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Journal articles on the topic 'Left-wing extremists'
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1
Sinclair, Samantha, Artur Nilsson, and Jens Agerström. "Tolerating the intolerant: Does realistic threat lead to increased tolerance of right-wing extremists?" Journal of Social and Political Psychology 10, no. 1 (March 16, 2022): 35–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.8017.
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Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one’s group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.
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Nayak, Giridhari. "Strategy and Tactics in Countering Left Wing Extremists in India." Strategic Analysis 34, no. 4 (June 23, 2010): 504–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161003802661.
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Windisch, Steven, Gina Scott Ligon, and Pete Simi. "Organizational [Dis]trust: Comparing Disengagement Among Former Left-Wing and Right-Wing Violent Extremists." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 6 (December 6, 2017): 559–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2017.1404000.
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VAN HIEL, ALAIN. "A psycho-political profile of party activists and left-wing and right-wing extremists." European Journal of Political Research 51, no. 2 (May 11, 2011): 166–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01991.x.
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Asst. Inst. Ali Hassan Yousif Fattah. "Domestic Terrorism in the United States of America after the Attacks September 11, 2001 A statistical study of the role of the extreme right))." Tikrit Journal For Political Science 2, no. 32 (June 30, 2023): 32–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.25130/tjfps.v2i32.189.
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The United States of America faces many internal threats and challenges, and terrorism is one of the most significant challenges and threats. The years following the attacks of (September 11, 2001) witnessed a substantial decrease in the rate of external (foreign) terrorism in the United States, at a time when domestic terrorism witnessed an apparent rise at unprecedented rates in the last two decades. There are four main categories of ideologies in the United States of America: the far right, the far left, religious extremism, and ethnic extremism. The far right is the first and most significant challenge and threat to the United States, as the operations and attacks of this wing have increased rapidly in terms of quality and quantity. Within this wing, there are many movements, and white extremists and anti-government extremists are considered the most critical movements. It is a statistical study that tries to shed light on domestic terrorism in the United States of America after the 11 September 2001 attacks by collecting data from American formal and informal institutions. The study utilizes the quantitative approach as a tool for analyzing these data.
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Cohen, Jeffrey E. "Ideology and Attitudes toward Jews in U.S. Public Opinion: A Reconsideration." Religions 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2024): 59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel15010059.
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Antisemitism has been found on both the extreme left and right among political elites. However, at the mass public level, limited research suggests right-wing antisemitism, but not much left-wing antisemitism. This paper challenges that research, at least for the U.S., offering an alternative theory. The theory argues that the lowest levels of antisemitism will be found among mainstream liberals and conservatives. Ideological moderates will exhibit higher rates of antisemitism, while those lacking an ideological orientation will show still higher antisemitic rates. Extremists of the right and left may be more antisemitic than mainstream conservatives and liberals, but the inability of standard ideological self-placement questions to distinguish extreme ideologues from the very conservative/liberal makes it difficult to test the extremism hypothesis. Numerous items measuring attitudes towards Jews in the U.S. across five major surveys finds overwhelming support for the mainstream philosemitism theory. The conclusion puts the findings into perspective and offers suggestions regarding future research.
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van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, and André P. M. Krouwel. "Psychological Features of Extreme Political Ideologies." Current Directions in Psychological Science 28, no. 2 (January 29, 2019): 159–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721418817755.
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In this article, we examine psychological features of extreme political ideologies. In what ways are political left- and right-wing extremists similar to one another and different from moderates? We propose and review four interrelated propositions that explain adherence to extreme political ideologies from a psychological perspective. We argue that (a) psychological distress stimulates adopting an extreme ideological outlook; (b) extreme ideologies are characterized by a relatively simplistic, black-and-white perception of the social world; (c) because of such mental simplicity, political extremists are overconfident in their judgments; and (d) political extremists are less tolerant of different groups and opinions than political moderates. In closing, we discuss how these psychological features of political extremists increase the likelihood of conflict among groups in society.
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Nayak, Giridhari. "A Model Action Plan for the Maoist-Infested Region." Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 78, no. 3 (September 2005): 229–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/pojo.2005.78.3.229.
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Left-wing extremism has made great inroads in large swathes of South Asia. With military gradualism, vituperative propaganda and an ever-expanding network, the extremists are on the march. Their influence and infiltration are increasing in different new areas. The terror unleashed by the extremists is intended to overthrow the government and dislocate the state structure. In order to forestall and fight effectively, the government has to evolve proper and appropriate policies, develop institutions, marshal resources, and train, motivate and equip manpower. Many actions on policy, organisation and operations have to be taken; an agenda for action has to be framed and a Model Action Plan prepared. The Action Plan is an effort to conceptualise and strategise the repertoires of collective action that are essential to create a framework which can beat the threat of Maoist terrorism.
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Wojtasik, Karolina. "Utøya – Christchurch – Halle. Right-wing Extremists’ Terrorism." Security Dimensions 33, no. 33 (June 30, 2020): 84–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.2670.
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The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.
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De Witte, Hans, Jaak Billiet, and Peer Scheepers. "Hoe zwart is Vlaanderen ? : Een exploratief onderzoek naar uiterst-rechtse denkbeelden in Vlaanderen in 1991." Res Publica 36, no. 1 (March 31, 1994): 85–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/rp.v36i1.18755.
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On the basis of the research literature, five aspects of the extreme right-wing ideology were distinguished : racism, extreme ethnic nationalism, the preference for a strong leadership, anti-parliamentarianism, and an anti-left attitude. The data of a postal survey in the spring of 1991 of a representative sample of the Flemish population in Belgium show that the items with which these extreme right-wing topics were operationalized show a one dimensional structure. About 10% to 25% of the interviewees agree with the individual items and about 20% of the subjects scored on the extreme right-wing side of the scale. The 'hardcore' of extreme right-wing respondents is, however, much smaller (about 1% to 2%), and does not seem to be higher in Flanders than in most of the surrounding countries. The right-wing extremism scale developed correlates as expected with a previously developed typology that integrates the attitude with respect to autochthons and allochthons. The analysis confirms that the voters for the Vlaams Blok - taken as a whole - may not be considered right-wing extremists, as suggested by previous research. Right-wing extremism correlates with a large number of attitudes and seems to be embedded in the broader opinion dimension of socio-cultural conservatism. This may also explain why it is associated primarily with the age, educational level, and religiosity of the respondents.
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Forest, James J. F. "Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970-2010." Crime & Delinquency 58, no. 5 (September 2012): 769–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011128712452962.
