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1
Judson, Pieter M. "“Not Another Square Foot!” German Liberalism and the Rhetoric of National Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Austria." Austrian History Yearbook 26 (January 1995): 83–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0067237800004252.
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Early on involume 3 of his massive political memoirs, German Liberal party leader Ernst von Plener offhandedly introduces the reader to a I new word that had entered Austrian political discourse in the 1880s. The word isNationalbesitzstand, or “national property,” and Plener calls it “ a word taken from our party's rhetoric.” Most historians remember Plener as the quintessential Austrian centralist, a Liberal party leader of the bureaucratic mold whose annoyance with German nationalist agitation was equaled only by his discomfort with the public demands forced on him by constituent politics. And yet in the late 1880s and early 1890s we find the sober Plener increasingly resorting to an aggressively nationalist rhetoric organized around this concept ofNationalbesitzstand, a rhetoric often invoked by the very radical nationalists, populists, and anti-Semites he scorned. In this article I explore the growing use of such rhetoric by Liberals like Plener in the 1880s as a way to suggest some new approaches to understanding the development of German nationalism among nineteenth-century Austrians. In particular I consider how the concept ofNationalbesitzstandmediated a transformation in the rhetoric employed by self-identified Germans in the monarchy to justify their privileged position vis-à-vis other national groups. Where formerly German nationalists had rejected arguments based on empirical data like population or land ownership statistics to legitimize their political claims, in the 1880s and 1890s they began to embrace such arguments.
2
Mühlstein, Jan, Lea Muehlstein, and Jonathan Magonet. "The Return of Liberal Judaism to Germany." European Judaism 49, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 44–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/ej.2016.490105.
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AbstractThe German Jewish community established after World War Two was shaped by refugees from Eastern Europe, so the congregations they established were Orthodox. However, in 1995 independent Liberal Jewish initiatives started in half a dozen German cities. The story of Beth Shalom in Munich illustrates the stages of such a development beginning with the need for a Sunday school for Jewish families and experiments with monthly Shabbat services. The establishment of a congregation was helped by the support of the European Region of the World Union for Progressive Judaism and ongoing input from visiting rabbis. The twenty years since the founding of the congregation have also seen the creation of the Union of Progressive Jews in Germany, the successful political struggle for a share of the state funding for Jewish communities and the establishment of the first Jewish theological faculty in Germany.
3
Hung, Jochen. "The ‘Ullstein Spirit’: The Ullstein Publishing House, the End of the Weimar Republic and the Making of Cold War German Identity, 1925–77." Journal of Contemporary History 53, no. 1 (December 22, 2016): 158–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009416669419.
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This article examines the role of the Ullstein company, a liberal publishing house with Jewish roots and one of Germany’s most important cultural producers, in the disintegration and the subsequent historical interpretation of the Weimar Republic. It reconstructs the company’s history before and after the Second World War and retraces the public debate about Ullstein’s political role to arrive at a more balanced picture of the company’s place in twentieth-century Germany. Ullstein portrayed itself as a pillar of democracy during the Weimar era, but distanced itself from this tradition during the economic and political crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s. After 1945, Ullstein’s history was distorted by its use as a political token in the Cold War struggle between the two German states over the ‘right’ view of Weimar’s demise. Western media – most prominently the Axel Springer publishing house – interpreted Ullstein as a symbol of a Jewish-German tradition of Western liberal democracy, while the East German press and some commentators in West Germany accused the company of paving the way for the Nazis. Ultimately, Axel Springer succeeded in integrating an overly positive version of Ullstein’s history into West German national identity.
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RYNHOLD, JONATHAN. "The German question in Central and Eastern Europe and the long peace in Europe after 1945: an integrated theoretical explanation." Review of International Studies 37, no. 1 (July 19, 2010): 249–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210510000501.
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AbstractWithin the field of International Relations, theoretically informed explanations of the long peace in Europe since 1945 tend to focus on Western Europe, especially the revolution in Franco-German relations. In contrast, German relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are ignored, despite the fact that this nexus was a major cause of instability prior to 1945. This article focuses on why the German question in CEE ceased to threaten the stability of Europe after 1945. The article empirically examines the development of the German question in CEE since 1945, which refers here mainly to the Oder-Neisse line and the plight of ethnic Germans expelled from CEE after World War II. It provides a theoretically integrated and chronologically sequenced explanation. First, it argues that Realism primarily explains the successful containment of the German question in CEE between 1945 and the late 1960s. Second, it argues that the Constructivist process of cultural change, which altered German intensions, was primarily responsible for subsequently increasing the depth of peace and stability between Germany and CEE, especially after the Cold War. Finally, it is argued that prior Realist factors and Liberal processes constituted a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for cultural change.
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Luft, David S. "Austrian Intellectual History before the Liberal Era: Grillparzer, Stifter, and Bolzano." Austrian History Yearbook 41 (April 2010): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s006723780999004x.
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In 1960, Robert A. Kann pointed out in A Study in Austrian Intellectual History: From Late Baroque to Romanticism that “[h]istorians of the future will still have to meet the challenging task of writing the comprehensive German-Austrian intellectual history.” The value of the project Kann called for is generally acknowledged, but there is no clear agreement in the field about what a survey of German-Austrian intellectual history should look like. In 2007, I argued in an article for The Austrian History Yearbook that the scope of Austrian intellectual history still needs to be circumscribed and characterized adequately—geographically, linguistically, and comparatively. Rather than concentrating on Vienna or extending the field to the whole of the Habsburg monarchy, including Hungary and Galicia, I proposed that we concentrate our approach to this question on the historic core of the Austrian state: the Austrian and Bohemian Crownlands, a unity from at least 1749 to 1918. This was the region where state-building, centralization, and reform were most coherently pursued in the century after 1749, when the German language was dominant in education and public life. I contrasted this view to the disembodied approach to the German intellectual life of the entire Habsburg monarchy, which relies on conventions that were developed for dynastic and diplomatic history, conventions that also work quite well for economic history or even for cultural history, neither of which is so directly dependent on language. The region I have in mind is the southeastern part of the German Confederation that was included in the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848 but excluded from Bismarck's Germany in 1866. The very existence of this region, let alone its long and rich history since the Middle Ages, often gets lost in political narratives of German nationalism and the Habsburg monarchy (Figure 1).
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Hochstadt, Steve. "Demography and Demographers in Modern Germany: Social Science and Ideology across Political Regimes." Social Science History 40, no. 4 (2016): 657–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2016.26.
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The history of German research and writing about migration has been heavily influenced by politics. The assumptions and methods of successive generations of migration researchers demonstrate the interplay of social science and politics across very different political regimes. Soon after serious research began in the late nineteenth century, migration researchers divided into two camps. Urban statisticians with liberal political ideas used city migration registration data to analyze the circulatory movement of migrants within Germany. Conservative writers used census data to argue that migration was essentially movement from countryside to city, and was politically and morally injurious to the German people. These two sides hardened after World War I, as the conservative side increasingly incorporated racist ideas into their critique of migration. This debate continued even after the Nazis took power in 1933 with the competing publications of Rudolf Heberle and Wilhelm Brepohl. Heberle was forced to leave Germany and Brepohl became the Nazis’ favorite analyst of migration. After 1945, Brepohl retained his standing as a leading migration researcher in the German Federal Republic. The dominance of this conservative interpretation of migration continued into the 1970s. In recent decades, the writings of the liberal statisticians from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been rediscovered, and German migration research has shifted again toward a more empirically based understanding of migration.
