Academic literature on the topic 'Liberal Islam, Indonesia'

Kemajuan yang dicapai oleh negara Barat dalam bidang ilmu pengetahuan, teknologi, dan ekonomi, berakar pada trilogi liberalisme, pluralisme, dan sekularisme. Atas dasar itulah, beberapa tokoh Islam Indonesia ingin memajukan umatnya dengan trilogi tersebut. Dalam perjalanannya, tokoh Islam seperti Nurcholish Madjid dan Ulil Abshar menuai kritik dari Rasjidi dan Atiyan Ali. Puncaknya adalah ketika MUI mengeluarkan fatwa mengharamkan Islam liberal. Bagaimana gambaran sejarah masuk Islam liberal di Indonesia? Mengapa terjadi polemik Islam liberal di Indonesia? Untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, metode yang digunakan adalah metode sejarah, meliputi heuristik, kritik, interpretasi, dan historiografi. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian, sejarah Islam liberal di Indonesia terbagi ke dalam empat tahap, yaitu: Tahap awal ketika masih menyatu dengan pemikiran neo-modernisme. Kedua, pembentukan enam paradigma Islam liberal. Ketiga adanya kritik dan evaluasi pemikiran Islam liberal. Kemudian sebab terjadinya polemk pemikiran Islam liberal disebabkan oleh perbedaan paradigma berfikir dan metodologi memahami ajaran Islam dalam melihat realitas yang terjadi di masyarakat pada masa kontemporer. The progress achieved by Western countries in the fields of science, technology and economics is rooted in liberalism, pluralism and secularism. For this reason, some Indonesian Muslim intellectuals want to reform their people accordingly. However, in working with these modern ideas, the polemics arose as those Muslim scholars such as Nurcholish Madjid and Ulil Abshar were criticized by Rasyidi and Atiyan Ali. This caused the MUI to issued a fatwa forbidding Liberal Islam. This study addressed two questions: How did liberal Islam come to Indonesia? Why did liberal Islam polemic occur in Indonesia? The method employed in this study is historical method which is comprised of heuristics, criticism or analysis, interpretation, and historiography. The result of the study shows that the history of liberal Islam in Indonesia was developed into four stages. First, when the thought of liberal Islam was still integrated with neo-modernism. Second, the establishment of six liberal Islam paradigms. Third, the emergence of criticism and evaluation toward it. Fourth, the polemic of liberal Islamic thought was caused by different paradigms and methodology in understanding the teaching of Islam that is compatible with the needs of contemporary society.

Penulis berusaha dalam tulisan ini membahasa dan mengkaji mengenai pemikiran Islam Liberal dan kritikan tehadap pemikiran tersebut, agar umat Islam di Indonesia bisa menjauhi pemikiran yang sangat bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip Islam ini. Dalam karya ini juga penulis menjelaskan sedikit menganai arti dari kata Islam dan Liberal karena dua kata ini ketika digabungkan sangatlah kontradiksi, yang mana Islam dalam arti tunduk dan patuh sedangkan Liberal memiliki arti bebas. Dalam sejarah perkembangan Liberalisme di Indonesia bermula pada tahun 1970 dan berkembang dengan tiga fase hingga munculah fatwa MUI tntang pelarangan pemikiran tersebut. Dan penulis menyinggung sedikit tentang hiruk pikuknya pemikiran Islam Liberal dan kritikas serta respon dari pada ormas-ormas yang baru muncul setelah masa reformasi hingga dua ormas terbesar dan tertua di Indonesia yaitu NU dan Muhammadiyah