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This article examines whether a terrorist group’s ideology has a meaningful impact on its involvement in kidnapping. On a global level, incident data (1970-2010) indicate that in the past decade the number of kidnappings by terrorist groups has increased, while Muslim extremists have replaced left-wing/Marxist revolutionaries as the world’s leading kidnappers. However, when we incorporate data about the attributes of terrorist organizations and their operating environments, this analysis indicates that ideology does not play an important role in determining the likelihood of a group’s involvement in kidnapping. The article concludes with implications and suggested topics for further study.
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Ackerman, Gary A., and Jeffrey M. Bale. "The potential for collaboration between Islamists and Western left-wing extremists: A theoretical and empirical introduction." Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 5, no. 3 (November 1, 2012): 151–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2012.745197.
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FOOT, JOHN M. "‘WHITE BOLSHEVIKS’? THE CATHOLIC LEFT AND THE SOCIALISTS IN ITALY – 1919–1920." Historical Journal 40, no. 2 (June 1997): 415–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x9700722x.
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During Italy's ‘two red years’ (1919–20), left-wing catholics challenged the authority of the church and the landowners in large areas of northern Italy. Calling themselves the estremisti (the extremists), left catholic unions organized peasants and workers in land and farm occupations and encouraged a series of radical strikes. Left catholic leaders became national figures, in particular Guido Miglioli at Cremona and Romano Cocchi at Bergamo. This article examines these innovative struggles and their troubled relationship with the traditional socialist Italian left during this turbulent period. No alliances were formed between the estremisti and the ‘red’ unions until 1921–4, when fascism was already rampant and the revolutionary wave had already subsided. The article analyses why alliances were not built earlier, and why the socialists were so hostile towards the catholic left. Both the theory and the practice of the traditional left prevented any positive appraisal of the estremisti. In addition, there are detailed accounts of the extraordinary mass movements inspired by Cocchi and Miglioli in some of the richest and most staunchly catholic regions of northern Italy.
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van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, and André P. M. Krouwel. "Extreme Political Beliefs Predict Dogmatic Intolerance." Social Psychological and Personality Science 8, no. 3 (September 26, 2016): 292–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550616671403.
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Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.
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Ballsun-Stanton, Brian, Lise Waldek, and Julian Droogan. "Online Right-Wing Extremism: New South Wales, Australia." Proceedings 77, no. 1 (April 27, 2021): 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2021077018.
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Academics and policymakers recognize the absence of empirically grounded research to support the suppositions on which terrorist focused policies are based. (Sageman, Marc. 2014. “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”. Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (4): 565–80) We developed our project, Mapping Networks and Narratives of Online Right-Wing Extremists in New South Wales, (Department of Security Studies and Criminology. 2020. Mapping Networks and Narratives of Online Right-Wing Extremists in New South Wales. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4071472) to illuminate this space. Using the analysis of large-scale online data to generate evidence-based insights into online Right-Wing Extremism (RWE) across the state, our research focused on four key questions: (1) What is the nature of the online RWE environment in New South Wales, Australia (NSW)? (2) How is this movement distributed across NSW? (3) How are themes and narratives framed in different online contexts to mobilize support? (4) What level of risk does the online right-wing environment pose? These questions were left purposely broad to facilitate an exploratory project into what was, in 2018–2019, still a relatively little studied milieu. We combined expertise from computational science, security studies, and behavioral science. We were funded by the Department of Communities and Justice, NSW. We identified two distinct—yet connected—levels of risk. The first was a creeping threat to democracy fueled by networks and content that challenged the fundamental principles of pluralistic liberal democracy. The second was a risk of violence perpetrated by individuals and/or groups that advocate and/or support the use of violence as a tactic to achieve an ideological end. The communities we examined were primarily characterized by networks of individuals as opposed to formal groups. The role played by individual influencers has important ramifications for policy communities: attention should be paid to issues of proscription and moderation. While this milieu engaged with Australian issues and events, it was notably far more obsessed with American issues: particularly those focused on populist narratives and Trumpism. Despite being hateful and extreme, online RWE communities are, firstly, spaces of sociability for users, where social networks are maintained by shared values and norms. For those involved, these spaces engender positive experiences: individuals might share an image of their dinner cooking in their kitchen interspersed with “shitposting” and virulent hate speech. While we identified a variety of narratives that focused on the delegitimization of government and dehumanization of others, the central theme was that of “white identity under threat”. We observed five distinct stages of moderation approach and echo chamber strength. A series of issues for future consideration were identified from the analysis: (1) Awareness raising for key stakeholders across different levels of government and civil society about the revolutionary and anti-social agenda of RWE communities. (2) Building awareness about the civic underpinnings of representative liberal democracy and the threat that RWE poses. (3) Expanding current Countering Violent Extremism infrastructure provided by the NSW government to individuals and communities vulnerable to right wing extremism. (4) The local government is well positioned to deliver programs in rural communities impacted by RWE. (5) Upskilling front-line workers to recognize the risks associated with RWE, and providing pathways into CVE intervention programs for individuals identified as being at-risk.
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Czulo, Oliver, Dominic Nyhuis, and Adam Weyell. "Der Einfluss extremistischer Gewaltereignisse auf das Framing von Extremismen auf SPIEGEL Online." Journal für Medienlinguistik 3, no. 1 (October 20, 2020): 14–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.21248/jfml.2020.11.2.
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In this article, we examine the representation of right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and Islamism in the media-public discourse using the example of SPIEGEL Online, one of the leading German media. We derive four central dimensions for the conceptualization of extremisms: ideological foundation, origin of the actors, position towards society and typical actions. We observe the development of the representation of extremisms at potential breakpoints: We investigate the associative framing of the extremisms before and after a prominent extremism-related violent event, namely 9/11, the publication of the NSU scandal and left-wing extremist activities during the G20 summit. We observe changes in framing motivated by the selected events and compare the resulting framing with the current definitions of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in order to work out possible differences in the conceptualization of extremism variants with potentially different logics of action to be expected from diverging conceptualisations.
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Czulo, Oliver, Dominic Nyhuis, and Adam Weyell. "Der Einfluss extremistischer Gewaltereignisse auf das Framing von Extremismen auf SPIEGEL Online." Journal für Medienlinguistik 3, no. 1 (October 20, 2020): 14–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.21248/jfml.2020.11.2.
