Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Law of estoppel'

This thesis focuses upon recent Australian developments in the law of estoppel. It provides a justification and basis in principle for the doctrine of estoppel described in cases such as Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1987-1988) 164 C.L.R. 387 and Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394. This basis is found in the principle that we ought all to take reasonable steps to ensure the reliability of the assumptions that we induce in others. Ensuring the "reliability" of an induced assumption means ensuring that a party who relies upon the assumption does not thereby suffer harm: harm in the sense that he is worse off because the assumption has proved unjustified than he would have been had it never been induced. The thesis suggests a pattern for the development of the Australian law of estoppel reflecting that basis in principle. It further demonstrates the potential usefulness of the doctrine with specific reference to (i) pre-contractual negotiations and letters of intent, (ii) firm offers to contract, (iii) variations of contract unsupported by consideration, and (iv) the "battle of forms".

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the legal avenues that may be open to taxpayers for holding the South African Revenue Services ('SARS') to the representations which it makes to the public in the form of general statements and specific rulings or directives. These avenues lie in two areas of law, namely the doctrine of estoppel as it has been developed in a public law context, and (potentially) the realm of so-called substantive legitimate expectation.

This comparative thesis addresses the evidentiary value of bills of lading and estoppel under the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules, the law in the United Kingdom and the United States. After an analysis of the travaux prepraratoires of the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules, and a comparison with the Hamburg Rules, the thesis focuses on the English common law and the relevant statutory provisions. The thesis advocates a new, alternative approach in order to overcome the current interpretive problems with the application of the common law doctrine of estoppel. The analysed provisions are those of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1971 (U.K.), an enactment of the Hague/Visby Rules, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1992 (U.K.), the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, an enactment of the Hague Rules, and the U.S. Federal Bills of Lading Act, 1994. Further reference will be made to the relevant provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (U.K.) (repealed), the Bills of Lading Act, 1855 (U.K.) (repealed), and the U.S. Federal Bills of Lading Act, 1916 (Pomerene Act), re-enacted as the U.S. Federal Bills of Lading Act, 1994. The thesis concludes with an outline of the evidentiary value of bills of lading in the age of electronic data interchange (EDI).

Romėnų teisininkai aiškino, jog sutarčiai sudaryti vien šalių vidinės valios, noro nepakanka - vidinė valia, kol nėra išreikšta, negali sukelti teisinių padarinių, nes žmonės apie ją tiesiog nieko nežino. Kadangi šalys privalo aiškiai išreikšti savo valią sudarant sandorį, šiandien toks valios išreiškimas dažniausiai pasireiškia įtvirtinant ją sutartyse. Tačiau sudarius sutartį, neretai šalys atitinkamai veikia, ko pasėkoje siekia pakeisti savo sutartinių santykių turinį, to neįtvirtindami sutarties pagrindu. Todėl natūraliai kyla klausimas – ar toks valios išreiškimas (konkliudentiniais veiksmais) gali lemti tai, jog rašytinės sutarties nuostatos bus pakeistos? Būtent į šį klausimą ir mėginama atsakyti šiame darbe. Siekiant atsakyti į aukščiau įvardytą klausimą, darbe analizuojami sutarties formos reikalavimai nuo pat Romos teisės laikų. Pateikiamas šiandieninis reguliavimas dėl keliamų reikalavimų sutarties formai Anglosaksų ir Kontinentinės tradicijos šalyse, tai lėmusios priežastys ir ateities vizija pagal Troikos (CISG, Unidroit ir PECL principų) reguliavimą. Išsamiai atskleidžiami sutarties formos laisvės bei contrarius actus principai. Daugiausia dėmesio šiame darbe skiriama contrarius actus principo išimčiai, vadinamai Estoppel taisyklei Anglosaksų tisinėje tradicijoje, kurią yra perėmę dauguma Kontinentinės tradicijos šalių, o taip pat ir Troikos reguliavimas. Paskutiniame šio darbo skyriuje analizuojama Lietuvos teisėje įtvirtinta Estoppel taisyklė, kuri yra... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]
Rome lawyers annotated that only the will or desire of the parties to conclude a contract is not enough, until it is expressed bilateral. In other way the contract would be concluded because parties would not know each other will . Since parties must express their will unequivocal, today they will generally is expressed in written contracts. But sometimes parties after concluding a contract takes some kind of performance expecting that this action will change content of the contract, without amendments established in the contract. This situation brings to light a question – whether these actions can amend content of concluded contract? Exactly this question is observed in this work. With a view to answer above set question, author of this work researches requirements of contract form starting from ancient Rome regulation. Author also overlooks contract form requirements in common law and continental traditions law systems, named regulation reasons and the vision of the future in accordance with the Troika (CISG, Unidroit and PECL principles). Disclosed in details principles of freedom of the contract form and contractus actus. The focus of this work is granted exceptionally about contrarius actus principle exemption which is known as Estoppel rule in common law tradition system, which is also detected in continental tradition law system and Troika. The last chapter of this work analyzes the Estoppel rule in Lithuanian law system and how it is successfully applied in... [to full text]

