the determination of what is fair in the particular instance. It is a necessary adaptation to the new reality of administration, something we hope to see come about in the very near future in Canada.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the usefulness of the social entrepreneurship (SE) framework in highlighting effective models of service development and practice in mental health equity. Design/methodology/approach – Using a rigorous SE search process and a multiple case study design, core themes underlying the effectiveness of five services in Toronto, Canada for transgender, Aboriginal, immigrant, refugee, and homeless populations were determined. Findings – It was found that the SE construct is highly applicable in the context of services addressing mental health inequities. In the analysis five core themes emerged that characterized the development of these organizations: the personal investment of leaders within a social justice framework; a very active period of clarifying values and mission, engaging partners, and establishing structure; applying a highly innovative approach; maintaining focus, keeping current, and exceeding expectations; and acting more as a service working from within a community than a service for a community. Practical implications – These findings may have utility as a guide for individuals early in their trajectories of SE in the area of mental health equity and as a tool that can be used by decision maker “champions” to better identify and support SE endeavours. Originality/value – In a context characterized by increasing attention given to models of SE in health equity, this study is the first to directly examine applicability to mental health equity.

Adjudication is a complex and multifaceted process that involves not only legal but also personal and psychological aspects. In a combination, they can be regarded as the extra-legal affect on specific categories of cases. The issue under studies is relatively new in present-day Ukraine. However, this field of scientific research originated in America at the end of the XIX century. Although it has lost its relevance, today, this issue is gaining popularity again, particularly in the works by both national and foreign scholars, who directly or indirectly reveal it. The article under discussion presents the analysis of theories, developed by national and foreign authors. These works trace the tendency to identify the factors that may affect the judges’ decision-making process, both directly (legal experience; political predisposition; intellectual and temperamental traits) and indirectly (overall erudition; family and personal associations, social status).What is more, the author of the article has identified two possible options for a judge to make a decision - by justice and by law. They are by no means related to each other, since not all the decisions, made in compliance with the law, are fair, whereas it is much easier to make fair decisions conform to the letter of the law. This research is based on the materials of study carried out in 1914-1916 regarding some New York City magistrate judges, who made different decisions on similar categories of cases. Such a discrepancy again outlines the boundaries of individual relationships that affect the administration of justice. In addition to the above, the theoretical material, outlined in the article, is rests on the examples from the court records of Canada and Ukraine. This made it possible to prove and realize that such extra-legal impact does exist today and is ruining the judicial system from inside.Besides, the investigation reveals the ECHR’s position on the issue under study. Relying on specific examples, we have pointed out various manifestations of judges’ bias. In those cases, they were driven by personal views and motives, which, in turn, influenced their final decisions, the latter being subsequently challenged.

Abstract Hong Kong’s system of administrative law has drawn strength and durability from its English counterpart, on which it was heavily modelled. Too often, however, there is a slavish acceptance of the pre-eminence of English law and a tendency to conservativism and a lack of innovation. This article argues that Hong Kong courts and legislators must dare to diverge from English law where an alternative path would prove more credible or appropriate. Three prisms are deployed through which to argue that a misplaced emulation of English law can result in a poor legal framework. First, it is shown that a failure to properly conceptualize error of law as a ground of judicial review has resulted in a ground that, locally, is in a state of incoherence and disarray and that the admission or non-admission of a distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors urgently requires clarification from the Court of Final Appeal. Second, it is proposed that the English-inspired incorporation of a specific time limit in the rules for applying for judicial review should be abolished in the interests of access to justice and legal certainty, drawing on the experience of jurisdictions such as New Zealand, Canada, and Scotland. Finally, it is explained why the antiquated system of administrative tribunals in Hong Kong, redolent of the unreformed English tribunal system of decades past, needs comprehensive structural and procedural redesign. Courts and legislators must dare to diverge in these areas, with Hong Kong’s administrative law standing on its own two feet, where minds are focused on a genuine, locally crafted improvement of standards prevailing in administrative law and public administration.

Innovative design labs were created by public authorities of the USA, Australia, Singapore, Finland, Canada, the UK, Switzerland, Denmark, China, and other countries to accelerate changes and develop modern public service. This paper provides further insight to establishing external innovation accelerators for strengthening capacity of public institutions. The study aims to define the development opportunities for innovative design labs for the public sector in Ukraine’s regions by the case of the Laboratory of Intellectual Development for Empowering Regions (LIDER). The study was conducted at two stages: (1) exploring the features of innovation implementation in the public sector and outlining the main problems of innovation capacity of public institutions; (2) defining the development opportunities for the LIDER via SWOT-analysis. To substantiate the study results, the correlation analysis between autocratic, bureaucratic, competitive, self-protective, and participative leadership behaviors of CEOs and innovation index based on data from 18 countries was performed, as well as a survey of 195 public servants of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and an interview of 9 experts were conducted. The following key development opportunities for the LIDER were detected: promoting the introduction of incremental innovations in public institutions by using design thinking methodology; assisting the development of pro-innovative culture and participative leadership via individual-centric and system-oriented approaches; developing effective tools for performance management and supporting public institutions in project activity; organizing the competitions for regional innovative projects; assisting in creation of radically human systems in public institutions. AcknowledgmentThe paper was prepared within the framework of the joint Ukrainian-Lithuanian R&D project “Competence Development of Lithuanian and Ukrainian Public Sector Employees Using Design-Thinking Methodology”.The project has received funding from the Research Council of Lithuania (LMTLT, agreement № S-LU-20-5) and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (agreement № М/31-2020).

“Eye-opening,” “disheartening,” and “inspiring” are some of the words used by law students who met in 2008–2009 to discuss their mosaic of experience in the field doing public interest work. These students had returned from placements under the first mandatory public interest requirement to be introduced in a Canadian law school (the Osgoode Public Interest Requirement, OPIR). OPIR arose from questions about the relationship between what is learned in law school and what is required to be a professional. Academics have challenged each other to do more to instill an “ethos of professionalism” during law school. Others have suggested that law students who do not receive exposure to the world outside the walls of the law school carry an “idealized conception of the profession” and are often unaware of the many practice contexts available to them. Others have warned that if ethical and professional responsibilities are not modeled and articulated for students, that teaching only the “law of lawyering” does not prepare students for becoming ethical lawyers. Teacher-educator Lee Shulman has bluntly accused law schools of “failing miserably” at connecting its lessons in how to “think like a lawyer” with how to “act like a lawyer.” For years, there have been similar concerns raised about the decline of professionalism among lawyers, both in Canada and in the U.S. A survey of Osgoode graduates revealed that students wanted more opportunities to engage with the community and to experience non-traditional forms of law practice. Osgoode Hall Law School grappled with many of these questions, and in 2007 it approved changes to the curriculum, including a new first year Ethics course (Ethical Lawyering in a Global Community, ELGC) and OPIR. In addition to the more traditional first year mandatory course load, Osgoode Hall law students must also complete ELGC, a minimum of 40 hours of public interest work and then engage in a discussion or written exercise reflecting on their experiences. These reflections are a valuable lens for seeing the profession and the administration of justice through the eyes of first and second year law students. Their experiences remind us in the profession that learning can flow in both directions.

La norme de contrôle judiciaire occupe toujours un espace considérable dans les litiges impliquant les organismes administratifs spécialisés au Canada. Bien plus qu’une simple question technique, la détermination de la norme de contrôle applicable pose en fait tout le problème de l’autonomie décisionnelle des tribunaux administratifs et du rôle des cours de justice à cet égard. À partir d’une critique de deux arrêts récents de la Cour suprême du Canada impliquant un tribunal des droits de la personne et un arbitre de grief le présent texte examine l’évolution de la jurisprudence concernant tout particulièrement la question du contentieux des droits de la personne et suggère des pistes de réflexion pour l’élaboration d’une norme de contrôle qui concilierait le pouvoir de contrôle judiciaire et la mission des organismes administratifs spécialisés en cette matière.

Les tribunaux administratifs de la famille des organismes de régulation ont toujours eu droit de cité dans le système de droit administratif québécois comme organismes multifonctionnels (arrêt Brosseau de 1989). Mais le phénomène de multifonctionnalité est remis en question par les exigences d'indépendance institutionnelle et d'impartialité structurelle découlant de l'article 23 de la Charte québécoise. Inspirée par la jurisprudence des affaires Lippé et Généreux, la Cour d'appel vient d'invalider l'un des plus visibles de ces tribunaux, la Régie des alcools des jeux et des courses. La multifonctionnalité est-elle compatible avec les exigences de la Charte ? Il s'agit là d'un des aspects de la crise de la justice administrative. La Cour suprême du Canada saisie du problème s’orientera-t-elle vers une conception atténuée ou modulée de l'impartialité structurelle, ou bien le législateur devra-t-il procéder à des réformes radicales ?

