Academic literature on the topic 'Language and education – Government policy'

The Zimbabwe government introduced a new language policy in education to change the colonial language policy seven years after attaining independence. So much was expected from the postcolonial language. The use of English as the media of instruction during the colonial era was problematic. It denied Africans to describe the world in their languages. Native languages were marginalized and neglected. Africans were robbed of their self-worth and identity. It is against this background that the Zimbabwean government African states after attaining independence and sovereignty pursued an agenda of linguistic decolonization. This paper evaluates the implementation of Zimbabwe's language policy after it gained independence from Britain in 1980. We argue that despite the claim by the Zimbabwe government that it is a revolutionary government which would completely overhaul all colonial structures, institutions, and policies, the implementation of the language policy is a continuity, rather a radical change. Colonial language policy fundamentals are intact and present in the current language policy. English is still the dominant language of instruction. Indigenous languages are considered inferior and on the verge of extinction. The policy failed where it matters most—decolonizing the mind. Zimbabwe needs a sound language policy in education to shake off vestiges of a colonial legacy, and allow children to go to school in their languages to achieve the overall goal of education for all. The language policy must be developed through a broad-based consultative process with specific implementation strategies and commitment by government and non-governmental agencies for funding its implementation.

Why is it that some governments recognize only one language while others espouse multilingualism? Related, why are some governments able to shift language policies, and if there is a shift, what explains the direction? In this article, the authors argue that these choices are theproduct of coalitional constraints facing the government during critical junctures in history. During times of political change in the state-building process, the effective threat of an alternate linguistic group determines the emergent language policy. If the threat is low, the government moves toward monolingual policies. As the threat increases, however, the government is forced to co-opt the alternate linguistic group by shifting the policy toward a greater degree of multilingualism. The authors test this argument by examining the language policies for government services and the education system in three Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand).

This article analyses changes to the language policy in Russia in 2017, and their effects on the state (national) languages of Russia’s republics within the education system. In July 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Council on Interethnic Relations, addressing the language rights of the Russian-speaking population and stressing the existing limit of the power of Russia’s 22 ethnic republics to introduce compulsory study of their official languages. The President’s statements provoked widespread prosecutorial inspections in the republics’ schools and a new round of public discussion about language policy. Public discontent in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Komi led to protests against both ethnic Russians and the native speakers of languages recognised as co-official with Russian (‘state languages of the republics’). The authorities of some republics publicly disagreed with the position taken by the federal government. In other republics, however, the President’s speech did not trigger any public discussion. In many republics, it looks like the regional authorities will ultimately accept the decision of the federal government and speakers of republican languages will not actively defend their languages. Effectively, the balance of rights of the federation and the republics for the establishment of state languages, achieved in the 1990s, was violated.

This paper attempts to survey language-in-education planning in the 1980s drawing on both formal publications and the more “ephemeral” but often more directky influential documents of government education departments and other authorities. Two problems are immediately evident: first, the influential ephemeral documents are hard to obtain. The second problem in surveying language-in-education planning is symptomatic of language policy-making in general; it is necessary to differentiate between, on the one hand, policy which is little more than uncoordinated good or bad ideas, limited in the range of needs that it seeks to answer, or incidental to policy serving other purposee (e.g., immigration policy) and, on the other hand, systematic, formalized language-in-education planning (cf., Rist 1982). This paper also focuses on only that part of language-in-education policy concerned with second or foreign language teaching and learning; other papers in this volume deal with the areas of literacy and bilingual education.

Abstract The roles of language policy and language practice and use in education have been regarded to influence the efficacy of teaching and learning in the school setting. With the rise of globalisation and internationalisation of services in education, the objective of producing manpower that is equipped to the demands of the knowledge-based economy has realigned government policies worldwide to put education at the forefront of its development plans. From the rise of English language as ‘the’ language for globalisation calls for a more inclusive and locally- oriented mother-tongue based multilingual education (MTB-MLE), this article will discuss broadly the dynamics of language, access and influence, and will look at the Philippines as a country case study of explicit and implicit declarations in language policy and use, as affecting the education sector, and access to the labour market.