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Kornberg, Jacques. "Vienna, the 1890s: Jews in the Eyes of Their Defenders. (The Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus)." Central European History 28, no. 2 (June 1995): 153–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900011638.
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Advocatesfor minority rights make stringent demands upon those they defend. The relationship between the persecuted and their defenders is often a minefield of conflicting agendas, made even worse by patronizing attitudes on the one side and wounded pride on the other. One example is the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus (The Association for Defense Against Antisemitism), founded in Vienna in 1891 to combat the alarming rise of political antisemitism, unmistakable in the stunning electoral successes of the Christian Social Party led by Karl Lueger. Abwehrverein members came from Austria's elite of education and property (Bildung und Besitz): Liberal politicians, large-scale industrialists and merchants, members of the free professions, and artists. Most members were Austro-German liberals, and Liberal Reichsrat deputies sat on its board. Its founder and president was Baron Arthur Gunduccar von Suttner (1850–1902), a writer, and husband of Bertha von Suttner, recipient of the Noble Peace Prize in 1905. My intention is to explore the attitude of the Abwehrverein to Jewry, and to raise the question of whether it served Jewish interests well. But before that, a word or two must be said about the association.
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Münz, Rainer, and Ralf Ulrich. "Immigration and Citizenship in Germany." German Politics and Society 17, no. 4 (December 1, 1999): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/104503099782486761.
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In Germany, as in many other European democracies, immigrationand citizenship are contested and contentious issues. In the Germancase it was both the magnitude of postwar and recent immigration aswell as its interference with questions of identity that created politicaland social conflict. As a result of World War II, the coexistenceof two German states, and the persistence of ethnic German minoritiesin central and eastern Europe, (West) Germany’s migration andnaturalization policy was inclusive toward expellees, GDR citizens,and co-ethnics. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany,despite the recruitment of several million foreign labor migrantsand—until 1992—a relatively liberal asylum practice, did not developsimilar mechanisms and policies of absorption and integration of itslegal foreign residents.
9
Fitzpatrick, Matthew P. "Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Decolonization." Central European History 51, no. 1 (March 2018): 83–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938918000092.
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In the past two decades, colonial studies, the postcolonial turn, the new imperial history, as well as world and global history have made serious strides toward revising key elements of German history. Instead of insisting that German modernity was a fundamentally unique, insular affair that incubated authoritarian social tendencies, scholars working in these fields have done much to reinsert Germany into the broader logic of nineteenth-century global history, in which the thalassocratic empires of Europe pursued the project of globalizing their economies, populations, and politics. During this period, settler colonies, including German South West Africa, were established and consolidated by European states at the expense of displaced, helotized, or murdered indigenous populations. Complementing these settler colonies were mercantile entrepôts and plantation colonies, which sprouted up as part of a systematic, global attempt to reorient non-European economies, work patterns, and epistemological frameworks along European lines. Although more modestly than some of its European collaborators and competitors, Germany joined Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States in a largely liberal project of global maritime imperialism.
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Ashkenazi, Ofer. "Prisoners’ fantasies in Weimar film." Journal of European Studies 39, no. 3 (September 2009): 290–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047244109106683.
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Prison cells constituted a unique sphere in post-World War I German films. Unlike most of the modern city spheres, it was a realm in which the private and the public often merged, and in which reality and fantasy incessantly intertwined. This article analyses the ways in which filmmakers of the Weimar Republic envisaged the experience within the prison, focusing on its frequent association with fantasies and hallucinations. Through the analysis of often-neglected films from the period, I argue that this portrayal of the prison enabled Weimar filmmakers to engage in public criticism against the conservative, inefficient and prejudiced institutions of law and order in Germany. Since German laws forbade direct defamation of these institutions, filmmakers such as Joe May, Wilhelm Dietherle and Georg C. Klaren employed the symbolism of the prisoner’s fantasy to propagate the urgent need for thorough reform. Thus this article suggests that Weimar cinema, contrary to common notions, was not dominated by either escapism or extremist, anti-liberal worldviews. Instead, the prison films examined in this article are in fact structured as a warning against the decline of liberal bourgeois society in the German urban centres of the late 1920s.
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Møller, Jørgen. "Wherefore the Liberal State?" East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 21, no. 2 (May 2007): 294–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325407299784.
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The post-Soviet setting is characterized by a disheartening political paradox. Since the fall of communism, some kind of electoralism has been spreading to almost every corner of the former empire, yet liberal rights and the rule of law have not been its fellow travelers; nor do they seem destined to provide companionship in the imminent future. Revisiting the long-standing German current of fiscal sociology, it is possible to solve this paradox. In the Europe of yesterday, liberal constitutionalism was the product of a quid pro quo between the rulers and the ruled: an exchange of rights for revenue. Historically, this “grand bargain of the liberal state” was a prerequisite for liberal democracy, and the very same social mechanisms—or lack thereof— seem to be operating in the post-Soviet world of today.
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Emmenegger, Patrick, Lukas Graf, and Alexandra Strebel. "Social versus liberal collective skill formation systems? A comparative-historical analysis of the role of trade unions in German and Swiss VET." European Journal of Industrial Relations 26, no. 3 (April 23, 2019): 263–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959680119844426.
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We distinguish between social and liberal collective skill formation systems and demonstrate that the German VET system is a social system with a strong (parity) role for trade unions in its governance. In contrast, unions play a considerably weaker role in the more liberal Swiss system, which privileges employers’ interests. We show that the different position of unions in VET systems has the expected consequences on a range of indicators. We further examine why unions are less important in Switzerland and show how, after the First World War, differences in the institutional environment and power resources of the union movements set Germany and Switzerland on different paths, which are still visible today.
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Kettler, Mark T. "Designing Empire for the Civilized East: Colonialism, Polish Nationhood, and German War Aims in the First World War." Nationalities Papers 47, no. 6 (May 27, 2019): 936–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.49.
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AbstractThis article critically reexamines how Germans understood Polish national identity during World War I, and how their perceptions affected German proposals for ruling Polish territory. Recent historiography has emphasized the impact of colonial ideologies and experiences on Germans’ imperial ambitions in Poland. It has portrayed Germans as viewing Poland through a colonial lens, or favoring colonial methods to rule over Polish space. Using the wartime publications of prominent left liberal, Catholic, and conservative thinkers, this article demonstrates that many influential Germans, even those who supported colonialism in Africa, considered Poland to be a civilized nation for which colonial strategies of rule would be wholly inappropriate. These thinkers instead proposed multinational strategies of imperialism in Poland, which relied on collaboration with Polish nationalists. Specifically, they argued that Berlin should establish an autonomous Polish state, and bind it in permanent military and political union with the German Empire. The perception of Poland as a civilized nation ultimately structured Germany’s occupation policy and objectives in Poland throughout the war, much more than stereotypes of Polish primitivity.
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Perry, Joe. "Opinion Research and the West German Public in the Postwar Decades*." German History 38, no. 3 (September 2020): 461–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/gerhis/ghaa063.
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Abstract This article investigates the history of opinion research in West Germany in the decades following the Second World War, which witnessed the emergence of a dense network of research institutes, including the Institut für Demoskopie-Allensbach (IfD), Emnid and Infratest. It argues that ‘opinion research’—a term used to encompass political polling as well as market research—helped consolidate an emerging West German consumer society based on liberal, free-market capitalism and offered West Germans new ways of imagining this new national collective. The opinion surveys and the subjectivities they measured were mutually constitutive of this reconfigured ‘public’, as exposure to survey results in countless media reports both reflected and shaped popular understandings of self and society. To make this argument, the article explores the US influence on German opinion research from the 1920s to the 1960s and the ‘modern’ language and techniques of survey research in the FRG. It offers an account of sex research as a case study of the same and concludes with a brief discussion of opinion research and its role in shaping contemporary understandings of the public sphere.