La Cour du Québec est aujourd’hui une juridiction impressionnante par l’ampleur et la diversité de ses attributions en matière tant civile que criminelle et pénale, mais aussi dans des matières de droit administratif ou qui ont un aspect de droit administratif. Quelle est la vocation véritable de cette cour ? Récemment une division administrative et d’appel a été créée. Il y a une controverse au sujet de la signification de l’appel à cette cour civile qui n’est pas une cour supérieure… Il y a eu plusieurs tournants décisifs dans l’histoire contemporaine de cette cour. En 1965, la jurisprudence a permis un élargissement considérable de sa juridiction civile, ce qui a inclus des matières comme les contrats administratifs ou la responsabilité civile de l’Administration. Par contre, en 1972 la Cour suprême du Canada a amputé la Cour du Québec d’une de ses attributions traditionnelles en droit municipal, soit la contestation des règlements municipaux pour cause d’illégalité. Le rôle spécifique de la Cour du Québec comme instance d’appel en droit administratif a été étudié dans le rapport Dussault en 1970, le livre blanc de 1975, le rapport Ouellette en 1987 et le rapport Garant en 1994. Au cours de la décennie 70, le législateur continuera de créer des droits d’appel à la Cour, mais surtout il crée d’importants tribunaux administratifs d’appel, tels que le Tribunal du travail, le Tribunal des transports ou le Tribunal des professions où il fait siéger les juges de la Cour. La Cour est devenue la plus imposante institution judiciaire au Québec : 270 postes de juges réguliers et 33 postes de juges de paix magistrats. Depuis les années 60, la Cour a bénéficié d’un parti pris très favorable de la part du législateur québécois. En 1996-1997, la Cour a été amputée de certaines juridictions d’appel au profit du Tribunal administratif du Québec, mais elle est restée un important tribunal d’appel dans des domaines variés : expropriation, impôt sur le revenu, fiscalité municipale, contentieux électoral, territoire agricole, déontologie policière, logement, accès à l’information… ; elle entend des contestations provenant de plusieurs tribunaux administratifs. Or la grande question de l’heure est de préciser la portée de ce contrôle judiciaire par comparaison avec celui de la Cour supérieure…

Dans l'article qui suit, l'auteure cherche à vérifier la compatibilité des exigences que pose le principe de précaution avec l'attitude de déférence des cours de justice canadiennes à l'égard des décisions des organismes administratifs spécialisés. Le degré de déférence judiciaire repose sur un certain nombre de facteurs, parmi lesquels figurent l'expertise du décideur administratif et la nature discrétionnaire de son pouvoir. Comme le principe de précaution constitue à la base une stratégie de gestion des risques soumise à l'attention des décideurs appelés à prendre position dans un contexte d'incertitude scientifique, l'expertise du décideur pourrait difficilement fonder la déférence judiciaire puisque, dans un tel cas, l'expert atteint les limites de son expertise. Toutefois, dans l'hypothèse où le décideur dispose d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire, cette caractéristique pourrait justifier la déférence et limiter le contrôle judiciaire au caractère raisonnable de la décision rendue. Selon l'affaire Baker c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration), le caractère raisonnable d'une décision discrétionnaire repose notamment sur sa compatibilité avec les valeurs qui en sous-tendent la délégation. Or, les valeurs qui sous-tendent toute délégation du pouvoir de rendre des décisions dans un contexte de précaution expriment notamment la nécessité d'élargir l'espace public de dialogue, pour permettre aux citoyens de s'exprimer quant aux mesures à prendre et au niveau de risque qu'ils sont prêts à accepter dans un contexte d'incertitude scientifique. De plus, l'affaire 114957 Canada ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) c. Hudson (Ville) suggère un certain nombre d'indications selon lesquelles le Canada reconnaîtrait les valeurs que véhicule le principe de précaution. Par conséquent, les exigences de ce principe sont compatibles avec la politique de déférence judiciaire, qui s'appliquera non pas au contenu de la décision prise dans un contexte de précaution mais au processus suivi pour y parvenir

Medicine regulators rely on pivotal clinical trials to make decisions about approving a new drug, but little is known about how they judge whether pivotal trials justify the approval of new drugs. We explore this issue by looking at the positions of 3 major regulators: the European Medicines Agency, Food and Drug Administration, and Health Canada. Here we report their views and the implications of those views for the approval process. On various points, the 3 regulators are ambiguous, consistent, and demonstrate flexibility. The range of views may well reflect different regulatory cultures. Although clinical trial information from pivotal trials is becoming more available, regulators are still reluctant to provide detailed information about how that information is interpreted. As medicines and vaccines come up for approval for treatment of COVID-19, transparency in how pivotal trials are interpreted will be critical in determining how these treatments should be used.

Background: Neurosurgeries are at high risk of surgical site infections (SSI), a complication associated with increased morbidity, mortality, and cost. Our aim was to measure SSI incidence and risk factors following pediatric neurosurgery at CHU Sainte-Justine, the provincial center for pediatric craniofacial surgery in Québec, Canada. Methods: Retrospective cohort study of all patients with elective neurosurgery performed at CHUSJ between October 2014 and October 2018. Medical records were reviewed to compare demographics, clinical presentations, and outcomes of patients. SSIs occurring within 30 days of a procedure without implant and up to 90 days with implant, were identified. SSI incidence was measured in patient years, and risk factors were assessed using univariate logistic regressions. Results: In total, 379 patients were included with an overall SSI incidence of 3.96 patient years. We found a higher SSI incidence in 2014–2015 compared to 2016–2018 (1.82 vs 4.83 patient years). The median age was 3.90 years, and cases seemed younger than controls (1.45 vs 4.15 years). No difference between groups was found for sex, body mass index, prematurity, and length of hospitalization. The proportion of deep SSIs was greater than superficial SSIs (53.3% vs 46.7%). Cases were more likely to present with a more severe ASA score, previous history of neurosurgery, neurological conditions, and pulmonary conditions than controls: OR, 3.90 (95% CI, 1.36–11.49); OR, 2.59 (95% CI, 0.88–7.40); OR, 2.77 (95% CI, 0.98–8.41), and OR, 3.21 (95% CI, 0.86–9.94), respectively. Among patients with history of neurosurgery, a higher proportion of cases experienced a cerebrospinal fluid leak (28.6% vs 2.2%). Most patients (85.8%) received preoperative prophylactic antibiotic. Of those, 49.3% were considered appropriate based on antibiotic and timing of administration. When antibiotic dosage was also considered, the number of patients who received an appropriate antibiotic therapy decreased radically. Conclusions: Patients with comorbidities, especially neurological and pulmonary conditions, are at higher risk of SSI after neurosurgery. We are currently working on a detailed analysis to explain the increase in SSI incidence after 2016. Finally, prophylactic antibiotic therapy needs to be improved and its impact on SSI rates needs to be monitored.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None

In the wake of 9/11, Canada was among a number of Western states that instituted a wide range of legal frameworks designed to more efficiently prevent and suppress transnational terrorism. One of the defining features of its national security policy has since been the integration of a selection of intelligence agencies into a global counterterrorism network. Operationally distinct agencies, such as the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment, and the Canada Border Services Agency have been centrally coordinated towards the end of facilitating intelligence exchange within and across our borders. With few opportunities for public scrutiny or parliamentary and judicial review, the flow of information has gone on largely unregulated and, in a selection of notable cases, has contributed to serious human rights abuses both at home and abroad.

Objective: We aimed to describe interactions between police and persons who experience homelessness and serious mental illness and explore whether housing status is associated with police interactions. Method: We conducted a secondary analysis of 2008 to 2013 data from the Toronto, Canada, site of the At Home/Chez Soi study. Using police administrative data, we calculated the number and types of police interactions, the proportion of charges for acts of living and administration of justice, and the proportion of occurrences due to victimization, involuntary psychiatric assessment, and suicidal behavior. Using generalized estimating equations, we estimated the odds of police interaction by housing status. Results: This study included 547 adults with mental illness who were homeless at baseline. In the year prior to randomization, 55.8% of participants interacted with police, while 51.7% and 43.0% interacted with police in Study Years 1 and 2, respectively. Of 2,228 charges against participants, 12.6% were due to acts of living and 21.2% were for administration of justice. Of 518 occurrences, 41.1% were for victimization, 45.6% were for mental health assessment, and 22.2% were for suicidal behavior. The odds of any police interaction during the past 90 days was 47% higher for those who were homeless compared to those who were stably housed (95% CI 1.26 to 1.73). Conclusions: For people who experience homelessness and mental illness in Toronto, Canada, interactions with police are common. The provision of stable housing and changes in policy and practice could decrease harms and increase health benefits associated with police interactions for this population.

In Canada, small rural and remote communities continue to struggle to access equitable and affordable high speed internet connections that address local priorities and needs. The First Nations Education Council (FNEC) is working with their community partners across Quebec to plan and operate a First Nation owned and managed fibre network to deliver broadband connections throughout each community. Public and private partnerships were established by FNEC to fund and construct the regional and local networks connecting these rural and remote communities. The paper describes the history of this development along with its future goals. Sharing infrastructure and network support services with all the other service providers (health, education, administration, justice, policing, homes, etc.) in each of these communities helps to sustain the ongoing operation and maintenance of the network.

Since taking office in 2017, the president of the United States of America (US), Donald Trump has been on an offensive on the trade front. His administration has levied tariffs on goods coming from China, which retaliated by levying tariffs against the US. This has led to a trade war between these two economies. The economic warring took a turn for the worse with the arrest of Chinese financial executive for Huawei, Meng Wanzhou in Canada on request from the US Department of Justice. She was accused of making false statements to HSBC Bank in 2013 which significantly understated Huawei’s relationship with Skycom. The arrest came after the US levied tariffs on Chinese goods, and also attempted to bar imports of Huawei products. In light of the above, the question that begs for an answer is: Does the US-China trade war undermine the principles of international law and the WTO rules? The article aims to answer the question of the propriety or otherwise of the ongoing US-China trade war within the ambit of international law and the World Trade Organisation economic framework.

The question whether the functions performed by the prosecutor in the criminal justice system are subject to judicial scrutiny has been a matter for concern in common-law jurisdictions for quite some time. The courts in the Commonwealth generally agree that prosecutors must function independently; act fairly and responsibly in the interests of the public; and must be free from political interference. Their role in the administration of justice is to uphold the rule of law. Therefore, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should ordinarily not be interfered with by the courts except in rare cases. However, the extent to which the courts, in respective Commonwealth jurisdictions, review prosecutorial discretions differs. A comparative study of the Canadian experience and the South African approach, where the judicial approaches to the review of prosecutorial discretion significantly differ, is a clear illustration. In Canada, the courts hardly interfere with, or review the manner in which the prosecutor performs his or her duties, except that prosecutorial discretion is not immune from all judicial oversight, since it is reviewable for abuse of process (see R v Anderson [2014] 2 SCR 167). In South Africa on the other hand, the exercise of the powers of the prosecutor and their ramifications are, like every exercise of public power, subject to the constitutional principles of legality and rationality. The recent judgments of the Full Bench of the Gauteng Division, Pretoria in Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2016 (2) SACR 1 (GP) as affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Zuma v Democratic Alliance 2018 (1) SA 200 (SCA)—the so-called ‘spy-tape’ saga—are the latest illustrations of this approach.

