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1
Kohl, Markus. "Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought." Journal of the History of Philosophy 53, no. 2 (2015): 301–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2015.0034.
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Assiter, Alison. "Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (April 3, 2013): 275–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246113000155.
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Kant and Kierkegaard are two philosophers who are not usually bracketed together. Yet, for one commentator, Ronald Green, in his bookKierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, a deep similarity between them is seen in the centrality both accord to the notion of freedom. Kierkegaard, for example, in one of hisJournalentries, expresses a ‘passion’ for human freedom. Freedom is for Kierkegaard also linked to a paradox that lies at the heart of thought. InPhilosophical FragmentKierkegaard writes about the ‘paradox of thought’: ‘the paradox is the passion of thought […] the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without the passion.’
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Love, S. M. "Kant After Marx." Kantian Review 22, no. 4 (2017): 579–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415417000280.
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AbstractWhile there are many points of opposition between the political philosophies of Marx and Kant, the two can greatly benefit from one another in various ways. Bringing the ideas of Marx and Kant together offers a promising way forward for each view. Most significantly, a powerful critique of capitalism can be developed from their combined thought: Kant’s political philosophy offers a robust idea of freedom to ground this critique, while Marx provides the nuanced understanding of social and political power structures under capitalism that allows this idea of freedom to be properly applied.
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Cibotaru, Veronica. "God’s role in the ethics of Kant and Dostoevsky." SHS Web of Conferences 161 (2023): 03002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202316103002.
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Despite their differences there is a deeper connection between Kant and Dostoevsky’s thought on the relationship between belief in God and ethics. For Dostoevsky, belief in the existence of God plays an essential role with regard to the possibility and meaning of ethics. This role is expressed in the idea that we can find for example in The Brothers Karamazov, according to which if there were no God, everything would be allowed, i.e. there would not be any sense in moral interdiction. In Kantian moral theory, on the other hand, even though God is not a condition of possibility for ethics as such, as in Dostoevsky’s case, it is still a subjective condition for the possibility of the realisation of ethics for finite human beings. Furthermore, I show that for both thinkers the importance of God for ethics does not exclude the importance of freedom. Thus, I argue that there is an implicit reflection on the importance of freedom for faith and therefore also for ethics in Dostoevsky’s thought. In the “Legend of the Inquisitor” from The Brothers Karamazov Dostoevsky actually criticises dogmatic faith, incarnated in the figure of the Inquisitor. I will conclude from this that, according to Dostoevsky, faith needs a form of freedom.
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LeBar, Mark. "Kant on Welfare." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29, no. 2 (1999): 225–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10717512.
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Contemporary debate over public welfare policy is often cast in Kantian terms. It is argued, for example, that respect for the dignity of the poor requires public aid, or that respect for their autonomy forbids it. In some recent political discourse, the views of Kant himself have been invoked in defense of public welfare provision. Some have argued that his moral theory mandates welfare as an expression of our duty to be beneficent, or that Kant's commitments to freedom require public provision of aid to those in need. These implications are thought to be reflected in his political theory in a variety of ways.However, at no point in his political works does Kant explicitly argue for the public provision of welfare on the basis of either beneficence or freedom. These omissions are the more striking because he does explicitly endorse the public provision of welfare. But the rationale for welfare he offers is that it is instrumentally necessary for the security and the stability of the state. This approach is very different from one grounded in moral duties of beneficence or respect for freedom, and may perhaps be disappointing to those who would like to establish some more hortatory moral rationale for welfare. But if Kant is to be enlisted in the cause of public welfare provision for the sake of beneficence or freedom, then an explanation is required why he offers no argument to that effect.
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Lin, Zisai, and Eugene Heath. "The Kingdom of Freedom in the Garden of God: Ferguson's Postulates of Moral Action." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16, no. 2 (2018): 105–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2018.0192.
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Similar to Immanuel Kant, Adam Ferguson links freedom of the will, the existence of God, and immortality to the possibility of moral conduct. We explore these three dimensions of Ferguson's thought across several of his works. Ferguson's account of these postulates of morality not only anticipates Kant but incorporates a religious sensibility that manifests an appeal to nature rather than scripture.
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Houlgate, Stephen. "Hegel's Ethical Thought." Hegel Bulletin 13, no. 01 (1992): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026352320000481x.
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It is often assumed that Hegel's philosophy contains no practical dimension, no doctrine of how human beings should live, but is concerned exclusively with showing that human existence, as the product of reason, is already fully rational. As a consequence, even though Hegel's social and political thought (which is set out mainly in his Philosophy of Right) has been the subject of extensive and detailed study over the years, few commentators have ever tried to develop a Hegelian ethical theory to place alongside those of Aristotle, Kant and Mill. In his book, Hegel's Ethical Thought, Allen Wood has set himself the task of remedying this situation and, in my view, has succeeded in producing one of the most thoughtful, informative and provocative accounts of Hegel's Philosophy of Right to date. Wood's achievement is extraordinary. He offers a coherent and sophisticated account of virtually all the major elements of Hegelian “objective spirit”, including freedom, happiness, recognition, right, property, punishment, morality, conscience, civil society, poverty, the state and history; and in the process he engages Hegel in a fascinating and highly instructive dialogue with a whole host of thinkers, including Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Fichte, J F Fries and J S Mill, in a way that exceedingly few commentators have succeeded in doing (or have even tried to do). As a result, I believe that Wood has shown conclusively that Hegel is an ethical theorist who is every bit as sophisticated as Aristotle, Kant and Mill, and whose contribution to ethical theory can no longer continue to be disparaged or ignored (as is largely the case) by contemporary students of the subject.
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Smajevic, Milica. "Deduction of morality and freedom in Kant’s ethics." Theoria, Beograd 63, no. 1 (2020): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2001029s.
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In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant?s two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.
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Dedek, Helge. "A Particle of Freedom: Natural Law Thought and the Kantian Theory of Transfer by Contract." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 25, no. 2 (2012): 313–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s084182090000583x.
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Modern contract law theorists frequently invoke Kantian ideas to conceptualize contract as a form of immediate transfer. The Kantian theory of contract itself is eclectic: Kant makes use of the main conceptual building blocks of Natural Law (in particular Grotian) contract doctrine – promise and transfer. Yet Kant re-arranges and adapts them to his own epistemology and conceptual system. I submit that because of this connection, additional light can be shed on Kant’s theory of contract by placing it in the context of contemporary Natural Law discourse. One of the most outspoken critics of contract theory in the Grotian tradition was then famous (and now apocryphal) legal philosopher Theodor Schmalz. Schmalz faulted Natural Law thought for conceptualizing contract as transfer by fallaciously – “subreptively”– explaining the normative event of creating an obligation through the model of the empirical transfer of physical objects. Kant’s theory reads like a response to this critique: Kant avoids modelling contract on the transfer of property. Rather, he explains any transfer as contractual, brought about by a unified will.
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Ivanov, Mikhail A. "Kant on free thinking and its boundaries." SHS Web of Conferences 161 (2023): 06002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202316106002.