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Kahan, Alan. "The Victory of German Liberalism? Rudolf Haym, Liberalism, and Bismarck." Central European History 22, no. 1 (March 1989): 57–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900010827.
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The vague figure of Rudolf Haym, founding editor of thePreussische jahrbücher, hovers hazily in the background of many discussions of nineteenth-century German Liberalism. He has been relegated to obscurity by more forceful and impressive personalities: Dahlmann, Gervinus, and Hansemann in 1848, Max Duncker and Georg von Vincke in the 1850s and 1860s, Treitschke and Mommsen in the 1860s and 1870s, to name a few. Yet in a long career whose accomplishments are modest only in historical perspective, Haym possessed a quality shared by none of his more famous contemporaries: a gift for being at the center of moderate liberal opinion, sometimes a few years in advance of more renowned liberals. This gift was expressed in his philosophical work on Hegel, and above all in his political journalism in thePreussische Jahrbücher.
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Gimžauskas, Edmundas. "Institutions for the Administration of Vilnius at the Beginning of the German Occupation during the First World War." Lithuanian Historical Studies 19, no. 1 (February 20, 2015): 135–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-01901006.
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The entrenched opinion in historiography is that during the First World War, the German army, after entering the lands belonging to the Russian Empire, created its own occupying administrative structures essentially in an empty space. This also applies to the case of Vilnius. Nevertheless, the diaries and memoirs of witnesses of the events of that time cast doubt on this very entrenched stereotype. Indeed, the entry of the Germans into Vilnius in September 1915 meant radical changes in the development of the city’s administration, but from an administrative point of view, the arriving conquerors did not really find an empty space here. Certain structures, the city magistrate, police and Citizens’ Committee were approved for retention. This was done not at the initiative of the Russian government that carried it out, but of the local public itself. After the Germans marched in, they did not destroy the structures of civil administration they found, but adapted them to meet their own interests. Along with this, they created military structures, leaving civilian rule on the sidelines. As the Germans gradually established themselves, the rudiments of occupation civilian rule, which were drawn from cadres of local Poles, began to emerge. This was associated with the trend the German authorities expressed in the first months of the occupation to link the future of the Vilnius region with Poland. The Poles of Vilnius, dominating in the structures of the civil administration, hoped for a liberal system of government, similar to that of occupied ethnic Poland. However, in the late autumn of 1915, at the initiative of the highest German military command in the East, a special administrative formation, the Oberost, began to be created, which was to become an economic and military colony of Germany. The Vilnius region was also to be part of it. From then on, the creation of the German civil administration began on a purely military basis, with the suppression of the Polish identity and the gradual restriction and pressure on all former local administrative structures, which was fully revealed at the beginning of 1916.
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Seitzer, Jeffrey. "Carl Schmitt's Internal Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism: Verfassungslehre as a Response to the Weimar State Crisis." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 10, no. 1 (January 1997): 203–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s084182090000031x.
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In one of his most famous dicta, the German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt proclaimed it “obvious” that “all political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning,” because “[t]hey are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation.” Taking Schmitt at his word, I argue that one must read Schmitt's masterpiece of comparative law from the Weimar period, Verfassungslehre, as a response to the Weimar state crisis. Schmitt's conceptual approach in Verfassungslehre aims to create a form of constitutional theory capable of compensating for structural defects of the Weimar state. Reading Verfassungslehre in this way also reveals that Schmitt does not present his constitutional theory as an alternative to liberal constitutionalism, but rather Schmitt's comparative history of constitutionalism in Verfassungslehre locates his decisionism at the very core of the liberal constitutional tradition.
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Zup, Iulia Elena. "Bewahren der deutschen Identitȁt und Sprache in Großrumȁnien. Das Vereinsleben." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philologia 66, no. 3 (September 20, 2021): 87–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphilo.2021.3.06.
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"Preserving the German Identity and Language in Romania after 1918. Cultural Associations. The present paper explores some cultural sociological aspects of the economic, leisure-related and professional associations of the German minority living in Romania at the time of the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), in the context of the social-political transformations and the development of the modern, interwar Romanian society. Although German associations existed in the now Romanian territories before 1918 as well, many new associations were founded and the activity of the already existing ones flourished during the interwar period. The associations are analysed in respect to the regions in which the Germans of Romania lived (Transylvania, Banat, Bukovina, the Romanian Old Kingdom and Bessarabia), the type of association, their objectives, publications and activities. The establishment of so many associations at the time of the Weimar Republic and their intense activities reveals, on one hand, the endeavours of the German minority to preserve its language and identity, and on the other hand, the freedom that the German community enjoyed – in other words, quite a liberal cultural politics of the Greater Romania. The associations were a part of the development of a socio-cultural field which granted the Germans a special place in Romania’s cultural history. Keywords: associations, Germans of Romania, Weimar Republic, Greater Romania, German language and identity "
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McFalls, Laurence. "Political Culture and Political Change in Eastern Germany: Theoretical Alternatives." German Politics and Society 20, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 75–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/104503002782385426.
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In the past century, Germany, for better and for worse, offered itselfas a natural laboratory for political science. Indeed, Germany’sexcesses of political violence and its dramatic regime changes largelymotivated the development of postwar American political science,much of it the work of German émigrés and German-Jewishrefugees, of course. The continuing vicissitudes of the German experiencehave, however, posed a particular challenge to the concept ofpolitical culture as elaborated in the 1950s and 1960s,1 at least inpart to explain lingering authoritarianism in formally democraticWest Germany. Generally associated with political continuity or onlyincremental change,2 the concept of political culture has been illequippedto deal with historical ruptures such as Germany’s “breakwith civilization” of 1933-1945 and the East German popular revolutionof 1989. As well, even less dramatic but still important and relativelyrapid cultural changes such as the rise of a liberal democraticVerfassungspatriotismus sometime around the late 1970s in West Germany3and the emergence of a postmodern, consumer capitalist culturein eastern Germany since 19944 do not conform to mainstreampolitical culture theory’s expectations of gradual, only generationalchange. To be sure, continuity, if not inertia, characterizes much ofpolitics, even in Germany. Still, to be of theoretical value, the conceptof political culture must be able not only to admit but toaccount for change.
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MORRIS-REICH, AMOS. "Anthropology, standardization and measurement: Rudolf Martin and anthropometric photography." British Journal for the History of Science 46, no. 3 (February 23, 2012): 487–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000708741200012x.
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AbstractRecent scholarship on the history of German anthropology has tended to describe its trajectory between 1900 and the Nazi period as characterized by a paradigmatic shift from the liberal to the anti-humanistic. This article reconstructs key moments in the history of anthropometric photography between 1900 and 1925, paying particular attention to the role of the influential liberal anthropologist Rudolf Martin (1864–1925) in the standardization of anthropological method and technique. It is shown that Rudolf Martin's primary significance was social and institutional. The article reconstructs key stages in Martin's writing on and uses of photography and analyses the peculiar form of scientific debate surrounding the development of anthropometric photography, which centred on local and practical questions. Against the political backdrop of German colonialism in Africa and studies of prisoners of war during the First World War, two key tensions in this history surface: between anthropological method and its politicization, and between the international scientific ethos and nationalist impulses. By adopting a practical–epistemic perspective, the article also destabilizes the conventional differentiation between the German liberal and anti-humanist anthropological traditions. Finally, the article suggests that there is a certain historical irony in the fact that the liberal Martin was central in the process that endowed physical anthropology with prestige precisely in the period when major parts of German society increasingly came to view ‘race’ as offering powerful, scientific answers to social and political questions.
