Dissertations / Theses: 'Kant, Immanuel, Ethics. Virtue'

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Stolle, Jeffrey James. "The paradox of ethical immediacy : Levinas and Kant /." view abstract or download file of text, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3004004.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-228). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

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AU, Laiwing. "論康德的道德主體觀". Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2008. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/16.

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康德的主體理論不但為西方的理性主義開出了一個新的領域，在近代中國儒學的研究中更被視為一個重要的樞紐。康德的主體理論除了為日後相關的討論提供了穩固的框架外，他對一些重要概念──諸如理性、道德的必然性等──的反省和釐清，更為當世的相關討論帶來了突破性的發展和影響。當然，其道德主體理論也有不少困難。本文分成四章，基於上述各點展開討論。第一章為前言，旨在闡明康德對其它道德理論的抨擊，以顯康德對道德的看法之獨特處。第二章對康德的道德主體理論作系統性的闡釋。由康德的最高道德原則出發，闡明當中的關鍵概念，例如：道德的無條件性與普遍性，從而帶出主體所具備的實踐理性及自律性。康德於捍衛道德的普遍性及肯定人之主體性方面，成就無容置疑。但另一方面，在其系統中，道德法則只能呈現為命令，亦不允許情感的滲雜。康德的這種主體觀並非沒有困難。本文的第三章則指出康德道德理論對主體的一些前設，並透過比較康德與王陽明的道德理論，揭示康德的道德主體觀並非在所有文化下都為人接受。最後，本章亦希望帶出道德主體觀與道德境界的密切關係，以點出不同道德主體觀的意義。全文最後以第四章作結。

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Tafani, Daniela. "Christoph Andreas Leonhard Creuzer : la discussione della dottrina morale di Kant alla fine del Settecento /." Genova : Erga, 1999. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=008933417&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Hildebrand, Carl. "Kant & moral character." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5edd493f-e783-4a8e-b246-4ba5a1e18082.

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This thesis argues that Kant has a viable, intellectualist account of moral character that is much richer and more interesting than has often been thought. This account is consistent with his broader practical philosophy, in particular, his account of moral worth. Chapter one establishes that Kant has a theory of education on which a child's inclinations are to be trained in preparation for her to grasp the moral law and acquire full moral agency. It argues that his account of habit is complex, recognizing a kind of moral value that is broader than his definition of moral worth. Chapter two argues that sympathy is, for Kant, a primarily cognitive disposition of special importance; this is because it provides knowledge of how the moral law applies in particular circumstances, therefore enabling an agent to fulfill her duties toward others. This chapter also resolves a puzzle concerning Kant's dual concept of character (as both intelligible and empirical) by drawing an analogy with one account of weakness of will. Chapter three develops an account of moral worth that incorporates these more palatable elements of Kant's account of moral character with the seemingly more austere elements familiar from the Groundwork. This theory allows for positive, participating inclinations alongside ascriptions of moral worth. Further, it introduces a distinction between full and mitigated moral worth, to account for agents who, for example, act rightly but for confused reasons as in the case of Twain's Huckleberry Finn. Chapter four responds to two objections to Kant on the basis of moral demandingness, one concerning psychological integration and personal relationships, the other concerning the value of non-moral goods more broadly. It then responds to some objections to his account of the highest good, or the idea of a world in which happiness is distributed in proportion to virtue.

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Athanassoulis, Nafsika. "The problem of moral luck." Thesis, University of Reading, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.325217.

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Salam, Abdallah. "Perfect and imperfect rights, duties and obligations : from Hugo Grotius to Immanuel Kant." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:882da778-1126-4909-b38b-5ada51cc8e78.

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In this doctoral thesis, Kant's distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is examined. The thesis begins with an exploration of how the distinction originates and evolves in the writings of three of Kant's most prominent natural law predecessors: Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Christian Wolff. The thesis then moves on to Kant's own writings. It is argued that Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction in as many as twelve different ways, that these ways are not entirely consistent with one another, and that many of them, even taken by themselves, do not hold up to scrutiny. Furthermore, it is argued that Kant's claim that perfect duties always trump imperfect duties - which can be referred to as "the priority claim" - is not actually supported by any one of the ways in which Kant draws the perfect-imperfect distinction. After this critical reading of Kant's writings, the thesis then switches gears and a more "positive" project is attempted. It is argued that the perfect-imperfect distinction, even though it does not support the priority claim, is not altogether normatively neutral or uninteresting. In particular, for some of the ways in which the distinction is drawn, it is shown that the distinction yields the following normative implication: Sometimes perfect duties override imperfect duties and all other times there is no priority one way or the other. Finally, it is explained that this normative implication - which can be referred to as the "privilege claim" - translates into the following practical directive: When there is a conflict between a perfect duty and an imperfect duty, sometimes one must act in conformity with the former duty and all other times one is free to choose which of the two duties to act in conformity with. This practical directive represents the ultimate finding of this thesis.

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Samuel, Álvaro Milani. "Moral e direito em Kant." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UCS, 2014. https://repositorio.ucs.br/handle/11338/911.

