Relevant bibliographies by topics / Legislation Veto Executive power

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Legislation Veto Executive power'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 15 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Legislation Veto Executive power"

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Chandler, Andrea. "Presidential Veto Power in Post-Communist Russia, 1994-1998." Canadian Journal of Political Science 34, no. 3 (2001): 487–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423901777980.

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This article examines the use of presidential veto power in Russia from 1994 to 1998. Russia's 1993 constitution enables the president to veto legislation, but allows the bicameral Federal Assembly to overturn vetoes with a two-thirds majority. President Boris Yeltsin was a controversial figure in Russia's difficult post-communist transition, and although he had considerable executive powers, his power to veto legislation has rarely been examined as an independent variable which shapes Russian politics. This article looks at patterns of presidential vetoing in Russia within their comparative a
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McCarty, Nolan M. "Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics." American Political Science Review 94, no. 1 (2000): 117–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586384.

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It is often argued that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims, I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium, stronger veto power leads to a lower level of distrib
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Hoff, Samuel B. "The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality." Journal of Policy History 6, no. 2 (1994): 188–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030600003717.

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The general constitutional authority of the President to veto legislation passed by Congress has recently received renewed scholarly attention. However, few studies have focused on the pocket veto—the power to negate proposed laws sent for approval without the possibility of reconsideration—and its ramifications for presidential effectiveness. This research comprehensively investigates the creation, development, and employment of the pocket veto. First, this article will trace the history of this form of executive prerogative from colonial times through its establishment in the Constitution. S
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Koß, Michael. "Executive Prerogatives in the Legislative Process and Democratic Stability: Evidence from Non-Presidential Systems." Political Studies Review 18, no. 1 (2019): 71–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929919862235.

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In their seminal Presidents and Assemblies, Shugart and Carey regard executive prerogatives over legislation as a potential threat to democratic stability. This article asks whether this claim is also valid beyond presidential systems. A long-term analysis of four cases (Britain, France, Sweden and Germany) over the 1866–2015 period leads to three preliminarily conclusions. First, executive prerogatives – the veto, privileges in the introduction of certain pieces of legislation and decree powers – can also be found in (emerging) parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Second, even legisla
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Wolf, Loammi. "Pre- and Post-Trial Equality in Criminal Justice in the Context of the Separation of Powers." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 14, no. 5 (2017): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2011/v14i5a2600.

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The previous Westminster criminal justice system entailed a different kind of separation of powers insofar as it concerns the role of state prosecutors. In the Westminster system prosecutors are part of the executive branch, whereas they were a split-off from the judiciary in constitutional states and function like a de facto second organ of the third branch of state power. Currently executive interference in state prosecutions often leads to pre-trial inequality. A further difficulty arises from the unconsidered manner in which the former royal prerogative of pardoning was retained in the Con
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Pünder, Hermann. "DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION—A COMPARATIVE VIEW ON THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND GERMAN LAW." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 58, no. 2 (2009): 353–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589309001079.

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AbstractThis article addresses the problem of democratic legitimacy posed by the executive branch's use of delegated legislative powers. After some remarks on the need for delegated legislation and the problem of legitimation the study identifies in a comparative perspective three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries sufficient democratic legitimation. A first means of democratic legitimation is parliamentary predetermination of the executive role. German law proves that the proper legislature under the Damocles sword of unconstitutionality is in many cases well able to pr
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Chaisty, Paul. "The Legislative Effects of Presidential Partisan Powers in Post-Communist Russia." Government and Opposition 43, no. 3 (2008): 424–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2008.00261.x.

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CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS FINDS that the distribution of power between presidents and assemblies can vary significantly from one presidential polity to the next, and can even change within the same presidential regime over a relatively short period of time. Presidents are shown to exercise different levels of control over the law-making process according to the de jure legislative powers at their disposal – initiation, veto, veto override, budgetary and decree powers– and their de facto partisan power – the level of disciplined party support that they command within
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Negretto, Gabriel L. "Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America." Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 5 (2004): 531–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414004263663.

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What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives’ ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaini
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Trimble, Phillip R. "The President’s Foreign Affairs Power." American Journal of International Law 83, no. 4 (1989): 750–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2203363.