<p>Tulisan ini membahas tentang respons terhadap pemikiran yang dilontarkan oleh para pendukung Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), sebuah jaringan yang beranggotakan anak-anak muda yang menyebarkan gagasan-gagasan pemikiran liberal. JIL telah menjadi salah satu ikon pemikiran Islam liberal di Indonesia. Banyak di antara gagasan-gagasan pemikiran yang diusung oleh para anggotanya menjadi gagasan yang kontroversial. Sebuah artikel berjudul “Menyegarkan Kembali Pemahaman Islam” yang ditulis oleh Ulil Abshar-Abdalla dan dimuat dalam harian Kompas menjadi salah satu artikel yang paling kontroversial. Berbagai respons dan kritik telah dilontarkan terhadap artikel tersebut, baik respons metodologis kritis ataupun apologetis, respons yang bersifat teoretis normatif maupun praktis. Bahkan fatwa mati telah dikeluarkan oleh sekelompok orang bagi penulis artikel tersebut. Dalam banyak hal, respons dan kritik tersebut bukanlah hal baru dalam sejarah perjalanan Islam di Indonesia. Berbagai kritik serupa juga telah dilontarkan oleh berbagai kalangan terhadap Nurcholish Madjid di era 1970-an ketika melontarkan gagasan yang sangat kontroversial, yaitu gagasan tentang pembaharuan pemikiran Islam. Hanya fatwa mati saja yang tidak pernah keluar bagi Nurcholish Madjid.</p>

Liberal Islam Network (JIL), is an organization that carries liberal ideas in Indonesia, encompassing Pluralism, anti-theocracy, supporting democracy and guaranteeing women's rights. JIL emphasizes individual freedom, opens the door of ijtihad in its widest manner by promoting an understanding of context rather than text, and liberates from oppressive social and political structures. JIL discourse is a lot of lurking controversy in Indonesia. JIL discourse is considered to have undermined the understanding of established Islamic teaching (qath'i). Practically, this movement of thought does not see the problems comprehensively. This paper will look at the understanding of JIL in formulating the discourse in terms of the Sociology approach. Conclusively JIL tends to use the Conflict Theory to address the established traditions. This theory is built on three basic assumptions, one of which is the regularity contained in society simply because of pressure or coercion of power from the ruling class, represented by the establishment of the tradition itself

In the contemporary Islamic discourse in Indonesia, an Islamic movement initiated by a group of young muslim intelectuals emerged which offered a new paradigm in comprehending Islamic doctrines. The movement naming itself Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) carrys some jargons of modern life like pluralism, tolerance, inclussivism, freedom of thought, and human rights. Through sociological approach, this article shows that JIL has played a significant role in dinamizing Islamic discouse in Indonesia. JIL proposed the “individualism” of Islamic thought; it is called “individual autonomy” in Berger and Luckman’s term, and “Islamic liberalism” in Binder and Kurzman’s one. Some methodologies applied by JIL in promoting its ideas are ijtihad freedom, hermeneutics, reactualization of Islamic doctrines, and “al-muhâfazhah ‘alâ al-qadîm al-shâlih wa al-akhdzu bi al-jadîd al-ashlah”.

Theofogicaffy, Islam is one and absolutely correct. However, historicaffy, after being understood and translated into the real life, Islam is not single, but various or plural that manifests at feast in three schools of thoughts: Traditional Islam, Revivalist Islam (fundamentalism), and Liberal Islam (Progressive). The group of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) represents the fast school of thoughts. Even though it is stiff young (ten years), JIL becomes populer because it frequentfy proposes the new thoughts that often evoke controversions in the community. The reformation of thoughts proposed by JIL covers four areas: first, reformation in politics. In this context, JIL gives a priority to the idea of secularism; Second, reformation in socio-religion. Dealing with this, JIL proposes the concept of pluralism; Third, reformation in individual freedom. In this case, JIL gives a priority to the idea of liberalism both in thoughts and actions;fourth, reformation in women. Regarding this, JIL proposes the idea of gender equaliry. This reformation thought of JIL receives pro and con in the community. On the one hand,some of them panne and fulminate it; on the other hand, the other ones support and give appreciation. In such situation, JIL grows as a thought and Islamic progressive movement in Indonesia. Key Words: Islamic Thought, JIL, Secularism, Pluralism, Liberalism, and Gender Equality.

