Journal articles on the topic 'Kabarga (Russia)'

of the East Circassians ancestors of the Kabardinians to the territory of the former Western Alanya can be dated to the time after the invasion of Timur 1395-1396. The design of Kabarda as a principality can be dated to the first half of the 15th century. The division of Kabarda into Idarey, Kaitukoi, Tlachtostan, Dzhelyakhstan can be dated to the first half of the XVI century. Kabarda in this era becomes one of the leading forces in the North Caucasus. Kabardinians competed with the Great Nogai Horde for control of the Astrakhan Khanate. Temryuk Idarov in 1563 attracted Nogais and Russians in his confrontation with the Ingush. Kabardians of Idarey to confront the Crimean Tatars and Kumyks in the XVI century. They were allies of Russians. The Idaroviches use the Russians in the confrontation with the Kumyks and Crimean Tatars, and they themselves take part in the Livonian War and the Russian campaigns against various Caucasian rulers. Ties of Kabardians and with Nogais are made. Kabardinians of Kaitukoi are guided by the Crimean Khanate and the Small Nogai Horde. Circassian expansion to the east leads to the fact that the Karachais, Balkars, part of the Ossetians and Chechens are under the control of the Kabardinians. In the struggle for hegemony in the North Caucasus, the Kabardinians in the 16th –17th centuries face with the kumyks. None of the parties managed to win a convincing victory and they mutually exhausted each other. Kabardinians were the guides of Russian influence in the 17th century in the North Caucasus and their helped Russians in the Russian-Qizilbash conflict in 1651–1653. Kabardinians actively support the Russians against the Crimean Tatars in the 17th century. The significance of the Battle of Kanzhal is greatly exaggerated in Kabardinian historiography. We can talk about the participation of 20 thousands of Crimean Tatars in the battle and the death of a fourth of them in the battle. The defeat of 1708 only temporarily weakened the Crimean Tatars. Crimean Tatars make revenge hikes to Kabarda and devastate the region in the 10-ies and 20-ies of XVIII century. The Kabardinians victories under Baksan (1729) and Chеrеshty (1731) helped to stop the Crimean Tatar advance. Kabarda there were the Baksan and Kashkatau parties oriented to the Russians and Crimeans in the 18th century. They sought to win over external forces in order to secure subjectivity in foreign policy relations. The anti-Russian position of the Kabardinians set up the construction by Russians of the Mozdok fortress. Key words: Kabarda, Lesser Kabarda, Great Kabarda, Idarey, Kaitukoi, Crimean Khanate, Russian state, Great Nogai Horde, Lesser Nogai Horde, Ottoman Empire

The Küçük Kaynardzha Peace Treaty of 1774, which sanctioned joining of Kabardia and Ossetia to Russia and formal independence of the Kuban Nogais, once again confirmed that the solution of the question of the international legal status of the North Caucasus was the prerogative right of great powers and did not belong to the sphere of Russian-Caucasian relations. Since the 1770s, military lines in the form of fortification chains and some Cossack settlements were built in the region. Access to the Black Sea at the end of the 18th century and joining of the Crimea to Russia became important events in international life and politics. They raised the authority of Russia in Europe and at the same time heightened tensions with the Turkish Empire. The people’s liberation movement under Sheikh Mansur’s command caused a massive public outcry in the North Caucasus due to common goals of the local peoples in the liberation struggle. The Treaty of Jassy of 1791 only confirmed the terms of the peace treaty of 1774 without any new territorial changes in the region. During the period under consideration, the Russian authorities hardly took any actions in regards to the local peoples. The actions of the Russian administration in the region did not go beyond external control and encouragement of trade and economic ties between the local population and immigrants from the central provinces of Russia. The control was carried out by the military authorities actively introduced into the geographical area of the region (construction of fortresses, creation of new garrisons and places of deployment of Russian troops). The creation of the civil administration of the region (vicarious authority, government, police force) was also started.

The present paper is dedicated to the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria – one of the subject of Russian Federation, in which two ethnic groups have a status of “titular nation”. The point of entry to the further considerations is an analysis of the phenomenon of “bi-titularism” in the context of the specifics of the political system of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and Russian Federation. The further part of the study is dedicated to two ethnic groups, which are completely different in both cultural and linguistic aspect – Kabardians (who belong to Abkhaz-Adyghe superethnos) and Turkic Balkars. The influence of bi-titular model on the character of the political regime, inter-ethnic relations and stability of the regional situation.

