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Journal articles on the topic 'Knowability'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 8 June 2024

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Heylen, Jan, and Kristine Grigoryan. "From Knowability to Conjecturability, and Back Again." Contemporary Pragmatism 21, no. 3 (2024): 287–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-bja10090.

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Abstract Chiffi and Pietarinen (2020) argue that the knowability paradox disappears if we adopt the concept of conjecturability instead of knowability within the framework of Peirce’s theory of science. They make two main claims: first, conjecturability plays an all-important role in scientific inquiry and it explains better scientific progress than knowability; second, conjecturability does not produce aparadox akin to the knowability paradox. However, based on our reading of Peirce, we contend that knowability plays an important role in scientific inquiry and progress. Moreover, we show that

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2

Wójcik, Arkadiusz. "The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62, no. 1 (2020): 53–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2020-0013.

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Abstract In this paper we undertake an analysis of the knowability paradox in the light of modal epistemic logics and of the phenomena of unsuccessful updates. The knowability paradox stems from the Church-Fitch observation that the plausible knowability principle, according to which all truths are knowable, yields the unacceptable conclusion that all truths are known. We show that the phenomenon of an unsuccessful update is the reason for the paradox arising. Based on this diagnosis, we propose a restriction on the knowability principle which resolves the paradox.

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3

Grigoryan, Kristine, and Felipe Morales Carbonell. "Peircean Knowability and Fitch-Like Paradoxes." Res Philosophica 102, no. 2 (2025): 163–90. https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica2664.

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In this paper, we aim to contribute to the growing literature on historical approaches to knowability by examining how the concept of knowability can be developed in the context of Peirce’s philosophy. There has been some previous work on Peirce’s notion of knowability (Dabay 2016; Chiffi and Pietarinen 2020), but our analysis differs from these attempts. We argue that Peirce is committed to a version of the knowability thesis and thus liable to validate Fitch’s paradoxical argument, but that his overall epistemology offers a nuanced picture of the limits of knowledge.

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4

Williamson, Timothy. "Knowability and Constructivism." Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 153 (1988): 422. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219707.

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5

Jago, M. "Closure on knowability." Analysis 70, no. 4 (2010): 648–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq067.

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6

Chalmers, D. J. "Actuality and knowability." Analysis 71, no. 3 (2011): 411–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr038.

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7

Douven, Igor. "The Knowability Paradox." Ars Disputandi 6, no. 1 (2006): 163–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819919.

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8

Williamson, Timothy. "Definiteness and Knowability." Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, S1 (1995): 171–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00769.x.

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9

DeVidi, David, and Tim Kenyon. "Analogues of Knowability." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 4 (2003): 481–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659757.

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10

Hand, Michael, and Jonathan L. Kvanvig. "Tennant on knowability." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 4 (1999): 422–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409912349191.

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11

Heylen, Jan, and Felipe Morales Carbonell. "Concepts of Knowability." Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, no. 23 (December 26, 2023): 287–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp287-308.

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Many philosophical discussions hinge on the concept of knowability. For example, there is a blooming literature on the so-called paradox of knowability. How to understand this notion, however? In this paper, we examine several approaches to the notion: the naive approach to take knowability as the possibility to know, the counterfactual approach endorsed by Edgington (1985) and Schlöder (2019) , approaches based on the notion of a capacity or ability to know (Fara 2010, Humphreys 2011), and finally, approaches that make use of the resources of dynamic epistemic logic (van Benthem 2004, Hollida

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12

Murzi, Julien. "Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability." Philosophical Studies 149, no. 2 (2009): 269–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9349-y.

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13

Chiffi, Daniele, and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. "From Knowability to Conjecturability." Contemporary Pragmatism 17, no. 2-3 (2020): 205–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01701160.

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Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce’s pragmaticism, called here ‘action-first’ epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer from paradoxes. Given fundamental uncertainty that permeates inquiry, knowability and what Peirce t

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14

KOOI, BARTELD. "THE AMBIGUITY OF KNOWABILITY." Review of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 3 (2016): 421–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020315000416.

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AbstractIn this paper it is shown that the Verification Thesis (all truths are knowable) is only susceptible to Fitch’s Paradox if one conflates the de re and de dicto interpretation of knowability. A formalisation shows that if one treats knowability as a complex second-order predicate, then the paradox falls apart.

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15

Saramifar, Younes. "The Shadows of Knowability." Critical Survey 30, no. 4 (2018): 67–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/cs.2018.300406.