This dissertation examines the place of agency law in the South African context. The dissertation is premised on the idea that the principles governing agency, such as binding the principal for the conduct of her agent, are derived from English law. With that starting point, the paper examines the English law, in order to place the South African law of agency in context. The dissertation is not a comparative study and the discussion of English law of agency is limited to providing context to the development of agency law in South Africa. The dissertation further discusses the differences between the principles of estoppel and ostensible authority. The theoretical basis for agency and its practical effects are examined. Both the majority and minority judgments of the court in Makate v Vodacom are discussed and the rationales thereof examined. The dissertation recommends the appropriate mechanism to be employed in holding the principal accountable without the need to evoke the traditional principles which have been proved problematic by the Makate case.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2019.
Mercantile Law
LLM
Unrestricted

Tato diplomová práce popisuje vznik a formování ekvity v systému anglického práva, její vzájemné postavení vůči common law, současné použití ekvity a některé její vývojové trendy. Teoretická část této práce je doplněna konkrétními precedenty.

L’estoppel ou l’interdiction de se contredire au détriment d’autrui consacre un principe connu dans les sources de la common law : le principe de cohérence. Cette règle n’existait pas en droit judiciaire privé français. Son introduction en procédure civile et en matière d’arbitrage s’est faite de manière progressive. À cela, il convient de constater qu’il existe, dans notre ordonnancement judiciaire, des institutions jurisprudentielles et légales qui sanctionnent déjà des attitudes procédurales contradictoires. Leur existence se retrouve dans le code de procédure civile, mais aussi dans de nombreuses décisions de la Cour de cassation. En droit positif, l’estoppel ne serait ainsi pas la seule règle sanctionnant l’incohérence procédurale.Déjà étudié sous l’angle contractuel, le principe de cohérence n’avait encore jamais été analysé sous son angle processuel. Tout d’abord, cette thèse conduit à se pencher sur la recherche d’une définition du principe de cohérence, pour ensuite s’attacher à la pertinence de son introduction dans notre droit interne
The estoppel or prohibition to contradict himself embodies a principle known in the sources of the common law: the principle of coherence. This rule does not exist in French private judicial law. Its introduction in civil procedure and in arbitration procedure is made gradually.To this, it must be noted that there is already, in our judicial right, jurisprudential and legal institutions who condemn the inconsistency of an attitude in front of the adversary. Their existence is found in the Code of Civil Procedure, and in some decisions of the Court of Cassation. In positive law, estoppel would not be the only rule sanctioning procedural incoherence.Already studied under the contractual perspective, the principle of coherence had never been analyzed under its procedural angle. First, this thesis led to consider looking for a definition of the principle of coherence, then focus on the relevance of its introduction into French judicial law