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Ledford, Kenneth F. "Lawyers, Liberalism, and Procedure: The German Imperial Justice Laws of 1877–79." Central European History 26, no. 2 (June 1993): 165–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900020112.
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Although Franz Schnabel described the nineteenth century as the “century of the formal Rechtsstaat,” most political and social historians of the German Kaiserreich have paid surprisingly little attention to the legal aspect of the development of society and polity. Textbooks in German history contain only brief mention of the enactment of legal reforms, either naming them without comment or subsuming them under administrative initiatives of the National Liberal party. More importantly, even standard works on the history of liberalism give precious little space to the important legislative reforms that are the focus of this essay; James J. Sheehan devotes only a paragraph to the adoption of the Imperial Justice Laws of 1877–79, and Dieter Langewiesche stresses the importance of legal unity and these reforms to liberals, but also in only one paragraph. In general, historians of German liberalism have left efforts to examine the development and unification of the German legal system after 1848 to legal historians, who are housed in Germany in the separate legal faculties and focus their work primarily on the history of legal doctrine. By failing to examine law as a historical artifact, however, political and social historians have also overlooked the Weberian message that law is a crucial analytical entry point into any understanding of modem society. Contemporary legal scholars stress that legal and social systems are inextricably intertwined, and that neither can be understood without a grasp of the other. Understanding legal discourse helps historians understand broader social discourse.
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Mann, Peter Gordon. "The good European in the Great War: Thomas Mann’s Reflections of an Unpolitical Man and the politics of self, nation and Europe." Journal of European Studies 47, no. 1 (November 1, 2016): 34–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047244116676677.
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This article interprets Thomas Mann’s Reflections of an Unpolitical Man (1918) as a document of the reimagining of self, nation and Europe during the First World War. In this messy and mostly forgotten work, Thomas Mann created an identity that he adopted for the rest of his life: the artist-intellectual as the self-overcoming decadent and saviour of culture. He did this by mapping his heroic vision of Germany as the saviour of Europe onto his own artistic ethic of the self-overcoming decadent. I show how the Reflections allowed Mann to probe the unanswered questions operative in his own work and in his conflicting identities as an artist, an intellectual, a German and a European. Constructing the crisis of modernity according to the opposition of décadence v. Bildung, Mann called for a particularly German and artistic irony to mediate this conflict and preserve the authentic identities of self, nation and Europe. This heroic irony – used as a conservative defence of German culture during the war – would become, ironically, the basis of Mann’s endorsement of the Weimar Republic in 1922 and his future identity as a defender of liberal Europe.
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Sensenig, Melvin L. "Duhm, Mowinckel, and a Disempowered King: Protestant Liberal Theological Analysis in Jeremiah's Construction of Jehoiachin." Biblical Theology Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture 49, no. 2 (April 12, 2019): 60–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146107919831865.
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Late 19th–early 20th-century German biblical scholarship, because of its connections with Protestant liberal theology and the search for myth in modern Germany, lost the category of disempowered king in its treatment of one of the final kings of Judah, Jehoiachin, in the book of Jeremiah. While current scholarship has already moved beyond Protestant liberalism, it has not yet recovered the hermeneutical category of disempowered king as a way to understand Jehoiachin and later expectations of kingship. I suggest ways for contemporary critical scholars to build on the work of more recent scholarship and engage the canonical shape of Jeremiah.
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O'Sullivan, Michael E. "Religion, Modernity, and Democracy in Central Europe: Toward a Gendered History of Twentieth-Century Catholicism." Central European History 52, no. 4 (December 2019): 713–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000893891900102x.
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Numerous past review articles by scholars of German history share ideas produced by the religious turn in historiography since the 1970s and 1980s. Although highlighting a still growing groundswell of work focused on the German Catholic minority, these essays typically express discomfort with the relation of their subspecialty to the rest of the discipline. Bemoaning the marginalization of Catholic history and the self-inflicted ghettoization of research narrowly focused on regional traditions, past reviewers have worried about the integration of Catholicism within a larger framework. These past articles summarize phases of research on German Catholicism that produced much scholarship and multiple conceptual frameworks through which to understand the enduring impact of the church. Scholars of the 1970s and 1980s pushed against the grain of Hans-Ulrich Wehler's Bielefeld School to prove that Catholicism contributed more to the liberal democratic development of Germany than had been previously assumed, and by the 1990s German Catholic research focused primarily on the social history of Catholicism. The field of German Catholic history underwent a period of uncertain change during the early 2000s. Many of the German-language monographs on the topic remained wedded to the milieu model, but some younger scholars responded to critiques of German Catholic history by studying women's history or deploying poststructuralist analysis.
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Augustine, Dolores L. "The Business Elites of Hamburg and Berlin." Central European History 24, no. 2-3 (June 1991): 132–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900018902.
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In many respects, Hamburg and Berlin represent two societal models at work in Wilhelmian Germany. Hamburg and the other Hanseatic cities, Lübeck and Bremen, have traditionally been thought to represent bourgeois society as it might have been in Germany as a whole: self-assured, liberal, and antiaristocratic. Historians are generally in agreement with Richard J. Evans in his assertion that “neither the economic activity nor the social world nor finally the political beliefs and actions of the Hamburg merchants corresponded to anything that has ever been defined, however remotely, as ‘feudal.’” Berlin, on the other hand, was dominated by the imperial court and the aristocracy, which, it is said, seduced and fatally weakened not only the business elite of the capital, but in fact the most influential segment of the German bourgeoisie as a whole.
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JOPPKE, CHRISTIAN, and ZEEV ROSENHEK. "Contesting ethnic immigration: Germany and Israel compared." European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 3 (December 2002): 301–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003975602001121.
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After World War II, Israel and Germany adopted curiously similar policies of ethnic immigration, accepting as immigrants only putative co-ethnics. The objective of this article is to account for the main variation between the two cases, the resilience of Jewish immigration in Israel, and the demise of ethnic-German immigration in Germany. The very fact of divergent outcomes casts doubt on conventional accounts of ethnic immigration, which see the latter as deriving from an ethnic (as against civic) definition of nationhood. We point instead to the possibility of ‘liberal’ and ‘restrictive’ contention surrounding ethnic immigration, and argue that for historical and geopolitical reasons the political space for such contention has been more constricted in Israel than in Germany.
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BRYDAN, DAVID. "Axis Internationalism: Spanish Health Experts and the Nazi ‘New Europe’, 1939–1945." Contemporary European History 25, no. 2 (April 12, 2016): 291–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777316000084.
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AbstractMany of the forms and practices of interwar internationalism were recreated under the auspices of the Nazi ‘New Europe’. This article will examine these forms of ‘Axis internationalism’ by looking at Spanish health experts' involvement with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Despite the ambiguous relationship between the Franco regime and the Axis powers, a wide range of Spanish health experts formed close ties with colleagues from Nazi Germany and across Axis and occupied Europe. Many of those involved were relatively conservative figures who also worked with liberal international health organisations in the pre- and post-war eras. Despite their political differences, their opposing attitudes towards eugenics and the tensions caused by German hegemony, Spanish experts were able to rationalise their involvement with Nazi Germany as a mutually-beneficial continuation of pre-war international health cooperation amongst countries united by a shared commitment to modern, ‘totalitarian’ forms of public health. Despite the hostility of Nazi Germany and its European collaborators to both liberal and left-wing forms of internationalism, this phenomenon suggests that the ‘New Europe’ deserves to be studied as part of the wider history of internationalism in general and of international health in particular.
