Journal articles on the topic 'Lancaster House Constitution'

This article provides an overview analysis of the relevant provisions of the Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Act 20 of 2013 (Zimbabwe Constitution 2013) that, inter alia, deals with the functions of the judiciary. To this end, the article examines the adequacy of the aforesaid provisions in relation to their practical enforcement and the promotion of constitutional democracy in Zimbabwe. In light of this, a synoptical analysis of the gaps and flaws of the provisions dealing with the functions of the judiciary under the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 will be provided. In addition and where applicable, a comparative analysis of these provisions and those that were provided under the Lancaster House Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 19 of 2008 (Lancaster House Constitution 2008) will be undertaken. This is done to explore whether the flaws and gaps that were associated with the relevant provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution 2008 are now corrected under the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. Thereafter, possible recommendations and concluding remarks will be stated.

Zimbabweans have been both victims of and witnesses to serious human rights violations over the years.Though there is wide agreement and speculation that the state and its agencies are the perpetrators of these atrocities, they have largely remained unprosecuted and unpunished.Such impunity is inter alia the result of ineffective law enforcement mechanismsand institutions as well as the lack of capacity and legal knowledge of victims to approach the courts and seek redress. These factors negatively affected the protection of human rights and access to justice in Zimbabwe.Although the Lancaster House Constitution contained a Declaration of Rights, its enforcement mechanisms, particularly those relating to locus standi (legal standing), posed a great challenge to human rights litigation in Zimbabwe. This is so because the Lancaster House Constitution adopted the traditional common law approach to standing. Under this approach it was required that an individual must have a "personal, direct or substantial interest" in a matter in order to have standing. The Lancaster House Constitution failed to recognise the importance of broader rules of standing, which would accommodate public interest litigation, specifically for the purpose of protecting human rights. Contrary to this, the new Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) broadens the rules of standing in order to enhance access to the courts. This paper analyses the new approach to standing under the new constitutional dispensation in Zimbabwe.To this end, the discussion commences with an elucidation of the concept of locus standi and its link to access to justice. This is followed by an analysis of locus standi under the Lancaster House Constitution. Since the new approach in Zimbabwe is greatly informed by the South African approach to locus standi, a brief analysis of standing in South Africa is made. The paper concludes with a discussion of the approach to locus standi under the new constitution with a view to demonstrating how the new approach is likely to impact on the right of access to justice and human rights protection.

On 18 April, 1991, the Republic of Zimbabwe celebrated its 11th year of independence. Coincidentally, just a few months earlier, the 11th constitutional amendment Act was passed. This flurry of legislative activity was the result of a desire on the part of the government to develop a new constitutional structure rather than to remain with the constitution which was essentially imposed upon it by the British during the 1979 Lancaster House conference which eventually led to independence in 1980. The new constitutional model is of considerable interest as it is based upon those operating in many other African nations but, according to the Minister of Justice, is designed to provide safeguards on the exercise of presidential power and to avoid unnecessary conflict and division between the various branches of government. On several occasions, ministers have stressed the autochthonous nature of the new structure and some have indeed suggested that it might form a model for other African countries.It is the intention of this article to examine the legitimacy of these assertions by analysing both the new constitutional structure and its operation in practice. In order to assess the significance of these changes, it is first necessary to examine very briefly the Lancaster House constitution and constitutional developments in the early years of independence.

The origin of the initial African constitutions is easy to establish. While the former British territories “received” their Westminster-type constitutions negotiated during the Lancaster House conferences, the former French territories, except Guinea, became independent under constitutions drawing heavily upon the constitution of the Fifth French Republic, of which they were virtual copies. Among the countries formerly under Belgian rule, the Congo (Zaïre) was the only one attaining independence with a constitution, theLoi fondamentaleof 1960 which was an Act of the Belgian Parliament.Therefore, initially the degree of homogeneity was fairly large; there were basically three types of constitutions and the deviation from these models was limited. Admittedly subject to adaptations all the Westminster constitutions were similar, and in fact to some extent they still are; thus in its essential features the 1980 constitution of Zimbabwe draws from the same stock as its predecessors of the early 1960s. The first constitutions of the former French territories were, likewise, very similar, inspired as they were by the French constitution of 1958. TheLoi fondamentaleof the Congo was strongly influenced by the Belgian constitution, and so was the autochthonous constitution of Burundi which was promulgated a few months after independence in 1962.Many constitutions have since succeeded these initial texts: between 1960 and 1985 there have been 43 constitutions in the 18 French-speaking countries under consideration, i.e. an average of 2·4 constitutions per country. This flow has led to a considerable diversification of constitutional types.