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The concept of “free thinking” in the context of Kant’s philosophy presents a theoretical and practical problem. Kant applies the concept of freedom primarily to practical reason and moral philosophy, but elements of freedom (in thinking) can be identified in other sections of his teaching. Free thinking, according to Kant, can be interpreted as thinking activity conducted in the absence of any prerequisites, utmost unboundedness and independence, but having definite boundaries in various areas. The analysis of this ambivalence of free thinking is carried out in such sections of Kant’s teaching as theoretical knowledge, the area of everyday thinking, the social field and the work of artistic genius. One of the tendencies revealed as a result of this analysis is Kant’s desire to postulate the unconditionality of the freedom of thought in different areas, and then to formulate minimum constraints on it. Thus, while proclaiming unlimited freedom “to use his mind and speak on his own behalf” in the social sphere, Kant admits only two restrictive principles: the requirement of scientific knowledge and the presence of goodwill. The most important component of free thinking in the teachings of Kant is the principle of sapere aude, which acts as the trigger-mechanism and the foundation of free thinking, as well as the evidence for its sociality and non-mechanistic nature. Research shows that, through the concept of free thinking, Kant implicitly formulates the ideal of free thinking, which manifests historical continuation and has lasting value.
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Kaufman, Alexander. "Reason, Self-Legislation and Legitimacy: Conceptions of Freedom in the Political Thought of Rousseau and Kant." Review of Politics 59, no. 1 (1997): 25–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500027145.
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Rousseau and Kant both argue for contractarian theories of justice. In spite of their common contractarianism, however, Rousseau and Kant argue for conceptions of legitimacy which differ markedly. The substantive differences between their accounts of legitimacy, I suggest, illustrate the political implications of disagreement regarding the status of practical reason. Rousseau, in assigning reason to a merely instrumental status, anticipates both postmodern and empiricist skepticism regarding the power of reason to ground the choice of ends. Kant is the forerunner of contemporary accounts of justice which reject such skeptical views of practical reason. Rousseau's skepticism about practical reason ties his criterion of legitimacy directly to the actual preferences of individuals. Kant's more robust conception of practical reason (1) allows him to argue for a criterion of great generality and flexibility, but (2) ties the plausibility of his account of legitimacy directly to the soundness of his conception of practical reason.
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Angela, Taraborrelli. "Cosmopolitanism and Space in Kant's Political Thought." Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 10 (2019): 15–26. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3583349.
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Kant’s cosmopolitanism can be read from two main perspectives: temporal and spatial. Reading cosmopolitanism from a temporal perspective means paying attention to the historical realization of the ideal of cosmopolitanism and to its related issues such as: the progress of humankind, its final destination, the purpose of universal history, the highest purpose of nature. Instead, reading cosmopolitanism from a spatial perspective means paying attention, e.g. to the ‘fact’ of the sphericity of the earth and to its relationship with cosmopolitan right, territoriality, borders and freedom of movement. In this paper I would like to show how adopting a spatial perspective is useful not only in order to delimit a field of inquiry, but also to shed new light on apparently well-known and thoroughly investigated notions of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, such as the notions of the citizen of the world, of the cosmopolitan right, and of the World republic.
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Zhao, Ying. "The Interpretation of Role Model and Its Contemporary Value Under Kant's Moral Education Thought." Humanities and Social Sciences 12, no. 2 (2024): 35–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20241202.13.
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Kant's moral education ideology is an important component of his entire ideological system and a brilliant gem in the history of human educational thought. Kant's moral education philosophy is mainly reflected in stimulating the intrinsic moral motivation of the educated and cultivating their kind will, advocating for the construction of moral freedom and spiritual meaning based on the principle of formality and universality as the basis for their own will. However, the current moral education in schools is still fundamentally based on material practical principles such as utilitarianism, emotion, self love, and reputation, which leads to low efficiency and formalization of moral education practice. In this sense, moral education cannot truly cultivate the sense of responsibility and obligation of the educated, let alone generate a Kantian sense of moral respect and sublimity from the depths of their hearts. The author believes that universities can change the way learners think and enhance people's moral motivation through the role of role models in moral education. By playing a role model, laying the foundation for the construction of ideas, and then making free choices, true freedom can be achieved. This article analyzes the connotation and characteristics of exemplary education in Kant's educational philosophy based on current research experience and relevant academic literature, and further explains the role of exemplary education in Kant's moral education philosophy. Finally, combining the role of role models, this paper focuses on exploring the contemporary value of the concept of role models in Kant's moral education ideas, aiming to draw on the essence of Kant's role model education and promote the reform and innovation of moral education in Chinese universities.
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Krstic, Predrag. "Unwanted parenthood: Romanticism and Kant." Filozofija i drustvo 26, no. 1 (2015): 88–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1501088k.
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Over the Romantic reception of Kant, the author attempts to show a relationship between the Romanticism and the Enlightenment. First part of the paper reconstructs the social conditions that created the strange path of transformation of parts of Kant?s teachings in the romantic motifs. The second part follows the theoretical precomposition of Kant?s thought in Fichte and expressly deviation from it in Novalis and Schlegel. Third section presents the key moments of the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment mind, and fourth its ambiguous pracital-political effects. In conclusion, it is suggested that Romanticism tested and testified the transcending of limits of the very freedom for which Kant believed that man becomes worthy of only if it is used in a lawful and purposeful manner.
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Grapotte, Sophie. "Traduction de l’ « Introduction » du cours de droit naturel ditNaturrecht Feyerabend(1784)." Kant-Studien 111, no. 4 (2020): 612–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kant-2020-0046.
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AbstractThis paper offers the first French translation of the “Introduction” (“Einleitung”) of the only available manuscript of the natural law course (which Kant taught between 1767 and 1788) known as Naturrecht Feyerabend (1784). The translation is preceded by a “Présentation” which, in particular, aims to establish the important but often ignored place of the “Introduction” of the Naturrecht Feyerabend in the development of Kant’s moral thought. The most obvious interest of the Naturrecht Feyerabend is related to the year in which this course was taught: 1784, a crucial year in the evolution of Kant’s moral thought, where Kant worked to complete the Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten. In this regard, the “Présentation” that we propose for the French translation of the “Introduction” emphasizes that the Introduction of the NF contains arguments which are not found in the Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (among others the arguments that only freedom gives dignity and makes rational beings ends in themselves and that freedom must be a law to itself). To this extent, this “Présentation” aims to contribute to showing that the Introduction of the NF is a valuable text for the historian of Kantian thought who wants to reconstruct the development of Kant’s moral thought.
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Sferco, Senda, and Sebastián Botticelli. "Foucault, Kant y el carácter anfibólico de la libertad." Dorsal. Revista de Estudios Foucaultianos, no. 11 (December 24, 2021): 61–88. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5802866.
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<strong>Resumen</strong>: Dentro del pensamiento foucaultiano, la noción de libertad mantiene un carácter inacabado, plástico y abierto. Pero además muestra en su particularidad una condición especialmente anfibólica pues retiene un doble sentido que permite entramar la analítica histórico-ontológica de las relaciones de saber-poder con una actitud crítica capaz de comprometerse con las posibilidades de transformación del propio tiempo. Esta condición de límite, o de problema que opera sobre los límites, remite a Kant. El presente artículo propone modelizar a partir del pensamiento kantiano las distintas acepciones de la libertad que pueden encontrarse en el trayecto intelectual de Foucault. Se espera con esto componer una aproximación a las dimensiones más profundamente filosóficas del pensamiento foucaultiano. <strong>Abstract</strong>: Within Foucauldian thought, the notion of freedom keeps an unfinished, plastic and open character. But it also shows in its particularity an especially amphibolic condition since it retains a double meaning that allows an articulation between the historical-ontological analysis of knowledge-power relations and the elaboration of a critical attitude capable of an engagement with the possibilities of transformation of the own time. This condition of limit, or of a problem that operates on the limits, refers to Kant. This article proposes to model from Kantian thought the different meanings of freedom that can be found in Foucault’s intellectual trajectory. It is hoped to compose an approach to the most deeply philosophical dimensions of Foucauldian thought.
