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Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins. "Justification is potential knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no. 2 (April 2014): 184–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.923240.
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This paper will articulate and defend a novel theory of epistemic justification; I characterize my view as the thesis that justification is potential knowledge (JPK). My project is an instance of the ‘knowledge-first’ programme, championed especially by Timothy Williamson. So I begin with a brief recapitulation of that programme.
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Bender, John W. "Knowledge, justification and Lehrer's theory of coherence." Philosophical Studies 54, no. 3 (November 1988): 355–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00646275.
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Ghari, Meghdad. "Distributed Knowledge Justification Logics." Theory of Computing Systems 55, no. 1 (August 4, 2013): 1–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00224-013-9492-x.
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Silva, Paul. "KNOWING HOW TO PUT KNOWLEDGE FIRST IN THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION." Episteme 14, no. 4 (May 19, 2016): 393–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.10.
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AbstractIn what follows I offer a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). The upshot is a virtue-theoretic, knowledge-first view of justification that is internalist-friendly and able to explain more facts about justification than any other available view.
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Taylor, James E., and William P. Alston. "Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge." Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 163 (April 1991): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219601.
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Steup, Matthias, and William Alston. "Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, no. 1 (March 1992): 228. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107759.
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ARTEMOV, SERGEI. "THE LOGIC OF JUSTIFICATION." Review of Symbolic Logic 1, no. 4 (December 2008): 477–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020308090060.
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We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t: F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. As a case study, we offer a resolution of the Goldman–Kripke ‘Red Barn’ paradox and analyze Russell’s ‘prime minister example’ in Justification Logic. Furthermore, we formalize the well-known Gettier example and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier’s reasoning.
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GÓES, HELNA ALMEIDA DE ARAUJO, GERMANO GLUFKE REIS, and GUSTAVO ABIB. "WHEN STAKEHOLDER THEORY MEETS JUSTIFICATION THEORY: AN INTERSECTION PROPOSAL." Cadernos EBAPE.BR 19, no. 4 (December 2021): 901–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1679-395120200179.
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Abstract We discuss an interplay between two theories by addressing the question: In what ways can the Justification theory (JT) complement the Stakeholder theory (ST)? While ST provides an insight on the importance of creating value for stakeholders without resorting to tradeoffs, it does not address how several stakeholders employ justifications to achieve their goals, nor does it explore the analytical thinking on how organizations and their stakeholders account for and negotiate behaviors during disputes. The JT provides a framework that interprets social interactions and tensions by considering that actors’ decisions and actions are contextualized within organizational reality. Several studies that apply the JT framework in the context of organizations do so by directly or indirectly analyzing stakeholders. Hence, this essay sheds light on how such an intersection may help to comprehend the phenomena related to disputes. The study offers tools and contributes to understanding managerial practices for stakeholders identification and engagement since, to the best of our knowledge, there is a research gap regarding the intersection between JT and ST.
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Faria, Domingos. "A Knowledge-First Account of Group Knowledge." Logos & Episteme 13, no. 1 (2022): 37–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20221312.
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The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson’s theory of knowledge is correct, these are not good analyzes for understanding group knowledge. For, in such framework, knowledge is not analyzed in terms of belief and justification, and the same should apply to group knowledge. Thus, we propose to analyze which consequences Williamson’s theory has for social epistemology, namely for an understanding of group knowledge. The questions that will guide this article are the following: What is a knowledge-first approach to group knowledge? And what does a knowledge-first approach teach us with regard to one of the most pressing issues of social epistemology, namely the dispute between summativists and non-summativists accounts of groups? We claim that a knowledge-first account of group knowledge can be offered and that it favors non-summativism.
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Booth, Anthony Robert. "The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce." Erkenntnis 75, no. 1 (December 17, 2010): 37–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9264-9.
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Roth, Michael D. "Knowledge and Evidence." Dialogue 30, no. 4 (1991): 591–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300011896.
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This is an ambitious and frustrating book. Among the many virtues which Moser claims for it are all of the following: (a) it answers the need to counteract certain “epistemologically harmful muddles with careful distinctions and arguments” (p. 2); (b) it provides the reader with a “forceful” reply to both justification scepticism and knowledge scepticism and argues that both can be “effectively challenged, if not refuted” (p. 3); (c) it “solves” the Gettier problem (p. 233); and (d) it not only removes the “normative mystery” from epistemic concepts such as knowledge and justification, but provides a meta-justification which will allow us, the readers, to see why the theoretical account offered in its pages is preferable to its competitors (p. 2–3). It is worth mentioning that the competitors over whom Moser claims his theory has a “dialectical edge” (p. 3) include accounts authored by Chisholm, Lehrer, Goldman, Alston, Bonjour, Rorty, Foley and Stroud. As I said, this is an ambitious book.
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Sankey, Howard. "Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth?" Logos & Episteme 10, no. 4 (2019): 445–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910440.
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This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.
