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1
Olsen, Jonathan. "The Left Party and the AfD." German Politics and Society 36, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 70–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2018.360104.
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In the 2017 German Federal Election. The Left Party (Die Linke, or LP) saw its vote share in eastern Germany seriously erode. The main culprit behind the LP’s losses was the Alternative for Germany (AfD): 430,000 voters who cast their ballots for the LP in 2013 voted for the AfD in 2017. Why was this the case? This article suggests that the AfD in 2017 was able to attract protest voters, largely in eastern Germany, dissatisfied with the state of democracy and the political establishment in Germany who once voted for the LP. The LP and AfD have become eastern German populist competitors.
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Olsen, Jonathan. "The Left Party Thirty Years After Unification." German Politics and Society 37, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2019.370403.
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The story of Die Linke (Left Party, or LP) over the past thirty years reflects the incomplete project of politically unifying the two halves of Germany. Over the course of its history, the LP has been transformed from a desperate holdover from the communist era, to a populist representative of eastern identity in the decade after unification, and finally to a modern, all-German radical left party. Since 2015, however, the LP has found itself threatened in its eastern German heartland by the radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is attempting to supplant the LP as the voice of eastern German protest.
3
KOPKA, Artur. "Populizm lewicowy w Europie na przykładzie partii „Die Linke” w Republice Federalnej Niemiec." Przegląd Politologiczny, no. 4 (November 2, 2018): 79–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pp.2010.15.4.7.
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One of the main challenges European democracy has faced recently is growing political radicalism, and primarily the increasing importance of populist parties originating from both left and right sides of the political arena. This paper refers to the theoretical assumptions concerning this phenomenon to analyze the operations of the ‘Die Linke’ party in the German party system. This party is an excellent example of taking skillful advantage of the circumstances favoring the development of the populist tendencies that have emerged following the recent, radical, social, and political changes in the Federal Republic of Germany. Against the background of European extremist left-wing parties, the paper presents the influence this Left-Wing Party exerts on the changing balance of power on the German political arena on a regional and national level, the ideological profile and party platform, and the changing structure of both its members and voters.
4
Elo, Kimmo. "The Left Party and the Long-Term Developments of the German Party System." German Politics and Society 26, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 50–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2008.260303.
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In mainstream analyses of the German political system, the emergence of the Left Party (Die Linke) is presented as an unexpected consequence of German unification and as an indication of the existence of an East-West divide. This view is for the most part based on the idea that German unification is a process of political integration of the East into the West. Such an understanding, however, downplays the long-term developments in the German party system. This article examines the emergence of the Left Party in light of both the long-term developmental tendencies of the German party system and findings from comparative studies among other West European countries. The article concludes that the main reason for the current political stalemate is the incapability of the postwar Volksparteien to respond to changes in political space and action. Based on evidence from comparative studies, the article also suggests a pragmatic rethinking especially in the SPD is necessary in dealings with the Left Party.
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Neundorf, Anja, and James Adams. "The Micro-Foundations of Party Competition and Issue Ownership: The Reciprocal Effects of Citizens’ Issue Salience and Party Attachments." British Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (April 6, 2016): 385–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123415000642.
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While previous research on the reciprocal effects of citizens’ issue attitudes and their party support emphasize citizens’ issue positions, political competition revolves equally around issue salience – that is, debates over which issue areas political parties should prioritize. Using multi-wave panel survey data from Germany and Great Britain, this study analyzes the reciprocal effects of citizens’ issue salience and their party support, and concludes that citizens’ issue priorities both influence and are influenced by their party attachments and, moreover, that these effects are linked to parties’ long-term associative issue ownership. This effect is strongest among supporters of a small issue-orientated niche party, the German Greens.
6
Anderson, Karen M., and Traute Meyer. "Social Democracy, Unions, and Pension Politics in Germany and Sweden." Journal of Public Policy 23, no. 1 (January 2003): 23–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x03003027.
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This article investigates the politics of reforming mature, pay-as-you-go pensions in the context of austerity. In both Sweden and Germany the Social Democratic party leadership advocated reform in response to similar financial and demographic pressures, but the Swedish reform was more successful in correcting perceived program weaknesses and in defending social democratic values. To explain this difference in outcomes, we focus on policy legacies and the organizational and political capacities of labor movements. We argue that existing pension policies in Germany were more constraining than in Sweden, narrowing the range of politically feasible strategies. By contrast, in Sweden, existing pension policy provided opportunities for turning vices into virtues and financing the transition to a new system. In addition, the narrow interests of German unions and the absence of institutionalized cooperation with the Social Democratic Party hindered reform. By contrast, the Swedish Social Democrats' bargaining position in pension reform negotiations with non-socialist parties was formulated with blue collar union interests in mind. The encompassing interests of Swedish unions and their close links with the Social Democrats facilitated a reform compromise.
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Caciagli, Mario. "Le sette elezioni federali nella Germania unita (1990-2013)." Quaderni dell Osservatorio elettorale QOE - IJES 72, no. 4 (December 30, 2014): 55–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.36253/qoe-9571.
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Stability and predictability had been the norm in the German political system before the unification. The seven federal elections in the unified Germany from 1990 to 2013 did have significant consequences on the traditional continuity. After the last two governments headed by Helmut Kohl (1990-1998), the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder became Chancellor in a Red-Green coalition (1998-2005) and the Christian Democrat Angela Merkel became Chancellor, fi rst in a Grand Coalition with the Social Democrats (2005-2009), than in a coalition with the Liberals (2009-2013), and after the 2013 elections in a Grand Coalition again. These frequent changes can be explained by the mobility of the electorate: the cumulative effect of the growth of the middle class and the general social mobility have eroded traditional loyalties, as the disaffection of the youth includes changing electoral choices or tendency to no-vote. Economic and social issues too did have effect on voting behavior: because their critical social situation the electors of the East had preferred fi rst Kohl’s CDU, than Schröder’s SPD and again the CDU under Merkel’s leadership; in the West millions of left electors disappointed by Schröder’s contentious reforms of the labor market leaved the SPD in the 2009 and 2013 elections; the performance of the economy in the last years after periods of crisis, collocating Germany at the top of the European Union, has stimulated the support to Merkel. Because a new party, the PDS than Linke, which has stable roots in the East, but can’t be partner of a government; because the exclusion from the Bundestag of the liberal FDP; and, finally, because the least reform of the electoral system toward more proportionality: all that injects uncertainty into a “fluid” party and political system.
8
Ferguson, Thomas, and Hans-Joachim Voth. "Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 101–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.101.