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In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, Congress set out to attack the imperial Presidency and to recapture its “historic constitutional role” in foreign policy. The tools of congressional activism included the National Commitments Resolution, the War Powers Resolution, the Case Act, the legislative veto over arms sales and nuclear exports, trade restrictions aimed at the Soviet Union and regulation of intelligence activities. In response, Presidents Carter and Reagan charged that Congress was invading presidential prerogatives. Joined by former executive branch officials and academic commentato
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Vitanski, Dejan, and Dijana Kirova. "POLITICAL CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE CERTAIN ENVELOPES OF STATE AUTHORITY WITH A SPECIAL ACCENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." Knowledge International Journal 28, no. 6 (2018): 1779–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.35120/kij28061779d.

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The executive power is a gravitational center of political power, that is the basic lever of the mechanism of power and at the same time, one of the key elements for determining the character of the political system. In order to prevent or disable the concentration of power in the hands of the executive power, political and legal thought have repeatedly sought for effective mechanisms for restricting that power and keeping it under control. The executive power in order not to turn it into its negation, must be as fully and accurately dimensioned and limited as possible. The nicules of the idea
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Legislation Veto Executive power"

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Magar, Eric. "Bully pulpits : posturing, bargaining, and polarization in the legislative process of the Americas /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC IP addresses, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3026372.

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Hetsper, Rafael Vargas. "Os significados político-institucionais do uso do veto na relação Executivo-Legislativo em Pelotas (RS) no período 2001-2008." Universidade Federal de Pelotas, 2011. http://repositorio.ufpel.edu.br/handle/ri/1593.

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Made available in DSpace on 2014-08-20T13:46:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_rafael_vargas_hetsper.pdf: 1858865 bytes, checksum: e5d2e3a7d89ead9b07eb76b2dd79fa81 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-07-18<br>This work has as its main purpose identifying the political-institutional meanings that the veto usage by the Mayor of Pelotas (RS) acquired for the relationship between the Executive and Legislative powers in a period of time between 2001 and 2008. As a secondary plan, it aims at finding behavioral changes in the relationship standard between the local powers when there was
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Bispo, Nikolay Henrique. "O veto presidencial no STF: estudo de um caso de tensão entre os poderes." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16464.

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Submitted by Nikolay Henrique Bispo (nikolayhb@gmail.com) on 2016-04-29T10:49:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 BISPO (2016). O veto presidencial no STF um estado de caso de tensão entre os poderes.pdf: 2694325 bytes, checksum: 09cd7c7d9c831d32b6578a4c7afc1a4d (MD5)<br>Rejected by Letícia Monteiro de Souza (leticia.dsouza@fgv.br), reason: Prezado Nikolay, Favor alterar seu trabalho de acordo com as normas ABNT: 1 - Resumo e Abstract: Inserir as Palavras Chaves e Key-words. Atenciosamente, Letícia Monteiro 3799-3631 on 2016-05-02T12:17:16Z (GMT)<br>Submitted by Nikolay Henrique Bispo (n
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Dallari, Paulo Massi. "O instituto do veto presidencial no constitucionalismo brasileiro contemporâneo." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2134/tde-03052016-103219/.

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Nos Estados republicanos modernos, o sistema de freios e contrapesos é um dos modelos institucionais responsável por assegurar o equilíbrio entre os Poderes e prevenir abusos por parte dos governantes. Dois questionamentos podem ser encontrados na literatura brasileira sobre o tema e fundamentam esta Dissertação: um geral sobre o suposto poder excessivo que o nosso sistema político confere ao Poder Executivo e outro, específico, de que nesse contexto, o veto teria um papel central na supremacia do presidente da república sobre o Congresso Nacional no âmbito do processo legislativo. Partindo de
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Moya, Mauricio Assumpcao. "Executivo versus legislativo: os vetos presidenciais no Brasil (1988-2000)." Universidade de São Paulo, 2006. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-18072007-133555/.

