Academic literature on the topic 'KUKIZ'15'

The 2015 presidential election was a turning point in a history of celebritisation of politics in Poland. Rock vocalist Paweł Kukiz unexpectedly finished third with 20% of votes, the highest result of any celebrity–candidate in presidential elections. He achieved that, campaigning mostly on Facebook, without any significant power base and financial support. Kukiz set up his own political organisation, which gained a 9% backing in the parliamentary elections. He achieved that with no political platform, no media backing, and no party structure. We argue that his persona was a crucial asset in his political success. We will show how Kukiz created, managed and performed his persona, how he used it to mobilise three million voters and then to create and brand his “Kukiz’15 Movement.” Finally, we analyse limits, traps and contradictions of persona power. Analysed material includes Paweł Kukiz’s and his opponents’ Facebook posts, televised political advertisements, performances in celebrity TV shows and debates.

<p>Analiza wypowiedzi Pawła Kukiza pozwala stwierdzić, że przypisywany politykowi populizm widoczny jest zarówno w treściowej warstwie wypowiedzi, jak i jej językowym kształcie. Wystąpienia sejmowe i posty zamieszczane na portalu społecznościowym Facebook zawierają wszystkie cechy konstytutywne dla populizmu, czyli centralnie usytuowany lud w kreowanej przez polityka wizji świata, który przedstawiany jest zawsze w opozycji do elit lub obcych, a także symplifikację językowego obrazu świata (w tym wartości), ponadto obecność lidera występującego z woli ludu. Językowy kształt wypowiedzi polityka odwołuje się do języka potocznego, bliskiego przeciętnemu użytkownikowi języka, dzięki czemu wypowiedzi lidera Kukiz’15 są emocjonalne, wyraziście wartościują opisywaną rzeczywistość, także przez stereotypy i metafory. Tak ukształtowany sposób komunikowania się z odbiorcami tworzy spójną wizję z przyjmowanymi przez polityka rolami, w które wchodzi, przywołując archetypy wojownika, chłopaka z sąsiedztwa, nie wyzbywając się nigdy pozycji dominującej.</p>

AbstractConstituting the key element of a democratic system, political parties are among entities obliged by the Polish legislator to comply with the principle of disclosure by providing public information. The main objective of this paper is to determine the level of Polish political parties’ disclosure, understood here as their willingness to disclose information on their own structures. It seems that the practice of disclosing such basic organizational data may constitute a specific measure of Polish political parties’ respect for the idea of disclosure. The subject matter of the conducted research was particular parties’ sites in the Public Information Bulletin as well as their official websites. An attempt was made to acquire data concerning party structures by way of direct contact with particular parties’ organizational units – questionnaires were sent to both central and regional/district organizational units. In order to acquire a wider perspective, the research also included data provided by the Central Statistical Office concerning political parties’ organizational structures and election manifestos. The conducted analysis was summarized in the form of a ranking of the examined political parties based on a proposed political party disclosure index. This attempt to measure disclosure on the basis of data on internal structures provided by parties themselves is of a preliminary character which, nevertheless, makes it possible to capture the general properties of the phenomenon under analysis. Among the examined parties, it is PSL, SLD, and PO that, to an acceptable degree, follow the principle of disclosure in the analysed scope (indexes at the level of 60%-80% of the maximum value). Four other parties, i.e. N, Wolność, Razem, and Kukiz’15, are on the edge of the zone making it possible to regard their disclosure as sufficient (indexes at the level of around 50% of the maximum value). In the case of PiS, whose index does not reach 20% of the maximum value, it should be concluded that this party implements the principle of disclosure at a minimum level. The ranking did not show relationships between parties’ willingness towards providing information and their sizes or positions on the political scene (parliamentary parties vs. extra-parliamentary parties).

The paper describes, interprets, and characterizes the results of elections to the European Parliament in Poland based on the voting behaviour of the Ukrainian national minority. In the article, four European elections 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 were considered. The research hypothesizes is that the Ukrainian national minority could have a distinct voting behaviour from their region of permanent living and voted obviously for the representatives of liberal and leftist political forces rather than for far-right and right, or even far-left candidates on the elections to the European Parliament. In the years 2004-2019, an interesting phenomenon could be observed in the elections to the European Parliament in the area of communes inhabited by the Ukrainian population. In the «Ukrainian» municipalities located in the northern part of Poland, where the electorate was rather liberal (Civic Platform) or possibly anti-system (Self-Defence) the election results did not differ from the rest of the regions. This phenomenon was inherent in both the West Pomeranian and Warmia-Masurian voivodships. On the other hand, in the Komańcza commune, which is located in the Subcarpathian voivodship, in which the conservative electorate has been the strongest, the results of the voting in the “Ukrainian” commune were significantly different from other communes of the region. In other words, the results of the elections in Komańcza were much more similar to the results obtained in northern and western Poland than to the results in the South-Eastern Poland. The article concludes that, in general, those municipalities, where the citizens of Ukrainian descent consist at least 10% of the overall population, vote for more liberal parties to the European Parliament. Instead, the support of rightwing political parties like Law and Justice, Kukiz’15, Korvin Confederation as a right-wing parties is much lower. Even during elections to the European Parliament in 2019, Law and Justice, victorious in the rest of the country, evidently had lower support in “Ukrainian” municipalities. The Civic Platform is perceived as a much more moderate party, guaranteeing, in their opinion, representatives of the Ukrainian minority a greater sense of security and comfort of living in the Polish state.

The aim of this article is to raise a few issues related with the political group of Kukiz’15,which is an unprecedented phenomenon on the Polish political scene after 1989. First of all,the paper tried to present the genesis of the formation, including the factors that contributedto its creation and development. Secondly, the analysis of ideological assumptions was made.Thirdly, an attempt was made to classify the formation based on its characteristics. Thecontent analysis method was used to carry out this task, and the source base was made upof press enunciations by nationwide opinion-forming magazines, such as “Rzeczpospolita”and “Gazeta Wyborcza”, monographs and elaborations, as well as Internet sources. It shouldbe emphasized that this study was assumed to represent an introduction to the in-depthresearch into the phenomenon that is undoubtedly this political group.Keywords: Kukiz’15, Polish Political Scene, Political Formations