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Abstract This paper examines the value of connections between German industry and the Nazi movement in early 1933. Drawing on previously unused contemporary sources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns, we find that one out of seven firms, and a large proportion of the biggest companies, had substantive links with the National Socialist German Workers' Party. Firms supporting the Nazi movement experienced unusually high returns, outperforming unconnected ones by 5% to 8% between January and March 1933. These results are not driven by sectoral composition and are robust to alternative estimators and definitions of affiliation.
9
Raisch, Judith, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer. "Beeinflussen Klima-Schulstreiks die politische Agenda? Eine Analyse der Twitterkommunikation von Bundestagsabgeordneten." Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 51, no. 3 (2020): 667–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0340-1758-2020-3-667.
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Have the school strikes for the climate (Fridays for Future (FFF) movement) affected political agenda setting in Germany? And does a MP’s party affiliation matter for how often and in what ways he or she mentions the FFF movement? These questions are answered by analyzing 78,000 Twitter tweets of 89 Members of the German Bundestag from all seven parties represented in parliament between November 2017 und April 2019 . MPs of all parties paid more attention to climate issues after the school strikes began . Moreover, and in line with the expectations of the issue ownership literature, it turns out that MPs for the Greens and the Left Party referred more often to the FFF movement in their tweets than members of the AfD, FDP, CDU, and CSU . Similarly, Green and Left MPs’ tweets about the FFF movement were more positive, encouraged followers to support the movement more often, and linked comments on the FFF movement that critiqued the government’s climate policy more frequently than members of the latter parties . The tweets of SPD MPs resembled those of Green and Left MPs .
10
Oswald, Michael T., Meike Fromm, and Elena Broda. "Strategic clustering in right-wing-populism? ‘Green policies’ in Germany and France." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 15, no. 2 (June 2021): 185–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12286-021-00485-6.
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AbstractPast research pointed to the idea that right-wing ideology and climate-change skepticism are inherently linked. Empirical reality proves differently however, since right-wing populist parties are starting to adapt pro environmentalist stances. In this paper, we look into two prominent cases of diametrical diverging environmental strategies by right-wing-populist-parties: France’s Rassemblement National and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland. In order convey this point, we use comparative qualitative content analysis and examine several decisive determinants regarding environmental strategies of right-wing populist parties. We argue that right-wing-populism is remarkably adaptable considering political opportunity structures, even clustering in ideologically diametrical versions of the same issue while each party coherently extends its policy-orientation to its respective alignment of the issue. That means, populism might be far less ideological than assumed in the past.
11
Stenfeldt, Johan. "The Fascist Who Fought for World Peace: Conversions and Core Concepts in the Ideology of the Swedish Nazi Leader Sven Olov Lindholm." Fascism 8, no. 1 (July 1, 2019): 9–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116257-00801002.
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This article deals with the political conversion and ideological thought of the Swedish National Socialist Sven Olov Lindholm (1903–1998). Lindholm began his career as a fascist in the twenties, and became a member of Sweden’s main National Socialist party led by Birger Furugård, in the early thirties. Ideological divisions and a failed attempt to oust Furugård saw Lindholm found his own party in January 1933, the nsap (later renamed the sss). Previous research has often described this party as a left-wing Nazi alternative, but its ideological basis has never been thoroughly dissected. The present article uses a variety of archival collections, speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper articles to suggest a cluster of six interdependent core concepts in Sven Olov Lindholm’s ideological thought: anti-Semitism, anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, anti-materialism, the idealization of the worker, and the definition of Nazi Germany as a worker’s state. Lindholm underwent a second political awakening in the sixties, redefining himself as a communist, and thus the article also examines the ideological remains thereafter. It is found that anti-materialism, linked to a broad antipathy to modernity, was central throughout his career.
12
Nadezhdin, A. E. "ПРОБЛЕМА ИСЛАМИЗАЦИИ ГЕРМАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА В КОНТЕКСТЕ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ МИГРАЦИОННЫХ ПРОЦЕССОВ." Konfliktologia 13, no. 2 (June 6, 2018): 104. http://dx.doi.org/10.31312/2310-6085-2018-13-2-104-118.
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This article deals with the process of Islamisation in Western Europe, particularly in Germany taking into account the current domestic situation and the changes it has undergone. Muslim population growth and the fight for their rights, reconstruction of their native country elements (building mosques, wearing religious attire, conducting religious worship) or the voluntary refusal to adapt to the recipient society contribute greatly to segregation and growth of tensions between the local “majority” and the “minority” of newcomers. It has been noted that if state institutions don’t have the capacity to resolve the problems linked to Islamisation (enclavisation, ghettoisation, criminalization etc.), the recipient society starts to generate its own ways of tackling these issues. Such situations lead to internal conflicts between the authorities and the public and reshape the existing political landscape. Within the context of these circumstances, such groups as “PEGIDA” and the electoral success of the “Alternative for Germany” party are of particular interest. The article also provides a characteristic of the main Germany-based Muslim social organizations underscoring the radical and extremist ones whose members could potentially be involved in terrorist activities. Special attention is paid to The migrant crisis of 2015-2016, that has exposed the existing drawbacks of the German integration, socialization and adaptation policy targeted at migrants with Muslim background. The crisis and the subsequent criminal offences have highlighted the need to revise the existing national security strategy in view of the new threats and challenges as well as to harmonize the basics of intercultural and interreligious dialogue within the society of “guiding German culture”.
13
Nadezhdin, A. E. "ПРОБЛЕМА ИСЛАМИЗАЦИИ ГЕРМАНСКОГО ОБЩЕСТВА В КОНТЕКСТЕ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ МИГРАЦИОННЫХ ПРОЦЕССОВ." Konfliktologia 13, no. 2 (June 6, 2018): 94. http://dx.doi.org/10.31312/2310-6085-2018-13-2-94-108.
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This article deals with the process of Islamisation in Western Europe, particularly in Germany taking into account the current domestic situation and the changes it has undergone. Muslim population growth and the fight for their rights, reconstruction of their native country elements (building mosques, wearing religious attire, conducting religious worship) or the voluntary refusal to adapt to the recipient society contribute greatly to segregation and growth of tensions between the local “majority” and the “minority” of newcomers. It has been noted that if state institutions don’t have the capacity to resolve the problems linked to Islamisation (enclavisation, ghettoisation, criminalization etc.), the recipient society starts to generate its own ways of tackling these issues. Such situations lead to internal conflicts between the authorities and the public and reshape the existing political landscape. Within the context of these circumstances, such groups as “PEGIDA” and the electoral success of the “Alternative for Germany” party are of particular interest. The article also provides a characteristic of the main Germany-based Muslim social organizations underscoring the radical and extremist ones whose members could potentially be involved in terrorist activities. Special attention is paid to The migrant crisis of 2015-2016, that has exposed the existing drawbacks of the German integration, socialization and adaptation policy targeted at migrants with Muslim background. The crisis and the subsequent criminal offences have highlighted the need to revise the existing national security strategy in view of the new threats and challenges as well as to harmonize the basics of intercultural and interreligious dialogue within the society of “guiding German culture”.
