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Casey, Brian P. "Natural law and the challenge of legal positivism." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/4842.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007.The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on January 30, 2008) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Martin, Margaret Ellen. "Raz's exclusive legal positivism : the tension between law and morality." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.614073.
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Glahn, Jason C. "Is hard positivism too hard to swallow? /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p1426061.
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Himma, Kenneth Einar. "A positivist account of legal principles /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5720.
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McMorrow, Thomas. "Law at L'Arche : reflections from a critical legal pluralist perspective." Thesis, McGill University, 2007. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=112606.
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This thesis is an on-the-ground exploration of the radical hypothesis that each individual human being bears responsibility for constructing order out of the overwhelming plurality and dissonance of normative experience. It constitutes an empirically-based, critical legal pluralist analysis of everyday life at L'Arche Montreal---a community serving persons with intellectual disabilities. The aim of this thesis is to highlight the active role persons with intellectual disabilities living at L'Arche Montreal play in constructing legal normativity.
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Chilovi, Samuele. "Grounding Legal Reality." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/667056.
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The four main chapters of this thesis, while each largely autonomous, collectively provide a study of the relation between grounding and supervenience, and a comprehensive application of grounding theory to the philosophy of law. Chapter 1 argues that a supervenience relation interestingly weaker than necessitation can be used to capture a substantive connection between grounding and modality. Chapter 2 argues that metaphysical grounding is the relation of dependence that connects legal facts to their determinants, and that the positivism/anti-positivism debate in legal philosophy involves competing claims on the grounds of legal facts. Chapter 3 criticizes extant grounding- based formulations of legal positivism offered by Rosen (2010) and Plunkett and Shapiro (2017), and puts forward a novel and insightful formulation that is capable of solving their problems, which crucially relies on the notion of a social enabler. Finally, Chapter 4 shows that Hume’s Law – the thesis that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ – poses no significant threat to legal positivism or moral naturalism, both understood as views about grounding.
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Kirby, Coel Thomas. "Exorcising Matovu's ghost : legal positivism, pluralism and ideology in Uganda's appellate courts." Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=112605.
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In 1966, the High Court of Uganda legitimised the new nation's first coup d'etat. After two decades of civil war, Ugandans enacted their first popular constitution in 1995. However, the judiciary's dominant positivist ideology, Matovu's ghost, still haunts the new legal order. The author sets out this ideology's presumptions and then critiques them against an alternative, pluralist map of laws in Uganda.The constructive analysis of recent case law (or lack thereof) that follows shows how this ideology undermines the constitution's promises of equality and freedom. This pluralist methodology is also essential to explain contemporary crises like the Lord's Resistance Army, arms proliferation in Karamoja and Museveni's "no-party" rule. In conclusion, exorcising Matovu's ghost is a priority for Ugandans and the process deserves considered thought for legal scholars advocating the "rule of law" or interventions by the International Criminal Court.
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Jenkins, Maricarmen Marshall. "Philosophical assumptions in legal philosophy : a critique of contemporary philosophy of law /." *McMaster only, 1998.
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Phillips, Cindy L. "Rescuing Inclusive Legal Positivism from the Charge of Inconsistency." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2011. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/81.
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Scott Shapiro, an exclusive legal positivist, argues that inclusive legal positivism is inconsistent with the view that legal norms must conceptually provide reasons for agents of a legal system to act in specified ways. I defend inclusive legal positivism from Shapiro's charge of inconsistency.
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Cassagne, Juan Carlos. "New constitutionalism and the foundations of the legal system." THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/107730.
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Inside the field of Law, the usual question about the meaning of a determined concept or the question towards what it makes reference to has alwaysbeen complicated. In the last years, different events have produced that philosophical trends reconsider the understanding of the legal system.In the present article, the author does a presentation of what new constitutionalism means and its opinion towards it. The author also makes a critical analysis of the positivist and jusnaturalist visions, connecting them with the understandingof Law and the legal system, making an emphasis on Administrative Law.En el campo del Derecho, la pregunta sobre qué significa o a qué hace referencia determinado concepto siempre ha sido complicada. En los últimos años diversos acontecimientos han ocasionado que corrientes filosóficas replanteen la forma de entender el orden jurídico.En el presente artículo, el autor hace una presentación de qué se entiende por nuevo constitucionalismo y su opinión sobre el mismo. Asimismo, realiza un análisis crítico de los planteamientos positivistas e iusnaturalistas, conectando los mismos con el entendimiento del Derecho y del orden jurídico, poniendo énfasis en la rama del Derecho Administrativo.
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Ghirardi, José Garcez. "Important, unimportant: a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in wonderland." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116127.
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Almost a full century separates Alice in Wonderland (1865) of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson(who will be referred by his pseudonym, Lewis Carroll) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the croquet game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the Grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests (see Green, 2003; Posner, 2005).This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview that Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section («Sleepy and stupid») discusses Lewis’ critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section («Do bats eat cats?») discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section («Off with their heads!») explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section («Important, Unimportant») explains the sense in which a «critical anticipation» is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.Casi un siglo entero separa a Alicia en el país de las Maravillas (1865) de Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (a quien nos referiremos por su seudónimo, Lewis Carroll) y a la segunda, más larga y más elaborada edición de la Teoría pura del derecho (1960) de Hans Kelsen —cuya primera edición fue publicada en 1934—. Y, sin embargo, es posible argumentar que la primera obra anticipa y trata en forma crítica a muchos de los supuestos filosóficos que fundamentan y son elementales en los razonamientos sobre la última. Ambos textos, con las diferencias iluminadoras que surgen de sus géneros dispares, tienen como uno de sus temas clave las normas y su funcionamiento. El país de las maravillas, como Alicia pronto descubre, es un mundo sitiado por regulaciones de todo tipo: desde los rituales de etiqueta de la merienda de locos hasta los arreglos cambiantes para el juego de croquet y la insensatez procesal del juicio con el que termina la novela. La Teoría Pura del derecho, como enfáticamente recalca Kelsen, tiene a la Grundnorm (norma fundamental) como la piedra angular sobre la que reside todo el edificio teórico (véanse Green, 2003; Posner, 2005).Este trabajo discute algunos de los supuestos en los que se basa el razonamiento de Kelsen como un ejemplo de la moderna visión del mundo a la que satíricamente analiza Carroll. La primera sección («Somnolienta y atontada») discute la crítica de Carroll a la idea de que, para comprender un objeto (en el caso del estudio de Kelsen, el derecho), uno tiene que liberarlo de sus elementos ajenos. La segunda sección («¿Comen murciélagos los gatos?») discute la noción de coherencia sistémica y su impacto sobre las formas modernas de pensamiento sobre la verdad, el derecho y la sociedad. La tercera sección («¡Que les corten la cabeza!») explora las conexiones entre las lecturas de sistemas como entidades neutrales y la perpetuación del poder político. La cuarta y última sección («Importante, No importante») explica el sentido en el que una «anticipación crítica» es tanto posible como útil para discutir los supuestos filosóficos que estructuran algunos argumentos positivistas. Esta sección también discute las razones para elegir concentrarse en el trabajo de Kelsen, más que en el del contemporáneo de Carroll John Austin, cuya obra La provincia de la jurisprudencia determinada (publicada en 1832) continúa influyendo hoy en los debates legales.
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Kletzer, Christoph. "The mutual inclusion of law and its science : reflections on Hans Kelsen's legal positivism." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/251950.
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MEDEIROS, BERNARDO ABREU DE. "INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM: THE POSSIBILITY OF INCORPORATION OF MORALS IN LAW IN CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL STATES." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2009. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31494@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
Poucas questões têm sido tão abordadas ao se discutir teoria do direito e direito constitucional como a a crise do positivismo jurídico. A publicação de O Conceito de Direito de Hart em 1961 representou um marco na teoria do direito do século XX, tanto pelas inovações teóricas que aportou, representando um refinamento da teoria juspositivista, como pelo fecundo debate que gerou. Tal debate, que se inicia com as primeiras críticas de Dworkin ao positivismo de Hart em Modelo de Regras I e II, compiladas em Levando os direitos a sério, se desenvolve até hoje com fortes debates internos ao próprio positivismo jurídico. Dentre elas, centraremos a análise no positivismo inclusivo, termo cunhado por Wilfrid Waluchow, mas cujas origens remontam ao início dos anos 70. A principal proposta de tal corrente é conciliar alguma das críticas de Dworkin com as bases da tradição positivista. A corrente se constrói refutando de um lado, teses não positivistas como as de Dworkin e, de outro, teses exclusivas como as de Raz, buscando assim manter as bases do positivismo jurídico e dar conta de uma das principais características dos estados constitucionais contemporâneos - a ampla incorporação de valores ao direito, especialmente nas cartas constitucionais. Inicialmente, serão abordados os fundamentos da teoria juspositivista, encarando-a como uma tradição. Em seguida será situado o debate Hart/Dworkin nesse cenário para analisar seus desdobramentos, focando no surgimento e consolidação do Positivismo Inclusivo. Finalmente, abordam-se as contribuições recentes ao debate, fazendo um balanço das teses envolvidas e discutindo a sua relevância atual.
Few issues have been so intensively discussed in legal theory and constitutional aw as the crisis of legal positivism. The publication of The Concept of Law by Hart in 1961 represented a milestone in the theory of law of the twentieth century, both for the theoretical innovations that it contributed, representing a refinementf the theory juspositivista, as for the fruitful discussions that resulted. This debate, which begins with the first criticism of Dworkin to Hart s positivism in the Model of Rules I and II, and is developed till today with very strong internal debates in legal positivism. Among them, the analysis focus on inclusive positivism, a term created by Wilfrid Waluchow but whose origins date back to the early 70ths The main proposal of this version is to reconcile some of the criticisms of Dworkin with the tenants of positivist tradition. The proposal was, on one hand, to reject part of, Dworkin critics to legal positivism, and on the other, exclusive theories such as Raz s conception of law, seeking thereby to maintain the foundations of legal positivism and give an account of the main features of contemporary constitutional states - the extensive incorporation of moral values, especially in constitutional charters. Initially, this dissertation seeks for the grounds of positivist tradition. Then the debate will be located in Hart/Dworkin scenario to analyze its developments, focusing on the emergence and consolidation of Inclusive Positivism. Finally, it deals with the recent contributions to the debate, balancing the arguments involved and discussing its relevance today.
