Journal articles on the topic 'Liberal Catholic authors'

However strongly some authors may oppose the adjective ‘Catholic’ as limiting their vocation, a recognisable body of British Catholic literature does exist from the mid-nineteenth century. Its boundaries are not always easily definable since its origins are mixed. It was moulded initially by pre- and post-Emancipation renewals, the number and energy of the new converts from the Oxford Movement, the effects of Irish immigration, and the anti-Catholic rhetoric in both Protestant revivals and rising liberal secular thought. As a result British Catholicism formed a distinctive apologetic, which marked its literature from the beginning. Thus, Newman’s Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert (1848) made the case for Catholicism against Elizabeth Harris’s novel, From Oxford to Rome, and in his Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics (1851) he defended the faith during the ‘Papal Aggression’ fury. Similarly, both Wiseman and Newman responded to anti-Catholic caricatures in Charles Kingsley’s Hypatia (1851) with their own fictional depictions of the early Church, Fabiola (1854) and Callista (1856) respectively.

The article analyzes the ideological contradictions of liberal democracy, or neoliberalism (antiidentism), and traditionalism (identism) on the example of Christian churches. Antiindentism considers traditional religiosity to be hostile: it should be reformed to conform to neoliberal values, and it should be banished from public space. At the same time, antiidentism does not want to eliminate religion, because it is one of the identities that have to be redone like other human identites. The article examines anti-Christian movements (like the “Black Lives Matter”) as well as conservative and liberal movements within various confessions. The authors emphasize that the antiidentist demands are based on the Christian values of respect for any person, for women and men, regardless of anything, for humane methods of raising children, mercy for any categories of people, regardless of their sexual orientation, etc. On the other hand, the demands of antiidentists go far beyond Christian principles and even common sense (not to quote inconvenient passages of the Bible, to change the rules of church life and the appointment of clergy). The article proposes a classification of confessions by direction and by territorial feature, depending on specifics of divisions based on the attitude to antiidentism (American Churches, the Catholic Church, Lutherans and Anglicans as well as diversity of Orthodox churches that are also touched by the antiidentist wave). The authors conclude that the Christian churches, despite the existence of liberal factions, are primarily a traditionalist force in modern politics. Because of fundamental ideological differences, the consolidation of diverse Christian forces is a difficult task. However, there is some progress in this direction. Evangelicals, traditional Catholics, who make up the majority of the Catholic Church, as well as the majority of Orthodox Christians, are a serious political and, what perhaps more important, ideological force.

The article offers an analysis of approaches of different Christian confessions to understanding of the moral status of human embryo in the context of modern biomedical developments. It compares challenges faced by the proponents of each denominational position and their arguments. According to documents and papers of the theologians there are at least three specific positions in relation to moral status of early human embryo: conservative, liberal and indefinite. The author focuses on arguments of such liberal Protestant authors as T. Peters, R. Cole-Turner and J. Polkinghorne; on strong and weak aspects of Roman Catholic perspective; and specific characteristics of Orthodox Christian approaches.

Abstract In a time when the two major strategies followed by Christian religious traditions in modernity have lost traction—Christendom and subcultural isolation on the one hand and liberal and socialist assimilation with modernity on the other hand—Charles Taylor’s Catholic modernity idea opens up a “third grand strategy,” a new perspective on the relationship between religion and modernity. Moreover, the perspective can be put to use in other religious traditions as well. We will, hence, argue for the extension from a Catholic modernity to a religious modernities perspective. With the help of the arguments and suggestions as well as the critiques put forward by Taylor and the other authors in this volume Modernity and Transcendence, we will chart some of the main axes of this vast research field: (1) the clarification of Catholic/religious modernity; (2) the generalization of the Catholic modernity idea into a religious modernities perspective; (3) the invention of an inspiring, post-Christendom Christianity/post-fusional religion and theology; (4) the issue of religious engagement in our time—what Taylor calls “the Ricci project”; (5 and 6) the need for encompassing theories of modernity and religion (transcendence).

Abstract This work aims to deepen the knowledge of the culturalist, Iberian and Catholic aspects of Brazilian conservatism, turning to the work by Gilberto Freyre, Sobrados e mucambos. We seek to understand how his work, positively received in the modernist, nationalist and anti-liberal context of the 1930s due to its revealing of the roots and ‘essence’ or ‘originality’ of Brazilian society, fell into disfavour after the Second World War when the process of massification and democratization of society led more radical sectors of the expanding middle class to lean toward socialism. In concluding, we point out how an imaginary of national belonging, in the form of common positive referents, was due in large measure to authors such as José de Alencar and Freyre.

ABSTRACTIt is argued that the Windsor Report is a new Anglican ecclesiology that attempts to answer problems within more classical and historically induced and offered Anglican ecclesiologies. In order to reflect this new direction, the authors borrowed ideas from several offsetting loci—including Roman Catholic receptio theology of communion and a more classic magisterial Protestant theology of Scripture—and as such has morphed the understanding of how Anglican authority, in all its forms, might look without opting for a Roman or the, as perceived by many as problematic, Protestant Liberal model. It is asked whether there is a polarity in the above theologies and which theme, if any, must assume the central role in articulating Anglican ecclesiology. I offer that it is the tacit theology of Scripture that is the true strength of the Windsor Report and which needs to be clarified in future discussions on Anglican ecclesiology.

An analysis of survey data on membership, pillarisation, voting behaviour and attitudes.Belgian society is traditionally portrayed as heavily pillarised, i.e. having a system of exclusive linkages between voluntary associations and political parties, resulting in the formation of a catholic, a socialist and a liberal 'pillar' within society. Recently, several authors have questioned the validity oft his model. Our survey of the Flemish population, however, shows that pillarisation is an enduring feature of Flemish society. Membership of voluntary associations, trade unions and health insurance organisations remains ideologically motivated, and shows a high degree ofconsistency in this respect. Integration into a 'pillar' exerts a strong influence on voting behaviour, although this effect weakens in younger generations. Pillars also have significant, but weaker effects on attitudes like individualism, trust and solidarity. In the social capital research tradition, these differential effects of membership are often neglected. Although there are signs that pillarisation weakens in Fiemish society, the system certainly has not disappeared.

The purpose of this article is to review the controversy between two, potentially most influential legal theorists in 20th century, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. Their philosophical concepts: Schmittian decisionism and Kelsenian normativism, were based on different assumptions, leading their authors to variant practical conclusions. It is reasonable to infer that the differences in their visions of constitutional order were deeply rooted in different intellectual traditions – not only political (Kelsen’s involvement in defense of liberal democracy unlike Carl Schmitt, whose conservative attitude and critique of liberalism led to support totalitarian state and extreme right wing ideology), but also theological (pantheistic idea of God and fideism; conflict between rationality and faith). So from this perspective „Pure theory of law” can be seen as pantheistic political theology, because „pantheism overcomes the opposition of God and World; the Pure Theory of Law accordingly overcomes the opposition of State and Law”. On the other hand legal philosophy of Carl Schmitt is inspired by the Roman Catholic theological concept of the miracle, whereby God is free from the laws of nature – and in consequence – the sovereign is not bound by the law and may decide exceptions to it.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to use the authors’ reflections and a review of literature to assess the ways that universities have yet to fully include faculty members in their sexual assault prevention initiatives. Recommendations for how faculty can assist are included. Design/methodology/approach The paper provides a review of literature regarding institutional factors related to sexual assault and the potential of faculty, followed by personal reflections by both authors, who together have more than four decades experience studying sexual assault, providing training and educational presentations, and serving victims as well as perpetrators of sexual violence. Findings The authors conclude that, despite White House mandates for training faculty and campus requirements that should utilize the expertise of faculty members, many campuses are relying heavily or exclusively on student affairs professionals and lawyers to create and implement sexual assault prevention programs. Faculty should, the authors assert, be involved in task forces, needs assessments, training, and other initiatives in order for campus prevention programs to be robust. Research limitations/implications The limitations of this paper are that it is based only on a review of literature and personal reflections from the authors, who teach at a small, Catholic, liberal arts school in South Florida. As such, the recommendations, while intended to be thoughtful, may be less appropriate for educators and administrators at different types of colleges or outside of the USA. Additional research on faculty experience with sexual assault prevention is recommended. Practical implications The recommendations provided in the paper should be useful to academic leaders who are developing or expanding sexual assault prevention initiatives. The paper also provides useful information for faculty members regarding how they can assist with these issues. Social implications Faculty members with training and expertise can and should be used to help craft campus policies, procedures, and programs related to sexual assault. In the USA, sexual assault training is required but has not been fully implemented. Originality/value Although much has been written about campus sexual assault, little research assesses the role of faculty. This paper is a preliminary effort to address how interpretations of US federal law include faculty and how faculty remain an untapped resource in terms of sexual assault prevention.

The article is sacrificed to the person of Wawrzyniec Grzymała Goślicki (Laurentius Grimaldus Goslicus), senator and bishop of Poland, author of the political treaties De optimo senatore. The treaties is one of less known in Poland, but was very popular in England, where it was published in English three times (The Counsellor [1598], A Comonwealth of good counsaile [1607], The Accomplished Senator [1733]). We do knowalso that the treaty was twice plagiarised, first in Germany as Jurisprudentiae Politicae, apud Antonium Hummium (1611), second one was The Sage Senator published in England (1660). There is also a manuscript of English translation of the first book of the treaties (1585). There are other evidences of its popularity in England and western Europe. In USA the treaties is considered as influencing authors of Declaration of Independence and Constitution of USA. Reprint of The Accomplished Senator was published in USA in 1992. The most probable date of his birth is 1538 in Goślice near Płock. He studied at Jagiellonian University theology and liberal arts (1556-1562). Than hewas continuing his education in Padua and Bologna studying theology, philosophy, oratory, Greeks, astronomy and law, finishing it as utrisque iuris doctor. It was stressed that he was one of the most educated person in Poland. As humanist he was not only political writer but also splendid orator and poet, writing in Latin. After his return to Poland Goślicki acts in the Royal secretary, proceeding many diplomatic missions. Simultaneously he is member of hierarchy of Catholic Church in Poland. In 1587 he entered Senat as a bishop of Kamieniec, than Chełm (1590), Przemyśl (1591), Poznań (1601). As bishop he had been introducing reforms of Tridentina. In 1593 with few persons was preparing Union of Brześć on the ground of which the orthodox hierarchy returned to Catholic Church. In politics Goślicki was acting as mediator between conflicting parties. Died in 1607 in Ciążyń preparing synod in Poznań. His sepulchre is in Cathedral in Poznań.

The Belgian scientific literature dealing with political parties has four main characteristics. First it pays great attention to party doctrines and to parliamentary struggle. Indeed, in the nineteenth century political parties do not strike by their organization, which is still undeveloped, nor by their functions, which are still limited, but by the public debate they are stimulating in Parliament and in the press. Only from the end of the century, when the suffrage is extended, the organization of the parties wilt get more articulated and their functions more complicated. Secondly the literature pays great attention to the legitimation of the political parties, which are still controversial particularly because they should threaten the national union. The authors exert oneselves to prove that parliamentary government is by definition a party government. They distinguish parties from factions in order to make the first acceptable. Thirdly the literature deals with the party system.The Belgian authors take the two party system which exists in Great Britain as example and try to prove that the alternation of two parties, the party of conservation and the party of progress, is necessary for the good working of the institutions. Fourthly, the literature, particularly the historica!, is rather descriptive and is characterized by a lack of comparisons, generalizations and hypothesis.Two periods can be distinguished in the literature. In the first period, 1830-1894, the suffrage is limited and the political scene is dominated by two parties (the liberal and the conservative or catholic parties) .This period is marked by the publications of Emile de Laveleye (1822-1892), one of the most prolific writers of the second half of the nineteenth century. In the second period, 1894-1914, the advent of the socialist party disturbs the working of the classical party government. Maurice Vauthier (1860-1931) is the main author of this period. He tries to establish the characteristics of the party government and its chances in the future.