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Rego, Pedro Costa. "Liberdade e Imputabilidade em Kant: uma Controvérsia." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 25, no. 1 (2023): 42–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/1414-3004.2021v25n1p42-63.
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ResumoO presente artigo inscreve-se numa pesquisa constituída de duas etapas, das quais apenas a primeiraé aqui contemplada. Essa etapa consiste essencialmente num esforço por chamar a atenção para o queconsidero uma dificuldade conceitual relativa à noção de liberdade prática no pensamento de ImmanuelKant. Proponho que Kant trabalha com duas acepções distintas da liberdade que deve caracterizar oarbítrio humano, que são acepções dificilmente conciliáveis e cuja confusão torna problemático o projetofundamental de sua filosofia prática. Uma delas, conquistada argumentativamente nos seus textosfundacionais de filosofia prática, assimila liberdade a moralidade, dando ocasião ao problema da imputabilidadedas escolhas imorais. A outra, aparentemente pressuposta ao longo de todos os seus escritossobre o tema da liberdade e preferida quase unanimemente pelos intérpretes, equivale a uma concepçãomoralmente neutra de livre arbítrio. Contra ela, há de saída a explícita recusa do próprio filósofo quandochamado a se manifestar ex professo sobre sua legitimidade na Metafísica dos Costumes. Mas tento mostrarque, mais grave que isso, se trata de um conceito de liberdade que, a fim de garantir a imputabilidadede escolhas imorais, acaba tornando qualquer escolha inimputável.Palavras-chave: Liberdade, moralidade, imputabilidade, vontade, arbítrio.AbstractIn this paper, corresponding to the first of two parts of my current research, I endeavor to lay out aconceptual difficulty concerning the notion of practical freedom in Kant`s thought. I argue that the philosopherdeals with two distinct and conflicting meanings of the freedom of human choice, which rendersproblematic the fundamental project of his practical philosophy. The one, conceptually rooted in hisgrounding texts on freedom of the will, assimilates freedom and morality and ends up by making, primafacie, unconceivable free choices against morality, hence, renders impossible the imputation of immoralchoices. The other, apparently presupposed throughout most of Kant`s writings on freedom and almostunanimously cheered by the interpreters, amounts to a morally neutral conception of free choice. Againstit raises Kant`s declared refusal when provoked to express himself about it in the Metaphysics of Morals.Moreover, I argue it`s a concept of freedom that, meant to guarantee the accountability of immoral choices,ends up by making all choices unaccountable.
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Rivera de Rosales, Jacinto. "Genesis of Moral Freedom in Kant." ETHICS IN PROGRESS 12, no. 2 (2021): 10–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/eip.2021.2.2.
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In Kant’s writings, we can discover four key moments in the realization of moral freedom: i) The original possibility of being free, ii) The act described by Kant as radical evil, iii) The opposite act, that is, an inner conversion to good, and, finally, iv) The long process of the self-development of virtue extending to immortality. There are further issues such as the double concept of moral evil, and practical temporality. Moral freedom is originally located (and presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction) in the individual, her decisions, and the maxims or principles that guide her actions, even though a community (as both a „kingdom of ends” and social reality) provides the scope wherein all this takes place and its socially and historically-situated shapes. This paper tries to systematize these crucial stages of Kant’s moral philosophy with the focus on the concept of virtue.
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Crichlow, Harold E. "Kant and Hegel: Their Religious Philosophies Compared." Hegel Bulletin 17, no. 01 (1996): 87–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200003177.
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Despite the existence of a Promethean strain in the history of western thought from the Pre-Socratics down to the time of Kant and Hegel, it is fair to say that mankind generally had some kind of belief in the Gods or the one God. Even before recorded history began, people felt surrounded on all sides by superior supernatural beings who inspired terror and who could only be placated by sacrifice – human, animal and plant – the stage of animism. Since Kant and Hegel, despite the rapid and growing secularisation of society and the decline of overt acts of religion in European societies which lead the word in freedom and material development, census figures show that a large number of people still hold some kind of religious belief. The subject of religion in Kant and Hegel is too wide to be dealt with comprehensively in a paper of this kind, and I shall be looking very briefly at three areas, viz, epistemology where God is presupposed in both systems, freedom through which the religious dimension in human life is expressed, and the possibility of an after-life traditionally treated under the title of the immortality of the soul. God, Freedom and the Immortality of the Soul have been the fundamental issues that have engaged the minds of the great system-builders in philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel.
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Valentim, Inácio, Marita Rainsborough, and Paulo Jesus. "Kant in africa and africa in kant." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 9, no. 2 (2022): 9–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2021.v9n2.p9.
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Immanuel Kant devotes his thought to the diversity and unity of humanity both in the natural and cultural domains, especially through the foundation or, at least, renovation, of two complementary disciplines: Geography and Anthropology. Thinking of Africa based on Kantian philosophy is an exercise that exposes essential tensions, inherent in questioning the meaning of universality and particularity, as well as its relations. From the angle of the critical power of human intelligence, one can find Kantian resonances in the ideas of freedom and liberation that animate all contemporary African cultural expressions, with an anti- and post-colonial outlook, from politics to the arts, through religion, law, economy and education. However, simultaneously, the Aufklärung that Kant announces and lives, is located in European history, in the mutation of Modernity whose passion for the Universal remains deeply anchored in the concrete body of 18th-century Europe divided between Feudalism and Liberalism, but always inclined towards physical and spiritual possession of the world, aimed at the expansion of its Faith and its Empire, identifying the apex of the supposedly progressive history of humanity with its Logos and its civilizing Ethos. Therefore, Kant’s German-Christian Eurocentrism is a constitutive position that challenges the self-critical power of all Critical Reason. Moreover, if Kant rejects and disapproves of colonial violence as a war of aggression that destroys the conditions of perpetual peace, offending Cosmopolitan Justice, he remains nevertheless permeable to Eurocentric stereotypes that represent the character of black otherness and its cultural creations, oscillating between a hierarchical and an egalitarian view of humanity’s ethnic-racial differences.
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Niesen, Peter. "Kant and Rawls on Free Speech in Autocracies." Kantian Review 23, no. 4 (2018): 615–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415418000420.
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AbstractIn the works of Kant and Rawls, we find an acute sensibility to the pre-eminent importance of freedom of speech. Both authors defend free speech in democratic societies as a private and as a public entitlement, but their conceptions markedly differ when applied to non-liberal and non-democratic societies. The difference is that freedom of speech, for Kant, is a universal claim that can serve as a test of legitimacy of all legal orders, while for Rawls, some legal orders are owed full recognition even if they do not in principle guarantee freedom of speech. I explain Kant’s account of free political speech and argue that the defence of individual rights should be seen as its core feature, both in republican and in autocratic states. I then argue that a much-overlooked shift in Rawls’s development to Political Liberalism likewise ties his account of free speech in democratic societies to issues concerning rights and justice. In a next step, I discuss Rawls’s perspective on some non-democratic regimes in his Law of Peoples, regimes that he understands as well-ordered but which do not guarantee freedom of speech. I criticize Rawls’s account from Kant’s perspective and suggest to introduce a ‘module’ from Kant’s pre-republican thought into Rawls’s conception, aiming to secure a core area of rights- and justice-related speech. My claim is that under Kant’s view of autocratic legitimacy, an important extension of speech rights is called for even in non-liberal, non-democratic states, and that a Rawlsian account should and can adopt it.
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Holly, Wilson. "Freedom and Klugheit in Kant's Anthropology Lectures." Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 5 (2017): 26–37. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.823542.
