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Journal articles on the topic 'Kantian'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 February 2022

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1

Mota, Lindomar Rocha. "O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO CRITICISMO DE KANT: EVOLUÇÃO E PROBLEMAS NA PASSAGEM DO PÓS AO NEOKANTISMO." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 43, no. 135 (May 1, 2016): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v43n135p121-142/2016.

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Resumo: Este artigo discute a evolução do pensamento kantiano a partir do conceito de coisa-em-si. A divisão da realidade entre fenômeno e noumeno marca claramente uma preocupação posterior nos discípulos e seguidores deste autor. O modo como os ditos conceitos evoluíram, de maneira diferente é tema principal na reelaboração constitutiva do Criticismo. Dois pontos são ressaltados no debate: a visão dos pós-kantianos e Neokantianos, especialmente Liebmann e Cohen, seguidores tardios que julgaram ser necessária uma adaptação à filosofia kantiana. Em todo caso, é possível perceber a pouca fidelidade de ambos ao pensamento do autor. A filosofia crítica deixa de ser o parâmetro de sua própria interpretação para entrar num projeto puramente evolutivo a respeito da ética, da metafísica e da história.Abstract: This article discusses the evolution of Kantian thought from the notion of the thing-in-itself. The division of reality between phenomenon and noumenon clearly became a concern for Kant’s disciples and followers. The ways these concepts develop is the central theme of the constitutive reworking of Criticism. Two points are emphasized in the debate: the vision of the post-Kantians and that of the neo-Kantians, especially Liebmann and Cohen, later followers who felt it necessary to adapt Kantian philosophy to new challenges. In any case, both tendencies show little fidelity to the author’s thought. Critical philosophy ceases to be the parameter of its own interpretation to enter into a purely evolutionary project about ethics, metaphysics and history.

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Figueira, Márcio Alves, and Rodrigo Vicente Maia Mendes. "A FUNDAMENTAÇÃO KANTIANA DA DOUTRINA DA INCORPORAÇÃO DO BILL OF RIGHTS." Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito 5, no. 2 (December 20, 2019): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.26668/indexlawjournals/2526-012x/2019.v5i2.5831.

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RESUMOO artigo científico visa esclarecer a fundamentação kantiana da doutrina da incorporação do Bill of Rights. A Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos estendeu o Bill of Rights aos Estados. Neste trabalho pretendemos demonstrar a fundamentação kantiana na doutrina da incorporação do Bill of Rights, abordando a corrente filosófica do utilitarismo e do contratualismo. Em primeiro lugar, examinaremos o precedente da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) e em seguida analisaremos filosoficamente o precedente. Em relação aos procedimentos metodológicos esta pesquisa caracteriza-se como qualitativa e descritiva, uma revisão de literaturas por meio de livros, revistas especializadas e periódicos.Palavras-Chave: Bill of Rights; Doutrina da Incorporação; Utilitarismo; Contratualismo; Imperativo categórico kantiano. ABSTRACTThe scientific article aims to clarify the Kantian foundation of the doctrine of incorporation of the Bill of Rights. The United States Supreme Court has extended the Bill of Rights to the states. In this paper we intend to demonstrate the Kantian grounding in the doctrine of incorporation of the Bill of Rights, addressing the philosophical current of utilitarianism and contractualism. First, we will examine the precedent of the United States Supreme Court Gideon v. Wainwright and then we will philosophically analyze the precedent. Regarding the methodological procedures this research is characterized as qualitative and descriptive, literature review through books.Keywords: Bill of rights; Doctrine of Incorporation; Utilitarianism; Contractualism; Kantian categorical imperative.

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3

Editorial, Equipe. "Editor’s note." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 7, no. 1 (July 23, 2019): 9–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2019.v7n1.02.p9.

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Just as the last issue of Estudos Kantianos, published in January, the current one contains articles from what is to be a future Kantian Electronic Lexicon in Portuguese Language [Léxico Kantiano Eletrônico em Língua Portuguesa], an enterprise which began in mid-2015 and congregates a few dozens of Brazilian and Portuguese collaborators, as well as German, Argentinian, Spanish, Italian and North-American scholars.