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Gaido, Daniel. "The First Workers’ Government in History: Karl Marx’s Addenda to Lissagaray’s History of the Commune of 1871." Historical Materialism 29, no. 1 (March 19, 2021): 49–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569206x-12341972.
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Abstract In Marxist circles it is common to refer to Karl Marx’s The Civil War in France for a theoretical analysis of the historical significance of the Paris Commune, and to Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray’s History of the Commune of 1871 for a description of the facts surrounding the insurrection of the Paris workers and its repression by the National Assembly led by Adolphe Thiers. What is less well-known is that Marx himself oversaw the German translation of Lissagaray’s book and made numerous additions to it. In this article we describe Marx’s addenda to Lissagaray’s work, showing how they contribute to concretising his analysis of the Paris Commune and how they relate to the split in the International Working Men’s Association between Marxists and anarchists that took place after the Commune’s defeat. We also show how Marx’s additions to the German version of Lissagaray’s book were linked to his involvement with the recently created Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany and to his criticism of the programme it had adopted at the congress celebrated in the city of Gotha.
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Kerr, Rebecca. "Social Democratic Party’s Electoral Strategies Amid Social Class (Re)alignment and (Re)mobilisation." Review of European Affairs 4, no. 1 (2020): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.51149/roea.1.2020.3.
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Social Democratic parties have long been steady pioneers of European democracy, but over the past decade they have suffered a humiliating collapse. It is commonly asserted that European countries have entered a classless society. Subsequently, mainstream left parties adopted broad electoral strategies to appeal widely to the median voter, exemplified by the Blair-Schröder Third Way. Electoral backlash following the British and German social democratic party’s 1990s neoliberal shift, their approach to globalization as well as their handling of the financial crisis and refugee crisis have eroded their popularity. Subsequent frustration with the political establishment is exemplified by the cultural backlash thesis. However, a countermovement signified by postmaterialism and social liberalism calls for transformative social and political change. The two convictions clash on binary issues, exacerbating a righteous divide between sociocultural liberals and conservatives, recently popularized as the “anywheres” and the “somewheres”. This paper puts forth the necessity for social democratic parties to re-engage with the cleavage politics of today. This is particularly important as today’s cleavages are largely ideologically driven. Questions of electoral strategy, ideological positioning and mobilisation tactics are contested intra-party. Attention is paid to Corbyn’s Labour, whose move towards traditionalism at first earned electoral support, only to be discredited in 2019. In comparison, the German SPD embraced centrism in 2017 and were penalized for it. They must now respond and offer a strategic alternative following competition from the Greens and Die Linke.
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Grohs, Stephan. "Contested boundaries: The moralization and politicization of prostitution in German cities." European Urban and Regional Studies 27, no. 2 (January 10, 2019): 156–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0969776418822083.
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The local regulation of prostitution in Germany is a contested area of urban politics. In this issue area, morality claims intersect with the material interests of home- and landowners and the security demands of ‘ordinary’ citizens. The Prostitution Law of 2001 has liberalized the legal framework: the legislation ‘normalized’ sex work, triggering the re-definition of urban strategies to regulate prostitution. This article analyses the conflict dynamics and the framing of conflicts over regulations in four German cities. It identifies the main actors, coalition-building processes and the framing of conflicts, and links these elements to the resulting policies. With regard to theory, it explores the relevance of classical explanatory approaches to local governance such as party politics, urban growth coalitions, political culture and bureaucratic politics to the value-laden issue of prostitution. It thereby contributes to the growing academic interest in the nature of morality policies and the question of the specific conditions under which prostitution is framed as a moral issue or as a ‘normal’ subject within urban politics.
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Grashoff, Udo. "Driven into Suicide by the East German Regime? Reflections on the Persistence of a Misleading Perception." Central European History 52, no. 02 (June 2019): 310–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938919000165.
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AbstractThe assumption that the communist dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) drove many people to suicide has persisted for decades, and it is still evident in academic and public discourse. Yet, high suicide rates in eastern Germany, which can be traced back to the nineteenth century, cannot be a result of a particular political system. Be it monarchy, democracy, fascism, or socialism, the frequency of suicide there did not change significantly. In fact, the share of politically motivated suicides in the GDR amounts to only 1–2 percent of the total. Political, economic, or sociocultural factors did not have a significant impact on suicide rates. An analysis of two subsets of GDR society that were more likely to be affected by repression—prisoners and army recruits—further corroborates this: there is no evidence of a higher suicide rate in either case. Complimentary to a quantitative approach “from above,” a qualitative analysis “from below” not only underlines the limited importance of repression, but also points to a regional pattern of behavior linked to cultural influences and to the role of religion—specifically, to Protestantism. Several factors nevertheless fostered the persistence of an overly politicized interpretation of suicide in the GDR: the bereaved in the East, the media in the West, and a few victims of suicide themselves blamed the regime and downplayed important individual and pathological aspects. Moreover, state and party officials in the GDR unintentionally reinforced the politicization of suicide by imposing a taboo on the subject, which only fueled the flames of speculation about its root causes.
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Waldvogel, Thomas. "Applying Virtualized Real-Time Response Measurement on TV-Discussions with Multi-Person Panels." Statistics, Politics and Policy 11, no. 1 (June 25, 2020): 23–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/spp-2018-0013.
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AbstractTelevised debates are major events in electoral campaigns, serving voters as a substantial source of political information and reaching millions of the potential electorate. Scholars have made use of this potential by applying Real-Time Response Measurement (RTR) to assess reception and perception processes. However, RTR-research has yet almost exclusively focused on duel scenarios. In this paper, we argue that the focus on the duel format in political and communication science research is inappropriate. Thus, we apply virtualized RTR on TV-debates with a multi-person panel. Drawing on data of two field studies (n = 1191/1058) conducted with the Debat-O-Meter – an innovative virtualized RTR-Measurement toolbox – in the course of the 2017 federal election in Germany, we show that virtualized RTR-Measurement can indeed produce valid and reliable data regarding TV-discussions with a multi-person podium. Additionally, we find perception processes to be primarily shaped by party identification and prior political preferences such as candidate orientation. Furthermore, our results give strong evidence that candidate preferences are substantially affected by debate reception. Overall, our data follows an established structure well-known from research on TV-duels. As such, research on TV discussions with a multi-person panel is compatible with the existing repertoire of methods, offers great potential for political communication research and provides results that can be linked to current findings in empirical debate research while making its own contribution to the research field.