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O presente trabalho dissertativo tem como objetivo examinar a natureza das relações existentes entre as esferas da moral e do direito no âmbito da filosofia de Kant, a fim de compreender como é sustentada a legitimidade do exercício coercitivo das normas jurídicas, como elemento de justiça, de delimitação dos arbítrios, e pressuposto de uma convivência social racional. O problema que tencionamos investigar diz respeito a saber, em que medida se verifica uma eventual vinculação entre moral e direito nos escritos kantianos. Nessa perspectiva, o primeiro capítulo busca explicitar os conceitos de lei moral, boa vontade e imperativos, bem como as noções de autonomia e heteronomia, elementos esses diretamente implicados na hipótese kantiana da adequação humana necessária às leis prescritas pela razão, no âmbito da liberdade interna. A partir da base conceitual então estabelecida, busca-se, no segundo capítulo, examinar a proposta de um direito natural (racional) como conjunto de princípios a priori da razão pura prática que visam garantir a realização da liberdade na esfera da exterioridade. Para tanto, examina-se o modo através do qual se dá a construção do conceito kantiano de direito e seu respectivo princípio universal, tendo em conta ainda a forma a partir da qual se estabelece a relação entre liberdade (externa) e lei, e o papel da coerção. Uma vez demarcados os dois âmbitos, busca-se, no terceiro capítulo, aprofundar as distinções entre as esferas da interioridade e da exterioridade da liberdade, para então avaliar a hipótese de trabalho que está assentada sobre a possibilidade de uma conexão entre moral e direito na filosofia de Kant. Duas são as principais teses consideradas na investigação: i) a tese da independência e ii) a tese da dependência. A primeira é sustentada pelo grupo de interpretações que afirmam a separação entre moral e direito no pensamento de Kant, assumindo a coerção como elemento característico do direito e a não derivação de seu princípio em relação ao imperativo categórico. A segunda é sustentada pelos interpretes que entendem haver em Kant uma conexão entre moral e direito, baseando-se na desvalorização do elemento coerção e numa acentuação do elemento do dever, pelo que defendem a derivação dos deveres jurídicos da teoria moral kantiana e a derivação do princípio do direito diretamente do princípio da moralidade. Explicitados os elementos constitutivos dessas interpretações, realiza-se, então, ao final, a consideração da possibilidade do vínculo entre moral e direito, e o exame da consistência de uma eventual dependência/derivação dos princípios a priori do direito em relação ao princípio da moralidade, tudo de modo a avaliar em que medida se dá a validade da hipótese assumida e quais pontos sustentam a sua eventual plausibilidade. Submitted by Ana Guimarães Pereira (agpereir@ucs.br) on 2015-03-09T16:27:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Alvaro Milani Samuel.pdf: 1176002 bytes, checksum: 835ccc97f25e114b4ce2b1f2c6add133 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-09T16:27:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Alvaro Milani Samuel.pdf: 1176002 bytes, checksum: 835ccc97f25e114b4ce2b1f2c6add133 (MD5) Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior. This argumentative paper aims to examine the nature of the relationship between the spheres of morality and law in the context of Kant's philosophy in order to understand how the legitimacy of coercive exercise of legal rules is sustained, as justice element of delimitation of wills, and assumption of rational social life. The problem we intend to investigate concerns the extent to which there is a possible link between morality and law in the Kantian writings. In this perspective, the first chapter seeks to clarify the concepts of moral law, goodwill and imperatives as well as the notions of autonomy and heteronomy, these elements directly involved in the Kantian hypothesis of human adaptation necessary laws prescribed by reason, within the internal freedom . From then established conceptual basis, we seek to, in the second chapter, consider the proposal for a natural right (rational) as a set of a priori principles of pure practical reason intended to ensure the attainment of freedom in the sphere of externality. To do so, it examines the way in which it gives the construction of the Kantian concept of law and its respective universal principle, taking into account also the form from which establishes the relationship between freedom (external) and law, and the role of coercion. Once marked the two areas, we seek to, in the third chapter, further distinctions between the spheres of interiority and exteriority of freedom, and then evaluate the working hypothesis that sitteth upon the possibility of a connection between morality and law Kant. There are two main theses considered in research: i) the independence thesis and ii) the theory of dependency. The first is supported by the group of interpretations that affirm the separation between morality and law in Kant's thought, assuming coercion as a characteristic element of the right and not to bypass principle in relation to the categorical imperative. The second is supported by interpreters that understand Kant in a connection between morality and law, based on the devaluation of coercion element and an accentuation of the element of duty, by defending the derivation of the legal duties of Kantian moral theory and the derivation of principle of the right directly from the principle of morality. Explained the elements of these interpretations, takes place then at the end, consideration of the possibility of the link between morality and law, and the examination of the consistency of a possible dependence / derivation of a priori principles of the right to the principle of morality all in order to assess the extent to which gives the validity of the assumed hypothesis and points which support the eventual plausibility.

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Hipolito, Jeffrey Nevin. "Extremes meet : Coleridge on ethics and poetics /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/9427.

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Stephenson, Erik H. "The ethics of authenticity : Heidegger's retrieval of the Kantian ethic in Being and time." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2005. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=015480233&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Yazicii, Asli. "An Inquiry Concerning The Place Of Emotions In Virtue Ethics (a Comparison Between Aristotle And Kant)." Phd thesis, METU, 2005. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12606742/index.pdf.

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This dissertation examines the claim that, unlike utilitarianism and deontology, virtue ethics ascribes a positive role to emotions in moral evaluation by taking them as the constituents of moral goodness and moral value. I wish to identify the limit and scope of this claim and to show what kind of emotion theory is suitable for explaining the essential features of virtue ethics. To do so, I defend some kind of cognitivism, the cognitive-affective theory of emotion, as the most suitable theory for virtue ethics. I argue that the moral significance that virtue ethicists assign to emotions can only be explained by such a holistic and non-reductionist account of emotions. In order to demonstrate how the virtue ethicists&rsquo positive treatment of emotions with respect to moral evaluations works in theory, I have looked at Aristotle&rsquo s theory of emotions and ethics, paying special attention to his notion of the &lsquo mean relative to us.&rsquo We shall see that the &lsquo mean relative to us,&rsquo which entails the existence of suitable emotions being felt by the moral agent, is justified on the basis of such an idea. The other main purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether Kant&rsquo s ethics is compatible with virtue ethics. My interpretation is that Kant&rsquo s position on emotions oscillates between the negative and the instrumentalist view, while Aristotle&rsquo s view is moralist. I will argue that even the most celebrated Kantian feeling of respect does not fall under the moralist position. Although Kant recognizes emotions as morally relevant in the determination of duties of virtue, the kind of roles he assigns to them are merely aesthetic, instrumental, or ornamental and regulative, all of which are secondary to pure practical reason. But, in virtue ethics, emotions and feelings play actual causative roles. They can both influence and be influenced from reason in the determination of virtuous actions they are therefore both causally active and morally valuable in moral actions.

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Hansson, Mats G. "Human dignity and animal well-being a Kantian contribution to biomedical ethics /." Uppsala : Stockholm, Sweden : [Uppsala University] ; Distributor, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1991. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/24766855.html.

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Johnson, Michelle J. "A PEDAGOGY FOR JUSTICE: KANT, HEGEL, MARCUSE AND FREIRE ON EDUCATION AND THE GOOD SOCIETY." UKnowledge, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/11.

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Rousseau’s educational treatise Emile is a well-known pedagogical work often noted for its progressive educational insights. Although Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy is much less well known, Kant suggests a solution to an educational problem Rousseau is unable to solve: the problem of whether or not education can work for the good of humanity. Rousseau is concerned that society, and the schools in society, inflames people’s passions and leads to inequality and enslavement. Rousseau sketches an educational program that ideally develops students’ autonomous moral reasoning untainted by inflamed passion, an education which enables students to be moral and just citizens, working for the good of humanity. I argue that Rousseau’s educational philosophy ultimately fails because Rousseau maintains a deep skepticism that society, and therefore schools, can ever be a good place for humans. Rousseau suggests education must go to extreme measures such as isolating students in a rural environment and manipulating all aspects of their lives to prevent passions from becoming inflamed. Implementing this kind of education is not only improbable for individual students; it is especially improbable that it could be implemented on a large scale. I further argue that Kant’s educational philosophy provides a solution to the problems which beset Rousseau’s educational philosophy. Kant embraces negative passions as necessarily educative, and so his educational philosophy does not require extreme measures to combat negative passion. In addition, Kant argues that is only in society and through these negative passions that humanity develops. Kant’s educational philosophy is achievable for both the individual student and also on a large scale because it focuses on developing three key aspects of students that draw on capacities within the student and that are developed in community with others: a robust will bent towards the good; good and skilled moral judgment; and a commitment to the ethical commonwealth. Lastly, I argue that Hegel, Marcuse and Freire, three philosophers who follow after Kant, develop important aspects of Kant’s solution to Rousseau’s problem. Taken together, these four philosophers present a compelling educational philosophy which suggests that education not only can but indeed must work for the good of humanity

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Sipert, Claudio 1976. "O problema da realidade objetiva da ideia do sumo bem em Kant." [s.n.], 2008. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279539.