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation examines the approach to statutory formalities in South African law. It focuses primarily on formal requirements which result in nullity in the event of non-compliance, and in particular, on those prescribed for alienations of land (section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981) and suretyships (section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956). To provide context, the study commences with a general historical overview of the development of formal requirements. It also considers the advantages and disadvantages of formalities. The conclusion is reached that an awareness of both is required if a court is to succeed in dealing with the challenges posed by statutory formalities. The dissertation then considers more specific aspects of the topic of formal requirements, including the difference between material and non-material terms. It also reveals that the current interpretation of statutory formalities is quite flexible and tends towards a conclusion of validity if reasonably possible. However, cases involving unnamed or undisclosed principals present particular challenges in this context, and the possibility of greater consistency, without the loss of theoretical soundness, is investigated. A discussion of what should be in writing, and with what exactitude, necessarily involves a consideration of the extent to which extrinsic evidence is admissible. The interaction between formal requirements and the parol evidence rule is therefore investigated. Special attention is paid to incorporation by reference. After an examination of the common-law approach to this topic, the conclusion is reached that room exists for developing this area of South African law, especially where a sufficient reference to another document is concerned. Rectification also enjoys detailed examination, due to the unique approach adopted in South African law. Where formalities are constitutive, a South African court first satisfies itself that a recordal complies with these requirements ex facie the document, before it will consider whether rectification may be appropriate. An analysis of both civilian and common-law judgments suggests that the South African approach is based on a misconception of the purpose of rectification. This leads to the further conclusion that the requirement of ex facie compliance should be abolished as a separate step and that a court should rather consider whether awarding a claim for rectification would defeat the objects of formalities in general. Finally, the remedies available to a party who performs in terms of an agreement void for formal non-compliance and the effect of full performance in terms of such an agreement, receive attention. An investigation of the remedies available in other legal systems reveals that the South African approach of limiting a party to an enrichment claim is unnecessarily restrictive. It is argued that local courts should reconsider their exclusion of estoppel in this context, particularly in cases where one party’s unconscionable conduct has led the other to rely on the formally defective agreement. In cases of full performance, no remedies are available, but it is argued that a distinction should be drawn between reciprocal and unilateral performances.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die benadering tot statutêre formaliteite in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Dit fokus hoofsaaklik op die formele vereistes wat lei tot nietigheid in die geval van nie-nakoming, en in die besonder dié wat voorgeskryf word vir die vervreemding van grond (artikel 2 (1) van die Wet op Vervreemding van Grond 68 van 1981) en borgstellings (artikel 6 van die Algemene Regswysigingswet 50 van 1956). Ten einde die nodige konteks te verskaf, begin die studie met ‘n algemene historiese oorsig van die ontwikkeling van formaliteite. Dit oorweeg ook die voor- en nadele van formaliteite. Die gevolgtrekking is dat ‘n bewustheid van beide vereis word indien ‘n hof die uitdagings wat deur statutêre formaliteite gestel word, suksesvol wil hanteer. Die proefskrif oorweeg dan meer spesifieke aspekte van formaliteite, insluitende die verskil tussen wesenlike en nie-wesenlike bedinge. Dit toon ook dat die huidige opvatting van statutêre formaliteite redelik buigsaam is en tot ‘n bevinding van geldigheid lei waar dit redelikerwys moontlik is. Gevalle van onbenoemde of versweë prinsipale bied egter besondere uitdagings in hierdie verband en die moontlikheid word ondersoek om ‘n meer konsekwente, maar tegelyk teoreties-gefundeerde benadering te volg. ‘n Bespreking van wat op skrif moet wees, en met watter mate van sekerheid, behels noodwendig ‘n oorweging van die mate waarin ekstrinsieke getuienis toelaatbaar is. Die interaksie tussen formaliteite en die parol evidence-reël word derhalwe ondersoek. Spesiale aandag word bestee aan inlywing deur verwysing. Na oorweging van die benadering in gemeenregtelike stelsels, word die gevolgtrekking bereik dat ruimte bestaan vir ontwikkeling op hierdie gebied, veral met betrekking tot ‘n voldoende verwysing na ‘n ander dokument. Rektifikasie word ook breedvoerig hanteer, vanweë die eiesoortige benadering in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Waar formaliteite konstitutief van aard is, sal ‘n Suid-Afrikaanse hof eers vasstel dat ‘n ooreenkoms ex facie die dokument aan die formaliteite voldoen, voordat dit sal oorweeg of rektifikasie moontlik is. ‘n Ontleding van sivielregtelike en gemeenregtelike beslissings dui daarop dat die Suid-Afrikaanse benadering op ‘n wanbegrip van die doel van rektifikasie gebaseer is. Dit lei tot die verdere gevolgtrekking dat die vereiste van ex facie nakoming as ‘n afsonderlike stap afgeskaf behoort te word en dat ‘n hof eerder moet oorweeg of die toestaan van ‘n eis vir rektifikasie die oogmerke van die formaliteite in die algemeen sou verydel. Laastens word aandag geskenk aan die remedies beskikbaar aan ‘n party wat presteer ingevolge ‘n ooreenkoms wat nietig is weens nie-nakoming van formaliteite, asook die effek van volle prestasie kragtens so ‘n ooreenkoms. In eersgenoemde geval beperk die Suid-Afrikaanse reg daardie party tot ‘n verrykingseis. ‘n Ondersoek van die remedies beskikbaar in ander regstelsels toon dat dit onnodig beperkend is. Dit word aangevoer dat Suid-Afrikaanse howe die uitsluiting van estoppel in hierdie konteks moet heroorweeg, veral in gevalle waar een party se gewetenlose optrede daartoe lei dat die ander party staat maak op die formeel-gebrekkige ooreenkoms. In gevalle van volledige prestasie is daar geen remedies beskikbaar nie, maar dit word aangevoer dat ‘n onderskeid getref moet word tussen wedersydse en eensydige prestasies.