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Merkulova, Irina A., and Vladimir B. Pomelov. "Features of the formation of spiritual and moral values in the educational practice of Germany in the second half of the twentieth century." Perspectives of Science and Education 49, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): 478–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.32744/pse.2021.1.33.
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The problem of forming spiritual and moral values in the educational practice of Germany in the second half of the twentieth century is of theoretical interest and practical value for Russian teachers in terms of using the experience accumulated by foreign colleagues in the course of reforming the national school. The hypothesis of the study was that the various forms of work practiced by teachers of the two countries – the GDR and the FRG, – during this period contributed to the formation of spiritual and moral values among the youth of the two German states. The following research methods were used: literature analysis, scientific and pedagogical interpretation of information contained in sources; comparative method; axiological method that allows to identify the positive content in the scientific subject. Main results of the study. The fundamental difference in socio-political and ideological attitudes that took place in the GDR and the FRG in 1949-1989 determined to a decisive extent the choice of forms and content of educational work carried out in educational institutions in both countries. In the GDR, there was a single comprehensive public school, which was under the full ideological and administrative control of the ruling Socialist United Party of Germany. Special attention was paid to educating the younger generation in the spirit of devotion to the ideals of socialism, rejection of religion and the values of bourgeois society. The Union of Free German Youth and the children's pioneer organization named after Ernst Telman were actively used in the process of socialist education of young people. At the same time, they actually copied the forms and methods of work of the corresponding organizations that operated in the USSR, – the Komsomol and the Lenin Pioneer organization. In Germany, on the contrary, there was a significant number of types of secondary educational institutions, many of which were non-governmental: private, Waldorf, Catholic and Evangelical, etc. Ideological education, aimed, among other things, at the assimilation of spiritual and moral values, was carried out mainly at school, in accordance with the guidelines adopted in this educational institution. The study allowed us to characterize the features of the formation of spiritual and moral values in the educational practice of Germany in the second half of the twentieth century. The significance of the results obtained is that they to a certain extent factual enrich modern Russian historical and pedagogical science. The main conclusion of the study is that in the GDR, the concept of the goal of education was inextricably linked with collective interests and orientation to the socialist ideology, while the liberal-democratic ideology in the FRG gave absolute priority to the individual over the collective. A scientifically formulated study of this approach provides a perspective for further research.
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Dyer-Witheford, Nick. "Left Populism and Platform Capitalism." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 18, no. 1 (January 13, 2020): 116–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v18i1.1130.
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This paper contextualizes and analyses the policy proposals of new “left populisms” (Mouffe 2018) for the regulation and reform of the “platform capitalism” (Srnicek 2017) that increasingly organizes digital communication. The era of the 2008 crash and subsequent recession saw the emergence in North America and Europe of new left-wing electoral initiatives, either as new parties or fractions within older parties. These include, in the USA, Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Democrats; in the UK, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party; in Spain, Podemos; in Germany, Die Linke; in France, La France Insoumise. While many of these groupings might be described as socialist, or democratic socialist, they often also distinguish themselves from older socialist or social democratic formations; so, for lack of a better term, we call them left populisms. Left populisms are connected in contradictory ways to the appearance of platform capitalism, a corporate model exemplified by Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon and Uber, deploying proprietorial software as a launch-point for user activities accessing commodified or advertising-driven goods and services. The rise of left populism correlates with the ascent of platform capitalists. Left populist parties emerged from the anti-austerity movements (Occupy in the USA, the Indignados in Spain, student campus occupations in the UK) organized with the help of social media platforms. However, it is also the failures and scandals of platform capitalism have been important to left populism. Edward Snowden’s revelations of ubiquitous surveillance and the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica-Russian hacker imbroglio around the 2016 US election have fuelled a “techlash” against giant digital corporations that is now an important component of left populist sentiment. Drawing on policy documents, manifestos, speeches, position paper, this paper analyses the policy platforms in which left populist parties confront platform capitalism around issues of content regulation; concentration of ownership; the rights of digital workers; alternative ownership models; and proposals for a high-tech driven transition to “postcapitalism” (Mason 2016). It considers the similarities and difference between and within left populist parties on these issues; the extent of their departure from neoliberal policies; and their differences, and occasional erratic similarities, with right-wing populisms, such as that of Trump. It then reviews critiques of left populism made from Marxist and ecological anti-capitalist positions, with particular reference to technological issues. The paper concludes with a summary of the opportunities and problems for a left wing “data populism” (Morozov 2016) in the current political conjuncture.
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Nissen, Mogens Rostgaard. "Alex Walter – “… den tyske embedsmand, der overhovedet har gjort Danmark de største tjenester under krigen”." Fund og Forskning i Det Kongelige Biblioteks Samlinger 54 (March 3, 2015): 423. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/fof.v54i0.118896.
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Mogens Rostgård Nissen: Alex Walter, — “… the German official who rendered the largest services of all to Denmark during the war.”
Alex Walter was head of the German government committee, which during the occupation of Denmark negotiated trade agreements with the corresponding Danish government committee. That is why he had great influence on the economic side of occupation policy, which the German occupying power carried out in Denmark during the war. Walter had a broad knowledge of Danish economy and Danish conditions in general, because since 1932 he had negotiated trade agreements with top Danish officials. At the same time, he was well-known and respected in Denmark, and that was important for the agreements he assisted in concluding during the occupation. Under his leadership, the German occupying power followed a traditional trade policy, which was focused on practical issues and concrete results. It was a policy, which objectively was for the common good of Denmark and Germany. Walter was a very high-level official in the thoroughly Nazified Ministry of Nutrition and Agriculture. His immediate superior, Herbert Backe, was responsible for German food planning, and he had a decisive influence on the Nazi occupation policy for all of Europe, including the exploitation policy, which took place in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. But Denmark followed an entirely different economic track, which was characterized by negotiations and cooperation, and it was very much Walter, who became responsible for planning and implementing this economic policy. Among his negotiation partners in Denmark, Walter was perceived as a reasonable and sensible man, with whom one could negotiate and rely on. There was a clear understanding that Walter had intervened several times during political crises — among other things when the Danish government stood down in August 1943; during the general strike in the summer of 1944 and in connection with the deportation of the police in the autumn of 1944. But he also had a dark Nazi side to him, precisely because he was linked to Backe and the Ministry of Nutrition and Agriculture. After the war, he was interned due to the fact that as a senior official, he had been a member of the Nazi party and held the rank of SS Sturmbannführer. That is why he was only finally acquitted and stripped of his Nazi status in October 1948, a few months before he died.