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Diener, Keith William. "A Defense of Soft Positivism: Justice and Principle Processes." unrestricted, 2006. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04172006-125357/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006.Title from title screen. Andrew Altman, committee chair; Andrew J. Cohen, William Edmundson, committee members. Electronic text (75 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 17, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-75).
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Villas-Bôas, Marcos de Aguiar. "In dubio pro contribuinte." Universidade Federal da Bahia, 2009. http://www.repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/12324.
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A Ciência do Direito vem passando por muitas mudanças nos últimos anos. Os estudos avançaram bastante, formando novos movimentos e teorias, que devem guiar a pesquisa jurídica nos próximos anos. A aproximação entre o direito e os sujeitos, os fatos e os valores é cada vez maior. O enfraquecimento do positivismo jurídico impõe uma revisão dos temas estudados sob o seu enfoque, o que também ocorre no direito tributário. O in dubio pro contribuinte é uma das matérias que merecem uma nova análise, ainda mais se considerarmos a crescente preocupação do jurista com a efetividade dos direitos fundamentais do cidadão. A partir das noções pós-positivistas que têm influenciado a ciência do direito, como a tópica, a argumentação jurídica e a teoria dos princípios, cumpre investigar se o in dubio pro contribuinte pode receber uma outra roupagem, funcionando como um princípio constitucional que busca dar máxima eficácia aos direitos fundamentais do contribuinte frente aos excessos do poder estatal e que pode ser desdobrado ainda em outras categorias normativas: regra e postulado. O in dubio pro contribuinte, como um princípio constitucional, influenciaria a construção das demais normas do sistema tributário brasileiro, impediria a construção de normas que não conferissem máxima efetividade aos direitos fundamentais e determinaria a aplicação de um postulado que imporia, nos casos difíceis tributários, um aumento da argumentação para a limitação desses direitos.
Salvador
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Tauber, Andrew E. (Andrew Emanuel). "Tyranny on trial : the politics of natural law and legal positivism in the Federal Republic of Germany." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/10253.
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Turégano, Mansilla Isabel. "Transnational Law or the Need to Overcome Monism and Dualism in Legal Theory." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116647.
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Law in a transnational context loses the features with which it has been configured since modernity. Classic distinctions between national and international, public and private, substantive and procedural, legal and political, social and legal lose their rigidity in a context of norms, orders, institutions and agents that interact and overlap in diverse and changing ways. A legal theory capable of explaining and evaluating this overflowing legal reality is lacking. A theoretical reflection on international law is not enough. Transnationalism appeals to a plurality of legal actors and spaces that interact to create, interpret and enforce rules which they mutually identify with. Transnationalism does not only refer to the global or the supranational, but to the interdependence of both with the local and transit spaces. And this translates into a change of focus or perspective that is required of each legal agent: management of the interrelation between diverse orders aimed to create spaces for approach, contestation and innovation is a normative requirement and it must be weighed against other legal values. Concepts to which legal theory must focus its attention change their meaning. The work refers to four of those concepts that I consider essential: social group or community, relations between orders and interlegality, coercion and normative diversity. The last part of the paper addresses the way in which these necessary changes have a place in our theories elaborated from the perspective of the great traditions of legal philosophy. What legal positivism, socio-legal theory and legal realism have in common might be an appropriate approach to the review of our discipline.El derecho, en un contexto transnacional, pierde los rasgos con los que lo hemos configurado desde la modernidad. Las clásicas distinciones entre lo nacional y lo internacional, lo público y lo privado, lo sustantivo y lo procedimental, lo jurídico y lo político, lo social y lo jurídico abandonan su rigidez en un entramado de normas, órdenes, instituciones y agentes que se entremezclan y superponen de modos diversos y cambiantes. Carecemos de una teoría del derecho capaz de explicar y evaluar esta realidad jurídica desbordante. No es suficiente una reflexión teórica sobre el derecho internacional. Lo transnacional apela a una pluralidad de actores y de espacios jurídicos que interaccionan para crear, interpretar y ejecutar normas con las que se identifican mutuamente. Lo transnacional no se refiere solo a lo global o a lo supranacional, sino a la interdependencia de ambos con lo local y los espacios de tránsito. Ello se traduce en un cambio de enfoque o de perspectiva que se exige a cada operador jurídico: la gestión de la interrelación entre órdenes diversos orientada a la creación de espacios para la aproximación, la contestación y la innovación es una exigencia normativa y debe ser ponderada con el resto de valores jurídicos. A partir de ahí cambia el significado de los conceptos a los que ha de orientar su atención la teoría jurídica. El trabajo se refiere a cuatro de dichos conceptos que considero esenciales: grupo social o comunidad, relaciones entre órdenes e interlegalidad, coerción y diversidad normativa. El modo en que los cambios necesarios tienen cabida en la teoría elaborada desde las grandes tradiciones de la iusfilosofía es abordado en la última parte del trabajo, considerando que lo que tienen en común el positivismo jurídico, la teoría socio-jurídica y el realismo jurídico puede ser una aproximación adecuada para la revisión de nuestra disciplina.
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Ródenas, Ángeles. "Challenges for Legal Philosophy in the 21st Century." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/115910.
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This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method.En este trabajo se constata un desajuste entre una demanda real y acuciante de un análisis filosófico que permita dar cuenta de la irrupción de nuevos fenómenos en el panorama del derecho y la limitada oferta de herramientas teóricas con que satisfacer esta demanda que aporta el modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho. Tras el diagnóstico inicial de desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda, se destaca como un problema medular del modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho su resistencia a asumir una racionalidad de tipo práctico y se defiende la viabilidad de esta forma de pensamiento. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta para la reinvención de la filosofía del derecho del siglo XXI, redefiniendo sus objetivos y replanteando su método.
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Mesquita, Márcio Satalino. "O positivismo jurídico como fundamento da educação do bacharel em direito: a concepção do objeto como condicionante do modo de ensino." Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2005. https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/2788.
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Previous issue date: 2005-12-16Starting from the idea that the philosophical law conception accepted, consciously or unconsciously, determines, or at least conditiones significantly, the law teaching, the author examines the legal acts that rules the law schools curriculum directives in Brazil, as well as the educational programs and some courses descriptions of law graduation at the USP Universidade de São Paulo Law School and FADISC Faculdades Integradas de São Carlos Law School, and questions of some admission examinations of Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, Seção de São Paulo (Brazil s Bar Association, Section of São Paulo). This analysis, which includes an examination of accepted bibliography references and other teaching practices, is done aiming at the identification of the determinations or conditionings of legal positivism accepted as the predominant philosophical law conception in Brazil about the teaching way. Towards, the author describes the legal positivism concept and identifies its main characteristics, mainly its more sophisticated version, using the Hans KELSEN s work, specially referring to the distinguishing between Natural Law and Positive Law, as well as referring to the supremacy of statute as law source and about its hermeneutics peculiarities. The author makes an effort to establishes distinguishings and similarities between legal positivism and Auguste COMTE s positivism, as well as between legal positivism and neo-positivism. The issue of the practicability of a juridical science understood as the currently dominant paradigm and as relevant legal positivism characteristic is treated by the author incidentally, making criticisms about objective verifiability of legal rules, about legal or illegal human behaviors; about the possibility of legal logics development; and about the juridical science object delimitation, based on the Karl POPPER s empiric science concept. For the criticism of the juridical science object delimitation, in the conception of the legal positivism, the author develops, as a category of analysis, the statute fetishism concept, based on Karl MARX s commodity fetishism concept. Throughout the examination of the mentioned empiric data, including comparative analysis with statute texts, the author establishes the characteristics of the so called Positivist Law Teaching, about curriculum directives, the way of making the curriculum, the courses contents, the doctrine and the evaluation way. Finally, the author indicates the consequences of positivist law teaching, concerning to normative reductionism, normative abstractionism, non-historicism, and legal technicism, and proposes a new approach of law teaching, about the abandoning of scientific paradigm, and about the enlargement of the study object limits.
Partindo da idéia de que a concepção filosófica adotada, de forma consciente ou inconsciente, sobre o Direito determina, ou ao menos condiciona significativamente, o ensino jurídico, o autor examina os atos normativos que disciplinam as diretrizes curriculares dos cursos de Direito no Brasil, bem como as grades curriculares e conteúdos programáticos de algumas disciplinas dos cursos de graduação em Direito da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo e das Faculdades Integradas de São Carlos, e ainda questões de alguns exames de admissão na Seção de São Paulo da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil. Essa análise, que inclui ainda o exame de referências bibliográficas adotadas, e outras práticas de ensino, é feita visando identificar a existência de determinações ou condicionamentos do positivismo jurídico tido como concepção filosófica do Direito dominante no Brasil sobre o modo de ensino. Para tanto, o autor delineia conceitualmente o positivismo jurídico e identifica suas principais características, notadamente em sua corrente teoricamente mais sofisticada, valendo-se da obra de Hans KELSEN, e em especial no que se refere à distinção entre direito natural e direito positivo, bem como com relação à supremacia da lei como fonte do Direito, e quanto às peculiaridades da sua hermenêutica. Nesse esforço, o autor estabelece ainda distinções e similitudes entre o positivismo jurídico e o positivismo comteano, bem como entre o positivismo jurídico e o neo-positivismo. A questão da viabilidade de uma ciência do Direito tida como paradigma atualmente dominante e como característica relevante do positivismo jurídico é tratada pelo autor incidentalmente, sendo feitas críticas quanto ao tema da verificabilidade objetiva das proposições jurídicas sobre a existência das normas jurídicas, e sobre a licitude das condutas humanas; e também quanto o tema da possibilidade de desenvolvimento de lógicas jurídicas; e da delimitação do objeto da ciência do Direito, com base na concepção de ciência empírica de Karl POPPER. Para a crítica da delimitação do objeto da ciência do Direito, na concepção juspositivista, o autor desenvolve, como categoria de análise, o conceito de fetichismo da lei, inspirado no conceito de fetichismo da mercadoria de Karl MARX. Mediante o exame dos dados empíricos referidos, inclusive utilizando-se de análises comparativas com textos legais, o autor estabelece as características do que denomina ensino positivista do Direito, quanto às diretrizes curriculares, ao modo de elaboração do currículo, ao conteúdo programático, à doutrina e ao modo de avaliação. Por fim, o autor aponta conseqüências do ensino positivista do Direito, quanto ao reducionismo normativista, ao normativismo abstrato, ao a-historicismo, e ao tecnicismo jurídico, e formula propostas para uma nova abordagem do ensino do Direito, quanto ao abandono do paradigma cientificista, e quanto à ampliação dos limites do objeto de estudo.