Although most intellectual historians have left novels to their cultural colleagues, novels often illuminate the prevalent kinds of thought within historical periods. History, like fiction, is a narrative that constructs, reconstructs, and deconstructs meaning and novels, read by more people than any other kind of writing, can tell us what their readers prefer to think. This is most likely when authors with a serious purpose have access to an audience willing to take them seriously or at least to engage with them at some level of reflection. During the two tumultuous decades that followed the Great War, new varieties of fiction appeared that deliberately attempted to alter perceptions and reflection about unprecedented events. Among the avant garde, Evelyn Waugh was a new, satirical voice that shared anti-modernist, anti-technological attitudes with Elliot and Huxley, and a religious commitment with Tolkien. But he was unique among his contemporaries because of his trajectory through an exotic, far flung world, domestically and internationally. A reading of Waugh, in the context of his troubled times, reveals an adapter and propagator of ideas and pervasive mentalities shared by great numbers of people both within and without elites. His outrageous, misanthropic, bitterly cynical, very funny, relentlessly self-centered, anti-feminist, anti-Semitic and consistently best-selling novels attacked “modernity,” “progress,” and the possibility of reform. Repudiating liberal and socialist ideals, Waugh reflected and endorsed a conservative, traditionalist, and by the 1940s, a Roman Catholic alternative among the new ideas stridently clamoring for attention. Especially in those novels and occasional essays meant to influence opinion, written from Decline and Fall in 1928 through Brideshead Revisited in 1944, Waugh represented newly asserted and contested thinking about free will, determinism, religious and secular obligation, tradition, social status, and morality.

In 1783 Henry Grattan complimented Charles James Fox by describing his views as ‘liberal to Ireland and just to those lately concerned in her redemption’. He also claimed that ‘Fox wished sincerely for the liberty of Ireland without reserve.’ Sir James Mackintosh’s draft inscription for Westmacott’s statue of Fox in Westminster Abbey stated that he had ‘contended for the rights of the people of America and Ireland’. Whiggish historians subsequently built upon this notion of Fox and his followers as great friends of Ireland. For the most part, modern scholars have avoided passing judgement on Fox’s views on Ireland, but a few authors have challenged early assumptions, depicting Fox as unprincipled in his use of Irish politics as a stick to beat the North and Pitt ministries. Christopher Hobhouse, commenting on Fox’s commitment to Catholic relief, claims that he ‘gave himself away’ and that ‘the House could distinguish by this time between Fox the religious liberator and Fox the artful dodger’. John Derry asserts that Fox ‘ruthlessly and irresponsibly exploited anti-Irish prejudice in England’ during the controversy over Pitt’s trade proposals of 1785. L.G. Mitchell notes that ‘his sympathy for American patriots had had real limits, and so had his concern for Ireland’, and that ‘Irish patriots were never sure of Fox, and their doubt was entirely justified.’ There is a good deal of substance in these comments, and in this article I also intend to argue that Fox was first and foremost a British parliamentarian. However, his conduct towards Ireland was not solely ruled by this stance. Free from the shackles of government, Fox was disposed to be generous to Irish patriotism and his friends and relatives in the Irish opposition.

In Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus,Andrew March asks if Muslims can draw on Islamic doctrinal resources tosupport living as a minority in secular liberal democracies? His answer is athoroughly researched and argued “Yes.” This work of political philosophyprovides a cogent rebuttal to the Islamophobic narrative common in certaincircles that Muslims are a fifth column – cuckoo hatchlings waiting for demographicdominance before Islamizing their host nations.The author’s detailed and critical analysis is long overdue, particularlygiven the debates about Muslims in western countries that have polarizedopinions on such issues as France’s “burqa-bans” or the United States’ “waron terror.” There is also a wider context: addressing how religious doctrinescan be subordinated to secular authority, which is asked by others with sacredlaw-based religions, among them Orthodox Jews, Catholics, and Baha’is. Further,for those interested in strengthening commitment to civil society, Marchpresents belief-sourced reasons for supporting the argument that liberaldemocracy can shore up support among the religious faithful who are not necessarilyswayed by secular arguments ...

The problem of large-scale migration of British and Irish Catholics to continental Europe in the 16th—18th centuries is investigated. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that the religious schools of Catholics in Europe were seen as examples of pious communities, the foundations on which the emerging traditions of religious tolerance, stability and commercial prosperity were built in England. It is noted that this fueled the arguments of the supporters of liberal religious reforms in the UK in the 19th century. The novelty of the study is seen in the fact that the study of the movement of Catholics to Europe makes it possible to reveal the degree of influence of religious schools on British politics and public opinion, to understand how the expatriate community in exile functioned, adapted and communicated. Migration has been proven to be most intense during the Elizabethan period and early Stuart reign, but its impact on religious life in Britain and Ireland was felt over a longer period, until the end of the 18th century. The authors conclude that for Catholics who remained in England, religious institutions in Europe were not only a source of supply of missionary priests and religious literature, but also a link with the continental Counter-Reformation.

In the article is analyzed the Mykola Hnatyshak`s publicistic works, which are concentrated in the publications of the author’s column «From the Literary Life» in the newspaper «Meta» (Lviv, 1931—1939). This Catholic critic led this column during 1935—1939 and published there his own articles, notes, reviews and polemical materials. M. Hnatyshak founded a column to persuade those representatives of the intellectuals who believed that literature and art were social phenomena that did not bring a material benefit that these intellectuals were not wright. He also defined the conception of «Catholic literature» and «Catholic criticism». Catholic literature was in the process of formation not only in the Ukrainian literary environment of Galicia, but also in the more developed countries of the Western Europe. Hnatyshak drew attention to the fact that the Catholic literature is not limited to poetic and prose works of religious subjects, and it is possible to include in it those literary works that do not contradict the ideals of a truth, kindness and beauty. He also thought it was necessary to develop literature on a national basis, but opposed journalistic rhetoric and didacticism. A number of publications in the column «From the Literary Life» were debatable. M. Hnatyshak argued with the representative of liberal critic Mykhailo Rudnytskyi: in a public debate on topic «Should a writer have a worldview?» (14th April 1935). At the same time, M. Hnatyshak opposed M. Rudnytskyi at the same time, M. Hnatyshak opposed M. Rudnytskyi in question of evaluation criteria during awarding writers in the 1935 literary awards. M. Hnatyshak emphasized the need to know the origins in the context of the history of Ukrainian literature — works of folk poetry, chronicles, Cossack epic. «The Tale of Igor’s Campaign» is a unique monument of the XI century, which presents the mythological, Christian and knight’s spirit of knyazes times. The critic drew special attention to the inheritance of Markian Shashkevych, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko. M. Hnatyshak’s other publications were reviews of new poetic and prose works, researches and periodicals. Key words: Mykola Hnatyshak, Catholic criticism, publicism, newspaper «Meta», column «From the Literary Life».

In the humanities, including religious studies, personal factors often play a role in the selection of topic and methodology of research. This autobiographical sketch gives an overview of a long career in the study of religion in Indonesia, from the selection of the topic for doctoral research, through various jobs and academic projects until some work written in a period of retirement. The author’s background of liberal Catholicism with much interest in non-official popular religiosity, has influenced an approach in Islamic Studies and a selective attention for the boundaries between official and more popular religiosity, for literary and artistic expressions rather than for rigid doctrinal traditions. This history is told from field work to pesantren education in the early 1970s, the variety of Islamic history of Indonesia in the 1980s, until a major work in three volumes on the Catholic traditions of Indonesia in the period 1990-2010.[Dalam ilmu humaniora, termasuk studi keagamaan, faktor-faktor pribadi sering mempengaruhi pemilihan topik dan metodologi penelitian. Uraian biografis ringkas ini menggambarkan perjalanan panjang sebagai peneliti agama di Indonesia, mulai dari pemilihan topik riset disertasi, melewati beragam pekerjaan dan proyek-proyek akademik, sampai dengan beberapa karya yang ditulis sesudah pensiun. Latar belakang penulis sebagai penganut Katolik liberal dan banyak tertarik pada keberagamaan populer non-resmi, mempengaruhi pendekatan dalam pengkajian Islam dan perhatian khusus pada batas-batas antara agama resmi dan agama populer, pada ungkapan-ungkapan sastrawi dan seni daripada tradisi-tradisi doktriner yang kaku. Kisah ini berangkat dari pengalaman penelitian lapangan di lingkungan pendidikan pesantren pada tahun 1970an, kemudian serpihan-serpihan sejarah Indonesia pada tahun 1980an, sampai dengan penulisan tiga jilid buku penting tentang tradisi-tradisi Katolik Indonesia pada tahun 1990-2010.]

Deel 3: Hoogtepunt 1910-1914De samenwerking tussen August Vermeylen en Hugo Verriest kende in de laatste jaren voor de Eerste Wereldoorlog een waar hoogtepunt. De toespraak van Verriest op de Brusselse wereldtentoonstelling, 5 juli 1910, in aanwezigheid van koning Albert I, maakte veel ophef, maar stootte ook de liberale opinie voor het hoofd door zijn eenzijdige kijk op de West-Vlaamse literatuur. In 1912 stelde Vermeylen zijn bekende leuze uit 1900 bij: “om iets te zijn moeten we Vlaming zijn. Wij willen Vlaming zijn om Europeeër te worden”. Hij positioneerde de Vlaamse beweging in het groeiende spanningsveld tussen Frankrijk en Duitsland.Het jaar daarop zette Vermeylen zich in, als voorzitter van de Vereniging van Vlaamse Letterkundigen, om op 17 augustus 1913 een grootse hulde te brengen aan de pastoor van Ingooigem, in aanwezigheid van duizenden Vlamingen en Nederlanders. Hij prees hierbij de verdraagzaamheid die Verriest opbracht voor andersdenkenden. Hij waardeerde in hem de “innige samenhang van kunst en leven, die letterkundigen en strijders voor hogere cultuur in Vlaanderen verenigt”. Op de feestelijkheid waren alle generaties sedert het overlijden van Albrecht Rodenbach (1880) aanwezig, “van overal waar Nederlandse taal klinkt”.De laatste vooroorlogse samenwerking betrof de agitatie rond het wetsontwerp van minister Prosper Poullet op het lager onderwijs en de desbetreffende taalregeling voor de Vlaamse kinderen, inzonderheid te Brussel. Op de meeting van 10 februari 1914 voerden de socialistische voorman Alberic Deswarte, de katholieke priester Hugo Verriest en August Vermeylen het woord. Verriest had het over het bevrijdende ‘nadere springtij’ in Vlaanderen. Met zijn allen ijverden zij voor de fundamentele rechten van alle volkskinderen op onderwijs in de moedertaal, vorming en behoorlijke beroepsopleiding. Vermeylen waarschuwde scherp voor het verlies van Brussel door de sterke verfransingsdruk.Als algemeen besluit mag gelden dat de samenwerking van Vermeylen en Verriest in de jaren 1895-1914 een belangrijke bijdrage betekende in de vooruitgang van de Vlaamse beweging.________Tolerance and pragmatic cooperation in the Flemish Movement. Hugo Verriest and August Vermeylen 1895-1914. Part 3: High point 1910-1914During the last years before the First World War the cooperation between August Vermeylen and Hugo Verriest culminated in a true high point. Much was made of Verriest’s address at the Brussels’ world exhibition on 5 July 1910 in the presence of King Albert I, but the speech also offended the liberals because of its one-sided view of West Flemish literature. In 1912 Vermeylen adjusted his well-known slogan from 1900: “in order to be anything, we need to be Flemish. We wish to be Flemish in order to become Europeans”. He positioned the Flemish movement in the growing area of tension between France and Germany.On 17 August of the following year, Vermeylen as chairman of the Association of Flemish Authors dedicated his efforts to pay an elaborate tribute to the parish priest of Ingooigem in the presence of thousands of Flemish and Dutch people. In doing so, he praised the tolerance with which Verriest treated dissidents. He appreciated that Verriest manifested “the close cohesion of art and life, which unites authors and fighters for higher culture in Flanders”. At this festive occasion all generations since the death of Albrecht Rodenbach (1880) were present, “from everywhere where the Dutch language is spoken”.The last time they cooperated before the war related to the turmoil about Minister Proper Poullets’ draft law on elementary education and the relevant language regime for Flemish school children, in particular in Brussels. At the meeting on 10 February 1914, the socialist leader Alberic Deswarte, the Catholic priest Hugo Verriest and August Vermeylen took the floor. Verriest spoke about the liberating ‘approaching spring tide’ in Flanders. All together they dedicated their efforts to the fundamental rights of all working-class children to enjoy education in their native language, to formation and a decent professional training. Vermeylen warned in strong terms about the loss of Brussels because of the strong pressure towards Frenchification.We may draw the general conclusion that the cooperation between Vermeylen and Verriest during the period of 1895-1914 made a major contribution towards the progress of the Flemish movement.