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GUSEV, ALEXANDER, and DMITRY IVANOV. "JUSTIFICATION OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE: REPRESENTATIONALISM AND DIRECT REALISM." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 13, no. 1 (2024): 129–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2024-13-1-129-149.
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The paper examines two of the most influential approaches to the problem of the justification of perceptual knowledge: representationalism and direct realism, taken in a version of epistemological disjunctivism. The problem itself can be represented as the need to demonstrate that there is a logical connection between a statement about the perception of a certain fact, p, and a statement about the knowledge of p. The article notes that both approaches face the problem of “the silence of the senses.” This problem was pointed out by Ch.Travis, who tried to show that the content of sensory experience is not propositional; senses themselves do not tell us what fact we are dealing with when perceptually interacting with the world. The first part of the article reconstructs the argument from looks that Travis proposed to criticize representationalism. This part demonstrates that we cannot accept representationalism as an approach in the philosophy of perception that successfully overcomes the shortcomings of sense data theory. The main drawback of this theory was its adherence to the myth of the given—the idea that in perceptual experience we are dealing with non-propositional, non-conceptual “raw” data. The second part of the paper notes that Travis’s argument can also be directed against such a version of direct realism as epistemological disjunctivism, since according to representatives of this theory, the content of veridical perceptual experience, being identical with the perceived state of affairs, is propositional. This part also analyzes the response to Travis from such a representative of this theory as J.McDowell. While McDowell rejects propositionalism, he nevertheless insists that the content of perceptual experience must be regarded as conceptual. It allows us to avoid the myth of the given. In conclusion, criticism of McDowell’s approach from the phenomenological position taken by H.Dreyfus is discussed, and it is noted that McDowell’s conceptualism is quite compatible with both phenomenology and enactivism. The enactivist understanding of perception that we find in McDowell leads us to accept the enactivist account of perceptual knowledge, where the foundation of knowledge is action, i.e. something epistemically groundless.
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Peters, Kristian, Laura Maruster, and René J. Jorna. "The evaluation of knowledge claims in an innovation project: A case study." Management Learning 42, no. 5 (May 6, 2011): 537–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1350507611406062.
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Understanding how an organization determines what knowledge is valid leads to new insights about how firms cope with innovation. Although the evaluation of knowledge is a relevant topic in the field of knowledge management, the existing literature does not provide substantial contributions. Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) theory of justification is the only established approach. This study adopts an empirical approach for improving the understanding of knowledge claim evaluation by presenting a conceptual framework based on Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation theory. We apply the framework in a small-scale study at the headquarters of a large building technology multinational. Based on the results, we reflect upon Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) justification theory. Our findings indicate that the justification theory explains actual knowledge claim evaluation only partially. The unexplained parts, for which we explore alternative meanings, enlighten why innovations fail or succeed from the viewpoint of knowledge claim evaluation.
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Floridi, Luciano. "The problem of the justification of a theory of knowledge." Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25, no. 1 (March 1994): 17–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00769275.
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Floridi, Luciano. "The problem of the justification of a theory of knowledge." Journal for General Philosophy of Science 24, no. 2 (September 1993): 205–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00764387.
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Adams, Frederick. "The Function of Epistemic Justification." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 3 (September 1986): 465–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1986.10717130.
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There is a venerable and thoroughly entrenched tradition of regarding epistemic justification as playing an essential cognitive role in the acquisition, maintenance, or even loss of knowledge. Hold fixed that p is true and that S believes that p. Given this, whether S comes to know that p, still knows that p, or no longer knows that p essentially depends upon whether S has acquired, sustained, or lost justification for believing that p. I shall call any theory which regards epistemic justification as playing this essential epistemological function in cognition a Jn-theory. To simplify, we will say that a Jn-theorist is one who holds that - when the truth of p is held constant and S's belief that p is held constant - S's knowledge that p varies directly with the victory of S's justification and indirectly with its defeat.
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Carter, J. Adam, and Philip J. Nickel. "ON TESTIMONY AND TRANSMISSION." Episteme 11, no. 2 (March 4, 2014): 145–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.4.
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AbstractJennifer Lackey's case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticized on the ground that it does not really refute the transmission theory, because there is still somebody in a chain of testifiers – the person from whom the creationist teacher acquired what she testifies – who knows the truth of the testified statements. In this paper, we provide a kind of pattern for generating counterexample cases, one that avoids objections discussed by Peter Graham and others in relation to such cases.
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Poston, Ted. "IS FOUNDATIONAL A PRIORI JUSTIFICATION INDISPENSABLE?" Episteme 10, no. 3 (August 7, 2013): 317–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.25.