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Niquet, Marcel. "FACTICITY AND SOCIOCENTRISM: SOME REMARKS CONCERNING TWO BASIC CONCEPTS OF MORAL THEORY." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 35, no. 113 (April 6, 2010): 301. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v35n113p301-318/2008.

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Faticidade e sociocentrismo são dois conceitos fundamentais com os quais toda teoria moral se vê confrontada. O artigo enquadra o significado deles na deontologia clássica kantiana e no paradigma pós-kantiano da ética do discurso. A discussão dos problemas implicados nesses conceitos leva o autor a defender um paradigma do Realismo Normativo que faz justiça ao conteúdo crítico desses conceitos e às intuições morais contidas neles.Abstract: ´Facticity´ and ´socio-centrism´ denote major structural features of theories of morality. The paper explicates their core-meaning and tries to demonstrate how these notions are instantiated in classical Kantian deontology and the post-Kantian paradigms of discourse-ethics. A justification is attempted for abandoning these theories in favour of a possible successor paradigm of Normative Realism which does better justice to the critical content of these concepts and the morally loaded intuitions contained therein.

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Sanchez-Perez, Jorge H. "Deberes de caridad, deberes de justicia y la creación del otro en la tradición kantiana." Sílex 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.53870/uarm2020.n122.

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Este artículo sostiene que hay problemas importantes en la tradición kantiana, en la medida en que existe una tendencia persistente a atribuir valor intrínseco basado en la existencia de capacidades cognitivamente relevantes. Además, se argumenta que después de un análisis de la obra de Kant, la exclusión de seres moralmente relevantes es una inclinación prevalente de la tradición. El trabajo de Rawls es utilizado para mostrar cómo, del racismo, el proyecto kantiano pasa al capacitismo. En la conclusión, se demuestra que incluso una versión más contemporánea y abierta de la tradición kantiana, como la defendida por Korsgaard, sigue vinculada a los mismos problemas que las formulaciones anteriores de la tradición. In this paper, there are important problems in the Kantian tradition that are argued, insofar as there is a persistent tendency to attribute intrinsic value based on the existence of cognitively distinct capacities. Furthermore, it is argued that after an analysis of the work of Kant the exclusion of morally relevant beings is a prevalent inclination of the tradition. The work of Rawls is used to show how from racism, the project moves on to ableism. In the conclusions, is showed that even a more contemporary and open version of the Kantian tradition, such as the one defended by Korsgaard, is still bound to the same problems as the previous formulations of the tradition.

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6

Yamamoto, Tales. "CONSEQUENCIALISMO KANTIANO DE DAVID CUMMISKEY NA FÓRMULA DA LEI UNIVERSAL." PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília 9, no. 18 (August 31, 2020): 125–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/pl.v9i18.30539.

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Neste artigo, busca-se reproduzir o primeiro argumento de David Cummiskey em Kantian Consequantialism e, em seguida, realizar uma avaliação crítica dele. Tal avaliação é realizada através de duas objeções que recorrem à epistemologia kantiana: a primeira objeção demonstra que o imperativo fornecido pelo autor recorre à empiria; a segunda explicita a condição contida no pressuposto do imperativo. Esta segunda objeção bifurca-se em dois argumentos: o primeiro é contra as intuições morais, e o segundo figura como um contraexemplo hipotético. Nesse sentido, exemplos e experimentos mentais são utilizados ao longo do texto como argumentos complementares. Conclui-se que a tentativa de um consequencialismo kantiano está em fundamental oposição com sua epistemologia e, portanto, deve ser rejeitada.

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7

PODOKSIK, EFRAIM. "NEO-KANTIANISM AND GEORG SIMMEL'S INTERPRETATION OF KANT." Modern Intellectual History 13, no. 3 (December 15, 2014): 597–622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1479244314000663.

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This essay explores the development of Georg Simmel's interpretation of Immanuel Kant's philosophy in the context of neo-Kantianism and its preoccupation with the question of unity in modern diversity. It argues that the neo-Kantian movement can be divided into two periods: in the first, unity was addressed with regard to Kant's epistemology; in the second period, the main issue was the overall coherence of Kantian teaching. Simmel, who belonged to the younger generation of neo-Kantians, absorbed the conclusions of the previous generation that purged Kantian epistemology from its metaphysical foundations related to the noumenal world. Yet he did not share the views of his peers who considered Kant to be the philosopher of cultural plurality. On the contrary, he argued that Kant's system is thoroughly intellectualistic, and that ethics, aesthetics and religion within it are subordinated to logic. At the same time, his own philosophy presupposed cultural plurality akin to that of other neo-Kantians. In other words, Simmel abandoned Kant in order to develop his own version of neo-Kantianism.

