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Books on the topic '"lian" sentence'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 5 June 2025

Last updated: 24 June 2025

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1

China) Quan guo liang xing gui fan hua xue shu yan tao hui (2009 Nanjing. Liang xing gui fan hua li lun tan yao: "quan guo liang xing gui fan hua xue shu yan tao hui" lun wen ji. Zhongguo ren min gong an da xue chu ban she, 2010.

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2

Wang, Tianyou. Xian dai Han yu fu ju guan lian biao ji li shi yan jiu. Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 2019.

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3

China. Zui gao ren min fa yuan. Liang xing gui fan hua gai ge xiang mu zu, ed. "Ren min fa yuan liang xing zhi dao yi jian" yu "liang gao san bu" "guan yu gui fan liang xing cheng xu ruo gan wen ti de yi jian" li jie yu shi yong. Fa lü chu ban she, 2010.

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4

Qiu, Xiaomin. Liang xing gong zheng zhi cheng xu lu jing: The procedural approaches to sentencing justice. Zhongguo ren min gong an da xue chu ban she, 2010.

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5

Tu jie li an zheng ju ding zui liang xing biao zhun yu fa lü shi yong bian xie zu. Tu jie li an zheng ju ding zui liang xing biao zhun yu fa lü shi yong: Di 6 ban. Zhongguo fa zhi chu ban she, 2010.

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6

Xiong, Ying. Liang xing shi ye xia de li gong zhi du yan jiu. Henan ren min chu ban she, 2013.

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7

Yunteng, Hu, Jiang Huiling, and Li Yuping 1971-, eds. Zhong Mei liang xing gai ge guo ji yan tao hui wen ji: Papers of the Joint Seminar on sentencing reform in China and the United States. Zhongguo fa zhi chu ban she, 2009.

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8

Zhang, Shuping. Hai xia liang an xing shi si fa hu zhu yan jiu. Jiu zhou chu ban she, 2011.

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9

Zhongguo fa xue hui. Lian zheng fa zhi yan jiu hui>, ed. Guo jia gong zuo ren yuan shi zhi fan zui jie xian yu ding zui liang xing yan jiu. Zhongguo fang zheng chu ban she, 2010.

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10

Zhongguo fa xue hui. Lian zheng fa zhi yan jiu hui, ed. Guo jia gong zuo ren yuan lan yong zhi quan fan zui jie xian yu ding zui liang xing yan jiu. Zhongguo fang zheng chu ban she, 2010.

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11

Lin, Jixi. Ying yu xing si ju. Shang wu, 1993.

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12

Ludlow, Peter, and Bradley Armour-Garb. Microlanguages, Vagueness, and Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0006.

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This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.

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13

Pietroski, Paul M. Truth or understanding. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812722.003.0005.

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This chapter and the next argue against the idea that children acquire languages whose sentences have compositionally determined truth conditions. The chapter begins by discussing Davidson’s bold conjecture: the languages that children naturally acquire support Tarski-style theories of truth, which can serve as the core components of meaning theories for the languages in question. The argument is that even if there are plausible theories of truth for these languages, formulating them as plausible theories of meaning requires assumptions about truth that are extremely implausible. Sentences like ‘My favorite sentence is not true’, which happens to be my favorite sentence, illustrate this point. But the point is not merely that “Liar Sentences” are troublesome, it is that theories of truth and theories of meaning have different subject matters.

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14

Rumfitt, Ian, and Bradley Armour-Garb. The Liar without Truth. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0008.

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Liar sentences say nothing, according to this chapter—which, it claims, we can, in effect, prove. But extending the proof as the chapter does appears to result in revenge. The solution to this problem is to restrict the laws of logic by distinguishing expressing a falsehood from failing to express a truth. But the question that presses is how we can signify that a given sentence—a liar sentence, for example—fails to express a truth without being mired in paradox. To this end, the chapter revisits the sort of bilateral system that Rumfitt (2000) has discussed. The chapter shows that there is a way of developing Aristotle’s conception of truth into a definition of truth that does not yield a contradiction, even when applied to a semantically closed language. If successful, the proposal will enable us to reject a Strengthened Liar as untrue without asserting its negation.

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15

Pietroski, Paul M., and Bradley Armour-Garb. I-Languages and T-Sentences. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0007.

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This chapter argues that liar sentences reveal a fundamental problem for the project of characterizing linguistic meaning in terms of truth. It further argues that weak-logic solutions to the Foster problem for Davidsonian theories are exacerbated by the Liar. According to the chapter, liar sentences have no truth conditions, and any theory that has its instances of the T-schema as a theorem is just false. The author urges that liar sentences illustrate a deep difficulty for truth-theoretic conceptions of meaning for Human Languages and that we should find a different conception of meaning according to which expressions of Human Languages—I-Languages—are not among the truth-evaluable things.

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16

Barnard, Robert, Joseph Ulatowski, Jonathan M. Weinberg, and Bradley Armour-Garb. Thinking about the Liar, Fast and Slow. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0003.

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In the past, experimental philosophers have explored the psychological underpinning of a number of notions in philosophy, including free will, moral responsibility, and more. But prior to this chapter, although a number of philosophers have speculated on how ordinary folks might, or should, think about the liar paradox, no one had systematically explored the psychological underpinnings of the Liar itself. The authors take on this task. In particular, the chapter investigates the status of a liar sentence, L = ‘Sentence L is false’. The thesis, arrived at by interpreting the data the authors have accrued, is that reflective thinkers (some of whom possess a modicum of philosophical expertise) judge L to be neither true nor false (as opposed to false or true), and the authors see this as some evidence for the claim that L is neither true nor false.