La loyauté procédurale n’est pas consacrée dans le droit du procès administratif. Elle fait pourtant l’objet d’un débat au sein de la doctrine publiciste. Alors que la jurisprudence judiciaire et la doctrine privatiste font de la loyauté des débats essentiellement un enjeu de moralisation du procès entre les parties, le discours de la doctrine publiciste sur la loyauté vise à révéler et justifier les garanties apportées aux parties dans le procès administratif. Une démarche inductive, consistant à systématiser le discours doctrinal, permet de formuler un concept de loyauté procédurale propre au procès administratif. Celui-ci apporte une justification à certains traits de procédure, consacrés par les textes ou la jurisprudence, qui n’ont pas de fondement exprès et dont le point commun est de reconnaître des garanties aux parties. Ce concept offre une grille d’analyse du droit du procès. La circonstance que le principe de loyauté procédurale est rejeté en droit n’exclut pas, en outre, l’intérêt d’un usage conceptuel de la loyauté. Le concept de loyauté permet d’apprécier l’opportunité de consacrer certains mécanismes contentieux et d’identifier les difficultés posées par le procès administratif selon les critères de l’intégrité, de l’accessibilité et de l’efficacité à l’égard des parties. Envisagée comme un concept d’explication, la loyauté procédurale devient un concept d’analyse de la procédure suivie devant le juge administratif et suggère certaines évolutions des règles applicables au procès administratif
The concept of procedural loyalty is not enshrined in the legal frameworks that govern administrative legal proceedings. Nonetheless, it has been subject to significant debate throughout the administrative legal doctrine. In contrast to judicial case law and civil doctrine where the concept of loyalty of debates is essentially focused on the moralization between the parties involved, the administrative doctrine on loyalty aims to disclose and justify the guaranties and safeguards given to the parties involved. An inductive approach, consistent in systematizing the doctrinal discourse, has lead to a concept of procedural loyalty that is unique to administrative legal proceedings. It provides justification over the key features of legal proceedings, features that are enshrined in either legal texts or case law but do not have explicit legal foundations and for which the common feature is to recognize safeguards afforded to the parties involved. This concept brings about a new set of legal terminology. The fact that the principal of procedural loyalty is not explicitly covered in legal frameworks, does not mean however that the conceptual usage of loyalty should be discarded. This concept allows us to acknowledge the opportunity in devoting litigation mechanisms to administrative legal proceedings, in order to identify the difficulties brought about in respect of the integrity, accessibility and efficiency with regards to all parties involved. Initially envisaged as an explanatory concept, procedural loyalty has been transformed into a conceptual analysis of the proceedings presided over by administrative judges

The purpose of this paper is to glimpse as the Tax Law is inserted in the unit of general law, being important for understanding the knowledge of public and private law in general.In the second part of the paper, the author analyzes how private law applies to the financial subsidiary way through forwarding making the tax law itself or by express provision of the civil. He emphasizes in this introduction as dogmatic construction of the tax liability, originated and rationale in civil liability.Finally the author explains how general principles of law necessarily apply to financial law. Thus, the principles of good faith, breach of law, and the doctrine of estoppel, are universal principles applicable to every right and inexcusably financial and tax law.
El presente artículo busca vislumbrar cómo el Derecho Financiero y Tributario está inserto en la unidad del Derecho en general, resultando importante para su comprensión el conocimiento del Derecho Público y Privado. Por ello, el autor analiza cómo se aplica en forma subsidiaria el Derecho Privado al Derecho Financiero a través del reenvío que realiza la propia legislación fiscal o por disposición expresa de la civil. Destacamos en esta introducción cómo la construcción dogmática de la obligación tributaria tuvo su origen y razón de ser en la de la obligación civil.Finalmente el autor explica cómo los Principios Generales del Derecho necesariamente se aplican al Derecho Financiero. Así, los principios de buena fe, abuso del derecho, y la doctrina de los actos propios, son principios universales aplicables a todo el Derecho e inexcusablemente al Derecho Financiero y Tributario.

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This dissertation work proposes a brief study of the estoppel, as well as a review of the arbitration process, in order to finish up on the existence and applicability of estoppel in the arbitration process. To this end, we will briefly comment on the institutes of estoppel and the arbitration process, tracing its logical precepts and introducing the combination of both concepts
Neste trabalho de dissertação de mestrado propõe-se um breve estudo acerca do instituto da preclusão, assim como uma revisão sobre o processo de arbitragem, com a finalidade de concluir-se sobre a existência, aplicabilidade e limites da preclusão no processo de arbitragem. Para tanto, faremos breves comentários sobre os institutos da preclusão e do processo de arbitragem, traçando seus preceitos lógicos e introduzindo a conjugação de ambos os conceitos

This PhD dissertation is about legal fictions in private law. A legal fiction, broadly, is a false assumption knowingly relied upon by the courts. The main aim of the dissertation is to formulate a test for which fictions should be accepted and which rejected. Subsidiary aims include a better understanding of the fiction as a device and of certain individual fictions, past and present. This research is undertaken, primarily, to establish a rigorous system for the treatment of fictions in English law - which is lacking. Secondarily, it is intended to settle some intractable disputes, which have plagued the scholarship. These theoretical debates have hindered progress on the practical matters which affect litigants in the real world. The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is a historical study of common-law fictions. The conclusions drawn thereform are the foundation of the acceptance test for fictions. The second chapter deals with the theoretical problems surrounding the fiction. Chiefly, it seeks precisely to define 'legal fiction', a recurrent problem in the literature. A solution, in the form of a two-pronged definition, is proposed, adding an important element to the acceptance test. The third chapter analyses modern-day fictions and recommends retention or abolition for each fiction. In the fourth chapter, the findings hitherto are synthesised into a general acceptance test for fictions. This test, which is the thesis of this work, is presented as a flowchart. It is the author's hope that this project will raise awareness as to the merits and demerits of legal fictions, de-mystify the debate and bring about reform.