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Tiffany, Evan. "How Kantian Must Kantian Constructivists Be?" Inquiry 49, no. 6 (December 2006): 524–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201740601016205.

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9

Zieliński, Paweł. "The Relationships and Differences of the Kantian Philosophy and Pedagogy in Regard to Postmodern Pedagogic." Studia Edukacyjne, no. 48 (April 15, 2018): 115–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/se.2018.48.8.

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The aim of the study is articulated in the title. The author is reconstructing Kantian philosophy and pedagogic, the thesis of postmodernism and post-modern pedagogic and indicates the relationships and differences of those two systems. Both Kant and the Baden-based neo-Kantians enabled the emancipation of the humanities. The Kantian model of pedagogy was the basis for pedagogic directions, belonging to the meta-theory of humanistic education and critical pedagogy, especially the postmodern one. There are clear links with Kantian ideas of pedagogy, the way to capture the role of dignity, knowledge and freedom in the morality of a human being. There are also significant differences: Kant did not include to his pedagogy social, political and pluralistic questions, which are so important in postmodern pedagogy.

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10

Wicks, Andrew C. "How Kantian a Theory of Kantian Capitalism?" Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics 1 (1998): 61–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ruffinx199817.

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11

Forrester, Stefan. "Why Kantian Symbols Cannot Be Kantian Metaphors." Southwest Philosophy Review 28, no. 2 (2012): 107–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201228246.

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12

Cholbi, Michael. "A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide." Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, no. 4 (2010): 489–515. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552410x511455.

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AbstractKant's claim that the rational will has absolute value or dignity appears to render any prudential suicide morally impermissible. Although the previous appeals of Kantians (e. g., David Velleman) to the notion that pain or mental anguish can compromise dignity and justify prudential suicide are unsuccessful, these appeals suggest three constraints that an adequate Kantian defense of prudential suicide must meet. Here I off er an account that meets these constraints. Central to this account is the contention that some suicidal agents, because they are unable to fashion a rational conception of their own happiness, are diminished with respect to their dignity of humanity, and as a result, lack the pricelessness that makes prudential suicide wrong on a Kantian view.

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13

Smyth, Nicholas. "Integration and authority: rescuing the ‘one thought too many’ problem." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 6 (December 2018): 812–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1415105.

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AbstractFour decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along.

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14

Merritt, Melissa McBay. "Practical Reason and Respect for Persons." Kantian Review 22, no. 1 (January 31, 2017): 53–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415416000376.

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AbstractMy project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians take practical reasoning to be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the grounds that it need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this conception of practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical debate — each side of which, I argue, points to issues that need to be jointly accommodated in the account of practical reason. From the constructivist, I accept the essential efficacy of practical reason; from the realist, I accept that any genuinely cognitive exercise of practical reason owes allegiance to what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. I conclude that a Kantian account of recognition respect enables us to accommodate both claims.

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15

Carr, David. "Kantian Humility." International Philosophical Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2000): 109–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200040164.

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Baxley, Anne Margaret. "Kantian Virtue." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 3 (May 2007): 396–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00079.x.

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17

Denis, Lara, and David Cummiskey. "Kantian Consequentialism." Philosophical Review 107, no. 1 (January 1998): 130. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998324.

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Irwin, Terence. "Kantian Autonomy." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55 (September 2004): 137–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008663.

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Kant takes autonomy to be recognizably valuable. In claiming that non-Kantian views of morality treat the morally good will as heteronomous, he intends to present an objection to these views. He expects proponents of these views to recognize that the implication of heteronomy is a serious objection; his task is not to convince them that heteronomy is bad, but to convince them that their views imply heteronomy.

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19

Bailey, Tom. "Kantian Deeds." British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 5 (September 2012): 1039–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2012.717910.

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Hill,, Thomas E. "Kantian Pluralism." Ethics 102, no. 4 (July 1992): 743–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293446.