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Maier, Charles S. "How Did Germany Go Right?" Central European History 51, no. 1 (March 2018): 134–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938918000195.
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To set a single agenda for German history would be a foolhardy task, but let us begin with a major generalization about the long-term development of the field. Two mega-issues have dominated the historiography and debates for a century or more, standing on the path of historical research like some huge boulders that can not be moved or even circumvented. The first concerns how the German communities of Central Europe had constructed a nation-state—Tantae molis erat Germanam condere gentem, to adapt Vergil. There was a Prussian-centered statist answer by scholars including Leopold von Ranke, Heinrich von Treitschke, and Friedrich Meinecke, and continuing through Christopher Clark'sIron Kingdom. A more decentered approach has, by contrast, stressed local experiences; liberal and participatory currents of a political or religious (often Roman Catholic in sympathy, e.g., the work of Franz Schnabel) or cultural nature; and, finally, the heritage of a federalist constitutionalism, whether instantiated in the Holy Roman Empire or in the later celebratory afterglow ofHeimat. The second mega-issue that dominated the historiography for the first generation—perhaps half-century—after World War II and the collapse of Nazism was one that I was asked about at my undergraduate oral examinations in the spring of 1960: Where did Germany go wrong? The catastrophic career of National Socialist Germany, both internally and for Europe in general, compelled my generation and later ones never to lose sight of that issue. Even those who rejected claims about long-term disabling flaws in the emergence of liberal democracy—the political original sin, so to speak—had to address that fundamental issue.
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Cramer, Kevin. "A World of Enemies: New Perspectives on German Military Culture and the Origins of the First World War." Central European History 39, no. 2 (May 19, 2006): 270–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938906000112.
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In the introduction to his 1915 book Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk, Otto Hintze ruefully quoted an Englishman's observation that, “Prussian history is endlessly boring because it speaks so much of war and so little of revolution.” As the “Great War” entered its second year, and with Germany's hopes for a quick and decisive victory fading, Hintze saw history repeating itself. Like Frederick the Great's Prussia, he wrote, “The German Reich, under a Hohenzollern Kaiser, [now] battles for its existence against a world of enemies.” Since the beginning of the war, Entente propaganda had mobilized the home front by depicting the war as an epochal struggle against the enemy of all civilized men: the savage “Hun,” the jack-booted, spike-helmeted despoiler of innocent Belgium. The crudity of this propaganda caricature aside, its power to persuade nevertheless drew on a widespread conviction that the story of war constituted the core of German history and that the disease of “militarism” was a peculiarly German deformation of the national psyche. In response to the censure of their nation's enemies, the German intellectuals rejected that diagnosis while defending the role war had played in their nation's history. Published in the Kölnische Zeitung on October 4, 1914, the hastily drafted manifesto “To the Civilized World!” was endorsed (if not read) by ninety-three of the Second Reich's most prominent scholars, scientists, philosophers, and theologians, including Peter Behrens, Lujo Brentano, Adolph von Harnack, Max Lenz, and Gustav von Schmoller. They vehemently repudiated the distortion of Germany's history: “Were it not for German militarism, German civilization would long since have been extirpated.” “The word militarism,” the liberal jurist Gerhard Anschütz defiantly declared in 1915, “which is being used throughout the world as a swear word against us, let it be for us a badge of honor.” As Hintze, Anschütz, and their contemporaries understood the course of German unification (and Germany's rise as a great power under Prussian leadership), the modern German nation-state owed its very existence to what Hintze called “the monarchical-military factor.” If we are to advance our understanding of how a nationalist discourse obsessed with foreign and domestic threats supported a foreign policy that ignited two world wars in the space of twenty-five years, we must be prepared, I believe, to re-think the “Sonderweg thesis,” not in its relation to the putative immaturity of German liberalism or an atavistic predilection for autocratic rule, but as it was rooted in German military culture. The books under discussion in this essay reframe the militarism/“Sonderweg” debate by examining the unique connection between modern German visions of the nation and the waging of war as revealed in the experience of the First World War. Representing the maturation of the new intellectual and cultural history of war, they pose two fundamental questions: What kind of war did the Second Reich's military, political, and intellectual leadership envision that would “complete” the German nation? And how did they define Germany's enemies?
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Fulbrook, Mary. "The State and the Transformation of Political Legitimacy in East and West Germany since 1945." Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, no. 2 (April 1987): 211–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417500014481.
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Recent German history has produced a remarkable succession of state forms: an empire riddled with internal social tensions, brought down by external defeat in a world war for which it bore a large degree of responsibility; an unstable and ultimately suicidal parliamentary democracy; a genocidal dictatorship which eventually collapsed, totally defeated by opponents of its expansionist and increasingly radical foreign and domestic plans; and, concurrently, two remarkably stable and enduring instances of quite different political types, liberal parliamentary democracy in the capitalist west, and “actually existing socialism” based in democratic centralism in the communist east. Compared to their respective Western and Eastern European neighbours, the Germans on both sides of the inner-German border are now sustaining and reproducing their respective political systems with remarkable efficiency. Put crudely, it seems that good Nazis have been turned into good democrats and good communists, respectively.
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Nicklich, Manuel, and Markus Helfen. "Trade union renewal and ‘organizing from below’ in Germany: Institutional constraints, strategic dilemmas and organizational tensions." European Journal of Industrial Relations 25, no. 1 (January 22, 2018): 57–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959680117752000.
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Organizing is widely discussed as a remedy for continued union decline. Originating in the liberal market industrial relations systems of the Anglo-Saxon world, the ‘organizing’ strategy is increasingly discussed in countries like Germany, traditionally known for consensual industrial relations and multi-employer collective bargaining. To study whether and how ‘organizing’ is translated in union organizations operating in a different institutional context, we study the link between organizational transformation and institutions in IG Metall in Germany, which was been influenced by the American Service Employees International Union (SEIU). We find a German variety of organizing rather than a mere copying of ‘best practice’: the union’s approach is based on institutional and organizational structures as a resource and constraint.
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Boder, Wolfram. "Zwischen nationalem Anspruch und lokalpolitischen Zwängen: Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsbedingungen der Kasseler Opern Louis Spohrs." Studia Musicologica 52, no. 1-4 (March 1, 2011): 311–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/smus.52.2011.1-4.22.
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In 1823 Louis Spohr published an article entitled “Aufruf an deutsche Komponisten” (Appeal to German Composers) in the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung (AMZ). He did so for the purpose of encouraging young German composers to contribute to the genre of German opera. But he probably had other intentions, too. He was determined to promote his latest opera Jessonda, which he mentioned as a model for his ideas of German opera. Thus one could say that the project of “German opera” was in some aspects merely a marketing strategy.A closer look at Jessonda reveals that Spohr did certainly not think along nationalist lines. In a way its dramaturgy depicts Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment and aims at a united and enlightened mankind. So did Spohr in his personal life. And by so doing he became very popular with the liberal citizens in Kassel, the city in which he worked as “Hofkapellmeister” from 1822 to 1857. This popularity in some cases misguided him. The liberal and enlightened ideas of Spohr are so prominent in his operas that they became increasingly neglected in the 1870s when chauvinistic tendencies became more prominent. This development culminated in the 1940s when the Nazis banned Jessonda from the German stage. They did however try to make it suitable for their ideas of German opera. As Spohr’s original did resist to this violation, the “Reichsstelle für Musikbearbeitungen” commissioned an amended version. Luckily the end of World War II terminated these efforts.