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AbstractLaurence BonJour's (1985) coherence theory of empirical knowledge relies heavily on a traditional foundationalist theory of a priori knowledge. He argues that a foundationalist, rationalist theory of a priori justification is indispensable for a coherence theory. BonJour (1998) continues this theme, arguing that a traditional account of a priori justification is indispensable for the justification of putative a priori truths, the justification of any non-observational belief and the justification of reasoning itself. While BonJour's indispensability arguments have received some critical discussion (Gendler 2001; Harman 2001; Beebe 2008), no one has investigated the indispensability arguments from a coherentist perspective. This perspective offers a fruitful take on BonJour's arguments, because he does not appreciate the depth of the coherentist alternative to the traditional empiricist-rationalist debate. This is surprising on account of BonJour's previous defense of coherentism. Two significant conclusions emerge: first, BonJour's indispensability arguments beg central questions about an explanationist form of coherentism; second, BonJour's original defense of coherentism took on board certain assumptions that inevitably led to the demise of his form of coherentism. The positive conclusion of this article is that explanatory coherentism is more coherent than BonJour's indispensability arguments assume, and more coherent than BonJour's earlier coherentist epistemology.
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Wusteman, Judith. "Explanation-based learning as justification of knowledge." Expert Systems 9, no. 3 (August 1992): 139–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0394.1992.tb00394.x.
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Hosseini, Zahra, and Fateme Sahraei. "Epistemological Validity of Traditionalists’ Theory of "Sacred Knowledge": Its Truth and Justification." Mirror of Wisdom 22, no. 4 (February 20, 2023): 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.52547/jipt.2023.230016.1355.
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De Cat, Broes, Marc Denecker, Maurice Bruynooghe, and Peter Stuckey. "Lazy Model Expansion: Interleaving Grounding with Search." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 52 (February 25, 2015): 235–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.4591.
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Finding satisfying assignments for the variables involved in a set of constraints can be cast as a (bounded) model generation problem: search for (bounded) models of a theory in some logic. The state-of-the-art approach for bounded model generation for rich knowledge representation languages like ASP and FO(.) and a CSP modeling language such as Zinc, is ground-and-solve: reduce the theory to a ground or propositional one and apply a search algorithm to the resulting theory. An important bottleneck is the blow-up of the size of the theory caused by the grounding phase. Lazily grounding the theory during search is a way to overcome this bottleneck. We present a theoretical framework and an implementation in the context of the FO(.) knowledge representation language. Instead of grounding all parts of a theory, justifications are derived for some parts of it. Given a partial assignment for the grounded part of the theory and valid justifications for the formulas of the non-grounded part, the justifications provide a recipe to construct a complete assignment that satisfies the non-grounded part. When a justification for a particular formula becomes invalid during search, a new one is derived; if that fails, the formula is split in a part to be grounded and a part that can be justified. Experimental results illustrate the power and generality of this approach.
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Ahmed, Farid. "A Review of Lakatos’s Rational Progress Theory on Rationality of Science." Dhaka University Studies 79, no. 1-2 (December 30, 2023): 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.62296/dus202212004.
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Abstract: The rationality of science is debated by contemporary and recent philosophers, and the debate turned vibrant in Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Lakatos’s rational progress theory adopts the best parts of Pooper’s hypo-deductive method and Kuhn’s revolutionary approaches to provide a comprehensive framework of justification of science. By designing negative and positive heuristics for scientific rationality, he refutes Humean scepticism that proven knowledge is an untenable ideal. The paper objects “anything goes” principle concerning scientific progress and argues that Lakatos’s framework is a better approach to scientific research and progress, and demonstrates the justification of scientific theories if triangulation, internal justification, and external verification are considered integral parts of scientific rationality.
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Snauwaert, Dale. "The Dialogical Turn in Normative Political Theory and the Pedagogy of Human Rights Education." Education Sciences 9, no. 1 (March 9, 2019): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/educsci9010052.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore a capacity-building pedagogical approach to human rights education as a complement to the “declarationist” approach. The basic premise of this philosophical paper is the idea of human rights as justified claims and/or demands; as such, ethical and moral justification is presupposed in the very idea of rights itself. It is argued that a dialogical turn in moral and political philosophy, in particular theoretical justifications of principles of justice, such as rights, has taken place. Given that ethical and moral justification is central to the meaning of human rights, the significance of this dialogical turn for the idea of human rights and human rights education is explored from within the idea of the logical structure of disciplines of knowledge, a discipline’s fundamental ideas and forms of thought (methods of inquiry). From within this perspective, it is argued that the dialogical nature of justification central to rights should structure the pedagogy of human rights education. It is suggested that this pedagogy entails three forms of normative dialogue—ethical, moral, and critical—that can form the normative structure of a pedagogy of human rights education. It is concluded that while awareness and respect are necessary conditions to the realization of human rights, the development of the capacity of future citizens to make, to justify, and to critique human rights claims is also necessary for the realization of human rights.
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Ajayi, Toluwalase. "Knowledge, Belief and Justification of the African Conception of Reincarnation." Oguaa Journal of Religion and Human Values 6, no. 2 (December 1, 2021): 52–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.47963/ojorhv.v6i2.873.