Abstract Objective – To determine the general public’s levels of social tolerance toward public library materials containing racist content in order to present opinion data to librarians within a framework of scholarly perspectives that they can use for making decisions about intellectual freedom and controversial materials in libraries. Design – Percentage and regression analysis of the General Social Survey longitudinal trend study dataset. Setting – United States, 1976-2006. Subjects – Random samples of 26,798 primarily English-speaking adults aged 18 and up. Methods – The author analyzed responses from the well-respected and frequently used General Social Survey (GSS), which has been conducted by the National Opinion Research Center since 1972. The GSS is a closed-ended survey including a variety of demographic measures. Between the years 1976 and 2006, it also included a question to gauge the support of removing a book with racist beliefs about African Americans from the public library. The surveys were conducted irregularly over this thirty-year span, and in total the question was asked nineteen times garnering 26,798 responses. Spanish speakers were not included until 2006. The author examined the data in multilevel cross-tabulations using percentages, and calculated chi-square for independence using frequencies. A multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine the predictive value of the independent variables examined on opinions of book removal. The author examined different variables, including education level, race, age, parental status, sex, geographic factors, religious affiliation, political party, and political conservatism. Occupation was not used in the regression analysis because sample sizes in some categories were too small. The two ordinal variables, age and education level, were available as ratio level data that are most appropriate for regression calculations. Due to the large sample size, very small differences in percentages are significant at the .000 level. In these cases the author made judgment as to whether these differences were meaningful, or divided the data into multi-layer cross-tabulations to reduce the sample size and make the significance test more informative. Main Results – Analysis revealed the most influential predictors of support for book removal from the public library were education level, religious affiliation, and race. Age was particularly influential for older respondents, while occupation and living in the South were moderately influential. Variables with only slight correlations to support of book removal included political party affiliation and conservatism, parental status, and sex. Across all years of the study only 35.3% of respondents supported removal of racist materials from the public library. Levels of support only changed slightly over the decades: in 1976, 38.1% supported removal while in 2006 only 34.5% did. The mean age of respondents was 44.1 years and the median was 42 years. Respondents over 57 years old were more likely to support removal (43.5%) compared to younger ages whose support ranged from 31.1–34.1%. The largest change over time was seen from respondents 57 years and older, whose support for removal dropped in later years of the study. Education level had a strong impact on opinions; the lower one’s education level, the higher their support for removal of the racist book from the public library. Of those with less than a high school degree, 50.6% supported removal versus 35.8% of high school diploma holders. Respondents with junior college, bachelor’s, and graduate degrees supported removal at 29.2%, 20.5%, and 15.3%, respectively. Over time, those with high school degrees maintained their level of support for removal while those with higher levels of education increased their support for removal. Race was strongly related to opinions on removing offensive items from the library. While half of African American respondents supported removing a racist book, only one-third of white respondents did. However, in all but a few subcategories of analysis, the majority of African Americans did not support removal, indicating a great deal of social tolerance on their part despite the possibility of being more sensitive to the implications of having racist materials in the library. When cross-tabulated with education level, the same pattern of support for removal was reproduced. There was little variation over time in white respondent’s opinions while African Americans’ varied slightly. Geographic factors affected opinions supporting removal of racist materials, though place size only had a small impact on opinions. Respondents in the South were most likely to support removal (42.1%) and those in New England were least likely (25.2%). About one-third of respondents from the Midwest (33%), Mid-Atlantic (36%), and the West (29.8%) supported removal. Opinions over time remained the same in all regions but the South, whose support of removal dropped to 38.8%. Religion was found to correlate with opinions on removing racist books from the library. Protestants showed the highest level of support for removal (39.5%), followed by Catholics (32.3%), Jews (21.7%), and respondents unaffiliated with religion (20.5%). Race had a strong impact within some religions on supporting removal, particularly among Methodists and those claiming no religion. When opinions by religion were cross-tabulated with education level, at every level Baptists were more likely to support removal than other groups, while Jews and those without religious affiliation were least likely. Other demographic variables had little effect on opinions concerning removal of racist materials from the library. Parents supported removal (37%) while nonparents were less likely to (30%), and men and women were almost equally likely to support removal (33% and 37% respectively). Political affiliation and level of conservatism only showed slight effects on opinions supporting removal. By a small margin Democrats were most likely to support removal (39.2%) followed by Republicans (34%) and independents (32.5%). Across the conservatism spectrum, moderates were most likely to support removal (37.7%) followed by conservatives (36.4%) and liberals (29.9%). The author also examined whether a respondent’s occupation influenced their opinions and focused this inquiry on the professions of library workers and educators. Librarians were overwhelmingly against removal of racist materials while library paraprofessionals were less likely to support it than other workers with a similar level of education. College and university teachers in disciplines other than library and information science were divided but in comparison to other similarly educated professions they were less likely to support removal. School teachers were significantly more likely to support removal than other occupations also requiring a bachelor’s degree. When contrasted with controversial materials of other types, such as those by openly homosexual or communist authors, different patterns of support for removal over time were observed. Support for removal of books by homosexuals and communists declined significantly over the decades. Similar to the support of the removal of racist materials, education and religious affiliation were the variables most highly correlated to support of removal of these other types of controversial books. Conclusion – The discomfort among Americans over the free expression of exclusionary speech about African Americans remained relatively consistent over the years of the study (1976 – 2006) despite some shifts within particular demographic categories. Tolerance toward free expression by homosexuals and communists increased over time, demonstrating exclusionary speech may be perceived as a different type of social threat. Librarians can use this information to: better understand how non-librarians view intellectual freedom in the context of materials with offensive content; inform collection development decisions and predict likelihood of challenges based on the demographics of their user communities; and to educate the public and library stakeholders of the implications of challenging these kinds of items within a library’s collection through upholding their professional values. Librarians should continue to serve their communities by acting as champions of intellectual freedom and to uphold the profession’s rigorous standards. The author suggests future research could: address attitudes about materials with racist views of populations other than African Americans; look for differences in opinions among library users versus non-users; and differentiate between adult and children’s materials containing controversial topics.

Just as literary authors have long taken liberties with the biblical accounts of Jesus Christ and shaped Him to fit their own agendas, they have also appropriated considerable artistic licence in enhancing the meagre information about Peter in the New Testament when constructing fictional narratives about him. A comparison of The Big Fisherman by the theologically liberal American Congregationalist Lloyd C Douglas and Simon Peter the Fisherman by the Austrian Catholic Kurt Frieberger illustrates how two accomplished novelists, drawing in part on similar sources, created markedly different and to some extent predictable images of this apostle. Neither novel is fully faithful to the New Testament evidence; both evince the influence of extrabiblical sources.

„Let’s not be too eager about equality” – brain sex, heteronormativity, and the scientific mystiqueThe article analyses the role of brain sex in Polish public discourse of the last years. The authors of a popular book Brain Sex claim that differences between women and men stem from differences in the brain structure, and because of that they are universal and unchangeable; feminism is based on misrepresentation of science. This thesis was overtaken by right-wing journalists, as it gave scientific justification to conservative gender politics and contemplementarity – the gender ontology of the Catholic church. However, in the rightwing journalism a significant aspect of brain sex theory is silenced, namely, the claim that homo- and transsexuality result from disorders in brain development; they are unchangeable and should be accepted. Despite its conservative roots, brain sex was popularized in liberal media as well. The aura of science that accompanied this popular theory allowed to naturalize its anti-feminism and heteronormativity. This phenomenon is discussed on the basis of media activity of two Polish scientists who are popular both in right-wing and liberal media: Anna Grabowska and Jerzy Vetulani. Both present brain sex theory as objective, universally accepted truth, which is attacked in the name of the leftist ideology by ignorant activists who deny science. „Nie popadajmy w przesadę z tą równością” – płeć mózgu, heteronorma i mistyka naukowościArtykuł analizuje rolę płci mózgu w polskim dyskursie publicznym ostatnich lat. Autorzy niezwykle popularnej w Polsce książki Płeć mózgu twierdzą, że różnice między kobietami i mężczyznami wynikają z różnic w budowie mózgów, a przez to są uniwersalne i niezmienne, feminizm zaś jest oparty na fałszowaniu nauki. Teza ta została podchwycona przez prawicowych publicystów, ponieważ nadawała naukową legitymację konserwatywnej polityce płci oraz komplementaryzmowi – ontologii płci przyjętej przez Kościół katolicki. W prawicowym piśmiennictwie przemilcza się jednak istotny aspekt płci mózgu, mianowicie twierdzenie, że homo- i transseksualność wynikają z wad w rozwoju mózgu, są niezmienne i powinny być akceptowane. Mimo swoich konserwatywnych korzeni płeć mózgu była popularyzowana także w mediach liberalnych. Nimb naukowości, którym otaczany był popularny pogląd, pozwalał naturalizować związane z nim antyfeminizm i heteronormatywność. Zjawisko to omówione jest na podstawie działalności popularyzatorskiej dwojga naukowców, cieszących się popularnością zarówno w prawicowych, jak i liberalnych mediach: Anny Grabowskiej i Jerzego Vetulaniego. Oboje przedstawiali płeć mózgu jako obiektywną, powszechnie uznawaną naukową prawdę, z którą w imię lewicowej ideologii próbują walczyć nieakceptujący ustaleń nauki aktywiści.