The gazetting of the Land Acquisition Bill on 24 January, 1992 unleashed what has been described as the fiercest debate ever known in the history of Zimbabwe. However, the issue of land reform had been back on the political agenda ever since the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution on 18 April, 1990, and pressures from a variety of quarters, both internal and external, had been brought to bear on the government during the intervening period. In particular, its adoption in 1990 of a document declaring National Land Policy had generated intense controversy. In accordance with the principles set out in that document the government has sought to facilitate the acquisition of land for resettlement purposes, first by amending section 16 of the Lancaster House Constitution and subsequently by enacting the Land Acquisition Act. In formulating its policy the government has recognized both the need to redress inequalities in land distribution and the need to take into account current national and international socio-economic realities. The result is a compromise.

If human rights are to be effectively protected in any country, the judiciary has to recognise that it also has a role to play in this regard. The rationale for this is that the judiciary has a duty to enhance and protect human rights. Across Africa and most notably in Zimbabwe political interference has been noted as a factor that limits judicial independence. In Zimbabwe the weak protection of judicial independence has contributed to gross human rights violations. Constitutional reforms have been conducted in order to improve the independence of the judiciary and consequently the judicial protection of human rights. These efforts have resulted in the adoption of a new Constitution in Zimbabwe which has replaced the Lancaster House Constitution. The Constitutional reforms have captured legal principles which will ensure an improvement in the human rights situation. Key to the reforms has been the independence of the judiciary. The Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary. Despite such guarantees there are a number of challenges with regards to this independence. The aim of this paper is therefore to analyse the judicial reforms introduced by the Constitution of Zimbabwe with a view to establishing whether or not such reforms are likely to improve judicial independence and in turn the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe became a colony of the British Empire on 13 September 1890, and attained independence in 1980. During the colonial period of 1890 to 1980 land was expropriated primarily from the indigenous Ndebele and the Shona tribal groups through the institutionalisation of legislation that brought about the segregation of Africans and paved the way for settlement and farming by whites. Between 1980 and 1990 there was little progress in terms of resettlement programmes because of financial constraints and the terms and conditions of the Lancaster House Agreement regarding the willing seller willing buyer principle. There were serious economic challenges in the decade 1990 to 2000, but the period post 2000 witnessed brisk land repossessions which were spearheaded by war veterans and politicians. At the heart of the “land invasions,” as they were popularly termed, lay historical injustices. This paper seeks to provide an insight into the centrality of the oral tradition or oral history as legal basis for the land repossessions that took place. Neither legal recourse nor visiting archives and other information centres for the purposes of authentication were a priority. The Lancaster Constitution was viewed as an obstacle when dealing with land. The National Archives of Zimbabwe is placed in context within the situation discussed.

The issue of decentralization in Zimbabwe’s local government system has been topical since the colonial era. In the post-independence epoch the expectation was that the new majority government would address the centralization of governance which was motivated by racial imbalances. However, decentralization was not achieved as local government was not recognized in the Lancaster House Constitution adopted at independence in 1980. For years this allowed the central government to control all the local government structures in the country. The relationship between local governments and the central government became bitter and tense after the formation of a formidable opposition, MDC, which has been controlling most urban local authorities since its formation. The 2013 Constitution has not improved things either as the central government has not been willing to implement the new law to its latter and spirit. In all this it is the citizens who have been bearing the brunt as there has been poor service delivery owing to the bad relationship between the center and local structures. The study found out that if decentralization is fully implemented in Zimbabwe it has the potential of bringing efficient and effective service delivery, citizen participation, democracy and accountability in the local government system. The paper also makes recommendations on what needs to be done to achieve decentralization in the country’s local government system.