The author examines in the article the aspect of the functioning of the jury trial and topical issues of reforming this institution in the criminal proceedings of Ukraine. Given the existence of a small amount of research on the prospects of reforming the jury and their prognostic nature, there is a need to analyze current bills to reform the jury, which determines the purpose of the author's study. Based on the works of domestic scientists and the current legal framework, as well as the study of statistics of jury trials, the author concluded that the real impact of jurors on the implementation of criminal proceedings is negligible. However, this fact allows us to determine the need to amend a number of regulations of Ukraine in order to expand the competence of juries and realize their inherent potential. The author, having analyzed the current bills to improve the regulation of the jury institute in criminal proceedings, examined the proposed changes and found that they are aimed at introducing in Ukraine the classical model of the jury trial. Among the proposed innovations, the author draws attention to the main ones, namely: the responsibility of the State Judicial Administration for the formation of juries is assigned instead of local councils; granting the right to the State Judicial Administration to use the information of the State Register of Voters; increase in the number of jurors; establishing the position of the chairman of the jury and giving him the appropriate competence; empowering jurors to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused; the possibility of appealing the verdicts handed down on the basis of a jury verdict. The changes proposed in the draft laws to improve the institution of a jury trial in criminal proceedings, if included in the legislative framework of Ukraine, will help turn the jury trial into an effective mechanism for exercising the right of the people to participate directly in the administration of justice. In addition, to better understand the proposed changes, the author reviewed and analyzed the experience of countries where the Anglo-American model of jury trial is applied on the example of the United States, Canada and England. Finally, the author notes his own opinion on the feasibility of introducing the Anglo-American model of jury trial in Ukraine.

PurposeThis study aims to clarify the labor market participation of highly educated Turks who moved or were exiled to the Western countries after the July 15th, 2016 Coup attempt in Turkey. These recent Turkish flows create a compelling case for researching higher education connections and the administration of justice in migration policies/practices related to highly educated people's job market participation. This study aims to expand the discussion on migration policies, practices, job market participation, how highly skilled migrants perceive them in various contexts and understand the complexity of highly educated migrants' incorporation into destination countries and their perspectives and lived experiences with policy practice.Design/methodology/approachThe primary source of the data is the semi-structured 30 interviews with the highly educated Turkish immigrants and refugees in Western countries, which enables comparative data from individuals of the same origin. The qualitative data have been transcribed, coded and analyzed according to the grounded-theory design from this vulnerable community. The high education was determined as graduation from 4-years colleges, which was recognized by destination countries. Our methodological tools were driven by the obstacles to collect data from politically sensitive, forced, or exiled migrants.FindingsFirst, this article challenges the assumption that incorporating job market participation is a smooth process for highly educated migrants who moved to Western countries. Second, highly educated immigrants tried to reach their previous statuses and life standards as fast as possible by working hard, making sacrifices and developing innovative strategies. The immigrants in Europe have faced greater obstacles with policies while participating in the job market. Third, the importance of networking and the active usage of social media platforms to communicate with other immigrants in similar situations facilitated the job market participation and job preferences of highly educated migrants. Fourth, while fast job market participation experiences of immigrants in Northern America were increasing their positive feelings regarding belonging, people who have similar skillsets in Europe experienced more problems in this process and felt alone.Research limitations/implicationsThe research results may lack generalizability due to the selected research approach. Further studies are encouraged to reach more population for each country to compare them.Practical implicationsConsequently, higher education may be a more vital decision point in migration policies and practices. This study contributes to a better understanding of these factors by showing the perspectives and experiences of highly educated migrants comparatively. Thus, it broadens the discussion about migration policies and job market participation of highly educated migrants.Social implicationsBuilding on this work, the authors suggest more studies on the temporary deskilling of highly educated migrants until they reach re-credentialing/education or training to gain their former status.Originality/valueFirst, while most studies on immigrants' labor market participation and highly educated immigrants focus on voluntary migrants, this study examines underrepresented groups of involuntary migrants, namely forced migrants and exiled people, by focusing on non-Western Muslim highly educated Turks. Second, the trouble in the Middle East continues and regimes change softly or harshly. There is a growing tendency to examine these topics from the immigrants' perspective, especially from these war-torn areas. This article adds to this discussion by stating that rather than forced migration due to armed conflict, the immigrants from Turkey – the non-Arab Muslim state of the Middle East – are related to political conditions. Lastly, drawing on the relationship between social change in the origin country and migration and addressing the lack of reliable and comparative data, this study focuses on same origin immigrants comparatively in eight different countries.

The Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI) is one of the most frequently used tools to assess criminogenic risk–need in justice-involved individuals. Meta-analytic research demonstrates strong predictive accuracy for various recidivism outcomes. In this exploratory study, we applied machine learning (ML) algorithms (decision trees, random forests, and support vector machines) to a data set with nearly 100,000 LS/CMI administrations to provincial corrections clientele in Ontario, Canada, and approximately 3 years follow-up. The overall accuracies and areas under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUCs) were comparable, although ML outperformed LS/CMI in terms of predictive accuracy for the middle scores where it is hardest to predict the recidivism outcome. Moreover, ML improved the AUCs for individual scores to near 0.60, from 0.50 for the LS/CMI, indicating that ML also improves the ability to rank individuals according to their probability of recidivating. Potential considerations, applications, and future directions are discussed.

Cross-border pharmacy sales of prescription drugs to U.S. patients by Canadian Internet pharmacies have generated significant controversy in the U.S. and Canada. Violative of U.S. legislation and Canadian professional codes of conduct, cross-border pharmacy has nonetheless flourished in response to strong demand and incomplete enforcement. Proponents laud the greater affordability of needed drugs provided by cross-border pharmacy; opponents decry the practice as unsafe, economically ill-advised and harmful to Canadian interests in the long term. This article evaluates the safety arguments that have been put forward by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and others and concludes that they do not justify a prohibition on prescription drug imports from Canada. Similarly. Canadian professional regulatory bodies' objections to the participation of Canadian pharmacists and physicians in cross-border dispensing are a misapplication of conduct rules developed in another context. Objections to cross-border drug sates based on an economic analysis assume normative positions that should be explicitly identified and socially determined. On the other hand, if patient safety, professional responsibility and economic arguments fail to provide adequate support for a policy of prohibition, then self-interest in protecting domestic drug supplies and prices may support, at least from a Canadian perspective, some constraints on cross-border pharmacy.