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In this article, we examine the representation of right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and Islamism in the media-public discourse using the example of SPIEGEL Online, one of the leading German media. We derive four central dimensions for the conceptualization of extremisms: ideological foundation, origin of the actors, position towards society and typical actions. We observe the development of the representation of extremisms at potential breakpoints: We investigate the associative framing of the extremisms before and after a prominent extremism-related violent event, namely 9/11, the publication of the NSU scandal and left-wing extremist activities during the G20 summit. We observe changes in framing motivated by the selected events and compare the resulting framing with the current definitions of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in order to work out possible differences in the conceptualization of extremism variants with potentially different logics of action to be expected from diverging conceptualisations.
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Marshall, Jonathan. "U.S. Cold War Policy and the Italian Far-Right: The Nixon Administration, Republican Party Operatives, and the Borghese Coup Plot of 1970." Journal of Cold War Studies 25, no. 1 (2023): 138–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01124.
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Abstract The Nixon administration's attempt to promote a military coup in Chile after the election of a far-left president in September 1970 is a well-documented example of U.S. officials’ willingness do whatever was needed to curtail Soviet influence in the Third World. Drawing on declassified White House documents and records of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, this article examines the parallel but largely unknown story of U.S. dealings with right-wing extremists in one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Italy, at around that same time. In December 1970, far-right activists in Italy staged an abortive coup that was intended to prevent further gains by Italy's leftist parties. The article draws on new and widely forgotten sources to examine the background and involvement of two private U.S. operatives for the Republican Party who were closely aligned with senior coup plotters in Italy. Their involvement with Italian neo-fascists should raise concerns about the dangers of private meddling in foreign policy and the potential for private actors to create misperceptions about critical U.S. government policies.
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Luken-Bull, Ronal. "DEFENDERS OF DIVERSITY?" Journal of Islamic Studies and Civilization 1, no. 01 (October 25, 2023): 1–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.61680/jisc.v1i01.2.
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Banser is the paramilitary wing of Ansor, the young men’s organization for Nahdlatul Ulama (Renaissance of the Scholars; NU). NU is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, and because Indonesia is so large, the largest in the world. It has been long committed to Indonesia as a non-shariah state as well as multi-religious and multi-ethnic nation. Nahdlatul Ulama’s young men’s organization Ansor, seeks to train non-radical Muslim leaders with a range of expertise and foci. Ansor has a sub-organization called Banser which regularly guards Christian churches, liberal Muslims, and businesses from being targeted by extremists like the Islamic Defenders Front. If the present, or even recent, history of Banser and Ansor is that of protecting religious minorities and pluralism, this has not always been the case. Ansor/Banser was an important auxiliary force in the Revolution (1945-1949) and in the 1965-1966 national bloodletting that left 500,000 alleged communists dead. It is even more telling and interesting if we explore the ways in which the newer socially progressive actions are based on conservative, traditional understandings of Islam and not liberal or progressive religious understandings.
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Kil'dyushov, Oleg. "Between the Ethos of Science and “Vice Squad”: Max Weber as Polеmicist." Sotsiologicheskoe Obozrenie / Russian Sociological Review 22, no. 2 (2023): 71–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2023-2-71-84.
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The article deals with the uniquely specific public profile of Max Weber, who, on the one hand, entered the history of social thought as a staunch supporter of the value-free scientific work, and on the other hand, was a passionate polemicist ready to cause a public scandal even for a minor occasion. At the outset, Weber’s ambivalent understanding of the ethos of modern science as a methodically-controlled search for objective knowledge of the world at the edge of the scientist’s self-denial and free from the influence of extra-scientific motives is pointed out. In so doing, the paradoxical combination in Weber’s anthropology of science of the imperatives of analytical sobriety and passionate loyalty to one’s “daemon” is recorded. It has been argued that his ambivalence was a specific trait of the classicist of German and world sociology, combining his titanic personality with the extremes of a scholarly hermit and a world celebrity with a reputation for unbalanced scandals. Following then are the judgments about the eminent social thinker made by representatives of opposing political currents, both right-wing conservatives and left-wing extremists. On the basis of a number of high-profile scandals that became known to the scientific and general public in early-20th century Germany, the mechanism of Weber’s involvement in conflicts with various opponents at the personal and institutional level is demonstrated. The practical significance for Weber himself of his scientific-theoretical and methodological principles, which became canonical for the self-understanding of the modern scholarly profession, is questioned. Finally, the passionate controversy surrounding Weber’s famous work Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism is analyzed, reconstructed on the example of historian F. Raphael’s critique and the response of Weber’s First Anticritique.
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Jungkunz, Sebastian, Marc Helbling, and Nina Osenbrügge. "Measuring political radicalism and extremism in surveys: Three new scales." PLOS ONE 19, no. 5 (May 8, 2024): e0300661. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0300661.
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This paper introduces three new scales to measure left- and right-wing radical as well as general extremist attitudes that can be applied across Western European countries. We therefore propose a thorough conceptualization of extremist attitudes that consists of two dimensions: general extremism, by which we understand attitudes that oppose the constitutional democratic state, and another dimension that differentiates between right- and left-wing radicalism by which we understand people who take far-reaching but often one-sided positions on political issues (e.g., on nationalism or anti-imperialism) by advocating fundamental socio-political change. Based on data from Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands (n = 6,201) we created short indices for general extremism and left- and right-wing radicalism. We check for convergence validity by assessing the psychometric properties of the extracted indices, i.e. their internal coherence and the degree to which a scale is able to distinguish strongly extremist and non-extremist individuals. Finally, we correlate the scales with various constructs that are likely related to extremist attitudes in order to assure external or construct validity. The results indicate that the three scales are highly valid and applicable across three Western European countries. Overall, we find that about two to four percent of citizens in each country hold left-wing or right-wing extremist attitudes.
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Kamenowski, Maria, Patrik Manzoni, Sandrine Haymoz, Anna Isenhardt, Cédric Jacot, and Dirk Baier. "Religion as an influencing factor of right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremism. Findings of a Swiss youth study." PLOS ONE 16, no. 6 (June 17, 2021): e0252851. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0252851.
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In criminological research the relationship between religion and delinquency has received great attention. Religiosity has been shown to be a protective factor for violent behaviour, drug use and other types of crime. In contrast, the relationship between religion and extremism was rarely investigated and then almost exclusively in relation to Islamist extremism. This paper presents results of a youth survey on extremism in Switzerland. A total of 8317 young people in ten cantons were interviewed about right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremism. The study allows in a unique way to analyse religion, religiosity and religious attitudes in relation to three forms of extremist attitudes. The results show that religion is an important influencing factor of extremism, but religious affiliation and religiosity are less important than specific religious attitudes such as religious tolerance and religious exclusivity.
