Academic literature on the topic 'Knowledge, Theory of (Buddhism) Enlightenment (Buddhism)'

<em>Before the birth of Buddhism, Indian society was familiar with various beliefs which were characterized by the ascetic tradition, the rites of the Brahmins, the religion of the Upanisads, and the strong ascetic traditions of the Jainas. Buddhist philosophy was born from the teachings of Buddha Gautama, obtained from the results of his enlightenment. The Buddha guided his followers to arrive at the Arahant. Buddhism is divided into two major schools, Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. Ethics or morality in Buddhism can be found in three sentences, such as avoiding bad deeds, adding to good deeds, and cleansing the heart, all of which are summarized in the Pancasila Buddha and Pancadhamma. The main teachings of the Buddha are recorded in the Tripitaka. Between philosophy, religion and ethics in Buddhism has a very close relationship in the goal of achieving liberation, because Buddhism does not separate knowledge from behavior, theory and practice.</em>

Tantrism is the science of practical spiritualism. Tantrism is the practical way out of enlightenment. It is the perfect mix of theoretical and empirical knowledge of liberation. Although there are different arguments for and against tantric Buddhism. To find out the basic overview of Tantric Buddhism the study has been conducted. It is a literature review of Tantric Buddhism in Nepal. In conclusion, the study found that there is a great contradiction between Buddhist philosophy with the law of cause and effect. It is difficult to make ritual action conform to such a law, as he demonstrated.

Thirty-eight million Polo Mints are consumed every day, apparently without a second thought. However, could this humble little minty fella actually be the gateway to true knowledge about life, the Universe and everything? We have drawn on the inspiration of Sartre, the Dalai Lama, Tao Ti Ching, Heidegger and Mahayana Buddhism to find five reasons why the Polo Mint's inner emptiness, with its sweet minty after taste, can lead to contemplations of the ultimate truth.

The author considers the problems of women's place in Buddhist culture in the context of feminist discourse. He notes that Buddhism is distinguished by a tolerant and respectful attitude to the female. Buddhism admits that women, along with men, are able to achieve enlightenment and find Nirvana. However, the relationship between male and female monastic orders in Buddhism was not fully equal. The order of nuns was considered to be the youngest in comparison with the order of monks, and the rules restricting the behavior of the nuns were more than for the monks, which was probably a forced step aimed at taking into account the realities of society. Despite this, the Foundation of the women's monastic organization, which opened the way for women to religious knowledge and spiritual rank, was in its essence a radical social revolution for that time. The emergence of the female monastic community was an example of a fundamentally new view of women and their position in society. With the release of Buddhism outside India female monasticism became widespread in many Asian countries. Later, however, in the countries of South, South-East Asia and Tibet, the Institute of full female monasticism disappeared. In the second half of the twentieth century the attempts to revive the Institute that have led to the emergence of the phenomenon of neonuns. As a result of the spread of Buddhism in the West, it was included in the field of gender studies and feminist discourse. The question of equality between women and men in Buddhism has been actively developed by Western female Buddhists in the feminist discourse, that has formed a statement about the original equality of the sexes in Buddhism. The theme of the status of women in society and their rights has become an important part of the social concept of Western Buddhism. The result was the emergence of the international women's Buddhist Association "Sakyadhita".

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to argue that mainstream economic theory leads to a diminishment of human happiness and well-being. Alternatively, Buddhist wisdom, applied to economic decision making, offers the opportunity for a well-lived life of purpose and meaning. Design/methodology/approach – The paper begins with an examination of the foundational elements of Buddhism and economics, then contrasts the paths (or models) constructed from these bases and the associated implications for happiness and well-being. Findings – The assumptions of Buddhism and economics regarding incessant wants, method of analytical inquiry, assignation of primary agency, and promotion of individual freedom, all bear striking similarities. Yet, despite these commonalities, the paths they undertake could not be more different. Specifically, their views and beliefs regarding consumption, work, and self-interest lead to radically different implications for how to live a well-lived life and how to organize economic society. Research limitations/implications – Business leaders should develop alternative business models that incorporate a broader range of values and ideals than those associated with traditional economic modeling. Explicit inclusion of a firm's social responsibilities can be implemented via social accounting procedures and its mission statement. Responding to consumer demand for goods that are produced fairly, humanely, and sustainably will allow firms to do well by doing good. Originality/value – Significant and detrimental consequences arise from the adherence to the mainstream economic model. Buddhist wisdom, on the other hand, provides a path that offers an alternative vision of economic society, one that would likely lead to greater human fulfillment.