In this article, which was compiled with financial support from a Russian Federation presidential grant for supporting young scientists (grant MK-2488.2019.6), examines the regional specifics of developing civil society values in one of Russia’s subjects – the Kabardha-Balkar Republic. The issues and specifics of developing a civil society is one of the most relevant topics for social sciences in modern-day Russia. There are still arguments to this day between those who support European integration and joining the Western world and advocates of Russia being its own civilization. Our country’s socio-cultural characteristics imply significant regional diversity in the development of a civil society. Expert reports prepared by various research centers note that civil society values tend to be more prominent in the country’s more economically developed regions. Citizens create and actively partake in the activities of public organizations, they propagate charity work, and actively protect their own rights. Meanwhile in the less advanced regions, civil society is not as well developed. In this article, the author examines the issues in question based on the example of one of Russia’s regions which possesses its own substantial cultural specificity. The methodological underpinnings for the study are based on a systemic and interdisciplinary approach. The study was conducted by means of questionnaire survey method. The sample size amounted to 550 people. In terms of geography, all municipalities of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic were covered, including remote and hard to reach highland areas (Chereksky, Zolsky, Elbrussky districts). During the study, it was revealed that residents of Kabardino-Balkaria would more often resort to assistance from their relatives or to corrupt dealings in order to solve their problems. At the same time help from public organizations, law enforcement and the judicial system are sought after by a much smaller proportion of citizens, which might speak to the population bearing a relatively low level of legal awareness. Despite the fact that the republic’s youth came of age in post-Soviet Russia, which was being modeled after democratic nations, this socio-demographical population group demonstrates a higher level of social apathy and disapproval for civil society values than the region’s population does on average.

Straipsnyje atliktas vieno iš naujausių religinių judėjimų Rusijoje, pavadinimu „Senosios Rusijos pravoslavų sentikių-inglingų bažnyčia“ (Древнерусская церковь православных староверов-инглингов), tyrimas. Tai neopagoniškasis judėjimas, kurio įkūrėjas Aleksandras Jurjevičius Chinevičius, naudodamas įvairias lingvistines manipuliacijas, savo paties nežinia iš kur paimtas ir vis plačiau tiek popieriniu, tiek elektroniniu pavidalu platinamas „Slavų Vedas“, bando pagrįsti savo pretenzingą doktriną apie slavų (turimi omenyje rusai)-arijų kilmę iš protėvių-dievų (Peruno) prieš daugelį šimtų tūkstančių, jei ne milijonų metų, kitose planetose, iš kurių atkeliavę į Žemę čia užėmė šiaurės pusrutulį. Slavų-arijų kultūra pagal jo (ir kitų šio rato neopagonių autoritetų, visų pirma Trechlebovo) doktriną, buvo visų didžiųjų civilizacijų pradininkė, bet krikščionybės diegimo laikais Europos tautos iš jų pavogė jų istoriją ir pasisavino jų nuopelnus, bandė sunaikinti jų kultūrinę atmintį, primesdami jiems žeminantį įvaizdį, esą iki X amžiaus jų tiesiog nebuvo, o jeigu kas ir buvo, tai tamsi neišmani liaudis... Tyrime buvo atlikta Chinevičiaus „lingvistinio metodo“ analizė, kurios metu paaiškėjo, kad jis naudojasi kai kuriais judėjų Kabalos interpretaciniais metodais, kurie visiškai natūraliai tinka semitų kalboms dėl jų specifikos, bet netinka indoeuropiečių kalboms. Dėl to Chinevičius priverstas iškraipyti ir perdaryti rusų kalbą pagal semitų kalbų struktūrą, nepamiršdamas aiškinti, kad šie metodai – taip pat senoviniai rusų metodai, kuriuos kažkas iš jų pasisavino. Kaip pirmavaizdis tiriant šiuos kabalistinius metodus buvo pateikti keli pavyzdžiai su komentarais iš Zoharo.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: inglingai, Kabala, lingvistika, neopagonys, rasizmas.Linguistical Transformations of IdentityAušra Kristina PažėraitėSummary In this paper I presented an analysis of a recent religious movement in Russia, called “The Old Russian Pravoslavian Old Believers – inglingian Church“ (Древнерусская церковь православных староверов-инглингов). This neo-pagan movement, whose founder, Alexander Yuryevich Hinevich, using a variety of linguistic manipulation and “Slavonic Vedas” of unknown origins, increasingly spreading up in paper and electronic format, – is trying ambitiously justify his doctrine of the genetic origins of ancestors of Slavic (having in mind Russian) – Aryan peoples going down to gods (namely Perun) for many hundreds of thousands, if not millions, years ago, who descended here, on the planet Earth from other planets, and occupied the northern hemisphere. Slavic-Aryan culture, in accordance with his doctrine (and of the rest of close to his church neo-pagan authorities, in particularly that of Trehlebov’), has been a real originator of all great civilizations in the World, but during the time of introduction of Christianity in Russia other nations “have robbed their history and their cultural advancements” trying to destroy their national memory by imposing them degraded self-images... In this study is presented analysis of “linguistic approach” of Hinevich, which revealed, that he uses a series of interpretative methods of Jewish Kabbalah, which fit naturally to semitic languages, but not so well to Indo-European ones. What results in distortion made by Hinevich of Russian language rules to fit those interpretative methods, not neglecting to explain that these techniques are also old Russian techniques, which were from them took off. As a possible prototype of these Kabbalistic methods was presented some examples from the Zohar with commentaries.Keywords: ingliizm, Kabbalah, hermeneutics, racism, neopagans.