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Baier, Dirk, Patrik Manzoni, and Marie Christine Bergmann. "Einflussfaktoren des politischen Extremismus im Jugendalter — Rechtsextremismus, Linksextremismus und islamischer Extremismus im Vergleich / Influencing Factors of Political Extremism in Adolescence — Right-Wing Extremism, Left-Wing Extremism and Islamic Extremism Compared." Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform / Journal of Criminology an Penal Reform 99, no. 3 (November 1, 2016): 171–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mkr-2016-0302.
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Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag werden Einflussfaktoren von drei Formen des politischen Extremismus untersucht. Die Einflussfaktoren werden aus der Desintegrations-, Bindungs- und Selbstkontrolltheorie abgeleitet. Die Prüfung erfolgt anhand einer umfangreichen Befragung von Jugendlichen der neunten Jahrgangsstufe, die im Jahr 2013 in Niedersachsen durchgeführt wurde. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein kleiner Teil der Jugendlichen extreme Einstellungen befürwortet bzw. extremes Verhalten ausführt. Extremismusübergreifend erweisen sich »institutionelle Desintegration« in Form einer als negativ wahrgenommenen Behandlung durch die Polizei, »belief« in Form der eigenen Gesetzestreue und »Risikosuche« als eine Dimension der niedrigen Selbstkontrolle als wichtige Einflussfaktoren. Mit Blick auf den islamischen Extremismus, der aufgrund der Datenlage als Deutschenfeindlichkeit operationalisiert wird, werden zusätzlich spezifische Einflussfaktoren identifiziert (strukturelle Desintegration, Vereinszugehörigkeit und schulische Erfahrungen).
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Ghosh, Rajashri. "Naxalism: The Left-Wing Extremist Movement in India." Polish Political Science Yearbook 52, no. 2 (2023): 7–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202332.
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After 200 years of bondage, India gained freedom from the British through numerous revolutionary movements in 1947. But, within 20 years of the independence, insurgent movements had started arising against the Indian Government as well. In 1967, the Naxalite insurgency was initiated as a radical protest by the oppressed peasants against the colonial tenancy system retained by the feudal landowners even after the British had left the country for good. The uprising got pinpointed as Naxalism and the rebels as Naxals, as it all started at Naxalbari, a village in the Indian state of West Bengal. Spanning over 50 years, this ongoing movement initially acquired the respect of the general population of India with its radical ideologies of fighting against the oppressor imperialists but soon mutated into a source of terror. A qualitative assessment of the instances taken from secondary sources, such as context-related online journals and blog articles, will help this paper to explain the formation of the contemporary perception of Naxalism as an extreme radical armed revolution and one of the biggest security challenges against the Indian Government.
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Ouassini, Nabil, and Arvind Verma. "Socio-economic Inequality or Demographic Conditions: A Micro-level Analysis of Terrorism in Jharkhand." Journal of Victimology and Victim Justice 1, no. 1 (June 13, 2018): 63–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2516606918765494.
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A popular perception is that left-wing extremism has its roots in the phenomenon of socio-economic inequality. Yet, empirical work analysing this perception and exploring the links between left-wing extremism and socio-economic deprivation is limited. This article examines the relationship between socio-economic-demographic indices and left-wing extremism in the state of Jharkhand in India. The analysis tests the strength of the relationship linking left-wing terrorist incidents that occurred between the years of 2005 and March of 2012 and various socio-economic-demographic factors. The results suggest that the districts that report high incidents of terrorist attacks are not only linked to socio-economic inequality but also associated with socio-demographic conditions concerning state access and the lack of penetration by security and government agencies. In the conclusion, policy implications and future research for the state of Jharkhand are suggested.
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Rigoli, Francesco. "Political Extremism in a Global Perspective." Journal of Global Awareness 4, no. 1 (May 29, 2023): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.24073/jga/4/01/03.
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Examining data from the World Value Survey about left-right political orientation, the paper explores political extremism among common people worldwide. Our analysis reveals (i) a positive correlation between left-wing and right-wing extremism across countries, (ii) an average rise in political extremism globally in the last decade, (iii) greater political extremism in less developed countries, (iv) and a surge, during the last decade, in political extremism for less developed countries and for countries where development has not met expectations. Besides offering a picture of how successful political extremism is globally, our investigation provides insight into the driving forces behind this phenomenon.
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Geymbukh, Nadezhda G. "FORMS OF EXTREMISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Pravo, no. 38 (2020): 25–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/22253513/38/3.
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Representatives of German state (constitutional) law define political extremism as "a set of political beliefs and aspirations... which are aimed at denying the democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values". Based on the definition, the criterion for recognising any "political belief or aspiration" as extremist is the notion of a democratic constitutional state. In line with this, the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has given an expansive interpretation of a "free democratic state" that "constitutes a legal state order whose basis is the self-determination of the people according to the will of the majority, freedom and equality. It excludes all forms of despotism or arbitrariness. Among the basic principles of this order are at least: the protection of human rights as laid down in the Basic Law of Germany, the sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, the responsibility of the government, the legitimacy of government, the independence of the judiciary and the principle of multi-partyism. According to article 21, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), political parties that "endeavour to harm or destroy the foundation of the free demo-cratic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany" are declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The possibility to ban political parties as provided for in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees the development of a democratic political system of the state. It is worth emphasising that the stability and democratism of the German political system and the stability of the constitutional order in the state depend not only on the prohibition provision in the Basic Law of the FRG, but above all on the ability of political parties to reach agreement on the basic principles of a "free democratic state system" and to implement these principles in the minds of the people. To realise these goals, Germany has the Federal Office for the Protection of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, a public authority whose task is to control and supervise the legality of the activities of political parties. The forms of extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany are "left-wing extremism" and "right-wing extremism". In right-wing extremism, the older generation is gradually being freed from the aggressive youth, in an increased willingness to use force. Left-wing extremism has become less focused on global global themes - it has become more local and regional, more relatable and at the same time integrated. Because of the new nature of the development of extremism in a united Germany a left-right antagonism has emerged. At the same time, different tendencies of West and East Germany can be observed: in West Germany the struggle "left vs. right" prevails, in East Germany the struggle "right vs. left" prevails.