Lors des travaux de la Commission du droit international relatifs aux actes unilatéraux des États, le rapporteur spécial a nié que le silence puisse être qualifié de manifestation de la volonté étatique. Rien dans la théorie de l’acte juridique ne justifie pourtant cette position. L’étude de la pratique révèle en outre que, selon les cas, le silence étatique peut être qualifié de refus ou d’acquiescement et qu’il joue un rôle fondamental dans la formation, l’interprétation ou la modification des rapports de droit interétatiques. En effet, dans la mesure où, en droit international, il revient aux États d’apprécier le bien-fondé ou la légalité du comportement de leurs pairs, l’objectif de la sécurité juridique impose de retenir la pertinence légale de leur silence. Cet objectif, sous ses diverses facettes, constitue la raison d’être de l’attribution d’un effet légal au silence et permet ainsi une systématisation des hypothèses très variées où il pèse sur les États une « charge de réagir ». Selon la situation face à laquelle il est appréhendé, le silence permet ainsi d’assurer la détermination actuelle ou future des rapports de droit.L’étude des conditions nécessaires à la production de l’effet attribué au silence révèle par ailleurs que le droit positif consacre la possibilité théorique d’y voir un acte juridique. Pour que son silence produise des effets, le droit international exige toujours que l’État ait été libre de réagir et qu’il ait eu connaissance de la situation qui le rendait pertinent. En outre, les régimes de la preuve de la connaissance et de l’existence du silence ne justifient pas nécessairement la dénonciation du caractère honteusement fictif de l’explication volontariste des phénomènes en cause. Il n’y a, en toute hypothèse, aucune fiction juridique à qualifier le silence en tant qu’acte juridique
. During the work of the International Law Commission regarding Unilateral Acts of States, the Special Rapporteur denied that State’s silence could be qualified as a manifestation of its will. Nevertheless,no theoretical reason justifies this position. The study of the practice reveals more over that, as the casemay be, State’s silence can be qualified as refusal or as acquiescence and that it plays a fundamental role in the formation, the interpretation or the modification of legal interstate relations. Indeed, since it is the State’s prerogative to appreciate the legality of the behavior of others States, legal certainty imposes to hold the legal relevance of their silence. Under its diverse facets, this objective constitutes the raison d’être of the effect attributed to silence and thus allows a systematization of the various hypothesis in which it is taken into account. Depending on the situation to which it reacts, silence ensures the current or future determination of legal relations. Furthermore, the study of the conditions necessary for the production of the silence’s effects reveals that positive law consecrates the theoretical possibility of qualifying silence as a legal act. International law requires, in order toattribute an effect to silence, that the silent State was free to react and had knowledge of the situation that made his silence legally relevant. Moreover, the rules governing the proof of the knowledge and of the existence of silence do not necessarily justify the criticism towards the fictive character of the voluntarist explanation of the phenomena. There is, in any event, no legal fiction in qualifying silenceas a legal act

Le droit privé européen se construit progressivement, à la fois en tant que branche du droit, notamment à travers les instruments du droit de l’Union européenne, et en tant que discipline juridique, c’est-à-dire comme savoir juridique. Le rôle de la doctrine apparaît primordial dans cette construction (ou reconstruction dès lors que le jus commune médiéval est considéré comme un précédent). Au caractère fragmentaire et sectoriel des instruments du droit de l’Union européenne touchant au droit privé, la doctrine a répondu en élaborant des instruments de droit prospectif qui ambitionnent de construire le droit privé européen comme une branche du droit complète et cohérente. Les projets publiés couvrent par exemple la théorie générale des contrats (Principes du droit européen des contrats, dirigés par O. Lando), le droit de la responsabilité civile (Principles of European Tort Law), voire tout le droit patrimonial (Draft Common Frame of Reference, dirigé par C. von Bar). La doctrine joue aussi un rôle dans la diffusion des concepts dans les différents systèmes juridiques (estoppel, intérêts négatif et positif, incombance,…). Cette diffusion est favorisée par l’apparition de manuels, de cours, de diplômes consacrés au droit privé européen, alors même que celui-ci demeure très incomplet. Quelle que soit la manière dont est envisagé le droit privé européen, la doctrine tient un rôle essentiel. L’omniprésence de la doctrine impose donc de s’interroger sur son rôle dans la construction, ou selon certains dans la reconstruction, d’un droit privé européen
European private law is gradually built, both as a branch of law, especially through EU legal instruments, and as a legal discipline, i.e. as a legal knowledge, a jurisprudence. Legal scholarship plays a fundamental part in this construction (or reconstruction when medieval jus commune is regarded as a precedent). In response to the fragmentary and sectorial approach of EU legal instruments concerning private law, legal scholarship has drawn up several legal drafts; these drafts aim to build the European private law as a complete and consistent branch of law. The published drafts include general contract law (Principles of European Contract Law, edited by O. Lando), tort law (Principles of European Tort Law), and even the whole patrimonial law (Draft Common Frame of Reference, edited by C. von Bar). The legal scholarship also plays a part in the diffusion of concepts in different legal systems (estoppel, reliance and expectation interests, Obliegenheit, …). This diffusion is enhanced by the emergence of books, lectures, degrees in European private law, even if this law remains very incomplete. Whichever way European private law is understood, legal scholarship contributes in an essential manner. The omnipresence of the legal scholarship leads to question its role in the construction, or according to some authors the reconstruction, of a European private law