Discussed is the problem of complex (historical-demographical, ecological-geographical and economical) administrative-territorial division (ATD) of one of national republics of the North Caucasus, i.e. Kabardino-Balkaria Republic (KBR), based on a comprehensive approach. Data on population censuses of different years, scientific works on discussed topic and the authors own materials on geo-ecology and demography of KBR were used. The archaic character of ATD of the region according to ethnopolitical principle is shown, and it is argued, that such a division of the republic’s territory is a legacy of Russia's colonial policy in the North Caucasus in the 19th century, and the command and administrative system of the Soviet period in the 20th century. Based on historical information, sources of dismemberment of the predecessor of the KBR, i.e. Kabarda (the name up to 1922) on ethno-political principle as one of the tools for solving the militarystrategic task of weakening and “appeasing” are highlighted. Rejection and occupation by Russian colonists of the plain part of Kabarda and redistribution by colonial administration of remaining territory between two indigenous ethnic groups (Kabardins and Balkars) with infringement of one side and encouragement of other created a “three-story” contradictory structure: one on the plain, others on the foothills, others on the foothills in the mountains. Such a division was finally established as a result of administrative-territorial reform of the 1920s and continues to form the formal basis of ATD of KBR. This fact, as well as consolidation of artificial division of Kabarda in the double name of the republic (Kabardino-Balkaria) periodically becomes occasion for demonstration of ostentatious separatist sentiments. Results of this study indicate, that by the end of the 20th century, due to redistribution of population and integration processes, the ethnic map of KBR came into conflict with the ATD on ethno-political basis. With this in mind, a new version of ATD of KBR, based on basin principle is proposed and justified, removing interethnic contradictions, generated by previous division and guaranteeing sustainable development of the republic. Relevance of the study is in the imperfection of ATD of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, as the cause of interethnic contradictions has not yet become the subject of a special study. Thus, adoption of the basin principle as the basis of the ATD with establishment of 5th districts instead of the current 10th would remove problems, created by ethno-political division and contribute to sustainable development and preservation of unique nature of one of mountain resorts of the country.

The article considers the evolution and suggests the periodization of the activities of local judicial and administrative control institutions in the North Caucasus in the last third of the 18th — first half of the 19th centuries on the example of bailiffs’ offices. Four stages are highlighted: 1) the establishment of the first private bailiff in Kabarda (1769) and the formation of the Main Caucasian bailiff’s office (1800); 2) its separation from the Main Kalmyk bailiff’s office structure (1801); 3) adoption of an Institution for the administration of the Caucasus region (1827); 4) reorganization of the Chechen bailiff (1852) and replacement of bailiffs by institutions of military popular administration (1858). The functions of the main and local bailiffs’ offices within the framework of the proposed periodization are considered. The features of administrative subordination of local and main bailiff offices and their staff structure are studied. Attention is drawn to the difficulties of organizing the activities of bailiffs’ offices related to their subordination, on the one hand, to the Board (Ministry) of Foreign Affairs, on the other — to the provincial or linear authorities. It is concluded that the proposed periodization allows to present the dynamics of the activity of the bailiffs in the North Caucasus in the last third of the 18th — first half of the 19th centuries as a complex phenomenon aimed at finding optimal forms of governance of the peoples included in the political and legal space of the Russian Empire.

Background. The Kabardino-Balkarian Republic is one of the floristically unique territories in the Russian Federation. Its vegetation, especially in the mountainous and foothill areas, is very rich due to, inter alia, the extremely complex and diverse relief. Over 50% of the entire Caucasian flora is present in the republic, representing all main groups of plant formations, except subtropical and tropical ones. It seems relevant to search for and collect crop wild relatives as well as landraces of vegetables and cucurbits cultivated for a long time in the surveyed territory and adapted to local environmental conditions in order to add new genetic resources of these crops to the VIR collection.Methods. The expedition route included explorations of the foothill and highland areas of Kabardino-Balkaria, and familiarization with the seed assortment available at the markets and agricultural stores in Nalchik and Prokhladny. The target areas were surveyed from August 18 through 26, 2019, by one- or two-day trips starting from Nalchik. The length of the itinerary was about 600 km.Results. The collecting mission examined local farms and homesteads, explored the mountains, and collected 256 local and commercial cultivars of vegetable and cucurbit crops, 69 seed and vegetative samples of vegetable crop wild relatives, plus a number of fodder plant samples. Russian and foreign breeding companies whose cultivars are popular in Kabar dino-Balkaria were identified.

This paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of ethnic and political history of the Nakhs in the Ancient Times, Middle Ages and Early Modern Times. Several Nakh tribes were known mainly to Georgians and Armenians. Nakhs were the main population of Georgia until the 4th century BC. The formation of the Iberian kingdom (Kartli) was closely connected with the interaction of the Kartvelian peoples with the nakhs of the South Caucasus, which appeared in Georgian sources under the name Durdzuks. The Nakhs were confronted with Scythians, Sarmatians, Alans n the North Caucasus. Therefore, Nakhs were better known in the South Caucasus. The most notable of the Durdzuk cluster was the tribe of the Tsanars. During the VIII-IX centuries Tsanars actively resisted the Arabs. The Tsanar chorebishop was one of the titles of the king of Kakheti and they actively participated in the Kakheti wars with the Abkhaz, Kartli, and Tao-Klardzhet kings. The final Kartvelization of the tsanars dates back to the XI century. Tushins, Pshavs, Khevsurs were kartvelized in the end of the XII century. Only the Batsbians retained the Nakh identity. Ethnonym Dzurzuk from the XIII century ceased to denote the Nakh population of the South Caucasus, which began to be designated by Kistins and Batsbians. Durdzuks from the XIII century these are the nakhs of the North Caucasus. The North Caucasian nakhs were ruled by the Alan kings in the XI-XIII centuries. Mongol invasion in XIII century weakened the power of the Alans over the North Caucasus. The territory of Chechnya united the Nakh state of Simsim in the middle of the XIV century, which at the end of the XIV century attacked by the Chagatays of Timur. Establish Georgian power over the highlanders in the middle of the fourteenth century. And in the 30s. XVII century Georgian kings Giorgi V and Teymuraz tried. Their real power was only over Georgian highlanders (Pshavs, Khevsurs, Tushins) and Batsbians. Kabardinians made a big campaign against the Nakhs in the middle of the XVI century. Temruk Idarov during the campaign of 1563 used the help of Nogays and Russians. Kabardinians entered the Sunzha region and drove the Ingush into the mountains. In the mountains was the possession of the Ingush Lars. The first of the Chechens to contact the Russians were the rulers of Aukh (Okoks of Russian sources). Some part of the Okoks in the XVII century evicted from Aukh on a plane to the area of Terek and Sunzha. The population of the Chechen possession obeyed the princes Turlovs from Gumbet. The people of Nokhch-Mokkh often opposed the Russians in the XVII century. There are some reasons to believe that they depended on the Kumyk rulers of the Andirean beilik. Avars and Kumyks also contributed to the penetration of Islam to the Chechens. Shibutians (Shatoys) and Chantiyans actively contacted Russians. Russian influence until the middle of the XVIII century it was rather nominal and was manifested in the presence of Cossacks and Streltsy on the Terek and Sunzha and in the exchange of embassies with Georgia. Not a single regional state such as the Safavid state or the Crimean Khanate has succeeded in establishing its power in the Central Caucasus. Chechens used vassality from the Russians as a counterweight to the influence of the Crimean Khanate and the Afshar state in the first half of the XVIII century, but this did not interfere with their situational alliances with the Kumyks and Crimean Tatars against the Russians. Chechens actively supported Islamic fanatics. Strengthening Russian power in the North Caucasus in the second half of the XVIII century led to the fact that the Ingush took Russian citizenship. There have been social changes in Chechnya. Societies drove out their princes. In this situation, the Chechens and other peoples of the Caucasus made an attempt to unite Sheikh Mansur. An attempt to unite Chechnya was also undertaken in the XIX century by Beibulat Taimiev. Key words: Vainakhs, Durdzuki, Chechens, Ingushes, Chechen domain, Georgia, Minor Kabarda, free societies

This article is devoted to the relationship of the Circassians with the Turkic peoples. The Caucasian-speaking ancestors of the Adyge, Circassians and Kabardians were known to contemporaries under several ethnonyms. Papags and Kasogians were mixed Turkic-Caucasian tribes and served in the Khazar Kaganate. Zikhians occupied the Northern-East Black Sea littotal lands and were ruled by Georgian (Abkhazian) kings and Zikhian archbishops of the Matarcha. The Pechenegs were allies of the Zikhians, and the Oguzes were their opponents. It can be argued about a certain period of dominance of the Zikhians on the Taman Peninsula in the 13th century, but in the 12th century the local Zikhians were supposed to recognize the power of the Byzantine Empire. The relations of the Zikhians with the Qipchaqs were friendly. The infiltration of Turkic elements into the ethnogenesis of the North-West Caucasus tribes contributed to the emergence of the Circassian ethnos. In the Golden Horde the Circassians actively maintained contacts with both the Genoese and the Tatars. Circassians living on the plane were integrated into the administrative system of Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde). Circassians also fought against the Tatars of the Golden Horde and the Great Horde. The first Circassian principalities sources are recorded in the XV century. These were Khetuk, Kremuk, Kopa, Tatarkosia, Kabarda. The first three principalities worked closely with the Genoese and became victims of Turkish aggression in the 70-80-ies of XV century In the XVI century the principalities of Zhaney, Temirgoy, Besleeney, Khatukai took shape. Natukhai, Abadzekhs, Shapsugs were circled Abazins and became part of the Circassian ethnosphere only in the 18th century. Zhaney, Temirgoy, Besleney, Khatukai in the XVI century suffered from the invasions of the Crimean Tatars, therefore, in the middle of the XVI century hoped for an alliance with the Russians and sent embassies to