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Mareš, Miroslav. "Strategies for Creating Insurgencies and Civil Wars in Europe :." Jindal Journal of International Affairs 2, no. 1 (October 1, 2012): 90–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.54945/jjia.v2i1.33.
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The article assesses the role of violent acts committed by extremist forces in Europe. Through an understanding of contemporary social, ideological and political background it analyses selected strategies of insurgencies and civil wars that will remain an important element of Europe’s future security development. Islamist strategies and responses to left wing West European political and military power are described. From the perspective of extremist forces, the author concludes with a vision of Europe deeply dissected into extreme left and right wing politics of control underscored with threats of violence.
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Campion, Kristy. "“Unstructured terrorism”? Assessing left wing extremism in Australia." Critical Studies on Terrorism 13, no. 4 (August 25, 2020): 545–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2020.1810992.
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Maiberg, Heidi, and Alar Kilp. "Extremism in a classroom: topics discussed and Estonian teachers' experiences and self-reflective choices." Society Register 6, no. 1 (March 8, 2022): 107–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/sr.2022.6.1.06.
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Violent acts motivated by extreme interpretations of ideologies (right-wing, left-wing, religions, etc.) catch a lot of attention and cause serious deep emotions such as fear, hate, uncertainty, support polarization of society, and stigmatization of certain people, things, and societal groups. However, little attention has been given to how educators have addressed issues of violent radicalisation, extremism and terrorism with their students. According to Vallinkoski et al., 2021 as schools are one of the primary settings where most children spend their time, educators are needed to help children foster these (critical media reading and interpreting skills) skills to support students in understanding the reasons behind and aftermath of extremist events.
This article gives overview of the results of a pilot study focusing on Estonian educators' experiences with discussing and tackling extremism in a classroom. The study examines educators' experiences in discussing topics related to extremism with students and colleagues and an overview of topics that students have raised. It also answers whether educators self-censorship themselves in discussing topics related to extremism and if so, what are the reasons for doing that. The study's questionnaire is created based on a similar study conducted in Finland by Vallinkoski, Koirikivi and Malkki (2021) with the permission of the authors and with adaptions for the Estonian context. The study results show that Estonian teachers discuss the extremism-related context in classroom by their and students' initiative. While doing it, they face difficulties in defining 'extremism', understanding how to interpret the students reactions and ideas, and when to contact further counterparts.
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McClosky, Herbert, and Dennis Chong. "Similarities and Differences Between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals." British Journal of Political Science 15, no. 3 (July 1985): 329–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400004221.
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Although some scholars have argued that authoritarianism is characteristic only of the right and not of the left, persuasive reasons exist for doubting this claim. Intuitive observation of left-wing and right-wing regimes as well as radical political movements of the left and right reveals striking parallels in their styles of political engagement, their reliance upon force, their disdain for democratic ideals and practices and their violations of civil liberties. In addition, systematic inquiry into the similarities and differences between far-left and far-right radicals in the United States has been hampered by various methodological difficulties. One can list, among these, such problems as the obvious inappropriateness of the F scale (owing to its strong right-wing content) as a measure for identifying left-wing authoritarians; the difficulty of obtaining adequate samples of true believers of the extreme left and right; the self-image of the American left as a persecuted minority which, for reasons of self-interest, spuriously inflates the degree of support expressed by its members for individual rights and liberties; and the exposure of both extreme camps to the liberal democratic values dominating American political culture, which unmistakably colours their political rhetoric.We have reason to think that a similar study conducted in some – perhaps many – European countries would reveal even greater similarities between the far left and far right than we have turned up in the United States. Unlike the United States, which has enjoyed a strong liberal democratic tradition that has served to weaken and soften the intensity of its radical movements, a number of European countries, less wedded to liberal democratic principles, have developed a more vigorous, less diluted tradition of radical politics. These nations have long had to contend with powerful extremist movements actively and significantly engaged in the political struggles of their respective nations. The radical movements of Europe have been more extreme and zealous – more unequivocally revolutionary and reactionary – than the radical movements of the United States. The sustained confrontation of these extremist movements, in our view, is likely to have intensified the authoritarian propensities of each.In the present article, through a series of surveys in which we have tried to idenify, as best we can, supporters of the far left and far right, we have systematically compared the two camps on a variety of political and psychological characteristics. We find, in keeping with the conventional view, that the far left and the far right stand at opposite end of the familiar left–right continuum on many issues of public policy, political philosophy and personal belief. They hold sharply contrasting views on questions of law and order, foreign policy, social welfare, economic equality, racial equality, women's rights, sexual freedom, patriotism, social conventions, religion, family values and orientations towards business, labour and private enterprise.Nevertheless, while the two camps embrace different programmatic beliefs, both are deeply estranged from certain features of American society and highly critical of what they perceive as the spiritual and moral degeneration of American institutions. Both view American society as dominated by conspiratorial forces that are working to defeat their respective ideological aims.The degree of their alienation is intensified by the zealous and unyielding manner in which they hold their beliefs. Both camps possess an inflexible psychological and political style characterized by the tendency to view social and political affairs in crude, unambiguous and stereotypical terms. They see political life as a conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’, a struggle between good and evil played out on a battleground where compromise amounts to capitulation and the goal is total victory.The far left and the far right also resemble each other in the way they pursue their political goals. Both are disposed to censor their opponents, to deal harshly with enemies, to sacrifice the well-being even of the innocent in order to serve a ‘higher purpose’, and to use cruel tactics if necessary to ‘persuade’ society of the wisdom of their objectives. Both tend to support (or oppose) civil liberties in a highly partisan and self-serving fashion, supporting freedom for themselves and for the groups and causes they favour while seeking to withhold it from enemies and advocates of causes they dislike.In sum, when the views of the far left and far right are evaluated against the standard left–right ideological dimension, they can appropriately be classifled at opposite ends of the political spectrum. But when the two camps are evaluated on questions of political and psychological style, the treatment of political opponents, and the tactics that they are willing to employ to achieve their ends, the display many parallels that can rightly be labelled authoritarian.
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Mazumdar, Arijit. "Left-Wing Extremism and Counterinsurgency in India: The ‘Andhra Model’." Strategic Analysis 37, no. 4 (July 2013): 446–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2013.802518.
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Sarkar, Debjani, and Nirban Manna. "Left‐wing extremism in India: Red terror through the novel." Literature Compass 17, no. 11 (September 19, 2020): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lic3.12604.
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Schröder, Carl Philipp. "Antisemitism among Adolescents in Germany." Youth and Globalization 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 163–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25895745-02020003.