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Kant holds in his works on morality that prudence is not free, because only action under the moral law is free. He also holds that acting on prudent reasons is incompatible with the moral law. If one explores his lectures on anthropology, however, one has reason to believe that not only is prudent action free in some sense as freedom of choice, but it is also not incompatible with moral action, since it does not necessitate using other human beings as mere means, even though it is about using other human beings as ends to one’s happiness. This article will show how Kant holds these positions in his lectures on anthropology.
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Misseri, Lucas. "Zamiatin y la ética kantiana: libertad y felicidad en Nosotros." Quaderns de Filosofia 7, no. 2 (2021): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/qfia.7.2.18801.
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Zamyatin and Kantian Ethics: Freedom and Happiness in We
 
 Resumen: Nosotros cumple un siglo y, a diferencia de otras distopías, no existen muchos estudios en español sobre ella. En este trabajo se analiza la perspectiva de la ética retratada en la novela y en especial el conflicto entre libertad y felicidad como una dicotomía en la cual se privilegia a la felicidad sobre la libertad. Tras analizar las referencias a Kant en la obra, se concluye que es verosímil considerar que la postura del escritor ruso se asemeja a la de la ética kantiana. Finalmente, se sostiene que la dicotomía entre libertad y felicidad es una falsa dicotomía.
 Abstract: Since a century ago when it has been written, We has not been the focus of the Spanish critical attention, in contradistinction to other dystopias This work analyzes the perspective on ethics portrayed in the novel and especially the conflict between freedom and happiness as a dichotomy in which happiness is privileged over freedom. After analyzing the references to Kant in the work, it is concluded that it is plausible to consider that the position of the Russian writer is similar to that of Kantian ethics. Finally, it is argued that the dichotomy between freedom and happiness is a false dichotomy.
 
 Palabras clave: Distopía, Pensamiento utópico, Crítica Social, Literatura rusa, Kant.
 Keywords: Dystopia, Utopian Thought, Social Critique, Russian Literature, Kant.
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Murphy, James Bernard. "Practical Reason and Moral Psychology in Aristotle and Kant." Social Philosophy and Policy 18, no. 2 (2001): 257–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002983.
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For a long time, it seemed that Aristotelians and Kantians had little to say to each other. When Kant the moralist was known in the English-speaking world primarily from his Groundwork and his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant's conceptual vocabulary of “duty,” “law,” “maxim,” and “morality” appeared quite foreign to Aristotle's “virtue,” “end,” “good,” and “character.” Yet ever since philosopher Mary Gregor's Laws of Freedom, published in 1963, made Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals central to the interpretation of his ethical thought, it has become clear that such “Aristotelian” terms as virtue, end, good, happiness, and character are also central to Kant. Aristotelians and Kantians now see that they have plenty to say to each other, and they have gone from being adversaries to sharing a sometimes unprincipled urge to merge central aspects of Aristotle's and Kant's ethical thought.
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Biasotto, Karine. "Esclarecimento e educação em Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) / Enlightenment and education in Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)." Revista de História e Historiografia da Educação 2, no. 6 (2019): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rhhe.v2i6.61418.
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O presente artigo trata do pensamento de Kant sobre a questão pedagógica. O objetivo consiste em apresentar o conceito de Iluminismo elaborado pelo intelectual e relacioná-lo com o seu pensamento no que diz respeito a educação. Para isso foram utilizados os ensaios: Resposta à pergunta: que é o Iluminismo e Sobre a Pedagogia. O primeiro é uma reflexão sobre o contexto social da Europa do século XVIII e suas consequências para a vida intelectual desse momento histórico. Já o segundo, trata-se de uma reunião de notas elaboradas por Kant e organizadas por seu discípulo Rink. Fortemente influenciadas por Rousseau, essas notas apresentam o pensamento kantiano por um longo período e destacam a questão da liberdade, do progresso e da autonomia a fim de educar um ser moral. A partir disso é possível perceber a influência daquilo que o autor entende como Iluminismo no processo de formação do homem, que para ele inicia desde muito cedo, quando a criança nasce, e se mantém até a juventude, sem um momento preciso para conclusão. Desse modo se torna evidente a atualidade do pensamento de Kant principalmente sobre o quão fundamental é aprender a pensar por si e assim fazer um bom uso da liberdade, caminhar para o progresso com fim na moralidade. * * *This article discuss the Kant's thought regarding to the pedagogical question. The aim consist in show the concept of Enlightenment elaborated by the intellectual and relate to his thought about education. Therefore, was used the essays: An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment and On Pedagogy. The first is a reflection on the social context of eighteenth-century in Europe and its consequences for the intellectual life. The second, it is a combination of notes elaborated by Kant and organized by his disciple Rink. Strongly influenced by Rousseau, the notes are based on the thinking for a long period and priorize the question of freedom, the progress and the auton-omy of a moral being. From this, it is possible realize the influence of that what the author understand as Enlightenment during the process of humani-ty formation that for him begins when the children born, and keep during the youth, without a precise moment to the conclusion. In this way became evi-dent the currentness of Kant's thought, especially to show how fundamental is learn to think for oneself and thus make a good use of freedom, to walk to progress with finality on the morality.
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Curtis‐Wendlandt, Lisa. "No Right to Resist? Elise Reimarus's Freedom as a Kantian Response to the Problem of Violent Revolt." Hypatia 27, no. 4 (2012): 755–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2011.01213.x.
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One of the greatest woman intellectuals of eighteenth‐century Germany is Elise Reimarus, whose contribution to Enlightenment political theory is rarely acknowledged today. Unlike other social contract theorists, Reimarus rejects a people's right to violent resistance or revolution in her philosophical dialogue Freedom (1791). Exploring the arguments in Freedom, this paper observes a number of similarities in the political thought of Elise Reimarus and Immanuel Kant. Both, I suggest, reject violence as an illegitimate response to perceived political injustice in a way that opposes Locke's strong voluntarism and the absolutism of Hobbes. First, they emphasize the need to maintain the legal state as a precondition for the possibility of external right. Second, they share an optimistic view of the inherently “just” nature of the tripartite republican state. And finally, Reimarus and Kant both outline an alternative, nonviolent response to political injustice that consists in the freedom of public expression and a discourse on the moral enlightenment of man.
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Dietzsch, Steffen. "Der Menschen „Beruf zum freien Denken“. Zum Begriff „Aufklärung“ in der Königsberger Kultur." Studia z Historii Filozofii 15, no. 1 (2024): 5–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/szhf.2024.001.
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Kant does not understand enlightenment primarily as producing and disseminating knowledge, technology and good morals. Instead, he draws attention to people’s operational powers, which, as subjective abilities, are the reason for the objective improvement of human life and its environment. – The central categories of the Königsberg Enlightenment are “thinking for yourself”, “freedom of thought,” and “criticism of guardianship and immaturity".
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Rodríguez, Yésica. "Kierkegaard y Kant: educación para la ética." Trilhas Filosóficas 11, no. 1 (2018): 125–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.25244/tf.v11i1.3036.