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Orientador: Zeljko Loparic Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T11:49:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sipert_Claudio_M.pdf: 596097 bytes, checksum: d59b0a555c6bc5b0711fce0e637ffc1e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é abordar o problema da realidade objetiva da idéia do sumo bem na filosofia prática kantiana. Na Crítica da Razão Prática, a idéia do sumo bem representa o objeto necessário de uma vontade moralmente determinada e, por conseguinte, a razão nos leva a procurar pelas condições de possibilidade do seu objeto. Diante da impossibilidade de um objeto correspondente ao sumo bem na experiência, a realidade objetiva desse conceito parece ser possível somente se assumirmos um ponto de vista transcendente, onde o postulado da existência de Deus é pensado como condição de possibilidade do sumo bem, seja para pensá-lo como possível numa vida após a morte ou num mundo criado em conformidade com uma ordem teleológica moral. Entretanto, com o postulado da existência de Deus ultrapassamos o campo da experiência possível que, de acordo com Kant, é o domínio onde a realidade objetiva de um conceito puro tem de ser provada. Assim sendo, a idéia do sumo bem permanece um conceito transcendente e sem realidade objetiva. Buscaremos uma solução para o problema levantado, pelo viés da semântica transcendental, proposta por Loparic, que consiste em perguntar pelo sentido e pela referência dos conceitos e juízos num domínio de dados sensíveis Abstract: The objective of this work is to approach the problem of the objective validity of the idea of the highest good in the kantiana practical philosophy. In Critical of the Practical Reason, the idea of the highest good is represented as necessary object of a will morally determined and, therefore, the reason take us to look for the conditions of possibility of its object. Ahead of the impossibility of a corresponding object to the highest good in the experience, the objective reality of this concept only seems to be possible to assume a point of view transcendent, where the postulate of the existence of God is thought as condition of possibility of the highest good, either to think the highest good possible about a life after the death or a world created in compliance with a moral teleologic order. However, with the postulate of the existence of God we exceed the field of the possible experience that, in accordance with Kant, is the domain where the objective reality of a pure concept has of being proven. Thus being, the idea of the highest good remains a concept transcendent and without objective reality. We will search a solution for the problem raised, for the bias of the transcendental semantics, proposal for Loparic, that consists of asking for the direction and the reference of the concepts and judgments in a domain of sensible data Mestrado Filosofia Mestre em Filosofia

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Oliveira, Marcos Alberto de. "A ideia de uma ciencia da virtude na metafisica Kantiana dos costumes." [s.n.], 2005. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281065.

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Orientador: Zeljko Loparic Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-04T16:41:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Oliveira_MarcosAlbertode_D.pdf: 17873725 bytes, checksum: bfec905f9aa6e8dc1d98ce8187dff057 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 Resumo: Não informado Abstract: Not informed. Doutorado Filosofia Doutor em Filosofia

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Wilburn, Heather. "An Adornoesque Ethics: The Problem of Damaged Life." OpenSIUC, 2014. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/863.

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The problem that my dissertation addresses is the connection between modern reason and the ethical failures of modernity. My project is centered against the background of Enlightenment reason's project of rationalization, from which I argue that modern conceptions of ethics are problematic because they involve an abstraction from the reality of suffering individuals. I take up Adorno's response to this problematic and show that ethical reflection needs to be restored to the physical world of particulars in their damaged state. Philosophically, I press the need to reflect on ethical conditions and the values of our moral theories. My overall objective is to show how an Adornoesque ethics can position us in a critical and resistant mode of thinking within actual sites of suffering and damage in late modern conditions.

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Bachour, Omar. "Kantian Ethics and the Formula of Humanity: Towards Virtues and Ends." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/30336.

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The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed.

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Luxon, Nancy Lynn. ""The Impossible Professions" : Freud and Foucault on doctors, educators, and ethical subjectivity /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC IP addresses, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3191990.

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Kraemer, Celso. "Ética e liberdade em Michel Foucault: uma leitura de Kant." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2008. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11765.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Celso Kraemer.pdf: 2089652 bytes, checksum: 3489958fe7eaf86e0466addbbdd67a7b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-03-10 The complementary thesis to the doctorate of Foucault about the Anthropology of Immanuel Kant opens some theoretical and methodological perspectives in his work. Among them the present research investigates the possibility of Ethics and the notion of Liberty in Foucault. The guide line that goes throughout the chapters is the lecture of Kant which appears in the minor texts, being the first just the complementary thesis at the beginning of the intellectual career of Foucault, and the last about Kant s Aufklärung at the end of his career. The data treatment attends the procedure of Foucault in the complementary thesis: facing the minor texts with the more canonical ones. In the complementary thesis Foucault related the Anthropology to the Critics of Kant. In the present research the parallels are settled between the minor texts where Foucault deals with Kant in his books, emphasizing Madness and Civilization and The Order of things. The result shows that there are some kantism in Foucault, one can recognize it in the archeology and in the genealogy. The kantian Critic looks to get a new strength in them. This one suffers an actualization by Foucault. Thus, the archeological and genealogical Critic looks for the conditions of possibility of the origin , the duration and the disappearance of different discursive and non-discursive strategies of practices of knowledge-power that he calls historical empiricities. On the other side, the realm of empiricities is signed by Aperture; in it the Truth shows its reciprocal dependency with Freedom. These three realms (Critic, empiricity and Aperture) establish the proper field for the question of ethics and freedom in the immanence of knowledge-power relations. In the game of subjection and autonomy grows the esthetic of existence as art of the self; in this function it requires the care of the self, the know yourself and the practices of the self A tese complementar ao doutorado de Foucault, sobre a Antropologia de Immanuel Kant, abre algumas perspectivas teóricas e metodológicas sobre seu trabalho. Dentre estas, a presente pesquisa investiga as possibilidades da ética e da noção de liberdade em Foucault. O fio condutor que perpassa todos os capítulos é a leitura de Kant que aparece em diversos textos menores , sendo o primeiro justamente a tese complementar, no início do percurso intelectual de Foucault, e o último, sobre a Aufklärung kantiana, no final deste percurso. O tratamento dos dados segue o procedimento de Foucault na tese complementar: confrontar textos menores com textos mais canônicos do autor. Na tese complementar Foucault relacionou a Antropologia com as Críticas de Kant. No presente trabalho, estabelecem-se paralelos entre os textos menores , em que Foucault aborda Kant, com os livros, com destaque para História da loucura e As Palavras e as coisas. O resultado mostra que há certo kantismo em Foucault, podendo-se apontá-lo na arqueologia e na genealogia. Nelas a Crítica kantiana parece obter novo vigor. Ela não deixa de sofrer certa atualização com Foucault. Assim, a Crítica arqueológica e genealógica busca as condições de possibilidade do surgimento, da duração e do desaparecimento de diferentes estratégias discursivas e não-discursivas das práticas do saber-poder, no que ele chama de empiricidades históricas. Na outra extremidade, o domínio das empiricidades encontra-se marcado pela Abertura; nela, a Verdade mostra sua recíproca dependência com a Liberdade. Estes três domínios (Crítica, empiricidade e Abertura) constituem o espaço próprio também para a questão da ética e da liberdade, na imanência das relações de saber-poder. No jogo sujeição e autonomia se constitui a estética da existência, enquanto arte de si; em função disso ela requer o cuidado de si, o conhece-te a ti mesmo e as práticas de si

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Ganier, Florian. "Bien et bonheur chez Kant." Thesis, Paris Est, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PESC0019/document.