Le changement de comportement correspond à une situation dans laquelle, pendant l’exécution du contrat, le créancier adopte une attitude contraire au contenu de l’accord originel, pour ensuite exiger l’application de ce dernier. Confronté aux règles classiques du droit des contrats (intangibilité, consideration), cette volte-face ne devrait avoir aucune force juridique. Malgré cela, en interdisant au créancier de réclamer l’exécution de l’accord initial, les juges français et anglais introduisent cette situation dans la sphère juridique.Comme l’imprévision, le changement de comportement bouleverse l’exécution du contrat ; comme la bonne foi, il est fondé sur la morale ; comme l’abus de droit, il sanctionne l’inconstance ; comme l’apparence, il est à la frontière entre le fait et le droit. Il se singularise pourtant, car il ne se confond avec aucune autre insitution juridique. Par ailleurs distinct de la confiance légitime et de l’interdiction de se contredire auxquelles il est rattaché, il est en quête d’un régime juridique propre. Une construction s’impose alors. Elle est facilitée par le miroir de la comparaison des droits français et anglais.Le changement de comportement révèle une renonciation du créancier à la créance, rendue possible par les prérogatives contractuelles qu’il tient, elles-mêmes autorisées par sa propriété sur la créance ou le renforcement de sa titularité. L’efficacité de cette appréhension flexible du contenu contractuel requiert cependant l’anéantissement d’éventuels remparts procéduraux : l’interdiction du changement ne doit alors plus seulement être un moyen de défense contre la contradiction, mais exprimer un comportement juridiquement contraignant
The change of behaviour refers to a situation in which, during the performance stage of the contract, the promisor behaves in a manner which is contrary to the existing contractual rights, but later neverthless insists on their application. Faced with the classic rules of contract law (sanctity of contracts, consideration), this volte-face should have no legal force. Yet, by prohibiting the promisor’s demand to perform the original agreement, French and English judges nevertheless introduce this situation in the law of contracts.Like frustration, the change of behaviour disrupts the performance of the contract ; like good faith and Equity, it is based on morality ; like an abuse of right, it punishes inconsistency ; like the theory of « apparence », it is in between facts and law. In spite of this, the change of behaviour stands out ; as it does not share the exact same scope as the expectations theory or the inconsistent behaviour theory, no other legal theory can wholly translate it into the law of the contracts. The change of behaviour therefore needs its proper legal framework which must consequently be found. The search is helped by the prism of comparative law, between French and Englis laws.The change of behaviour reveals a waiver of the promisor’s debt. The waiver is made possible by the contractual prerogatives he holds, prerogatives which are justified by the ownership of the debt. The efficiency of this flexible understanding of contractual content requires the obliteration of any litigation shield. As a consequence, forbidding the change should not only be seen as a defense against inconsistency, but should highlight a legally binding behaviour

This thesis examines the doctrine of public law estoppel and similar doctrines, such as substantive legitimate expectation, which seek to give substantive protection to people's expectations arising from their dealings with public bodies and officials. The substantive protection of expectations in public law is controversial and this thesis considers whether the concerns raised about its application have any sound basis. I review the case-law in which the courts have considered whether to apply estoppel in public law or otherwise extend the doctrine of legitimate expectation to substantive outcomes. Particular attention is paid to the "spill-over" of estoppel from private law into public law. I discuss whether there is any real difference between the doctrines which seek to give substantive protection to expectations. I conclude there is no material difference between the approaches or their inherent ability to respond to the concerns raised by the opponents of substantive protection. I then consider the notion of legal certainty in the law - the conceptual principle on which the doctrines of estoppel and legitimate expectation are based. I conclude that this principle has a strong foundation and creates a powerful argument for protecting expectations. I then examine the apparent concerns that arise from achieving legal certainty in public law and draw out the specific objections to applying public law estoppel and substantive legitimate expectation. I critique each of these objections and conclude that none of them present an insurmountable hurdle to the application of estoppel or substantive legitimate expectation in public law. I conclude by setting out a number of "touchstones" to assist in the case-by-case assessment of whether expectations should be protected. The touchstones attempt to place a greater emphasis on the underlying theoretical justification for protecting expectations and to ensure the assessment deals with the concerns that were raised about bringing the concept of legal certainty into public law.