I contrast briefly the Buddhist concept of Self as a process and a conditional reality with the concept of the substantial metaphysical concept of Self in Brahmanism and Hinduism. I present the criticism of the Buddhist thinkers, such as Nāgārjuna, who criticize any idea of the metaphysical Self. They deny the idea of the Self as its own being or as a possessor of its mental acts. However, they do not reject all sense of Self; they allow a pure process of knowledge (first of all, Self-knowledge) without a fixed subject or “owner” of knowledge. This idea is in a deep accord with some Chan stories and paradoxes of the Self and knowledge.

The Bhavacakra is a symbolic representation of Samsara, a powerful mirror for spiritual aspirants and it is often painted to the left of Tibetan monastery doors. Bhavacakra, ‘wheel of life’ consists of two Sanskrit words ‘Bhava’ and ‘Cakra’. The word bhava means birth, origin, existing etc and cakra means wheel, circle, round, etc. There are some textual materials which suggest that the Bhavacakra painting began during the Buddha lifetime. Bhavacakra is very famous for wall and cloth painting. It is believed to represent the knowledge of release from suffering gained by Gautama Buddha in the course of his meditation. This symbolic representation of Bhavacakra serves as a wonderful summary of what Buddhism is, and also reminds that every action has consequences. It can be also understood by the illiterate persons not needing high education and it shows the path of enlightenment out of suffering in samsara. Mahayana Buddhism is very popular in Asian countries like northern Nepal, India, Bhutan, China, Korean, Japan and Mongolia. So in these countries every Mahayana monastery there is wall painting and Thānkā painting of Bhavacakra. But in these countries there are various designs of Bhavacakra due to artist, culture and nation.

This article aims to study the function of Caṇḍāla, the outer caste character in Jātakaṭṭhakathā, the stories of the prior lives of the Buddha, and to study the relationship between the Caṇḍāla characters and the concept of justice in these Jātaka stories. In order to construct the concept of justice in Buddhism, and the framework of this study, Rawls’ theory regarding justice as fairness is used as a guideline for exploration of the Sutta, the Buddhist canon. The study reveals that the Caṇḍāla characters appear in nine Jātakas, playing significant roles in parts of many the prose narratives and the connection part of the story in order to illustrate that a low caste person can attain enlightenment. Three concepts of Dharma are conveyed by the Caṇḍāla characters in Jātakaṭṭhakathā: firstly, defilement causes humans in every caste to have suffering; secondly, every occurrence in one’s life depends on karma; and thirdly, humans in every caste have the potential to accomplish wisdom by understanding the path to eradicate suffering.

Abstract Science fiction has a lengthy history of irreligion. In part, this relates to its titular association with science itself, which, as both methodology and ontological basis, veers away from revelatory forms of knowledge in order to formulate hypotheses of reality based upon experimental praxis. However, during science fiction’s long antipathy to faith, Buddhism has occupied a unique and sustained position within the genre. This article charts the origins of that interaction, in the pulp science fiction magazines of the late 1920s and early 1930s, in which depictions of Buddhism quickly evolve from ‘Yellow Peril’ paranoia towards something much more intriguing and accommodating, and in so doing, provide a genre foundation for the environmental concerns of much 21st-century science fiction.

Writing in seventh century India, the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti developed a system of epistemology in which he recognized yogic intuition as a valid source of knowledge crowning the practice of meditation and capable of causing the psychological transformation necessary for the achievement of nirvana. But his account of the epistemological character of yogic intuition was controversial. Indeed, while it consists in a full understanding of a conceptual object (i.e. the four noble truths), Dharmakirti insisted that, due to its clarity, the yogin's intuition be considered a category of sensation, which by definition is non-conceptual and pertains to particular objects. This thesis is an analysis of Dharmakirti's account of yogic intuition as a category of cognition allowing the non-conceptual knowledge of conceptual objects.