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Bouchard, Kevin. "Aux origines conceptuelles du constitutionnalisme de common law contemporain : l’influence de la conception classique de la common law sur la théorie juridique de Wilfrid Waluchow." Thesis, Paris 2, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA020051.
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Ce travail propose une interprétation d’ensemble de la théorie du droit et de la théorie du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité des lois de l’auteur canadien contemporain Wilfrid Waluchow, à partir d’une étude de la manière dont elles s’inspirent de la conception classique de la common law. La partie préliminaire présente de façon synthétique la conception classique de la common law et la critique que lui adresse Thomas Hobbes, pour montrer comment elles font apparaître, dès les origines de la modernité, deux façons opposées de concevoir le droit, qui sous-tendent la pensée contemporaine. La première partie étudie le rapport que les conceptions du droit des inspirateurs plus immédiats de Wilfrid Waluchow entretiennent avec la conception classique de la common law. Elle explique comment H. L. A. Hart contribue à rapprocher le positivisme juridique de la vision coutumière des common lawyers à l’aide de la notion de règles secondaires et comment Ronald Dworkin associe plutôt l’approche de la common law à une méthode d’interprétation centrée sur la dimension argumentative du droit. La deuxième partie examine le positivisme juridique inclusif de Wilfrid Waluchow et la théorie de common law du contrôle judiciaire qu’il élabore à partir de celui-ci et elle montre comment l’effort de l’auteur canadien pour conjuguer dans sa pensée les influences des conceptions du droit de Hart et de Dworkin, à l’aide en particulier de la notion de moralité constitutionnelle, l’amène à développer une vision qui possède des affinités importantes avec la conception classique de la common lawThis work offers a general interpretation of the theory of law and the theory of judicial review of Canadian contemporary author Wilfrid Waluchow, through the study of their relation to classical common law jurisprudence. The preliminary section offers a summary of classical common law jurisprudence and of Thomas Hobbes’s critique of classical common law jurisprudence, and shows how they define two opposite ways of conceptualizing law that still underlie contemporary jurisprudence. The first section studies how the jurisprudence of H. L. A. Hart and of Ronald Dworkin, which directly inspire Wilfrid Waluchow’s theory of law, relate to classical common law jurisprudence. It shows how Hart, with his concept of secondary rules, moves legal positivism closer to classical common law’s customary understanding of the law and how Dworkin defines the common law approach otherwise, by proposing an interpretive method concentrating on the argumentative character of law.The second section studies Wilfrid Waluchow’s inclusive legal positivism and his common law theory of judicial review. It shows how Wilfrid Waluchow’s effort to reconcile Hart’s theory of the law with Dworkin’s jurisprudence, notably through the idea of constitutional morality, leads him to develop an understanding of the law which has important affinities with classical common law jurisprudence
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Cavalcanti, Avner Pinheiro. "O legislador: da crítica ao formalismo conceitual para início de consciência sobre legisgênese." Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, 2016. http://tede2.unicap.br:8080/handle/tede/955.
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The paper presents the bases for a theory of how the rules of law are formed, based on the only concept of substantive law already outlined, by Claudio Souto. According to the said author, Law is the externalization of the human feeling of being-oriented by the currently insuperable information or, simplifying, the compound SIV (Feeling, Idea and Will). The existence of this intrinsic feeling to the human condition has already been empirically proven by the work of Paul Bloom. However, further details, such as the proof of Claudio Souto's theory for Paul Bloom's work and the confirmation of the theory that will be presented, are scheduled for the next work, in Doctorate Degree. In the present work we present the fundamental bases of what has come to be called by us of “Legisgênesis” or the human social phenomenon of the configuration of the duty-to-be. This phenomenon differs from the legislator considered by the legal tradition, it is that it is exclusively formalist. The legislator idealized by tradition can be divided into two genres: legislator stricto sensu and legislator lato sensu. By legislator stricto sensu we mean the official agents responsible for drawing up the equally official laws and by legislator stricto sensu the strategies of argumentation, by rationalization, used in legal practice. These genre, on the other hand, present subdivisions in species that we classify and try to explain in the course of the present work.The fundamental difference between the conceptions raised is established between what can be called a formal legislator (legal myth) and real legislator (human phenomenon). Formal legislator, understood as the source of rules and law, is a modern legal myth about which a reality is artificially created, a reality that corresponds to what tradition calls the legal world. The real legislator, or rather, the legislature, takes care to explain how human societies formulate imperatives of conduct classifiable as Law. In order to allow and explain this fundamental difference and the reasons that hold the myth of the legislator in force, we are concerned with explaining the political and philosophical reasons why law has been operated through rhetoric in order to provide official leaders with a Mechanism of social control. The main purpose of the paper was to answer the question: if the law is admittedly prior to the laws formulated by the official authorities, who or what is the legislator in fact? The result was what we call the Theory of Legislation. The method used was transdisciplinary, correlating works and theses, from different areas, in order to configure a theory, or rather, the basis of a new theory in response to the problem.
O trabalho apresenta as bases para uma teoria de como são formadas as leis de direito com fundamento no único conceito de direito substantivo já traçado, o de Cláudio Souto. Segundo o dito autor, Direito é a exteriorização do sentimento humano de dever-ser orientado pelas informações atualmente insuperáveis ou, simplificando, o composto SIV (Sentimento, Ideia e Vontade). A existência deste sentimento intrínseco à condição humana já foi empiricamente comprovada pelo trabalho de Paul Bloom. Todavia, maiores detalhes como a comprovação da teoria de Cláudio Souto pelo trabalho de Paul Bloom e a constatação da teoria que será apresentada estão programados para o trabalho seguinte, em fase de doutorado. No trabalho atual, apresentamos as bases fundamentais do que veio a ser chamado por nós de Legisgênese ou o fenômeno humano social de configuração do dever-ser. Dito fenômeno se difere do legislador considerado pela tradição jurídica, esta que é exclusivamente formalista. O legislador idealizado pela tradição pode ser dividido em dois gêneros: legislador stricto sensu e legislador lato sensu. Por legislador stricto sensu, entendemos os agentes oficiais encarregados da elaboração das leis igualmente oficiais; por legislador lato sensu, as estratégias de argumentação, por racionalização, empregadas na prática jurídica. Estes gêneros, por sua vez, apresentam subdivisões em espécies que classificamos e tratamos de explicar no curso do presente trabalho. A diferença fundamental entre as concepções levantadas é estabelecida entre o que se pode chamar de legislador formal (mito jurídico) e legislador real (fenômeno humano). Legislador formal, entendido como fonte da lei e do direito, trata-se de um mito jurídico moderno sobre o qual uma realidade é artificialmente criada; realidade que corresponde ao que a tradição chama de mundo jurídico. O legislador real, ou melhor dizendo, a legisgênese, cuida de explicar como as sociedades humanas formulam imperativos de conduta classificáveis como Direito. De modo a permitir e explicar essa diferença fundamental e as razões que mantêm o mito do legislador em vigência, preocupamó-nos em explicar os motivos políticos e filosóficos pelo qual o Direito vem sendo operado através da retórica com o fim de fornecer aos líderes oficiais um mecanismo eficiente de controle social. O objetivo maior do trabalho foi responder a pergunta: se o Direito é reconhecidamente anterior às leis formuladas pelas autoridades oficiais, quem ou o que é o legislador de fato? O resultado foi o que passamos a chamar de Teoria da Legisgênse. O método empregado foi trasdisciplinar, correlacionando trabalhos e teses, das mais diferentes áreas, de maneira a configurar uma teoria, ou melhor, as bases de uma teoria nova em resposta ao problema.
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Abel, Henrique. "Os fundamentos epistemológicos do direito no constitucionalismo contemporâneo." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2016. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/6256.
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O presente trabalho busca sustentar a tese de que o Estado Democrático de Direito, oriundo do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo, representa um novo paradigma político-jurídico que se mostra radicalmente transformador na comparação com as encarnações anteriores do Estado Moderno. Sustenta, todavia, que este novo paradigma político-jurídico não veio acompanhado de um novo paradigma epistemológico (apesar de o chamado “neoconstitucionalismo” ter representado uma tentativa - frustrada e insuficiente - neste sentido). Na medida em que a última grande epistemologia jurídica de influência universal, a Teoria Pura do Direito própria do normativismo positivista kelseniano, se mostra absolutamente inadequada e insuficiente para explicar o Direito dentro daquele novo paradigma político-jurídico, se faz necessária uma (re)construção epistemológica do Direito no contexto do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo. Uma epistemologia jurídica efetivamente pós-positivista, aliada ao paradigma metodológico-interpretativo da hermenêutica jurídica, deve ser capaz de dar as condições de legitimidade discursiva e científica para que o Direito evite ser instrumentalizado pela política ou pelo poder econômico e, sobretudo, para que desfrute da autonomia necessária para atuar como instrumento qualificado na concretização do Estado Democrático de Direito e na proteção de direitos e garantias fundamentais.