This ethnographic research uses the applied linguistic landscape of Ben-Rafael (2009) to examine the choices of language practice (Spolsky, 2009) reflected through 459 Romanised names of the company on an island in Malaysia named Labuan. One of the outcomes of this study shows Malaysians are basically bilingual and about half of the names of the company are bilingual. However, the use of Malay language in naming the companies on the island is low though the Malay language is the national language of the country and the Malaysian government has implemented the Malay language education policy since independence in 1957. There are only 13% of company names presented in pure Malay language comparing to those in pure English (45%) and in code-mixing of Malay language and English or other languages (42%). Besides a low percentage of using the Malay language in the company names, incorrect uses of the language were identified. The study suggests the Malaysian government specifically the local government considers the company name written in both Malay language and English instead of merely in the Malay language when it comes to approving the application of new company licenses.

Abstract This article provides an overview of the use of the mother tongue (MT) in child education in the Nigerian context. We explicate previous government efforts at focusing on the native language as a means of improving learning in the early years, particularly in training the Nigerian child. We also address the obstacles to government's attempts at de-emphasising the place of English in the Nigerian polity. Without doubt, the English language is regarded by the citizenry as the language of now and the future. The belief is that school-age children and their parents are more comfortable with English than any other language. The policy of the adoption of an indigenous language as the instruction medium in the lower primary school is at variance with parents' desire to make their children speak English as the first language (L1). Our recommendation is that uniformity of policy implementation will reduce conflicts as the schools of the rich/elites and non-fee-paying government schools are made to employ the same medium to instruct the pupils. The above claims are supported by preliminary findings from observations, data from the administered questionnaire and interviews conducted to determine people's attitude towards the use of English and/or indigenous languages in the education of the child. Following Krashen's theory of Second Language Acquisition (SLA), which highlights the significance of exposure to and interaction in the target language, we conclude that, if English language remains the medium of instruction in the classroom, Nigeria and other African nations with similar linguistic complexities will be saved from further confusion and inconsistencies in educational policies, even as the MT will still function in other aspects of national life.

Social dynamics of a developing country undergo constant changes because of the demand of economic growth and people’s cater for social mobility. English has become important in all economic activities globally. Bangladesh was a British colony for almost 200 years. The legacy of English education still continues and it has not formulated any language policy, though the policy is to use mother tongue in all affairs of national/state functioning. Violating government rules, innumerable English education institutions operate taking advantage of the absence of government policy. This empirical study investigates unofficially how elements of social dynamics influence its language planning and policy.

Abstract The article reviews the past, present, and future position of English in the Pakistani language-in-education policy for the Pakistani government schools. The article first traces how the English language came to Pakistan, and underlines the social domains in which English is commonly used at the present time. The article highlights the fact that English has enjoyed the highest social position in Pakistan since the country’s establishment in 1947. Taking this fact into account, the article traces historically the status of the English language in the language-in-education policy for the government schools since 1947 to the present time. I argue that students from the elite and non-elite English medium schools end up being more literate in English and having better access to social mobility than the students from the Pakistani government schools because of the low quality education and the poor instruction of English as a subject taught through traditional teaching methods of imitation and memorization. In order to reduce the gap, although the recent National Education Policy (NEP 2009) of Pakistan has recommended not only teaching English as a compulsory subject in grade one onward but also using it as a medium of instruction in grade four onward for the content subjects such as science and mathematics in the Pakistani government schools, the current predicament of Pakistani public education raises questions and controversies about the successful implementation of the policy. The main suggestion of the paper is the fact that since teachers are the major agents of change in realizing such curriculum reforms at their classroom level (Fullan & Stiegelbauer, 1991), their perspectives, perceptions and attitudes must be sought as well as included in such policy making processes. Because the voices of Pakistani government teachers are overlooked in such top-down language policies, this paper implies that the their experiences, attitudes, and perspectives about the present and future role of English in public language-in-education policies need to be explored to better understand the potential future implications for Pakistani teachers and their education. Such steps not only make policies inclusive but also gauge how far such English initiatives are facilitative in raising the quality of education and developing English language literacy in Pakistan.