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The torch of ember and its puzzling knowability are my exemplars, serving to open the binary of opacity and transparency in narrativity. I highlight inadequacies in the binary of opacity and transparency by examining the works of Peter Lamarque and Clare Birchall on matters of narrative and secrecy. I will try to see how one can think about opacity/transparency through the lenses of speculative realism and object-oriented philosophy. I do so by drawing examples from memories of the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1989) and explaining how the language of remembering becomes the realm of a tension between p

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16

Kenyon, Tim. "Truth, Knowability, and Neutrality." Nous 33, no. 1 (1999): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00144.

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17

Percival, P. "Fitch and intuitionistic knowability." Analysis 50, no. 3 (1990): 182–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/50.3.182.

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18

Ong, Aihwa. "Landscapes of (un)knowability." Dialogues in Human Geography 8, no. 3 (2018): 351–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2043820617744974.

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19

Jenkins, Carrie S. "Review: The Knowability Paradox." Mind 115, no. 460 (2006): 1141–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzl1141.

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20

Hand, M. "Knowability and Epistemic Truth." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 2 (2003): 216–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659633.

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21

De Vidi, David, and Graham Solomon. "Knowability and intuitionistic logic." Philosophia 28, no. 1-4 (2001): 319–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02379783.

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22

EDGINGTON, DOROTHY. "The Paradox of Knowability." Mind XCIV, no. 376 (1985): 557–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xciv.376.557.

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23

Hand, Michael. "Antirealism and universal knowability." Synthese 173, no. 1 (2009): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9674-x.

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24

Fuhrmann, André. "Knowability as potential knowledge." Synthese 191, no. 7 (2013): 1627–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0340-y.

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25

Chase, James, and Penelope Rush. "Factivity, consistency and knowability." Synthese 195, no. 2 (2016): 899–918. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1253-3.

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26

Zardini, Elia. "Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability." THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30, no. 3 (2015): 365–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.14668.

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After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from the theory of understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that the principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted knowability principle but that the overall view still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper also argues, against

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27

Šustar, Predrag. "The Knowability of Biomedical Laws." Acta medico-historica Adriatica 22, no. 2 (2024): 299–313. https://doi.org/10.31952/amha.22.2.8.

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In this paper, I focus on the knowability of empirical laws in Kant. Specifically, I explore the interpretative thread according to which the knowability of an item is secured through an appropriate classification within a hierarchical ordering.The relationship between the knowability and classification is ultimately based on Kant’s characterization of our understanding as being “discursive”, i.e., relying on subsuming-procedures. More specifically, the focus is on empirical laws referring to biological phenomena broadly construed, which are interestingly intertwined with the teleology-mechani

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28

D'Alfonso, Nicola. "Analytic and synthetic based on the paradox of knowability." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 23, no. 1 (2019): 79–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p79.

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The purpose of this paper is to show how the paradox of knowability loses its paradoxical character when we correctly interpret one of its premises. It is then shown how this new interpretation can be used to logically define analytical and synthetic truths. In this way, the paradox of knowability is traced back to the harmless affirmation that, in order to know every proposition with certainty, there must be no propositions whose truth is synthetic.

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29

Freund, Max A. "Consideraciones lógico-epistémicas relativas a una forma de conceptualismo ramificado." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 23, no. 69 (1991): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1991.810.

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An intuitive interpretation of constructive knowability is first developed. Then, an epistemic second order logical system (which formalizes logical aspects of the interpretation) is constructed. A proof of the relative consistency of such a system is offered. Next, a formal system of intensional arithmetic (whose logical basis is the aforementioned second order system) is stated. It is proved that such a formal system of intensional arithmetic entails a theorem, whose content would show possible limitations to constructive knowability.

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30

Rosenkranz, Sven. "Knowability, Closure, and Anti-Realism." Dialectica 62, no. 1 (2007): 59–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01129.x.

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31

Roca-Royes, Sonia. "Inductive Knowability of the Modal." Disputatio 15, no. 69 (2023): 151–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0007.

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Abstract This paper scrutinises the limits of a posteriori induction in acquiring modal knowledge. I focus on my similarity-based account (Roca-Royes [2017]); an inductive, non-rationalist epistemology of modality about concrete entities. Despite the explanatory merits of the account in relation to a vast range of modal claims, this inductive epistemology has been found incapable of yielding knowledge of a certain, other range of modal claims. Here, two notions of knowability are distinguished which reveal some of these limitations to be not only accidental to the method but also virtuous. Add

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32

Liu, Sebastian. "(Un)knowability and knowledge iteration." Analysis 80, no. 3 (2020): 474–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz072.