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The study examines the epistemic justification of reincarnation in African Philosophy. It is also an attempt to investigate the problem of reincarnation and the belief in the ancestral world. It deploys the critical tool of epistemic justification to determine the conditions that render the African conception of reincarnation defensible. Epistemic justification is a philosophical theory aimed at investigating the extent to which a person’s beliefs are knowledge-based and therefore worth holding. The paper defends the thesis that African idea of reincarnation is justifiable and that belief in reincarnation can coexist with the belief in the ancestral world without contradiction. Humans are reborn and come back into this world several times until they have sufficiently paid for all their past misdeeds and purified themselves, before their souls are released to go to the ancestral world. A person’s destiny is never fulfilled in the first trip; hence a rebirth or reincarnation takes place to give the individual a succeeding chance or chances to fulfill his or her original destiny.
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Dunlop, Katherine. "Definitions and Empirical Justification in Christian Wolff’s Theory of Science." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 21, no. 1 (April 5, 2018): 149–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02101008.
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This paper argues that in Christian Wolff’s theory of knowledge, logical regimentation does not take the place of experiential justification, but serves to facilitate the application of empirical information and clearly exhibit its warrant. My argument targets rationalistic interpretations such as R. Lanier Anderson’s. It is common ground in this dispute that making concepts “distinct” (articulating their component marks) issues in the premises on which all deductive justification rests. Against the view that concepts are made distinct only by analysis, which is carried out by the understanding independently of experience, I contend that for Wolff some distinct concepts are arrived at through experience. I emphasize that Wolff countenances empirical methods of obtaining distinct concepts even in mathematics. This striking feature of his view indicates how its empiricist elements can be reconciled with his injunction to follow “mathematical” method.
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Vilanova Arias, Javier. "Cyrkularność w definiowaniu przez postulaty pojęcia wiedzy logicznej." Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, no. 17 (January 1, 2005): 73–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.17.05.
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In this paper I critically evaluate the Implicit Definition Theory and its possibility of resolution of two main problems concerning logical knowledge: the explication and the justification. I point at five results that can be obtained: apriority, factuality, normativity applicability and non-circularity. I argue that in case of explication all mentioned results can be obtained but in case of justification the circularity is inevitable. In the last paragraph I propose a solution of this problem.
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Williams, Michael. "Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1, no. 2 (2011): 124–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057011x608872.
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AbstractIn his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. Central to Sosa's anti-skeptical strategy is the claim that there are two kinds of knowledge. His thought is that animal knowledge, which can be understood in purely reliabilist terms, can ground justified trust in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties, thus elevating us (without vicious circularity) to the level of reflective knowledge. I offer a sketch of an alternative approach, linking knowledge and justification with epistemic accountability and responsible belief-management, which casts doubt on the idea that "animal" knowledge is knowledge properly so-called. However, it turns out that this approach is (perhaps surprisingly) close in spirit to Sosa's. I suggest that the differences between us may rest on a disagreement over the possibility of providing a direct answer to the Pyrrhonian challenge.
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Bratianu, Constantin, and Ruxandra Bejinaru. "The Theory of Knowledge Fields: A Thermodynamics Approach." Systems 7, no. 2 (March 29, 2019): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems7020020.
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The emergence of knowledge economy and knowledge management revealed the need for reconsidering the concept of knowledge in a larger framework than that created by philosophers from ancient times. While the epistemology as a theory of knowledge and justification considers knowledge as a justified true belief, experts in knowledge management consider knowledge as a strategic resource. The new economic interpretation of knowledge as a strategic resource and a key contributor to achieving a competitive advantage generated a search of new metaphors to supply the attributes needed in constructing the new framework of understanding and operating with a working concept of knowledge in management. The most widespread knowledge metaphors are based on analogies with stocks, flows, and stock-and-flows. These metaphors induce, beyond some useful attributes, the Newtonian mechanics paradigm which is limited by the properties of linear spaces and reversible processes. The purpose of this paper is to show how we can enrich the theory of knowledge by introducing the concepts of knowledge fields and knowledge dynamics based on metaphorical thinking and the thermodynamics principles. The focus of our research is the energy metaphor which considers energy as a source semantic field. The main outcome of the present research is that knowledge can be considered as a field, which is manifesting in different forms like energy. This thermodynamics framework opens new directions for research in knowledge management, decision-making and leadership.
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Gurung, Lina. "Feminist Standpoint Theory: Conceptualization and Utility." Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 14 (December 30, 2020): 106–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/dsaj.v14i0.27357.
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Feminist Standpoint theory challenges the notion of conventional scientific practices that had excluded women from the inquiry and marginalize them in every aspect of knowledge benefits and construction. Amidst the prevalent controversies, standpoint theorists have proposed alternative knowledge construction with the theses of ‘strong objectivity’, ‘situated knowledge’, ‘epistemic advantage’, and ‘power relations’. Feminist standpoint theory is claimed to be a successful methodology and the author support this argument based on the four reasons; the logic of discovery, insider-outsider position, study up, and methodological innovation. The author also put forwards the various challenges confronted by feminist standpoint theory and the justification given by the theorists. The cognitive, methodological, and epistemological interrogations toward this theory have widened its scope and adoption in social science research. The paper aims to suggest this analysis as the most suitable analytical and theoretical approach to do feminist inquiry which brings the understanding of feminist epistemologies as the most appropriate alternative approach of recent inquires against the dominant practices.