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Oehlke, Paul. "The development of labor process policies in the Federal Republic of Germany." Concepts and Transformation 6, no. 2 (December 3, 2001): 109–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/cat.6.2.03oeh.
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In the years following the Second World War, the West German market economy was to distinguish itself as a social alternative, superior to the real socialism as it existed in East Germany with all its economic weaknesses and democratic deficits. Within the context of this social competition, the crisis of Fordist mass production led to increasing attempts to humanize the workplace. The result in 1974 was that the social/liberal coalition government instigated labor policies that the subsequent Christian Democrat/liberal government continued. As the policies were translated into reality, a reform constellation was to crystallize — a network which, in the 1980s, was able to develop innovative concepts for the labor process. Over the next decade, it promoted extended concepts for production, service and employment which, however, eventually stagnated against the background of increasingly neoliberal strategies of rationalization and deregulation. These resulted in problems for employment and employment policy, the solution of which demands wide-ranging labor policies.
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Lin, Chien-Chih. "Global constitutionalism in Taiwan." Global Constitutionalism 10, no. 2 (July 2021): 275–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381720000325.
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AbstractIn contrast with the decline of liberal constitutionalism around the world, liberal constitutionalism seems to be resilient in Taiwan. Weaving together several threads of history, law and politics, this article first argues that foreign legal education and identity concerns explain why judicial review and constitutional development more broadly in Taiwan have not only flourished but mirrored both German and American constitutional jurisprudence. Second, it maintains that the case of Taiwan poses another challenge to the concept of global constitutionalism since the number of referenced jurisdictions is quite limited.
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Antolović, Mihael. "Идеје из 1914: немачки интелектуалци и легитимација политике Немачког рајха током Првог светског рата." Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology 11, no. 1 (April 18, 2016): 263. http://dx.doi.org/10.21301/eap.v11i1.12.
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After the outbreak of the World War in august 1914, German intellectuals – university professors, writers, artists and publicists – gave an important contribution to the legitimation of the German Reich’s war aims. As a kind of ‘spiritual mobilization’ for the sake of the defense of the fatherland from the allied enemies, they engaged in intense publicity and propaganda activities whose goal was to show the responsibility of the opponent countries for the outbreak of the war as well as to prove that Germany was fighting a just war for its national survival. The ideological justification of the German war aims formulated in the so called ‘ideas of 1914’ rested on several motives. First, the French revolution and its entire political, social and conceptual inheritance were discarded. The revolutionary transformation of society, the theory of natural law, the liberal and democratic ideology and the parliamentary system consider to be inappropriate to ‘German national spirit’, German intellectuals argued for the superiority of gradual social reforms, conservative social and political order and authoritarian political system embodied in the Hohenzollern monarchy. At the same time, they rejected the modern class society marked by the predominance of the egoistic individual interests in favour of an allegedly harmonious ‘organic community’. Finally, they attributed some higher metaphysical meaning to the current war since it was conceived of as a battle for the preservation of the German culture understood as sublimation of highest spiritual achievements of the entire humanity, from the decadent materialistic civilization of Western Europe as well as ‘barbarian’ Russia. In that way, in the ‘ideas of 1914, German intellectuals expressed all elements about the peculiarities of German history (der deutsche Sonderweg) thus giving ideological legitimacy to the German Reich’s war endeavours and to its ‘grab for world power’.
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Фролова, Ольга. "О семантических процессах в общественно-политической лексике (на примере слова „фашизм” и его дериватов)." Studia Rossica Posnaniensia, no. 42 (June 19, 2018): 127–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/strp.2017.42.11.
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The article discusses the semantics of the word fascism in explanatory dictionaries and analyzes its current use. Comparing different interpretations in dictionaries, one can see how the authors avoid mentioning a particular period in which the term fascism emerged. The important semantic features of the term fascism are racism, dictatorship, and opposition to a free society. The word fascist is used to refer to: a) a supporter of a certain ideological and political doctrine that arose and was implemented in Italy and Germany in the first half of the twentieth century, characterized by racism and chauvinism, and taking the form of dictatorship; b) a follower of racist attitudes; c) the enemy, an object of hatred; d) the enemy in children's games; e) camouflage element in the oxymoronic phrase 'liberal fascism', masking the rejection of liberal values by the speaker.
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Brasz, Chaya. "Dutch Progressive Jews and Their Unexpected Key Role in Europe." European Judaism 49, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/ej.2016.490102.
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AbstractLiberal Judaism remained absent in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century but finally became successful in the early 1930s under the influence of the Liberal Jewish Synagogue in London and the establishment of the World Union for Progressive Judaism in 1926. It had a specific Dutch character which was more radical than the German refugees who joined in were used to. The Shoah barely left survivors of the prewar congregations, but Liberal Judaism made a remarkable comeback in the Netherlands and had a key role position for Liberal Judaism on the continent of Europe. In a much smaller Jewish community than the French one, the Dutch Progressive congregations for a considerable period formed the largest Progressive community on the continent, next to France. Even today, while comprising ten congregations, it still has a growing membership.
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Iritsyan, Gurgen E. "The Role of the “Conservative Revolutionˮ Activists in the Substantiation of Nazism." IZVESTIYA VUZOV SEVERO-KAVKAZSKII REGION SOCIAL SCIENCE, no. 2 (210) (June 28, 2021): 17–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.18522/2687-0770-2021-2-17-22.
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The purpose of this work is the comparative analysis of the ideas of the important representatives of the “conservative revolutionˮ and the main provisions of the Nazi ideology. The “conservative revolutionˮ was a philosophical and political movement in Germany in the 20-30s of the last century. Representatives of this trend, trying to find a way out of the systemic crisis of the German Republic, saw it in the need for a “revolution on the rightˮ. Using the analytical method in the process of studying the texts of some conservative revolutionaries, as well as comparing the ideas of the latter with the main provisions of Nazism, allows us to draw the following conclusion. A number of venerable German thinkers such as O. Spengler, A. Moeller van den Bruck, E. Junger, and some others have done serious theoretical work on the justification of hegemonic, anti-liberal and authoritarian tendencies in the ideology and politics of the Third Reich. Much of what was in the propa-ganda Arsenal of the national socialists is found in the representatives of the “conservative revolutionˮ.
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Semenenko, I., and G. Irishin. "The World. Challenges of the Global Crisis. Germany." World Economy and International Relations, no. 2 (2014): 38–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-2-38-52.
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The economic crisis of 2008–2009 highlighted new problems in the development of the German social market economy model and brought to the forefront the factors of its resilience that have ensured Germany’s leadership positions in the EU. Changes in economic policy have affected in the first place the energy and the financial sectors. Shifts in the political landscape have led to the appearance of new political parties. These changes have affected the results of the 2013 elections, the liberal democrats failure to enter the Bundestag has made the winner – CDU – seek new coalition partners.
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Kwan, Jonathan. "Politics, Liberal Idealism and Jewish Life in Nineteenth-Century Vienna: The Formative Years of Heinrich Jaques (1831–1894)1." Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 64, no. 1 (2019): 197–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/ybz007.