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Abstract The KK principle states that knowing entails knowing that one knows. This historically popular principle has fallen out of favour among many contemporary philosophers in light of putative counterexamples. Recently, some have defended more palatable versions of KK by weakening the principle. These revisions remain faithful to their predecessor in spirit while escaping crucial objections. This paper examines the prospects of such a strategy. It is argued that revisions of the original principle can be captured by a generalized knowledge iteration principle, Weak-KK, which states that kn

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33

Conley, Donovan. "Slavery, experiential gaps, and knowability." Review of Communication 3, no. 1 (2003): 13–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1835859032000084106.

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34

WILLIAMSON, TIMOTHY. "On the Paradox of Knowability." Mind XCVI, no. 382 (1987): 256–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcvi.382.256.

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35

Salerno, Joe. "Introduction to knowability and beyond." Synthese 173, no. 1 (2009): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9680-z.

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36

Artemov, Sergei, and Tudor Protopopescu. "Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis." Synthese 190, no. 16 (2012): 3349–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0168-x.

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37

Palczewski, Rafał. "Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox." Studia Logica 86, no. 3 (2007): 455–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9.

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38

Borisov, Evgeny V. "THE MODAL ASPECT OF KNOWABILITY." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 81 (2024): 17–23. https://doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/81/2.

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The principle of knowability (KP) says that all facts are knowable. The Fitch paradox shows that the logical representation (formalization) of KP by means of epistemic logic is not a routine task, and in the literature this task remains an open problem. Various formalizations of KP have been proposed and are being discussed in the literature. One of them was proposed by Dorothy Edgington. She represents KP by the formula Ap → ◊KAp(1) where A is the actuality operator. She intends (1) to be interpreted using the situational semantics in the spirit of Humberstone rather than possible world seman

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39

Dorst, Kevin. "Abominable KK Failures." Mind 128, no. 512 (2019): 1227–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy067.

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Abstract KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily explain. I survey a variety of KK-denying responses and find them wanting. Those who object to the knowability of such conditionals mus

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40

Hållander, Marie. "Exemplets didaktik." Speki. Nordic Philosophy and Education Review 1, no. 1 (2024): 18–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/speki.10302.

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This article is a philosophical investigation of the example's function as a didactic practice. In teaching, it is common to use examples to concretize, clarify and give students a knowability of the taught content, but this knowability also implies something. But this knowability also means something specific. The article specifically discusses religious education and religious diversity in a Swedish school context. In the article I argue, drawing on Giorgio Agamben's understanding of the example, how the example stands for itself, but which also, in its specificity and singularity, moves tow

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41

Borisov, E. V. "On two formalizations of the principle of knowability de re." Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 9, no. 4 (2024): 58–62. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-4-58-62.

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The article is devoted to the problem of logical representation (formalization) of the principle of knowability de re. The principle says that any true proposition can be known de re. The aim of the paper is of a critical character. Two formalizations of the principle of knowability de re are examined, namely ones suggested by Edgington and Proietti, and it is shown that both do not solve the problem. I argue that Edgington’s formalizations does not work without an intuitively appealing interpretation of the actuality operator within situation semantics, and that Proietti’s formalization canno

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42

Shaffer, Michael. "The Paradox of Knowability and Factivity." Polish Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 1 (2014): 85–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pjphil2014816.

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43

Weiss, Bernhard. "Truth and the Enigma of Knowability." Dialectica 61, no. 4 (2007): 521–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01125.x.

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44

Sober, Elliott, and Mike Steel. "Time and Knowability in Evolutionary Processes." Philosophy of Science 81, no. 4 (2014): 558–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/677954.

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45

Costa-Leite, Alexandre. "New Essays on the Knowability Paradox." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25, no. 2 (2011): 194–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2011.574865.

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46

Stjernberg, Fredrik. "The Knowability Paradox - By Jonathan Kvanvig." Theoria 74, no. 3 (2008): 255–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00022.x.

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47

Bjerring, Jens Christian. "New Essays on the Knowability Paradox." History and Philosophy of Logic 33, no. 1 (2012): 101–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2011.615473.

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48

Freitag, Wolfgang. "Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem." Acta Analytica 26, no. 3 (2011): 273–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0112-y.

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49

D’Agostini, Franca. "Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes." Logica Universalis 13, no. 4 (2019): 577–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00237-x.

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50

Fara, Michael. "Knowability and the capacity to know." Synthese 173, no. 1 (2009): 53–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9676-8.

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