Jaringan Islam Liberal adalah salah satu lokomotif yang menggerakan tata nilai pemikiran keagamaan yang menekankan pada pemahaman Islam yang terbuka, toleran, inklusif dan kontekstual. Di Indonesia penyebaran Islam liberal telah berlangsung sejak awal tahun 70-an dan sejak tahun 2001, sejumlah aktivis dan intelektual muda Islam memulai penyebaran gagasan Islam liberal secara lebih terorganisir. Jaringan Islam Liberal mencoba membangun dan mengembangkan suasana beragama yang transformatif dan inklusif, menampakkan signifikansinya untuk selalu “dilirik” oleh komunitas umat. Melalui pemahaman keagamaan yang holistik dan pola keagamaan yang inklusif, umat Islam diharapkan dapat menyelesaikan krisis kemanusiaan, serta menjadikan modernitas sebagai proses yang memberikan manfaat sebesar-besarnya bagi manusia.

Abstract: The Greg Barton’s point of view on liberal Islam and Islamic political existence in Indonesia departs from the result of his study on liberal Muslim thinkers in Indonesia, including NurcholishMadjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Their thoughts are classified as a liberal. Madjid, in most of his methodologies, uses a double movement, while Wahid uses a socio-cultural approach. In addition, MadjidCakNuris also known by his secularization project, while Wahidis famous by his pluralism project. Greg Barton arrived at this conclusion after reading Madjid and Wahid’s opinions in books and articles. In relation to the existence of the political Islam in Indonesia, Greg Barton views that the collapse of the Islamist party of Masjumiwaspartly contributed by Madjid’sliberal thought in understanding Islam. On the other hands, the appearance of religious pluralism in society, which is also a part of a liberal Islamic thought, wasexpedited by Wahid when he was a president of Indonesia.Keywords: Islam liberal, Islamic political existence, Greg Barton Abstrak: Pandangan Greg Barton mengenai Islam liberal dan eksistensi politik Islam di Indonesia berangkat dari hasil penelitiannya terhadap tokoh-tokoh Islam liberal yang ada di Indonesia, di antaranya Nurcholis Madjid dan Abdurrahman Wahid. Kedua tokoh tersebut merupakan sample tokoh Islam liberal yang concern dan konsisten dalam pemikirannya terhadap Islam. Pemikiran kedua tokoh tersebut berada pada jalur liberal. Cak Nur menggunakan metode Double Movement dalam kerangka berpikirnya, sedangkan Gus Dur menggunakan pendekatan sosio kultural. Cak Nur dikenal dengan sekularisasinya, sedangkan Gus Dur dikenal dengan pluralismenya. Pemikiran keduanya oleh Greg Barton digambarkan dengan beberapa karya tulis yang menggambarkan sisi sekularnya bagi Cak Nur, dan sisi pluralnya bagi Gus Dur. Dalam kaitannya terhadap eksistensi politik Islam di Indonesia, Greg Barton memandang bahwa runtuhnya Masyumi era Cak Nur, merupakan dampak dari pemikiran liberal Cak Nur dalam memahami Islam. Selain itu muncul nilai pluralitas yang tinggi di masyarakat, yang juga merupakan bagian dari pemikiran Islam liberal. Hal ini dilakukan oleh Gus Dur pada masa ia menduduki pucuk pimpinan negara dan berlangsung lama meskipun ketika Gus Dur lengser.Kata Kunci: Islam liberal, eksistensi politik Islam, Greg Barton

This article aims to look at the political views of the Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) in Indonesia. As a community that wants to carry out reforms with the spirit of modernization and rationality in religion, seeing it in political and democratic contestation in Indonesia is interesting. So this article questions two things; how does Jaringan Islam Liberal view the relevance of religion and politics? and how does Jaringan Islam Liberal view the implementation of democracy? The method used in this paper is a literature study that seeks to collect data from journal articles, books, and other related reading materials. This article shows that the Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network) rejects forms of political Islam that try to formally fight for the superiority of Islamic value systems and symbols in the political sphere. They also reject the idea of an Islamic state and the formalization of shari'ah, and sees democracy as a value that must be implemented in a country. This is because it is in accordance with the basic rights that must be owned by individuals, which are known as human rights.