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Trunov, Philipp Olegovich. "Bilateral Relations between Germany and Saudi Arabia: Military-Political Dimension." Vestnik RUDN. International Relations 19, no. 4 (December 15, 2019): 663–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-0660-2019-19-4-663-674.
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Germany is an example of power, which is consistently trying to increase its role in global politics, including more active part in the solution of a wide range of military-political questions. At the same time Germany is facing the growing number of challenges for its own security, coming mostly from unstable Asian and African states. This makes Germany pay more attention on the Middle East in searching of new and strengthening traditional links with the regional partners. In this regard the article covers the dynamics, problems and perspectives of the bilateral interactions between Germany and Saudi Arabia in political-military sphere during the 2010s. Traditionally Saudi Arabia was one of the key partners of the ‘collective West’ in the Middle East and has had rather good relations with Germany. The key research method used in the article is the event-analysis. The research paper profoundly investigates the relations between Germany and Saudi Arabia during the first half of the 2010s. The article stresses the mutual interest in expanding and deepening cooperation in the context of the “Arab awakening”, including the solution of the Syrian problem. The key focus is paid to the growing discrepancies in positions of two parts regarding the Yemen conflict resolution in the context of confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The article also describes the dynamics of negotiations between Germany and Saudi Arabia on the highest and high levels in the middle 2010s. The paper points out the growing recession periods in German-Saudi relations in 2016-2017 (taken into account the execution of Shiite preachers in KSA; Qatar diplomatic crises and the assassination of J. Khashoggi). After the signature and implementation of the Iranian ‘nuclear deal’ Germany has been increasingly inclined towards the tactics of “balancing” between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And in this regard has emphasized the unacceptability of a direct military conflict between them. After Trump’s administration withdrawal from Iranian nuclear deal the article stresses the tougher German pressure on Saudi Arabia both in militarytechnical cooperation and political spheres in order to assure the withdrawal of Saudi Arabian military forces from Yemen. In the conclusion the author specifies the politicization of the bilateral military-technical cooperation and the sharp increase of the influence of Iranian factor over the German-Saudi relations. Three scenarios of future development of the confrontation between two states are proposed. Depending on each of them, the prospects for the development of German-Saudi relations are defined.
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Coffé, Hilde, and Rebecca Plassa. "Party policy position of Die Linke: A continuation of the PDS?" Party Politics 16, no. 6 (March 22, 2010): 721–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068809346075.
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M. Kopylenko. "The Political Party Landscape of Germany." International Affairs 65, no. 002 (April 30, 2019): 147–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.21557/iaf.53420846.
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HEDINGER, DANIEL. "The Spectacle of Global Fascism: The Italian Blackshirt mission to Japan's Asian empire." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 6 (November 2017): 1999–2034. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x17000026.
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AbstractIn the spring of 1938 a mission of the Italian Fascist Party journeyed to the Japanese empire, visiting China, Korea, Manchukuo, and Japan itself. Those were happy days for the Axis and, as such, characterized by a flood of shuttle visits and requests for cooperation between Italy, Japan, and Germany. As we explore the choreography of the visit and accompany the Italian Blackshirts on their two-month-long trip, two processes become clear. On the one hand, the presence of the Blackshirts in Japan helped place the nation's regional war with China in the broader context of worldwide conflicts. On the other hand, this trip assisted in firmly placing the new Axis alliance in the context of a pan-Asianist empire under Japanese control. This article suggests that both processes were linked and mutually enhancing of one another. At the same time they were part of a much more far-reaching phenomenon, namely the globalization of the Axis alliance. This, I will argue, was acted out on the stages provided by what is best described as the ‘spectacle of global fascism’. Of course, this spectacle proved to have its tensions and oddities. But as the focus on the performative aspects of the Italian-Japanese encounters shows, this novel form of fascist diplomacy was a way of handling contradictions within the alliance. At the same time, the spectacle served to strengthen it. In other words, seen through the lens of the Blackshirts’ mission, the Axis appears significantly stronger, diverse, and also more global than conventional diplomatic history has perceived it to be.
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Jörs, Inka. "East Germany: another party landscape." German Politics 12, no. 1 (April 2003): 135–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644000412331307554.
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Bois, Marcel. "Die radikale Linke als Massenbewegung. Kommunisten in Harburg-Wilhelmsburg 1918–1933." Historical Materialism 17, no. 1 (2009): 191–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156920609x399272.
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AbstractIn the mid-1990s, Klaus-Michael Mallmann published his study on 'Communists in the Weimar Republic'. His newly established social-historical approach on the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) has since been taken up by other historians. One of them is Christian Gotthardt, who recently published a book with the promising title 'The Radical Left as a Mass Movement'. Here he focuses on the regional history of the KPD in the city of Harburg-Wilhelmsburg. The great strength of his book is the detailed description of the local Communists' day-to-day work. However, when turning his attention to the turning points of KPD history, the problems associated with adopting Mallman's social-historical approach become obvious. For example this leads them both to reject the theory of 'Stalinisation'. The article shows that Gotthardt, as well as Mallmann, had come to questionable conclusions on the development of the KPD of the Weimar Republic by focusing on events outside of their context in time and space.
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정흥모. "Non major political party and Change of the political party system in Germany." Journal of European Union Studies ll, no. 33 (February 2013): 335–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.18109/jeus.2013..33.335.
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Basov, F. "Party System Transformation in Germany." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 2 (2021): 29–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-2-29-36.
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This article is devoted to the changes of the party system of Germany. In recent years, the transformation of the party system has caused several political crises. Party spectrum is pluralized and polarized in Germany. Regional differences also increase. In this situation, the German parties are in search of new dynamics. The consequence of this is that all the main parties are now factional. The system that existed in Germany for more than half a century, with the dominance of two political forces (CDU/CSU and SPD), gradually evolved into the “one and a half” party system (only CDU/CSU dominates). The question is whether evolution will continue towards simple multi-party system, or the “one and a half” party system will remain. With a significant degree of certainty, one can say that a return to a “two and a half” party system is impossible. Changes in the party-political system lead to an increase in the diversity of the composition of the coalitions ruling in Germany. German political parties should learn how to create coalitions of three political forces, also at the federal level. The main trend of the coming years for CDU, CSU and SPD will be an attempt to return to their traditional platforms. However, a full return is impossible. More frequent red-red-green coalitions can be expected, including the federal level. But, nevertheless, serious changes in the German party system did not lead to its chronic incapacity – the system adapted to them.
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BLAIS, ANDRÉ, AGNIESKA DOBRZYNSKA, and INDRIDI H. INDRIDASON. "To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice." British Journal of Political Science 35, no. 1 (December 8, 2004): 182–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123405000098.