The present work seeks to support the thesis that the Democratic Rule of Law, coming from Contemporary Constitutionalism, represents a new political-legal paradigm that is radically transformative in comparison with the previous incarnations of the Modern State. It argues, however, that this new political-legal paradigm was not accompanied by a new legal epistemological paradigm (although the so-called "neo-constitutionalism" represented a failed and insufficient attempt in this sense). Given the fact that the last major legal epistemology of universal influence, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, is today absolutely inadequate and insufficient to explain the Law within that new political-legal framework, a legal epistemological (re)construction - adequate to Contemporary Constitutionalism - is much needed. An effectively post-positivist legal epistemology, coupled with the methodological-interpretative paradigm of legal hermeneutics, must be capable of giving the conditions of discursive and scientific legitimacy for the Law, in the sense of been capable to avoid being manipulated or distorted by political or economic power. Above all, it must assure the Law's discursive autonomy necessary for it to act as a qualified instrument of concretization of the Democratic Rule of Law, protecting fundamental rights and democracy.
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Rafful, Leonardo José. "Utilitarismo e o positivismo jurídico." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2018. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/20994.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
This dissertation has the scope of the analysis of the paper: "An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation" by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the discussion of his theory and the application of it within a system in which legal positivism prevails. For this purpose, the descriptive method was used, based on an accurate bibliographic analysis of national and foreign papers about the author’s masterpiece and backbone of his work. We started from the hypothesis that the application of this theory could result in greater legal certainty. The application of utilitarianism in our legal system would remove arbitrariness and insecurity from the application of law as it does in the common law system. As so, the concepts of hedonistic and eudaimonist happiness were studied in order to verify what kind of individualistic happiness, utilitarianism can be embedded. In the following act, David Hume's principle of causality was analyzed in order to integrate those concepts, since Jeremy Bentham, in the first chapter of the work under analysis, states textually that the human being would be inextricably linked to the chain cause and effect. Finally, in order to insert in this research a counterpoint to the thought of Jeremy Bentham, the theory of Hebert Hart was analyzed, in his paper: "The concept of right", being verified that, while the first one takes care of the construction of a theory which would guarantee the elaboration of norms that lead to happiness, the second concerns about the application of law, concluding that utilitarianism is a theory directed to the legislators with the application in a positivist system, so that through it, society can achieve happiness without compromising legal security, social order, and caring, on the other hand, for causal relations
Esta dissertação tem por escopo a análise da obra: “An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation” da lavra do filósofo Jeremy Bentham, a discussão de sua teoria e a aplicação da mesma dentro de um sistema em que prevalece o positivismo jurídico. Utilizou-se, para tanto, o método descritivo, a partir da efetivação de uma acurada análise bibliográfica de obras nacionais e estrangeiras que comentam a obra mestra e espinha dorsal deste trabalho. Parte-se da hipótese de que a aplicação desta teoria traria, como conseqüência, uma maior segurança jurídica. A aplicação do utilitarismo em nosso sistema jurídico afastaria a arbitrariedade e a insegurança da aplicação do direito tal como ocorre no sistema do common law. Para tanto, foram estudados os conceitos de felicidade hedonista e eudaimonista com a finalidade de se verificar em qual tipo de felicidade individualista, o utilitarismo pode ser encaixado. Em ato seguinte, analisou-se o princípio da causalidade, defendido por David Hume, com o objetivo de integrar esses conceitos, uma vez que Jeremy Bentham, no primeiro capítulo da obra sob análise, afirma textualmente que o ser humano estaria ligado indissociavelmente da cadeia de causa e efeito. Por derradeiro, visando inserir na pesquisa um contraponto ao pensamento de Jeremy Bentham, analisou-se a teoria de Hebert Hart, em sua obra: “O conceito de direito”, constatando-se que, enquanto o primeiro cuida da construção de uma teoria que venha a garantir a elaboração de normas que acarretem a felicidade, o segundo preocupou-se com a aplicação do direito, concluindo-se que o utilitarismo é uma teoria direcionada aos legisladores com a aplicação em um sistema positivista, para que por meio dela, a sociedade possa alcançar a felicidade sem comprometer a segurança jurídica, a ordem social e cuidar, em contrapartida, das relações causais
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Ramos, Neto Nelson Gularte. "Teoria da decisão e controle judicial de políticas públicas ambientais." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UCS, 2016. https://repositorio.ucs.br/handle/11338/1184.
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Oliveira, Walter Jose Celeste de. "A justificação racional da autoridade à luz do paradigma da modernidade." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2139/tde-13022014-164416/.
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Thomas Hobbes é considerado o pai do conceito moderno de Estado. O núcleo de seu pensamento nasce do esforço de construir as bases da convivência a partir da demonstração dos fundamentos racionais da autoridade política. O liame entre o debate contemporâneo, polarizado entre interpretativistas e positivistas, e o pensamento moderno, simbolizado pelo pensamento hobbesiano, identifica-se com a seguinte pergunta: sob qual justificativa devemos obedecer os mandamentos da autoridade ainda que eles nos pareceram injustos?Thomas Hobbes is considered the father of the modern concept of state. The core of his thinking arises from the effort to build the foundations of acquaintanceship from the demonstration of the rational foundation of political authority. The link between the contemporary debate which is polarized between positivists and interpretativists and the modern thought, which is symbolized by hobbesian thinking relates to the following question: \'Under which justification must we obey the commandments of the authority even if they seemed unfair to us ?
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Zhu, Mingzhe. "Le droit naturel dans la doctrine civiliste de 1880 à 1940." Thesis, Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015IEPP0005/document.
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Le droit naturel a servi tout au long de la Troisième République d’outil épistémologique qui a permis de discuter le droit de manière rationnelle. La doctrine civiliste a fourni à cette époque de multiples séries des discours examinant les prises de position juridico-politiques dans le langage du droit naturel. L’intérêt d’écrire l’histoire d’un concept, celui du droit naturel, conçu le plus souvent comme éternel, universel et absolu, est non seulement de découvrir les mutations et les incohérences existant dans les discours portant sur ce concept mais aussi de constater ce que nous pouvons apprendre à propos des interactions entre l’histoire socio-politique, l’histoire juridique, et l’histoire doctrinale. Les usages de la notion démontrent à quel point ceux-ci varient selon les époques et selon les auteurs qui la mettent forme. L’idée du droit naturel implique l’existence d’un système juridique idéal et universel. Les législations nationales, considérées à la lumière du droit naturel, ne peuvent être que des créations arbitraires limitées par les frontières d’un État. Par conséquent, la recherche scientifique du droit ne devrait plus se borner à l’examen des textes législatifs. Les règles coutumières et jurisprudentielles sont devenues aussi la source du droit. Cette démarche, en réalité, a accordé à la doctrine le pouvoir de décider la source et l’interprétation du droit. Partant d’une telle observation, nous nous intéressons sur le rôle du droit naturel dans les discours des juristes face aux crises politiques, sociaux, mais aussi scientifiquesIf “natural law” is understood as a set of principles, legal or moral, that is eternal, immutable and universal, human understandings of this idea never cease to change in different time and location. These understandings, existing in form of discourse, enters into the interaction in context and circumstance. The dissertation examines the usages of natural law in the Third French Republic. It argues that French jurists use the idea of universal and ideal law as the response to socio-political issues: the establishment of republican regime and its anticlericalism, the rise of social sciences and social problems, and the construction of an international order after the WWI. Their responses, in turn, enrich the conceptions of natural law: metaphysically secular justifications of natural law are made by lawyers who are deeply catholic. This old idea is made compatible with social progress, and the universalism and idealism consisted in this idea are used to serve the patriotic cause
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Hara, Johnny Marcelo. "Argumentação e direito: contribuições da teoria da argumentação para o ensino superior de direito." Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF), 2010. https://repositorio.ufjf.br/jspui/handle/ufjf/3005.
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O presente estudo pretende relacionar a Teoria da Argumentação, de Chaim Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca, (com base no Tratado da Argumentação e em Ética e Direito) ao ensino jurídico, através da utilização, nos âmbitos pertinentes à razão argumentativa, da estrutura retórica, como ponto de partida para o estudo da sistemática do direito e, em especial, como metodologia de ensino, complementar à dogmática do positivismo jurídico (a partir da Teoria Pura do Direito, de Hans Kelsen). Estabelecida a relação entre a argumentação e o ensino do Direito, suscita-se sua relevância em face da crise instalada no ensino jurídico, particularmente quanto à abordagem de noções e princípios fundamentais que permeiam o direito, diante do constitucionalismo vigente no Brasil. Como ilustração, foram realizadas entrevistas com diretores de faculdades de Direito.
This study aims to relate the Theory of Argumentation, by Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, (based on the Argumentation Treaty and on Ethics and Law) to the teaching of Law, through the use, in areas relevant to the Argumentation, the rhetorical structure as a starting point for the systematic study of law and in particular, as a teaching methodology, complementary to the dogma of legal positivism (based on the Theory of Pure Law, by Hans Kelsen). By creating a relationship between the Argumentation and the teaching of Law, this intends to raise its relevance in light of the established crisis in the legal education, particularly on the approach to concepts and fundamental principles that underlie the law, within the current constitutionalism in Brazil. In order to illustrate this thesis, interviews were conducted with Law School Directors.
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Monteiro, Jaber Lopes Mendonça. "Direito e interpretação na tradição do positivismo jurídico: uma análise de John Austin, H. L. A. Hart e seus críticos." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2012. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=4115.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorO objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é examinar as teses centrais do positivismo jurídico de John Austin e de H. L. A. Hart. Analiso inicialmente as críticas que Hart faz à teoria do direito como comando, proposta inicialmente por Austin na primeira metade do século XIX. Em seguida, ocupo-me das críticas de Ronald Dworkin ao positivismo jurídico, bem como das tentativas recentes de se retomar a teoria do direito como comando. Por fim, procuro mostrar de que forma a discussão em torno das críticas ao positivismo legal foi recebido no contexto do debate teórico-jurídico no Brasil.