碩士
國立臺北大學
法律學系一般生組
96
My research motion is that in viewing our law, although there is a more complete introduce in the principle ot Good Faith, but does not have a introduce about principle of Estoppel at length. And then, in Amerian`s law they discuss a lot about principle of Estoppel, and build a complete frame of structure, dose it means this principle has it`s dimension, and whether the principle of Estoppel and the principle ot Good Faith is different？ How to use in our law？ All these question are my context`s major research motion . Second, my research intention is hoping that our principle ot Good Faith can be support and construct by principle of Estoppel. Third, my research function is based on the Comparative Law to introduce foreign law to supply the insufficient of our law. Our court held that, although the Insured authorize the insurance company to investigate the anamnesis, but it can`t excused the duty of TruthfulRepresentations of the Applicant. At this time, dose it collide to our Insurance Law §62 is doubtfully. If the insurance company investigate the Insured`s anamnesis, he will know the Insured`s health condition. But the insurance company does not do the investigation, it accept the insurance just according to the written answering coveage. In this time, although the Insured contravene §64（the duty of Truthful Representations of the Applicant）, but can the insurance company reduce it`s obligative of attention, because of the §64？ In my opinion, the §64 doesn`t deservedly eliminate §62, they should can be coexist. At last, this context will put the case into the principle of Estoppel, and inspected it. And then we can find that, this case cohere with the essentials of Estoppel. So, even though the insurance company can`t apply the §62, but it still can use the principle of Estoppel. So, the insurance company can`t rescind the insurance contract, the insurance company still need to pay the insurance benefits. At last, there have three advise. First, we should add extra rule in §64「When the insurance company should know the Insured`s adventurous condition, but it dosen`t know. At this time, although the Insured doesn`t tell the truth, but the insurance company can`t rescind the insurance contract. Both of each has demerit. the insurance company can only reduce the insurance benefits.」; Second, we can introduction the principle of Estoppel, to let the judge to estimate and apply. In order to balance the unfair condition. Third, because we don`t have a law to rule case like this, so the judge have to distinguish it more carefully, and find the most suitable rules. The judge can`t adjudge all kind of case in the same way.

碩士
中原大學
財經法律研究所
100
Abstract The theory of the doctrine of equivalents is that an applicant through the doctrine of equivalents should only be able to protect the scope of his invention, Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey &; Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990), not to expand the protectable scope of the claimed invention to cover a new and unclaimed invention. The doctrine of equivalents, and the extent to which prosecution history estoppel limits application of the doctrine. The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit used the Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. case to set rough contours of how these two legal doctrines interact. The Supreme Court's last word, in Festo VIII 535 U.S. 722,（2002） established three grounds for rebutting a presumption of estoppel for amendments submitted during patent prosecution for reasons "substantially related to patentability." These are: 1) that the equivalent was unforeseeable, 2) that the amendment had only a tangential relation to the equivalent, or 3) that there was "some other reason" that suggested the patentee would not have reasonably been expected to describe the equivalent. The Federal Circuit, tasked with establishing the extent to which these exceptions apply, last spoke in Festo X, where the Court held that "an alternative is foreseeable if it is disclosed in the pertinent prior art in the field of the invention. In other words, an alternative is foreseeable if it is known in the field of the invention as reflected in the claim scope before amendment." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The disclosure of patentable invention should be sufficiently, because the claim scope would not extend after amendment. This study is named “The Prosecution History Estoppel Under U. S. Patent Law” which is in the cases of Festo and Honeywell.

碩士
東吳大學
法律學系
101
The principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben) provisions is in Item No. 2 of Article 148 in the Civil Law of Taiwan, it is considered by scholars to achieve the highest guiding principle of fairness and justice law. Therefore, even if the provisions in the Civil Code not limited to, all areas of the law are to be bound. However, the principle of good faith, the law expressly, but a closer look at the specifications of the context, not as other law generally set clear the constituent elements of the legal effect of the provisions are highly abstract, and thus retain the applicable flexibility in the face contribute to the lack of supplementary Acts amending the law. Besides, the development of the specification does not suit to the social changes of the modern legal practice, and it will face the dilemma due to the law is not completed. In order to solve this problem; at the same time, however, it may produce the principle of good faith flow abused, and it may effect the stability of the legal and clarity. This abstract nature of the principle of good faith, must be established through a specific process of secondary concept, in order to solve the aforementioned problems may arise. The theory of estoppel by waiver (Verwirkung) system that is developed through the process of good faith and to adjust the indolent rights to take a substantial period of time for the non-used of the rights, their rights no longer advocate in the legal system . This system is to explore the necessity of following the creation by German doctrine, based on the legislators not be expressly formulated under the meaning of the theory and its existence must be explored for our doctrine and practice. Therefore, this article is by the observation and analysis of the legal judgments, and we try to practice insights based on the loss of the right to object to be typed, and review of the insights of the pros and cons of the various types of practices. We are looking forward to provide more rights to theory of estoppel by waiver in clear criterion, and thus contribute to the use and operation of this theory.

