Academic literature on the topic 'Kesavananda Bharati'

The Supreme Court of India acts as a Constitutional Court as well as the highest appellate court. The Constitution imposes mandatory minimum requirements for the strength of the Bench for constitutional adjudication. The apex Court has been criticized for constituting fewer number of Constitution benches, and for delaying the disposal of constitutional matters. Many Constitutional questions are being decided upon by Division benches or Constitutional benches, consisting of merely three members, due to prolific appeals in the Supreme Court. The researcher aims to analyze the question ‘whether the size of the Bench matters for constitutional adjudication?’ The article in the light of Constitutional provisions and the Supreme Court Rules, focuses on the impact of small and large benches, particularly in the highest Court of the land, where constitutional questions are decided upon. The Kesavananda Bharati case has been employed to examine the pros and cons of a large Bench, and the recent NJAC case is analyzed to bring out the problems of a smaller Bench, in overruling the decision of a larger Bench. The researcher therefore, attempts to answer the * Assistant Professor, SRM School of Law, SRM University, Kattankulathur, Tamil Nadu, India; muthukumarml@gmail.com question whether a minimum required strength of the Bench in constitutional adjudication is required for the organic development of constitutional jurisprudence in our country.

The tipping point in the history of judicial appointments in India was the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala ((1973) 4 SCC 225). In this essay that spans the tumultuous period between this judgment and the end of the Emergency (in 1977) when Indira Gandhi was prime minister, the author demonstrates how judicial appointments became a proxy for a larger battle for control of the Constitution. Arguing that the independence of the judiciary was imperilled beyond redemption, the author carefully traces the pattern of executive interference up to and after the proclamation of Emergency. This essay argues that the severe blow dealt to judicial independence in this period, in a way, determined the course of how the process for judicial appointments was shaped in future decades.

This essay deals with the ramifications of the judgment in the National Judicial Appointments Commission Case for the basic structure doctrine. The doctrine of basic structure places limits on the legislative power to amend the Constitution, and owes its origins to the judgment of the thirteen-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala ((1973) 4 SCC 225). According to the authors, the judges in the NJAC Case, by striking down the 99th Amendment to the Constitution of India for violating the basic structure, appear to have conceptually expanded the remit of the basic structure doctrine significantly. They conclude that the contents of what was held to be part of basic structure in the NJAC Case are largely incapable of being defended normatively. Against this background, they chart the significance of the judgment on constitutional law and separation of powers questions in the future.