From the mid-twentieth century, state and public conceptions of deviance and crime control have turned increasingly punitive (Hallett 115; Hutchinson 138). In a Western context, criminal justice has long been retributive, prioritising punishment over rehabilitation (Wenzel et al. 26). Within that context, there has been an increase in punitiveness—understood here as a measure of a punishment’s severity—the intention of which has been to help restore the moral imbalance created by offending while also deterring future crime (Wenzel et al. 26). Entangled with the global spread of neoliberal capitalism, punitiveness has become internationally pervasive to a near-hegemonic degree (Sparks qtd. in Jennings et al. 463; Unnever and Cullen 100).The punitive turn has troubling characteristics. Punitive policies can be expensive, and increased incarceration stresses the criminal justice system and leads to prison overcrowding (Hutchinson 135). Further, punitiveness is not only applied unequally across categories such as class, race, and age (Unnever and Cullen 105-06; Wacquant 212) but the effectiveness of punitive policy relative to its costs is contested (Bouffard et al. 466, 477; Hutchinson 139). Despite this, evidence suggests public demand is driving punitive policymaking, but that demand is only weakly related to crime rates (Jennings et al. 463).While discussion of punitiveness in the public sphere often focuses on measures such as boot camps for young offenders, increased incarceration, and longer prison sentences, punitiveness also has a darker side. Our research analysing discussion taking place on a large, regional, crime-focused online forum reveals a startling degree and intensity of violence directed at offenders and related groups. Members of the discussion forum do propose unsurprising measures such as incarceration and boot camps, but also an array of violent alternatives, including beating, shooting, dismemberment, and conversion into animal food. This article draws on our research to explore why discussion of punitiveness can be so intensely violent.Our research applies thematic analysis to seven discussion threads posted to a large regional online forum focused on crime, made between September and November 2017. One discussion thread per week of the study period was purposively sampled based on relevance to the topic of punitiveness, ultimately yielding 1200 individual comments. Those comments were coded, and the data and codes were reiteratively analysed to produce categories, then basic, organising, and global themes. We intended to uncover themes in group discussion most salient to punitiveness to gain insight into how punitive social interactions unfold and how those who demand punitiveness understand their interactions and experiences of crime. We argue that, in this online forum, the global theme—the most salient concept related to punitiveness—is a “subaltern citizenship”. Here, a clear division emerges from the data, where the group members perceive themselves as “us”—legitimate citizens with all attendant rights—in opposition to an external “them”, a besieging group of diverse, marginalised Others who have illegitimately usurped certain rights and who victimise citizens. Group members often deride the state as too weak and untrustworthy to stop this victimisation. Ironically, the external Others perceived by the group to hold power are themselves genuinely marginalised, though the group does not recognise or see that form of marginalisation as legitimate. In this essay, to preserve the anonymity of the forum and its members, we refer to them only as “the Forum”, located in “the City”, and refrain from direct quotes except for commonly used words or phrases that do not identify individuals.It is also important to note that the research described here deliberately focused on a specific group in a specific space who were concerned about specific groups of offenders. Findings and discussion, and the views on punitiveness described, cannot be generalised to the broader community. Nor do we suggest these views can be considered representative of all Forum members as we present here only a limited analysis of some violent discourse emerging from our research. Likewise, while our discussion often centres on youth and other marginalised groups in the context of offending, we do not intend to imply that offending is a characteristic of these groups.Legitimate CitizenshipCommonly, citizenship is seen as a conferred status denoting full and equal community membership and the rights and responsibilities dictated by community values and norms (Lister 28-29). Western citizenship norms are informed by neoliberal capitalist values: individual responsibility, an obligation to be in paid employment, participation in economic consumption, the sanctity of ownership, and that the principal role of government is to defend the conditions under which these norms can freely thrive (Walsh 861-62). While norms are shaped by laws and policy frameworks, they are not imposed coercively or always deployed consciously. These norms exist as shared behavioural expectations reproduced through social interaction and embodied as “common sense” (Kotzian 59). As much as Western democracies tend to a universalist representation of one, undifferentiated citizenship, it is clear that gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, and migrant status all exist in different relationships to citizenship as an identity category. Glass ceilings, stolen generations, same-sex marriage debates, and Australian Government proposals to strip citizenship from certain types of criminal offender all demonstrate that the lived experience of norms surrounding citizenship is profoundly unequal for some (Staeheli et al. 629-30). An individual’s citizenship status, therefore, more accurately exists on a spectrum between legitimacy—full community membership, possessing all rights and living up to all associated responsibilities—and illegitimacy—diminished membership, with contested rights and questionable fulfilment of associated responsibilities—depending on the extent of their deviation from societal norms.Discussing punitiveness, Forum members position themselves as “us”, that is, legitimate citizens. Words such as “we” and “us” are used as synonyms for society and for those whose behaviours are “normal” or “acceptable”. Groups associated with offending are described as “they”, “them”, and their behaviours are “not normal”, “disgusting”, “feral”, and merit the removal of “them” from civilisation, usually to “the middle of nowhere” or “the Outback”. Possession of legitimate citizenship is implicit in assuming authority over what is normal and who should be exiled for failing the standard.Another implicit assumption discernible in the data is that Forum members perceive the “normal we” as good neoliberal citizens. “We” work hard, own homes and cars, and take individual responsibility. There is a strong imputation of welfare dependency among offenders, the poor, and other suspect groups. Offending is presented as something curable by stripping offenders or their parents of welfare payments. Members earn their status as legitimate citizens by adhering to the norms of neoliberal citizenship in opposition to potential offenders to whom the benefits of citizenship are simply doled out.Forum members also frame their citizenship as legitimate by asserting ownership over community spaces and resources. This can be seen in their talking as if they, their sympathetic audience, and “the City” are the same (for example, declaring that “the City” demands harsher punishments for juvenile offenders). There are also calls to “take back” the streets, the City, and Australia from groups associated with offending. That a space can and should be “taken back” implies a pre-existing state of control interrupted by those who have no right to ownership. At its most extreme, the assertion of ownership extends to a conviction that members have the right to position offenders as enemies of the state and request that the army, the ultimate tool of legitimate state violence, be turned against them if governments and the criminal justice system are too “weak” or “soft” to constrain them.The Illegitimate OtherThroughout the data, perceived offenders are spoken of with scorn and hatred. “Perceived offenders” may include offenders and their family, youths, Indigenous people, and people of low socioeconomic status, and these marginalised groups are referenced so interchangeably it can be difficult to determine which is being discussed.Commenting on four “atsi [sic] kids” who assaulted an elderly man, group members asserted “they” should be shot like dogs. The original text gives no antecedents to indicate whether “they” is meant to indicate youths, Indigenous youths, or offenders in general. However, Australia has a colonial history of conflating crime and indigeneity and shooting Indigenous people to preserve white social order (Hill and Dawes 310, 312), a consequence of the tendency of white people to imagine criminals as black (Unnever and Cullen 106). It must be noted that the racial identity of individual Forum members is unknown. This does constitute a limitation in the original study, as identity categories such as race and class intersect and manifest in social interactions in complex ways. However, that does not prevent analysis of the text itself.In the Forum’s discursive space, “they” is used to denote offenders, Indigenous youths, youths, or the poor interchangeably, as if they were all a homogeneous, mutually synonymous “Other”. Collectively, these groups are represented as so generally hopeless that they are imagined as choosing to offend so they will be sentenced to the comforts of “holiday camp” prisons where they can access luxuries otherwise beyond their reach: freedom from addicted parents, medical care, food, television, and computers. A common argument, that crime is an individual choice, is often based on the idea that prison is a better option for the poor than going home. As a result, offending by marginalised offenders is reconstructed as a rational choice or a failure of individual responsibility rather than a consequence of structural inequality.Further, parents of those in suspect populations are blamed for intergenerational maintenance of criminality. They are described as too drunk or drugged to care, too unskilled in parenting due to their presumed dreadful upbringing, or too busy enjoying their welfare payments to meet their responsibility to control their children or teach them the values and skills of citizenship. Comments imply parents probably participated in their children’s crimes even when no evidence suggests that possibility and that some groups simply cannot be trusted to raise disciplined children owing to their inherent moral and economic dissipation. That is, not just offenders but entire groups are deemed illegitimate, willing to enjoy benefits of citizenship such as welfare payments but unwilling or unable to earn them by engaging with the associated responsibilities. This is a frequent argument for why they deserve severely punitive punishment for deviance.However, the construction of the Other as illegitimate in Forum discussions reaches far beyond imagining them as lacking normative skills and values. The violence present on the Forum is startling in its intensity. Prevalent within the data is the reduction of people to insulting nicknames. Terms used to describe people range from the sarcastic— “little darlings”—through standard abusive language such as “bastards”, “shits”, “dickheads”, “lowlifes”, to dehumanising epithets such as “maggots”, “scum”, and “subhuman arsewipes”. Individually and collectively, “they” are relentlessly framed as less than human and even less than animals. They are “mongrels” and “vermin”. In groups, they are “packs”, and they deserve to be “hunted” or just shot from helicopters. They are unworthy of life. “Oxygen thieves” is a repeated epithet, as is the idea that they should be dropped out at sea to drown. Other suggestions for punishment include firing squads, lethal injections, and feeding them to animals.It is difficult to imagine a more definitive denial of legitimacy than discursively stripping individuals and groups of their humanity (their most fundamental status) and their right to existence (their most fundamental right as living beings). The Forum comes perilously close to casting the Other as Agamben’s homo sacer, humans who live in a “state of exception”, subject to the state’s power but excluded from the law’s protection and able to be killed without consequence (Lechte and Newman 524). While it would be hyperbole to push this comparison too far—given Agamben had concentration camps in mind—the state of exception as a means of both excluding a group from society and exercising control over its life does resonate here.Themes Underlying PunitivenessOur findings indicate the theme most salient to punitive discussion is citizenship, rooted in persistent concerns over who is perceived to have it, who is not, and what should be done about those Others whose deviance renders their citizenship less legitimate. Citizenship norms—real or aspirational—of society’s dominant groups constitute the standards by which Forum members judge their experiences of and with crime, perceived offenders, the criminal justice system, and the state. However, Forum members do not claim a straightforward belonging to and sharing in the maintenance of the polity. Analysis of the data suggests Forum members consider their legitimate citizenship tainted by external forces such as politics, untrustworthy authorities and institutions, and the unconstrained excess of the illegitimate Other. That is, they perceive their citizenship to be simultaneously legitimate and undeservedly subaltern.According to Gramsci, subaltern populations are subordinate to dominant groups in political and civil society, lulled by hegemonic norms to cooperate in their own oppression (Green 2). Civil society supports the authority of political society and, in return, political society uses the law and criminal justice system to safeguard civil society’s interests against unruly subalterns (Green 7). Rights and responsibilities of citizenship reside within the mutual relationship between political and civil society. Subalternity, by definition, exists outside this relationship, or with limited access to it.Forum members position themselves as citizens within civil society. They lay emphatic claim to fulfilling their responsibilities as neoliberal citizens. However, they perceive themselves to be denied the commensurate rights: they cannot rely on the criminal justice system to protect them from the illegitimate Other. The courts are “soft”, and prisons are “camps” with “revolving doors”. Authorities pamper offenders while doing nothing to stop them from hurting their victims. Human rights are viewed as an imposition by the UN or as policy flowing from a political sphere lacking integrity and dominated by “do gooders”. Rights are reserved only for offenders. Legitimate citizens no longer even have the right to defend themselves. The perceived result is a transfer of rights from legitimate to illegitimate, from deserving to undeserving. This process elides from view the actual subalterns of Australian society—here, most particularly Indigenous people and the socioeconomically vulnerable—and reconstructs them as oppressors of the dominant group, who are reframed as legitimate citizens unjustly made subaltern.The Violence in PunitivenessOn the Forum, as in the broader world, a sense of “white victimisation”—the view, unsupported by history or evidence, that whites are an oppressed people within a structure systematically doling out advantage