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Resumen: El presente artículo pretende realizar una aproximación entre los pensamientos éticos de Kant y Kierkegaard concentrándonos en los conceptos de educación y libertad. Para ello pondremos foco en el pensamiento práctico desarrollado por el filósofo alemán en el año 1790, al cual denominamos la segunda ética kantiana, y en la primera autoría kierkegaardiana, es decir, O lo uno o lo otro (1843) y El concepto de angustia (1844). Consideramos que estos dos periodos, en ambos autores, nos brindan la posibilidad de encontrar puntos de contactos que nos permiten sostener que la ética que Kierkegaard tiene en mente para estas obras es el pensamiento moral desarrollado por Kant en este periodo.Palabras claves: Kant. Kierkegaard. Libertad. Educación. ÉticaAbstract: The present article intends to make an approximation between the ethical thoughts of Kant and Kierkegaard concentrating on the concepts of education and freedom. For this we will focus on the practical thought developed by the German philosopher in the year 1790, which we call the second Kantian ethic, and in the first Kierkegaardian authorship, that is, Either/Or (1843) and The Concept of Anxiety (1844). We consider that these two periods, in both authors, give us the possibility of finding points of contact that allow us to maintain that the ethics that Kierkegaard has in mind for these works is the moral thought developed by Kant in this period.Keywords: Kant. Kierkegaard. Freedom. Education. Ethics Resumo: O presente artigo pretende fazer uma aproximação entre os pensamentos éticos de Kant e Kierkegaard concentrando-se nos conceitos de educação e liberdade. Para isso, vamos nos concentrar no pensamento prático desenvolvido pelo filósofo alemão no ano de 1790, que chamamos a segunda ética kantiana, e na primeira autoria de kierkegaardiana, ou seja, Ou/Ou (1843) e O conceito de Angústia (1844). Consideramos que esses dois períodos, em ambos os autores, nos darão a possibilidade de encontrar pontos de contato que nos permitam sustentar que a ética que Kierkegaard tem em mente para essas obras é o pensamento moral desenvolvido por Kant nesse período.Palavras-chave: Kant. Kierkegaard. Liberdade. Educação. Ética REFERENCIASALLISON, Henry. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.ASSISTER, Alison. Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil. In: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 72 (April 1996), pp 275-296.DI GIOVANNI, George. Freedom and religion in Kant and his immediate successors: The vocation of mankind, 1774–1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.DIP, Patricia. Judge William: the Limits of the ethical. In: Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Volume 17, Katalin Nun,Jon Stewart (Eds.), London-New York, Routledge, 2016.FOUCAULT, Michel. Una lectura de Kant: Introducción a la antropología en sentido pragmático. Traducción Ariel Dilon. Buenos Aires: Siglo veintiuno, 2013.FREMSTEDAL, Roe. Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest Good. Virtue, Happiness, and the kingdom of God, New York: Palgrave Macmillan , 2014._______. The concept of the highest good in Kierkegaard and Kant. Int J Philos Relig (2011) 69:155–171._______. The moral argument for the existence of God and immorality. Kierkegaard and Kant. Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc, JRE 41. (2013), pp. 50–78._______. The Moral Makeup of the World: Kierkegaard and Kant on the Relation between Virtue and Happiness in this World. Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook. N° 1 (2012), pp. 25-47.FRIEDMAN, R. Kant and Kierkegaard: the limits of the Reason and the cunning of faith. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 19:3-22, pp. 3-22. _______. Kierkegaard: First Existentialist or last Kantian?. Religious Studies, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 18, Nº 2 (1982), pp. 159-170.FRIERSON, Patrick. R. Freedom and anthropology in Kant’s moral philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.GOUWENS, David. Kierkegaard as religious thinker. Cambridge: University Press, USA, 1996.GREEN, Ronald. Kant und Kierkegaard.The Hidden Debt. New York: State University New York Press, 1992.HELLER, Ágnes. Crítica a la Ilustración. Traducción Gustau Muñoz y José Ignacio López Soria. Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1999.HEIDEGGER, Martin. Kant y el problema de la metafísica. Traducción Gred Ibscher Roth. México: Fondo de cultura económica, 2013.KANT, Immanuel. Antropología en sentido pragmático. Traducción José Gaos. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014._______. La metafísica de las Costumbres. Traducción Adela Cortina Orts y Jesús Cornill Sancho. Madrid: Tecnos, 1994._______. Pedagogía. Traducción Lorenzo Luzuriaga y José Luis Pascal, Madrid: Akal, 2003.KIERKEGAARD, Soren. O lo uno o lo otro I. Traducción Bogonya Saez Tajafuerce y Darío González. Madrid: Trotta, 2006._______. O lo uno o lo otro II. Traducción Darío González. Madrid: Trotta, 2007._______. El concepto de angustia. Traducción Darío González y Óscar Parcero. Madrid: Trotta, 2013._______. En la espera de la fe, Traducción Luis Guerrero Martínez y Leticia Valadez. México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2005.KNAPPE, Ulrich. Theory and practice in Kant and Kierkegaard. (Kierkegaard studies. Monograph serie; 9), Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, 2004.KOSCH, Michelle. Freedom And Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006._______. Choosing Evil: Schelling, Kierkegaard, and the legacy of Kant's conception of Freedom. (Dissertation Philosophy). New York: Columbia University, 1999.LÖWITH, Karl. De Hegel a Nietzsche: La quiebra revolucionaria del pensamiento en el siglo XIX. Trad. Emilio Estiú. Buenos Aires: Katz, 2012.MOONEY, Edward. On Soren Kierkegaard, Dialogue, polemics, Lost Intimacy, and Time. Syracusa, Ashgate, 2007.MUENCH, Paul. Kierkegaard’s Socratic Task. (Dissertation). University of Pittsburgh, 2006.MUÑOZ FONNEGRA, Sergio. La elección ética. Sobre la crítica de Kierkegaard a la filosofía moral de Kant. Estudios filosóficos, Universidad de Antioquia, n. 41, pp. 81-109, 2010.NAES, Arnes. Kierkegaard and the values of education: Contribution to the Kierkegaard Conference of the International Institute of Philosophy, Copenhagen, 1966.NEGT, Oskar. Kant y Marx. Un diálogo entre épocas. Traducción Alejandro del Río. Madrid: Trotta, 2004.OLIVARES-BØGESKOV, Benjamín. El concepto de felicidad en las obras de Søren Kierkegaard: principios psicológicos en los estadios estéticos, ético y religioso. México: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2015._______. El concepto de felicidad en el estadio ético. La integración de la estética en la vida ética. La Mirada Kierkegaardiana. Nº 0, pp. 43-64, 2008.PECK, William. On Autonomy: The Primacy of the Subject in Kant and Kierkegaard. (Ph. D. Dissertation). Connecticut: Yale University, 1974.RODRÍGUEZ, Pablo. El descubrimiento de la libertad infinita. Kierkegaard y el pecado. El títere y el enano. Revista de Teología Crítica, Vol. 1, ISSN N°: 1853 – 0702, pp. 207-216, 2010.RODRÍGUEZ, Yésica; RODRÍGUEZ, Pablo; PEÑA ARROYAVE, Alejandro. El concepto de aburrimiento en Kierkegaard. Revista de Filosofía. Universidad Iberoamericana. Año 49, N° 142, ISSN: 0185-3481, pp. 97-118, 2017.RODRÍGUEZ, Yésica. Kierkegaard y Kant. Una interpretación del sí mismo a partir de la segunda ética kantiana. In: DIP, Patricia., RODRÍGUEZ, Pablo (Coord.) Orígenes y significado de la filosofía Poshegeliana. Buenos Aires, Gorla, 2017, pp. 113-139.STACK, George. Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1977.TORRALBA, Francesc. Poética de la libertad: Lectura de Kierkegaard. Madrid, Caparrós Editores, 1998.
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Polshchak, Aneliya. "Interpretation of Freedom in the Works of G. K. Chesterton." Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal, no. 11 (December 30, 2024): 110–30. https://doi.org/10.18523/2313-4895.11.2024.110-130.