This research into Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) presents the results of 60 first-person psycho-phenomenological interviews with 30 New Zealand women. The participants were recruited from the Canterbury and Wellington regions, 10 had recovered. Taking a non-dual, non-reductive embodied approach, the phenomenological data was analysed semiotically, using a graph-theoretical cluster analysis to elucidate the large number of resulting categories, and interpreted through the enactive approach to cognitive science. The initial result of the analysis is a comprehensive exploration of the experience of CFS which develops subject-specific categories of experience and explores the relation of the illness to universal categories of experience, including self, ‘energy’, action, and being-able-to-do. Transformations of the self surrounding being-able-to-do and not-being-able-to-do were shown to elucidate the illness process. It is proposed that the concept ‘energy’ in the participants’ discourse is equivalent to the Mahayana Buddhist concept of ‘contact’. This characterises CFS as a breakdown of contact. Narrative content from the recovered interviewees reflects a reestablishment of contact. The hypothesis that CFS is a disorder of action is investigated in detail. A general model for the phenomenology and functional architecture of action is proposed. This model is a recursive loop involving felt meaning, contact, action, and perception and appears to be phenomenologically supported. It is proposed that the CFS illness process is a dynamical decompensation of the subject’s action loop caused by a breakdown in the process of contact. On this basis, a new interpretation of neurological findings in relation to CFS becomes possible. A neurological phenomenon that correlates with the illness and involves a brain region that has a similar structure to the action model’s recursive loop is identified in previous research results and compared with the action model and the results of this research. This correspondence may identify the brain regions involved in the illness process, which may provide an objective diagnostic test for the condition and approaches to treatment. The implications of this model for cognitive science and CFS should be investigated through neurophenomenological research since the model stands to shed considerable light on the nature of consciousness, contact and agency. Phenomenologically based treatments are proposed, along with suggestions for future research on CFS. The research may clarify the diagnostic criteria for CFS and guide management and treatment programmes, particularly multidimensional and interdisciplinary approaches. Category theory is proposed as a foundation for a mathematisation of phenomenology.

The overall thesis of this dissertation may be summed up as the position that Mawlāna Rūmī and Nāgārjuna both eschew any and all epistemological positions (beliefs) so as to abandon any and all ontological positionality (being). To this end, my argument is arranged into two chapters dealing respectively with these two authors. In the chapter on Rūmī, following a review of the relevant Western and Persian literature (§2.2.), and prior to diving in to Mawlānā’s disavowal of any and all self-positionedness, I firstly focus on nationalist positions through an examination of some of the ways in which various exclusivist nationalist interests have competed, and continue to compete, to appropriate Mawlānā for ends quite anathematic to his own ecumenical/multivalent approach (§2.3.1.). I thus attempt to demonstrate that, far from giving voice to any specifically Persian or Iranian nationalist identity, Rūmī and his poetry have been appropriated by not only Iranian but also Afghan and Turkish nationalist discourses as means to assert their own ideological agendas. I then take a closer look at Mawlānā’s own conceptualization of identity (§2.3.2.). Drawing on selected passages from the Masnavī, I attempt to demonstrate that Jalāl al-Dīn’s notion of identity, particularly of the nationally-constituted kind, remains steadfastly untied to sectarian affiliations, and thereby undermines the appropriative nationalist efforts adumbrated theretofore. In succeeding sections, I develop the bulk of my argument by examining the means whereby Mawlānā Rūmī develops his own mode of discursive instability so as to reject positionality of any kind. Following a survey (§2.4.1.) and critique (§2.4.2.) of existing theoretical elaborations of apophasis as inadequate to Rūmī’s case , I specifically study the multiple authorial identities enacted by Rūmī in his eponymous Masnavī to negate his own affirmations, and thence even those negations, in multifolded dynamism, and thereby convey the paradoxical truth of self-subsistence in self-annihilation (baqāʾ andar fanāʾ) by which to disavow any self’s, and any belief’s, bids at self-assertion through self-definition. Rather than speaking through kataphatic avowal, logical demonstration, or doctrinal proclamation, Mawlānā adopts apophatic discursive strategies – whereby he speaks through negation (§2.5.1.) , negation of negation (§2.5.2.) and, ultimately, the negation of all binary affirmations and negations in multifolded dynamism (§2.5.3.) – so as to deny the ego the definitive affirmation it seeks. By thus elaborating a fully fleshed-out investigation of the dynamic interplay of personified presence and authorial absence at work in the Masnavī, I develop an original understanding of this mystic’s highly charged and profoundly ambiguous relationship to his own subjectivity, and thereby to any subjectively affirmed doxastic position. We will thus see that Mawlānā eschews even his own belief system as, ultimately, inadequate in the face of what I call the constitutively polylectic nature of reality (§2.6.). In so doing, I provide a Sufi perspective on the issue of identity that both challenges prevailing intellectual presuppositions and opens the way for a further appreciation of Rūmī’s unique contribution to Persian literature. As such, it is my hope that the ultimate conclusions of this chapter provide an alternative approach to the scholarly study of mystic poetics, while shedding light upon the various masks of identity itself. My concern in the chapter on Nāgārjuna is with his efforts to express ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) in the conventional garb of language (vyavahāra-satya or saṃvṛti-satya). I focus on Nāgārjuna’s use of the catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma in his major work, the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā) to make a number of inter-related propositions. Put briefly, I interpret the Nāgārjunian catuṣkoṭi to constitute an exhaustive and tetrāletheic āssertion aimed at “the abandonment of all views” (sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya) I understand to be the distinctively Nāgārjunian means of attaining nirvāṇa, and thus the over-arching aim of Nāgārjuna’s philosophical enterprise as a whole. Following a methodologically oriented introductory section (§3.1.), I describe the tetralemma as neutrally as possible (§3.2.1.), and thence go on to delineate three prevailing means whereby (predominantly Western) scholars have sought to ‘rescue’ Nagarjuna from the evident illogicality that the tetralemma entails (§3.2.2). Apart from contextualizing my position within the existing body of scholarship on Nāgārjuna’s thought, my subsequent criticisms (§3.2.3.) of these logicalist attempts at interpreting the catuṣkoṭi adequately clear the ground for my own reading. In avowing the irreducibly soteriological ends of Nāgārjuna’s thought as a whole, this, my own reading, is more closely aligned to some interpretations proposed by Chinese-language exegetes. I thus go on to provide a summary of these latter (§3.3). Following this, I detail my reading proper, according to which, firstly, the tetralemma is to be taken in tetraletheic (as opposed to dialetheic) terms (§3.4.). In the final sections of this chapter, I introduce this tetraletheic reading of the tetralemma in support of my main point regarding the abandonment of all views or ‘view of no view’. The fact that Nāgārjuna begins and ends his major work with calls for the cessation and abandonment of all views, coupled with the fact that time and again throughout the MK he uses the catuṣkoṭi to survey and reject all possible positions on a given topic, leads me to conclude that this wholescale cessation or abandonment must in fact be Nāgārjuna’s aim as the author of the MK. I argue for this interpretation on the basis of a close reading of Nāgārjuna’s text, in support of which I survey the MK and Nāgārjuna’s other philosophical works for evidence bolstering my reading (§3.5.). Cherry picking a few verses here and there in support of my interpretation while ignoring the formal structure of the literary text of the MK as a whole, however, would be all too facile a method. As such, I then argue (§3.6.) that the text as a structured whole is oriented towards just such abandonment of all conceptuality, and the concomitant transcendence of all notions of selfhood. In the course of my exposition, I have occasion to engage with several debates very much alive in contemporary scholarship on Nāgārjuna, and as such to make what I hope is something of an original contribution to them by proposing a reading that is both textually justified and philosophically interesting.