to minorities (King 89)—is a recurrent legitimising argument for punitiveness and vigilantism. Amid the shrinking social safety nets and employment precarity of neoliberal capitalism, competitiveness increases, and white identity forms around perceived threats to power and status incurred by “losing out” to minorities (Sacks and Lindholm 131). One 2011 study finds a majority of white US citizens believe themselves subject to more racism than black people (King 89). However, these assumptions of whiteness tend to be spared critical examination because, in white-dominated societies, whiteness is the common-sense norm in opposition to which other racial categories are defined (Petray and Collin 2). When whiteness is made the focus of critical questioning, white identities gain salience and imaginings of the “dark other” and besieged white virtues intensify (Bonilla-Silva et al. 232).With respect to feelings of punitiveness, Unnever and Cullen (118-19) find that the social cause for punitiveness in the United States is hostility towards other races, that harsh punishments, including the death penalty, are demanded and accepted by the dominant group because they are perceived to mostly injure “people they do not like” (Unnever and Cullen 119). Moreover, perception that a racial group is inherently criminal amplifies more generalised prejudices against them and diminishes the capacity of the dominant group to feel empathy for suffering inflicted upon them by the criminal justice system (Unnever and Cullen 120).While our analysis of the Forum supports these findings where they touch on crimes committed by Indigenous people, they invite a question. Why, where race is not a factor, do youths and the socioeconomically disadvantaged also inspire intensely violent punitiveness as described above? We argue that the answer relates to status. From this perspective, race becomes one of several categories of differentiation from legitimate citizenship through an ascription of low status.Wenzel, Okimoto, and Cameron (29) contend punitiveness, with respect to specific offences, varies according to the symbolic meaning the offence holds for the observer. Crimes understood as a transgression against status or power inspire a need for “revenge, punishment, and stigmatisation” (Wenzel et al. 41) and justify an increase in the punitiveness required (Wenzel et al. 29, 34). This is particularly true where an offence is deemed to make someone unfit for community membership, such that severe punishment serves as a symbolic marker of exile and a reaffirmation for the community of the violated values and norms (Wenzel et al. 41). Indeed, as noted, Forum posts regularly call for offenders to be removed from society, exiled to the outback, or shipped beyond Australia’s territorial waters.Further, Forum members’ perception of subaltern citizenship, with its assumption of legitimate citizenship as being threatened by undeserving Others, makes them view crime as implicitly a matter of status transgression. This is intensified by perception that the political sphere and criminal justice system are failing legitimate citizens, refusing even to let them defend themselves. Virulent name-calling and comparisons to animals can be understood as attempts by the group to symbolically curtail the undeservedly higher status granted to offenders by weak governments and courts. More violent demands for punishment symbolically remove offenders from citizenship, reaffirm citizen values, and vent anger at a political and criminal justice system deemed complicit, through weakness, in reducing legitimate citizens to subaltern citizens.ConclusionsIn this essay, we highlight the extreme violence we found in our analysis of an extensive online crime forum in a regional Australian city. We explore some explanations for violent public punitiveness, highlighting how members identify themselves as subaltern citizens in a battle against undeserving Others, with no support from a weak state. This analysis centres community norms and a problematic conception of citizenship as drivers of both public punitiveness and dissatisfaction with crime control policy and the criminal justice system. We highlight a real dissonance between community needs and public policy that may undermine effective policymaking. That is, evidence-based crime control policies, successful crime prevention initiatives, and falling crime rates may not increase public satisfaction with how crime is dealt with if policymakers pursue those measures without regard for how citizens experience the process.While studies such as that by Wenzel, Okimoto, and Cameron identify differences in status between legitimate citizens and offenders as amplifiers of punitiveness, we suggest the amplification may be mediated by the status relationship between legitimate citizens and authority figures within legitimate society. The offender and their crime may not contribute as much to the public’s outrage as commonly assumed. Instead, public punitiveness may predominantly arise from the perception that the political sphere, media, and criminal justice system respond to citizens’ experience of crime in ways that devalue the status of legitimate citizens. At least in the context of this regional city, this points to something other than successful crime control being integral to building more effective and satisfactory crime control policy: in this case, the need to rebuild trust between citizens and authority groups.ReferencesBonilla-Silva, Eduardo, Carla Goar, and David G. 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On May 18, 2003, the Australian Minister for Education, Brendon Nelson, appeared on the Channel Nine Sunday programme. The Yoda of political journalism, Laurie Oakes, attacked him personally and professionally. He disclosed to viewers that the Minister for Education, Science and Training had suffered a false start in his education, enrolling in one semester of an economics degree that was never completed. The following year, he commenced a medical qualification and went on to become a practicing doctor. He did not pay fees for any of his University courses. When reminded of these events, Dr Nelson became agitated, and revealed information not included in the public presentation of the budget of that year, including a ‘cap’ on HECS-funded places of five years for each student. He justified such a decision with the cliché that Australia’s taxpayers do not want “professional students completing degree after degree.” The Minister confirmed that the primary – and perhaps the only – task for university academics was to ‘train’ young people for the workforce. The fact that nearly 50% of students in some Australian Universities are over the age of twenty five has not entered his vision. He wanted young people to complete a rapid degree and enter the workforce, to commence paying taxes and the debt or loan required to fund a full fee-paying place. Now – nearly two years after this interview and with the Howard government blessed with a new mandate – it is time to ask how this administration will order education and value teaching and learning. The curbing of the time available to complete undergraduate courses during their last term in office makes plain the Australian Liberal Government’s stance on formal, publicly-funded lifelong learning. The notion that a student/worker can attain all required competencies, skills, attributes, motivations and ambitions from a single degree is an assumption of the new funding model. It is also significant to note that while attention is placed on the changing sources of income for universities, there have also been major shifts in the pattern of expenditure within universities, focusing on branding, marketing, recruitment, ‘regional’ campuses and off-shore courses. Similarly, the short-term funding goals of university research agendas encourage projects required by industry, rather than socially inflected concerns. There is little inevitable about teaching, research and education in Australia, except that the Federal Government will not create a fully-funded model for lifelong learning. The task for those of us involved in – and committed to – education in this environment is to probe the form and rationale for a (post) publicly funded University. This short paper for the ‘order’ issue of M/C explores learning and teaching within our current political and economic order. Particularly, I place attention on the synergies to such an order via phrases like the knowledge economy and the creative industries. To move beyond the empty promises of just-in-time learning, on-the-job training, graduate attributes and generic skills, we must reorder our assumptions and ask difficult questions of those who frame the context in which education takes place. For the term of your natural life Learning is a big business. Whether discussing the University of the Third Age, personal development courses, self help bestsellers or hard-edged vocational qualifications, definitions of learning – let alone education – are expanding. Concurrent with this growth, governments are reducing centralized funding and promoting alternative revenue streams. The diversity of student interests – or to use the language of the time, client’s learning goals – is transforming higher education into more than the provision of undergraduate and postgraduate degrees. The expansion of the student body beyond the 18-25 age group and the desire to ‘service industry’ has reordered the form and purpose of formal education. The number of potential students has expanded extraordinarily. As Lee Bash realized Today, some estimates suggest that as many as 47 percent of all students enrolled in higher education are over 25 years old. In the future, as lifelong learning becomes more integrated into the fabric of our culture, the proportion of adult students is expected to increase. And while we may not yet realize it, the academy is already being transformed as a result. (35) Lifelong learning is the major phrase and trope that initiates and justifies these changes. Such expansive economic opportunities trigger the entrepreneurial directives within universities. If lifelong learning is taken seriously, then the goals, entry standards, curriculum, information management policies and assessments need to be challenged and changed. Attention must be placed on words and phrases like ‘access’ and ‘alternative entry.’ Even more consideration must be placed on ‘outcomes’ and ‘accountability.’ Lifelong learning is a catchphrase for a change in purpose and agenda. Courses are developed from a wide range of education providers so that citizens can function in, or at least survive, the agitation of the post-work world. Both neo-liberal and third way models of capitalism require the labeling and development of an aspirational class, a group who desires to move ‘above’ their current context. Such an ambiguous economic and social goal always involves more than the vocational education and training sector or universities, with the aim being to seamlessly slot education into a ‘lifestyle.’ The difficulties with this discourse are two-fold. Firstly, how effectively can these aspirational notions be applied and translated into a real family and a real workplace? Secondly, does this scheme increase the information divide between rich and poor? There are many characteristics of an effective lifelong learner including great personal motivation, self esteem, confidence and intellectual curiosity. In a double shifting, change-fatigued population, the enthusiasm for perpetual learning may be difficult to summon. With the casualization of the post-Fordist workplace, it is no surprise that policy makers and employers are placing the economic and personal responsibility for retraining on individual workers. Instead of funding a training scheme in the workplace, there has been a devolving of skill acquisition and personal development. Through the twentieth century, and particularly after 1945, education was the track to social mobility. The difficulty now – with degree inflation and the loss of stable, secure, long-term employment – is that new modes of exclusion and disempowerment are being perpetuated through the education system. Field recognized that “the new adult education has been embraced most enthusiastically by those who are already relatively well qualified.” (105) This is a significant realization. Motivation, meta-learning skills and curiosity are increasingly being rewarded when found in the already credentialed, empowered workforce. Those already in work undertake lifelong learning. Adult education operates well for members of the middle class who are doing well and wish to do better. If success is individualized, then failure is also cast on the self, not the social system or policy. The disempowered are blamed for their own conditions and ‘failures.’ The concern, through the internationalization of the workforce, technological change and privatization of national assets, is that failure in formal education results in social exclusion and immobility. Besides being forced into classrooms, there are few options for those who do not wish to learn, in a learning society. Those who ‘choose’ not be a part of the national project of individual improvement, increased market share, company competitiveness and international standards are not relevant to the economy. But there is a personal benefit – that may have long term political consequences – from being ‘outside’ society. Perhaps the best theorist of the excluded is not sourced from a University, but from the realm of fictional writing. Irvine Welsh, author of the landmark Trainspotting, has stated that What we really need is freedom from choice … People who are in work have no time for anything else but work. They have no mental space to accommodate anything else but work. Whereas people who are outside the system will always find ways of amusing themselves. Even if they are materially disadvantaged they’ll still find ways of coping, getting by and making their own entertainment. (145-6) A blurring of work and learning, and work and leisure, may seem to create a borderless education, a learning framework uninhibited by curriculum, assessment or power structures. But lifelong learning aims to place as many (national) citizens as possible in ‘the system,’ striving for success or at least a pay increase which will facilitate the purchase of more consumer goods. Through any discussion of work-place training and vocationalism, it is important to remember those who choose not to choose life, who choose something else, who will not follow orders. Everybody wants to work The great imponderable for complex economic systems is how to manage fluctuations in labour and the market. The unstable relationship between need and supply necessitates flexibility in staffing solutions, and short-term supplementary labour options. When productivity and profit are the primary variables through which to judge successful management, then the alignments of education and employment are viewed and skewed through specific ideological imperatives. The library profession is an obvious occupation that has confronted these contradictions. It is ironic that the occupation that orders knowledge is experiencing a volatile and disordered workplace. In the past, it had been assumed that librarians hold a degree while technicians do not, and that technicians would not be asked to perform – unsupervised – the same duties as librarians. Obviously, such distinctions are increasingly redundant. Training packages, structured through competency-based training principles, have ensured technicians and librarians share knowledge systems which are taught through incremental stages. Mary Carroll recognized the primary questions raised through this change. If it is now the case that these distinctions have disappeared do we need to continue to draw them between professional and para-professional education? Does this mean that all sectors of the education community are in fact learning/teaching the same skills but at different levels so that no unique set of skills exist? (122) With education reduced to skills, thereby discrediting generalist degrees, the needs of industry have corroded the professional standards and stature of librarians. Certainly, the abilities of library technicians are finally being valued, but it is too convenient that one of the few professions dominated by women has suffered a demeaning of knowledge into competency. Lifelong learning, in this context, has collapsed high level abilities in information management into bite sized chunks of ‘skills.’ The ideology of lifelong learning – which is rarely discussed – is that it serves to devalue prior abilities and knowledges into an ever-expanding imperative for ‘new’ skills and software competencies. For example, ponder the consequences of Hitendra Pillay and Robert Elliott’s words: The expectations inherent in new roles, confounded by uncertainty of the environment and the explosion of information technology, now challenge us to reconceptualise human cognition and develop education and training in a way that resonates with current knowledge and skills. (95) Neophilliacal urges jut from their prose. The stress on ‘new roles,’ and ‘uncertain environments,’ the ‘explosion of information technology,’ ‘challenges,’ ‘reconceptualisations,’ and ‘current knowledge’ all affirms the present, the contemporary, and the now. Knowledge and expertise that have taken years to develop, nurture and apply are not validated through this educational brief. The demands of family, work, leisure, lifestyle, class and sexuality stretch the skin taut over economic and social contradictions. To ease these paradoxes, lifelong learning should stress pedagogy rather than applications, and context rather than content. Put another way, instead of stressing the link between (gee wizz) technological change and (inevitable) workplace restructuring and redundancies, emphasis needs to be placed on the relationship between professional development and verifiable technological outcomes, rather than spruiks and promises. Short term vocationalism in educational policy speaks to the ordering of our public culture, requiring immediate profits and a tight dialogue between education and work. Furthering this logic, if education ‘creates’ employment, then it also ‘creates’ unemployment. Ironically, in an environment that focuses on the multiple identities and roles of citizens, students are reduced to one label – ‘future workers.’ Obviously education has always been marinated in the political directives of the day. The industrial revolution introduced a range of technical complexities to the workforce. Fordism necessitated that a worker complete a task with precision and speed, requiring a high tolerance of stress and boredom. Now, more skills are ‘assumed’ by employers at the time that workplaces are off-loading their training expectations to the post-compulsory education sector. Therefore ‘lifelong learning’ is a political mask to empower the already empowered and create a low-level skill base for low paid workers, with the promise of competency-based training. Such ideologies never need to be stated overtly. A celebration of ‘the new’ masks this task. Not surprisingly therefore, lifelong learning has a rich new life in ordering creative industries strategies and frameworks. Codifying the creative The last twenty years have witnessed an expanding jurisdiction and justification of the market. As part of Tony Blair’s third way, the creative industries and the knowledge economy became catchwords to demonstrate that cultural concerns are not only economically viable but a necessity in the digital, post-Fordist, information age. Concerns with intellectual property rights, copyright, patents, and ownership of creative productions predominate in such a discourse. Described by Charles Leadbeater as Living on Thin Air, this new economy is “driven by new actors of production and sources of competitive advantage – innovation, design, branding, know-how – which are at work on all industries.” (10) Such market imperatives offer both challenges and opportunity for educationalists and students. Lifelong learning is a necessary accoutrement to the creative industries project. Learning cities and communities are the foundations for design, music, architecture and journalism. In British policy, and increasingly in Queensland, attention is placed on industry-based research funding to address this changing environment. In 2000, Stuart Cunningham and others listed the eight trends that order education, teaching and learning in this new environment. The Changes to the Provision of Education Globalization The arrival of new information and communication technologies The development of a knowledge economy, shortening the time between the development of new ideas and their application. The formation of learning organizations User-pays education The distribution of knowledge through interactive communication technologies (ICT) Increasing demand for education and training Scarcity of an experienced and trained workforce Source: S. Cunningham, Y. Ryan, L. Stedman, S. Tapsall, K. Bagdon, T. Flew and P. Coaldrake. The Business of Borderless Education. Canberra: DETYA Evaluation and Investigations Program [EIP], 2000. This table reverberates with the current challenges confronting education. Mobilizing such changes requires the lubrication of lifelong learning tropes in university mission statements and the promotion of a learning culture, while also acknowledging the limited financial conditions in which the educational sector is placed. For university scholars facilitating the creative industries approach, education is “supplying high value-added inputs to other enterprises,” (Hartley and Cunningham 5) rather than having value or purpose beyond the immediately and applicably economic. The assumption behind this table is that the areas of expansion in the workforce are the creative and service industries. In fact, the creative industries are the new service sector. This new economy makes specific demands of education. Education in the ‘old economy’ and the ‘new economy’ Old Economy New Economy Four-year degree Forty-year degree Training as a cost Training as a source of competitive advantage Learner mobility Content mobility Distance education Distributed learning Correspondence materials with video Multimedia centre Fordist training – one size fits all Tailored programmes Geographically fixed institutions Brand named universities and celebrity professors Just-in-case Just-in-time Isolated learners Virtual learning communities Source: T. Flew. “Educational Media in Transition: Broadcasting, Digital Media and Lifelong Learning in the Knowledge Economy.” International Journal of Instructional Media 29.1 (2002): 20. There are myriad assumptions lurking in Flew’s fascinating table. The imperative is short courses on the web, servicing the needs of industry. He described the product of this system as a “learner-earner.” (50) This ‘forty year degree’ is based on lifelong learning ideologies. However Flew’s ideas are undermined by the current government higher education agenda, through the capping – through time – of courses. The effect on the ‘learner-earner’ in having to earn more to privately fund a continuance of learning – to ensure that they keep on earning – needs to be addressed. There will be consequences to the housing market, family structures and leisure time. The costs of education will impact on other sectors of the economy and private lives. Also, there is little attention to the groups who are outside this taken-for-granted commitment to learning. Flew noted that barriers to greater participation in education and training at all levels, which is a fundamental requirement of lifelong learning in the knowledge economy, arise in part out of the lack of provision of quality technology-mediated learning, and also from inequalities of access to ICTs, or the ‘digital divide.’ (51) In such a statement, there is a misreading of teaching and learning. Such confusion is fuelled by the untheorised gap between ‘student’ and ‘consumer.’ The notion that technology (which in this context too often means computer-mediated platforms) is a barrier to education does not explain why conventional distance education courses, utilizing paper, ink and postage, were also unable to welcome or encourage groups disengaged from formal learning. Flew and others do not confront the issue of motivation, or the reason why citizens choose to add or remove the label of ‘student’ from their bag of identity labels. The stress on technology as both a panacea and problem for lifelong learning may justify theories of convergence and the integration of financial, retail, community, health and education provision into a services sector, but does not explain why students desire to learn, beyond economic necessity and employer expectations. Based on these assumptions of expanding creative industries and lifelong learning, the shape of education is warping. An ageing population requires educational expenditure to be reallocated from primary and secondary schooling and towards post-compulsory learning and training. This cost will also be privatized. When coupled with immigration flows, technological changes and alterations to market and labour structures, lifelong learning presents a profound and personal cost. An instrument for economic and social progress has been individualized, customized and privatized. The consequence of the ageing population in many nations including Australia is that there will be fewer young people in schools or employment. Such a shift will have consequences for the workplace and the taxation system. Similarly, those young workers who remain will be far more entrepreneurial and less loyal to their employers. Public education is now publically-assisted education. Jane Jenson and Denis Saint-Martin realized the impact of this change. The 1980s ideological shift in economic and social policy thinking towards policies and programmes inspired by neo-liberalism provoked serious social strains, especially income polarization and persistent poverty. An increasing reliance on market forces and the family for generating life-chances, a discourse of ‘responsibility,’ an enthusiasm for off-loading to the voluntary sector and other altered visions of the welfare architecture inspired by neo-liberalism have prompted a reaction. There has been a wide-ranging conversation in the 1990s and the first years of the new century in policy communities in Europe as in Canada, among policy makers who fear the high political, social and economic costs of failing to tend to social cohesion. (78) There are dense social reorderings initiated by neo-liberalism and changing the notions of learning, teaching and education. There are yet to be tracked costs to citizenship. The legacy of the 1980s and 1990s is that all organizations must behave like businesses. In such an environment, there are problems establishing social cohesion, let alone social justice. To stress the product – and not the process – of education contradicts the point of lifelong learning. Compliance and complicity replace critique. (Post) learning The Cold War has ended. The great ideological battle between communism and Western liberal democracy is over. Most countries believe both in markets and in a necessary role for Government. There will be thunderous debates inside nations about the balance, but the struggle for world hegemony by political ideology is gone. What preoccupies decision-makers now is a different danger. It is extremism driven by fanaticism, personified either in terrorist groups or rogue states. Tony Blair (http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6535.asp) Tony Blair, summoning his best Francis Fukuyama impersonation, signaled the triumph of liberal democracy over other political and economic systems. His third way is unrecognizable from the Labour party ideals of Clement Attlee. Probably his policies need to be. Yet in his second term, he is not focused on probing the specificities of the market-orientation of education, health and social welfare. Instead, decision makers are preoccupied with a war on terror. Such a conflict seemingly justifies large defense budgets which must be at the expense of social programmes. There is no recognition by Prime Ministers Blair or Howard that ‘high-tech’ armory and warfare is generally impotent to the terrorist’s weaponry of cars, bodies and bombs. This obvious lesson is present for them to see. After the rapid and successful ‘shock and awe’ tactics of Iraq War II, terrorism was neither annihilated nor slowed by the Coalition’s victory. Instead, suicide bombers in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia and Israel snuck have through defenses, requiring little more than a car and explosives. More Americans have been killed since the war ended than during the conflict. Wars are useful when establishing a political order. They sort out good and evil, the just and the unjust. Education policy will never provide the ‘big win’ or the visible success of toppling Saddam Hussein’s statue. The victories of retraining, literacy, competency and knowledge can never succeed on this scale. As Blair offered, “these are new times. New threats need new measures.” (ht tp://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6535.asp) These new measures include – by default – a user pays education system. In such an environment, lifelong learning cannot succeed. It requires a dense financial commitment in the long term. A learning society requires a new sort of war, using ideas not bullets. References Bash, Lee. “What Serving Adult Learners Can Teach Us: The Entrepreneurial Response.” Change January/February 2003: 32-7. Blair, Tony. “Full Text of the Prime Minister’s Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” November 12, 2002. http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6535.asp. Carroll, Mary. “The Well-Worn Path.” The Australian Library Journal May 2002: 117-22. Field, J. Lifelong Learning and the New Educational Order. Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books, 2000. Flew, Terry. “Educational Media in Transition: Broadcasting, Digital Media and Lifelong Learning in the Knowledge Economy.” International Journal of Instructional Media 29.1 (2002): 47-60. Hartley, John, and Cunningham, Stuart. “Creative Industries – from Blue Poles to Fat Pipes.” Department of Education, Science and Training, Commonwealth of Australia (2002). Jenson, Jane, and Saint-Martin, Denis. “New Routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship and the Social Investment State.” Canadian Journal of Sociology 28.1 (2003): 77-99. Leadbeater, Charles. Living on Thin Air. London: Viking, 1999. Pillay, Hitendra, and Elliott, Robert. “Distributed Learning: Understanding the Emerging Workplace Knowledge.” Journal of Interactive Learning Research 13.1-2 (2002): 93-107. Welsh, Irvine, from Redhead, Steve. “Post-Punk Junk.” Repetitive Beat Generation. Glasgow: Rebel Inc, 2000: 138-50. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Brabazon, Tara. "Freedom from Choice: Who Pays for Customer Service in the Knowledge Economy?." M/C Journal 7.6 (2005). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/02-brabazon.php>. APA Style Brabazon, T. (Jan. 2005) "Freedom from Choice: Who Pays for Customer Service in the Knowledge Economy?," M/C Journal, 7(6). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0501/02-brabazon.php>.