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21

KLEINGELD, PAULINE. "Kantian Patriotism." Philosophy Public Affairs 29, no. 4 (October 2000): 313–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2000.00313.x.

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22

Sher, George. "Kantian Fairness." Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 (October 2005): 179–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00060.x.

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Zavediuk, Nicholas. "Kantian Hospitality." Peace Review 26, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 170–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2014.906881.

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Elizondo, E. Sonny. "Kantian Cognitivism." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101, no. 4 (November 18, 2020): 711–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12326.

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Palmquist, Stephen R. "Kantian Redemption." Philosophia Christi 9, no. 1 (2007): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc2007914.

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Cummiskey, David. "Kantian Consequentialism." Ethics 100, no. 3 (April 1990): 586–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/293212.

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Kriegel, Uriah. "Kantian Monism." Philosophical Papers 41, no. 1 (March 2012): 23–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.662806.

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Roemer, John E. "Kantian Equilibrium." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 112, no. 1 (March 2010): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01592.x.

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Baldwin, Tom. "Kantian Modality." Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76, no. 1 (July 1, 2002): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00087.

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Millgram, Elijah. "Kantian Crystallization." Ethics 114, no. 3 (April 2004): 511–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/382248.

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Stewart, Hamish. "Kantian Police." New Criminal Law Review 17, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2014.17.1.1.

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Limits on consent in penal law flow not just from traditional criminal law problems such as consensual harms in the law of assault, but also from the way that regulatory offenses limit individuals’ ability to contract out of or to consent to departures from their requirements. For a Kantian who understands the justification of public power as connected only to the task of providing a rightful condition for free and purposive agents, these limits, and the police power from which they flow, are puzzling. It is not obvious, for example, how a fully consensual departure from a safety regulation or the mere possession of a firearm is inconsistent with the freedom and purposiveness of all. The possibility of penally enforced regulatory law, of Kantian police, can be explained as follows. The task of a legal order in a rightful condition includes the enactment of those public laws that are required for the creation or maintenance of a rightful condition but that cannot be understood purely in terms of protecting one private person’s purposiveness from the intrusion of other private persons. The regulatory law that is justified by these public tasks will frequently have a paternalistic appearance and therefore will frequently disregard the consent of the persons to whom it applies. But these limits on consent are characteristically by-products of its necessarily public nature rather than part of its justification.

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Kain, P. "Kantian Ethics." Philosophical Review 119, no. 1 (December 9, 2009): 104–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-029.

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Dorrien. "Kantian Concepts, Liberal Theology, and Post-Kantian Idealism." American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 33, no. 1 (2012): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/amerjtheophil.33.1.0005.

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Forgie, J. William. "Hyper–Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical Experience." Religious Studies 21, no. 2 (June 1985): 205–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500017194.

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Much work on mystical experience has taken for granted a certain view about the relation between experience and its interpretation. This ‘traditional view’ has received perhaps its most explicit statement in Stace's Mysticism and Philosophy. It is a view which is attractive to proponents of the doctrine of unanimity, the doctrine (roughly put) that at the phenomenological level all mystical experiences are basically similar. Recently, however, in a growing body of literature, the traditional view has come under heavy fire. Its critics adopt a Kantian, indeed a hyper–Kantian, picture of experience. And they see the traditional view, accordingly, as ‘naïve’ and ‘simplistic’. In addition, hyper–Kantians typically reject the doctrine of unanimity.

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CHENG, CHUNG-YING. "INCORPORATING KANTIAN GOOD WILL (2) A CONFUCIAN-KANTIAN SYNTHESIS." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 4 (November 14, 2011): 602–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2011.01678.x.

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Cheng, Chung-Ying. "Incorporating Kantian Good Will (2) A Confucian–Kantian Synthesis." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 4 (March 1, 2011): 602–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03804009.

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Zanella, Diego Carlos. "RELIGIÃO MORAL E ANALOGIA EM KANT." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 37, no. 117 (May 6, 2010): 45. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v37n117p45-55/2010.