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Gurung, Lina. "Feminist Standpoint Theory: Conceptualization and Utility." Dhaulagiri Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 14 (December 30, 2020): 106–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/dsaj.v14i0.27357.
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Feminist Standpoint theory challenges the notion of conventional scientific practices that had excluded women from the inquiry and marginalize them in every aspect of knowledge benefits and construction. Amidst the prevalent controversies, standpoint theorists have proposed alternative knowledge construction with the theses of ‘strong objectivity’, ‘situated knowledge’, ‘epistemic advantage’, and ‘power relations’. Feminist standpoint theory is claimed to be a successful methodology and the author support this argument based on the four reasons; the logic of discovery, insider-outsider position, study up, and methodological innovation. The author also put forwards the various challenges confronted by feminist standpoint theory and the justification given by the theorists. The cognitive, methodological, and epistemological interrogations toward this theory have widened its scope and adoption in social science research. The paper aims to suggest this analysis as the most suitable analytical and theoretical approach to do feminist inquiry which brings the understanding of feminist epistemologies as the most appropriate alternative approach of recent inquires against the dominant practices.
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Virani, Nurali, Naresh Iyer, and Zhaoyuan Yang. "Justification-Based Reliability in Machine Learning." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 04 (April 3, 2020): 6078–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i04.6071.
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With the advent of Deep Learning, the field of machine learning (ML) has surpassed human-level performance on diverse classification tasks. At the same time, there is a stark need to characterize and quantify reliability of a model's prediction on individual samples. This is especially true in applications of such models in safety-critical domains of industrial control and healthcare. To address this need, we link the question of reliability of a model's individual prediction to the epistemic uncertainty of the model's prediction. More specifically, we extend the theory of Justified True Belief (JTB) in epistemology, created to study the validity and limits of human-acquired knowledge, towards characterizing the validity and limits of knowledge in supervised classifiers. We present an analysis of neural network classifiers linking the reliability of its prediction on a test input to characteristics of the support gathered from the input and hidden layers of the network. We hypothesize that the JTB analysis exposes the epistemic uncertainty (or ignorance) of a model with respect to its inference, thereby allowing for the inference to be only as strong as the justification permits. We explore various forms of support (for e.g., k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) and ℓp-norm based) generated for an input, using the training data to construct a justification for the prediction with that input. Through experiments conducted on simulated and real datasets, we demonstrate that our approach can provide reliability for individual predictions and characterize regions where such reliability cannot be ascertained.
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Woldegiorgis, Tessema B. "Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology) and Application in Youth Livelihood Project: the case of Emmanuel Development Association, in Ethiopia." International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research 12, no. 7 (July 25, 2021): 641–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.14299/ijser.2021.07.09.
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Before we discuss the practices of knowledge in youth livelihood projects in EDA it would be relevant to define the philosophy of knowledge (epistemology) first. The philosophy of knowledge is Epistemology, and it is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Epistemologists study the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge, epistemic justification, the rationality of belief, and various related issues. Epistemology concerns itself with ways of knowing and how we know. The word is derived from the Greek words epistéme and logos – the former term meaning “knowledge” and that latter term meaning “study of” (Donald, 1967).
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Bakhurst, David. "Pragmatism and Moral Knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 24 (1998): 227–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10717501.
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In the last twenty years there has been a dramatic revival of interest in the idea that there can be genuine moral knowledge. The noncognitivist assumptions that dominated so much twentieth-century ethical theory no longer seem the obvious truths they once did to so many thinkers. It is now common to hear the claim that moral values are genuine constituents of the furniture of the world - or at least of its upholstery- and that moral deliberation and judgment legitimately aspire to truth. Morality, it is frequently argued, is a realm of discovery rather than invention, and moral reasoning, and the play of moral imagination, must be constrained by how the moral facts stand.Such “realist” or “cognitivist” views in ethics take many forms. This essay considers whether a pragmatist account of moral knowledge might fruitfully be developed. My project will recommend itself only to those who believe that pragmatist insights serve to support relatively robust conceptions of truth and justification.
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Laetz, Brian. "Epistemology neutralized." Disputatio 3, no. 28 (May 1, 2010): 259–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2010-0001.
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Abstract The thesis that knowledge is a partly evaluative concept is now a widespread view in epistemology, informing some prominent debates in the field. Typically, the view is embraced on the grounds that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge and a normative concept — a reasonable motivation. However, the view also has counterintuitive implications, which have been neglected. In particular, it implies that J.L. Mackie’s error-theory of value entails global epistemic scepticism and that any true knowledge claim suffices to prove the error-theory is false. In this paper, I elaborate these difficulties and address objections at length.
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Demin, Timofey S. "Gettier Problem." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 3 (2019): 58–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956349.