The aim of this dissertation is to examine John Austins and H. L. A. Harts defense of legal positivism. I firstly analyze Harts criticism of Austins theory of law as command. Then I examine Ronald Dworkins criticism of legal positivism, as well as recent attempts to resume and defend the theory of law as command. In the final part of this dissertation I examine the how the debate on legal positivism was received in the context of Brazilian tradition of legal theory.
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Frimodt, Staffan. "Integralteori och rättsfilosofi." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185489.
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The purpose of this thesis was to analyze four of the most commonly applied theories in jurisprudence by means of using the philosophical framework of in-tegral theory. Natural law, legal positivism, legal realism and critical legal theory were analyzed to find out how they relate to each other and to see what their strengths and weaknesses are in an integral perspective. The integral theory was created by the American philosopher Ken Wilber (1949-). Two of the main com-ponents of the theory are the four quadrants and the levels of development. The quadrants describe dimensions and perspectives of reality, and consists of the inner individual (subjective) quadrant, the outer individual (objective) quadrant, the inner collective (intersubjective) quadrant and the outer collective (interob-jective) quadrant. Individual values develop through different levels in a specific order, as is described in the second component of the integral theory. Different adult individuals can therefore be on different levels of development. This devel-opment is not only seen in individuals, but is also seen in historical and collective development. The levels that both individuals and societies develop through in-cludes (but are not limited to): the absolutistic (traditional) level, the rational (modern) level and the relativistic (postmodern) level.When using the integral theory to analyze the four theories in jurisprudence it became apparent that they can be mapped onto the integral framework. Natural law, which focuses on morality, can be placed in the intersubjective quadrant, and is mostly associated with the traditional level of development. Legal positiv-ism stems mostly from the interobjective quadrant where law is first and fore-most a system of rules that are enforced by different societal institutions. Legal positivism is typically associated with the modern level of development. Legal realism is also typically associated with the modern level of development and focuses a lot on the objective quadrant: on empiricism and on what judges actu-ally do. Critical legal theory is strongly associated with the postmodern level of development. It emphasizes different kinds of oppression in the intersubjective and in the interobjective quadrant. This thesis presents further examples of how the integral theory can be applied in legal theory and practice.
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Terreaux, Claude. "Sortir du positivisme juridique aujourd'hui : la solution de Jean Domat." Thesis, Paris 4, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA040091.
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La présente thèse a pour objet de démontrer que la conception du droit de Jean Domat (1625-1696) constitue une issue au positivisme juridique dominant aujourd'hui. Ce dernier fait obstacle à toute interrogation philosophique, n'a pas pu s'opposer à des débordements totalitaristes et contribue à une prolifération des textes qui mène à l'éclatement du lien social. Une pensée sur le droit aujourd'hui doit être facile à concevoir, toujours présente ; il faut qu'elle puisse se sentir dans l'action. Elle doit aussi animer tout le droit, privé comme public et permettre un contrôle complet des règles venant du pouvoir par les membres et responsables de la société, et être partageable par tous, de quelques croyances, religions et opinions qu'ils soient, pour éviter les critiques communautariennes. Il lui faut enfin être issue de l'examen du droit lui-même plutôt qu'être déduite d'une doctrine imposée, être capable de faire obstacle aux déviances politiques et enfin être logique dans ses développements pour être acceptée. Jean Domat découvre que le droit est animé par deux principes :"Nous ne devons pas faire à autrui ce que nous n'aimerions pas qu'autrui nous fasse ; nous devons faire à autrui ce que nous aimerions qu'autrui nous fasse". Ces principes répondent à ces critères. Il reconstruit et présente le droit privé d'une part, et le droit public d'autre part, en montrant comment ils s'organisent selon ces deux principes. Il démontre par une présentation réussie de tout le droit privé que les relations de droit entre particuliers peuvent dans le détail être toutes régies par ces deux principes. Il fait voir également comment l'action politique du Prince peut et doit être conduite par eux. Le Prince est soumis comme quiconque à ces exigences et ne dispose pas de prérogative particulière. Enfin, Jean Domat pose que le sujet n'a pas à obéir à une loi qui ne serait pas conforme à ces principes. Nous montrons que sa pensée, qui a été oubliée, présente une profonde nouveauté tant à son époque que dans le débat contemporain et permet de redonner sens au droitThis doctoral thesis aims to demonstrate that the conception of the law developed by Jean Domat (1625-1696) constitutes an alternative to legal positivism, which is the dominant approach today. Legal positivism impedes any philosophical interrogation; it was unable to oppose totalitarian excesses, and it contributes to the multiplication of texts, which disrupts social cohesion. A theory of the law today should be pervasive and easy to conceptualize. This theory needs to be action-oriented. It needs to inspire all spheres of the Law, be it private law or public law, and should be designed to place all rules imposed by the government under the complete control of the members and leaders of society. This thought should be shareable by everyone, regardless of creed, religion and opinion, hence avoiding communautarian criticism. Moreover, this theory needs to be the result of an examination of the Law itself rather than being deducted from an imposed doctrine. It needs to be able to stand in the way of political abuses and be logical in its developments to be accepted. Jean Domat discovered that the Law is inspired by two principles: “we shall not do to others what we would not like others do to us; we shall do to others what we would like others do to us”. Both principles are in line with the above-mentioned criteria. Jean Domat reconstructs and presents both private law and public law, and shows that they are organized according to these two principles. He presents the whole of private law and demonstrates that the details of the legal relationships between private individuals are all be governed by these two principles. He also shows that they can and should inspire the political action of the Prince. The Prince does not have any particular status: he is subjected to these requirements, as everybody else. Finally, Jean Domat postulates that a subject does not have to obey a law that is not in conformity with these principles. In this doctoral thesis, I show that his thought, that has been forgotten, is highly original for his time. It is also of high relevance in contemporary debate, as it can help us give some new meaning to the law. sunti as doles dolorisintur a consedi de voluptatur molorporum audae voluptio perferovid quiaerferum aut digendus consedi
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Gubert, Roberta Magalhães. "Nova teoria das fontes: da diferença ontológica entre fonte normativa e norma jurídica." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2017. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7060.
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UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos
A tese de doutorado versa sobre o tema das Fontes do Direito e a necessidade de uma concepção atualizada de fontes, congruente com o contexto da teoria do Direito contemporânea, fundada na importância do constitucionalismo e na discussão que emerge da tensão provocada pelas crises do Estado moderno e suas implicações – perda de soberania, internacionalização e privatização das fontes – e está delimitada, especificamente, pelo objetivo de desenvolver uma teoria das fontes adequada à Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito (CHD), de Lenio Streck. Desta forma, o problema de pesquisa está centrado no questionamento acerca do sentido de fonte que, enquanto categoria que tradicionalmente compõe a teoria do Direito, é mais adequado à realidade contemporânea, visivelmente alterada pelo constitucionalismo e pela internacionalização. Como hipótese original, o trabalho defende a tese de uma nova formulação da diferença ontológica heideggeriana entre “ser e ente”, para o âmbito do Direito, agora denominada diferença ontológica entre fonte normativa e norma jurídica. O método de trabalho é o fenomenológico-hermenêutico, fundado principalmente na filosofia hermenêutica de Martin Heidegger e na hermenêutica filosófica de Hans- Georg Gadamer, nos conceitos-chave de diferença ontológica e de círculo hermenêutico (pré-compreensão) e na crítica ao pensamento metafísico. O principal referencial teórico no âmbito do Direito é a Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito (CHD), de Lenio Streck. No capítulo dois enfrentam-se os aspectos dogmáticos das fontes, sua evolução histórica e principais classificações, tema bastante emaranhado, em decorrência da plurivocidade de sentidos do termo figurativo “fontes do Direito”. O capítulo três trata de forma crítica das concepções de fonte desenvolvidas pelas correntes positivistas dos séculos XIX e XX. O capítulo quatro aborda o contexto brasileiro e analisa de forma crítica a Lei de Introdução às Normas do Direito Brasileiro. O capítulo cinco, mais propositivo, apresenta o cenário contemporâneo de internacionalização e privatização das fontes, e propõe um novo conceito de diferença ontológica no Direito, entre fonte normativa e norma jurídica, como forma mais adequada de superar as teses positivistas de fontes e harmonizar as fontes tradicionais – leis, doutrina, jurisprudência – às novas fontes do Direito – princípios, tratados, normas, contratos e decisões internacionais, standards e indicadores, entre outros –, e que seja compatível com a Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito e sua preocupação com a autonomia do Direito, capaz de superar a arbitrariedade judicial.
The doctorate thesis explores the theme Sources of Law and the necessity of an updated concept of sources, congruent with the contemporary law theory. Founded in the importance of constitutionalism and the debate that emerges from the tensions raised by the crisis in the classical elements that characterizes modern States, such as the sovereignty principle, and today’s implications – internationalization and privatization of sources. The theme is specially delimitated by the purpose of developing a source theory that is suitable for the Critical Hermeneutics Legal Theory, proposed by Lenio Streck. The research problem questions the meaning of source that, as a traditional category in law’s theory, is more suitable for contemporary’s reality, clearly altered by constitutionalism and internationalization. As the original hypothesis, the paper suggests a new formulation for Heidegger’s ontological difference between “being and entity” in the context of Law, now denominated ontological difference between normative source and legal norm. The methodology adopted was the hermeneutical-phenomenology of Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutical philosophy and Hans-Geog Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. The main concepts of this current of thought used were ontological difference and hermeneutical circle (previous comprehension) and the criticism of metaphysical thought. The main theoretical frame in the scope of Law was Lenio Streck’s Critical Hermeneutics of Law Theory. Chapter two confronts conceptual and theoretical aspects of sources, as well as its historical evolution and main classifications, which considering the plurality of possible meanings attributed to the figurative term “sources of law” is a very tangled matter. Third chapter critically analyzes XIX and XX’s century positivism conceptions about sources of law. Chapter four talks specifically about the Brazilian context and criticizes the “Introduction to Brazilian Norm’s Statue”. The fifth chapter, more propositional, presents the current scenario for the new international and private sources and proposes a new concept for ontological difference in the field of Law, between normative source and legal norm. This is considered a more suitable alternative to overcome positivist thinking as well as to harmonize traditional sources – statues, jurisprudence, precedents – with new kinds of sources – principles, treaties, contracts and international decisions, standards and indicators, and others. This new concept is also considered to be the most compatible with Lenio Streck’s Critical Hermeneutics Legal Theory, that is very concerned with Law’s autonomy and the surpassing of judicial arbitrariness.