Moscow. The war against the Crimean Tatars was fought mainly by the forces of Kabardians and the Ukrainian condottier D.Vyshnevetsky. With the departure of the D.Vyshnevetsky to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ivan IV virtually ceased to support the Western Circassians, which led to their reversal towards the Crimean Khanate. They took part in the Ottoman-Safavid war of 1578-1590 on the side of the Turks. In the XVII century the Besleney and Temirgoy rebelled against the Crimean Tatars, hoping for an alliance with the Russians, but to no avail. Success in the fight against the Crimean Tatars became possible thanks to several victories of the Kabardians over the troops of Gherays in the XVIII century. Temirgoy, Abadzekhs, Bjedugs, Shapsugs, Besleney, Makhosh, Ubykhs rebelled against Crimean Tatars in this century. With the annexation by the Russians of the Crimean Khanate, the Western Circassians underestimated the anti-Russian position. Key words: Zikhians, Kasogians, Papags, Circassians, Khazar Khaganate, Golden Horde, Crimean Khanate, Ottoman Empire, Russians, Crimean Tatars

A politician’s political and personal selves have been in the spotlight of academic scholarship for hundreds of years, but only in recent years has a political ‘persona’ obtained new modes of mediation via networked media. New advancements in politics, technology, and media brought challenges to the traditional politics and personal self-representation of major leaders. Vladimir Putin’s divorce announcement in June 2013, posed a new challenge for his political self-mediation. A rather reserved leader (Loshak), he nonetheless broadcast his personal news to the large audience and made it in a very peculiar way, causing the media professionals and public to draw parallels with Soviet-era mediated politics and thereby evoke collective memories. This paper studies how Vladimir Putin’s divorce announcement was constructed and presented and also what response and opinion threads—satirical and humorous, ignorant and informed feedback—it achieved via media professionals and the general Twitter audience. Finally, this study aims to evaluate how Vladimir Putin’s political ‘persona’ was represented and perceived via these mixed channels of communication.According to classic studies of mediated political persona (Braudy; Meyrowitz; Corner), any public activity of a political persona is considered a part of their political performance. The history of political marketing can be traced back to ancient times, but it developed through the works of Renaissance and Medieval thinkers. Of particular prominence is Machiavelli’s The Prince with its famous “It is unnecessary for the prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them” (cited in Corner 68). All those centuries-built developments and patterns of political self-representation have now taken on new forms as a result of the development of media industry and technology. Russian mediated politics has seen various examples of new ways of self-representation exercised by major politicians in the 2010s. For instance, former president Dmitry Medvedev was known as the “president with an iPad” (Pronina), as he was advocating technology and using social networks in order to seem more approachable and appear to be responsive to collecting feedback from the nation. Traditional media constantly highlighted Medvedev’s keen interest in Facebook and Twitter, which resulted in a growing public assumption that this new modern approach to self-representation may signify a new approach to governance (see Asmolov).Goffman’s classic study of the distinction between public and private life helps in linking political persona to celebrity persona. In his view the political presentation of self differs from the one in popular culture because politicians as opposed to entertainers have to conform to a set of ideals, projections, social stereotypes and cultural/national archetypes for their audience of voters (Goffman; Corner). A politician’s public persona has to be constantly reaffirming and proving the values he or she is promoting through their campaigns. Mediations of a political personhood can be projected in three main modes: visual, vocal, and kinetic (Ong; Mayhew; Corner). Visual representation follows the iconic paintings and photography in displaying the position, attitude, and associative contexts related to that. Vocal representation covers both content and format of a political speech, it is not only the articulated message, but also more important the persona speaking. Ong describes this close relation of the political and personal along with the interrelation of the message and the medium as “secondary orality”—voice, tone and volume make the difference. The third mode is kinetic representation and means the political persona in action and interaction. Overlapping of different strategies and structures of political self-representation fortifies the notion of performativity (Corner and Pels) in politics that becomes a core feature of the multidimensional representation of a mediated political self.The advancement of electronic media and interactive platforms has influenced political communication and set the new standard for the convergence of the political and personal life of a politician. On its own, the President Clinton/Monica Lewinsky affair raised the level of public awareness of the politician’s private life. It also allowed for widely distributed, contested, and mediated judgments of a politician’s personal actions. Lawrence and Bennett in their study of Lewinsky case’s academic and public response state that although the majority of American citizens did not expect the president to be the moral leader, they expressed ambivalence in their rendition of the importance of “moral leadership” by big politicians (438). The President Clinton/Lewinsky case adds a new dimension to Goffman and Corner’s respective discussions on the significance of values in the political persona self-representation. This case proves