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Theories, that answering the question “What is knowledge?” in analytic epistemology appears under the influence of Gettier cases – a way of refutation such theories of knowledge, that have truth and belief as constituent elements. In the paper were analyzed basic strategies of solving the Gettier problem. One way is to save the analysis of knowledge by changing the elements in order to avoid the Gettier problem. There are three possible ways of doing so: adding new elements to the justification, changing the justification on the other criteria or strengthen the justification in such a way, that it would resolve any possible Gettier cases. For each strategy analysis of the theories of knowledge is given. In the paper idea of the inescapability of Gettier cases for analysis of knowledge was supported by the argumentation of Linda Zagzebski. In that ground, the analysis of knowledge was refuted. From that perspective, two of the most influenced ways of answering the question “what is knowledge” was proposed. First, the irreducible theory of knowledge, where knowledge is a mere state of the mind. Second, rejection existence of the universal invariant of the knowledge in every case. There are multiple senses of what the knowledge is and none of them is prior to other. The author lives as the open question the right way to think about the knowledge. In the closing part of the paper, the author presents a perspective critique of the knowledge problem as the project of overrated significance, and argues for a need to create new arguments that supporting that problem.
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Furqoni, Hafas. "SIGNIFIKANSI KAJIAN METODOLOGI DALAM PENGEMBANGAN BODY OF KNOWLEDGE EKONOMI ISLAM." Equilibrium: Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah 4, no. 1 (February 13, 2017): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/equilibrium.v4i1.1843.
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<p><em>Methodology in science philosophy study is usually discussed in the epistemological discussions which discuss nature, source, concept and theory of knowledge. Methodological discourse, therefore, follows the development of science phylosophy and epistemology discourse. However, there are differences in discussion focus and scope between epistemology and methodology. In epistemology, we study theory of knowledge, its nature and scope, while in methodology we study how to appraise a theory and evaluate it by scientific justification. As a new discipline, methodological discussion in Islamic economics is very important to develop the foundations of the discipline. A solid methodology would help to develop Islamic economics from its own sources of knowledge and use its own philosophical foundations. This paper aims to observe the relationship of Islamic epistemology and methodology of Islamic economics, the nature of Islamic economic methodology and its significance in developing Islamic economics.</em></p>
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Stelios, Spyridon, Panagiotis Tzavaras, and Mona Dermata. "Virtual Reality in education: Attempting an epistemic justification." European Journal of Teaching and Education 5, no. 1 (December 26, 2022): 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/ejte.v5i1.933.
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In discussing the limits of human knowledge, physical objects are, in principle, not identical to the apparent ones. This is because the latter depend also on the observer. Virtual reality (VR) models are environments that address the senses and therefore belong to the apparent space. Therefore, they seem to prevent an epistemic justification. Based on that, this paper discusses VR technology’s potential to provide knowledge of external reality to students. This is particularly important in light of the conditions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which have led to an increasingly significant role of VR related technologies in education. The research question of this study is whether VR models being used as educational tools, bring us closer – or not – to knowing the properties of physical objects. The main focus of this epistemic investigation is Russell’s theory of perception with an emphasis to the concept of space. Analysis indicates that VR is educationally useful especially when it comes to objects that are absent from our perceptual range. VR technology brings us closer to the theoretical properties of non-perceptual objects, those that cannot be perceived by the senses, like exoplanets. Furthermore, it brings us closer to the non-perceptual properties of directly perceived objects, properties referring, for example to subatomic structures. In a theoretical level, this macro and micro “terra incognita” may be linked to the sensibilia entities proposed by Russell (1914).
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Beller, Mara. "Experimental Accuracy, Operationalism, and Limits of Knowledge – 1925 to 1935." Science in Context 2, no. 1 (1988): 147–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269889700000521.
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The ArgumentThis paper analyzes the complex and many-layered interrelation between the realization of the inevitable limits of precision in the experimental domain, the emerging quantum theory, and empirically oriented philosophy in the years 1925–1935. In contrast to the usual historical presentation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as a purely theoretical achievement, this work discloses the experimental roots of Heisenberg's contribution. In addition, this paper argues that the positivistic philosophy of elimination of unobservables was not used as a guiding principle in the emergence of the new quantum theory, but rather mostly as a post facto justification. The case of P. W. Bridgman, analyzed in this paper, demonstrates how inconclusive operationalistic arguments are, when used as a possible heuristic aid for future discoveries. A large part of this paper is devoted to the evolution of Bridgman's views, and his skeptical reassessment of operationalism and of the very notion of scientific truth.
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Soin, Maciej. "Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory." Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym 21, no. 7 (April 2, 2018): 75–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1899-2226.21.7.05.
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Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory—which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics—are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
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Milosevic, Danica. "Justification of multiple ecofeminist perspectives: Diversity really matters." Beyond Philology An International Journal of Linguistics, Literary Studies and English Language Teaching, no. 16/2 (June 20, 2019): 77–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.26881/bp.2019.2.05.