Historically, health care in Zimbabwe was provided primarily to cater to colonial administrators and the expatriate, with separate care or second-provision made for Africans. There was no need for legislation to guarantee its provision to the settler community. To address the inequities in health that had existed prior to 1980, at independence, Zimbabwe adopted the concept of Equity in Health and Primary Health Care. Initially, this resulted in the narrowing of the gap between health provision in rural areas and urban areas. Over the years, however, there have been clear indications of growing inequities in health provision and health care as a result of mainly Economic Structural Adjustment Policies (ESAP), 1991–1995, and health policy changes. Infant and child mortality have been worsened by the impact of HIV/AIDS and reduced access to affordable essential health care. For example, life expectancy at birth was 56 in the 1980s, increased to 60 in 1990 and is now about 43. Morbidity (diseases) and mortality (death rates) trends in Zimbabwe show that the population is still affected by the traditional preventable diseases and conditions that include nutritional deficiencies, communicable diseases, pregnancy and childbirth conditions and the conditions of the new born. The deterioration of the Zimbabwean health services sector has also partially been due to increasing shortages of qualified personnel. The public sector has been operating with only 19 per cent staff since 2000. Many qualified and competent health workers left the country because of the unfavourable political environment. The health system in Zimbabwe has been operating under a legal and policy framework that in essence does not recognize the right to health. Neither the pre-independence constitution nor the Lancaster House constitution, which is the current Constitution of Zimbabwe, made specific provisions for the right to health. Progress made in the 1980s characterized by adequate financing of the health system and decentralized health management and equity of health services between urban and rural areas, which saw dramatic increases in child survival rates and life expectancy, was, unfortunately, not consolidated. As of 2000 per capita health financing stood at USD 8.55 as compared to USD 23.6, which had been recommended by the Commission of Review into the Health Sector in 1997. At the beginning of 2008 it had been dramatically further eroded and stood at only USD 0.19 leading to the collapse of the health system. Similarly, education in Zimbabwe, in addition to the changes it has undergone during the different periods since attainment of independence, also went through many phases during the colonial period. From 1962 up until 1980, the Rhodesia Front government catered more for the European child. Luckily, some mission schools that had been established earlier kept on expanding taking in African children who could proceed with secondary education (high school education). Inequity in education existed when the ZANU-PF government came into power in 1980. It took aggressive and positive steps to redress the inequalities that existed in the past. Unfortunately, the government did not come up with an education policy or philosophy in spite of massive expansion and investment. The government had cut its expenditure on education because of economic and political instability. This has happened particularly in rural areas, where teachers have left the teaching profession.

In the historiography of British imperialism, the role of the ‘man on the spot’ has been identified as an important impulse to the imperial project, and as a key instigator of decision making. Equal attention should be directed to assessing the contribution of ‘the man on the spot’ in the final unravelling of empire. Old fashioned diplomacy and diplomats should not be airbrushed from history as key individuals navigated the rocky terrain of decolonisation. The fraught negotiations at Lancaster House on Rhodesia-Zimbabwe's constitutional arrangements for independence between September-December 1979 were only part of the delicate process of resolution of the intractable UDI problem. The four months of Christopher Soames’ administration as the last British Governor comprised the second vital stage of implementation, particularly given the presence of four competing armed forces in Rhodesia at the time, all of whom had external backers.

In recent years, Kenya and Zimbabwe have been described in comparative terms. The similarities between the two countries include a shared colonial legacy, common experiences in the areas of power sharing, equitable distribution of resources, economic asymmetries, regional disparities, corruption and electoral reforms. The Independence Constitutions of the two countries were negotiated at Lancaster House in London, Britain, and are both referred to as Lancaster House Constitutions. Both countries have grappled with the challenge of creating widely accepted constitutions. Using a comparative case study approach, the article discusses the processes of constitution-making in the two countries. Although the article recognises the importance of content, it largely focuses on the processes leading to the creation of the 2010 and 2013 Constitutions of Kenya and Zimbabwe, respectively.