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Deux conceptions de l’union du bien et du bonheur s’opposent généralement. Selon la première, avoir conscience du bien suffit pour être heureux. Et selon la seconde, avoir conscience du bonheur suffit pour être vertueux. Cette thèse montre qu’il est possible de résoudre cette opposition, par une synthèse de concepts (entre le bien et le bonheur). Pour Kant, il est possible d’unir la vertu (le bien suprême) et le bonheur, c’est-à-dire d’unir la « morale » et la vie naturelle de l’homme. Il s’agit de réaliser la destination « morale » de l’homme. Pour cela, il faut trouver un accord entre le bien suprême et le bonheur. Cela est possible notamment par la paix, qui est pour Kant l’accord entre les hommes, comme but pour l’espèce humaine. Pour Kant, la « morale » doit être pensée de façon transcendantale, et non pas empirique. C’est pourquoi, l’union totale et définitive de la vertu et du bonheur est impossible. Cependant, cet idéal conduit l’homme et la société à une continuelle transformation (un perfectionnement de soi-même), cela en vue de rapprocher les générations futures du but suprême (le souverain bien) Two conceptions of the union of the good and the happiness generally oppose. According to the first, to be conscious of the good is enough for being happy. And according to the second, to be conscious of the happiness is enough for being virtuous. This thesis shows that it is possible to resolve this opposition, by a synthesis of concepts (between the good and the happiness). For Kant, it is possible to unite the virtue (the supreme good) and the happiness, that is to say to unite the « moral » and the natural life of the man. It is question to realize the « moral » destination of the man. For that, it is necessary to find an agreement between the supreme good and the happiness. It is possible notably by the peace, which is for Kant the agreement between the men, as the purpose for the human race. For Kant, the « moral » must be thought in a transcendental way, and not empirical. That is why, the total and definitive union of the virtue and the happiness is impossible. However, this ideal leads the man and the society to a continual transformation (an improvement of oneself), that is to lead together the futures generations of the supreme purpose (the highest good)

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26

Hookom, Andrew L. "But What Kind of Badness?: An Inquiry into the Ethical Significance of Pain." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2011. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/96.

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In this thesis, I argue against a claim about pain which I call the "Minimization Thesis" or MT. According to MT, pain is objectively unconditionally intrinsically bad. Using the case of grief, I argue that although MT may be true of pain as such, it is not true of particular pains. I then turn to an examination of the justification provided by Thomas Nagle for offering the MT and find that his argument is inadequate because it depends on an implausible phenomenology of pain experience. I argue it is more plausible to claim, as Kant does, that pain has desire-conditional badness. Finally, I present a Nietzschean argument for the irreducible complexity of badness. I suggest we may be willing to concede pain's badness so readily only because it has not been specified what kind of badness it actually has.

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Goski, Joseph Wyllie. "Kant's School of Morals: The Challenge of Radical Evil and the Need for Moral Education in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/31825.

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My aim in this thesis is to demonstrate that common interpretations of Kant’s theory of respect do not account for the motivation a subject feels to follow the moral law. A large number of interpreters focus on Kant’s early ethical works—such as the Grounding and the Critique of Practical Reason—to justify how the moral law alone motivates a subject to act rightly. However, by the time he published Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant had discovered the problem of radical evil—the fact that people tend to feel more motivated by the inclinations than by the moral law. Kant’s solution to this challenge comes in the form of moral education: the contingent practices of historical institutions (factors that are extraneous to the moral law) are required to learn respect for the law. By the end of the Religion, it will be asked whether duty for duty’s sake is ever achieved.

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Binici, Basta Basar. "Nietzsche&#039." Master's thesis, METU, 2010. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12612655/index.pdf.

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The purpose of this study is to explain and evaluate Nietzsche&rsquo s criticisms of Kantian morality. Kantian morality has greatly influenced western moral thought. Nietzsche&rsquo s criticisms focus on the scientific and universal character of this philosophy. This work focuses on the ideas of &lsquo freedom&rsquo , &lsquo autonomy&rsquo , &lsquo individual virtues&rsquo and &lsquo morality as a science&rsquo . In order to understand and analyze Nietzsche&rsquo s critiques, his epistemological criticisms are also evaluated.

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29

Pavão, Aguinaldo Antonio Cavalheiro. "O mal moral em Kant." [s.n.], 2005. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280624.

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Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-04T18:52:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pavao_AguinaldoAntonioCavalheiro_D.pdf: 13472945 bytes, checksum: 5daf00a9fef9016209dc57a48bea8526 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 Resumo: A tese examina a doutrina do mal radical em Kant. Nas duas primeiras partes, é feita uma reconstrução do argumento de kantiano, tal como desenvolvido na primeira parte da Religião nos Limites da Simples Razão.Também são discutidas as teses da Religião tendo em vista sua consistência com os conceitos fundamentais da filosofia moral apresentada nas obras Fundamentação da Metafisica dos Costumes e Critica da Razão Prática. Na terceira parte, argumenta-se a favor de uma leitura segundo a qual o mal radical deve figurar ao lado do conceito de dever em termos de dignidade conceitual dentro da filosofia prática de Kant. Criticam-se assim as leituras teológicas e antropológicas acerca do lugar e do papel da teoria kantiana do mal moral Abstract: Not informed. Doutorado Doutor em Filosofia

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30

Thompson, Gwen C. "The Reemergence of Kantian Ethics: Have We Adequately Responded to Hegel's Objections?" PDXScholar, 1997. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/2413.

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The philosophies of Kant and Hegel have experienced a renaissance for the past thirty years, and a debate continues as to whether Hegel's objections to Kant's moral philosophy are sound, and/or whether Hegel's ethics are an improvement on Kant's. This debate takes many forms, and most recently, theorists have been interested in measuring Hegel's objections against contemporary theories following in the Kantian tradition. 'Critics,' (theorists defending Hegel's moral point of view) suggests such reconstructed theories leave themselves open to identical criticisms Hegel wielded at Kant almost 200 years ago. 'Defenders,' (theorists supporting Kant's moral philosophy, or a revised version) reply in one of two ways. They either suggest that Hegel's criticisms of Kant are unwarranted, meaning Hegel misinterprets Kant's ideas and/or purposes; or, they maintain that Kant's ethics are vulnerable to Hegel's objections, however some newer version of Kant's ethics is not because it has been purged of those Kantian elements which Hegel attacks. Clearly, both views render Hegel's critique of Kant obsolete. So, why are we witnessing such an aggressive resurgence of Hegelian-styled arguments in the contemporary literature? In seeking to answer this question, this thesis reconsiders Hegel's actual critique of Kant. In this way, the thesis falls into a specific category of political philosophy. It is a study in the 'history of ideas.' Rather than considering the question of whether contemporary Critics or Defenders have the better argument concerning the merit of reconstructed Kantian theories, I intend to re-evaluate the soundness of Hegel's objections to Kantian ethics. Kant's moral and political thought on the proper ordering of society is deeply embedded in the pluralist democracies of the western world. As such, those Kantian ideas/elements should be defendable against Hegelian criticisms. Following an in-depth consideration of Hegel's critique of Kant, I argue that whereas Hegel accurately identifies weaknesses in the system of Kant's moral philosophy, his critique does not successfully achieve its goal. It does not show that Kant's ethical theory is an inadequate prescription for the rational agent seeking to act morally. Rather, it serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in democratic liberal theory.

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31

Lindholm, Lois. "Hospitality Fostering Integration : Reassessing Hospitality in Migration Ethics." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-159946.