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Ecofeminism has grown, developed and transformed itself as a theory and made progress to encompass many different philosophical stances today. Cultural, social and radical ecofeminism are just some of the forms that ecofeminism can currently take. All of these sources of knowledge have contributed immensely to ecofeminist thought in general, although they have often been confronted by and supportive of different epistemologies. For instance, cultural ecofeminists have been accused of being essentialist. On the other hand, social ecofeminists relying on constructionism, as opposed to essentialism, have fiercely attacked capitalism as well as other isms (like classism, racism, sexism) aiming at the pillars of power upon which patriarchal society is constructed. This paper will try to reconcile the said opposing ecofeminist theories and highlight their importance in the development of ecofeminist perspectives. It will give an overview of ecofeminist viewpoints and show how they can be complementary.
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Sartori, Carlos. "Epistemic Virtues and their Limits." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 19, no. 1 (June 16, 2016): 173–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v19i1.3330.
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The perspectivist virtue theory developed by Sosa requires two elements for a belief to be correct. First, the belief must be formed from a reliable ability or competence; second, the believer must have a higher order belief according to which he forms his beliefs from reliable abilities or competences. This conception faces Jason Boehr's accusation of negligence for not allowing character traits to have a place in the justification project. I will show Sosa's reply to this accusation and I propose to follow Audi and show that character traits, though interesting and desirable, play only an auxiliary role in the justification of beliefs and are inessential for knowledge.
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Kamaleeva, Alsu Raufovna, and Svetlana Yurevna Gruzkova. "Theoretical justification of pedagogical situations cognitive modeling." Samara Journal of Science 7, no. 2 (June 15, 2018): 245–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/snv201872306.
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The following paper deals with the application of methodology of pedagogical situations cognitive modeling, which is considered by the authors as a process consisting of six consecutive and interconnected stages. The first stage is a formulation of the purpose and the corresponding tasks. The second stage provides collecting, systematization and analysis of a pedagogical situation with the subsequent allocation of the major factors influencing development of the situation and determination of interrelation between them, i.e. creation of a cognitive map. At the third stage a focused count is created as a result of accounting of the cause and effect chains reflecting the system of interaction between the educational process subjects and allowing to form a pedagogical theory on the basis of basic person study categories: consciousness, thinking, knowledge, understanding, etc. The fourth stage assumes combination of the cognitive map and the focused count in a uniform cognitive model of the studied pedagogical situation. The fifth stage is focused on a real pedagogical situation cognitive model adequacy check i.e. on its verification. The last sixth stage allows to define possible options of a pedagogical situation development by a cognitive model, to find ways and mechanisms of a situation impact.
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Zuidervaart, Lambert. "HOW NOT TO BE AN ANTI-REALIST: HABERMAS, TRUTH, AND JUSTIFICATION." Philosophia Reformata 77, no. 1 (November 27, 2012): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000520.
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This article responds to a debate in analytic philosophy between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, as formulated by Alvin Plantinga. Whereas Plantinga recommends a return to Aquinas, I argue for a new understanding of propositional truth that grows out of Jürgen Habermas’s “pragmatic realist” conception. By critically appropriating Habermas’s insights, I aim to move beyond the realism/anti-realism dispute, replacing questions of independence with questions of interdependence. I claim that truth theory needs to begin with the interdependence of “mind” and “object” and with the corporeal multidimensionality of both human knowers and that about which they acquire knowledge.
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Parusniková, Zuzana. "Popperův flirt s dogmatismem." Teorie vědy / Theory of Science 41, no. 2 (February 24, 2020): 179–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.46938/tv.2019.465.
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At various occasions Popper states that in order for a theory to show its strength “certain amount” of dogmatism must precede the critical testing phase. He even argues that dogmatism is a necessary precondition of criticism. These are alarming statements, undermining Popper’s methodological imperative of falsification. Critical rationalism is based on a strict opposition to dogmatism for logical reasons (justification is impossible), for evolutionary reasons (justification blocks the growth of knowledge), and for ideological reasons (dogmatism encourages totalitarianism). Popper cannot provide any objective criterion defining the proper dosage of dogmatism and thus opens doors to its uncontrolled expansion. Criticism thus ceases to be the non-negotiable normative principle and the inviolable standard of rationality.
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Sol, Koemhong, and Kimkong Heng. "Understanding epistemology and its key approaches in research." Cambodian Journal of Educational Research 2, no. 2 (December 2022): 80–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.62037/cjer.2022.02.02.05.
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Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that concerns itself with the theory of knowledge. It is regarded as a core area of philosophy because it deals with the nature of our knowledge. Drawing on the literature on epistemology, this article provides some basic definitions of the term epistemology and answers some key epistemological questions such as: “what is knowledge?” “what are the sources of our knowledge?” “what do we know?” and “what differentiates knowledge from wisdom and opinion?” The article also discusses key epistemological approaches, namely positivism, interpretivism, and pragmatism, which are central to research. The article concludes that a high degree of epistemic justification is required for knowledge claims and for the conduct of research.