This article deals with two spurious texts by Adolphe Crémieux, the French Alliance israélite universelle, and neo-Nazi distortions and antisemitic ideology aiming at Jewish universalism. Based on a detailed reading of French, German, and English sources, the author’s point of departure is the German neo-Nazi Horst Mahler and his antisemitic,conspiracy-driven agitation against Crémieux in recent years. Crémieux was a representative of French Jewish liberal and universalistic circles in the nineteenth century. For example, as a politician he stopped slavery in the French colony of the Caribbean in 1848. Neo-Nazis as well as Islamists defame Jewish universalism. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion are invoked by both neo-Nazis, who base their hatred of Judaism and Jews on French Catholic as well as Nazi German sources, and by Islamists.Keywords: Alliance israélite universelle, Adolphe Crémieux, Horst Mahler, Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Radio Islam, universalism

In its preamble, The Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism (WA) commits the state to becoming: “A society in which respect for mutual difference is accompanied by equality of opportunity within a framework of democratic citizenship”. One of the principles of multiculturalism, as enunciated in the Charter, is “equality of opportunity for all members of society to achieve their full potential in a free and democratic society where every individual is equal before and under the law”. An important element of this principle is the “equality of opportunity … to achieve … full potential”. The implication here is that those who start from a position of disadvantage when it comes to achieving that potential deserve more than ‘equal’ treatment. Implicitly, equality can be achieved only through the recognition of and response to differential needs and according to the likelihood of achieving full potential. This is encapsulated in Kymlicka’s argument that neutrality is “hopelessly inadequate once we look at the diversity of cultural membership which exists in contemporary liberal democracies” (903). Yet such a potential commitment to differential support might seem unequal to some, where equality is constructed as the same or equal treatment regardless of differing circumstances. Until the past half-century or more, this problematic has been a hotly-contested element of the struggle for Civil Rights for African-Americans in the United States, especially as these rights related to educational opportunity during the years of racial segregation. For some, providing resources to achieve equal outcomes (rather than be committed to equal inputs) may appear to undermine the very ethos of liberal democracy. In Australia, this perspective has been the central argument of Pauline Hanson and her supporters who denounce programs designed as measures to achieve equality for specific disadvantaged groups; including Indigenous Australians and humanitarian refugees. Nevertheless, equality for all on all grounds of legally-accepted difference: gender, race, age, family status, sexual orientation, political conviction, to name a few; is often held as the hallmark of progressive liberal societies such as Australia. In the matter of religious freedoms the situation seems much less complex. All that is required for religious equality, it seems, is to define religion as a private matter – carried out, as it were, between consenting parties away from the public sphere. This necessitates, effectively, the separation of state and religion. This separation of religious belief from the apparatus of the state is referred to as ‘secularism’ and it tends to be regarded as a cornerstone of a liberal democracy, given the general assumption that secularism is a necessary precursor to equal treatment of and respect for different religious beliefs, and the association of secularism with the Western project of the Enlightenment when liberty, equality and science replaced religion and superstition. By this token, western nations committed to equality are also committed to being liberal, democratic and secular in nature; and it is a matter of state indifference as to which religious faith a citizen embraces – Wiccan, Christian, Judaism, etc – if any. Historically, and arguably more so in the past decade, the terms ‘democratic’, ‘secular’, ‘liberal’ and ‘equal’ have all been used to inscribe characteristics of the collective ‘West’. Individuals and states whom the West ascribe as ‘other’ are therefore either or all of: not democratic; not liberal; or not secular – and failing any one of these characteristics (for any country other than Britain, with its parliamentary-established Church of England, headed by the Queen as Supreme Governor) means that that country certainly does not espouse equality. The West and the ‘Other’ in Popular Discourse The constructed polarisation between the free, secular and democratic West that values equality; and the oppressive ‘other’ that perpetuates theocracies, religious discrimination and – at the ultimate – human rights abuses, is a common theme in much of the West’s media and popular discourse on Islam. The same themes are also applied in some measure to Muslims in Australia, in particular to constructions of the rights of Muslim women in Australia. Typically, Muslim women’s dress is deemed by some secular Australians to be a symbol of religious subjugation, rather than of free choice. Arguably, this polemic has come to the fore since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. However, as Aly and Walker note, the comparisons between the West and the ‘other’ are historically constructed and inherited (Said) and have tended latterly to focus western attention on the role and status of Muslim women as evidence of the West’s progression comparative to its antithesis, Eastern oppression. An examination of studies of the United States media coverage of the September 11 attacks, and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, reveals some common media constructions around good versus evil. There is no equal status between these. Good must necessarily triumph. In the media coverage, the evil ‘other’ is Islamic terrorism, personified by Osama bin Laden. Part of the justification for the war on terror is a perception that the West, as a force for good in this world, must battle evil and protect freedom and democracy (Erjavec and Volcic): to do otherwise is to allow the terror of the ‘other’ to seep into western lives. The war on terror becomes the defence of the west, and hence the defence of equality and freedom. A commitment to equality entails a defeat of all things constructed as denying the rights of people to be equal. Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux and Garland analysed the range of discourses evident in Time and Newsweek magazines in the five weeks following September 11 and found that journalists replicated themes of national identity present in the communication strategies of US leaders and elites. The political and media response to the threat of the evil ‘other’ is to create a monolithic appeal to liberal values which are constructed as being a monopoly of the ‘free’ West. A brief look at just a few instances of public communication by US political leaders confirms Hutcheson et al.’s contention that the official construction of the 2001 attacks invoked discourses of good and evil reminiscent of the Cold War. In reference to the actions of the four teams of plane hijackers, US president George W Bush opened his Address to the Nation on the evening of September 11: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). After enjoining Americans to recite Psalm 23 in prayer for the victims and their families, President Bush ended his address with a clear message of national unity and a further reference to the battle between good and evil: “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). In his address to the joint houses of Congress shortly after September 11, President Bush implicated not just the United States in this fight against evil, but the entire international community stating: “This is the world’s fight. This is civilisation’s fight” (cited by Brown 295). Addressing the California Business Association a month later, in October 2001, Bush reiterated the notion of the United States as the leading nation in the moral fight against evil, and identified this as a possible reason for the attack: “This great state is known for its diversity – people of all races, all religions, and all nationalities. They’ve come here to live a better life, to find freedom, to live in peace and security, with tolerance and with justice. When the terrorists attacked America, this is what they attacked”. While the US media framed the events of September 11 as an attack on the values of democracy and liberalism as these are embodied in US democratic traditions, work by scholars analysing the Australian media’s representation of the attacks suggested that this perspective was echoed and internationalised for an Australian audience. Green asserts that global media coverage of the attacks positioned the global audience, including Australians, as ‘American’. The localisation of the discourses of patriotism and national identity for Australian audiences has mainly been attributed to the media’s use of the good versus evil frame that constructed the West as good, virtuous and moral and invited Australian audiences to subscribe to this argument as members of a shared Western democratic identity (Osuri and Banerjee). Further, where the ‘we’ are defenders of justice, equality and the rule of law; the opposing ‘others’ are necessarily barbaric. Secularism and the Muslim Diaspora Secularism is a historically laden term that has been harnessed to symbolise the emancipation of social life from the forced imposition of religious doctrine. The struggle between the essentially voluntary and private demands of religion, and the enjoyment of a public social life distinct from religious obligations, is historically entrenched in the cultural identities of many modern Western societies (Dallmayr). The concept of religious freedom in the West has evolved into a principle based on the bifurcation of life into the objective public sphere and the subjective private sphere within which individuals are free to practice their religion of choice (Yousif), or no religion at all. Secularism, then, is contingent on the maintenance of a separation between the public (religion-free) and the private or non- public (which may include religion). The debate regarding the feasibility or lack thereof of maintaining this separation has been a matter of concern for democratic theorists for some time, and has been made somewhat more complicated with the growing presence of religious diasporas in liberal democratic states (Charney). In fact, secularism is often cited as a precondition for the existence of religious pluralism. By removing religion from the public domain of the state, religious freedom, in so far as it constitutes the ability of an individual to freely choose which religion, if any, to practice, is deemed to be ensured. However, as Yousif notes, the Western conception of religious freedom is based on a narrow notion of religion as a personal matter, possibly a private emotional response to the idea of God, separate from the rational aspects of life which reside in the public domain. Arguably, religion is conceived of as recognising (or creating) a supernatural dimension to life that involves faith and belief, and the suspension of rational thought. This Western notion of religion as separate from the state, dividing the private from the public sphere, is constructed as a necessary basis for the liberal democratic commitment to secularism, and the notional equality of all religions, or none. Rawls questioned how people with conflicting political views and ideologies can freely endorse a common political regime in secular nations. The answer, he posits, lies in the conception of justice as a mechanism to regulate society independently of plural (and often opposing) religious or political conceptions. Thus, secularism can be constructed as an indicator of pluralism and justice; and political reason becomes the “common currency of debate in a pluralist society” (Charney 7). A corollary of this is that religious minorities must learn to use the language of political reason to represent and articulate their views and opinions in the public context, especially when talking with non-religious others. This imposes a need for religious minorities to support their views and opinions with political reason that appeals to the community at large as citizens, and not just to members of the minority religion concerned. The common ground becomes one of secularism, in which all speakers are deemed to be indifferent as to the (private) claims of religion upon believers. Minority religious groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, invoke secular language of moral tolerance and