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Dietrich, William Galle. "Positivismo jurídico: uma tentativa de introduzir o método experimental de raciocínio nos assuntos morais." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2018. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7459.
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CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
O trabalho aborda o problema da neutralidade/externalidade do método descritivo das teorias juspositivistas analíticas. O primeiro capítulo faz um recorte no empirismo filosófico, buscando as origens e fundamentos filosóficos, que amparam a estrutura básica do juspositivismo analítico, no filósofo escocês David Hume. Procura-se, portanto, estabelecer as premissas básicas de tal corrente filosófica e as respectivas incorporações dentro das teorias jurídicas que são positivistas. O segundo capítulo procura focar na questão do método descritivo. Com uma abordagem explanatória, procura detalhar como o método descritivo foi incorporado ao Direito por Jeremy Bentham, passando por John Austin e Herbert L. A. Hart, até chegar, nesta década, em Scott J. Shapiro. Trata-se, portanto, de uma reconstrução histórica do método descritivo dentro da teoria do Direito. O terceiro capítulo, por sua vez, apresenta as principais críticas ao método descritivo, sobretudo as críticas direcionadas contra a neutralidade do método, e a consequente separação rígida entre fato e valor. O trabalho tem como finalidade básica, portanto, uma exposição geral da origem do método descritivo; da sua manutenção e evolução na teoria do Direito; e das principais críticas sofridas. Trabalhou-se com o “método” hermenêutico, fio condutor da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito e com revisão bibliográfica. Como resultados parciais, pode-se dizer, a partir do referencial filosófico adotado pelas teorias juspositivistas analíticas, ainda que inconscientemente, que as características de neutralidade valorativa e externalidade do cientista não conseguem ser mais do que meros constructos artificiais, na medida em que a rígida separação entre fato e valor já foi superada no âmbito teórico e prático da filosofia e do Direito. A introdução do método experimental de raciocínio na teoria do Direito, portanto, não consegue atingir a propugnada neutralidade/externalidade.
This work deals with the neutrality/externality problem of the descriptive method of analytical legal positivist theories. The first chapter investigates the roots of philosophical empiricism in the Scottish philosopher David Hume, seeking its philosophical origins and foundations, which support the basic structure of analytical legal positivism. It seeks, therefore, to establish the basic premises of such philosophical current and the respective incorporations within the positivistic legal theories. The second chapter seeks to focus more specifically on the central question regarding the descriptive method. With an explanatory approach, it seeks to detail how the descriptive method was incorporated into jurisprudence by Jeremy Bentham — which was maintained by John Austin, Herbert L. Hart, and, in this decade, by Scott J. Shapiro. It is, therefore, a historical reconstruction of the descriptive method within jurisprudence and legal theory. The third chapter, in its turn, presents the main criticisms of the descriptive method, especially the criticisms directed against the (supposed) neutrality of it, and the consequent rigid distinction between fact and value. The main purpose of the work is, therefore, a general exposition of the origins of the descriptive method; its maintenance and evolution in jurisprudence; and the main criticisms. The work’s approach is the hermeneutical "method", the basis of the Hermeneutical Critique of Law, and also a bibliographical revision. As partial results, it can be said, from the philosophical referential adopted by analytical legal positivist theories, albeit unconsciously, that the characteristics of the scientist's neutrality and externality cannot be more than mere artificial constructs, insofar as the rigid distinction between fact and value has already been overcome in both theoretical and practical scopes of philosophy and law. The introduction of the experimental method of reasoning in legal theory, therefore, fails to achieve the advocated neutrality/externality.
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Mazabraud, Bertrand. "De la juridicité : approche de phénoménologie herméneutique." Thesis, Poitiers, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013POIT5009.
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Bien que tout un chacun use du droit au quotidien, nul ne semble parvenir à s'accorder sur la juridicité. Pour approcher celle-ci, la phénoménologie-herméneutique, à la manière dont elle fut pratiquée par Ricoeur, offre de précieux jalons. D'abord, elle invite à entrer en dialogue avec les théories positivistes, afin de mieux expliquer la structure du droit, ses objets (les normes, les institutions), et son ordonnancement. Cependant, le positivisme est incapable d'expliquer ce qui fonde ou autorise une telle structure (I). Ensuite, la juridicité peut être approchée à travers ses modalités linguistiques et herméneutiques. Le droit se manifeste comme la formulation de significations sociales prioritaires qui, pour être appliquées, doivent être en permanence amendées et enrichies. L'herméneutique juridique se comprend comme la dialectique entre l'invention de la solution la plus juste et son acceptabilité par rattachement au droit existant. Toutefois, si la raison judiciaire est mieux comprise, il reste que ce n'est pas cette dernière seule qui valide l'existence d'un énoncé normatif, mais le dispositif conventionnel d'habilitation à dire le droit. Alors que le normativisme aboutissait à un primat de la loi, l'herméneutique judiciaire aboutit à un primat du juge. Or l'un présuppose l'autre et vice-versa (II). Enfin, l'herméneutique philosophique de Ricoeur permet de reconduire la juridicité aux paradoxes du politique et de l'éthique. Au regard du paradoxe politique, le droit s'entend du moyen pour une communauté historique de se doter de la capacité de décider et se trouve autorisé de rendre durable le concert d'action qui fonde ladite communauté. Au regard de la justice, le droit se comprend comme l'exception que le tiers peut opposer à la sollicitude illimitée due au prochain. Par suite, la raison de la validité instituée des énoncés juridiques tiendrait au tragique de l'action, de sorte qu'elle peut se comprendre comme une présomption de validité morale et politique (III)Although everyone uses law in their daily life, no one seems to agree on juridicity. To approach juridicity, hermeneutic phenomenology, as practiced by Ricoeur, provides valuable milestones. On the one hand, hermeneutic phenomenology allows a dialogue with the positivist theories with the purpose of better explaining the structure of law, its objects (norms, institutions) and sequencing, though positivism remains incapable of explaining what establishes or authorizes such a structure (I). On the other, juridicity can be approached through its linguistic and hermeneutical modalities. In fact, law is the formulation of priority social meanings which, to be applied must be constantly amended and enriched. Legal hermeneutics is therefore understood as the dialectics between the invention of the fairest solution and its acceptability as per the existing law. However, if the legal reason is better understood, it cannot, on its own, validate the existence of a normative statement. To do that, it also requires the conventional device which enables to say what is law. Thus, whereas normativism leads to a primacy of law, legal hermeneutics lead to the primacy of the judge though the former presupposes the latter and vice versa (II). At the end, Ricoeur's philosophical hermeneutics brings back juridicity to the paradoxes of politics and ethics. Under political paradox, law is the means by which a historic community acquires the ability to decide. It is, thus, endowed with the authority to allow the sustainability of the concert of action which is at the heart of this community's existence. In the eyes of justice, on the other hand, law is understood as the exception that one can oppose to the indefinite solicitude which one owes to one's fellows. Hence the reason for the validity of the established legal statements is based on the tragedy of action, and can be understood as a presumption of moral and political validity (III)
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Santos, Jaqueline Lucca. "A função primordial da regra jurídica : a construção do ponto de vista interno a partir das críticas às teorias de Holmes e Kelsen." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/147075.
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A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social.The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.
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Lima, Caio Moyses de. "O Império dos Direitos: lei e autoridade política em Ronald Dworkin." Universidade de São Paulo, 2011. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-25112011-155803/.
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O objetivo desta dissertação é expor as características centrais da teoria do filósofo norte-americano Ronald Dworkin sobre a natureza dos direitos fundamentais ou morais. A referida teoria é aqui compreendida como uma defesa da noção de direitos fundamentais, tal como aparece no sistema constitucional norte-americano, contra os ataques do utilitarismo e do juspositivismo. A concepção dworkiniana dos direitos fundamentais como razões de justiça (ou princípios) que operam como trunfos contra a utilidade geral é contrastada com duas teses adversárias: a concepção utilitarista dos direitos morais de John Stuart Mill e a tese juspositivista das fontes sociais. A famosa querela entre Ronald Dworkin e os juspositivistas é analisada em um enfoque normativo, como uma disputa sobre o conceito de autoridade política: Dworkin compreende os direitos fundamentais como a fonte última da autoridade jurídica, enquanto os positivistas sustentam que uma das funções da autoridade jurídica é precisamente estabelecer quais são os direitos das pessoas.The purpose of this research is to expound the main characteristics of Ronald Dworkins theory of fundamental (or moral) rights. Dworkins theory is herein considered as a defense of the idea of fundamental rights, as it appears in the United States Constitutional System, against the attacks advanced by the doctrines of utilitarianism and legal positivism. Dworkins conception of fundamental rights as reasons of justice (or principles) that function as trumps against the general utility is contrasted with two defiant theories: John Stuart Mills utilitarian conception of moral rights and the positivist social sources thesis. The well-known debate between Ronald Dworkin and the legal positivists is approached as a normative dispute concerning the concept of political authority: Dworkin regards fundamental rights as the ultimate source of legal authority, whereas legal positivists argue that one of laws main functions is precisely to settle peoples rights.
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Luker, Trish. "The rhetoric of reconciliation : evidence and judicial subjectivity in Cubillo v Commonwealth /." Access full text, 2006. http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/thesis/public/adt-LTU20080305.105209/index.html.
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Thesis (Ph.D.) -- La Trobe University, 2006.Research. "A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, La Trobe Law, Faculty of Law and Management, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria". Includes bibliographical references (leaves 318-338). Also available via the World Wide Web.