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This thesis analyses the concept of hospitality in the context of migration ethics. The underlying philosophical ideas of Kant, Levinas and Derrida are outlined and critically discussed. The use of hospitality in migration ethics as mainly a concern within the political dimension of society, devalues the concept and neglects the social dimension of hospitality. I argue that migration ethics should be more concerned with integration and that it is more relevant to speak of hospitality in relation to integration rather than migration, since hospitality has to do with interpersonal interactions. In order to view hospitality in the social dimension of society, I present some cases of interpersonal hospitality practiced today. Drawing from those examples whilst using a virtue ethics approach, I consider three virtues that I deem to be prerequisites for hospitality: courage, humility and patience. Hospitality is a rich and multi-layered concept and practice. I conclude that one such layer is hospitality fostering integration. That is, hospitality functioning as social cohesion with a potential to bring different parts together as a whole.

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32

Sticker, Martin. "Common human reason in Kant : a study in Kant's moral psychology and philosophical method." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/7445.

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In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant's ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant's claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant's conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant's method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.

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33

Crews-Anderson, Timothy Alan. "The Impossibility of Evil Qua Evil: Kantian Limitations on Human Immorality." unrestricted, 2006. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-07212006-172111/.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. Title from title screen. Melissa Merritt, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (44 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 19, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.

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34

Ring, Marian-Ellen. "Towards an adequate theory of universalizability." Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=69655.

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This thesis looks at two theories of universalizability: Immanuel Kant's deontological one and R. M. Hare's utilitarian one. It also looks at criticisms of both theories by David Wiggins. It concludes that his arguments against Hare are decisive because the moral theory that follows from Hare's version of the claim that moral judgements must be universalizable is incompatible with several basic requirements on moral theories. Wiggins' criticism of Kant, on the other hand, centres on a technical point that is overcome by an interpretation of Kant's tests for the universalizability of maxims that is given by Onora Nell. Finally the thesis argues that Kant's rational theory of ethics is superior to Wiggins' subjectivist claims because it both reflects our common sense conception of ethics and provides a rational basis for evaluating moral judgements.

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35

Ahlkvist, Felix. "Hjälp alla så långt du förmår! : En undersökning av Arthur Schopenhauers etik." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-323954.

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The subject of this thesis is the ethics of German 19th century philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. The study examines Schopenhauer’s ethics and investigates his criticism of the ethics of his older German colleague Immanuel Kant. By arguing that all true morally acceptable and good actions originate from compassion, Schopenhauer distinguishes his view from the deontological ethics held by Kant. The study focuses on Schopenhauer’s view on the basis of morals. Its purpose is to consider an ethical perspective that interconnect moral considerations with human empathy. By comparing the arguments presented by these two philosophers one can get a clearer view of the extent to which Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s ethics is justified. In the analysis, five major parts of Schopenhauer’s criticism are identified and studied one by one. The findings suggest that Schopenhauer’s ethics and the ethics of Kant can be represented as two different ethical paradigms.

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36

Rahbari, Mohammadreza. "Modernity and morality a study on the moral foundations of modern societies in the works of Durkheim, Weber, Foucault, Habermas and Kant /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ56262.pdf.

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37

Gacharná, Muñoz Javier Fermín. "Revisión crítica de la razón práctica en Kant." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/130836.

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La tesis se ocupa de buscar las posibles contradicciones de la ética kantiana teniendo como eje los postulados de la razón (Dios, alma y libertad) en tanto horizonte último de su ética. Circunscribiéndonos a algunos apartes de la Crítica de la Razón Pura, la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres y la Crítica de la Razón Práctica, pretendemos revisar los fundamentos de la ética desde los objetivos y formas de desarrollo argumental que el mismo autor plantea. En la Crítica de la Razón Pura, Kant pone freno a las aspiraciones exageradas de la razón, que pretende dar cuenta de los objetos de la metafísica, es decir, que aspira a conocer como si fuesen objetos de la naturaleza la inmortalidad del alma y la existencia de Dios. Dichos objetos son problemáticos para la razón especulativa en virtud de la imposibilidad de hacer un uso inmanente de los mismos. Quedan pues estos objetos puestos fuera de la órbita del saber y, por insistencia de la razón, se consagran al ámbito de lo práctico. Es decir, son objetos que se vuelven viables por medio de la libertad. En este cambio de lugar de los objetos de la metafísica, pretendemos encontrar un conjunto de inconsistencias del autor. Así, las preguntas que orientan este ejercicio de revisión son las siguientes: - En la Crítica de la razón pura: ¿cuál es el enlace entre la libertad trascendental y la búsqueda de un canon para el asunto ¿qué me cabe esperar? que mantenga la consistencia de la filosofía crítica? O dicho de otra forma: ¿es posible ensamblar moral con religión en el marco de una metafísica como la kantiana? - En la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres: dado el trayecto de cimentación ética, el cual podemos dar por consumado, ¿por qué insistir en la demanda de una cadena sin límite en la determinación de lo incondicionado? - En la Crítica de la razón práctica: desde la perspectiva de la filosofía crítica y teniendo en cuenta los límites impuestos a la razón en la anterior crítica y establecida la Ley Moral como guía universal y necesaria para la acción, nos preguntamos: ¿qué sentido tiene postular los objetos de la metafísica como horizonte trascendente del obrar humano? ¿No es suficiente la formulación del imperativo categórico para resolver el problema moral kantiano? Problema de trabajo: Dado el trayecto de la Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres y de la analítica de la Crítica de la razón práctica, como proceso de cimentación de la ética kantiana, ¿por qué insistir en la demanda de una cadena sin límite en la determinación de lo incondicionado? ¿Qué sentido tiene postular los objetos de la metafísica como garantes del obrar humano? ¿No es suficiente la formulación del Imperativo Categórico para resolver el problema moral kantiano? Limiting ourselves to some new paragraphs of Critique of the Pure Reason, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of the Practical Reason, we try to check the foundations of the ethics from the aims and forms of plot development that the same author raises. The thesis is about looking for the possible contradictions of the Kantian ethics, taking as an axis the postulates of the reason (God, soul and freedom) while last horizon of his ethics. In Critique of the Pure Reason, Kant limits the excessive aspirations of the reason, which tries to realize the objects of the metaphysics, that means that reason aspires to know as if they were objects of the nature, the immortality of the soul and the God's existence. The above mentioned objects are problematic for the speculative reason by virtue of the inability to do an immanent use of the same ones. These objects are put out of the orbit of knowledge, but they devote to the area of the practical thing because of the insistence of the reason. That is to say, they are objects that become viable by means of the freedom. In this change of place of the objects of the metaphysics, we try to find a set of inconsistencies of the author. The main problems we look for some answers are: In view of the distance of the Groundwork of the metaphysics of Morals and of the analytical one of the Critique of the Practical Reason, as process of foundation of the Kantian ethics, why insist on the demand of a chain without limit on the determination of the undetermined? What sense has to postulate the objects of the metaphysics as guarantors of act human being? Why the formulation of the Categorical Imperative is not enough to solve the moral Kant’s problem?

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38

Benson, Carolyn Jane. "Autonomy and purity in Kant's moral theory." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/937.

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Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory. Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative. This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.

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39

Hahn, Alexandre. "A função da antropologia moral na filosofia pratica de Kant." [s.n.], 2010. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280063.