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Abstract Europe is facing a new wave of antisemitism, which has grown in recent years. In 2019, the number of reported antisemitic crimes has increased in Germany. On the one hand, Muslim immigrants are suspected of so-called “imported Antisemitism”. On the other hand, right-wing extremism still appears to be the main cause of most antisemitic crimes. Moreover, antisemitism may also be rooted in the left-wing spectrum hiding behind the criticism of Israel and its policies. To analyze the connections of antisemitic attitudes, data from a school survey of 6,715 ninth-graders are used. The results indicate a strong connection between right-wing attitudes and antisemitism as well as left-wing and Islamist attitudes and antisemitism. Higher values of antisemitism are also found among Muslims, but the main predictor of antisemitic attitudes is by far right-wing attitudes.
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Kashpur, V. V., A. A. Baryshev, S. I. Chudinov, E. V. Shchekotin, and G. N. Serbina. "METHODS FOR REPRESENTATION OF RADICAL CONTENT UNDER STATE ANTI-EXTREMIST CENSORSHIP ON THE MATERIAL OF VKONTAKTE SOCIAL NETWORK." Вестник Удмуртского университета. Социология. Политология. Международные отношения 6, no. 1 (March 21, 2022): 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.35634/2587-9030-2022-6-1-7-18.
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The study aims to identify the forms and ways of representing the radical content of the ideologies of right-wing radicalism, Islamic radicalism and left-wing radicalism in conditions of state anti-extremist censorship on the material of the social network VKontakte. The research object is the radical texts and visual content of the studied ideologies posted on the Vkontakte. The research subject is the forms and methods of representation of this radical content under the conditions of state anti-extremist censorship. Content identification methods are structural links search, automatic content analysis, and natural language processing. To identify the forms and ways of implementing the representation of radical content, a combination of qualitative sociological methods and technologies for automatic analysis of texts are used. As a result of the identification of radical content, a list of 169 communities is compiled with a total number of 1,378,717 profiles. Communities of supporters of the right-wing radical are formed on the basis of rejection and protest against certain phenomena and processes of modern society. The difference from the resources, sharing the view and value system of traditional Islam, for radical Salafi communities is a pronounced emphasis on topics that separate “true believers” from the rest of the social world, mired in atheism, sins and social problems. The discourse of Russian left-wing radicals in VKontakte is associated with support for political protest actions and the propaganda of forms of self-organization of the population and production collectives in opposition to the bureaucratic tardiness of the authorities and the arbitrariness of corporate management. The general conspiracy frame of the left-wing radicals is the participation of the government in a conspiracy of world elites to destroy the productive forces, science, culture and social sphere of Russia and the exposure of liberals as agents of imperialism.
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Zelenkov, Mikhail Yuryevich, Sergey Zinkovsky, Alexei Valerivitch Altoukhov, Olga Mukhametshevna Dudina, and Alexander Nikolaev. "The duplex structure of modern political extremism." LAPLAGE EM REVISTA 7, no. 1 (May 31, 2021): 649–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.24115/s2446-6220202171952p.649-656.
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The article focuses on the identification of common grounds in the system of political extremism and making a distinction between the goals pursued by its left- and right-wing directions. The main results: detection of the wide and narrow approaches to the interpretation of the definition of political extremism, synthesis of its universal features, authorial understanding of the category of political extremism, and identification of the unity and struggle of opposites in the essence of political extremism.
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Scheithauer, Herbert, Vincenz Leuschner, Nils Böckler, Babak Akhgar, and Holger Nitsch. "Developmental Pathways towards Violent Left-, Right-Wing, Islamist Extremism and Radicalization." International Journal of Developmental Science 12, no. 1-2 (September 5, 2018): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/dev-189001.
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Doerr, Nicole. "How right-wing versus cosmopolitan political actors mobilize and translate images of immigrants in transnational contexts." Visual Communication 16, no. 3 (June 26, 2017): 315–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470357217702850.
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This article examines visual posters and symbols constructed and circulated transnationally by various political actors to mobilize contentious politics on the issues of immigration and citizenship. Following right-wing mobilizations focusing on the Syrian refugee crisis, immigration has become one of the most contentious political issues in Western Europe. Right-wing populist political parties have used provocative visual posters depicting immigrants or refugees as ‘criminal foreigners’ or a ‘threat to the nation’, in some countries and contexts conflating the image of the immigrant with that of the Islamist terrorist. This article explores the transnational dynamics of visual mobilization by comparing the translation of right-wing nationalist with left-wing, cosmopolitan visual campaigns on the issue of immigration in Western Europe. The author first traces the crosscultural translation and sharing of an anti-immigrant poster created by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a right-wing political party, inspiring different extremist as well as populist right-wing parties and grassroots activists in several other European countries. She then explores how left-libertarian social movements try to break racist stereotypes of immigrants. While right-wing political activists create a shared stereotypical image of immigrants as foes of an imaginary ethnonationalist citizenship, left-wing counter-images construct a more complex and nuanced imagery of citizenship and cultural diversity in Europe. The findings show the challenges of progressive activists’ attempts to translate cosmopolitan images of citizenship across different national and linguistic contexts in contrast to the right wing’s rapid and effective instrumentalizing and translating of denigrating images of minorities in different contexts.
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KOPKA, Artur. "Populizm lewicowy w Europie na przykładzie partii „Die Linke” w Republice Federalnej Niemiec." Przegląd Politologiczny, no. 4 (November 2, 2018): 79–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pp.2010.15.4.7.
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One of the main challenges European democracy has faced recently is growing political radicalism, and primarily the increasing importance of populist parties originating from both left and right sides of the political arena. This paper refers to the theoretical assumptions concerning this phenomenon to analyze the operations of the ‘Die Linke’ party in the German party system. This party is an excellent example of taking skillful advantage of the circumstances favoring the development of the populist tendencies that have emerged following the recent, radical, social, and political changes in the Federal Republic of Germany. Against the background of European extremist left-wing parties, the paper presents the influence this Left-Wing Party exerts on the changing balance of power on the German political arena on a regional and national level, the ideological profile and party platform, and the changing structure of both its members and voters.
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Hansen, Hendrik. "Left-Wing and Right-Wing Identity Politics: A Comparison of the Post-structuralist Turn in Left-Wing Extremism with the Ethnopluralism and Nominalism of the New Right." Telos 2023, no. 204 (2023): 11–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3817/0923204011.