The term Liberal Islam Network was not well known and was not noticed by people in Indonesia. Moreover, the number of proponents’ is very small, can be counted on the fingers. It presents a new face of Islam which is in the form of non-orthodox, Islam that has compatibility with alteration of era and Islam that has an insight into the future. That is not Islam that has ignorance into the future or that is not outdated. But the ideas promoted by them get a strong reaction from the public, either from the Indonesian religious leaders, or from the Indonesian Moslem intellectuals. Therefore, the term Liberal Islam Network was actually popularized by the opponents.

Cette thèse propose une lecture juridique, politique et sociale de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 dans le plus grand pays musulman du monde, l’Indonésie. Plusieurs controverses sont apparues ces dernières années concernant la nature de la loi sur le blasphème dans la vie religieuse de la société démocratique indonésienne ; cette loi correspond-elle à la prévention des abus en matière de religion et/ou de blasphème, comme il est mentionné explicitement dans son titre, ou bien concernerait-elle plutôt la restriction de la liberté de religion et d’expression en matière religieuse ? En avril 2010, après le procès contrôlant la constitutionnalité de cette loi, une décision de la Cour constitutionnelle indonésienne a établi que la loi examinée ne correspondait pas à cette seconde lecture. Si cette loi a bien pour objectif de restreindre la liberté de religion ou d’expression en matière religieuse, selon la Cour, cela ne signifie pas que cette forme de restriction est inconstitutionnelle dès lors que la Constitution de 1945 en vigueur s’accompagne d’une restriction légale au respect ou à la sauvegarde des valeurs religieuses en particulier, à côté de la moralité, de la sécurité et de l’ordre public. Toutefois, les débats et les tensions au sein de la société concernant l’application de cette loi perdurent sans relâche. Les défenseurs des droits de l’homme maintiennent que l’existence d’une telle loi anti-blasphème est contraire à l’esprit de la démocratie. En revanche, les défenseurs de la censure religieuse s’obstinent à affirmer que cette loi est nécessaire pour éviter les conflits religieux. À travers une analyse de son contenu juridique et de sa mise en application, nous considérons que la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 a visé en premier lieu à entraver le déploiement des courants de croyance spirituelle locale ou des courants mystiques javanais qui, dans une certaine mesure, sont considérés par les musulmans en particulier comme une menace pour les religions existantes et pour la désintégration du pays. Dans un second temps, nous verrons que l’existence de ladite loi est davantage destinée à restreindre le nombre des religions reconnues par l’État d’une part, et à réprimer les courants religieux « dissidents » ou « hétérodoxes » d’autre part. Si les actes jugés comme blasphématoires, parmi lesquels figure la diffusion d’interprétation religieuse « déviantes » de l’orthodoxie, sont des infractions sanctionnées, ce n’est pas la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 qui sert de référence, mais l’article 156a du Code pénal qui trouve son origine dans ladite loi. Ainsi, la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 est plutôt utilisée pour restreindre la liberté de religion et de conviction au sens large, alors que l’article 156a du Code pénal est chargé de limiter la liberté d’expression en matière religieuse. En Indonésie comme ailleurs, le renforcement de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème va de pair avec l’émergence des groupes religieux radicaux qui veulent voir triompher leur conception totalitaire d’une liberté d’expression bridée par le respect de la foi religieuse. Ces derniers utilisent de cette loi non seulement à des fins religieuses, mais également à des fins politiques, notamment celle déstabiliser un régime « laïque » ou bien d’étendre leur influence. L’objectif de cette thèse est non seulement d’analyser la nature de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965, mais aussi de proposer une perspective alternative pour aborder les conflits juridiques en Indonésie concernant les deux droits fondamentaux, à savoir le droit à la liberté de religion et le droit d’expression. La thèse vise alors la prévention des conflits juridiques en la matière et ainsi qu’à trouver un équilibre entre les libertés concernées
This thesis proposes a legal, political and social reading of the application of the blasphemy law in the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. Several controversies have emerged in recent years regarding the nature of the blasphemy law in the religious life of the Indonesian democratic society. For instance, disagreement remains with regards to the intent of this law, i.e., whether it really aims at preventing misuse of religion and/or acts of blasphemy, as explicitly mentioned in its title, or whether it intends to restrict the freedom of religion and religious expression. In April 2010, after the examination of the constitutionality of this law, the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled out the second possibility. The court further argues that even if the law has an unintended effect of restricting the freedom of religion or religious expression, it is not against the constitution since the 1945 Constitution is accompanied by a legal restriction to respect or preserve religious values in particular, as well as morality, security and public order. However, the debates and tensions within society regarding the implementation of this law continue unabated. On the one hand, human rights defenders persist in saying that the existing anti-blasphemy law is contrary to the spirit of democracy. On the other, defenders of religious censorship persist in resisting that this law is necessary to avoid religious conflicts. Through an analysis of legal content and its implementation, I argue that the blasphemy law of 1965 initially aims to hinder the development of the local spiritual belief stream or Javanese mystical groups, which to some extent are considered by Muslims in particular as a threat to existing religions and a source of disintegration of the country. Further, I maintain that the existence of the above-mentioned law has the tendency to restrict the number of religions officially acknowledged by the State and to repress “dissident” or “heterodox” religious movements. If acts considered blasphemous, including the "deviant" religious interpretation of orthodoxy, are punishable offenses, it is not the anti-blasphemy law of 1965 that serves as a reference, but the article 156a of the Penal Code, which has its origin in that blasphemy law does. As a consequence, the blasphemy law of the 1965 is rather used to restrict the freedom of religion and belief in the broad sense, while article 156a of the Penal Code is applied to limit the freedom of religious expression. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the strengthening of the application of the blasphemy law goes hand in hand with the emergence of radical religious groups intend to promote their totalitarian concept of freedom of expression restrained by respect for the religious faith. The latter make use of this law not only for religious reasons, but also for political reasons, including destabilizing a secular regime or extending their influence. The thesis does not only aim to analyze the nature of the blasphemy law of 1965, but also to propose an alternative perspective in understanding and solving the problem of the legal conflicts in Indonesia pertaining to the two fundamental rights, namely the right to freedom of religion and expression. The thesis also seeks to find a balance between two freedoms and to propose preventive measures that can be adopted in the aforementioned legal conflicts