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Orientador: Zeljko Loparic Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T03:22:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Hahn_Alexandre_D.pdf: 2008463 bytes, checksum: 7b8a3b66eb4b4f79b1564aeea1e04200 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 Resumo: Pretende-se, neste trabalho, determinar a função da antropologia moral na filosofia prática de Kant. Na Metafísica dos costumes, a mencionada antropologia é designada como a contraparte (Gegenstück) da moral pura, isto é, como o outro membro (Glied) da filosofia prática. Tal concepção impulsionou a presente investigação, de entender como Kant concebe a conexão entre a moral e a antropologia, uma vez que o filósofo também parece demarcar uma rigorosa separação entre a moral e a antropologia. Em vista disso, este trabalho defenderá a tese de que a antropologia moral de Kant é uma ciência pragmática, cuja função consiste em aplicar a moral no homem. Dito de outra forma, pretende-se mostrar que a antropologia moral, tomada como a contraparte da moral, cumpre o papel de formar o caráter moral do homem. A fim de demonstrar essa tese, os dois primeiros capítulos apresentarão um panorama da metafísica dos costumes (filosofia prática pura), expondo os problemas e soluções apresentados por Kant, e as evidências que sustentam a necessidade de haver uma antropologia moral. O terceiro capítulo explorará a definição do conceito de uma antropologia kantiana. O quarto capítulo elencará e discutirá alguns elementos que compõem a natureza moral do homem. O último capítulo apresentará alguns dispositivos responsáveis pela formação moral do homem. Abstract: The aim of this work is to determine the function of moral anthropology in Kant's practical philosophy. In the Metaphysics of Morals, this anthropology is called the counterpart (Gegenstück) of pure morality, that is, the other member (Glied) of practical philosophy. Such concept drove the present investigation in its attempt to understand the way Kant conceives the link between morality and anthropology, once the philosopher also seems to mark a strict distinction between morality and anthropology. Considering this, this work defends the thesis that Kant's moral anthropology is a pragmatic science, whose function consists on applying morality to man. In other words, my purpose is to show that moral anthropology, taken as the counterpart of morality, performs the role of forming the moral character of man. In order to prove this, the first two chapters present a description of the metaphysics of morals (pure practical philosophy), exposing the problems and solutions proposed by Kant, and the evidence that supports the necessity for moral anthropology. The third chapter explores the definition of a Kantian anthropology. The fourth chapter lists and discusses a few elements which are part of the moral nature of man. The last chapter presents a few devices that are responsible for the moral formation of man. Doutorado Historia da Filosofia Moderna Doutor em Filosofia

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40

Sack, Fabian P. D. "A moral law for the jungle a Kantian exploration in corporate environmental ethics /." Access electronically, 2005. http://www.library.uow.edu.au/adt-NWU/public/adt-NWU20060731.153244/index.html.

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41

Johansson, Mattias. "The Human Cloning Era : On the doorstep to our posthuman future." Thesis, Linköping University, Centre for Applied Ethics, 2003. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-1858.

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Human reproductive cloning came to the public´s attention when Dolly the sheep was cloned in Scotland in 1997. This news quickly spread around the world causing both excitements at the possibilities of what cloning techniques could offer, as well as apprehension about the ethical, social and legal implications should human reproductive cloning become possible. Many international organisations and governments were concerned about the impact of human reproductive cloning on human health, dignity and human rights. To this day, many institutions have drafted resolutions, protocols and position statements outlining their concerns. This paper outlines some of the major ethical issues surrounding human reproductive cloning and the position towards this novel technique taken by three important international organisations - Council of Europe, World Health Organization, and United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization - expressed in different regulatory frameworks. Proponents of human cloning occasionally point out that cloned humans are already among us in the form of twins - people with identical sets of DNA - so what is the problem? Besides avoiding the fact that natural twins are always siblings, whereas a clone could be the twin of a parent or grandparent, this observation ignores a crucial moral difference: natural twins arrive as rare creations, not as specifically designed products. Instead of being an uncontrolled, self-regulated evolutionary process, creation of man through reproductive cloning are shifting from being natural to a state of instrumentality where parental interests constitutes what is important. This shift will inevitably lead to the child being a means for some other end (parental interests). However, this is not the same as being subdued into genetic determinism, but the point brought forward is the child´s lack of freedom caused by the interests of the parents. In this sense the clone´s genome constitutes a heavy backpack because of our pre-knowledge of its physical building blocks - or in other words its potentiality. Even though the argument of genetic determinism is a weak one, our subconscious"forces"us to create hopes upon the child because of its potentiality. No longer is the evolution the creator with the dices of randomness. A new gambler is in town and this time the dices are equilateral.

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42

Ngapmen, Jean-Pierre. "Le défi de l’éthique rationnelle dans la dynamique du développement à l’heure de la mondialisation : le mérite de Kant et de Habermas." Thesis, Paris 10, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA100072/document.

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Le développement et la globalisation apparaissent comme des réalités incontournables et irréversibles. Parce qu’ils mettent en action la plupart des pays du globe, les polémiques qu’ils engendrent ont mis a nu un véritable défi à relever. Celui d’une éthique rationnelle pouvant fournir les bases de référence, d’évaluation des actions humaines. Ce défi se présente soit comme présence négative ou encore comme présence positive. Tout se passe comme si notre modernité est en train de sombrer dans une ambiance délétère. Les promesses des lumières semblent avoir été trahies. Le concept de développement est devenu lui-même ambivalent du fait d’un décalage constaté entre son aspect mythique idéal et sa réalité historique. La mondialisation comme l’ont reconnu certains experts est en soi comme un avions sans pilote. Il y a urgence de tirer la sonnette d’alarme parce que la philosophie n’as plus pour vocation de se mouvoir dans un ciel intemporel des idées et qu’au contraire, elle doit répondre à une situation de crise, celle qui grève nos rapports interpersonnels, d’abord et nos rapports avec la nature. Comment alors fonder rationnellement un corpus morale ou juridique, effectivement dissuasif capable d’humaniser l’économie, la science, le commerce et le développement. Si les théories proposées telles que l’utilitarisme et le pragmatisme, sont demeurées inopérantes, le recours à d’autres théoriciens de la morale doit se faire avec empressement. KANT par sa morale du devoir, et HABERMAS par l’éthique de la discussion ou éthique communicationnelle ont jeté les bases qui permettent d’être optimiste. Cela ne fait aucun doute. Voilà ce que nous présentons dans notre attelage théorique Development and globalization appear as unavoidable and irreversible realities. Because they bring into action most countries of the world, the polemics they engender have exposed a real challenge to be met. The challenge of a rational ethic which can provide the basics reference for evaluation of human actions. This challenge presents itself either as a negative presence or as a positive presence. Everything happens as if our modernity is sinking into a deleterious atmosphere. The promises of the lights seem to have been betrayed. The concept of development has become ambivalent itself because of a discrepancy between its ideal mythical aspect and its historical reality. Globalization, as recognized by some experts, is in itself an unmanned aircraft. It is urgent to draw the alarm bell because philosophy no longer has the vocation of moving in a timeless sky of ideas and on the contrary, it must respond to a crisis situation, the one that undermines our relations Interpersonal, first and our relationship with nature. How then can we rationally set foundations for a moral or juridical effectively dissuasive corpus capable of humanizing the economy, science, trade and development. If the theories proposed, such as utilitarianism and pragmatism, have remained inoperative, recourse to other theorists of morality must be done with eagerness. KANT by his morality of duty, and HABERMAS by the ethics of discussion or communication ethics have laid the foundation for optimism. There is no doubt. This is what we present in this theoretical coupling

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Bassoli, Selma Aparecida. "O conceito de grandeza negativa na filosofia moral de Schopenhauer." [s.n.], 2005. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281553.