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CAMPOS, GILSON DAVID. "THE OPPOSITON BETWEEN NATURAL LAW THEROY AND LEGAL POSITIVSM: A NEW VISION FROM JOHN FINNIS THOUGHT?" PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2012. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=20700@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROA presente dissertação é um trabalho de teoria do direito. Como o título sugere, seu objetivo é expor alguns aspectos da contraposição entre o jusnaturalismo e o positivismo jurídico no cenário contemporâneo. Utiliza como referência a reinterpretação da teoria jusnaturalista por John Mitchell Finnis e seu diálogo com positivismo jurídico contemporâneo. Ressalvo que aqui não se tem a pretensão de demonstrar que o debate entre as duas correntes esteja definitivamente encerrado, mas de esclarecer concepções e tentar afastar alguns equívocos que o permeiam.
This works is a legal theory one. As the title suggests, its goal is to expose some aspects of the opposition between natural law theory and legal positivism in the contemporary scenario. It take as reference the reiterpretation of the natural law theory by John Mitchell Finnis and his dialogue with the contemporary legal positivism. Indeed, it does not pretend to demonstrate that the debate between the two currents is definitely closed, but its purpose is to clarify concepts and attempt to remove some misconceptions that permeate it.
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Ramírez, Ludeña Lorena. "Diferencias y deferencia : una aproximación a la interpretación jurídica desde las nuevas teorías de la referencia." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/94491.
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Los partidarios de las nuevas teorías de la referencia defienden que los nombres propios y los términos de clase natural refieren directamente a los objetos. De este modo, recuperan la distinción intuitiva entre nombres propios y descripciones definidas puesto que rechazan que los primeros refieran en virtud de que el objeto en cuestión satisfaga una serie de descripciones. Al mismo tiempo, extienden sus apreciaciones acerca de los nombres propios a los términos de clase natural. En este trabajo sostendré que puede desvincularse la asunción de las nuevas teorías de la referencia de concepciones no positivistas del derecho y defenderé su incidencia en la interpretación de algunos términos jurídicos en un marco positivista. Ello posibilitará, además, una respuesta plausible por parte del positivismo al problema de los desacuerdos planteado por Dworkin.Authors that advocate for the new theories of reference defend that proper names and natural kind terms refer directly to objects. In this sense, they bring back the intuitive distinction between proper names and definite descriptions because they reject the idea that proper names refer to objects given that they satisfy a set of descriptions. At the same time, they extend their considerations to natural kind terms. In this work I argue that the new theories of reference can be dissociated from non-positivist conceptions of law; moreover, I claim they are relevant for the interpretation of some legal terms within a positivistic framework. This will allow me to provide a plausible positivistic answer to the problem of disagreements pointed out by Dworkin.
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Carneiro, Filho Roberto. "Efetividade dos direitos fundamentais laborais: abertura do sistema jurídico por meio da jurisprudência (do positivismo ao pós-positivismo)." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2016. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/19594.
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Dynamism and hypercomplexity as inherent characteristics of social relations molded to the concepts and values prevailing in the twenty-one century require of labor law scholar the permanent exercise of intellectual activity through critical reflections on the legal system currently existing labor regulations. In this sense, the present doctoral thesis, through theoretical and jurisprudential analysis, defends the transformation of labor law application method, to overcome the legal positivism and building a labor law post-positivist, for the purpose of seeking the application of labor law in order to bring it closer to the social reality, as well as it can give effect to labor fundamental rights with the constitutionalization of private law, which only shows possible since the use of legal interpretation mechanisms that are more open and flexible, supported the theory of legal argument. So this thesis PhD proposes that the labor courts in Brazil be the protagonist in the implementation of norms and constitutional values, giving effectiveness on labor fundamental rights, it may avail themselves of the general terms and undefined legal concepts like open windows through which it shows possible constitutionalising private law, observing always the balance between explicit and implicit constitutional values. Therefore, the case law as a source of labor law, against the legislative lethargy, it should take advantage of the constitutional activism to build the rule of law from case, as it did the Venerable Superior Labor Court when editing some statements of jurisprudence: item III of P. 244, item III of P. 378, P. 440 and P. 443
O dinamismo e a hipercomplexidade como características inerentes às relações sociais moldadas à luz dos conceitos e dos valores reinantes no séc. XXI exigem do estudioso do direito do trabalho o permanente exercício da atividade intelectiva por meio de reflexões críticas e construtivas quanto ao sistema jurídico de regulamentação laboral. Nesse sentido, a presente tese de doutoramento, por meio de análises teóricas e jurisprudenciais, defende o aprimoramento nas técnicas hermenêuticas de aplicação do direito do trabalho, para a superação do positivismo jurídico e a construção de um direito laboral pós-positivista, com a finalidade de se buscar a aproximação do direito do trabalho à realidade social, principalmente por meio da máxima efetividade dos direitos fundamentais laborais, o que somente se mostra possível com a constitucionalização do direito privado e a partir da utilização de mecanismos de interpretação jurídica sustentados na teoria da argumentação jurídica, que sejam mais abertos e flexíveis do que a ideia de estrita legalidade. Então, a presente tese de doutoramento propõe que a Justiça do Trabalho no Brasil seja protagonista na concretização das normas e dos valores constitucionais, dando máxima efetividade aos direito fundamentais laborais, seja por meio da eficácia direta e imediata dos direitos fundamentais, ou mesmo por meio da eficácia indireta e mediata dos direitos fundamentais, nesse último caso, quando se valerá das cláusulas gerais e dos conceitos jurídicos indeterminados expressos no Código Civil como janelas abertas por meio das quais se mostra possível constitucionalizar o direito privado, observando-se sempre a ponderação entre os valores constitucionais explícitos e implícitos, essa a “ratio” a ser seguida na regulamentação laboral. Portanto, a jurisprudência como fonte do direito do trabalho, diante da inércia legislativa frente à necessidade de constitucionalização da legislação laboral, deve se valer do ativismo constitucional para a construção da norma jurídica a partir do caso concreto, como já fez o Colendo Tribunal Superior do Trabalho quando da edição de alguns enunciados sumulares: item III da S. 244, item III da S. 378, S. 440 e S. 443
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Glarou, Despoina [Verfasser]. "The Impact of Naturalistic and Legal Positivist Doctrines on the Implementation of International Human Rights Treaty Law : The Case of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties / Despoina Glarou." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2017. http://d-nb.info/1126262722/34.
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Long, Chen Chieng. "Entre validade e faticidade: a jurisprudência como via de acesso e construção do conceito de sistema jurídico continental." Universidade de São Paulo, 2011. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2139/tde-01082012-154250/.
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O fenômeno do ativismo jurisdicional tem como causa a crise do direito. Uma releitura do tema a partir de uma perspectiva existencial permite concluir que sua origem assenta-se na perda do sentido da ocupação e preocupação do homem em relação ao direito. Esta crise articula-se, grosso modo, em dois níveis distintos. De um lado, pelo desgaste do modelo de racionalização contido na proposta da tripartição de poderes de Montesquieu; de outro, na perda do sentido do direito como forma de controle social no processo de incorporação da armação da técnica. Diante da anomia do legislador e do Estado aos desafios atuais em torno do direito, presencia-se, na atualidade, o aumento do ativismo jurisdicional na definição do conteúdo do direito continental. Dentro das possibilidades abertas no horizonte da experiência histórica, a evolução do direito continental permite constatar que esta se formou e perpetua-se a partir dos conceitos antagônicos de mutabilidade (em ajuste às necessidades da evolução da sociedade), mas também de segurança jurídica (representada pela norma posta). Um aumento do ativismo jurisdicional que pretenda preservar a experiência da tradição do direito continental exige que a ocupação e preocupação em torno do Direito se deem em aderência à experiência compartilhada dentro do mundo das vivências e no fino equilíbrio dos conceitos de normas sociais e de garantia, sem o que, no extremo da projeção do Dasein no horizonte de sua injunção social, teríamos inevitavelmente um processo de ruptura conceitual da experiência do Direito ou a anulação do Dasein perante o Direito.The phenomenon of the jurisdictional activism is caused by the crisis of law. A re-reading of the theme from an existential perspective allows for the conclusion that its origin is based on the loss of mans care and concern sense regarding the law. Broadly, this crisis articulates in two distinct levels. On one side, by the rationalization model exhaustion contained in the tripartite division of powers proposed by Montesquieu; on the other side, in the loss of law sense as a way of social control in the incorporation process of the frame of the technique. As a consequence of the anomy of the legislature branch and the State to the current challenges around the law, the increase of the jurisdictional activism in the definition of the continental law content can be contemporarily noticed. Within the possibilities opened in the historical experience scope, the evolution of the continental law allows for the observation that it was formed and continues from the antagonistic concepts of mutability (adjusted to the evolution needs of the society), but also of legal security (represented by the rule provided for). An increase of the jurisdictional activism intending to preserve the experience of the continental law tradition requires that the care and concern concerning the law comply with the experience shared within the world of experiences and in the fine balance of the social rules and guarantee concepts, without which, in the extreme of the Dasein projection in the scope of its social injunction, we would inevitably have a process of conceptual rupture of the law experience or annulment of Dasein before the law.
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Blanc, Nicolas. "Constitutionnalisme et exclusion : critique du regard français sur le modèle canadien de pluralisme." Thesis, Bordeaux, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014BORD0289/document.