The post-apartheid South African Constitution guarantees the children of this country “the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public education institutions where that education is reasonably practicable” (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Section 29 (2)) (Juta’s Statutes 2003). Yet ten years into the new dispensation nothing significant has been done to alter a situation in which the majority of children are obliged to access their basic education largely through the medium of a second or even a third language — English. In contravention of both the intentions and the specific provisions of numerous legislative measures and policy statements, Government has made no serious or effective attempt to promote the use of any language other than English in South African schools nor to encourage language practices most conducive to the cognitive development and academic success of millions of non-English speaking pupils. To make matters worse, most of the children who enter the school system with very little knowledge of English and are expected to make an abrupt transition to that language as a medium of instruction after a totally inadequate three years are from impoverished households and communities still suffering the gravest effects of the discrimination and oppression of apartheid. They are often underprepared and seriously disadvantaged by their background circumstances when they enter the culturally strange and intimidating western-style education system. To heap on top of these disadvantages the burden of language practices in the classroom that hinder rather than facilitate their access to education is indefensible. When Macdonald asks, “ Are our children still swimming up the waterfall?” (Macdonald 2002: 111) she is not exaggerating. In these circumstances and if ineffective language teaching and inadequate use of the mother tongue as a medium of instruction can be shown to bar effective access to basic education of an acceptable standard, there are far more serious and far-reaching implications in terms of human rights than just the right to choice of language medium. Linguistic research into medium of instruction has tended to be isolated from evaluative legal approaches to minority language rights, children’s rights, education rights or other fundamental human rights. Insufficient attention has been given to the interrelationship between the various rights and the importance of local conditions and circumstances in any assessment of their relative weight and enforceability. Human rights cannot be seen out of context, and theory from various disciplines, such as politics, economics and linguistics may be invaluable in forming a fresh perspective on the right to mother tongue education and, indeed, to basic education in general. The principle of non-discrimination in education is generally recognised, to be sure, as is the importance of ensuring access to and quality of education (Strydom 1992/93:139), but the dependence of these factors on the most appropriate medium of instruction within the education system does not merit much attention in the literature. The right to basic education tends to be seen as separate from any possible right to choice of medium of instruction and the latter often merely as a question of convenience or preference, at best a qualified right (Oosthuizen and Rossouw 2001: 666), dependent on feasibility, numbers and available finance (Motata and Lemmer 2002: 111). In fact, the case for regarding the right to mother tongue education as a strong positive right in many contexts and countries does not appear yet to have been made. This study is theoretical in nature and constitutes an attempt to fill this gap by examining the findings and views of experts from various disciplines within the framework of current thinking on human rights issues. The development of a coherent framework within which to view the right to mother tongue education and government obligations in connection therewith might be of some value to policy makers in their efforts to plan improvements within the education system. The synthesis and possibly, to a limited extent, the development of theory from the relevant disciplines will be undertaken by means of a survey of the relevant literature, an analysis of not only local but also international legislation and policy documents and the weighing and balancing of conflicting evidence and contrasting viewpoints. Sources and contributions in each area will be discussed under the headings outlined in Chapter 3. First, however, I should like to provide an overview of the educational, political and economic context in which mother tongue education must be considered.

This paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter one presents an introduction and overview of the nature of the problem, its significance and implication for public policy, and a presentation of the research design and methodology. Chapter two reviews the historical and legal background of bilingual education policy. Chapter three presents a literature review of bilingual education policy making, and examines the impacts and effects of federal aid in practice. Chapter four provides a summary of survey findings and recommendations for reform of the funding criteria for Title VII ESEA bilingual education grants.

England’s long history of education has witnessed many conflicts in regard to language teaching. In this thesis, I investigate the conflicts surrounding two language education reform movements, Language Awareness and Knowledge About Language, during the Conservative administration between 1979 and 1997. The investigation examines official and non-official plans and policy texts produced by various groups and actors, notably Hawkins and Cox, that detail how the teaching of ‘Language’ should be conducted in England’s state school curriculum. The focus of the research is upon identifying what LA and KAL were as pedagogical concepts; why LA was reconstituted as KAL; what the motives underpinning these various plans and policies were; and finally, why efforts to establish LA and KAL were resisted. In the effort to make sense of this history, I draw theoretically and methodologically upon the work of Foucault, Fairclough, Bernstein and Ager. Limitations of my interpretation of this history notwithstanding, my findings revealed that LA was an educational reform movement that emerged from common schooling discourses, and one that sought to improve its educational provision. While LA was originally intended to be a subject in its own right that bridged the English and Foreign Language subject areas, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate reconstituted LA and placed its responsibility firmly within the English subject area. The motives underpinning LA and KAL planning and policy are varied. Those underpinning the policies, however, are distinctly ideological in nature, drawing a strong relationship between language education and democracy. Nearly all motives pertain to what Bernstein calls a competence model of education, the modes of which are notably attuned to addressing inequality and promoting social integration. LA and KAL were reforms that were both ill understood and resented, for varying and complex reasons, by educators and the Conservatives alike. The thesis closes with directions for future research.