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O texto visa fornecer uma explicação da metáfora kantiana de círculos concêntricos com o objetivo de compreender como Kant entende a religião moral proposta com tal metáfora e a questão da analogia aí envolvida. Essa leitura não se compromete em momento algum em fazer uma avaliação do conteúdo da religião cristã ao explicar tal metáfora, embora, às vezes, faça alguma afirmação a esse respeito. Com efeito, o texto é apenas um comentário acerca da estrutura formal da metáfora kantiana de círculos concêntricos e dos elementos que a compõem.ABSTRACT: This paper aims to provide an explanation of the Kantian metaphor of concentric circles in order to comprehend how Kant understands both the moral religion proposed with such a metaphor, and the issue of analogy, which is also involved in it. No commitment whatsoever is made to assess the Christian religion, even though the explanation of Kant’s metaphor can, at times, lead to some statements on it. The paper is nothing but a comment about the formal structure of the Kantian metaphor of concentric circles and about the elements that compose it.

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López, Diana María. "Hanna Arendt y la Crítica de la Facultad de Juzgar." Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe, no. 8-9 (June 10, 2018): 105–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.14409/topicos.v0i8-9.7408.

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El núcleo central de este trabajo consiste en presentar a la Crítica de la Facultad de Juzgar de Kant como un recurso significativo en la formación del pensamiento político de Hanna Arendt. Según la interpretación que la autora realiza del juicio reflexivo y su vinculación con la comunidad ampliada presente en la concepción kantiana de sensus communis, es posible considerar una redefinición del juicio ahora más ligada a la contingencia de la acción y a la pluralidad de los espectadores en el ámbito de la esfera política. En síntesis, se trata de señalar los aspectos más problemáticos de la localización del legado de Kant en los últimos trabajos de Arendt a la vez que llamar la atención sobre la cuestión concerniente a la importancia del aporte kantiano a los ejes centrales del debate de la teoría política contemporánea. AbstractThe core of this paper consists of presenting Kant's Critique of the Faculty of Judgment as a significant resource in the formation of Hanna Arendt's political thought. According to Arendt's interpretation of reflective judgment and its relation to the enlarged community that is present in the kantian conception of sensus communis, a redefinition of judgment, now closer to the contingency of action and the plurality of spectators in the realm of the political sphere is possible to consider. In short, the aim is to point out the most problematic aspects of tracing Kant's legacy in Arendt's latter works as well as to draw attention to the question concerning the importance of the kantian contribution to the key points of the discussion of contemporary political theory.

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Alechnowicz-Skrzypek, Iwona. "Neokantysta w laboratorium psychologicznym — Richarda Hönigswalda poszukiwanie zasad bytu psychicznego." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 14, no. 3 (August 27, 2019): 113–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.14.3.8.

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Neo-Kantian in the Psychological Laboratory — Richard Hӧnigswald’s Research on the Principles of Mental BeingThe specificity of Richard Hӧnigswald’s attitude to the issues raised in the Neo-Kantian philosophy was clearly visible in his approach to psychology. First of all, this covered the question of the objectivity of cognizance. Like other Neo-Kantian philosophers, Hӧnigswald undertook in his work both the problem of the relationship between philosophy and psychology and the problem of psychologism. Unlike the representants of both Neo-Kantians schools, he took up psychology practically. In the years 1916–1930 he led the psychological laboratory of the Philosophical Seminar at the University of Wrocław, where he conducted a study of the process of thinking. Hӧnigswald took up psychology as he intended to expand the question of objectivity by the subjectivity conditions of cognizance, among which the most important was a synthesis in the way that Kant used this term — primary apperception, i.e. the unity of Self-Knowledge. According to Hӧnigswald, there is no knowledge beyond the knowing subject — an experience centre in which cognitive acts take place. In this way, Hӧnigswald extended the epistemological questions by the notion of ontology of thinking — the theory of mental existence.

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Quinn, Philip L. "Kantian Philosophical Ecclesiology." Faith and Philosophy 17, no. 4 (2000): 512–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil200017435.

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Bailey, Tom. "Nietzsche’s Kantian Ethics." International Studies in Philosophy 35, no. 3 (2003): 5–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil2003353167.

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42

Haskins, Casey. "The Kantian Sublime." International Studies in Philosophy 24, no. 3 (1992): 136–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil1992243131.

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43

Frankena, William K. "Kantian Ethics Today." Journal of Philosophical Research 15 (1990): 47–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_1990_4.