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Este trabalho trata dos vetos presidenciais ocorridos no Brasil entre outubro de 1988 e dezembro de 2000. Seu objetivo é identificar eventos que estejam associados ao uso do veto pelo presidente, e que permitam prever com alguma precisão as chances de sua ocorrência. O universo de análise é composto pelos 1322 projetos aprovados no período, excluindo-se os projetos relativos ao Orçamento e aqueles de autoria do Judiciário. São observadas cerca de duas dezenas de variáveis, classificadas em dois grupos: no primeiro estão as variáveis ligadas diretamente aos projetos e aos seus respectivos proce
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Grogan, John. "Emergency law: judicial control of executive power under the states of emergency in South Africa." Thesis, Rhodes University, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003189.

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This work examines the legal effects of a declaration of a state of emergency under the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 and the exercise of legislative and administrative powers pursuant thereto. The general basis of judicial control over executive action and the various devices used to limit or oust the court's jurisdiction are set out and explained. Against this background, the courts' performance of their supervisory role under the special circumstances of emergency rule is critically surveyed and assessed. The legal issues raised by the exercise of emergency powers is examined at the various l
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Quinart, Emilien. "L'émancipation du pouvoir réglementaire (1914-1958)." Thesis, Lille 2, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019LIL2D008.

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La République parlementaire s’enracine, à la fin du XIXe siècle, dans l’exaltation des principes de 1789 et le rejet du pouvoir personnel. Dans cet idéal, le pouvoir réglementaire fait figure de hantise. Il n’est admis qu’à condition d’être étroitement subordonné à la loi. Au XXe siècle, cette situation change. Les guerres et les crises économiques, financières ou sociales sont à l’origine d’une mutation profonde des activités de l’Etat, qui bouleversent l’exercice des fonctions de législation et heurtent les idéaux républicains. Cette étude entend démontrer comment, entre 1914 et 1958, l’Exéc
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Feinman, David Eric. "Divided government and congressional foreign policy a case study of the post-World War II era in American government." Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/4891.

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The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of American federal government, during periods within which these two branches are led by different political parties, to discover whether the legislative branch attempts to independently legislate and enact foreign policy by using "the power of the purse" to either appropriate in support of or refuse to appropriate in opposition to military engagement abroad. The methodology for this research includes the analysis and comparison of certain variables, including public opinion, budgetary c
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Books on the topic "Legislation Veto Executive power"

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Akbar, Patrialis. Hubungan lembaga kepresidenan dengan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat dan veto presiden. Totalmedia, 2013.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Subcommittee on the Legislative Process. H.R. 849: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process of the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session ... July 26, 1989. U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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Process, United States Congress House Committee on Rules Subcommittee on the Legislative. H.R. 849: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process of the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session ... July 26, 1989. U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Subcommittee on the Legislative Process. H.R. 849: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process of the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session ... July 26, 1989. U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Subcommittee on the Legislative Process. H.R. 849: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process of the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session ... July 26, 1989. U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Subcommittee on the Legislative Process. H.R. 849: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process of the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session ... July 26, 1989. U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Subcommittee on the Legislative Process. H.R. 849: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Process of the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, first session ... July 26, 1989. U.S. G.P.O., 1989.

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US GOVERNMENT. Line Item Veto Act. U.S. G.P.O., 1996.

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Weapons of influence: The legislative veto, American foreign policy, and the irony of reform. Westview Press, 1992.

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Budget, United States Congress Senate Committee on the. Legislative Line Item Veto Act: Report of the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, on S. 14, together with additional and minority views. U.S. G.P.O., 1995.

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Book chapters on the topic "Legislation Veto Executive power"

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Collins, Richard B., Dale A. Oesterle, and Lawrence Friedman. "Distribution of Powers." In The Colorado State Constitution. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190907723.003.0003.

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This chapter details Article III of the Colorado Constitution, which defines distribution of powers. The article separates the powers of Colorado’s state government into three departments: legislative, executive, and judicial. The separation doctrine’s general purpose is to prevent excessive concentration of power in a single arm of government. The constitution also pursues this end by dividing legislative power between two houses, providing for an executive veto, providing for direct democracy through the initiative and the veto referendum in Article V, and establishing home rule local governments in Articles XIV and XX. A basic form of separation in American government is for the three branches to have separate officers. Otherwise, the essential issue is whether an action of one branch of state government has overstepped constitutional boundaries.
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Cicero, Frank. "The Constitution of 1870." In Creating the Land of Lincoln. University of Illinois Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252041679.003.0008.