In Sonap Petroleum (formerly known as Sonarep) (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadog1an1s 1992 (3) SA 234 (A) the Appellate Division apparently approved the direct application of the reliance theory, without reference to prejudice or fault, to determine contractual liability in the absence of consensus. The various approaches to contractual liability in South African law are examined, and a comparative study of English law and the law of the Netherlands is conducted. It is submitted that the element of fault is not crucial to the enquiry, but rather, the elements of conduct , inducement and a reasonable reliance upon consensus. It is concluded that the test for contractual liability in the absence of actual consensus, as formula ted by the court in Sonap's case, without reference to prejudice or fault, has established sound precedent in South African law.
Criminal and Procedural Law
LL.M.

As a company is a juristic person it can only act through human agency. A question that arises because of this fact is under what circumstances a company can be held to a contract by a third party where its representative was unauthorised to enter into such contract. There should be a careful weighing and balancing of the interests of the shareholders and the company on the one hand and the contracting third party on the other. It is further important to have legal certainty on the validity and enforceability of contracts concluded by and with companies as the absence of certainty can hamper business dealings with companies which would have an impact on the economy. The common-law principles of agency form the foundation upon which representation within the context of company law takes place. The law of agency has been adapted in the context of company law to satisfy the unique needs that have originated in this regard. One such adaptation is the creation of the Turquand rule by the English courts which rule was taken over by the South African courts. One of the primary reasons for creating the Turquand rule was due to the harsh effect that the common-law doctrine of constructive notice had on third parties dealing with a company. In this study an examination of the current legal position regarding representation of a company in South Africa was undertaken. The history and development of the common-law principles of agency and doctrines that are unique to representation in a company law context are analysed and the relevant sections of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 are discussed. The integration of the common-law principles with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is considered and recommendations are made in respect thereof. In support of the analysis, a comparative study was undertaken of the history and development of this subject matter in England. It was concluded that South African company law, with all its shortcomings and uncertainties is still to be preferred above the position in England.
Aangesien ‘n maatskappy ‘n regspersoon is, kan dit slegs deur middel van natuurlike persone as agente optree. ‘n Vraag wat as gevolg van hierdie feit ontstaan is onder watter omstandighede ‘n maatskappy deur ‘n derde party gebonde gehou kan word aan ‘n kontrak waar die maatskappy se verteenwoordiger nie gemagtig was om die kontrak aan te gaan nie. Daar behoort ‘n versigtige afweging te wees tussen die belange van die maatskappy en sy aandeelhouers aan die een kant en ‘n derde party wat met die maatskappy kontrakteer aan die ander kant. Dit is verder belangrik om regsekerheid te hê oor die geldigheid en afdwingbaarheid van kontrakte wat met maatskappye aangegaan word aangesien die afwesigheid daarvan besigheidsverkeer met maatskappye kan kortwiek wat ‘n impak op die ekonomie tot gevolg sal hê. Die gemeenregtelike beginsels van verteenwoordiging vorm die basis waarop verteenwoordiging binne die konteks van maatskappyereg plaasvind. Verteenwoordigingsreg is aangepas binne die konteks van maatskappye om voorsiening te maak vir die unieke behoeftes wat in hierdie verband ontstaan het. Een sodanige aanpassing is die skepping van die Turquand reël deur die Engelse howe, welke reël deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe oorgeneem is. Een van die hoofredes vir die skepping van die Turquand reël is die onregverdige uitwerking wat die gemeenregtelike leerstuk van toegerekende kennis op derde partye gehad het wat met ‘n maatskappy onderhandel. ‘n Studie van die huidige regsposisie rakende verteenwoordiging van ‘n maatskappy in Suid-Afrika is hierin gedoen. Die geskiedenis en ontwikkeling van die gemeenregtelike beginsels van verteenwoordiging en leerstukke eie aan verteenwoordiging in die konteks van maatskappyereg is geanaliseer. Die betrokke artikels van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word bespreek. Die integrasie van hierdie gemeenregtelike beginsels met die betrokke bepalings van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 is oorweeg en aanbevelings in verband daarmee gemaak. Ter ondersteuning van die analise is ‘n vergelykende studie van die gekiedenis en ontwikkeling van hierdie onderwerp in Engeland onderneem. Daar is tot die slotsom gekom dat die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg, met al sy tekortkominge en onsekerhede nogsteeds bo die posisie in Engeland te verkies is.
Mercantile Law
LL. M.