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44

Sievert, Donald. "Whence Kantian Synthesis." Southwest Philosophy Review 23, no. 2 (2007): 41–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200723233.

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Hoffman, Sarah. "Kantian Harm Reduction." Health Care Analysis 28, no. 4 (October 16, 2020): 335–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10728-020-00408-8.

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Sherman, Nancy. "Concrete Kantian Respect." Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no. 1 (1998): 119–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003095.

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When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. No doubt, part of the appeal of the Kantian notion of respect is that it offers an intuitive way of talking about the wrongness of manipulation and coercion, and in general, the wrongness of unfairly taking advantage of another. For to respect persons is to take seriously their status as persons, and to forswear, at some level, actions and attitudes that would compromise their dignity. Talking about respect has become shorthand for signaling deontological concerns. More formally, within recent Kantian exegesis, respect is viewed as yielding a more accessible and less contrived account of the Categorical Imperative than the more traditional criterion of universalizability and the contradictions tests applied to it. Within the Kantianinspired political theory of John Rawls, respect is also a core notion, representing a pervasive good, the bases of which, just states have an obligation to distribute to their members. Yet, for all its appeal, respect is an odd feature of Kantian ethics. For it is an emotion in a theory that prides itself in grounding morality in principles of reason alone. In this essay, I draw attention to the importance of respect in Kant's account in order to show just how he makes room for the emotions. Indeed, I shall argue that on Kant's account of full moral agency, we are emotional as well as rational creatures. Although Kant often portrays respect as an abstract emotional attitude mysteriously connected to our rationality, I argue that on a suitable revision, respect can be transformed into a more concrete attitude, cultivated and expressed alongside other emotions requisite for full virtue.

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Lyas, Colin, and Anthony Savile. "Kantian Aesthetics Pursued." Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 175 (April 1994): 270. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219756.

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Rivera, Faviola. "Kantian Ethical Duties." Kantian Review 11 (March 2006): 78–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400002259.

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Perfect ethical duties have usually puzzled commentators on Kant's ethics because they do not fit neatly within his taxonomy of duties. Ethical duties require the adoption of maxims of ends: the happiness of others and one's own perfection are Kant's two main categories. These duties, he claims, are of wide obligation because they do not specify what in particular one ought to do, when, and how much. They leave ‘a latitude for free choice’ as he puts it. Perfect duties, however, such as the duties of respect, to avoid suicide, lying, and servility, do not appear to require the adoption of ends but only the performance or omission of specific types of actions. The puzzle is how these duties can be ethical, and therefore wide. Faced with this difficulty, Mary Gregor denies that perfect ethical duties are wide. She claims that they are an ‘anomaly’ and that they do not belong to ethics proper but to moral philosophy in general. She argues that these duties are derived from the categorical imperative, instead of, as Kant himself appears to have thought, the first principle of virtue. Taking a very different approach, Onora O'Neill finds the perfect/imperfect distinction of little importance and suggests doing without it altogether. Most other interpreters also assume that ‘wide’ is opposed to ‘perfect’ so that a wide perfect duty is a conceptual impossibility.

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Biss, Mavis. "Kantian Moral Striving." Kantian Review 20, no. 1 (January 30, 2015): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415414000260.

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AbstractThis paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kant’s explanation of the duty of moral self-perfection. What kinds of activity count as striving for purity in one’s disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge.

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Dean, Richard. "Cummiskey's Kantian Consequentialism." Utilitas 12, no. 1 (March 2000): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800002594.

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In Kantian Consequentialism, David Cummiskey argues that the central ideas of Kant's moral philosophy provide claims about value which, if applied consistently, lead to consequentialist normative principles. While Kant himself was not a consequentialist, Cummiskey thinks he should have been, given his fundamental positions in ethics. I argue that Cummiskey is mistaken. Cummiskey's argument relies on a non-Kantian idea about value, namely that value can be defined, and objects with value identified, conceptually prior to and independent of the choices that a rational agent would make. The contrasting Kantian concept of value is that to possess value is to be the object of (one sort or other) of rational choice. Inasmuch as Cummiskey gives no reason to reject the Kantian account of value in favour of his own (consequentialist) account, his argument does not establish that Kant's ethics inevitably leads to normative consequentialism.

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