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In September 1864, the Association Internationale pour le Progrès des Sciences Sociales met in Amsterdam to examine the system of proportional representation (PR) which had just been proposed by Thomas Hare. The meeting signalled a growing interest in systems of PR across the more democratic nations of the world – some of which had already begun experimenting with it. Sixty years later, the majority of existing democracies, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, had adopted PR for the election of their national legislatures.Why did so many countries decide to shift to PR? Why did the shift occur at a given point in time, not earlier or later? Why did some countries never move to PR? These are the questions that we address in this Note.We are interested in exploring the factors that influenced the decision to adopt PR at the turn of the twentieth century. We argue that two factors of considerable theoretical relevance were particularly important in facilitating the shift to PR: the spread of democratic ideas and the presence of a majority (usually two-round) system and, as a consequence, a multi-party system.Carstairs's classic history of electoral systems shows that at the turn of the twentieth century there was a strong demand for PR, which was linked to a more general demand for democratization. As Carstairs notes,there was a general movement in the direction of more democratic political institutions which took several different forms … There was a movement for the establishment or strengthening of parliamentary institutions … Extensions of the franchise for parliamentary elections enabled an increasingly large proportion of the population to gain representation in parliament … With these developments it became a matter of increasing concern that the elected members of parliament and the parties they supported should fairly represent the various interests and opinions of the electorate.
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Dalton, Russell J., and Willy Jou. "Is There a Single German Party System?" German Politics and Society 28, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 34–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2010.280203.
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Few aspects of politics have been as variable as partisan politics in the two decades since German unification. In the East, citizens had to learn about democratic electoral politics and the party system from an almost completely fresh start. In the West, voters experienced a changing partisan landscape and the shifting policy positions of the established parties as they confronted the challenges of unification. This article raises the question of whether there is one party system or two in the Federal Republic. We first describe the voting results since 1990, and examine the evolving links between social milieu and the parties. Then we consider whether citizens are developing affective party ties that reflect the institutionalization of a party system and voter choice. Although there are broad similarities between electoral politics in West and East, the differences have not substantially narrowed in the past two decades.
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Jähnichen, Gisa. "Book Review of ‘Kirsten Seidlitz. 2020. Musik & Politischer Konflikt aus der Türkei – kurdische, alevitische und linke Musik in Deutschland’ [Music and Political Conflict from Turkey – Kurdish, Alevi, and Leftist Music In Germany]. Bielefeld: Transcript." ASIAN-EUROPEAN MUSIC RESEARCH JOURNAL 7 (June 21, 2021): 97–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.30819/aemr.7-8.
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This short review essay refers to the book of Kirsten Seidlitz ‘Musik XXABSTRACT Politischer Konflikt aus der Türkei – Kurdische, alevitische und linke Musik in Deutschland [Music and Political Conflict from Turkey – Kurdish, Alevi, and Leftist Music in Germany], which was published in 2020 by the German Transcript Verlag in Bielefeld. It is written in German and addresses many important questions regarding political conflicts and their impact on music among various different Turkish people living in Germany. Migration and political participation are heatedly debated in recent times and also a part of cultural exchange.
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Niedermayer, Oskar. "Party system change in east Germany." German Politics 4, no. 3 (December 1995): 75–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644009508404414.
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Kudriachenko, Andrii, and Viktoriia Soloshenko. "Contemporary Problems of Political Transformation in Modern Germany." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XXI (2020): 700–716. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2020-35.
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The article states that the political party system formed on the constitutional basis of the Basic Law of Germany is one of the key pillars of democracy of the German state. The Western German-style political party system, based on a substantial legal framework, political culture, and traditions, has convincingly proved its democratic spirit and viability over several decades of the post-war period. The effectiveness of this system was ensured by the presence of the two large parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. The attractiveness of their policy priorities, broad political activity, and statist approaches made it possible to displace other, less influential, parties. The effectiveness and viability of the political party system of Germany are also proven by the course of the process of restoring the country’s state unity. The current period is characterised by systemic crisis phenomena, which have not spared German major parties. These processes are also taking place in other European countries, as previously stable parties transform over time into an idiosyncratic kind of political and technological institutions. For them, short-term success is a priority and is defined by the number of votes cast, rather than the focus on robust principles and visions of the future. However, it may be fair to claim that the whole previous experience testifies to the creativity of the political party system of post-war Germany, thus making the modern Federal Republic of Germany able to cope with contemporary problems and challenges. This is – and will be – buttressed by time and new approaches pursued by politicians, experts, and scholars as well as the previous practice of reaching compromises and social concord in the name of national interests. The political party system was and remains an important constituent of the entire state and political system of Germany. Keywords: political party system, Federal Republic of Germany, state system, Germany, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats.
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Niessen, Alexandra, and Stefan Ruenzi. "Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany." German Economic Review 11, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 441–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2009.00482.x.
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Abstract This paper investigates politically connected firms in Germany. With the introduction of a new transparency law in 2007, information on additional income sources for all members of the German parliament became publicly available. We find that members of the conservative party (CDU/CSU) and the liberal party (FDP) are more likely to work for firms than members of left-wing parties (SPD and The Left) or the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens). Politically connected firms are larger, less risky and have lower market valuations than unconnected firms. They also have fewer growth opportunities, but slightly better accounting performance. On the stock market, connected firms significantly outperformed unconnected firms in 2006, i.e. before the publication of the data on political connections. Differences in stock market performance were much smaller in 2007.
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Welsh, Helga A. "Party Formation and Dilemmas of Opportunity Structure: Freie Wähler in the German Political System." German Politics and Society 30, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2012.300401.
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The Freie Wähler (free voters, FW) offer the rare chance to analyze parties in the making. Their long-time anchoring in local elections, centrist, middle-class political orientation, and bifurcated organizational structure distinguish them from other new political parties that aspire to participate in Land (state), national and European elections. Against the backdrop of FW success in Bavaria, where they received 10.2 percent of the vote in 2008, this article explores the FW expansion to the state level but not their national aspirations. In contrast to most studies that emphasize opportunity structures that work in favor of new political actors, this article highlights their dialectical nature. For example, the FW self-image is based on their difference from political parties, but the rules of the game push them to the status of "almost-party" at the local level and parties at the Land level. Their local roots are a source of legitimacy, but when they reach beyond, divisions among members and voters hold back their electoral fortunes. Independence and issue orientation are appealing to some voters but hamper the establishment of a clear identity and effective campaigning in state elections. Success for FW candidates is linked to the weakness of the dominant parties in the conservative camp. Spatial-temporal conditions are significant in considering the future of the FW at the Land level.
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Detterbeck, Klaus. "Party Cartel and Cartel Parties in Germany." German Politics 17, no. 1 (March 2008): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644000701855119.