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In this article, we analyze G.K. Chesterton’s perspective on freedom. In his works, Chesterton emphasizes the importance of defining freedom and accepting its existence. He describes different types of freedom, including freedom of will and freedom of thought, and examines them from both scientific and philosophical perspectives. Chesterton does not believe that free will is merely about fulfilling human desires, nor does he deny its existence due to the presence of cause-and-effect relationships. For Chesterton, freedom of thought must also strike a balance to prevent it from becoming a dull and predictable process by following a rigid causal logic. It is important to consider the potential for abuse when exploring the idea that concepts and beliefs are relative and the concept of relativism. This relativistic approach, Chesterton argues, can lead to a disregard for the reality of the world. Both Kant and Chesterton believe that the defense of freedom is closely tied to the existence and defense of dogma. Chesterton highlights the distinctiveness of Christian dogma in comparison to other teachings of his era. He believes that the Christian creed safeguards human freedom by mirroring the Creator. Drawing from his personal experiences, Chesterton defends the presence of both a logical and mystical element in human life.
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Brink, David O. "Perfect Freedom: T. H. Green's Kantian Conception." Journal of the History of Philosophy 62, no. 2 (2024): 289–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a925521.
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abstract: This essay explores different conceptions of freedom in Kant, Green, and their critics. Kant introduces three kinds of freedom—negative freedom, positive freedom or autonomy, and transcendental freedom. Sidgwick objects that Kant's conception of positive freedom is unable to explain how someone might be free and responsible for the wrong choices. Though Green rejects transcendental freedom, he thinks Kant's conception of practical freedom can be defended by identifying it with the capacity to be determined by practical reason. Green identifies his own tripartite conception of freedom—juridical freedom, moral freedom, and real freedom. He thinks that these are stages in the perfection of freedom. Green's tripartite conception provides a principled reply to Berlin's doubts about positive freedom, explains Kant's claims that respect and esteem are fitting attitudes toward different aspects of freedom, and supports Schiller's criticisms of Kantian freedom and virtue. Green's conception of freedom defends the best elements of the Kantian perspective while addressing legitimate worries. In doing so, it unifies different aspects of freedom in a way that is grounded in moral personality or rational nature.
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Mehlich, Ju B. "N.A. Berdyaev’s “struggle” with I. Kant over irresponsible freedom and self-justification by philosophy." Solov’evskie issledovaniya, no. 1 (March 30, 2025): 98–111. https://doi.org/10.17588/2076-9210.2025.1.098-111.
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The relevance of the study relates to the 300th anniversary of I. Kant and the 150th anniversary of N.A. Berdyaev. The novelty of the study lies in the substantiation of the thesis that Berdyaev’s “struggle” with Kant is the main motive and core of his philosophical thought. A comparative analysis of Berdyaev’s philosophising is carried out, in the course of which similarities and differences of his ideas with those of other philosophers are established. Berdyaev’s new religious consciousness includes the idea of the Eternal Covenant based on freedom and the idea of free theurgy of Vl. Solovyov; the idea of paradoxical ethics of S. Kirkegaard; references to anarchism and M. Stirner’s construction of philosophy; Berdyaev’s worldview is compared to N.V. Stavrogin, who lived through the experience of evil. It is concluded that Berdyaev wins the struggle with Kant’s understanding of the ethics of duty with success for himself and his work.
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Lopes, Christine. "A Haskalah story: Kant and Maimon on rational faith." SHS Web of Conferences 161 (2023): 02006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202316102006.
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In 1789 Salomon Maimon sent Kant, via Markus Herz, the manuscript of his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (Kant, 1999, pp. 291-294). A surprised Kant replied to Herz: “None of my critics understood me as well as Herr Maimon does” (Kant, 1999, pp. 311-315). Kant’s praise of Maimon makes him a singular figure in the Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment. But while the theoretical aspect of Maimon’s criticism of Kant has received increasing attention in recent years, its practical implications remain under-examined. In what follows, I use the notion of rational faith for the purposes of a tentative reconstruction of Maimon’s reading of Kant’s transcendental philosophy that brings together theoretical and practical aspects of the thought of both philosophers. Kant and Maimon shared a project of devising a form of faith that would express rational rather than religious-based morality. Kant argued for a rational moral freedom that is vouched by an infinite intellect that cannot be attributed to humans but more appropriately to God. For Maimon, the answers to the questions What can I know? and What should I do? involve a cognitive and affective process of striving to expand our finite consciousness. This process is the rational expression of God in us.
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Belás, Ľubomír. "Kant’s ethics as practical philosophy: On philosophy of freedom." Ethics & Bioethics 7, no. 1-2 (2017): 25–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ebce-2017-0007.
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Abstract The paper focuses on some important philosophical issues of Kant’s philosophical legacy, especially on Kant’s thoughts on man and his acting in community with other human beings, his fellows, (Conjectural Beginning of Human History) from the aspect of morality based on moral-practical terms and categories. The field of Kant’s practical-critical thoughts is not only unusually broad but also full of ideological dynamics offered in a precise and modern linguistic form. The paper claims that Kant offers his own answer for the fourth question “Was ist der Mensch” (“What is man?”), introduced in Logic (Kant, 1992, p. 538) and at the same it also introduces a historical dimension to the issue of man, included in his short writings, in a compact form.
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Krijnen, Christian. "Kants Konzeption kosmologischer Freiheit – ein metaphysischer Rest?" Revista de Estudios Kantianos 2, no. 2 (2017): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.7203/rek.2.2.10407.
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The German idealists were of the opinion that Kant’s transcendental turn has unfettered a revolution in philosophical thought that needs to be completed by addressing critically the presuppositions or ‘foundations’ of Kant’s philosophy itself. To these presuppositions belong Kant’s architectonic of reason in general and the role the concept of freedom has within it in particular. It is shown that Kant’s cosmological or transcendental freedom does not so much establishes a secure starting point for further elaborations within the realm of practical philosophy but should primarily be taken as a problem in itself. By doing so, it becomes clear that the profile of Kant’s critical conception of freedom as well as that of the third antinomy heavily draw upon the German metaphysical tradition of the 18th century. By considering Kant’s conception of cosmological freedom in the context of the discussions of his age, several preliminaries and non justified constellations come into view. From Hegel’s perspective, they cannot be justified; rather, getting to the bottom of them transcendentally leads to a more general concept of freedom than Kant’s. The consequences of all this are illustrated by revisiting the transcendental philosophy of Bruno Bauch, probably the best neo-Kantian Kant specialist.
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Wauters, Bart. "Strict Liability and Necessity in Grotius, Pufendorf, Smith, Kant, and Beyond." Grotiana 42, no. 1 (2021): 69–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18760759-42010005.
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Abstract This article compares the views of Grotius and subsequent authors on the doctrines of necessity and strict liability. This comparison takes place at two levels. On the one hand, there is a comparison of the views of Grotius with those of Pufendorf, Smith, Kant and recent Kantian authors. On the other hand, there is a comparison between the doctrines of necessity and strict liability. This exercise leads to the conclusion that strict liability does not have to be a mere matter of choice opted for by positive law, but in some instances can also be thought of as a requirement of a private law framework expressing the fundamental moral equal freedom of man.
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Patkul, Andrei B. "Schelling’s Criticism of Ontological Argument and Interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of the Ideal of Reason." Kantian journal 40, no. 3 (2021): 28–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2021-3-2.