civil rights to be acknowledged by the state, and to carry out their door-to-door ‘information’ evangelisation/campaigns. Right wing fundamentalist Christian groups and Catholics opposed to abortion couch their views in terms of an extension of the secular right to life, and in terms of the human rights and civil liberties of the yet-to-be-born. In doing this, these religious groups express an acceptance of the plurality of the liberal state and engage in debates in the public sphere through the language of political values and political principles of the liberal democratic state. The same principles do not apply within their own associations and communities where the language of the private religious realm prevails, and indeed is expected. This embracing of a political rhetoric for discussions of religion in the public sphere presents a dilemma for the Muslim diaspora in liberal democratic states. For many Muslims, religion is a complete way of life, incapable of compartmentalisation. The narrow Western concept of religious expression as a private matter is somewhat alien to Muslims who are either unable or unwilling to separate their religious needs from their needs as citizens of the nation state. Problems become apparent when religious needs challenge what seems to be publicly acceptable, and conflicts occur between what the state perceives to be matters of rational state interest and what Muslims perceive to be matters of religious identity. Muslim women’s groups in Western Australia for example have for some years discussed the desirability of a Sharia divorce court which would enable Muslims to obtain divorces according to Islamic law. It should be noted here that not all Muslims agree with the need for such a court and many – probably a majority – are satisfied with the existing processes that allow Muslim men and women to obtain a divorce through the Australian family court. For some Muslims however, this secular process does not satisfy their religious needs and it is perceived as having an adverse impact on their ability to adhere to their faith. A similar situation pertains to divorced Catholics who, according to a strict interpretation of their doctrine, are unable to take the Eucharist if they form a subsequent relationship (even if married according to the state), unless their prior marriage has been annulled by the Catholic Church or their previous partner has died. Whereas divorce is considered by the state as a public and legal concern, for some Muslims and others it is undeniably a religious matter. The suggestion by the Anglican Communion’s Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, that the adoption of certain aspects of Sharia law regarding marital disputes or financial matters is ultimately unavoidable, sparked controversy in Britain and in Australia. Attempts by some Australian Muslim scholars to elaborate on Dr Williams’s suggestions, such as an article by Anisa Buckley in The Herald Sun (Buckley), drew responses that, typically, called for Muslims to ‘go home’. A common theme in these responses is that proponents of Sharia law (and Islam in general) do not share a commitment to the Australian values of freedom and equality. The following excerpts from the online pages of Herald Sun Readers’ Comments (Herald Sun) demonstrate this perception: “These people come to Australia for freedoms they have never experienced before and to escape repression which is generally brought about by such ‘laws’ as Sharia! How very dare they even think that this would be an option. Go home if you want such a regime. Such an insult to want to come over to this country on our very goodwill and our humanity and want to change our systems and ways. Simply, No!” Posted 1:58am February 12, 2008 “Under our English derived common law statutes, the law is supposed to protect an individual’s rights to life, liberty and property. That is the basis of democracy in Australia and most other western nations. Sharia law does not adequately share these philosophies and principles, thus it is incompatible with our system of law.” Posted 12:55am February 11, 2008 “Incorporating religious laws in the secular legal system is just plain wrong. No fundamentalist religion (Islam in particular) is compatible with a liberal-democracy.” Posted 2:23pm February 10, 2008 “It should not be allowed in Australia the Muslims come her for a better life and we give them that opportunity but they still believe in covering them selfs why do they even come to Australia for when they don’t follow owe [our] rules but if we went to there [their] country we have to cover owe selfs [sic]” Posted 11:28am February 10, 2008 Conflicts similar to this one – over any overt or non-private religious practice in Australia – may also be observed in public debates concerning the wearing of traditional Islamic dress; the slaughter of animals for consumption; Islamic burial rites, and other religious practices which cannot be confined to the private realm. Such conflicts highlight the inability of the rational liberal approach to solve all controversies arising from religious traditions that enjoin a broader world view than merely private spirituality. In order to adhere to the liberal reduction of religion to the private sphere, Muslims in the West must negotiate some religious practices that are constructed as being at odds with the rational state and practice a form of Islam that is consistent with secularism. At the extreme, this Western-acceptable form is what the Australian government has termed ‘moderate Islam’. The implication here is that, for the state, ‘non-moderate Islam’ – Islam that pervades the public realm – is just a descriptor away from ‘extreme’. The divide between Christianity and Islam has been historically played out in European Christendom as a refusal to recognise Islam as a world religion, preferring instead to classify it according to race or ethnicity: a Moorish tendency, perhaps. The secular state prefers to engage with Muslims as an ethnic, linguistic or cultural group or groups (Yousif). Thus, in order to engage with the state as political citizens, Muslims must find ways to present their needs that meet the expectations of the state – ways that do not use their religious identity as a frame of reference. They can do this by utilizing the language of political reason in the public domain or by framing their needs, views and opinions exclusively in terms of their ethnic or cultural identity with no reference to their shared faith. Neither option is ideal, or indeed even viable. This is partly because many Muslims find it difficult if not impossible to separate their religious needs from their needs as political citizens; and also because the prevailing perception of Muslims in the media and public arena is constructed on the basis of an understanding of Islam as a religion that conflicts with the values of liberal democracy. In the media and public arena, little consideration is given to the vast differences that exist among Muslims in Australia, not only in terms of ethnicity and culture, but also in terms of practice and doctrine (Shia or Sunni). The dominant construction of Muslims in the Australian popular media is of religious purists committed to annihilating liberal, secular governments and replacing them with anti-modernist theocratic regimes (Brasted). It becomes a talking point for some, for example, to realise that there are international campaigns to recognise Gay Muslims’ rights within their faith (ABC) (in the same way that there are campaigns to recognise Gay Christians as full members of their churches and denominations and equally able to hold high office, as followers of the Anglican Communion will appreciate). Secularism, Preference and Equality Modood asserts that the extent to which a minority religious community can fully participate in the public and political life of the secular nation state is contingent on the extent to which religion is the primary marker of identity. “It may well be the case therefore that if a faith is the primary identity of any community then that community cannot fully identify with and participate in a polity to the extent that it privileges a rival faith. Or privileges secularism” (60). Modood is not saying here that Islam has to be privileged in order for Muslims to participate fully in the polity; but that no other religion, nor secularism, should be so privileged. None should be first, or last, among equals. For such a situation to occur, Islam would have to be equally acceptable both with other religions and with secularism. Following a 2006 address by the former treasurer (and self-avowed Christian) Peter Costello to the Sydney Institute, in which Costello suggested that people who feel a dual claim from both Islamic law and Australian law should be stripped of their citizenship (Costello), the former Prime Minister, John Howard, affirmed what he considers to be Australia’s primary identity when he stated that ‘Australia’s core set of values flowed from its Anglo Saxon identity’ and that any one who did not embrace those values should not be allowed into the country (Humphries). The (then) Prime Minister’s statement is an unequivocal assertion of the privileged position of the Anglo Saxon tradition in Australia, a tradition with which many Muslims and others in Australia find it difficult to identify. Conclusion Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia, partly because it is perceived that their faith is under attack and that it needs defending (Aly). They construct the defence of their faith as a choice and an obligation; but also as a right that they have under Australian law as equal citizens in a secular state (Aly and Green). Australian Muslims who have no difficulty in reconciling their core Australianness with their deep faith take it as a responsibility to live their lives in ways that model the reconciliation of each identity – civil and religious – with the other. In this respect, the political call to Australian Muslims to embrace a ‘moderate Islam’, where this is seen as an Islam without a public or political dimension, is constructed as treating their faith as less than equal. Religious identity is generally deemed to have no place in the liberal democratic model, particularly where that religion is constructed to be at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy, namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. Indeed, it is as if the national commitment to secularism rules as out-of-bounds any identity that is grounded in religion, giving precedence instead to accepting and negotiating cultural and ethnic differences. Religion becomes a taboo topic in these terms, an affront against secularism and the values of the Enlightenment that include liberty and equality. In these circumstances, it is not the case that all religions are equally ignored in a secular framework. What is the case is that the secular framework has been constructed as a way of ‘privatising’ one religion, Christianity; leaving others – including Islam – as having nowhere to go. Islam thus becomes constructed as less than equal since it appears that, unlike Christians, Muslims are not willing to play the secular game. In fact, Muslims are puzzling over how they can play the secular game, and why they should play the secular game, given that – as is the case with Christians – they see no contradiction in performing ‘good Muslim’ and ‘good Australian’, if given an equal chance to embrace both. Acknowledgements This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. 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Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2001. 206-28.Brown, Chris. “Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity.” Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. Eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 293-324. Buckley, Anisa. “Should We Allow Sharia Law?” Sunday Herald Sun 10 Feb. 2008. 8 March 2008 < http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,231869735000117,00.html >.Bush, George. W. “President Outlines War Effort: Remarks by the President at the California Business Association Breakfast.” California Business Association 2001. 17 April 2007 < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-15.html >.———. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”. 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Banerjee. “White Diasporas: Media Representations of September 11 and the Unbearable Whiteness of Being in Australia.” Social Semiotics 14.2 (2004): 151- 71.Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971.Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books 1978.Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism. WA: Government of Western Australia, Nov. 2004. 11 March 2008 < http://www.equalopportunity.wa.gov.au/pdf/wa_charter_multiculturalism.pdf >.Yousif, Ahmad. “Islam, Minorities and Religious Freedom: A Challenge to Modern Theory of Pluralism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 20.1 (2000): 30-43.