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Childs, David. "Honecker’s Germany." Government and Opposition 22, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 78–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1987.tb00041.x.
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AS HE SALUTED THE GRIM FORMATIONS OF 10,000 ‘FIGHTING groups of the working class’ and thousands of other soldiers and paramilitary police in Berlin's Karl-Marx-Allee on 13 August, Erich Honecker looked quite relaxed. He knew that his colleagues Egon Krenz (crown prince and security overlord) and Erich Mielke (Minister for State Security) had taken every precaution to ensure that there would be no counter-demonstrations to mar this celebration of 25 years of the ‘anti-fascist defensive (Berlin) wall’. In this, his fifteenth year as leader of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the 74-year-old Honecker could compliment himself on a successful party congress followed by successfully staged elections. He could also look back to a number of successful initiatives in the GDR's external relations.
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Gerard, Emmanuel. "Hoe de vorming van een Vlaams en rechts front mislukte. De geschiedenis van de Concentratie in 1936." WT. Tijdschrift over de geschiedenis van de Vlaamse beweging 75, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 338–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/wt.v75i4.12043.
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In de tweede helft van 1936 beleefde België een periode van politieke destabilisering. Dat was het gevolg van de verkiezingen van 24 mei die een nederlaag betekenden voor de katholieke partij en een overwinning voor Rex van Léon Degrelle, die dictatoriale ambities koesterde en steun vond bij Hitler en Mussolini. Ook het Vlaams Nationaal Verbond, dat eveneens in fascistische richting was geëvolueerd, en de communisten boekten winst. De socialisten waren nu de grootste partij, maar accepteerden een regering van nationale unie met katholieken en liberalen onder de technocraat Paul Van Zeeland. Die regering kwam onmiddellijk onder vuur te liggen van links en rechts en werd geconfronteerd met afvalligheid in eigen rangen. Het nationaalsocialisme in Duitsland, het linkse Volksfront in Frankrijk en de burgeroorlog in Spanje vormden het referentiekader voor een periode van sterke polarisatie en felle agitatie, waarin partijen en politici streefden naar een herschikking, een “concentratie” van politieke krachten. Rechtse politici probeerden de regering omver te werpen en een coalitie zonder socialisten (die zij beschouwden als cryptocommunisten) op de been te brengen. Sommige katholieken probeerden de politieke eendracht onder geloofsgenoten te herstellen door een vorm van samenwerking met Rex en VNV, en nog andere katholieken probeerden met de Vlaams-nationalisten in Vlaanderen een Vlaamse Concentratie tot stand te brengen. De bakens werden verzet toen Rex en VNV op 6 oktober een alliantie sloten en daarmee een krachtig oppositiefront vormden. Op 25 oktober verijdelde de regering-Van Zeeland een rexistische “mars op Brussel”. Om dit nieuwe front de wind uit de zeilen te halen probeerden de Vlaamse katholieken, die zich hergroepeerden in de Katholieke Vlaamse Volkspartij, alsnog samenwerking te realiseren met de Vlaams-nationalisten. Dat leidde op 8 december 1936 tot het akkoord KVV-VNV, dat evenwel meteen van beide kanten werd gedesavoueerd. De tegenstelling tussen aanhangers van de bestaande orde en van de nieuwe orde, tussen voorstanders en tegenstanders van de regering, was te groot. De christendemocratische strekking in de katholieke partij haalde de bovenhand toen de bisschoppen op het einde van 1936 in een publieke brief niet alleen het communisme, maar ook alle strevingen naar een rechtse dictatuur veroordeelden. De destabilisering van de Belgische politiek verdween pas na de nederlaag van Degrelle in zijn verkiezingsduel met premier Van Zeeland op 11 april 1937. De democratiekritiek die de beweging naar “concentratie” ondersteunde bleef echter voortleven.________The unsuccesful formatiob of a Flemish and right-wing front. The history of the 1936 concentrationBelgium experienced a period of political destabilization in the second half of 1936. That was the result of the 24 May elections, the defeat of the catholic party and the victory of Rex, a movement led by Léon Degrelle, who had dictatorial ambitions and would soon be supported by Hitler and Mussolini. The Flemish Nationalists (VNV), also oriented towards fascism, and the Communists had made progress too. The socialists, who ended up being the largest party, accepted a cabinet of national union with the Catholics and the liberals under the leadership of a technocrat, Paul Van Zeeland. The Van Zeeland cabinet immediately came under fire from left and right and was confronted with deserters in its own ranks. National Socialism in Germany, the Front populaire in France and the civil war in Spain formed the horizon for a period of strong polarization and agitation in which politicians and parties aimed at redesigning political forces, “concentration” being the keyword. Politicians from the right attempted to establish a cabinet without socialists whom they considered crypto communists. Catholics tried to restore political union among the faithful through forms of cooperation with Rex and VNV, and some among them tried to install a “Flemish Concentration” through collaboration with the Flemish Nationalists. A decisive fact occurred on 0ctober 6 when Rex and VNV formed an alliance creating a strong opposition front. On October 25 the government foiled a rexist mass rally in Brussels. To regain control Flemish Catholics, who regrouped in the Katholieke Vlaamse Volkspartij (KVV), attempted to realize a form of collaboration with the Flemish Nationalists. It resulted in the December 8 KVV-VNV agreement, which was, however, immediately denounced from both sides. The antagonism between supporters of the existing order and those of a new order, between the partisans of the government and its opponents, was too strong. The Christian democrats in the catholic party finally gained the upper hand when the Belgian bishops, at the end of December 1936, issued a pastoral letter not only condemning communism but also a dictatorship of the right. The destabilization of Belgian politics disappeared after the defeat of Degrelle in his electoral duel with Prime Minister Van Zeeland on April 11, 1937. However, the fundamental criticism of democracy underlying the “concentration” movement did not.
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Chigasheva, M. A. "Gender political correctness in German (on the material of political leaders public performances)." Philology at MGIMO 23, no. 3 (September 17, 2020): 72–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2410-2423-2020-3-23-72-79.
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The issue of gender equality is currently being studied on the basis of different languages and from various positions, most intensively from the point of view of language policy. In this case, we are talking about the choice of language tools in oral or written speech that allow to unambiguously reflect gender and the social role of the named person. The word-building capabilities of the German language, in particular suffixation and substantiation, represent a significant potential for creating gender-correct lexical units. The main objective of the study was to identify lexical means of expressing political correctness in the speech of representatives of various political parties of Germany (Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, Social Democratic Party of Germany, Free Democratic Party, Green Party, Left Party, Alternative for Germany) in close interconnection with extralinguistic factors. In the research process, the continuous sampling method, semantic, contextual, and statistical analysis were used, which made it possible to identify units with a gender marking. Based on semantic attributes, the identified lexemes were classified into four groups: feminitives, gender-neutral, gender-asymmetric, and gender-symmetric units. The analysis shows the changes in the German language towards gender equality. The main tendency of this process is feminization, the signs of which are found primarily in the language of female politicians, which also reflects the national-cultural specificity of the modern German language.
