Academic literature on the topic 'Katanga secession'

AbstractThis article examines the Baluba Association of Katanga (Balubakat) from its creation in 1957 until its dissolution in 1964, as well as its leader Jason Sendwe. Despite not receiving much scholarly coverage hitherto, Sendwe and the Balubakat played an important part in undermining the Katangese secession, along with the UN and the Congolese National Army (ANC). This article's focus on the Balubakat and Sendwe challenges the traditional historical focus on top parties, such as the National Congolese Movement (MNC), and their leaders, such as Patrice Lumumba, when examining Congolese decolonisation. Sendwe's pragmatic, non-aligned stance helped the Balubakat maintain the support of powerful institutions, such as the Great Lakes Railway Company (CFL). His ability to hold the Balubakat together also derived from its members’ common wish to oppose the Katangese secession. Yet the efficacy of Sendwe's leadership was best demonstrated after the party disbanded following his assassination.

Post-colonial Africa has experienced relatively few contested states, defined as entities whose purported statehood is widely challenged by existing states. During the 1960s and 1970s the self-proclaimed states of Katanga, Biafra and Rhodesia encountered serious deficits in international recognition. The same fate befell the independent Bantustans created by South Africa. Today only the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and Somaliland fall in this category. The pair’s remarkable longevity shows that they cannot be wished away. Nor can Africa ignore the conflict potential attached to the very existence of the two disputed states. The African Union’s endorsement of the notion of sovereignty as responsibility provides moral obligations, pragmatic incentives and R2P-associated tools for dealing with the challenges posed by current and future contested states. The African Union could, however, consider two adaptations to R2P procedures. The first is the designation of established contested states as ‘territories of concern’ to highlight the necessity of collective R2P-type initiatives to resolve these situations. The second calls for the introduction of a ‘secessionism alert’ as part of the au’s early-warning system to try to prevent violent secession and the likely birth of contested states.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Negotiating a New Life: Burdens of Empire and Independence—the Case of the BalticsThe Soviet Union disappeared in 1991 but, dying, gave birth to many new shoots of life, each struggling to survive and flourish despite great difficulties. Devolution of empire rarely proceeds without pain; it often causes, or results from, great violence. The first year of independent life for the successor states of the USSR witnessed much less violence than attended the demise of other great empires in this century. None had to fight for liberation as did Algeria and Angola. The fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia does not approach the violence seen in the breakup of India, the attempted secessions of Katanga and Biafra, or the Croatian-Serbian war.

Jef van Bilsen, The Independence of the Congo and his view of Lumumba This article gives an overview of the involvement of Professor Jef Van Bilsen in Belgian politics before and during the Second World War and during the decolonisation of the Belgian Congo. It is based mainly on the statements and writings of Van Bilsen himself and on interviews with him. These personal testimonies are complemented with brief comments from others on Van Bilsen. Van Bilsen’s political career reveals a unique and interesting evolution. Before the Second World War, he became active in the Flemish emancipation struggle. As a student and young lawyer, he was a leading member of the elitist right wing movement, Verdinaso, which strove for the unification of Belgium and the Netherlands. During the war, he joined, together with a group of Verdinaso members, the royalist armed resistance against the German occupation. Immediately after the war, his commitment and his personal contacts allowed him to become a journalist in Central Africa, where he was brought face to face with the narrow-minded Belgian colonial policy and where he forged contacts with the first Congolese nationalists. In the early fifties, Van Bilsen returned to Belgium, where he became a professor in colonial and development matters and started advocating the planning of an independence process for the Belgian colonies in a political and academic environment that was very hostile to any idea of decolonisation. When the Belgian government in I960, under internal and international pressure, was obliged to grant independence, we see Van Bilsen offering his services as an adviser to the Congolese nationalists. During the independence talks and immediately after independence, the first President, Kasavubu, recruited him as a personal adviser. Van Bilsen declared in later interviews that he tried to act as a neutral adviser. During the conflict between President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Lumumba and the Katangese leader Tshombe, he strove for reconciliation between the three opponents and for a UN-sponsored political compromise He strongly condemned Belgian support for the secession of Katanga. Although Van Bilsen declared himself to be personally sympathetic to Lumumba, he was accused openly by Lumumba of defending Belgian and western interests. Finally, Van Bilsen was forced to leave the Congo but he continued to advocate an agreement between Kasavubu, Lumumba and Tshombe. In New York at the UN-sessions on the Congo-crisis, he argued forcefully for a resolute commitment to this policy on the part of the UN and that Belgium take a back seat in Congolese politics. In his later career as professor and as founder of the Belgian Overseas Co-operation Service, Van Bilsen became a determined defender of unconditional co-operation, a co-operation which was not tied to the economic and financial interests of western donors. He also continued to stress fervently the importance of the UN for the development of the Third World. The overview of Van Bilsen’s political career reveals the role that personal networks can play in contacts, even in circles whose members find themselves in opposing camps. It also shows how Van Bilsen’s confrontation with the colonial and post-colonial situation in Central Africa led him to insist on the formation of an African elite which was committed to political and social emancipation.