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Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Junior Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T01:23:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bassoli_SelmaAparecida_M.pdf: 270977 bytes, checksum: 441067c587503bb1b552422662bbc150 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 Resumo: Aplicamos o conceito matemático de grandeza negativa como um recurso que elucida aspectos da filosofia moral de Schopenhauer. Uma grandeza é negativa relativamente à outra, na medida em que só pode ser reunida a ela por oposição, quando uma suprime da outra o equivalente a si mesma. Utilizamos esse conceito para tratar da oposição entre as motivações, com o objetivo de evidenciar que um motivo leva à ação conforme suprime a influência, sobre o caráter, do motivo oposto. Também fizemos uso desse conceito para esclarecer a oposição entre a afirmação e a negação da vontade. Partindo da distinção entre nihil negativum e nihil privativum, adotada por Schopenhauer para tratar do nada que resulta da negação da vontade, mostramos que a vontade se nega à proporção que suprime o seu modo de afirmação anterior Abstract: We apply the mathematic concept of negative magnitude as a resource that elucidates Schopenhauer¿s aspects of moral philosophy. A magnitude is negative related to another as long it can be joint to it in opposition, when one suppresses the equivalent of itself from the other. We use this concept to deal with the opposition between the motivations, in order to realize that a motive leads to the action as it suppresses the opposite motive influence, on the character. We made use of this concept to elucidate the opposition between the affirmation and denial of will as well. Starting from the distinction between nihil negativum and nihil privativum, adopted by Schopenhauer to deal with nil resulted from the denial of will, we demonstrate that will is denied as it suppresses its previous affirmation mode Mestrado Mestre em Filosofia

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Scott, Liesel. "The meaning of work : an ethical perspective." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/21439.

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Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2008. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The central idea developed in this thesis is that meaningful work provides the normative standard of what work should be for all human beings, based on the normative idea that being human entails a realization of one’s potential and the expression of one’s intellect and creativity as a necessary part of living a full and flourishing life. Thus the key ethical foundation upon which my argument was built rests primarily upon classic Aristotelian ethical theory as well as more contemporary adaptations thereof. In reality, however, research reveals that up to eighty percent of people engage in work that is not meaningful in the sense that they are unable to experience both excellence and enjoyment through their work. This problem has been labeled as “employee disengagement” and has been acknowledged by organizations as a disturbingly growing trend particularly because of the financial cost it carries through lost productivity. My objective in this thesis was to outline the scope of the problem, and to make a strong case for the recognition of employee disengagement as a moral problem, and not simply as an economic one. Thus a major focus of this thesis was to unpack the concept of meaningful work and to argue for its moral value. Throughout my thesis, the importance of understanding meaningful work as a balance between both the subjective and objective elements that make work meaningful for the individual was emphasized. Having established employee disengagement as a moral problem, my attention then turned towards analyzing the potential causes of the problem at a systemic, organizational and individual level. My primary conclusion was that the modern paradigm facilitated a certain way of organizing business activity as well as a certain way of construing the relationship between work and life that has ultimately had a deep seated causal effect upon the absence of meaningful work. Thus addressing the problem entails a detachment from this paradigm and challenging some of the basic assumptions about organizational life. Finally, I proposed a business model that serves as a framework for a new way of working which has the capacity to be more fulfilling to the human spirit. This model assumes the tenets of virtue ethics as its core. In this model, individual employees, the organization as a community and leaders in the business all have specific roles and responsibilities to bring the model to life, and thus the quest for meaningful work has to be undertaken as a collaborative effort. The field of business ethics, with a refreshed Aristotelian mindset, has a lot of value to add in offering much needed ethical guidance to help steer this radical, yet exciting workplace transformation process in the right direction. AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kerngedagte van hierdie tesis is dat betekenisvolle arbeid die normatiewe standaard sou skep van wat werk vandonderstel is om vir die mensdom te beteken. Dit berus op die veronderstelling dat menswees meebring dat die individu se volle potensiaal, intelligensie en kreatiwiteit sal lei tot ‘n betekenisvolle bestaan. Die sleutelargument steun primêr die klassieke Aristoteliese etiese teorie asook hendendaagse aanpassings daarvan. Navorsing bewys egter dat tot 80% van die arbeidsmag betrokke is in betekenislose (sinlose) arbeid in die sin dat hulle geen genot of uitnemendheid ervaar nie. Die probleem word geetiketteer as “werknemersonttrekking” en word deur maatskappye beskou as ‘n onstellende tendens ten opsigte van die finansiële impak en die gepaardgaande verlies van produktiwiteit. Die oogmerk van die tesis is om die omvang van die probleem uit te lig en om redes aan te voer dat werknemers onttrekking as ‘n morele vraagstuk aangespreek moet word en nie net gesien sal word as ‘n finansiële dilemma nie. Die beweegrede van die tesis is om die begrip van betekenisvolle arbeid te ondersoek en om die morele aspek daarvan te debatteer. Die belangrikheid van die begrip, betekenisvolle arbeid, as ‘n balans tussen beide die subjektiewe en objektiewe beginsels word deurgaans onderstreep. Aangesien “werknemersonttrekking” as ‘n morele probleem beskou word is die oogmerk om die oorsake van die probleem te analiseer, op ‘n sistematiese, organisatoriese en individuele vlak. Die gevolgtrekking is dan dat die moderne paradigma ‘n sekere invloed het op die organisasie se besigheidsaktiwiteite en is ook ‘n metode om die verhouding tussen werk en bestaan te bepaal, wat uiteindelik ‘n diepgesete redegewende invloed het in die afwesigheid van sinvolle arbeid. ‘n Skeiding van die voorbeeld en die basiese veronderstelling van georganiseerde bestaan word benodig om begenoemde begrip te bevraagteken. Laastens is daar ‘n besigheidsmodel wat dien as ‘n raamwerk vir ‘n nuwe manier van werk, wat sal meebring dat werk meer vervulling aan die menslike gees sal bied. Díe model, veronderstel die beginsel van eerbare etiek as die grondslag. Werknemers van organisasies, die organisasie as ‘n gemeenskap en besigheidsleiers het spesifieke rolle en verantwoordelikhede, om lewe te gee aan die model. Daarvolgens moet die soeke na sinvolle arbied as ‘n kollektiewe poging beskou word. Die gebied van besigheidsetiek , met ‘n vernuwende Aristoteliese denkwyse, het tot voordeel , ‘n waardevolle bydrae tot ‘n onmisbare etiese leiding, om hierdie radikale maar opwindende transformasie in die werkplek mee te bring.

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Helfenstein, Mara Juliane Woiciechoski. "Juízo político em Hannah Arendt." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/13822.