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Abstract This article addresses the formative years of the liberal parliamentarian Heinrich Jaques (1831–1894). It traces his family life, social world, education, professional career, and public activities prior to his election to parliament in 1879. The focus is on Jaques's personal perspective as he negotiated various events and influences. The article argues that the combined effects of the 1848–49 revolutions and an intense engagement with German humanist classics forged a strong loyalty and commitment to liberal values. This was manifested both in politics (as a belief in liberal reforms to Austria) and in everyday life (as guiding principles in daily conduct). For Jaques’s generation in particular, the possibility of emancipation, integration, and acceptance was a goal to strive towards. Jaques pursued and articulated this vision in his writings and activities. His impressive achievements in the 1860s and 1870s are an example of the energy and hope of many Jews during the liberal era. For a number of reasons—economic downturn, widening democracy, a mobilized Catholic Church, resentment towards the liberal elites—antisemitism became an increasingly powerful factor in politics from the 1880s onwards. For Jaques and his fellow liberal Jews, the effect was profound. History and progress no longer seemed to be on the side of liberalism and Jewish integration. Nevertheless, for a certain milieu, the dreams of liberal humanism remained a strong and guiding presence in their lives.
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Kukartseva, M. A. "The EU’s Humanitarian Policy in Africa and Migration Crisis." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 11, no. 5 (December 3, 2018): 142–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2018-11-5-142-163.
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The article considers the essence and peculiarities of realizing of human security in the EU external policy in general and specifically in Africa. The article reveals the principles of the EU interest in Africa as a focus of their humanitarian policy: phantoms of the collective memory of the political class of Western European countries, huge potential of resources and markets, migration and terrorist threat. It is argued that this policy is considered by the EU as its strategic foreign policy narrative, in the course of which the Union, while ensuring the security of the African continent, primarily realizes its own interests. Specific features of the interpretation of this narrative in official documents of Germany as a key member of the EU are specified. It is revealed that Germany aims to play a major role in shaping European policy towards the African continent, and the specificity of its approach is economic-centric, which distinguishes it from the EU’s general approach to Africa. The key question of the article is how is disinterested Germany’s role, despite its permeation with the spirit of liberal values as a supplier of human security to African countries. It is shown that the discrimination of refugees and migrants in migration flows in the EU emphasized the importance of the Union’s activities in ensuring human security in Africa. In accordance with its goal to become the leading actor of the EU policy on the continent, its role as a leader of the liberal world and the peculiarities of the consequences of the migration crisis for the political and party system of the country and the stability of the social state, Germany proposed the German “Marshall Plan” for Africa as a concretization of its humanitarian policy on the continent. The parameters of this Plan, its advantages and implementation difficulties are considered. It is concluded that the Germany’s approach to Africa, on the whole, indisputably contributes to the latter’s development. At the same time, it is to a large extent focused on solving the tasks of ensuring national security of Germany itself, promoting the interests of German business, creating new German “reserves” in Africa through the African partnership. In this bi-directional process there is no obvious contradiction, but the results of this process can become ambivalent.
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Papenko, Nataliia. "«Reformer» of Wilhelmine Era: Bernhard Martin von Bulow (1849-1929)." European Historical Studies, no. 15 (2020): 118–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2020.15.9.
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In the article the author examines the socio-political development of the German Empire during the reign of Emperor Wilhelm II. The author of the article tries to reveal the complex mechanism of the methods of policy of the imperial chancellor B. von Bulow both in the sphere of foreign and domestic politics. He began his activities in a difficult historical time not only for Germany but also for most of Western Europe. It was the time of Germany’s struggle for world domination. The political leaders of the leading Western European countries were representatives of the new formation, therefore, they had to act with new methods of management of society and not only them. The Reichskanzler B. von Bulow was ready to enact political and social reforms in order to weaken social conflicts and improve society as a whole. The author of the article emphasizes that unlike Western Europe, Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century could not completely free itself from the feudal-absolutist heritage. However, the rapid capitalist-industrial development of the country had an impact on all strata of the society and political institutions of power. At the beginning of the twentieth century in Germany, conservatism crystallized as a consistent ideology coupled with liberal tendencies. A bright representative of this ideology was B. von Bulow. Intelligent, charismatic, he was not against the democratic changes at all, insisting that all kinds of changes in the country be introduced in order to promote the organic development of generally recognized state and social institutions. So they are not in danger. As a leader of the country, he understood well the need to abandon extremes of conservatism, from violent methods, insisting on the combination of conservatism and liberalism, thus creating a bloc of party unity. Therefore, he tried to act in a consistent, active manner. At the beginning of the twentieth century Germany failed to build a stable parliamentary system. The Europeans considered the Germans “behind the facade of democracy”, because the effects of liberalization appeared there only from time to time. The article emphasizes that the liberals were not prepared to consider the radical projects of B. von Bulow, for example, general suffrage, because there were authoritarian traditions of the court, the army, and so German liberalism was weak and could not play a leading political role in the country. Relevance of the topic of study is determined by the historical significance of problems raised in it. Significant political parties, political and economic forces have created a “geopolitical consensus,” leading Germany to a struggle for world domination.
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Rietzler, Katharina. "Counter-imperial orientalism: Friedrich Berber and the politics of international law in Germany and India, 1920s–1960s." Journal of Global History 11, no. 1 (February 8, 2016): 113–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1740022815000376.
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AbstractThe most trenchant critiques of Western international law are framed around the legacy of its historic complicity in the imperial project of governing non-European peoples. International law organized Europe and its ‘others’ into a hierarchy of civilizational difference that was only ever reconfigured but never overturned. But when analysing the complex relationship between international law and imperialism the differences within Europe – as opposed to a dyadic opposition of Europe versus the ‘rest’ – also matter. Within the historical and political constellations of the early and mid twentieth century, German difference produced a set of arguments that challenged dominant discourses of international law by posturing as anti-imperialist critique. This article focuses on the global career of Friedrich Berber (1898–1984), who, as a legal adviser in Nazi Germany and Nehru’s India, was at the forefront of state-led challenges to liberal international law. Berber fused notions of German civilizational superiority with an appropriation of Indian colonial victimhood, and pursued a shared politics of opposition. He embodied a version of German–Indian entanglement which did not abate after the Second World War, emphasizing the long continuities of empire, power differentials, civilizational hierarchies, and developmental logics under the umbrella of international law.
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Miller, David. "Crooked Timber or Bent Twig? Isaiah Berlin's Nationalism." Political Studies 53, no. 1 (March 2005): 100–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00519.x.
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Isaiah Berlin is often regarded as one of the sources of contemporary liberal nationalism. Yet his own attitude to nationalism, and its relation to his liberalism, remains unexplored. He gave conflicting definitions of nationalism in different places, and although he frequently contrasts more benign with more malign forms of nationalism, the terms in which he draws the contrast also vary. In Berlin's most explicit account, nationalist doctrine is presented as political, unitary, morally unrestricted and particularist, but these four dimensions are separate, and on each of them alternative nationalist positions are available. Berlin's account of the sources of nationalism is also ambiguous: his analysis of the Jewish condition in European societies and his support for Zionism contrasts with his diagnosis of the origins of German nationalism. Comparing Berlin with later liberal nationalists, we see that his liberalism prevented him from presenting a normative political theory in which liberal and nationalist commitments were successfully combined. Such a theory can indeed be developed, but the challenge that emerges from Berlin's writing is to explain how real-world nationalism can be kept within liberal limits.
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Rivers, Julian. "Counter-Extremism, Fundamental Values and the Betrayal of Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism." German Law Journal 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2018): 267–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200022690.