This thesis examines how reason and freedom have been expressed in Islam through a study of the Mu'tazilite movement in 8th century Persia, the Indonesian Islamic scholar and educator Harun Nasution and the Liberal Islam Network formed in Indonesia in 2001.

The focus of Chapter 5 is how the acts of religious improvisation intersect with political attempts to present Indonesia internationally as a “moderate” Muslim nation that is different from the “despotic” and “chaotic” Middle East. Although Muslims of different ideological stripes are actually capitulating to the West and absorbing the ideals of secular liberalism, the moderate Muslim discourse identifies liberal Muslims as “good” believers while denouncing Islamists as “bad” believers in need of liberal salvation. Blaming violence and discrimination on “bad” religion, however, promotes the view of religion as bounded and coherent and overlooks the complex constellation of factors that produce social ills.

Within the context of Indonesia’s encounters with liberalism in late colonial and postcolonial times, this chapter examines Muslim discourses that are critical of both Western liberal ideology and its Islamist detractors. After problematizing the existing categories of Islamic neo-modernism, Liberal Islam, and Islamic liberalism, the chapter focuses on alternative discourses formulated by Muslim intellectuals from both traditionalist and modernist-reformist Islamic backgrounds during the Reformasi era when Indonesia transitioned from a military autocracy to a democratic system of governance. Islamic Post-Traditionalists draws on poststructuralism and postcolonial theory to offer an emancipatory trajectory for Indonesian Muslims in the twenty-first century, while modernist-reformist intellectuals have drawn on the social sciences to develop a new paradigm referred to as Transformative Islam. Instead of presenting sweeping ideas, this younger generation is more concerned with translating new regimes of knowledge into applied thinking about concrete issues, such as democratization, development, justice and battling corruption.