Creators do not just 'create' or 'act' -- they are privileged agents, points of origin, sources of innovation and transformation. Within religious systems, creators can exist in an extra-discursive real beyond nature and culture, functioning as the origin of the word and being. They can be supernatural, existing outside nature to influence earthly events via strange powers. They can also be 'supra' natural -- above nature -- capable of acts that both break and establish laws to which the created are subject. Yet, these types of creators only seem to exist through the cultural economies which allow their representation. Their roles and personas can differ with the production, combination and utilisation of selected characterisations: in other words, creators are created. As these texts explore, the idea of creator is a site of textual contestation, where creations must be authenticated not only by their authors but by their believers. These fictive acts and others like them, explored to great narrative detail in 'The Fall of Every Sparrow', contribute to the way we collectively construe and construct the idea of creators. Yet the notion of 'creating' used here can also be understood as a process of transformation and, in this sense, it is argued that creators 'act', that they produce and position the object of their creation as a social process or discrete detail to which people respond accordingly. It is in such an environment that society can claim to collectively worship the 'works of the great masters' and yet not draw evidence of an artist's signature from an almighty creator written in the living world. And though it might remain unclear or at least debatable whether these 'masters' truly perceived themselves as such, it is clear that from time to time society requires its citizens to legitimise such positioning through culturally accepted activities and institutions: for example, gala musical performances, poetry and prose readings, publications and book launches, art galleries and festivals, etc. Our feature article, A Remarkable Disappearing Act: immanence and the creation of modern things by Warwick Mules, considers modern creation not as a phenomenon of the gifted artistic individual, but as present in the mediated spaces of the everyday. Drawing upon the theories of Latour and Deleuze and Guattari, he argues that the mode of desire of contemporary consumer culture is "the ghost of a certain kind of immanence which has haunted modernity and its projects from the very beginning." Mules traces this immanence to Descartes' creation of the modern ego on the paradoxical basis that an autonomous subject is conceivable only on the grounds that it partakes in something outside of itself (in Descartes' case, God). Mules views the commodity as an exemplary modern object which binds consumers into particular fields of immanence (the relations of consumer formations) in their acts of consumer self-creation. William J Wilson's fictional work, The Fall of Every Sparrow, recounts the last entry made by one Brother Clothren, an archeotheist whose main duty is to 'mark the fall of every sparrow'. This is an engaging and original piece, exploring concepts of deities 'wrought into existence solely by the collective belief and adoration of the worshipful races' and reflecting upon our own constructions of gods through irony in its evocative play on the contemporary death of the Terrene god Yahweh: 'Tell me about your gods', writes Wilson, 'and I will reveal the inmost secrets of you heart'. This is a piece that defies one reading – it's philosophical penetration demands additional readings. In The Documentary Photographer as Creator Maria Mitropoulos investigates the tension between creation and the representation of events in the field of documentary photography. She traces longstanding debates in the field between those who emphasise the faithful recording of events, and those who—regarding the technological manipulation of images as a legitimate means of enhancing their impact—emphasise the expressive potentials of the medium. By tackling these issues she argues for the reinstatement of the referent (or the semiotic trace of it) as an object of critical inquiry. In her own conclusions she attempts to avoid the impasse between naïve realism and thoroughgoing constructionism, acknowledging instead how documentary photography may contribute to the becoming of reality. Bev Curran analyses two novels—Le désert mauve by Nicole Brossard and The English Patient, by Michael Ondaatje— which exemplify "how a translator may flaunt her creativity, and allow the cultural position of the translator vis à vis language, history, or gender to be critically exposed by the text itself." In Portrait of the Translator as Artist, she proceeds from a deconstruction of a received cultural opposition between the author and the translator, in which the activity of former is viewed as creative and that of the latter as derivative. She suggests that translation in the broader sense of an openness to textuality is a creative process which acknowledges influence, positionality and contradictory currents. It allows the creative subject to be transformed in and by versions of reality as a result of giving up the pretence to creative autonomy. In That All May Be One: Co-creating God, community and religion within the Catholic sisters of St. Joseph, Patricia Foley explores the relationship between goals of self and the goals of religious institutions in the pursuit of social justice. In a personal and touching work about her sister's lure towards a religious organisation providing the opportunity to be 'involved in creative change', Foley considers the 'creation of new possibilities in the expression of faith'. Extending her argument beyond her concerns with her sister, Foley asks perhaps for a reconsideration of the overall location and situation of 'women religious' within and without the community. Foley suggests that contemporary forms of ministry for women can be diverse and empowering in application, which acknowledge more an individual's sense of creative autonomy than following the traditional image of a nun secluded within convent walls, unable to effect a difference. Marginalised positions, Foley argues, can become effective locations for change in rather creative ways. Leanne McRae examines the relationship between crises of masculinity and bodybuilding in Rollins, representation and reality: Lifting the weight of masculinity. She argues that "The desire to shore-up male power in the face of various 'threats' has called for a corporeal manifestation of masculine dominance." Part of this involves the performance of "superhero" myths across the body in order emphasise the supposed ability of men to create themselves and society. The article ends with a consideration of how rock star/bodybuilder Henry Rollins occupies, but plays with superhero roles, simultaneously embracing and deconstructing associated myths. Finally, in an extended work, Juliette Crooks concludes this publication by interrogating the traditional depiction of Prometheus being tortured night upon night as perhaps the 'quintessential image of masculinity in crisis'. With a view to contextualising the relationship between creator and created, Crooks examines 'the usurping of maternal (creative) power by patriarchy' and the various experimental models in which masculine identity might be recreated in the contemporary age. In closing, it can be argued that on the interpersonal, metaphorical, iconic or philosophical status of 'creators', cultural history shows their continual design. The articles in this issue deal with modern concepts of creation, from politics of self and creative autonomy, to the emerging linguistic foreplay between different forms of media and expression. The Romantics invented the author in the form of the creative artist-come-genius who is the originator of unique artistic impulses conceived in accordance with his/her own laws. Such creators seem peculiarly contemporary and it would be fair to argue that the idea of self-creation has stood behind many modern liberal concepts of agency. Yet it has also become the target of critique with the rise of constructionism, which emphasises the agency of language and society in determining subjectivity. And when such agency is debated, we can at least, according to some existentialists and liberals, count on the ability of the authentic individual to have the power to create him or her self. But as this publication aims to demonstrate, not all creators are created equally but are subject to the needs and desires of their worshippers.