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Chapter 7 summarizes debates of the 1869–70 Illinois state constitutional convention, whose blend of representatives from Democratic, Republican, and People’s Parties yielded a relatively nonpartisan outcome. The balance of governmental powers was adjusted so that the executive branch had a stronger veto, the legislative branch was barred from passing special-interest legislation, and the judicial system was enhanced with more courts and judges, a particular benefit to populous Cook County, home to the economic powerhouse of Chicago. Other major issues included African Americans’ civil rights and state management of railroads and warehouses. A progressive approach to minority representation sought to bridge sharp political divisions between north and south. The proposed 1870 constitution was ratified by the voters and remained in force for a century.
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Farrier, Jasmine. "Courts Cannot Unknot Congress." In Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0005.

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This chapter highlights five complex member lawsuits against legislative processes which resulted in mixed outcomes for the member-litigants. First is the deficit-reduction case surrounding the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, known after its sponsors as the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act (GRH), where plaintiffs ostensibly won back power but Congress opted to delegate again. Second is a multiplaintiff suit against executive enforcement of a base-closing commission decision that required supermajorities to override. This case emphasizes the risk that Congress takes when it delegates power away and does not have an easy mechanism to regain control over processes and outcomes. Third is the Democratic House members' unsuccessful suit against their own chamber's rule that mandated a supermajority in order to raise taxes. Fourth is the landmark challenge of the 1996 Line Item Veto Act that has been used by later courts to more readily dismiss member standing, even as the item veto itself is ruled unconstitutional by private plaintiffs the next year. Fifth is a hybrid group of House members and private organizations against the Senate filibuster, which stopped the Dream Act.
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Farrier, Jasmine. "Systemic Constitutional Dysfunction." In Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0001.

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This introductory chapter provides an overview of congressional litigation, which provides an outlet for the frustrations and constitutional arguments of members. Members often file the lawsuit because they know the regular legislative process will stall or fail to overcome a presidential veto even if they manage to pass a bill that curtails executive branch power. Member lawsuits deserve attention individually and together as separation of powers phenomena that are distinct from private litigation on the same topics. Private suits are more likely to succeed for a variety of reasons, while member suits provide an index of constitutional dysfunction. Ultimately, member lawsuits do not offer a simple solution to past, present, or future institutional imbalances, but they certainly provide opportunity for fresh analysis on how constitutional separation of powers principles can fall apart without deep and wide support. The chapter then considers the role of federal courts in constitutional conflicts.
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Collins, Richard B., Dale A. Oesterle, and Lawrence Friedman. "Executive Department." In The Colorado State Constitution. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190907723.003.0004.

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This chapter looks at Article IV of the Colorado Constitution, which defines the executive department. By providing for the separate election of the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general, Section 1 seems to divide executive branch authority. In practice, this tension has mattered only when the attorney general and governor belonged to different political parties, and the attorney general asserted a legal position opposed by the governor. Section 1 imposes term limits on the state’s elective executives. Section 11 gives the governor the usual veto power followed by Section 12, giving the special power of the line-item veto over appropriations bills. Section 13 has complex provisions for succession if the governor’s office becomes vacant during a term.
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Pugh, Brian. "Barbour, the Influential Executive." In Chaos and Compromise. University Press of Mississippi, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.14325/mississippi/9781496830197.003.0008.

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This chapter discusses how Governor Haley Barbour successfully penetrated the legislatively dominated budget making process. It shows how Barbour did not increase the formal powers of the executive branch of government, but how he did increase the informal executive powers significantly. Chapter 8 explains how Barbour gained budget power through political relationships on the state and federal levels, which ultimately resulted in the state of Mississippi withstanding one of the worst storms in the nation’s history, Hurricane Katrina. Unlike his predecessor discussed in the previous chapter, Governor Barbour did not get a single gubernatorial veto overridden because of the party loyalty that he championed among Republicans.
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Simonton, Matthew. "Oligarchic Power-Sharing." In Classical Greek Oligarchy. Princeton University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691174976.003.0002.