that values can not only be reinforced by one’s public persona, but those values can be (re)constructed by the press or public opinion. Values are becoming a contested trait in the contemporary mediated political persona. This view can be supported by Dmitry Medvedev’s case: although modern technology was known as his personal passion, it was publicised only with reference to his role as a public politician and specifically when Medvedev appeared with an iPad talking about modernisation at major meetings (Pronina). However, one can argue that one’s charisma can affect the impact of values in public self-representation of the politician. In addition, social networks add a new dimension to personified publicity. From Barack Obama’s ‘Yes We Can’ networked campaign in 2008 and through many more recent examples, we are witnessing the continuing process of the personalisation of politics (Corner and Pels). From one point of view, audiences tend to have more interest and sympathy in political individuals and their lifestyles rather than political parties and their programmes (Lawrence and Bennett; Corner and Pels). It should be noted that the interest towards political individuals does not fall apart from the historical logics of politics; it is only mediated in a new way. Max Weber’s notion of “leadership democracy” proves that political strategy is best distributed through the charismatic leadership imposing his will on the audience. This view can be strengthened by Le Bon’s concept of emotive connection of the leader and his crowd, and Adorno’s writings on the authoritarian personality also highlight the significance of the leader’s own natural and mediated persona in politics. What is new is the channels of mediation—modern audiences’ access to a politician’s private life is facilitated by new forms of media interactivity (Corner and Pels). This recent development calls for the new understanding of “persona” in politics. On one hand, the borderline between private and public becomes blurred and we are more exposed to the private self of a leader, but on the other hand, those politicians aware of new media literacy can create new structures of proximity and distance and construct a separate “persona” online, using digital media for their benefit (Corner and Pels). Russian official politics has developed a cautious attitude towards social networks in the post-Medvedev era - currently, President Vladimir Putin is not known for using social networks personally and transmits his views via his spokesperson. However, his personal charisma makes him overly present in digital media - through the images and texts shared both by his supporters and rivals. As opposed to Medvedev’s widely publicised “modernisation president” representation, Putin’s persona breaks the boundaries of limited traditional publicity and makes him recognised not only for his political activity, but looks, controversial expression, attitude to employees, and even personal life. That brings us back to Goffman, Corner and Lawrence and Bennett’s discussions on the interrelation of political values and personal traits in one’s political self-representation, making it evident that one’s strong personality can dominate over his political image and programme. Moreover, an assumption can be made that a politician’s persona may be more powerful than the narrative suggested by the constructed self-representation and new connotations may arise on the crossroads of this interaction.Russian President Divorce Announcement and Collective MemoryVladimir Putin’s divorce announcement was broadcast via traditional media on 6 June 2013 as a simple news story. The state broadcasting company Vesti-24 sent a journalist Polina Yermolayeva from their news bulletin to cover Vladimir Putin and Lyudmila Putin’s visit to a ballet production, Esmeralda, at the state Kremlin theatre. The news anchor’s introduction to the interview was ordinarily written and had no hints of the upcoming sensation. After the first couple and the journalist had discussed their opinion of the ballet (“beautiful music,” “flawless and light moves”), the reporter Yermolayeva suddenly asked: “You and Lyudmila are rarely seen together in public. Rumour has it that you do not live together. It is true?” Vladimir Putin and his wife exchanged a number of rather pre-scripted speeches stating that the first couple was getting a divorce as the children had grown old enough, and they would still stay friends and wished each other the best of luck. The whole interview lasted 3:25 minutes and became a big surprise for the country (Loshak; Sobchak).When applying the classification of three modes of political personhood (Corner; Ong) to Vladimir Putin’s divorce announcement, it becomes evident that all three modes—visual, vocal, and kinetic—were used. Television audiences watched their president speak freely to the unknown reporter, explain details of his life in his own words so that body language also was visible and conveyed additional information. The visual self-representation harkens back to classic, Soviet-style announcements: Vladimir Putin and Lyudmila Putina are dressed in classic monochrome suit and costume with a skirt respectively. They pose in front of the rather dull yet somewhat golden decorations of the Kremlin Theatre Hall, the walls themselves reflecting the glory and fanfare of the Soviet leadership and architecture. Vladimir Putin and his wife both talk calmly while Lyudmila appears even more relaxed than her husband (Sobchak). Although the speech looks prepared in advance (Loshak), it uses colloquial expressions and is delivered with emotional pauses and voice changes.However, close examination of not only the message but the medium of the divorce announcement reveals a vast number of intriguing symbols and parallels. First, although living in the era of digital media, Vladimir Putin chose to broadcast his personal news through a traditional television channel. Second, it was broadcast in a news programme making the breaking