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Over the course of the last three years, British Government counter-terrorism policy has shifted significantly to embrace “counter-extremism.” This is justified not only in terms of addressing the underlying causes of terrorism, but also in its own right as addressing the “harm” of extremism. These proposals raise fundamental questions about the limits of religious and other civil liberties. However, the problem of extremism is not new. The German public intellectual and constitutional lawyer Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde reflected extensively on the same problem in the context of German responses to left-wing radicalism in the mid-1970s. His work touched on both concrete legal problems as well as fundamental philosophical assumptions about the nature, characteristics, and limits of the liberal democratic constitutional state. In this article, I seek to retrieve his ideas and arguments for the current British context. I argue that the current discourse of extremism and fundamental British values risks being used as a vehicle for promoting a “progressive” public ideology of individual self-creation. This fails to take moral and religious diversity seriously, and its implementation betrays the foundations of the liberal democratic constitution. It provides striking confirmation of Böckenförde's thesis that the liberal state is perennially prone to a totalitarian tendency to seek to generate its own distinctive ethical community. As Böckenförde recognized, what is needed instead is the recovery of a thin common morality of civic loyalty as shown pre-eminently in obedience to law.
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Schupmann, Benjamin A. "Constraining political extremism and legal revolution." Philosophy & Social Criticism 46, no. 3 (June 20, 2019): 249–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453719856652.
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Recently, extremist ‘populist’ parties have succeeded in obtaining large enough democratic electoral mandates both to legally make substantive changes to the law and constitution and to legally eliminate avenues to challenge their control over the government. Extremists place committed liberal democrats in an awkward position as they work to legally revolutionize their constitutions and turn them into ‘illiberal democracies’. This article analyses political responses to this problem. It argues that the twin phenomena of legal revolution and illiberal democracy reveal a latent tension between the constitutional commitments to democracy and liberalism, that is, the equal chance to have one’s political goals enacted into law and individual basic rights. Political extremists make the latent tension real when they use the procedures of democratic legal change to abrogate constitutional commitments to liberalism, among other things. Although the two commitments normally coexist side by side, exceptional times raise an existential dilemma for liberal democracies: is it constitutional to democratically amend liberalism out of the constitution? After analysing the moral legitimacy of both the democratic and liberal arguments, this article concludes that liberal constitutionalism is constitutive of genuine democracy. In other words, it is unconstitutional to abrogate basic liberal commitments and it is legitimate to adopt constitutional mechanisms to guarantee liberalism – even if it means constraining democracy to do so. This article then situates ‘constrained democracy’ within the liberal current as a way to conceive of and respond to this pressing problem. It concludes by discussing four constitutional mechanisms – inspired by the German Grundgesetz – to guarantee liberalism: unambiguous lexically prior commitment to liberalism, limits on negative majorities, the eternity clause and party bans. It concludes that constrained democracy is an important constitutional guarantee of liberal democracy and that the four mechanisms, among others, are essential to enact constrained democracy.
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Zajc, Marko. "Slovenian Press and Russia in the late XIX — early XX centuries: attitude to K.P. Pobedonostsev." Russian-Slovenian relations in the twentieth century, no. IV (2018): 46–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2618-8562.2018.4.2.1.
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Life and work of K.P. Pobedonostsev were known to the Slovenian public, primarily thanks to the German press. The liberal public looked sympathetically at the understanding of the Orthodox Church as a people`s Church and on Pobedonostsev’s faith in the “strong” Russian people. Also, the Catholic Slovenian public emphasized that Russia needed to be understood, and also sympathized to Pobedonostsev’s ideas about the place of faith in society. But on the other hand, especially the Catholic press condemned him for caesaropapism and for persecutions against Catholics. For both liberal and Catholic critics, it was problematic to assess his attitude towards democracy and parliamentarism, although both of them agreed that Pobedonostsev’s criticism was fair.
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Rostislavleva, Natal'ya V. "WILHELM AND ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT IN THE HISTORICAL MEMORY OF NAZI GERMANY." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. Series Political Sciences. History. International Relations, no. 3 (2020): 123–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-6339-2020-3-123-133.
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The article examines the perception of biographies and heritage of the brothers Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt in National Socialist Germany. In the historical memory of modern Germany, their images have become one of the bases of German national identity, and the Humboldt-Forum – a platform for the connection of science and culture. In collective memory of the Third Reich, the brothers held unequal positions. The 100th anniversary of the death of W. von Humboldt caused a surge of interest in him, but his image was reformatted and inscribed in the racial parameters of Nazism: his interest in the issues of the German nation was emphasized, his commitment to liberal ideas was explained by criticism of absolutism, attempts were made to attract his image to Nazi anti-Semitic paradigm. However, there were some researchers of his heritage who retained scientific objectivity. Alexander von Humboldt was paid much less attention: the ideologists of the Third Reich hated his cosmopolitanism. But as he was the brother of W. von Humboldt and a world-famous scientist, it was impossible to forget about his merits. The collective memory kept an image of a traveler naturalist whose greatness the Third Reich did not deny. Commemoration is closely associated to the identity formation. For the construction of national identity in National Socialist Germany their images were practically not required.
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Yammine, Bruno. ""Honderden keren probeerden de Walen ons ervan te overtuigen dat er geen Vlamingen meer waren …" De 'zaak-Buisset' en de Duitse oorlogspropaganda (1914-1915)." WT. Tijdschrift over de geschiedenis van de Vlaamse beweging 71, no. 3 (September 11, 2012): 233–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/wt.v71i3.12251.
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Voor het voeren van zijn Flamenpolitik tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog, deed het Duitse Rijk beroep op een omvangrijke propaganda. Daarmee wilde het de Vlaamsgezinden er onder andere van overtuigen dat er in het buitenland een anti-Vlaamse hetze woedde. In vrijwel de hele literatuur over Flamenpolitik en activisme werd (en wordt) het aangenomen dat de wallingant Buisset, een liberale volksvertegenwoordiger uit Henegouwen, al bij de eerste gouverneur-generaal was gaan aandringen op de afschaffing van het Nederlands. Nader onderzoek leert ons echter dat het verhaal over Buisset op een Duitse propagandafabel berust, ons vooral overgeleverd via een bewuste Hineinterpretierung van oud-activist A.L. Faingnaert. Het verhaal moet ook in samenhang gezien worden met de propaganda van de Duitse stromannen in Nederland die medio 1915 de Flamenpolitik een versnelling hoger deden schakelen.________“The Walloons tried to convince us hundreds of times that there were no more Flemings left …” The story about Buisset and the German propaganda (1914-1915)During the First World War, the German Empire called upon an extensive propaganda for the propagation of its Flamenpolitik. In this way, it tried to convince the Pro-Flemish among other things of the existence of an anti-Flemish witch-hunt abroad. Practically the entire literature about the Flamenpolitik and activism assumed (and still assumes) that the wallingant Buisset, a liberal Member of Parliament from Hainault, had already approached the first governor-general to urge the abolishment of the Dutch language. However, further research indicates that the story about Buisset is based on German propaganda fiction, and has in particular been handed down by an intentional Hineinterpretierung by former activist A.L. Faingnaert. The story also needs to be viewed in context with the propaganda of the German front men in the Netherlands who cranked up the Flamenpolitik around the middle of 1915.
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Niessen, Alexandra, and Stefan Ruenzi. "Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany." German Economic Review 11, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 441–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2009.00482.x.
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Abstract This paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) are more likely to work for firms than members of left-wing parties (SPD and The Left) or the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens). Politically connected firms are larger, less risky and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms significantly outperformed unconnected firms in 2006, i.e. before the publication of the data on political connections. Differences in stock market performance were much smaller in 2007.