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To reconstruct a critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God in Schelling’s philosophy I examine his interpretation of the ontological argument by Anselm of Canterbury and Descartes as well as Schelling’s assessment of the critique of the Kantian ontological proof of the existence of God. I propose a reconstruction of Schelling’s account of undoubted being which cannot be deduced from the concept of the totality of all that is possible and therefore must come before any thought. He interprets reason as having an ecstatic nature which posits precedent undoubted being. This enables Schelling to formulate his own version of the thesis on the unity of being and thought, whereby being comes first and thought is only second. Against this background I analyse Schelling’s interpretation of the Kantian account of the ideal of reason. Schelling, on the one hand, agrees with Kant that being is not a real predicate, hence real existence cannot be deduced from essence in the sense of “what.” But, on the other hand, in contrast to Kant, he believes that real existence of the individual absolute must be assumed, which would be the subject for all possible predicates and whose being is ecstatically posited by reason as being external to itself. I raise the question of the relevance of Schelling’s thought for modern ontology, above all in overcoming ontotheology. Proceeding from the works of J. F. Courtine and L. Tengelyi I single out two aspects of Schelling’s doctrine that are relevant to my subject: (1) the priority of existence over essence in God’s being and (2) the fundamental irreducibility of God to a necessarily existent being, i.e. God’s freedom. It is evident that, in his interpretation of Kant, Schelling somewhat simplifies his train of thought and leaves it unclear how Kant links the concepts of necessary being and the supremely perfect being. It is also evident that Schelling’s concepts of “contingency,” “contingent necessity,” “the whole experience” need further study.
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Basta, Danilo. "Kant's metaphysics of law." Glasnik Advokatske komore Vojvodine 76, no. 9 (2004): 426–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/gakv0411426b.
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The history of reception and the history of interpretation of Kant's legal deliberation are not the same even after two centuries. This was not only due to the recipients and interpreters of Kant's thoughts but also and above all due to Kant, i.e., the content and the spirit of his philosophy. The law of the state, the international law, and the cosmopolitan law are the ways to approach the eternal peace, which was considered by Kant as the final goal of the entire international law. The existence of the State is based on the idea of the Initial Agreement. According to Kant, in the Initial agreement all the individuals abandoned their external freedom in order to attain the freedom in a legal order as members of the political union. Kant did not always succeed to stay on the level of his own legal and political principles, and hence the light of his philosophy is sometimes covered with the dark shadows.
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Martinez, Luciana. "Some Remarks about the Difference between Überzeugung and Überredung." Kantian journal 42, no. 2 (2022): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2023-2-5.
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According to several passages in the available sources, Kant developed some ideas about the difference between being persuaded and being convinced which have antecedents in the German tradition, but with regard to which he developed ideas of his own. It is my intention to examine precisely some of these passages. I will explain how the philosopher understood this difference, what its relevance is and why the figure of the other is necessary to determine it. For this purpose, texts published in the critical period and students’ lecture notes from the same period are considered. Furthermore, I will compare the treatment of the subject in these sources and in the textbooks used by Kant in his courses. In the conclusions, the link between this issue and Kantian arguments in defending freedom of thought and expression is also suggested. In order to do so, I first explain the notion of holding to be true and its difference from the notion of being true. Secondly, I examine what it means to be convinced and what it means to be persuaded. Finally, I analyse the relevance of alterity for the identification of this difference and consider the importance of freedom of expression.
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Zharinov, S. A. "Hannah Arendt: Eros for freedom of thought and love for political freedom = Hannah Arendt: Erôs de la liberté de penser et amour de la liberté politique / trans. from Fr. S. A. Zharinov." Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 10, no. 2 (2025): 132–43. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2025-10-2-132-143.
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The article examines the concept of love in the political theory of Hannah Arendt. The author focuses not on love-passion, which is a limited to the private sphere, but on political love, which Arendt presents in two forms associated with two forms of freedom: love for freedom of thought and love for political freedom. The author shows how Arendt, based on Socrates’ reflections on eros as a desire for what is lacking and his «two-in-one» principle, develops her own concept of the activity of thinking, aimed not at knowing the object, but at understanding it, and based not on unity, but on plurality. Thinking about freedom in this context turns out to be thinking about an object worthy of love in order to understand its meaning. The author also analyzes Arendt’s concept of political action, the principle of which is similarly eros – love for political freedom. In the course of the text, the author compares Arendt’s ideas with the ideas of Socrates, Augustine, Montesquieu, Kant, Levinas and Heidegger. In addition, Arendt's appeal to the poetic works of Goethe and Rilke is considered.
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Eylem, YILDIZER. "HUMAN FROM KNOWLEDGE TO JUDGMENT IN KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY." Socrates Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Studies 29 (May 11, 2023): 32–42. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7926254.
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Immanuel Kant's philosophy of criticism continues to be an important focus in today’s thinking, not only in terms of its impact on eighteenth century thought, but also in terms of pointing to new areas of philosophical thinking that will continue after him and addressing the problems of the modern world as a whole. Although there is a distinction between Kant’s pre-criticism and post-criticism in the history of philosophy studies, Kant’s interest in metaphysics and science in his early periods forms the basis of his critical philosophy. It should be underlined that Kant produced solutions to the major crises of his period in his critical philosophy, and while doing this, he had an envision for human and society by revealing the capacities of modern humans. Because when Kant discusses the relation of knowing with acting, the possibility of the communicability of subjective judgments, and the link between freedom and necessity, Kant basically points to the abilities of the human as a species, not based on the observation of a particular historical period, but on the basis of the possible to happen. In other words, Kant’s critical philosophy points to the abilities that a human being can use in every period, who can have “the courage to use his mind” and thus get out of the theoretical and practical crises. In this study, the understanding of human being seen in Kant’s critical philosophy will be presented by discussing the Critique of the Power of Judgment in particular and three critiques in general.
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Krakowiak, Józef Leszek. "Post-Kantian Elements in the Intersubjectively Constituted Subject of Universalism as a Metaphilosophy." Dialogue and Universalism 30, no. 2 (2020): 93–135. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202030220.
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This comparative essay about two kinds of interpersonal-centric humanism is dedicated to the memory of professor Janusz Kuczyński and his conception of dialogical universalism as a metaphilosophy, and shows Immanuel Kant’s thought as a ceaseless source of inspiration for all anti-conservatives and universalists. Kant’s philosophy gave man an unforgettable sense of freedom, because it not only posed the imperative of building a pan-human community of all rational beings, but also revealed the above-natural sense of the human species’ imposition of purposefulness upon itself, and the realisation of this purposefulness in the form of a republican federation of free states dedicated to co-creating eternal peace. Kantian ethics did not reach beyond the obligations people had towards one another, hence it was functionally anthropological and uninfluenced by religion, which re-situated philosophy with regard to scientific cognition and religious experience, giving rise to a metaphysics of anthropological responsibility for the condition of the spiritual freedom this ethic propounded. Kant revealed the existence of a metaphysical difference in the sphere of being—between the determinism of nature and the moral kingdom of freedom—without direct reference to the transcendental source of these two essentially different worlds. Kant was the first to set morality rooted in the autonomy and unanimous will of all rational beings—or true humanity—against legal and religious legalism. Kant laid weight on the processual character of man’s self-education to social life through the sense of commitment to self-improvement for the benefit of the solidary co-existence of all rational beings that he developed in himself as a rational being. Thus created freedom is founded on the selflesness of goodness and represents a new quality of being that only manifests itself and evolves in community, interpersonalcentrically. It is a universalistic approach capable of gradually neutralising the human inclination towards radical evil.My attempt to compare these two interpersonalcentric humanism conceptions aims to add some substance to this very delicate element in Kuczyński’s universalism as a metaphilosophy construct.