On 23 August 2005, John Howard, then Prime Minister, called together Muslim ‘representatives’ from around the nation for a Muslim Summit in response to the London bombings in July of that year. One of the outcomes of the two hour summit was a Statement of Principles committing Muslim communities in Australia to resist radicalisation and pursue a ‘moderate’ Islam. Since then the ill-defined term ‘moderate Muslim’ has been used in both the political and media discourse to refer to a preferred form of Islamic practice that does not challenge the hegemony of the nation state and that is coherent with the principles of secularism. Akbarzadeh and Smith conclude that the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘mainstream’ are used to describe Muslims whom Australians should not fear in contrast to ‘extremists’. Ironically, the policy direction towards regulating the practice of Islam in Australia in favour of a state defined ‘moderate’ Islam signals an attempt by the state to mediate the practice of religion, undermining the ethos of secularism as it is expressed in the Australian Constitution. It also – arguably – impacts upon the citizenship rights of Australian Muslims in so far as citizenship presents not just as a formal set of rights accorded to an individual but also to democratic participation: the ability of citizens to enjoy those rights at a substantive level. Based on the findings of research into how Australian Muslims and members of the broader community are responding to the political and media discourses on terrorism, this article examines the impact of these discourses on how Muslims are practicing citizenship and re-defining an Australian Muslim identity. Free Speech Free speech has been a hallmark of liberal democracies ever since its defence became part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Australian Constitution does not expressly contain a provision for free speech. The right to free speech in Australia is implied in Australia’s ratification of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 19 of which affirms: Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The ultimate recent endorsement of free speech rights, arguably associated with the radical free speech ‘open platform’ movement of the 1960s at the University of California Berkeley, constructs free speech as essential to human and civil liberties. Its approach has been expressed in terms such as: “I reject and detest XYZ views but will defend to the utmost a person’s right to express them”. An active defence of free speech is based on the observation that, unless held to account, “[Authorities] would grant free speech to those with whom they agree, but not to minorities whom they consider unorthodox or threatening” (“Online Archives of California”). Such minorities, differing from the majority view, do so as a right accorded to citizens. In very challenging circumstances – such as opposing the Cold War operations of the US Senate Anti-American Activities Committee – the free speech movement has been celebrated as holding fast (or embodying a ‘return’) to the true meaning of the American First Amendment. It was in public statements of unpopular and minority views, which opposed those of the majority, that the right to free speech could most non-controvertibly be demonstrated. Some have argued that such rights should be balanced by anti-vilification legislation, by prohibitions upon incitement to violence, and by considerations as to whether the organisation defended by the speaker was banned. In the latter case, there can be problems with excluding the defence of banned organisations from legitimate debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Sinn Fein was denounced in the UK as the ‘political wing of the IRA’ (the IRA being a banned organisation) and denied a speaking position in many forums, yet has proved to be an important party in the eventual reconciliation of the Northern Ireland divide. In effect, the banning of an organisation is a political act and such acts should best be interrogated through free speech and democratic debate. Arguably, such disputation is a responsibility of an involved citizenry. In general, liberal democracies such as Australia do not hesitate to claim that citizens have a right to free speech and that this is a right worth defending. There is a legitimate expectation by Australians of their rights as citizens to freedom of expression. For some Australian Muslims, however, the appeal to free speech seems a hollow one. Muslim citizens run the risk of being constructed as ‘un-Australian’ when they articulate their concerns or opinions. Calls by some Muslim leaders not to reprint the Danish cartoons depicting images of the Prophet Mohammed for example, met with a broader community backlash and drew responses that, typically, constructed Muslims as a threat to Australian cultural values of freedom and liberty. These kinds of responses to expressions by Australian Muslims of their deeply held convictions are rarely, if ever, interpreted as attempts to curtail Australian Muslims’ rights to free speech. There is a poor fit between what many Australian Muslims believe and what they feel the current climate in Australia allows them to say in the public domain. Positioned as the potential ‘enemy within’ in the evolving media and political discourse post September 11, they have been allocated restricted speaking positions on many subjects from the role and training of their Imams to the right to request Sharia courts (which could operate in parallel with Australian courts in the same way that Catholic divorce/annulment courts do). These social and political restrictions lead them to question whether Muslims enjoy citizenship rights on an equal footing with Australians from the broader community. The following comment from an Australian woman, an Iraqi refugee, made in a research interview demonstrates this: The media say that if you are Australian it means that you enjoy freedom, you enjoy the rights of citizenship. That is the idea of what it means to be Australian, that you do those things. But if you are a Muslim, you are not Australian. You are a people who are dangerous, a people who are suspicious, a people who do not want democracy—all the characteristics that make up terrorists. So yes, there is a difference, a big difference. And it is a feeling all Muslims have, not just me, whether you are at school, at work, and especially if you wear the hijab. (Translated from Arabic by Anne Aly) At the same time, Australian Muslims observe some members of the broader community making strong assertions about Muslims (often based on misunderstanding or misinformation) with very little in the way of censure or rebuke. For example, again in 2005, Liberal backbenchers Sophie Panopoulos and Bronwyn Bishop made an emotive plea for the banning of headscarves in public schools, drawing explicitly on the historically inherited image of Islam as a violent, backward and oppressive ideology that has no place in Western liberal democracy: I fear a frightening Islamic class emerging, supported by a perverse interpretation of the Koran where disenchantment breeds disengagement, where powerful and subversive orthodoxies are inculcated into passionate and impressionable young Muslims, where the Islamic mosque becomes the breeding ground for violence and rejection of Australian law and ideals, where extremists hijack the Islamic faith with their own prescriptive and unbending version of the Koran and where extremist views are given currency and validity … . Why should one section of the community be stuck in the Dark Ages of compliance cloaked under a veil of some distorted form of religious freedom? (Panopoulos) Several studies attest to the fact that, since the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Islam, and by association Australian Muslims, have been positioned as other in the political and media discourse (see for example Aly). The construct of Muslims as ‘out of place’ (Saniotis) denies them entry and representation in the public sphere: a key requisite for democratic participation according to Habermas (cited in Haas). This notion of a lack of a context for Muslim citizenship in Australian public spheres arises out of the popular construction of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Australian’ as mutually exclusive modes of being. Denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as political citizens, Australian Muslims must pursue alternative communicative spaces. Some respond by limiting their expressions to closed spheres of communication – a kind of enforced silence. Others respond by pursuing alternative media discourses that challenge the dominant stereotypes of Muslims in Western media and reinforce majority-world cultural views. Enforced Silence In closed spheres of discussion, Australian Muslims can openly share their perceptions about terrorism, the government and media. Speaking openly in public however, is not common practice and results in forced silence for fear of reprisal or being branded a terrorist: “if we jump up and go ‘oh how dare you say this, rah, rah’, he’ll be like ‘oh he’s going to go off, he’ll blow something up’”. One research participant recalled that when his work colleagues were discussing the September 11 attacks he decided not to partake in the conversation because it “might be taken against me”. The participant made this decision despite the fact that his colleagues were expressing the opinion that United States foreign policy was the likely cause for the attacks—an opinion with which he agreed. This suggests some support for the theory that the fear of social isolation may make Australian Muslims especially anxious or fearful of expressing opinions about terrorism in public discussions (Noelle-Neumann). However, it also suggests that the fear of social isolation for Muslims is not solely related to the expression of minority opinion, as theorised in Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence . Given that many members of the wider community shared the theory that the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in 2001 may have been a response to American foreign policy, this may well not be a minority view. Nonetheless, Australian Muslims hesitated to embrace it. Saniotis draws attention to the pressure on Australian Muslims to publicly distance themselves from the terrorist attacks of September 11 and to openly denounce the actions of terrorists. The extent to which Muslims were positioned as a threatening other was contingent on their ability to demonstrate that they too participated in the distal responses to the terrorist attacks—initial pity for the sufferer and eventual marginalisation and rejection of the perceived aggressor. Australian Muslims were obliged to declare their loyalty and commitment to Australia’s ally and, in this way, partake in the nationalistic responses to the threat of terrorism. At the same time however, Australian Muslims were positioned as an imagined enemy and a threat to national identity. Australian Muslims were therefore placed in a paradoxical bind- as Australians they were expected to respond as the victims of fear; as Muslims they were positioned as the objects of fear. Even in discussions where their opinions are congruent with the dominant opinion being expressed, Australian Muslims describe themselves as feeling apprehensive or anxious about expressing their opinions because of how these “might be taken”. Pursuing alternative discourses The overriding message from the research project’s Muslim participants was that the media, as a powerful purveyor of public opinion, had inculcated a perception of Muslims as a risk to Australia and Australians: an ‘enemy within’; the potential ‘home grown terrorist’. The daily experience of visibly-different Australian Muslims, however, is that they are more fearing than fear-inspiring. The Aly and Balnaves fear scale indicates that Australian Muslims have twice as many fear indicators as non-Muslims Australians. Disengagement from Western media and media that is seen to be influenced or controlled by the West is widespread among Australian Muslims who increasingly argue that the media institutions are motivated by an agenda that includes profit and the perpetuation of a negative stereotype of Muslims both in Australia and around the globe, particularly in relation to Middle Eastern affairs. The negative stereotypes of Muslims in the Australian media have inculcated a sense of victimhood which Muslims in Australia have used as the basis for a reconstruction of their identity and the creation of alternative narratives of belonging (Aly). Central to the notion of identity among Australian Muslims is a sense of having their citizenship rights curtailed by virtue of their faith: of being included in a general Western dismissal of Muslims’ rights and experiences. As one interviewee said: If you look at the Channel Al Jazeera for example, it’s a channel but they aren’t making up stories, they are taping videos in Iraqi, Palestine and other Muslim countries, and they just show it to people, that’s all they do. And then George Bush, you know, we hear on the news that George Bush was discussing with Tony Blair that he was thinking to bomb Al Jazeera so why would these people have their right to freedom and we don’t? So that’s why I think the people who are in power, they have the control over the media, and it’s a big political game. Because if it wasn’t then George Bush, he’s the symbol of politics, why would he want to bomb Al Jazeera for example? Amidst leaks and rumours (Timms) that the 2003 US bombing of Al Jazeera was a deliberate attack upon one of the few elements of the public sphere in which some Western-nationality Muslims have confidence, many elements of the mainstream Western media rose to Al Jazeera’s defence. For example, using an appeal to the right of citizens to engage in and consume free speech, the editors of influential US paper The Nation commented that: If the classified memo detailing President Bush’s alleged proposal to bomb the headquarters of Al Jazeera is provided to The Nation, we will publish the relevant sections. Why is it so vital that this information be made available to the American people? Because if a President who claims to be using the US military to liberate countries in order to spread freedom then conspires to destroy media that fail to echo his sentiments, he does not merely disgrace his office and soil the reputation of his country. He attacks a fundamental principle, freedom of the press—particularly a dissenting and disagreeable press—upon which that country was founded. (cited in Scahill) For other Australian Muslims, it is the fact that some media organisations have been listed as banned by the US that gives them their ultimate credibility. This is the case with Al Manar, for example. Feeling that they are denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as equal political citizens, Australian Muslims are pursuing alternative communicative spaces that support and reinforce their own cultural worldviews. The act of engaging with marginalised and alternative communicative spaces constitutes what Clifford terms ‘collective practices of displaced dwelling’. It is through these practices of displaced dwelling that Australian Muslims essentialise their diasporic identity and negotiate new identities based on common perceptions of injustice against Muslims. But you look at Al Jazeera they talk in the same tongue as the Western media in our language. And then you look again at something like Al Manar who talks of their own tongue. They do not use the other media’s ideas. They have been attacked by the Australians, been attacked by the Israelis and they have their own opinion. This statement came from an Australian Muslim of Jordanian background in her late forties. It reflects a growing trend towards engaging with media messages that coincide with and reinforce a sense of injustice. The Al Manar television station to which this participant refers is a Lebanese based station run by the militant Hezbollah movement and accessible to Australians via satellite. Much like Al Jazeera, Al Manar broadcasts images of Iraqi and Palestinian suffering and, in the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, graphic images of Lebanese casualties of Israeli air strikes. Unlike the Al Jazeera broadcasts, these images are formatted into video clips accompanied by music and lyrics such as “we do not fear America”. Despite political pressure including a decision by the US to list Al Manar as a terrorist organisation in December 2004, just one week after a French ban on the station because its programming had “a militant perspective with anti-Semitic connotations” (Jorisch), Al Manar continued to broadcast videos depicting the US as the “mother of terrorism”. In one particularly graphic sequence, the Statue of Liberty rises from the depths of the sea, wielding a knife in place of the torch and dripping in blood, her face altered to resemble a skull. As she rises out of the sea accompanied by music resembling a funeral march the following words in Arabic are emblazoned across the screen: On the dead bodies of millions of native Americans And through the enslavement of tens of millions Africans The US rose It pried into the affairs of most countries in the world After an extensive list of countries impacted by US foreign policy including China, Japan, Congo, Vietnam, Peru, Laos, Libya and Guatamala, the video comes to a gruelling halt with the words ‘America owes blood to all of humanity’. Another video juxtaposes images of Bush with Hitler with the caption ‘History repeats itself’. One website run by the Coalition against Media Terrorism refers to Al Manar as ‘the beacon of hatred’ and applauds the decisions by the French and US governments to ban the station. Al Manar defended itself against the bans stating on its website that they are attempts “to terrorise and silence thoughts that are not in line with the US and Israeli policies.” The station claims that it continues on its mission “to carry the message of defending our peoples’ rights, holy places and just causes…within internationally agreed professional laws and standards”. The particular brand of propaganda employed by Al Manar is gaining popularity among some Muslims in Australia largely because it affirms their own views and opinions and offers them opportunities to engage in an alternative public space in which Muslims are positioned as the victims and not the aggressors. Renegotiating an ‘Othered’ Identity The negative portrayal of Muslims as ‘other’ in the Australian media and in political discourse has resulted in Australian Muslims constructing alternative identities based on a common perception of injustice. Particularly since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the ensuing “war on terror”, the ethnic divisions within the Muslim diaspora are becoming less significant as Australian Muslims reconstruct their identity based on a notion of supporting each other in the face of a global alliance against Islam. Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia. This causes problems, however, since religious identity has no place in the liberal democratic model, which espouses secularism. This is particularly the case where that religion is sometimes constructed as being at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy; namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. This problematic creates a context in which Muslim Australians are not only denied their heterogeneity in the media and political discourse but are dealt with through an understanding of Islam that is constructed on the basis of a cultural and ideological clash between Islam and the West. Religion has become the sole and only characteristic by which Muslims are recognised, denying them political citizenship and access to the public spaces of citizenship. Such ‘essentialising practices’ as eliding considerable diversity into a single descriptor serves to reinforce and consolidate diasporic identity among Muslims in Australia, but does little to promote and assist participatory citizenship or to equip Muslims with the tools necessary to access the public sphere as political citizens of the secular state. In such circumstances, the moderate Muslim may be not so much a ‘preferred’ citizen as one whose rights has been constrained. Acknowledgment This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. References Akbarzadeh, Shahram, and Bianca Smith. The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media (The Age and Herald Sun Newspapers). Melbourne: Monash University, 2005. Aly, Anne, and Mark Balnaves. ”‘They Want Us to Be Afraid’: Developing Metrics of the Fear of Terrorism.” International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 6 (2007): 113-122. Aly, Anne. “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42.1 (2007): 27-40. Clifford, James. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. London: Harvard UP, 1997. Haas, Tanni. “The Public Sphere as a Sphere of Publics: Rethinking Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere.” Journal of Communication 54.1 (2004): 178- 84. Jorisch, Avi. J. “Al-Manar and the War in Iraq.” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5.2 (2003). Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion.” Journal of Communication 24.2 (1974): 43-52. “Online Archives of California”. California Digital Library. n.d. Feb. 2008 < http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt1199n498/?&query= %22open%20platform%22&brand=oac&hit.rank=1 >. Panopoulos, Sophie. Parliamentary debate, 5 Sep. 2005. Feb. 2008 < http://www.aph.gov.au.hansard >. Saniotis, Arthur. “Embodying Ambivalence: Muslim Australians as ‘Other’.” Journal of Australian Studies 82 (2004): 49-58. Scahill, Jeremy. “The War on Al-Jazeera (Comment)”. 2005. The Nation. Feb. 2008 < http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051219/scahill >. Timms, Dominic. “Al-Jazeera Seeks Answers over Bombing Memo”. 2005. Media Guardian. Feb. 2008 < http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/nov/23/iraq.iraqandthemedia >.