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La recherche vise à mettre en évidence les relations entre constitutionnalisme et exclusion dans le cadre d’unecritique du regard français sur le modèle canadien de pluralisme. La problématique de l’exclusion, être altériséen raison de l’identité du droit, naît des silences de la comparaison différentielle France – Canada. Une critiqueidentitaire permet de déplacer la triple dialectique de la comparaison : positivisme c. pluralisme, universalisme c.différentialisme et républicanisme c. libéralisme pluraliste. La problématique de l’orientation identitaire du droitest commune aux deux systèmes juridiques. Aussi, la recherche est relative à l’identité du constitutionnalisme.L’exclusion se définit comme le décalage entre l’orientation identitaire du constitutionnalisme et l’identité ducorps du sujet. La méthode d’analyse proposée, afin de traiter de l’exclusion en droit, et déplacer la comparaison,est tripartite : mettre en évidence l’orientation identitaire du constitutionnalisme, en identifier la structureidentitaire, pour, enfin, en déterminer les étrangers ou « Autres. » La recherche vise à déplacer la comparaison enproduisant une phénoménologie de l’exclusion constitutionnelle, ou « dehors constitutifs, » avec une typologiedes étrangers du droit. La démonstration sera faite dans le cadre des conflits de la religion et de l’orientationsexuelle démontrant l’orientation blanche, hétéropatriarcale et hétéronormative du droit constitutionnelThis research intends on proving how constitutionalism and exclusion collide one against the other through acritique of the french gaze on a supposedly canadian model of pluralism. The negative comparison’s silencesbetween France and Canada gave birth to this question of how one is being excluded and othered based on theidentity of constitutional law. This critique, that focuses on identities, is shifting those three dialectics supportingthe aforementioned negative comparison : positivism v. pluralism, universalism v. differentialism, republicanismv. liberal pluralism. France and Canada share the issue of how legal reality is oriented toward specific identities.This research, then, is a critique of constitutionalism identities. Exclusion is defined as the gap between theorientation of law’s identities and the bodily reality of its subjects. The analytical tool developed here to tackleexclusion in law has three steps : shedding light on the orientations of constitutionalism, its identity structure,and its constitutional Others. This research purports on turning scholars’ critical gaze towards thisphenomenology of constitutional exclusion, its « constitutive outside, » by deciphering a typology ofconstitutional Others. This will be so through the collisions of freedom of religion and sexual orientation.Constitutionalism is per se oriented towards the ascendency of whiteness, patriarcalism and heteronormativity
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Raynal, Pierre-Marie. "De la fiction constituante. Contribution à la théorie du droit politique." Thesis, Paris 2, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA020058.
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Inspiré par une démarche de droit politique, le présent travail se propose d’envisager la fiction en droit à travers le prisme inédit de la légitimité, afin d’étudier sous un angle théorique son utilité dans la constitution de la réalité juridique, c’est-à-dire dans les fondations du droit en vigueur. Caractérisée en référence à la réalité politique, la fiction constituante est une technique justificative dont la fonction relève soit de la connaissance, soit du gouvernement. En tant qu’instrument de connaissance, la fiction constituante se trouve au coeur de l’épistémologie du positivisme juridique, et sert à reléguer la légitimité en son sens le plus profondément politique à une simple affaire de "Sein", c’est-à-dire « extra-juridique » ; tel est notamment l’objet de la "Grundnorm" de Kelsen. Le propos de la première partie de ce travail est de montrer que cet isolement de la chose juridique empêche d’approfondir la connaissance de ses fondations ; ce faisant, il s’agira de poser les bases de ce que pourrait être une épistémologie de droit politique. En tant qu’instrument de gouvernement, la fiction constituante se trouve au coeur de l’État, et sert à légitimer l’exercice du pouvoir politique par le biais de la représentation. En s’appuyant sur des auteurs classiques tels que Hobbes, Locke et Rousseau, le propos de la seconde partie de ce travail est de montrer que ce sont les caractéristiques de ce système d’organisation politique, quelle que soit au demeurant la forme de gouvernement retenue, qui rendent nécessaire le recours au registre fictionnel "lato sensu" ; celui-ci étant en effet susceptible de s’inscrire dans trois catégories discursives distinctes : la fiction "stricto sensu", le mensonge ou le mytheFollowing an approach inspired by "droit politique", this work aims at considering legal fiction through the unexplored prism of legitimacy in order to study from a theoretical perspective its utility in creating legal reality, i.e. in founding the law in force. Defined through its relation to political reality, constituent fiction is a technique of justification and its function is either a matter of knowledge or of government. As an instrument of knowledge, constituent fiction is at the core of the epistemology of legal positivism. It is used to relegate legitimacy, in its most political sense, to a simple matter of "Sein, i.e". to an “extra legal” matter, as it is notably the case of Kelsen’s "Grundnorm". The first part of this work aims at showing that this isolation of law prevents a deeper understanding of its foundations. In doing so, we will try to lay the grounds for what could be an epistemology of "droit politique". As an instrument of government, constituent fiction is at the core of the State. It is used to legitimize the exercise of political power by the means of representation. Relying on the classical works of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the second part of this study aims at identifying the characteristics of this system of political organization that makes recourse to fiction a necessity; whatever the form of government chosen. This recourse to fiction, considered here in its broadest sense, can relate to three distinct discursive models: fiction in its strictest sense, falsehood, or myth
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"Can Kelsen's Legal Positivism Account for International Regime Change?" Master's thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.15787.
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abstract: In this discussion I will state fundamental principles of Kelsen's Legal Positivism in International Law and explain four problems with his theory. I will then propose two suggestions in the light of which Kelsen's theory is modified in this discussion and explain how these two suggestions address the four problems and help the theory account for regime change. Finally, I will address possible objections to the view advanced in this discussion.Dissertation/Thesis
M.A. Philosophy 2012
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I-Sen, Chen, and 陳以森. "Beyond Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory: the Representational Nature of Law." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18820232464030476361.
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Chechik, Grigorina. "The Hart-Dworkin debate and the separation thesis of legal positivism." Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-08-1957.
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In the postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L. A. Hart describes the on-going debate inspired by his book, focusing on the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin. In this essay, I will discuss Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart, as well as Hart’s responses, showing that while Hart responds adequately to some criticisms, he fails to respond adequately to others. I will also reconstruct and evaluate the arguments given for and against the separation thesis by Dworkin and Hart. Finally, I will argue that the debate about the separation thesis – the thesis that morality and law are separable – is misguided, conflating as it does two distinct questions. These are the questions of what the positive law is, that is, the law that is posited in a specific time and place, and of what the natural law is, that is, the law that (if it exists) is universal and timeless. Once we distinguish these questions, we will see that the answer to the question of whether law is separable from morality depends on which sense of ‘law’ is relevant, and that there are two different answers corresponding to the two senses of positive law and natural law. Positive law is separable from morality while natural law is not.text
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Chao, Cheng-Kang, and 趙正康. "An Essay on the Multiple Perspectives of Law in Hartian Legal Positivism." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73306324359011487513.
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碩士國立臺北大學
法律學系一般生組
101
Legal positivism and natural law is two main debating grounds in jurisprudence. Not only each views the issue of ethics in different attitude, but also each has different methodological demand in knowledge. Naturalism demands any theory should be verifiable and verified in experience. Traditional legal positivist Jeremy Bentham established utilitarian principle and legal positivism by his strict naturalism demand. By naturalized moral standard in utilitarian standard test of happiness, and set the division of censor and expositor in legal study. Bentham modified his legal positivism as a stable bridge of rule-utilitarian in better position to evaluate and reform new naturalized utilitarian standard. Bentham’s legal positivism and utilitarian was criticized not only in Ethics for undefinable good, but also in the restricted view of naturalism. Strict naturalism tends to explain phenomenon in foundationalism view of knowledge and ignores other human activities. Peter Winch with other analytic philosophers in twentieth century criticized the foundational view of naturalism, and emphasized the participant perspectives in understanding human society. H. L. A. Hart among other philosophers provided insight in understanding human society particular in law. However, there are tensions between Hart’s naturalism restrict and internal accuracy. I have argue it is this tensions lead to Hart had clarify his legal theory is both general and descriptive in The Concept of Law’s Postscript. By maintaining the general and descriptive legal theory, Hart is able to provide the broadest explanation while avoid distorting any particular perspective in multiple perspectives of legal phenomenon. The legal positivism’s project to better understanding and evaluation the law will even more fruitful in supplementing legal realism and natural law perspective of particular legal system.
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Bennett, Mark John. "Legal Positivism and the Rule of Law: The Hartian Response to Fuller's Challenge." Thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/35776.
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This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.
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Wu, Pei-Yu, and 吳佩諭. "Analytical Legal Positivism on the Objectivity of Law: A Critical Survey of Marmor's and Coleman's Arguments." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82906263608416585456.
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碩士世新大學
法律學研究所(含碩專班)
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The focus of this essay is the exclusive legal positivist Andrei Marmor and the inclusive legal positivist Jules Coleman’s viewpoint on the legal objectivity. Although Marmor and Coleman have different viewpoint on what kind of convention the rule of recognition is and the role of moral in legal identification, they both assert that the legal objectivity has no concern with Realism and separate the problem about the objectivity of law and moral. If we differentiate the legal objectivity which acclaimed by Marmor and Coleman, Marmor assures the objectivity legal practice by admitting the objectivity of the rule of recognition, therefore Marmor's assertion on the rule of recognition has certain kind of implement on Marmor's assertion of legal objectivity. The challenge of the modest objectivity which asserted by Coleman is how to define the meaning of “epistemically ideal conditions”. If Coleman cannot clearly specify the “epistemically ideal conditions”. , there is a great possibility that the legal system couldn't execute its social function as people's regulation or reason to behave themselfs.
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Scarffe, Eric John. "Toward a dignity-based account of international law." Thesis, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/42161.
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Since the end of World War II there has been a rapid proliferation of international law and international legal institutions. Once limited to issues in maritime and trade law, today the most recognizable examples of international law govern issues such as human rights, intellectual property, crimes against humanity and armed conflict. In many ways, this proliferation has been a welcomed development. However, when coupled with international law’s decentralized structure, this rapid proliferation has also posed problems for how we (and in particular judges) identify if, when, and where international law exists. This dissertation puts forward a novel, dignity-based account for how we answer these questions. The upshot of my account is two-fold. First, it explains many features of international law that other theories leave unaccounted for or under-explained. And second, my dignity-based account provides for a mechanism through which the system can continue to be developed and improved.2023-02-22T00:00:00Z