This paper analyses the debilitative effects of the restraint clause in the negotiated 1979 Lancaster House Constitution that called for a moratorium on the possibility of constitutional reforms during the first 10 years of Zimbabwe’s independence. That clause effectively meant that reforms related to the nature and form of land (re)settlement, let alone radical repossession, could not be entertained until after 1990. This paper argues that George Mujajati’s play, The Wretched Ones, dramatises the negative impact that this restraint clause had on the majority of the black population of Zimbabwe in the first 10 years of their independence as the state could not radically redistribute land to correct the imbalances of the colonial era. Thus, the paper attributes the glaring poverty and misery among the majority of the black characters in the play to that restraint clause, a clause that continued to benefit white settlers, such as Mr Buffalo in this play, who had appropriated land by force during the colonial era. The paper concludes that land redistribution is a powerful tool in the fight against poverty in countries where the majority of the people live in rural areas.

In Zimbabwe, the Prime Minister’s Directives on Decentralisation and Development of 1984 and 1985, together with the Provincial Council and Administration Act 1985, constitute the foundation for post-independence attempts to ensure effective governance. The Directives provided for the establishment of hierarchical structures and mechanisms to coordinate government activities, including development planning at various levels of government. This paper asks whether these structures and mechanisms have been effective in promoting ‘sound’ intergovernmental planning and budgeting, and whether they are still relevant given that in 2013 Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution with greater promises, visions and demands than its predecessor, the Lancaster House Constitution. The paper argues that the adoption of a new Constitution provides a valuable opportunity to reform the intergovernmental planning and budgeting process, which to date has proved ineffective in fostering integrated and coherent effective governance.

This contribution provides an overview of children's rights adjudication in Zimbabwe with a specific focus on emerging jurisprudence under the 2013 Constitution. After a summary of Zimbabwe's performance in implementing children's rights under both international and African regional law, the authors examine how Zimbabwean superior courts have dealt with the protection of children's rights. In order to give a fair assessment, we begin by reflecting on the Lancaster House (LH) Constitution (1980) and the resultant jurisprudence thus shedding light on how courts conceptualised children's rights in the absence of a specific child rights provision in the Constitution. This is followed by an analysis of the emerging jurisprudence under the 2013 Constitution which specifically entrenches children's rights. We focus specifically on cases decided between 2013-2019. A focus on seminal court judgements and how courts adjudicated children's rights will guide the authors in ultimately deciding whether or not Zimbabwean courts have made giant leaps or baby steps in the protection and promotion of children's rights under the 2013 Constitution.

The article argues that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme should be viewed from a security and strategic perspective motivated by its historiographical heritage regarded as worthy of preservation. It has always been a sensitive issue so compelling that successive colonial administrations, setter regimes and governments were determined to utilize all their instruments of power to exert authority for its preservation and control. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme, like its predecessors was a clear expression of the close relationship between foreign, domestic and military policy in pursuit of national goals and values. The subtext of the article is the assertion of the principle of self-determination over the right of ownership of land on a people as expressed by the United Nations norms and values. The aim of the article is to interrogate the security and strategic dimension of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The article argues that the involvement of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme must be understood and analysed from the long held Clauzewitzian philosophy of the crucial inter-relationship between; foreign, domestic, and military policy (Dimitriu, 2018). Four main areas are discussed: the historical land brutal military conquests through the foreign policy pronouncements at the 1884/5 Berlin conference; the United Nations Resolution on the colonised people and how the Lancaster House torpedoed the principle in 1979; the constitutional provisions and prescriptions on the repossession of land; the historical role of Armed Forces in supporting civilian authorities in the implementation of domestic and foreign policy objectives deemed to be of security and strategic nature by successive colonial and settler regimes in Zimbabwe. The major findings of the study provide the modern classical background theoretic, necessary principles that explain the legitimacy and rationale for the professional military involvement in politics of the day. The study concludes that the issue of land on a State or Nation is an emotive matter, which can easily be a source of conflict, if not addressed from a security and strategic perspective.