Idealizing and medicalizing of methods ascribed to Buddhism has led to individualizing their structural and societal challenges. Although the long-undervalued need for introspection may get addressed, people are now caught under the cloak of spirituality hoping for quick enlightenment or a panacea solving mental diseases. Thus, at this point, the impact of decontextualizing concepts, unreflectively copying feudal structures into Tibetan Buddhist seminar- and meditation-centers, as well as of lacking knowledge required for the gradual application-oriented learning processes taught in traditional Buddhist philosophy have become clear. This shows in recent testimony of economical, psychological, and physical abuse in international Tibetan Buddhist organizations. The violence against individuals and man-made trauma in such contexts need to get analyzed before the background of neologisms, that is concepts allowing for arbitrariness and violence in the name of spirituality, as well as of the sophisticated systems of rationalizing damage and silencing trauma and victims. Furthermore, though those in the ‘inner circles’ run the risk of traumatization and of being held accountable, it is women who are at higher risk, particularly those who engage in secret relationships. Thus, in terms of treatment, the collectively projecting the shadow on the feminine, leading to an attitude of exploitation and control against women, requires consideration.

Chapter 9 explores how individuals working to attain peak performance are at their best when intimately embedded and engaged in their chosen sector of the world, moving with and helping to shape its creative turbulence. Primarily focusing on the Buddhist notion of an enlightened self, we propose the sage ideally represents the fractal self with Confucian and Daoist philosophies complementing Buddhist thinkers in their conscious struggle against problems arising in selves devoted to an integrity way of being. The Buddhist self becomes the paradigmatic model for a self of intimacy. In intimacy, knowledge resides at the interface of self and world and free-will manifests in our evolved nature with our option to choose constructive engagement with our world—from family harmony to international well-being and biospheric sustainability. This chapter takes readers into discussions that may seem paradoxical, as in the concept of no-self and the sources of suffering, barriers to approaching nirvana. The Western notion of an individuated human soul dissolves into the unbounded vision of the self of intimacy that Buddhists believe is realized in traveling the “Eightfold Path.” Bash?’s poetry evokes the Path and opens vistas of compassion and enlightenment in the quest of a fractal self.