This article gives an overview of the involvement of Professor Jef Van Bilsen in Belgian politics before and during the Second World War and during the decolonisation of the Belgian Congo. It is based mainly on the statements and writings of Van Bilsen himself and on interviews with him. These personal testimonies are complemented with brief comments from others on Van Bilsen. Van Bilsen's political career reveals a unique and interesting evolution. Before the Second World War, he became active in the Flemish emancipation struggle. As a student and young lawyer, he was a leading member of the elitist right wing movement, Verdinaso, which strove for the unification of Belgium and the Netherlands. During the war, he joined, together with a group ofVerdinaso members, the royalist armed resistance against the German occupation. Immediately after the war, his commitment and his personal contacts allowed him to become a journalist in Central Africa, where he was brought face to face with the narrow-minded Belgian colonial policy and where he forged contacts with the first Congolese nationalists.In the early fifties, Van Bilsen returned to Belgium, where he became a professor in colonial and development matters and started advocating the planning of an independence process for the Belgian colonies in a political and academic environment that was very hostile to any idea of decolonisation. When the Belgian government in 1960, under internal and international pressure, was obliged to grant independence, we see Van Bilsen offering his services as an adviser to the Congolese nationalists. During the independence talks and immediately after independence, the first President, Kasavubu, recruited him as a personal adviser. Van Bilsen declared in later interviews that he tried to act as a neutral adviser. During the conflict between President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Lumumba and the Katangese leader Tshombe, he strove for reconciliation between the three opponents and for a UN-sponsored political compromise. He strongly condemned Belgian support for the secession of Katanga. Although Van Bilsen declared himself to be personally sympathetic to Lumumba, he was accused openly by Lumumba of defending Belgian and western interests. Finally, Van Bilsen was forced to leave the Congo but he continued to advocate an agreement between Kasavubu, Lumumba and Tshombe. In New York at the UN-sessions on the Congo-crisis, he argued forcefully for a resolute commitment to this policy on the part of the UN and that Belgium take a back seat in Congolese politics. In his later career as professor and as founder of the Belgian Overseas Co-operation Service, Van Bilsen became a determined defender of unconditional co-operation, a co-operation which was not tied to the economic and financial interests of western donors. He also continued to stress fervently the importance of the UN for the development of the Third World. The overview of Van Bilsen's political career reveals the role that personal networks can play in contacts, even in circles whose members find themselves in opposing camps. It also shows how Van Bilsen's confrontation with the colonial and post-colonial situation in Central Afrika led him to insist on the formation of an African elite which was committed to political and social emancipation.KEY WORDS: Belgian recent history, Belgian Congo, Congo's independence, Lumumba, Second World War

This chapter uses the case studies of the Suez crisis (1956) and the UN mandate for peacekeeping in the Congo (1960-61) to illustrate and analyze in detail the Hammarskjöld diplomacy within his value-based framework, and the context of the rivalry between the Western and Eastern bloc as well as the non-aligned countries of the Global South emerging. It suggests that Hammarskjöld practiced an anti-hegemonic policy. Particular attention is paid to the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, and the limitations placed on securing lasting peace and stability after the secession of Katanga under Moise Tshombe, and also his support from Belgium. In addition, this chapter discusses the dilemmas Hammarskjöld faced due to having a vague mandate and also increasingly conflicting with the interests of both the East and the West in the UN Security Council. It seeks to balance his achievements and failures, putting Hammarskjöld’s individual leadership into the wider context of the institutional framework. The UN Security Council’s mandates set boundaries and demarcations, which not only allowed for interventions, but often limited decisive action.