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This chapter focuses on institutions that governed relations among the elite of ancient Greece. It first considers the need for egalitarian relations among Classical Greek oligarchs before discussing the political mechanisms that secured equality among the members of the oligarchic community and satisfied their individual sense of self-worth, including the establishment of multiple veto points in the voting process, consensus-building, and the secret ballot. It then examines the strict regulation of expenditure through sumptuary legislation and how oligarchs in judicial situations devised ways of keeping dispute resolution restrained, courteous, and respectful of one another's pride, thus avoiding escalation. It also describes the use of exile as an effective institution of oligarchic punishment and shows that exile could be a useful tool if it was unanimously agreed upon by the members of the oligarchy.
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Kriner, Douglas L., and Eric Schickler. "The Direct Influence of Congressional Investigations on Policy Outcomes." In Investigating the President. Princeton University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691171852.003.0004.

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This chapter focuses on two direct pathways through which congressional investigations can produce concrete changes in the specific policy area targeted by the investigation. First, investigations may provide the impetus for new legislation that otherwise would not have passed in its absence. Investigative hearings can spur congressional action and generate political pressure on the president and members of his party to vote for and sign legislation that they may have otherwise resisted through the filibuster or veto. Second, even when investigations are not followed by legislative action compelling the administration to change its behavior, high-profile committee inquiries into executive-branch actions may bring enough political pressure to bear on the White House that it opts to make concessions rather than continue a bruising public fight with the legislature.
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Bulmer, Simon, David Dolowitz, Peter Humphreys, and Stephen Padgett. "Electricity and Telecommunications: Fit for the European Union?" In Germany, Europe, and the Politics of Constraint. British Academy, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197262955.003.0012.

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This chapter examines the processes and outcomes of Europeanization in the German utilities sectors. Employing an institutionalist perspective, it focuses on interaction between the institutional system of the EU and that of Germany. The chapter argues that adaptation pressures are reduced by Germany's ability to exert ‘soft’ power to ensure that EU policy is congruent with domestic governance. The tempo of EU reform is particularly significant. Incremental legislation in telecommunications permitted Germany to liberalize at its own pace in line with domestic policy style. In electricity, by contrast, the 1996 Directive created more acute adaptation pressures. Thus, in telecommunications Germany was activist in ‘downloading’ EU legislation in line with EU requirements. In electricity, it made considerable use of the zone of discretion in the Directive to minimize the impact on domestic governance. In examining the way in which Germany responds to adaptation pressures, particular attention is given to opportunity structures, veto points, and institutional norms in the domestic policy process. The experience of the electricity reform suggests that adaptation pressures are exacerbated by a highly pluralist institutional regime with numerous veto actors capable of blocking implementation. Moreover, German reluctance to embrace independent, sector-specific regulation suggests the resistance of domestic regulatory norms to the effects of Europeanization.
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Taillant, Jorge Daniel. "Resurgence." In Glaciers. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199367252.003.0012.

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In the days following the president’s veto of the glacier protection law on November 11, 2008, the executive power was again in political turmoil. Congress was in an uproar with the veto in part because the congressional majority held by the administration during the earlier months of the presidency was fledgling, and President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner was slowly losing her political capital to an increasingly empowered opposition, one eager to bring controversial issues to the forefront of the political arena to further weaken her presidency. The glacier law, and specifically the Barrick Veto, played well into this objective. Following the veto, the Natural Resource Commission of the Lower House of Congress convened a public meeting for November 18 to discuss how to respond to the veto. Only seven of the thirty-one members of the commission (mostly opposition members) showed, shy of the minimum quorum necessary to take official action. The meeting was held anyway. Several environmental organizations were invited. Marta Maffei, the original author of the glacier law, contributed to the discussion, as did Ricardo Villalba, the director of the Argentine Institute for Snow Research, Glaciology and Environmental Sciences (IANIGLA). Villalba made unusually strong public statements in defense of the glacier law, indicating that the scientific community was “shocked and saddened” by the president’s decision to veto it. Despite not having a quorum, the commission set out an action plan to bring back the law. They were aware of the official party’s intention to develop a new version, one that would appease the mining sector. Clearly, it would be a utilitarian version similar to what had been proposed in Chile. However, those present that day insisted that the same law, just as it had been passed, should be resubmitted, using the exact same text. In the meantime, the president’s office was deliberating on what to do about the fallout. Cristina Fernandez vetoed the glacier protection law because it was incompatible with Barrick Gold’s flagship project, Pascua Lama, valued by conservative estimates of the time at upward of US$20 billion.
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Conference papers on the topic "Legislation Veto Executive power"