A same-but-different dichotomy has recently been encapsulated within the US Food and Drug Administration’s ill-defined concept of “substantial equivalence” (USFDA, FDA). By invoking this concept the genetically modified organism (GMO) industry has escaped the rigors of safety testing that might otherwise apply. The curious concept of “substantial equivalence” grants a presumption of safety to GMO food. This presumption has yet to be earned, and has been used to constrain labelling of both GMO and non-GMO food. It is an idea that well serves corporatism. It enables the claim of difference to secure patent protection, while upholding the contrary claim of sameness to avoid labelling and safety scrutiny. It offers the best of both worlds for corporate food entrepreneurs, and delivers the worst of both worlds to consumers. The term “substantial equivalence” has established its currency within the GMO discourse. As the opportunities for patenting food technologies expand, the GMO recruitment of this concept will likely be a dress rehearsal for the developing debates on the labelling and testing of other techno-foods – including nano-foods and clone-foods. “Substantial Equivalence” “Are the Seven Commandments the same as they used to be, Benjamin?” asks Clover in George Orwell’s “Animal Farm”. By way of response, Benjamin “read out to her what was written on the wall. There was nothing there now except a single Commandment. It ran: ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS”. After this reductionist revelation, further novel and curious events at Manor Farm, “did not seem strange” (Orwell, ch. X). Equality is a concept at the very core of mathematics, but beyond the domain of logic, equality becomes a hotly contested notion – and the domain of food is no exception. A novel food has a regulatory advantage if it can claim to be the same as an established food – a food that has proven its worth over centuries, perhaps even millennia – and thus does not trigger new, perhaps costly and onerous, testing, compliance, and even new and burdensome regulations. On the other hand, such a novel food has an intellectual property (IP) advantage only in terms of its difference. And thus there is an entrenched dissonance for newly technologised foods, between claiming sameness, and claiming difference. The same/different dilemma is erased, so some would have it, by appeal to the curious new dualist doctrine of “substantial equivalence” whereby sameness and difference are claimed simultaneously, thereby creating a win/win for corporatism, and a loss/loss for consumerism. This ground has been pioneered, and to some extent conquered, by the GMO industry. The conquest has ramifications for other cryptic food technologies, that is technologies that are invisible to the consumer and that are not evident to the consumer other than via labelling. Cryptic technologies pertaining to food include GMOs, pesticides, hormone treatments, irradiation and, most recently, manufactured nano-particles introduced into the food production and delivery stream. Genetic modification of plants was reported as early as 1984 by Horsch et al. The case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty resulted in a US Supreme Court decision that upheld the prior decision of the US Court of Customs and Patent Appeal that “the fact that micro-organisms are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the patent law”, and ruled that the “respondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter”. This was a majority decision of nine judges, with four judges dissenting (Burger). It was this Chakrabarty judgement that has seriously opened the Pandora’s box of GMOs because patenting rights makes GMOs an attractive corporate proposition by offering potentially unique monopoly rights over food. The rear guard action against GMOs has most often focussed on health repercussions (Smith, Genetic), food security issues, and also the potential for corporate malfeasance to hide behind a cloak of secrecy citing commercial confidentiality (Smith, Seeds). Others have tilted at the foundational plank on which the economics of the GMO industry sits: “I suggest that the main concern is that we do not want a single molecule of anything we eat to contribute to, or be patented and owned by, a reckless, ruthless chemical organisation” (Grist 22). The GMO industry exhibits bipolar behaviour, invoking the concept of “substantial difference” to claim patent rights by way of “novelty”, and then claiming “substantial equivalence” when dealing with other regulatory authorities including food, drug and pesticide agencies; a case of “having their cake and eating it too” (Engdahl 8). This is a clever slight-of-rhetoric, laying claim to the best of both worlds for corporations, and the worst of both worlds for consumers. Corporations achieve patent protection and no concomitant specific regulatory oversight; while consumers pay the cost of patent monopolization, and are not necessarily apprised, by way of labelling or otherwise, that they are purchasing and eating GMOs, and thereby financing the GMO industry. The lemma of “substantial equivalence” does not bear close scrutiny. It is a fuzzy concept that lacks a tight testable definition. It is exactly this fuzziness that allows lots of wriggle room to keep GMOs out of rigorous testing regimes. Millstone et al. argue that “substantial equivalence is a pseudo-scientific concept because it is a commercial and political judgement masquerading as if it is scientific. It is moreover, inherently anti-scientific because it was created primarily to provide an excuse for not requiring biochemical or toxicological tests. It therefore serves to discourage and inhibit informative scientific research” (526). “Substantial equivalence” grants GMOs the benefit of the doubt regarding safety, and thereby leaves unexamined the ramifications for human consumer health, for farm labourer and food-processor health, for the welfare of farm animals fed a diet of GMO grain, and for the well-being of the ecosystem, both in general and in its particularities. “Substantial equivalence” was introduced into the food discourse by an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report: “safety evaluation of foods derived by modern biotechnology: concepts and principles”. It is from this document that the ongoing mantra of assumed safety of GMOs derives: “modern biotechnology … does not inherently lead to foods that are less safe … . Therefore evaluation of foods and food components obtained from organisms developed by the application of the newer techniques does not necessitate a fundamental change in established principles, nor does it require a different standard of safety” (OECD, “Safety” 10). This was at the time, and remains, an act of faith, a pro-corporatist and a post-cautionary approach. The OECD motto reveals where their priorities lean: “for a better world economy” (OECD, “Better”). The term “substantial equivalence” was preceded by the 1992 USFDA concept of “substantial similarity” (Levidow, Murphy and Carr) and was adopted from a prior usage by the US Food and Drug Agency (USFDA) where it was used pertaining to medical devices (Miller). Even GMO proponents accept that “Substantial equivalence is not intended to be a scientific formulation; it is a conceptual tool for food producers and government regulators” (Miller 1043). And there’s the rub – there is no scientific definition of “substantial equivalence”, no scientific test of proof of concept, and nor is there likely to be, since this is a ‘spinmeister’ term. And yet this is the cornerstone on which rests the presumption of safety of GMOs. Absence of evidence is taken to be evidence of absence. History suggests that this is a fraught presumption. By way of contrast, the patenting of GMOs depends on the antithesis of assumed ‘sameness’. Patenting rests on proven, scrutinised, challengeable and robust tests of difference and novelty. Lightfoot et al. report that transgenic plants exhibit “unexpected changes [that] challenge the usual assumptions of GMO equivalence and suggest genomic, proteomic and metanomic characterization of transgenics is advisable” (1). GMO Milk and Contested Labelling Pesticide company Monsanto markets the genetically engineered hormone rBST (recombinant Bovine Somatotropin; also known as: rbST; rBGH, recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone; and the brand name Prosilac) to dairy farmers who inject it into their cows to increase milk production. This product is not approved for use in many jurisdictions, including Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan. Even Monsanto accepts that rBST leads to mastitis (inflammation and pus in the udder) and other “cow health problems”, however, it maintains that “these problems did not occur at rates that would prohibit the use of Prosilac” (Monsanto). A European Union study identified an extensive list of health concerns of rBST use (European Commission). The US Dairy Export Council however entertain no doubt. In their background document they ask “is milk from cows treated with rBST safe?” and answer “Absolutely” (USDEC). Meanwhile, Monsanto’s website raises and answers the question: “Is the milk from cows treated with rbST any different from milk from untreated cows? No” (Monsanto). Injecting cows with genetically modified hormones to boost their milk production remains a contested practice, banned in many countries. It is the claimed equivalence that has kept consumers of US dairy products in the dark, shielded rBST dairy farmers from having to declare that their milk production is GMO-enhanced, and has inhibited non-GMO producers from declaring their milk as non-GMO, non rBST, or not hormone enhanced. This is a battle that has simmered, and sometimes raged, for a decade in the US. Finally there is a modest victory for consumers: the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture (PDA) requires all labels used on milk products to be approved in advance by the department. The standard issued in October 2007 (PDA, “Standards”) signalled to producers that any milk labels claiming rBST-free status would be rejected. This advice was rescinded in January 2008 with new, specific, department-approved textual constructions allowed, and ensuring that any “no rBST” style claim was paired with a PDA-prescribed disclaimer (PDA, “Revised Standards”). However, parsimonious labelling is prohibited: No labeling may contain references such as ‘No Hormones’, ‘Hormone Free’, ‘Free of