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Esta dissertação apresenta a concepção de juízo político de Hannah Arendt. Afastando-se de uma leitura ortodoxa dos textos kantianos, Arendt vislumbra no juízo reflexionante estético de Kant a estrutura do juízo político. Em um constante diálogo com a obra kantiana a autora se apropria de vários conceitos, tanto conceitos constantes na Crítica da faculdade do juízo, que é a obra que ela afirma conter a verdadeira filosofia política de Kant, como conceitos de outras importantes obras kantianas. No decorrer deste texto, quando entendemos que ocorre uma apropriação conceitual buscamos situar minimamente o conceito no contexto da obra kantiana para compreendermos a concepção e o gesto interpretativo de Arendt. Através da análise de seus escritos mostramos como ela compreende o modo de funcionamento da faculdade humana de julgar os eventos políticos, por meio da exposição e discussão dos principais conceitos envolvidos em sua teoria. Assim, apresentamos as condições de possibilidade do juízo representadas pelas faculdades da imaginação e do senso comum, bem como as duas perspectivas pelas quais essa faculdade se manifesta no mundo público, o juízo do ator e o juízo do espectador. Depois, analisamos a conexão entre as faculdades de pensamento e juízo para extrair as implicações éticas da faculdade humana de julgar. Estas reflexões são uma tentativa de compreender como, para Arendt, opera a faculdade de julgar; por que ela considera esta faculdade a mais política das habilidades espirituais do homem, e qual é a relevância política desta atividade do espírito. This dissertation presents the conception of Hannah Arendt’s political judgment. Moving away from an orthodox reading of Kantian texts, Arendt glimpses in the aesthetic reflective judgment of Kant, the structure of the political judgment. In one constant dialogue with Kantian Work the author appropriates several concepts, as concepts constant in the Critique of judgment, which is the Work that she affirms that contains the true Kant’s political philosophy, as concepts of other important Kantian Works. In elapsing of this text, when we understand that a conceptual appropriation occurs, we try to situate the concept in the context of the Kantian Work to understand Arendt’s conception and the interpretation gesture. Through the analysis of her writings we show as she understands the way of functioning of the human faculty to judge the political events, by the exposition and debate of the main involved concepts in her theory. So, we present the conditions of judgment possibility represented by the faculties of the imagination and the common sense, as well as the two perspectives for which manifests this faculty in the public world, the judgment of the actor and the judgment of the spectator. After that, we analyze the connection between the faculties of thought and judgment to extract the ethical implications of the human faculty to judge. These reflections are an attempt to understand how does the faculty of judge operate for Arendt; why does she consider this faculty the most political of men’s mental abilities, and what is the politic relevance of this spirit’s activity.

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Brown, Walter. "Patents, pills, poverty and pandemic : the ethical issues /." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2003. http://eprints.ru.ac.za/142/.

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Söderberg, Almén Björn. "Den mångfasetterade Guden : Att inte begränsa Gud." Thesis, Enskilda Högskolan Stockholm, Teologiska högskolan Stockholm, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ths:diva-1119.

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Detta är en uppsats som tar sig an, på ett semantiskt sätt, ordet Gud och människors syn på vad ordet Gud har för betydelse. Genom att göra en idéanalys av Jonna Bornemarks analys av Nicolas Cusanus för att se om detta kan vara en väg för att ge en mera mångfasetterad bild och värde av ordet Gud och gudsbilden till den scientistiska människan i Sverige. Uppsatsen tar avstamp i att försöka visa på de nycklar Cusanus filosofi ger genom Jonna Bornemarks tolkning av Cusanus i Det omätbaras renässans. Nicholas Cusanus levde mellan åren 1401 och 1464. Cusanus var astronom, matematiker, teolog och filosof. En verklig renässansmänniska. Cusanus var en man som var på gränsen mellan skolastiken på medeltiden och renässansens mera kosmopolitiska livshållning som tiden gav. Cusanus var starkt influerad av den mystiken som bland annat Mäster Eckhart stod bakom. Den mystika negativa teologin som talade om att det är enklare att beskriva vad den kristna Gud inte är, än att berätta vad som Gud är. Cusanus studerade både Aristoteles och den Plotinos nyplatonska filosofin. Denna filosof kom jag kontakt med genom Cusanus lilla bok Gudsseendet med stort innehåll, vilket han skrev som en guide till munkarna i Tegernsee. Den behandlar den sinnliga bilden och de begrepp som gör att man kan se det som kan finnas bakom den ikoniska bilden. Den ikoniska bilden uppfattar Cusanus vara det djup som en bild kan vara bärare av. Det symboliska värdet på den bild som väcker åskådarens reflektion och reaktion. Den ikoniska bilden är bärare av detta djup som kan vara en utlösande av det personliga symboliska värdet för den specifika bilden. I Gudseendet är det en ikon som Cusanus kallar för ”Guds ikon”. Cusanus öppnade dörrar för mig i hur man kan tänka om att inte ser med de fysiska sinnena, utan måste använda sitt inre öga för att kunna se det som är större än det jag bara kan med de fysiska sinnena erfara. Startpunkten till denna uppsats är att kanske kunna förstå hur människan kan komma närmare det som inte sinnligt kan erfaras, den kunskapen menar Cusanus behöver människan för att vara en hel människa. Bornemark tar Cusanus filosofi till dagens samhällsproblem med att samhället alltid vill mäta allting. Studiens inriktning är att försöka svara på de frågor som uppsatsen ställer inför Bornemarks tolkning av Cusanus filosofi. På grund av corona utfördes framläggningen online.

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Saunders, Josiah Paul. "Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Philosophy and Religious Studies, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/992.

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This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.

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Melim, Laura Ann. "The active contrast between virtue and obligation (Aristotle, Immanuel Kant)." Thesis, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/16369.

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This study aims to restore to virtue, as manifest in action, a central place in ethical theory, by securing for virtuous action conceptual and evaluative independence from virtuous agency, on the one hand, and morally obligatory action, on the other. An Aristotelian, rather than a Kantian or consequentialist, perspective emerges as the perspective proper to a study of virtuous action. However, in its emphasis upon actions, rather than upon the qualities of agents, this study differs from Aristotle's ethics, as well as from most contemporary writings on virtue ethics. To establish the conceptual autonomy of virtuous action, relative to virtuous agency, I posit the primacy of virtue itself and identify virtuous action as secondary to, and informed by, virtue. An action is informed by virtue just in case it is good and fitting. A good action is one whose aim is good, where the aim of an action is neither the intention of the agent nor the actual or probable consequence of the action, but the consequence which a reasonable person would have grounds for inferring is the intended consequence of the action. Virtuous action, so defined, has value and is not merely the expression of the agent's virtue or good motives. Hence, the value of virtuous action does not derive from the agent's virtue or the value of his motives. I distinguish virtuous action from morally obligatory action in three ways: (1) by showing that some obligatory actions lack fittingness, which is a necessary condition for virtuous action; (2) by showing that my definition of virtuous action distinguishes the concept of virtuous action from the deontic concepts of special obligation, supererogation and imperfect duty; (3) by arguing that the ethical perspective proper to an analysis of the nature of virtuous action is genuinely distinct from the ethical perspective which informs modern theories of obligation. Examining the question of the limits of obligation, I argue that there are actions which are morally good and non-obligatory, by proposing criteria of non-obligatoriness in actions and by presenting four examples of actions which, given these criteria, are non-obligatory, yet are virtuous and moral.

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Saunders, Joe. "Kant's departure from Hume's moral naturalism : a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy /." 2007. http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/etd/adt-NZCU20080114.085033.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Kant, Immanuel, Ethics. Virtue'

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