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Gogunskii, Viktor D., Kateryna V. Kolesnikova, and Dmytro V. Lukianov. "Entropy analysis of organizations' knowledge systems on the example of project management standards." Applied Aspects of Information Technology 5, no. 2 (July 4, 2022): 91–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.15276/aait.05.2022.7.
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The problems of managing complex project management systems are associated with numerous parameters that characterize their state. Most modern methods of forecasting project activity are based on the use of statistical modeling of individual processes and tools, for example, a work schedule, which requires both the justification of the adopted laws for the distribution of random work durations and the planning of a certain organizational and technological sequence of work. The collection and processing of data on all parameters is a complex and expensive procedure, and a complete justification of all project characteristics can lead to the information complexity of the system under consideration. However, it is impossible to refuse this due to the need to obtain relevant and reliable data for the adoption and implementation of management decisions. Thus, it is necessary to look for ways and means to reduce the number of controlled parameters, create algorithms that allow predicting the presence of undesirable processes in a controlled system, and develop recommendations for a more detailed analysis of individual project management subsystems. To overcome the informational complexity of predictive models, it is proposed to use a phenomenological approach that is associated with the definition of entropy, which allows using a minimum of information about the planned and updated course of the project. The concept of entropy is one of the key concepts of thermodynamics and information theory, and also finds its application in a number of other sciences, the subject of research and study of which are complex stochastic systems. The possibilities of using entropy and entropy modeling are currently being actively explored in the theory of project management. The paper considers an entropy approach to modeling project management systems, in which, on the basis of mathematical procedures arising from K. Shannon's information theory, information phenomenological models are created. The IPMA ICB 4.0 standard is considered as an example. The developed tool creates the prerequisites for the effective use of the entropy approach to assessing complex economic and social systems.
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Ehrenberg, Kenneth M. "Less Evidence, Better Knowledge." McGill Law Journal 60, no. 2 (March 23, 2015): 173–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1029207ar.
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In his 1827 work Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Jeremy Bentham famously argued against exclusionary rules such as hearsay, preferring a policy of “universal admissibility” unless the declarant is easily available. Bentham’s claim that all relevant evidence should be considered with appropriate instructions to fact finders has been particularly influential among judges, culminating in the “principled approach” to hearsay in Canada articulated in R. v. Khelawon. Furthermore, many scholars attack Bentham’s argument only for ignoring the realities of juror bias, admitting universal admissibility would be the best policy for an ideal jury. This article uses the theory of epistemic contextualism to justify the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence, and even reliable hearsay, on the basis of preventing shifts in the epistemic context. Epistemic contextualism holds that the justification standards of knowledge attributions change according to the contexts in which the attributions are made. Hearsay and other kinds of information the assessment of which rely upon fact finders’ more common epistemic capabilities push the epistemic context of the trial toward one of more relaxed epistemic standards. The exclusion of hearsay helps to maintain a relatively high standards context hitched to the standard of proof for the case and to prevent shifts that threaten to try defendants with inconsistent standards.
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Vilanova Arias, Javier. "Petitio Principii, Ad Ignorantiam y fundamentación del conocimiento." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 43, no. 127 (December 14, 2011): 27–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.851.
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In this paper I examine the problem of circularity in the justification of knowledge from the point of view of argumentation theory. I introduce the expression founding argument for the arguments we use to try to prove that we know, and explain the classical account of the two fallacies that may be committed: ad ignorantiam and petitio principii. A new definition of both fallacies, based on recent work in the theory of argumentation, is used to show that not every founding argument is fallacious.
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Pg Arshad, Pg Mohd Auzae Mohd, Rohaizat Baharun, and Norzaidahwati Zaidin. "Goal-setting Theory (Gst) and Gamification Relationship in Increasing Mobile Fitness Apps Engagement: A Conceptual Discussion." Journal of Business and Social Review in Emerging Economies 5, no. 1 (June 30, 2019): 155–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.26710/jbsee.v5i1.548.
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Purpose- The main purpose of this paper is to propose a research model conceptual through the extension study of goal-setting theory (GST) and gamification on mobile fitness app user engagement among Malaysian millennial group. This paper is discussed the justification of goal-setting theory (GST) and gamification in supporting engagement relationships.
Methodology- This paper proposed a quantitative method in determine the relationship between independent and dependent variables of engagement behavior. It also used a cross-sectional design because the data will be collected in a short period of time.
Findings- The finding of this paper is expected to support the justification of goal-setting theory (GST) and gamification in explaining the user engagement relationship. It also enriches the knowledge of goal-setting theory (GST) and gamification in body of literature.
Practical Implication- A further studies should be given to the goal-setting theory (GST) and gamification in order to enhance the user engagement on mobile fitness app especially for Malaysian Millennial Group.
Social Implication- By studying goal-setting theory (GST) and gamification in mobile fitness app engagement context, it will promote a healthy and fitness lifestyle among Malaysian millennial group that also can contribute to healthy lifestyles practice in social community.