Bibliography: pages 70-80.
Language planning and language policy are currently being debated by both politicians and educationists. Language policy is seen by both Afrikaner nationalists and some progressive educationists as the key to political and economic power. This dissertation argues that language policy-making alone cannot achieve political goals. It also proposes that the most successful and most democratic policies are those which are "facilitatory and enabling rather than compulsory and punitive" (Fishman, 1991: 82) and which are differentiated to take account of existing sociolinguistic contexts. Chapter 1 begins by looking at definitions of language planning and language policy. Following this, it examines some of the terms that people use to speak about language and languages in language planning. The concern here is not with establishing fixed meanings but with how the use of these terms constructs certain "realities", for example relationships amongst languages. This chapter also looks at some of the proposed relations between language and "reality". Chapter 2 briefly outlines the history of language planning in South Africa, focusing on language medium of instruction in education. It examines the Nationalists' and the ANC's language policy positions. A postscript discusses the agreement reached in November 1993. Chapter 3 looks at the role of various non-governmental associations in the language policy debate. It also examines the phenomenon of white advocacy of increased status for African languages. Chapter 4 deals with the process of language planning. Who decides on language goals and through what mechanisms are goals promoted? Chapter 5 asks questions about what bilingual or multilingual medium of instruction models would mean in terms of classroom practice and underlines the lack of consensus in bilingual education research about universally applicable solutions. Chapter 6 summarises the main arguments covered in the dissertation and makes some general recommendations about language-in-education policy.

Spanish is the second-largest speaking language in the United States, and while many government agencies have developed programs to help immigrants learn English, little is known about how program participants perceive the programs in terms of utility in transitioning to life in America or the usefulness of skills learned. Using Blalock's racial power-threat theory as the foundation, the purpose of this general qualitative study was to examine the perceptions of one such program in a mid-Atlantic city specifically oriented toward Spanish speaking immigrants. Data were collected from 15 adults, Spanish speaking program facilitators and a review of publicly available documentation related to the program. These data were inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. The primary theme of this study is that program participation is valuable and useful in cultural acclimation, but the programs are difficult to find within the local government structure. Generally speaking, it was determined that power-threat theory may explain the perceived lack of accessibility of the programs to some extent. Recommendations resulting from this study include advice to local government decision-makers about expanding outreach and staging of programs in order to increase participation, thereby supporting positive social change in better accommodating the needs of a diverse population of residents.

AbstractHigher education in Tajikistan has undergone substantial changes over the past 25 years as a result of both its internal crises and those social and economic transition challenges seen throughout the Newly Independent States (NIS). HEIs in the country have also shown eagerness to change and grow as they move toward world education space. In this chapter, we examine the evolution of the Tajik system of higher education from the Soviet time through independence (1991–2015) in terms of growth, emerging landscape and diversification, and key policy developments and issues. We analyze these changes in the context of relevant economic, social and political factors, and rely on a comparative analysis in understanding the commonalities and differences in higher educational landscapes between Tajikistan and others in the NIS. Institutional diversity has occurred in the country along several dimensions. Among these is a geometric expansion of the number of HEIs: Those transformed from preexisting Soviet institutes as well as the establishment of many new ones. This has been fueled partly by the mass creation of new programs that reflect the needs of an emerging knowledge-based economy but also the result of parental craving for higher education for their children—regardless of market demands. Specific features of the massification of higher education in Tajikistan are further explained by internationalization according to the Bologna Process and other globalization agendas; the establishment of international HEIs under bilateral government agreements (with Russia), and significantly increasing HEI programs and enrolments in far-flung regions of the country—especially in programs related to industry and technology. Our analyses are based on a variety of official statistical sources; educational laws, institutional documents and reports published by international organizations; accounts from the English-language press; and open-ended interviews conducted by the authors in Tajikistan between 2011 and 2014.

AbstractThe chapter explores the developmental trajectory of Ukraine’s higher education system since the middle ages. Starting with just a few comprehensive universities in the western parts at first and later Eastern parts of the country, the system gradually evolved into a diverse and differentiated institutional landscape. The variety and scope of HEIs reflects the internal logic of the system’s own development as well as outside factors, including changes of the ruling governments, fluctuations in the demographic trends, shifts in political alliances and cultural and language oscillations, which have been characteristic of the Ukrainian history. The authors elaborate on several policy rationales that came to underpin some of the changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as policy discussions and policy silences (lack of dialog amongst various stakeholders) that have taken a lot of energy and yet have not lead to any noticeable changes in the institutional scene. The chapter also discusses the most recent changes in the legislation and practical implementations leaving space for future research to draw conclusions as to their effectiveness.