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McCann, Dermot. "Germany: a good model for Labour Party renewal?" Contemporary Politics 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 279–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2013.804151.
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Giurlando, Philip. "France’s déclassement in the Eurozone." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 74, no. 4 (December 2019): 559–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702019896299.
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In France, the adoption of the euro was partly motivated by the desire for equality with Germany, but asymmetry has increased in terms of economic prowess and international status, leading to a sense of déclassement. This paper identifies links between France’s status reduction, a consequent feeling of humiliation, and the foreign policy positions associated with that collective emotion. Evidence of France’s déclassement includes macroeconomic trends, semi-structured interviews with a sample of elites, the secondary literature, and the domestic political disputes that have emerged as a result of this reduction of national status. The paper also systematically compares France to Italy, as in many ways it is similar to that country, but with one key difference: the political forces which have been loudest about Italy’s humiliation vis-à-vis Germany obtained power and governed from May 2018 to August 2019. Their orientations and positions provide a peek into the kinds of international political decisions associated with both déclassement and humiliation, and provide further evidence on the links between status reduction, group-level emotion, and inter-group behaviour.
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CASAL BÉRTOA, FERNANDO, and ANGELA BOURNE. "Prescribing democracy? Party proscription and party system stability in Germany, Spain and Turkey." European Journal of Political Research 56, no. 2 (November 17, 2016): 440–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12179.
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Salzborn, Samuel. "Antisemitism in the “Alternative for Germany” Party." German Politics and Society 36, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 74–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2018.360304.
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The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has been sitting in Germany’s federal parliament since September 2017, having won 12.6 percent of the popular vote. In considering this young party’s recent development, researchers have focussed on its rhetorical strategies (i.e., populism) and its radicalization. Until now, much less attention has been paid to antisemitism within the AfD— also because the party would prefer to keep this out of public debate. By investigating its treatment of antisemitism, Nazism, and the politics of remembrance, it can be shown that the AfD has the features of a far-right party, to a much clearer extent than might be guessed from its media image, particularly inside Germany.
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Patton, David F. "Party-Political Responses to the Alternative for Germany in Comparative Perspective." German Politics and Society 38, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 77–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2020.380105.
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In September 2017, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the first far-right party to join the Bundestag in nearly seventy years. Yet, it was not the first time that a challenger party entered the parliament to the chagrin of the political establishment. After introducing the AfD, the bhe, the Greens, and the Party of Democratic Socialism (pds), the article analyzes how established parties treated the newcomers and why they did so. This comparative perspective offers insights into the AfD’s challenge, how distinctive the policies toward the AfD have been, and why the established parties have dealt with the AfD as they have.
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Aigner, Franziska, and Uri Turkenich. "Introduction." Maska 31, no. 181 (December 1, 2016): 40–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/maska.31.181-182.40_2.
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A series of interviews with artists involved with Tanztheater Wuppertal explores changes in the field of dance in the '70s and '80s in West Germany. Starting with Pina Bausch, the relation between choreographer and dancer shifted, blurring the line of role division. Raimund Hoghe, Susanne Linke, Dominique Mercy, William Forsythe, Reinhild Hoffmann and Vivienne Newport reflect on those changes, which coincided with broader socio-political transformations that were taking place in German society at the time.
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Gaunder, Alisa, and Sarah Wiliarty. "Conservative Women in Germany and Japan: Chancellors versus Madonnas." Politics & Gender 16, no. 1 (January 31, 2019): 99–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x18000867.
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AbstractDespite many similarities between them, the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have represented women in parliament at different rates. This article argues that differences in party organization, electoral system rules, and left party strength interact to explain the varying levels of representation of conservative women in parliament. The CDU's corporatist structure allowed it to represent diverse interests and successfully respond to challenges for female support from the left. As a result of a weaker left party challenge and a classic catch-all party organization, the LDP's attempts to incorporate women have been less extensive and largely symbolic.
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Ovsienko, Alex. "The political Debate on the Wearing the Facing veil in Germany and the Back Right of religious Freedom." Religious Freedom, no. 20 (March 7, 2017): 35–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/rs.2017.20.858.
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The discussions on the ban on burka in Germany started on November the 15 th. 2015 as the party convention of the CSU (a Bavarian part of the ruling CDU) demanded on its party convention to pass the law which would ban the wearing on facial veils in Germany. In the next months the discussion intensified in Germany as more and more politicians got involved in the debate , like the prominent German member of the Free Democratic Party Alexander Graf Lamsdorf or Wolfgang Kubicki, the vice chairman of the FDP which were both in favor of the ban, on the other side there are German politicians like the President of Germany Joachim Gauck or the German minister of justice Heiko Maas who were opposed to ban the wearing of facial veils in Germany.
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König, Thomas. "Bicameralism and Party Politics in Germany: An Empirical Social Choice Analysis." Political Studies 49, no. 3 (August 2001): 411–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00319.
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This paper analyses whether and how party politics transform German bicameralism. Based on the policy positions of bicameral legislators, the study computes the win sets, the yolks of each chamber and a Nash solution in order to analyse empirically the effects of party politics on German bicameralism. In comparison to the basic bicameral model, hypotheses on bicameral conflict and policy stability are tested in the case of similar and different party majorities in the two-dimensional policy space of German labour politics. The results show that party politics transform German bicameralism in two ways. Similar majorities collapse bicameral checks-and-balances, while different party majorities come close to the basic bicameral model with high policy stability and conflict between both chambers.
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Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. "The Origins of Party Discipline: Evidence from Eastern Germany." German Politics and Society 24, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 23–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/104503006780681894.
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In Germany, the Bundestag and the Landtage (state parliaments) in the old Länder (states) have such consistently high levels of party discipline that there is not enough variance to determine the cause of this behavior. The creation of five new democratic state legislatures after the fall of the German Democratic Republic, however, provides a unique opportunity to investigate the origins of party voting. I test which of three hypothesized institutional mechanisms for this practice—the need to keep an executive in office, efficiency incentives, or electoral concerns—was primarily responsible for the emergence of party discipline in the new Länder. The evidence indicates that the need to support the executive branch is the primary cause of party voting. This finding helps explain both the unexpected rise of western German-style party discipline in the eastern states following unification, well as the persistence of the seemingly outdated practice of party discipline in contemporary Germany as a whole.