news of the president’s divorce, paradoxically, quite a mundane news event. Third, the semiotic construction of the divorce announcement bore a lot of connotations and synergies to the conservative, Soviet-style information distribution patterns. There are a few key symbols here that evoke collective memories: ballet, conservative political report on the government, and the stereotype of a patriarchal couple with a submissive wife (see Loshak; Rostovskiy). For example, since the perestroika of the 1990s, ballet has been widely perceived as a symbol of big political change and cause of public anxiety (Kachkaeva): this connotation was born in the 1990s when all channels were broadcasting Swan Lake round the clock while the White House was under attack. Holden reminds us that this practice was applied many times during major crises in Soviet history, thus creating a short link in the public subconscious of a ballet broadcast being symbolic of a political crisis or turmoil.Vladimir Putin Divorce: Traditional and Social Media ReceptionIn the first day after the divorce announcement Russian Twitter generated 180,000 tweets about Vladimir Putin’s divorce, and the hashtag #развод (“divorce”) became very popular. For the analysis that follows, Putin divorce tweets were collected by two methods: retrieved from traditional media coverage of Twitter talk on Putin’s divorce and from Twitter directly, using Topsy engine. Tweets were collected for one week, from the divorce announcement on 6 June to 13 June when the discussion declined and became repetitive. Data was collected using Snob.ru, Kommersant.ru, Forbes.ru, other media outlets and Topsy. The results were then combined and evaluated.Some of those tweets provided a satirical commentary to the divorce news and can be classified as “memes.” An “Internet meme” is a contagious message, a symbolic pattern of information spread online (Lankshear and Knobel; Shifman). Memes are viral texts that are shared online after being adjusted/altered or developed on the way. Starting from 1976 when Richard Dawkins coined the term, memes have been under media scholarship scrutiny and the term has been widely contested in various sciences. In Internet research studies, memes are defined as “condensed images that stimulate visual, verbal, musical, or behavioral associations that people can easily imitate and transmit to others” (Pickerel, Jorgensen, and Bennett). The open character of memes makes them valuable tools for political discourse in a modern highly mediated environment.Qualitative analysis of the most popular and widely shared tweets reveals several strong threads and themes round Putin’s divorce discussion. According to Burzhskaya, many users created memes with jokes about the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. For instance, “He should have tied up his relationship with Dmitry Anatolyevich long ago” or “So actually Medvedev is the case?” were among popular memes generated. Another collection of memework contained a comment that, according to the Russian legislation, Putin’s ex-wife should get half of their wealth, in this case—half of the country. This thread was followed by the discussion whether the separation/border of her share of Russia should use the Ural Mountains as the borderline. Another group of Twitter users applied the Russian president’s divorce announcement to other countries’ politics. Thus one user wrote “Take Yanukovich to the ballet” implying that Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich (who was still a legitimate president in June 2013) should also be taken to the ballet to trigger changes in the political life in Ukraine. Twitter celebrity and well-known Russian actress and comedian Tatiana Lazareva wrote “In my opinion, it is a scam”, punning on the slang meaning of the word “razvod” (“divorce”) in Russian that can also mean “fraud” or “con”. Famous Russian journalist Dmitry Olshansky used his Twitter account to draw a historical parallel between Putin and other Russian and Soviet political leaders’ marital life. He noted that such Russian leaders as Tsar Nikolay the Second and Mikhail Gorbachev who loved their wives and were known to be good husbands were not successful managers of the state. In contrast, lone rulers of Russia such as Joseph Stalin proved to be leaders who loved their country first and gained a lot of support from their electorate because of that lonely love. Popular print and online journalist Oleg Kashin picked up on that specific idea: he quoted Vladimir Putin’s press secretary who explained that the president had declared that he would now spend more time working for the prosperity of the country.Twitter users were exchanging not only 140 symbol texts but also satirical images and other visual memes based on the divorce announcement. Those who suggested that Vladimir Putin should have divorced the country instead portrayed Lyudmila Putina and Vladimir holding candles and wearing funereal black with various taglines discussing how the country would now be split. Other users contributed visual memes jamming the television show Bachelor imagery and font with Vladimir Putin’s face and an announcement that the most desirable bachelor in the country is now its president. A similar idea was put into jammed images of the Let’s Get Married television show using Vladimir Putin’s face or name linked with a humorous comment that he could try those shows to find a new wife. One more thread of Twitter memes on Putin’s divorce used the name of Alina Kabaeva, Olympic gymnast who is rumoured by the press to be in relationship with the leader (Daily Mail Reporter). She was mentioned in plenty of visual and textual memes. Probably, the most popular visual meme (Burzhskaya; Topsy) used the one-liner from a famous Soviet comedy Ivan Vasylievich Menyaet Professiyu: it uses a joyful exclamation of an actress who learns that her love interest, a movie director, is leaving his wife so that the lovers can now fly to a resort together. Alina Kabaeva, the