Hormones’, ‘No BST’, ‘Free of BST’, ‘BST Free’,’No added BST’, or any statement which indicates, implies or could be construed to mean that no natural bovine somatotropin (BST) or synthetic bovine somatotropin (rBST) are contained in or added to the product. (PDA, “Revised Standards” 3) Difference claims are prohibited: In no instance shall any label state or imply that milk from cows not treated with recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST, rbST, RBST or rbst) differs in composition from milk or products made with milk from treated cows, or that rBST is not contained in or added to the product. If a product is represented as, or intended to be represented to consumers as, containing or produced from milk from cows not treated with rBST any labeling information must convey only a difference in farming practices or dairy herd management methods. (PDA, “Revised Standards” 3) The PDA-approved labelling text for non-GMO dairy farmers is specified as follows: ‘From cows not treated with rBST. No significant difference has been shown between milk derived from rBST-treated and non-rBST-treated cows’ or a substantial equivalent. Hereinafter, the first sentence shall be referred to as the ‘Claim’, and the second sentence shall be referred to as the ‘Disclaimer’. (PDA, “Revised Standards” 4) It is onto the non-GMO dairy farmer alone, that the costs of compliance fall. These costs include label preparation and approval, proving non-usage of GMOs, and of creating and maintaining an audit trail. In nearby Ohio a similar consumer versus corporatist pantomime is playing out. This time with the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) calling the shots, and again serving the GMO industry. The ODA prescribed text allowed to non-GMO dairy farmers is “from cows not supplemented with rbST” and this is to be conjoined with the mandatory disclaimer “no significant difference has been shown between milk derived from rbST-supplemented and non-rbST supplemented cows” (Curet). These are “emergency rules”: they apply for 90 days, and are proposed as permanent. Once again, the onus is on the non-GMO dairy farmers to document and prove their claims. GMO dairy farmers face no such governmental requirements, including no disclosure requirement, and thus an asymmetric regulatory impost is placed on the non-GMO farmer which opens up new opportunities for administrative demands and technocratic harassment. Levidow et al. argue, somewhat Eurocentrically, that from its 1990s adoption “as the basis for a harmonized science-based approach to risk assessment” (26) the concept of “substantial equivalence” has “been recast in at least three ways” (58). It is true that the GMO debate has evolved differently in the US and Europe, and with other jurisdictions usually adopting intermediate positions, yet the concept persists. Levidow et al. nominate their three recastings as: firstly an “implicit redefinition” by the appending of “extra phrases in official documents”; secondly, “it has been reinterpreted, as risk assessment processes have … required more evidence of safety than before, especially in Europe”; and thirdly, “it has been demoted in the European Union regulatory procedures so that it can no longer be used to justify the claim that a risk assessment is unnecessary” (58). Romeis et al. have proposed a decision tree approach to GMO risks based on cascading tiers of risk assessment. However what remains is that the defects of the concept of “substantial equivalence” persist. Schauzu identified that: such decisions are a matter of “opinion”; that there is “no clear definition of the term ‘substantial’”; that because genetic modification “is aimed at introducing new traits into organisms, the result will always be a different combination of genes and proteins”; and that “there is no general checklist that could be followed by those who are responsible for allowing a product to be placed on the market” (2). Benchmark for Further Food Novelties? The discourse, contestation, and debate about “substantial equivalence” have largely focussed on the introduction of GMOs into food production processes. GM can best be regarded as the test case, and proof of concept, for establishing “substantial equivalence” as a benchmark for evaluating new and forthcoming food technologies. This is of concern, because the concept of “substantial equivalence” is scientific hokum, and yet its persistence, even entrenchment, within regulatory agencies may be a harbinger of forthcoming same-but-different debates for nanotechnology and other future bioengineering. The appeal of “substantial equivalence” has been a brake on the creation of GMO-specific regulations and on rigorous GMO testing. The food nanotechnology industry can be expected to look to the precedent of the GMO debate to head off specific nano-regulations and nano-testing. As cloning becomes economically viable, then this may be another wave of food innovation that muddies the regulatory waters with the confused – and ultimately self-contradictory – concept of “substantial equivalence”. Nanotechnology engineers particles in the size range 1 to 100 nanometres – a nanometre is one billionth of a metre. This is interesting for manufacturers because at this size chemicals behave differently, or as the Australian Office of Nanotechnology expresses it, “new functionalities are obtained” (AON). Globally, government expenditure on nanotechnology research reached US$4.6 billion in 2006 (Roco 3.12). While there are now many patents (ETC Group; Roco), regulation specific to nanoparticles is lacking (Bowman and Hodge; Miller and Senjen). The USFDA advises that nano-manufacturers “must show a reasonable assurance of safety … or substantial equivalence” (FDA). A recent inventory of nano-products already on the market identified 580 products. Of these 11.4% were categorised as “Food and Beverage” (WWICS). This is at a time when public confidence in regulatory bodies is declining (HRA). In an Australian consumer survey on nanotechnology, 65% of respondents indicated they were concerned about “unknown and long term side effects”, and 71% agreed that it is important “to know if products are made with nanotechnology” (MARS 22). Cloned animals are currently more expensive to produce than traditional animal progeny. In the course of 678 pages, the USFDA Animal Cloning: A Draft Risk Assessment has not a single mention of “substantial equivalence”. However the Federation of Animal Science Societies (FASS) in its single page “Statement in Support of USFDA’s Risk Assessment Conclusion That Food from Cloned Animals Is Safe for Human Consumption” states that “FASS endorses the use of this comparative evaluation process as the foundation of establishing substantial equivalence of any food being evaluated. It must be emphasized that it is the food product itself that should be the focus of the evaluation rather than the technology used to generate cloned animals” (FASS 1). Contrary to the FASS derogation of the importance of process in food production, for consumers both the process and provenance of production is an important and integral aspect of a food product’s value and identity. Some consumers will legitimately insist that their Kalamata olives are from Greece, or their balsamic vinegar is from Modena. It was the British public’s growing awareness that their sugar was being produced by slave labour that enabled the boycotting of the product, and ultimately the outlawing of slavery (Hochschild). When consumers boycott Nestle, because of past or present marketing practices, or boycott produce of USA because of, for example, US foreign policy or animal welfare concerns, they are distinguishing the food based on the narrative of the food, the production process and/or production context which are a part of the identity of the food. Consumers attribute value to food based on production process and provenance information (Paull). Products produced by slave labour, by child labour, by political prisoners, by means of torture, theft, immoral, unethical or unsustainable practices are different from their alternatives. The process of production is a part of the identity of a product and consumers are increasingly interested in food narrative. It requires vigilance to ensure that these narratives are delivered with the product to the consumer, and are neither lost nor suppressed. Throughout the GM debate, the organic sector has successfully skirted the “substantial equivalence” debate by excluding GMOs from the certified organic food production process. This GMO-exclusion from the organic food stream is the one reprieve available to consumers worldwide who are keen to avoid GMOs in their diet. The organic industry carries the expectation of providing food produced without artificial pesticides and fertilizers, and by extension, without GMOs. Most recently, the Soil Association, the leading organic certifier in the UK, claims to be the first organisation in the world to exclude manufactured nonoparticles from their products (Soil Association). There has been the call that engineered nanoparticles be excluded from organic standards worldwide, given that there is no mandatory safety testing and no compulsory labelling in place (Paull and Lyons). The twisted rhetoric of oxymorons does not make the ideal foundation for policy. Setting food policy on the shifting sands of “substantial equivalence” seems foolhardy when we consider the potentially profound ramifications of globally mass marketing a dysfunctional food. If there is a 2×2 matrix of terms – “substantial equivalence”, substantial difference, insubstantial equivalence, insubstantial difference – while only one corner of this matrix is engaged for food policy, and while the elements remain matters of opinion rather than being testable by science, or by some other regime, then the public is the dupe, and potentially the victim. “Substantial equivalence” has served the GMO corporates well and the public poorly, and this asymmetry is slated to escalate if nano-food and clone-food are also folded into the “substantial equivalence” paradigm. Only in Orwellian Newspeak is war peace, or is same different. It is time to jettison the pseudo-scientific doctrine of “substantial equivalence”, as a convenient oxymoron, and embrace full disclosure of provenance, process and difference, so that consumers are not collateral in a continuing asymmetric knowledge war. References Australian Office of Nanotechnology (AON). 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