On 23 August 2005, John Howard, then Prime Minister, called together Muslim ‘representatives’ from around the nation for a Muslim Summit in response to the London bombings in July of that year. One of the outcomes of the two hour summit was a Statement of Principles committing Muslim communities in Australia to resist radicalisation and pursue a ‘moderate’ Islam. Since then the ill-defined term ‘moderate Muslim’ has been used in both the political and media discourse to refer to a preferred form of Islamic practice that does not challenge the hegemony of the nation state and that is coherent with the principles of secularism. Akbarzadeh and Smith conclude that the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘mainstream’ are used to describe Muslims whom Australians should not fear in contrast to ‘extremists’. Ironically, the policy direction towards regulating the practice of Islam in Australia in favour of a state defined ‘moderate’ Islam signals an attempt by the state to mediate the practice of religion, undermining the ethos of secularism as it is expressed in the Australian Constitution. It also – arguably – impacts upon the citizenship rights of Australian Muslims in so far as citizenship presents not just as a formal set of rights accorded to an individual but also to democratic participation: the ability of citizens to enjoy those rights at a substantive level. Based on the findings of research into how Australian Muslims and members of the broader community are responding to the political and media discourses on terrorism, this article examines the impact of these discourses on how Muslims are practicing citizenship and re-defining an Australian Muslim identity. Free Speech Free speech has been a hallmark of liberal democracies ever since its defence became part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Australian Constitution does not expressly contain a provision for free speech. The right to free speech in Australia is implied in Australia’s ratification of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 19 of which affirms: Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The ultimate recent endorsement of free speech rights, arguably associated with the radical free speech ‘open platform’ movement of the 1960s at the University of California Berkeley, constructs free speech as essential to human and civil liberties. Its approach has been expressed in terms such as: “I reject and detest XYZ views but will defend to the utmost a person’s right to express them”. An active defence of free speech is based on the observation that, unless held to account, “[Authorities] would grant free speech to those with whom they agree, but not to minorities whom they consider unorthodox or threatening” (“Online Archives of California”). Such minorities, differing from the majority view, do so as a right accorded to citizens. In very challenging circumstances – such as opposing the Cold War operations of the US Senate Anti-American Activities Committee – the free speech movement has been celebrated as holding fast (or embodying a ‘return’) to the true meaning of the American First Amendment. It was in public statements of unpopular and minority views, which opposed those of the majority, that the right to free speech could most non-controvertibly be demonstrated. Some have argued that such rights should be balanced by anti-vilification legislation, by prohibitions upon incitement to violence, and by considerations as to whether the organisation defended by the speaker was banned. In the latter case, there can be problems with excluding the defence of banned organisations from legitimate debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Sinn Fein was denounced in the UK as the ‘political wing of the IRA’ (the IRA being a banned organisation) and denied a speaking position in many forums, yet has proved to be an important party in the eventual reconciliation of the Northern Ireland divide. In effect, the banning of an organisation is a political act and such acts should best be interrogated through free speech and democratic debate. Arguably, such disputation is a responsibility of an involved citizenry. In general, liberal democracies such as Australia do not hesitate to claim that citizens have a right to free speech and that this is a right worth defending. There is a legitimate expectation by Australians of their rights as citizens to freedom of expression. For some Australian Muslims, however, the appeal to free speech seems a hollow one. Muslim citizens run the risk of being constructed as ‘un-Australian’ when they articulate their concerns or opinions. Calls by some Muslim leaders not to reprint the Danish cartoons depicting images of the Prophet Mohammed for example, met with a broader community backlash and drew responses that, typically, constructed Muslims as a threat to Australian cultural values of freedom and liberty. These kinds of responses to expressions by Australian Muslims of their deeply held convictions are rarely, if ever, interpreted as attempts to curtail Australian Muslims’ rights to free speech. There is a poor fit between what many Australian Muslims believe and what they feel the current climate in Australia allows them to say in the public domain. Positioned as the potential ‘enemy within’ in the evolving media and political discourse post September 11, they have been allocated restricted speaking positions on many subjects from the role and training of their Imams to the right to request Sharia courts (which could operate in parallel with Australian courts in the same way that Catholic divorce/annulment courts do). These social and political restrictions lead them to question whether Muslims enjoy citizenship rights on an equal footing with Australians from the broader community. The following comment from an Australian woman, an Iraqi refugee, made in a research interview demonstrates this: The media say that if you are Australian it means that you enjoy freedom, you enjoy the rights of citizenship. That is the idea of what it means to be Australian, that you do those things. But if you are a Muslim, you are not Australian. You are a people who are dangerous, a people who are suspicious, a people who do not want democracy—all the characteristics that make up terrorists. So yes, there is a difference, a big difference. And it is a feeling all Muslims have, not just me, whether you are at school, at work, and especially if you wear the hijab. (Translated from Arabic by Anne Aly) At the same time, Australian Muslims observe some members of the broader community making strong assertions about Muslims (often based on misunderstanding or misinformation) with very little in the way of censure or rebuke. For example, again in 2005, Liberal backbenchers Sophie Panopoulos and Bronwyn Bishop made an emotive plea for the banning of headscarves in public schools, drawing explicitly on the historically inherited image of Islam as a violent, backward and oppressive ideology that has no place in Western liberal democracy: I fear a frightening Islamic class emerging, supported by a perverse interpretation of the Koran where disenchantment breeds disengagement, where powerful and subversive orthodoxies are inculcated into passionate and impressionable young Muslims, where the Islamic mosque becomes the breeding ground for violence and rejection of Australian law and ideals, where extremists hijack the Islamic faith with their own prescriptive and unbending version of the Koran and where extremist views are given currency and validity … . Why should one section of the community be stuck in the Dark Ages of compliance cloaked under a veil of some distorted form of religious freedom? (Panopoulos) Several studies attest to the fact that, since the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Islam, and by association Australian Muslims, have been positioned as other in the political and media discourse (see for example Aly). The construct of Muslims as ‘out of place’ (Saniotis) denies them entry and representation in the public sphere: a key requisite for democratic participation according to Habermas (cited in Haas). This notion of a lack of a context for Muslim citizenship in Australian public spheres arises out of the popular construction of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Australian’ as mutually exclusive modes of being. Denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as political citizens, Australian Muslims must pursue alternative communicative spaces. Some respond by limiting their expressions to closed spheres of communication – a kind of enforced silence. Others respond by pursuing alternative media discourses that challenge the dominant stereotypes of Muslims in Western media and reinforce majority-world cultural views. Enforced Silence In closed spheres of discussion, Australian Muslims can openly share their perceptions about terrorism, the government and media. Speaking openly in public however, is not common practice and results in forced silence for fear of reprisal or being branded a terrorist: “if we jump up and go ‘oh how dare you say this, rah, rah’, he’ll be like ‘oh he’s going to go off, he’ll blow something up’”. One research participant recalled that when his work colleagues were discussing the September 11 attacks he decided not to partake in the conversation because it “might be taken against me”. The participant made this decision despite the fact that his colleagues were expressing the opinion that United States foreign policy was the likely cause for the attacks—an opinion with which he agreed. This suggests some support for the theory that the fear of social isolation may make Australian Muslims especially anxious or fearful of expressing opinions about terrorism in public discussions (Noelle-Neumann). However, it also suggests that the fear of social isolation for Muslims is not solely related to the expression of minority opinion, as theorised in Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence . Given that many members of the wider community shared the theory that the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in 2001 may have been a response to American foreign policy, this may well not be a minority view. Nonetheless, Australian Muslims hesitated to embrace it. Saniotis draws attention to the pressure on Australian Muslims to publicly distance themselves from the terrorist attacks of September 11 and to openly denounce the actions of terrorists. The extent to which Muslims were positioned as a threatening other was contingent on their ability to demonstrate that they too participated in the distal responses to the terrorist attacks—initial pity for the sufferer and eventual marginalisation and rejection of the perceived aggressor. Australian Muslims were obliged to declare their loyalty and commitment to Australia’s ally and, in this way, partake in the nationalistic responses to the threat of terrorism. At the same time however, Australian Muslims were positioned as an imagined enemy and a threat to national identity. Australian Muslims were therefore placed in a paradoxical bind- as Australians they were expected to respond as the victims of fear; as Muslims they were positioned as the objects of fear. Even in discussions where their opinions are congruent with the dominant opinion being expressed, Australian Muslims describe themselves as feeling apprehensive or anxious about expressing their opinions because of how these “might be taken”. Pursuing alternative discourses The overriding message from the research project’s Muslim participants was that the media, as a powerful purveyor of public opinion, had inculcated a perception of Muslims as a risk to Australia and Australians: an ‘enemy within’; the potential ‘home grown terrorist’. The daily experience of visibly-different Australian Muslims, however, is that they are more fearing than fear-inspiring. The Aly and Balnaves fear scale indicates that Australian Muslims have twice as many fear indicators as non-Muslims Australians. Disengagement from Western media and media that is seen to be influenced or controlled by the West is widespread among Australian Muslims who increasingly argue that the media institutions are motivated by an agenda that includes profit and the perpetuation of a negative stereotype of Muslims both in Australia and around the globe, particularly in relation to Middle Eastern affairs. The negative stereotypes of Muslims in the Australian media have inculcated a sense of victimhood which Muslims in Australia have used as the basis for a reconstruction of their identity and the creation of alternative narratives of belonging (Aly). Central to the notion of identity among Australian Muslims is a sense of having their citizenship rights curtailed by virtue of their faith: of being included in a general Western dismissal of Muslims’ rights and experiences. As one interviewee said: If you look at the Channel Al Jazeera for example, it’s a channel but they aren’t making up stories, they are taping videos in Iraqi, Palestine and other Muslim countries, and they just show it to people, that’s all they do. And then George Bush, you know, we hear on the news that George Bush was discussing with Tony Blair that he was thinking to bomb Al Jazeera so why would these people have their right to freedom and we don’t? So that’s why I think the people who are in power, they have the control over the media, and it’s a big political game. Because if it wasn’t then George Bush, he’s the symbol of politics, why would he want to bomb Al Jazeera for example? Amidst leaks and rumours (Timms) that the 2003 US bombing of Al Jazeera was a deliberate attack upon one of the few elements of the public sphere in which some Western-nationality Muslims have confidence, many elements of the mainstream Western media rose to Al Jazeera’s defence. For example, using an appeal to the right of citizens to engage in and consume free speech, the editors of influential US paper The Nation commented that: If the classified memo detailing President Bush’s alleged proposal to bomb the headquarters of Al Jazeera is provided to The Nation, we will publish the relevant sections. Why is it so vital that this information be made available to the American people? Because if a President who claims to be using the US military to liberate countries in order to spread freedom then conspires to destroy media that fail to echo his sentiments, he does not merely disgrace his office and soil the reputation of his country. He attacks a fundamental principle, freedom of the press—particularly a dissenting and disagreeable press—upon which that country was founded. (cited in Scahill) For other Australian Muslims, it is the fact that some media organisations have been listed as banned by the US that gives them their ultimate credibility. This is the case with Al Manar, for example. Feeling that they are denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as equal political citizens, Australian Muslims are pursuing alternative communicative spaces that support and reinforce their own cultural worldviews. The act of engaging with marginalised and alternative communicative spaces constitutes what Clifford terms ‘collective practices of displaced dwelling’. It is through these practices of displaced dwelling that Australian Muslims essentialise their diasporic identity and negotiate new identities based on common perceptions of injustice against Muslims. But you look at Al Jazeera they talk in the same tongue as the Western media in our language. And then you look again at something like Al Manar who talks of their own tongue. They do not use the other media’s ideas. They have been attacked by the Australians, been attacked by the Israelis and they have their own opinion. This statement came from an Australian Muslim of Jordanian background in her late forties. It reflects a growing trend towards engaging with media messages that coincide with and reinforce a sense of injustice. The Al Manar television station to which this participant refers is a Lebanese based station run by the militant Hezbollah movement and accessible to Australians via satellite. Much like Al Jazeera, Al Manar broadcasts images of Iraqi and Palestinian suffering and, in the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, graphic images of Lebanese casualties of Israeli air strikes. Unlike the Al Jazeera broadcasts, these images are formatted into video clips accompanied by music and lyrics such as “we do not fear America”. Despite political pressure including a decision by the US to list Al Manar as a terrorist organisation in December 2004, just one week after a French ban on the station because its programming had “a militant perspective with anti-Semitic connotations” (Jorisch), Al Manar continued to broadcast videos depicting the US as the “mother of terrorism”. In one particularly graphic sequence, the Statue of Liberty rises from the depths of the sea, wielding a knife in place of the torch and dripping in blood, her face altered to resemble a skull. As she rises out of the sea accompanied by music resembling a funeral march the following words in Arabic are emblazoned across the screen: On the dead bodies of millions of native Americans And through the enslavement of tens of millions Africans The US rose It pried into the affairs of most countries in the world After an extensive list of countries impacted by US foreign policy including China, Japan, Congo, Vietnam, Peru, Laos, Libya and Guatamala, the video comes to a gruelling halt with the words ‘America owes blood to all of humanity’. Another video juxtaposes images of Bush with Hitler with the caption ‘History repeats itself’. One website run by the Coalition against Media Terrorism refers to Al Manar as ‘the beacon of hatred’ and applauds the decisions by the French and US governments to ban the station. Al Manar defended itself against the bans stating on its website that they are attempts “to terrorise and silence thoughts that are not in line with the US and Israeli policies.” The station claims that it continues on its mission “to carry the message of defending our peoples’ rights, holy places and just causes…within internationally agreed professional laws and standards”. The particular brand of propaganda employed by Al Manar is gaining popularity among some Muslims in Australia largely because it affirms their own views and opinions and offers them opportunities to engage in an alternative public space in which Muslims are positioned as the victims and not the aggressors. Renegotiating an ‘Othered’ Identity The negative portrayal of Muslims as ‘other’ in the Australian media and in political discourse has resulted in Australian Muslims constructing alternative identities based on a common perception of injustice. Particularly since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the ensuing “war on terror”, the ethnic divisions within the Muslim diaspora are becoming less significant as Australian Muslims reconstruct their identity based on a notion of supporting each other in the face of a global alliance against Islam. Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia. This causes problems, however, since religious identity has no place in the liberal democratic model, which espouses secularism. This is particularly the case where that religion is sometimes constructed as being at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy; namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. This problematic creates a context in which Muslim Australians are not only denied their heterogeneity in the media and political discourse but are dealt with through an understanding of Islam that is constructed on the basis of a cultural and ideological clash between Islam and the West. Religion has become the sole and only characteristic by which Muslims are recognised, denying them political citizenship and access to the public spaces of citizenship. Such ‘essentialising practices’ as eliding considerable diversity into a single descriptor serves to reinforce and consolidate diasporic identity among Muslims in Australia, but does little to promote and assist participatory citizenship or to equip Muslims with the tools necessary to access the public sphere as political citizens of the secular state. In such circumstances, the moderate Muslim may be not so much a ‘preferred’ citizen as one whose rights has been constrained. Acknowledgment This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. References Akbarzadeh, Shahram, and Bianca Smith. The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media (The Age and Herald Sun Newspapers). Melbourne: Monash University, 2005. Aly, Anne, and Mark Balnaves. ”‘They Want Us to Be Afraid’: Developing Metrics of the Fear of Terrorism.” International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 6 (2007): 113-122. Aly, Anne. “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42.1 (2007): 27-40. Clifford, James. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. London: Harvard UP, 1997. 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Feb. 2008 http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/nov/23/iraq.iraqandthemedia>. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Aly, Anne, and Lelia Green. "‘Moderate Islam’: Defining the Good Citizen." M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/08-aly-green.php>. APA Style Aly, A., and L. Green. (Apr. 2008) "‘Moderate Islam’: Defining the Good Citizen," M/C Journal, 10(6)/11(1). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/08-aly-green.php>.