This paper traces the origins of today’s campaigns for school vouchers and other modes of public funding for private education to efforts by Milton Friedman beginning in 1955. It reveals that the endgame of the “school choice” enterprise for libertarians was not then—and is not now--to enhance education for all children; it was a strategy, ultimately, to offload the full cost of schooling onto parents as part of a larger quest to privatize public services and resources. Based on extensive original archival research, this paper shows how Friedman’s case for vouchers to promote “educational freedom” buttressed the case of Southern advocates of the policy of massive resistance to Brown v. Board of Education. His approach—supported by many other Mont Pelerin Society members and leading libertarians of the day --taught white supremacists a more sophisticated, and for more than a decade, court-proof way to preserve Jim Crow. All they had to do was cease overt focus on race and instead deploy a neoliberal language of personal liberty, government failure and the need for market competition in the provision of public education.

China’s government is using public-private investment funds, known as guidance funds, to deploy massive amounts of capital in support of strategic and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. Drawing exclusively on Chinese-language sources, this report explores how guidance funds raise and deploy capital, manage their investment, and interact with public and private actors. The guidance fund model is no silver bullet, but it has many advantages over traditional industrial policy mechanisms.

Children with disabilities suffer disproportionately from the learning crisis. Although they represent only about 1.5% to 5% of the child population, they comprise more than half of out-of-school children globally. Inspired by a commitment that every child has the right to quality education, a growing global drive for inclusive education promotes an education system where children with disabilities receive an appropriate and high-quality education that is delivered alongside their peers. The global commitment to inclusive education is captured in the Sustainable Development Goal 4—ensuring inclusive and equitable education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. This paper explores inclusive education for children with disabilities in Mongolia’s mainstream education system, based on a 2019 survey of more than 5,000 households; interviews with teachers, school administrators, education ministry officials, and social workers; and visits to schools and kindergartens in four provinces and one district of the capital city. Mongolia has developed a strong legal and policy framework for inclusive education aligned with international best practice, but implementation and capacity are lagging. This is illustrated using four indicators of inclusive education: inclusive culture, inclusive policies, inclusive practices, and inclusive physical environments. The conclusion presents a matrix of recommendations for government and education sector development partners.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

In the spring of 2008, WIFO, KMU Forschung Austria, Prognos AG in Germany and convelop were jointly commissioned by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth to perform a systems evaluation of the country's research promotion and funding activities. Based on their findings, six recommendations were developed for a change in Austrian RTDI policy as outlined below: 1. to move from a narrow to a broader approach in RTDI policy (links to education policy, consideration of the framework for innovation such as competition, international perspectives and mobility); 2. to move from an imitation to a frontrunner strategy (striving for excellence and market leadership in niche and high-quality segments, increasing market shares in advanced sectors and technology fields, and operating in segments of relevance for society); 3. to move from a fragmented approach to public intervention to a more coordinated and consistent approach(explicit economic goals, internal and external challenges and reasoning for public intervention); 4. to move from a multiplicity of narrowly defined funding programmes to a flexible, dynamic policy that uses a broader definition of its tasks and priorities (key technology and research segments as priority-action fields, adequate financing of clusters and centres of excellence); 5. to move from an unclear to a precisely defined allocation of responsibilities between ministries and other players in the field (high-ranking steering group at government level, monitoring by a Science, Research and Innovation Council); 6. to move from red-tape-bound to a modern management of public intervention (institutional separation between ministries formulating policies and agencies executing them, e.g., by "progressive autonomy").

On Thursday, 30 April 2020, the EdTech Hub participated in an “Ask me anything” session for policy-makers and funders in Nepal. The session focused on designing high-quality, effective, distance education programmes during the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants included high-level officials from the Nepalese government (e.g., the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the Curriculum Development Office and the Education Review Office), representatives from development partners (e.g., the World Bank, UNICEF and USAID) and other education organisations (e.g., OLE Nepal). The session was convened for two purposes. First, to consider international good practice and current trends in distance education during the COVID-19 pandemic, presented by the World Bank EduTech team and the EdTech Hub. Second, for the EdTech Hub team to gather questions from participants, to be able to target guidance specifically to the situation in Nepal. This document provides answers to a consolidated list of 10 questions received from stakeholders during the session. To consolidate any overlap, we have occasionally combined multiple questions into one. In other cases, where multiple important issues required a focused response, we split apart questions.