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Reynolds, Nathalène. "On the Muslim Minority in India." Journal of Development Policy, Research & Practice (JoDPRP) 1, no. 1 (December 31, 2017): 34–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.59926/jodprp.vol01/03.
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Western media usually describe India as ‘the largest democracy in the world’, paying little attention to the various dark corners surrounding this rosy picture , especially if one takes into consideration the difficulties its neighbours have had in their roads to democracy. It is true that the country has historically benefitted from generally good press in the West due to concerns about the increasing assertiveness of another demographic giant – the People’s Republic of China. As the centre of global gravity moves inexorably towards Asia, Western Europe and North America, with their ageing populations, seek to keep on board allies with whom they believe they share a similar system of values. Above all, western powers have their gaze fixed on the Indian market, assuming that its annual economic growth of 7% can offer rich dividends.Prime Minister Narendra Modi has acquired almost rock star status in recent years: November 2015 saw him address crowds packed inside London’s Wembley Stadium, while in June 2016, American Congressmen and women applauded him as he made an extended comparison of the virtues of American and Indian democracy. Incidentally, he boasted that the ‘biggest democracy in the world’ guarantees equal rights to all its citizens, whatever their religious beliefs. Indeed, he declared himself in favour of stronger Indo-American linkages, especially, he added, when it came to the fight against terrorism (Kelly 2016). Some observers may recall a remark made by Modi as the Chief Minister of Gujarat in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks during The Big Fight, a Star News Channel debate programme, on 14 September 2001. He stated that, ‘All Muslims are not terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims’ (Engineer 2015). During political debates, especially televised ones, politicians often make use of such rhetorical devices to nurture or boost their popularity. Even limiting oneself to India itself, such a declaration was factually incorrect. According to figures for the year 2014 cited by Aakar Patel in a revealingly titled article, Most extremists in India are not Muslim – they are Hindu, published on 8 June 2015, the country had: Some 976 deaths from terrorism (or extremism, whatever name one wants to use for it) in India. Of these, the most (465) came in the North East. The second most (314) came from left-wing extremism, by a group of people called Maoists. Deaths in Jammu & Kashmir, assuming one wants to attribute the whole lot to terrorism, stood at 193. Outside of these conflict theatres, Islamist extremism claimed four lives (Patel 2015). India is home to a very significant Muslim population that is scarcely reassured by the absolute majority enjoyed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (India People’s Party, Hindu nationalist in outlook) in the Lok Sabha (House of the People, the lower house of India’sbicameral parliament). Before looking at the fragile position of the Muslim community and the campaigns it believes are conducted at its expense, the author would first like to see how India has projected its power across the New World Order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. India rightly seeks recognition as a great power, but is inclined to forget that in a sense, it remains a colossus with feet of clay – top end scientific research juxtaposed with aching poverty. It is made up of a mix of different religious communities, harmony between which has been key to the successful construction of the nation. More extreme sections of the Sangh Parivar (a group of Hindu nationalist organisations) who play up – without always sticking close to the facts – the threat of rapid population growth of the Muslim community. This seems to neglect one of the attributes that has the potential to increase India’s global influence: its 180 million Muslim inhabitants that have the potential to project India’s power in the Islamic world. This work, therefore, seeks to first of all look at India’s position internationally, and how this has enabled the most extreme Hindu nationalist components to adopt policies and political positions of concern with regard to minorities in general and Muslims in particular. Narendra Modi was formally cleared of all the various accusations made against him pertaining to his role in Gujarat in 2002. However, some schools of thought continue to cast doubt as to his innocence. Given the difficult relations between India and Pakistan in recent times, the author will abstain from any recommendations as to what the Indian government should or should not do. However, the author would encourage India’s civil society to undertake a greater role in reinforcing inter-communal harmony so necessary to the construction of a country that remains uniquely diverse in a world characterised by a worrying level of polarisation.
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Bunina, A. "The evolution of right-wing radicalism in the United States during the Trump era." Pathways to Peace and Security, no. 1 (2021): 60–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-60-88.
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The article examines the evolution of right-wing radicalism and extremism in the United States during the period from 2015 to January 2021 and their destructive impact on elections and power transit. The main drivers of radicalization are explored, with special attention paid to the role of conspiracy theories, in particular the QAnon phenomenon. The article analyzes how the Internet in general and social networks in particular created echo chambers and accelerated the spread of radical ideas. Distinctions are made between the more traditional forms of radicalism and the new generation of radicals (that flourished under the Donald Trump administration). Righ-wing radicalism of the new generation is dominated by cultural libertarianism, comprised of “alt-right” and “alt-light” movements, antagonistic towards left-wing radicalism. While the Trump administration underplayed the rise in right-wing extremism, it considerably overstated the threat of left-wing radicalism. Special attention is paid to thе role of the media, including its growing lack of neutrality and emergence of the ecosphere for conservative viewers where fakes and conspiracy mindsets thrive. Anti-democratic behavior of the president and the Republican Party are explored, including deliberate misleading of voters and denial of the presidential election results. The storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 is interpreted as a natural progression of the above-mentioned trends. In conclusion, the forecast of future trends is made. These trends include persistence of populist sentiments, the increasing role of the alt-right, persistence of street violence, and the growing acceptance of anti-democratic behavior. All of this presents a serious challenge not only for the Republican Party, but also for the U.S. political institutions in general.
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Pérez-Castaños, Sergio, and Juana María Ruiloba-Núñez. "Once More, with Feeling! Digital Campaigns and Emotional Candidacies in X in Andalusia and Castilla y León." Social Sciences 12, no. 9 (September 7, 2023): 504. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci12090504.
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In 2022, two regional elections were held that initiated a new electoral cycle in Spain. The first, in February, took place in Castilla y León where, for the first time, the extreme right-wing party, VOX, formed a coalition in a regional government with the right-wing Partido Popular, while, simultaneously, the extreme left-wing party Podemos was barely left with parliamentary representation. The second, in June in Andalusia, led to VOX increasing its representation by two seats and beginning its national level electoral growth; the far-left that was split in two parties, finding that the dynamic that began in Castilla y León also affected them as they lost 10 representatives. This article seeks to compare the emotional strategies of these extremist parties in the 2022 regional elections, focusing especially on leaders’ and parties’ communication strategies on X, formerly Twitter, during the electoral campaign. We expect to find differences between political parties but also between regions. To test this, we carried out an ‘X account content analysis’. We selected those accounts representing the candidates to the regional President and also the main political party accounts in the regions: namely VOX in both regions, Podemos in Castilla y León, and Adelante Andalucía and Por Andalucía in Andalusia.