purported love interest of Putin, was jammed to be that actress as she announced the “triumphal” resort vacation plan to a girlfriend over the phone.Vladimir Putin’s 2013 divorce announcement presented new challenges for his personal and political self-representation and revealed new traits of the Russian president’s interaction with the nation. As the news of Vladimir and Lyudmila Putin’s divorce was broadcast via traditional media in a non-interactive television format, commentary on the event advanced only through the following week’s media coverage and the massive activity on social networks. It has still to be examined whether Vladimir Putin’s political advisors intentionally included many symbols of collective memory in the original and staid broadcast announcement. However, the response from traditional and social media shows that both Russian journalists and regular Twitter users were inclined to use humour and satire when discussing the personal life of a major political leader. Despite this appearance of an active counter-political sphere via social networks, the majority of tweets retrieved also revealed a certain level of respect towards Vladimir Putin’s privacy as few popular jokes or memes were aggressive, offensive or humiliating. Most popular memes on Vladimir Putin’s divorce linked this announcement to the political life of Russia, the political situation in other countries, and television shows and popular culture. Some of the memes, though, advanced the idea that Vladimir Putin should have divorced the country instead. The analysis also shows how a charismatic leader can affect or reconstruct the “values” he represents. In Vladimir Putin’s divorce event, his personality is the main focus of discussion both by traditional and new media. However, he is not judged for his personal choices as the online social media users provide rather mild commentary and jokes about them. The event and the subsequent online discourse, images and texts not only identify how Putin’s politics have become personified, the research also uncovers how the audience/citizenry online often see the country as a “persona” as well. Some Internet users suggested Putin’s marriage to the country; this mystified, if not mythologised view reinforces Vladimir Putin’s personal and political charisma.Conclusively, Vladimir Putin’s divorce case study shows how political and private persona are being mediated and merged via mixed channels of communication. 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В статье на основе архивных источников и опубликованных материалов представлено историко-генеалогическое исследование двух фамилий: дигорских баделят Тугановых из Дигорского общества и тагаурских алдар Тугановых из Тагаурского общества Северной Осетии. Рассмотрены генеалогические предания обеих фамилий, сохранившиеся в устном народном творчестве осетин. Показано различие происхождения каждого из привилегированных родов, не связанных между собой общими корнями. Указаны населенные пункты, в которых проживали Тугановы в обоих осетинских обществах. Определен ряд родственных фамилий, происходящих с ними от одного корня. Согласно прошениям представителей обеих фамилий, поданным ими в Комитет для разбора личных и поземельных прав горцев Военно-Осетинского округа в 1859 г., предком Тугановых из Дигорского общества является Бадели, а предком Тугановых из Тагаурского общества — Тага. Фамилия Тугановых встречается, помимо Осетии, у кабардинцев, ингушей, ногайцев, русских, татар и других народов. И если до революции Тугановы в Осетии принадлежали к привилегированному сословию, то у соседних народов Кавказа и России представители этой фамилии зачастую могли относиться также и к зависимым сословиям. Приведены примеры имеющихся однофамильцев Тугановых из числа знати соседних кавказских народов и в среде зависимых сословий Осетии и Кабарды. Также представлена биографическая информация и фотографии наиболее известных представителей фамилий Тугановых Дигорского и Тагаурского обществ Северной Осетии. Материалы исследования могут служить дополнительным источником к изучению истории Осетии. Они позволяют более глубоко и основательно исследовать генеалогию осетинских фамилий. The article presents a historical-genealogical study of two family names: the Tuganovs from the Digor Society of North Ossetia and the Tagaur Aldar Tuganovs from the Tagaur Society of North Ossetia, based on archival sources and published materials. The genealogical legends of both families, preserved in the oral folk art of the Ossetians, were also investigated. The difference in the origin of each of the two genera, which are not privileged by common common roots, is shown. The settlements in which the Tuganovs lived in both Ossetian societies are indicated. According to the petitions of the representatives of both families submitted to the Committee for analyzing the personal and land rights of the mountaineers of the Military Ossetian District in 1859, the ancestor of the Tuganovs from the Digor Society is Badeli, and the ancestor of the Tuganovs from the Tagaurian society is Taga. The name of the Tuganovs is found in addition to Ossetia, among the Kabardins, Ingushes, Nogais, Russians, Tatars and other peoples. And if before the revolution the Tuganovs in Ossetia belonged to the privileged class, then among the neighboring peoples of the Caucasus and Russia, representatives of this family often could also refer to dependent estates. A number of related surnames, originating with them from the same root, are determined. Biographical information and photographs of the most famous representatives of the names of the Tuganovs of Digorian and Tagaurian societies of North Ossetia are also presented. Examples are given of the namesake of the Tuganovs among the nobility of the neighboring Caucasian peoples and among the dependent estates of Ossetia and Kabarda. The materials of the study significantly supplement the history of Ossetia, contribute to a deeper and renewed study of the genealogy of Ossetian surnames.