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Abdullah, Khamosh. "The impact of the absence of the constitution of the Kurdistan region on extending the term limits of the legislative and executive authority." In INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEFICIENCIES AND INFLATION ASPECTS IN LEGISLATION. University of Human Development, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21928/uhdicdial.pp123-140.

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Legislative and presidential power, and the center of the constitution in all political systems, after presidential elections. This period has been suspended for a long time. However, it is possible for the institutions that can do this, because there is a constitution in their vicinity, for the exemplary assembly that can be done by the institution that can do this easily, by opening the door to extension, what happened . Actually in the region. To do the constitution by the constitution
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Wisnaeni, Fifiana. "The Shift of Executive Power in The State Administrative System of the Republic of Indonesia: a Study on Presidential Powers on Legislation-Making." In The First International Conference On Islamic Development Studies 2019, ICIDS 2019, 10 September 2019, Bandar Lampung, Indonesia. EAI, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.10-9-2019.2289416.

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Mohammed Ameen, Peshraw. "the presidential and the semi-presidential system." In INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEFICIENCIES AND INFLATION ASPECTS IN LEGISLATION. University of Human Development, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21928/uhdicdial.pp152-163.

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In this research we dealt with the aspects of the presidential system and the semi-presidential system, and he problematic of the political system in the Kurdistan Region. Mainly The presidential system has stabilized in many important countries, and the semi-presidential concept is a new concept that can be considered a mixture of parliamentary and presidential principles. One of the features of a semi-presidential system is that the elected president is accountable to parliament. The main player is the president who is elected in direct or indirect general elections. And the United States is
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McCready-Shea, S., F. E. Taylor, and J. Batt. "Experiences of Dealing With Environmental Statements for Nuclear Reactor Decommissioning Projects Under the EIA Directive." In ASME 2003 9th International Conference on Radioactive Waste Management and Environmental Remediation. ASMEDC, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icem2003-4713.

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European Council Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC, sets out a framework for the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. It is known as the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive. The Directive is implemented in Great Britain (GB) for the dismantling or decommissioning of nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactor by the Nuclear Reactors (Environmental Impact Assessment for Decommissioning) Regulations 1999 (EIADR99). The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the competent authority for EIADR99 in GB, and h
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Davidov, Robin, Larry Plitch, and Chris Pollatos. "What’s Happening With Green Power Marketing and the Latest on Renewable Energy Credits: How Much Are They Worth and Who Owns Them?" In 11th North American Waste-to-Energy Conference. ASMEDC, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/nawtec11-1663.

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The subject of the presentation is Green Power Marketing for Waste To Energy Facilities. Many WTE projects signed long term energy contracts under the rules of PURPA. Several projects signed short term agreements. In other cases, power contacts were sold or assigned by the original purchaser or the project voluntarily agreed to a buy out. In any case, power markets have changed and are continuing to change. One of the most significant changes is the deregulation of the electricity market. WTE projects are no longer required to sell power to a captive utility. While electricity continues to flo
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Brown, Merwin, Lloyd Cibulka, Jim Cole, and Larry Miller. "New Electric Transmission Technologies for Renewable Integration." In ASME 2009 3rd International Conference on Energy Sustainability collocated with the Heat Transfer and InterPACK09 Conferences. ASMEDC, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/es2009-90161.

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California has established aggressive Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) goals to increase the fraction of electricity generated from renewable energy resources and to decrease greenhouse gas emissions. Legislation AB 32 requires 20% of California’s electricity to come from renewables by 2010. More recently, an executive order has set a goal of 33% by 2020. Most of this new renewable generation will require the electric grid for delivering its electricity to customers. Renewable generators will be integrated into the grid at both transmission and distribution levels, but most of this capacity
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