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Butts, Robert E. "Kant's Theory of Musical Sound: An Early Exercise in Cognitive Science." Dialogue 32, no. 1 (1993): 3–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300014955.
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Kant is well known as the philosopher who spent his life hunting for a prioris, philosophically identifiable characteristics of the make-up of human beings. These characteristics are species-universal, and are necessary presuppositions of the possibility of the success of various kinds of cognitive and cultural strategies. Kant bagged some big game. Space, time and the categories are a priori conditions of the possibility of human cognition. God, freedom and immortality are a priori conditions of the possibility of morality. The sensus communis is the a priori condition of the possibility of the universalization of judgments of taste. The hard-won trophies are presuppositions of possibilities. Once they were thought to be properties of a universe well ordered by a substantive god. No longer. Now we must look upon them as entrenched contributions of what it is to be human, as preconditions of human potentialities.
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McLeod, Carolyn. "Mere and Partial Means: The Full Range of the Objectification of Women." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 28 (2002): 219–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2002.10717588.
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Kant discussed the moral wrong of treating people as mere means or as a means only. To treat people as means is to treat them as objects for our use. It is to objectify them. To treat people as a mere means is to treat them wholly as objects, rather than partially so. It is to have an objectifying manner that is absolute or unmitigated. Whether Kant meant to suggest that we commit a moral wrong only when we treat people as means absolutely, rather than partially, is debatable. My concern is with how feminist theorists writing on the objectification of women have followed Kant in emphasizing the extreme case of the mere means. These feminists have implied that the moral wrong of objectification occurs only with absolute objectification, as though between it and respecting someone's autonomy there were no degrees of objectification that are morally suspect.The relevant feminist work centres on such topics as women's reproductive freedom, their sexual freedom, and gender equity in employment.
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Nurkic, Petar. "Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 3 (2021): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2103091n.
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Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.
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Long, D. Stephen. "Making Theology Moral." Scottish Journal of Theology 52, no. 3 (1999): 306–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930600050237.
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The relationship between theology and ethics has been largely determined in the modern era by the questions Immanuel Kant posed and the answers he gave. This contains a certain irony because in 1786 at Marburg Kant's philosophy was banned on the assumption that it threatened faith and morals. His demolition of the scholastic arguments for the existence of God were thought to be a threat to Christian faith. Many neo-kantians relished this challenge to theology and moved Kantianism in the very direction the orthodox authorities feared. By 1835 Heinrich Heine wrote an essay for French publication entitled, ‘On the history of religion in Germany'. He argued that Robespierre himself was unworthy of comparison with the revolutionary Kant. Robespierre may have lopped off a few royal heads but ‘Kant has stormed heaven, he has put the whole crew to the sword, the Supreme Lord of the world swims unproven in his own blood’. Perhaps Kant's ethics did not go as far as Heine asserted, but it did result in the marginalization of theology from ethics. Ethics was grounded in freedom alone. Theology could be consistent with ethics, but not determinative for it.
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Mortensen, Jacob P. B. "Kants begreb om det radikale onde." Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift 75, no. 2 (2012): 103–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/dtt.v75i2.105564.
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The article is a reading of Book One in Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. The main focus is the concept of radical evil, which Kant posits as a philosophical analogue to the Christian concept of Original Sin. The article unfolds the relations between the concepts that Kant uses to establish the concept of radical evil. The main point is that Kant ends up contradicting his own conceptual defi nition because he ascribes evil to the concept of freedom, which is fundamentally good. The article thus follows a peripheral and marginalized trajectory within Kantian scholarship by proposing a Kant who is inconsistent and paradoxical. Even though this ‘contradictory Kant’ ends up not explaining what he sets out to explain, the article appreciates his work for his effort to fi nd a foothold in the question concerning the problem of evil.
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Wirth, Mathias. "Mitigated Freedom? Thomas Pröpper’s Reappraisal as Theological Tribute to Autonomy." Theology Today 75, no. 4 (2019): 494–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040573618810363.
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Thomas Pröpper’s (1941–2015) systematic theology, that was deemed particularly innovative especially in the German-speaking Catholic realm but thus far has garnered hardly any international attention, poses the question of whether a reflection of the is and ought of freedom yields any returns for the question of God and moreover for ethics. 1 A theological way of thinking should be established that helps with understanding faith whilst also offering philosophical justification. 2 For eminently theological reasons, Pröpper pursues a theology of freedom because God’s self-revelation as love can be adequately inferred through concepts of freedom. 3 Pröpper’s theological approach of a question of the contemporary philosophy of subject and freedom also involves the inclusion of authority-critical thought. 4 According to Pröpper’s own information, Hermann Krings’s freedom thinking in particular alongside his transcendental philosophy, 5 tracing back to Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, is applicable to Pröpper’s own approach. 6 Consequently, for Pröpper a theological argument can be given only from man ( ex parte hominis). For such an argument to be convincing, it must fulfil satisfy two criteria: it must be able to exist in the application of one’s own reason (“im Gebrauch der eigenen Vernunft”) and in the execution of freedom (“im Vollzug der Freiheit”). 7
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Uimonen, Paula. "Decolonising cosmopolitanism: An anthropological reading of Immanuel Kant and Kwame Nkrumah on the world as one." Critique of Anthropology 40, no. 1 (2019): 81–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0308275x19840412.
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This article offers an anthropological reading of the works of Immanuel Kant and Kwame Nkrumah. By doing so it seeks to expose the Eurocentric and racist ontology that lies behind dominant contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism. The article draws attention to the possibility of a more egalitarian vision of the “world as one” that can be derived from the perspective of an African philosophical viewpoint. Rather than regarding African social theory as a subordinate or subaltern mode of apprehending the world, it places African philosophy on a par with European traditions of philosophical thought. By focusing on some of the central tenets of cosmopolitanism, it argues that Nkrumah, by insisting on freedom and equality for all of humanity, had articulated a more genuinely cosmopolitan ontology than any that can be derived from the philosophy of Kant. The article argues that an engagement with critical anthropology enables us to imagine forms of decolonised cosmopolitanism which are genuinely both inclusive and egalitarian.
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Gómez-Jeria, Juan Sebastián. "Alfred Rosenberg on Gutenberg, Copernicus, Kant, Freedom of Research and Worldview and Science." Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy 8, no. 01 (2024): 13–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.36348/jaep.2024.v08i01.002.
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Following one of our research lines, we present here the first English translation of four speeches of Alfred Rosenberg related with freedom of research, science and worldview, Gutenberg’s invention, Nicolaus Copernicus and Immanuel Kant. Some of his philosophical thoughts are still valid today and deserve more analysis.
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Dubber, Markus Dirk. "The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought." Law and History Review 16, no. 1 (1998): 113–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/744322.
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The Enlightenment was the age of empathy and abstract identity. The common man no longer was to be pitied for his unfortunate plight. Instead, enlightened gentlemen and reformers strove to empathize with the ordinary person—identify with him—precisely because he was identical to them in some fundamental sense. That sense differed from Enlightenment theory to theory, but the identity remained central. So Bentham insisted that every member of the utility community was like any other because every member's pain and joy equally affected the utilitarian calculus and thus the common good. Contractarians like Beccaria or Fichte portrayed all citizens as identical insofar as they were all signatories to the social contract, a contract grounded in the shared rationality of its signatories who surrendered some of their external freedom to pursue their life plans protected from the chaos of the law of nature. And Kant and Hegel stressed the common capacity for rational deliberation shared by all humans as rational beings.