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Cruickshank, Justin. "The Expansion of Prevent: On The Politics of Legibility, Opacity And Decolonial Critique." New Formations 100, no. 100 (June 1, 2020): 43–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/newf:100-101.04.2020.
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It is argued here that the liberal state has authoritarian aspects that are irreducible to the authoritarian aspects of neoliberalism. The argument draws on James Scott's work on modern state ruling through bureaucratic 'legibility', and the decolonial work of S. Sayyid on how a form of political Islam he calls 'Islamism' challenges the west's construction of modernity as an intrinsically western project. The state's need for legibility undermines democracy by seeking to shape political debate and political activity to fit its bureaucratic channels for engagement, and Islamophobia caused by the UK state's reaction to Islamism, shapes how the UK state seeks control via legibility. Prevent expanded in 2011 from focusing on 'violent extremism' to 'extremism', with extremism defined in terms of normative commitments the state takes to be in tension with its conception of 'British values'. The state defined the Muslim population as opaque because they were taken to not be socially integrated. This was used to justify a repressive ubiquitous surveillance based on what is termed here a 'legibility of symptoms'. This was presented, after 2015, as paternalistic 'safeguarding', when workers in public sector bureaucracies became legally obligated to carry out Prevent surveillance. Left-wing and environmental organisations engaged in extra-parliamentary protest are now as defined as potentially extremist. With the expansion of Prevent in 2011, the state created a 'pre-crime' space in civil society that is taken to justify repressive surveillance, presented as paternalistic safeguarding to save individuals 'at risk' of 'radicalisation' from going on to commit criminal acts.
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Colussi, Tommaso, Ingo E. Isphording, and Nico Pestel. "Minority Salience and Political Extremism." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 13, no. 3 (July 1, 2021): 237–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20190703.
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We investigate how the salience of an ethnic minority affects the majority group’s voting behavior. We use the increased salience of Muslim communities during Ramadan as a natural experiment. Exploiting exogenous variation in the distance of election dates to Ramadan over the 1980–2013 period in Germany, our findings reveal an increased polarization. Vote shares for both right- and left-wing extremist parties increase in municipalities with mosques when an election takes place shortly after Ramadan. We use survey data to provide evidence on mechanisms: Ramadan increases respondents’ perceived share of the foreign-born population and emphasizes cultural dissimilarities, ultimately worsening attitudes toward Muslims. (JEL D72, D91, J15, Z12, Z13)
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Yagnamurthy, Sreekanth. "How schools function in the districts affected by left-wing extremism in India." Asian Education and Development Studies 2, no. 3 (October 14, 2013): 263–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aeds-10-2012-0041.
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Leo, Tobias. "Der Nazis neue Kleider: Die Vereinnahmung jugendlicher Subkulturen durch die extreme Rechte." historia.scribere, no. 8 (June 14, 2016): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.15203/historia.scribere.8.486.
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Far right parties, organisations and movements try to usurpate youth subcultural movements. As a result, Skinheads are primarily xenophobic and racist thugs for the public and media, although this subculture in reality is very heterogeneous. But it is true that right-wing extremist Skinheads are a large part of it. Today the Autonomous Nationalists try to conquer and copy left subcultures, but much more subtle and on a broad social base. The focus of this work is the acquisition of the Skinhead subculture and the attempt to do the same at left movements by the extreme right. As an explanatory model, the Hegemony Theory of Antonio Gramsci is used here.
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HOŁUB, ADAM. "Political Radicalism as a Threat to the Reborn Republic of Poland." Internal Security 12, no. 1 (July 22, 2020): 225–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.3199.
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Political radicalism as a threat to the reborn Republic of Poland. The interwar period in Poland was characterised by the occurrence of real threats to the internal security of the state, the source of which was radicalism and political extremism. It was both left-wing and right-wing radicalism. We should mention here communism supported by Bolshevik Russia, Ukrainian nationalism supported by unfavourable countries such as Germany or Czechoslovakia, and Polish right-wing radicals who sought to change the political system of the country but not to annihilate it. All these political trends may have contributed to the destabilization of the Second Republic, but reborn Poland managed to create an appropriate internal security system, which included the Political Police, and on the other hand, the Polish society, as the history of the Second Republic shows, was not seduced by the political extremes.
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Eberl, Jakob-Moritz. "Lying press: Three levels of perceived media bias and their relationship with political preferences." Communications 44, no. 1 (March 14, 2019): 5–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/commun-2018-0002.
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Abstract In the context of decreasing media trust as well as the rise of populist movements in many Western Democracies, this study sets out to revisit the relationship between political preferences and perceived media bias. It investigates perceived bias of the entire media system, the perceived bias of individual outlets as well as perceived beneficiaries of this favorable coverage. Analyses are based on an online survey in Austria in 2015 (n ~ 1,679) and compare citizens’ perceived biases towards eight newspapers and television outlets. Results show that media system bias in Austria is strongly related to right-wing but not to left-wing extremism. Furthermore, there are not only differences between single outlets but also between media genres, as particularly tabloids are less afflicted by right-wing perceptions of bias. Finally, there is evidence of hostile media perceptions irrespective of actual media exposure.
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Morozov, Ilya Leonidovich. "HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF COUNTERING YOUTH POLITICAL TERRORISM BY THE POLICE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND CONCLUSIONS FOR PRESENT-DAY RUSSIA (TERROR GROUP ‘RED ARMY FRACTION’ TAKEN AS AN EXAMPLE)." Russian Studies in Law and Politics 1, no. 1 (December 24, 2017): 4–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.12731/2576-9634-2017-1-4-11.
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‘Red Army Fraction’ is a youth extremist left-wing terror group that was active in the 1970–1980s on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The terror group and its ideology originated mostly in Western German university circles. Most representatives of the group were descendants from wealthy families of high social standing.
The ideology of the group included a mix of concepts related to social equity, preventing autocratic tendencies in the government machinery and interventions of Western countries against developing ‘third world’ countries and peoples. State security system of West Germany was unable to suppress the terror group for over two decades.
The group finally announced its voluntary dissolution in 1998 due to a dramatic change in socio-political climate and general crisis of the left-wing political ideology. The growth of oppositional sentiments among present-day Russian young people is partially similar to the students’ unrest that had place in Western Europe in the 1960s and gave rise to terrorist groups.
This makes the study of West Germany’s experience in countering the threat important.