This chapter explains how liberal Muslim intellectuals and activists have drawn on religious teachings to popularize and validate political reform and human rights agendas from the late 1980s. This prepared the way for Indonesia's majority Islamic community to embrace democracy as an alternative to authoritarianism. The wealth of progressive Islamic thought and action that marked those decades, has, however, fallen victim to the illiberal aspects of reformasi. One of the paradoxes of democratization is that the progressive Islamic movement quickly became a casualty of the increasing dominance of conservative Islamic forces. The chapter concludes that while liberal Islam flourished in New Order Indonesia because it had the support of the regime, it was unable to leverage that success in the face of broader religiocultural and political changes from the early 2000s, which have been driven by, and favored, conservative Islamist forces.

The history of postcolonial Indonesia can therefore be divided into three periods, dominated by different regimes with its own characteristics, during which Islamisation process has continued to evolve. The Sukarno presidency (1945-1965) marks the first period, during which Mayumi established itself as the main Islamic political party. It began with decade of continuing nation building when the young republic was first engaged in armed conflict with the Dutch; experimented with liberal democracy; but then shifted toward ‘Guided Democracy’ and the disbanding of Masyumi. During the same twenty-year period, the unity of Indonesia was also challenged by the Islamist Darul Islam movement. A military coup in 1965 heralded the beginning of the military New Order Regime of General Suharto (1965-1998). Political Islam was kept control and occasionally manipulating it for its own purposes. From the 1970s onward, New Order did make some allowances for Muslim participation in governance, initiating further use of Islam for political purposes between 1983—1993. After the dramatic regime change in 1998, the democratisation process that started in 1999 saw an unprecedented opening-up of the public sphere. This change in Indonesia’s political climate offered new opportunities for socio-political activism across the Islamic spectrum, but also presented a new set of challenges for the world’s largest Muslim nation state. Islamic mass organisations, newly formed political parties, NGOs, think tanks and other platforms began presenting a range of competing Islamic discourses.

This chapter studies the common assumption that in Muslim societies, religion plays a negative part in the development of democracy. Indeed, some observers uphold the idea of ‘Islamic exceptionalism’ — in effect the view that Muslims are uniquely resistant to liberal democracy and secularism. Democratic institutions left by departing Western regimes, so the argument runs, have failed to survive everywhere except in Turkey; they have been superseded by autocracy and one-party states. Islamists in particular are thought to endorse democracy, before subsequently suppressing democratic opposition as subversive and irreligious. Another obvious limitation of the negative view is that it focuses on a few Muslim countries around the Mediterranean, and ignores those in the Far East, such as Indonesia, not to mention those that do not have a Muslim majority, such as India. Neither of those countries is consistent with the conventional assumptions. Moreover, the negative view tends to overlook the fact that Oriental societies have good grounds for regarding the Western model of parliamentary democracy as suspect — not least because the United States and Britain have a record of collaborating with Muslim autocracies and undermining and overthrowing democracies when they choose left-wing or anti-Western governments. This is notoriously the case in countries such as Iran after 1945.

This chapter explains the main concept of the book, religious improvisation, or how the practice of Islam involves trial and error and is contingent upon context. The possibility for religious improvisation has been enhanced in Indonesia’s transition from authoritarianism and democracy, which is why both conservative Islamists and liberal Muslims—the main actors shaping Indonesian democracy—are participating in it. Religious improvisation produces part-Islamic, part-Western assemblages. Such hybrid practices may indeed seem strange and surprising, and they importantly challenge dominant assumptions that Islam is external to Western secular liberalism.