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17

Harman, Gilbert. Toward Resolving the Liar Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0005.

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This chapter asks whether there is a notion of truth that applies to nonindexical sentences of English and, if there is, how that is to be explained. After showing that the liar paradox casts doubt on an attempt at capturing the meaning of ‘true’, the chapter proposes a novel notion that does seem to apply to nonindexical sentences of English—that of what the author calls default implication. Using this notion of default implication, the chapter recasts the initial attempt at capturing the meaning of ‘true’ and shows that this is not plagued by the consequences of the liar paradox.

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18

Wright, Cory, and Bradley Armour-Garb. Pluralism and the Liar. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0014.

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Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.

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19

Simmons, Keith. The Theory at Work. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791546.003.0007.

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Chapter 7 puts the singularity theory to work on a number of semantic paradoxes that have intrinsic interest of their own. These include a transfinite paradox of denotation, and variations on the Liar paradox, including the Truth-Teller, Curry’s paradox, and paradoxical Liar loops. The transfinite paradox of denotation shows the need to accommodate limit ordinals. The Truth-Teller, like the Liar, exhibits semantic pathology-but, unlike the Liar, it does not produce a contradiction. The distinctive challenge of the Curry paradox is that it seems to allow us to prove any claim we like (for example, the claim that 2+2=5). Paradoxical Liar loops, such as the Open Pair paradox, extend the Liar paradox beyond single self-referential sentences. The chapter closes with the resolution of paradoxes that do not exhibit circularity yet still generate contradictions. These include novel versions of the definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, and Yablo’s paradox about truth.

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20

Jago, Mark. Dealing with Liars. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823810.003.0010.

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In this final chapter, I want to investigate what the theory of truth developed so far tells us about the Liar paradox (and other paradoxes involving truth). I’ll begin by reviewing the paradox (§9.1) and why it is such a difficult issue to solve (§9.2). I’ll then argue that approaches which weaken the underlying logic (§§9.3–9.5), or restrict or alter the T-scheme (§9.6), are not good options. Instead, I’ll argue that our account of propositions from chapter 8 already provides an adequate solution: there is no proposition for the Liar sentence to express (§9.8). I discuss the consequences of this view for meaning and logic in §9.9.

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21

Liang xing di yuan li yu cao zuo. Xin hua shu dian Shanghai fa xing suo fa xing, 1991.

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22

Bing ju zhen liao shi: Wrong sentences diagnosed. Ji tian wen hua shi ye you xian gong si, 2000.

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23

Liang xing shuo li ji zhi: Sentencing reasoning mechanism. Zhongguo ren min gong an da xue chu ban she, 2012.

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24

Ge, Gao. Ding zui yu liang xing (Bo shi sheng dao shi cong shu). Zhongguo fang zheng chu ban she, 1999.

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25

Gao, Ge. Ding zui liang xing di li lun yu shi jian. Jilin ren min chu ban she, 1994.

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26

Bobzien, Susanne, Bradley Armour-Garb, and Bradley Armour-Garb. Gestalt Shifts in the Liar orWhy KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0004.

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This chapter offers a revenge-free solution to the liar paradox and presents a formal representation of truth in, or for, a natural language like English, which proposes to show both why (and how) truth is coherent and how it appears to be incoherent, while preserving classical logic and most principles that some philosophers have taken to be central to the concept of truth and our use of that notion. The chapter argues that, by using a truth operator rather than truth predicate, it is possible to provide a coherent, model-theoretic representation of truth with various desirable features. After investigating what features of liar sentences are responsible for their paradoxicality, the chapter identifies the logic as the normal modal logic KT4M. Drawing on the structure of KT4M, the author proposes that, pace deflationism, truth has content, that the content of truth is bivalence, and that the notions of both truth and bivalence are semideterminable.

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27

Tu jie pu tong xing shi fan zui li an, ding zui, liang xing biao zhun. Zhongguo fa zhi chu ban she, 2009.

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28

Simmons, Keith. Consequences for Deflationism. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791546.003.0010.

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Chapter 10 investigates the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary theories in general and disquotational theories in particular. The chapter argues that if we accept the singularity theory, we must reject deflationary theories of truth, denotation, and extension. The phenomena of repetition and rehabilitation (introduced in Chapter 2, and discussed throughout the book) show that pathological expressions, such as Liar sentences, may be successfully assigned semantic values. As a consequence, there are truths from which ‘true’ cannot be disquoted away (and similarly with ‘denotes’ and ‘extension’). The chapter argues that one leading motivation for the deflationist-namely, the role that ‘true’ plays in expressing generalizations-is fully captured by the singularity theory.

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29

Ray, Greg. Tarski on the Concept of Truth. Edited by Michael Glanzberg. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.013.27.

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Alfred Tarski’s work on truth has been so central to the discourse on truth that most coming to it for the first time have probably already heard a great deal about what is said there. Unfortunately, since the work is largely technical and Tarski was only tangentially philosophical, a certain incautious assimilation dominates many philosophical discussions of Tarski’s ideas, and so, examining Tarski on the concept of truth is in many ways an act of unlearning. This chapter will focus on key ideas in Tarski’s work that have had a lasting impact: T-sentence, Convention T, Tarskian truth definition, and Tarski’s general limiting theses on the expressibility and definability of truth. Though these ideas are familiar in name, the chapter seeks to uncover and remove certain widespread misunderstandings. Tarski’s name also features prominently in discussions of the liar paradox, so we will discuss Tarski’s misunderstood connection to this ancient puzzle.

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