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1
Trofymenko, Anastasiia, and Dmytro Lubinets. "The main lobbying development trends in the United States of America." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 39 (June 16, 2019): 156–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2019.39.156-163.
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The relevance of the issue of decreasing corruption in Ukraine causes the scientific interest in the study of such a political institution as lobbyism. An analysis of the global lobbying experience allows us to distinguish the lessons Ukraine can apply in this field. The article presents an analysis of the American lobbying model, since the United States was the first country to acknowledge and determine lobbying, as well as to develop the most advanced lobbying methods and technologies on the legislative level. The authors specify the main trends in the establishment and functioning of lobbying in the United States of America through studying the requirements of legislation in this field, imposed both on lobbyists and officials, considering ethical norms that lobbyists should be guided by in their work, subject-object determination of American lobbyism, and prevailing forms thereof in the state. As a result of the study carried out, it was found out that the legal framework for lobbying in the United States is based on the following: the principles of compulsory accountability and reporting of lobbyists and their clients, foreign clients, in particular; ethical standards of conduct for employees; restriction of lobbying for former civil servants; lobbying in all the branches of power; lobbying supervision and control by government agencies (these functions are entrusted to the Secretary of the Senate and Secretary of the House of Representatives) and the public, by lobbyists as well through establishing a Code of Lobbying Ethics, mediation between the client and the authorities.
Keywords: lobbyism, lobbying, American model, Association of Government Relations Professionals, Code of Lobbying Ethics, lobby register.
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Hansen, Thomas Bowe. "Lobbying of the IASB: An Empirical Investigation." Journal of International Accounting Research 10, no. 2 (November 1, 2011): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jiar-10078.
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ABSTRACT This paper provides evidence on how the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) generates accounting standards in the presence of lobbyists with differing preferences. I develop hypotheses regarding the associations between attributes of lobbyists and their lobbying activity, and their lobbying success. I find that lobbying success is positively related to the ability of the lobbyist to provide information to the IASB; however, this success is dependent on the credibility of the lobbyist. I also find evidence that lobbying success is associated with the impact that the lobbyists have on the viability of the IASB, measured by their financial contributions and the size of the capital market in their home country. However, this association is not present when I look only at cases where lobbyists disagree with IASB proposal drafts. This evidence is useful in evaluating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent considerations regarding the adoption of IFRS by the U.S., as well as the recent change in the structure of the IASB that requires a defined geographic mix of board members by the year 2012. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the paper.
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Boucher, Maxime, and Christopher A. Cooper. "Consultant Lobbyists and Public Officials: Selling Policy Expertise or Personal Connections in Canada?" Political Studies Review 17, no. 4 (June 6, 2019): 340–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929919847132.
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Recent research suggests that there are two different types of lobbyists: those specializing in providing access to their personal connections with public office holders, and those specializing in a particular policy sector. This article advances this research by examining the actual behaviour of consultant lobbyists with data gathered from the Canadian Lobbyist Registry. Specifically, we probe two questions. First, using four indicators found within the literature, we investigate whether the behaviour of consultant lobbyists reflects the well-connected generalist or the issue specialist lobbyist. Second, we examine moving public office holders to see whether administrative officials – who make greater use of technical information – or politicians and partisan advisors – who are more interested in partisan/political information – are more likely to continue to be contacted by consultant lobbyists who contacted them in their previous position. Our results suggest that a more nuanced understanding of lobbying is required. While the majority of activities by consultant lobbyists are consistent with providing expertise to policymakers, a sizable minority of lobbyist activity is consistent with selling access to public office holders. Yet even here, our second analysis suggests that personal relationships may also involve the provision of expertise.
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Bondarenko, Olha, Vladimir Pakhomov, and Yurii Lukianenko. "Corrupt Lobbying in Ukraine: Essence, Determinants and Countermeasures." Russian Journal of Criminology 12, no. 5 (November 8, 2018): 738–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2500-4255.2018.12(5).738-747.
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Corruption in all its manifestations is one of the most dangerous problems of modern societies. High level political corruption, which has now acquired a universal character, is especially harmful. Corruption lobbyism is one of the key forms of such corruption. The authors draw attention to the essence and key characteristics of this phenomenon, which include unlawfulness, unethical character of corruption lobbyism, its ability to have an unfair influence on the authorities as well as the fact that corruption lobbyism is an instrument of enriching certain groups or elites. Besides, a special feature of Ukrainian corruption lobbyism is its politicization. The authors break the key determinants of corruption lobbyism into three groups. The first group is political determinants: the absence of legislative basis for lobbyism; the insufficient transparency of the work of people with power; the vagueness of methods used to involve stakeholders in discussing and making managerial decisions; the absence of due diligence in the anti-corruption and criminological expertise of normative legal acts. The second group is economic determinants (the existence of shadow economy and the reluctance of lobbyists to leave the shadow zone to evade taxes). The third group is composed of cultural and educational determinants: the historical trend of our society to put personal connections above professional ones; the absence of not only legal, but also moral frameworks for the interactions between lobbyists and authorities. The authors pay special attention to the analysis of key measures of counteracting corrupt lobbyism. They conclude that the main determinant of corrupt lobbyism is the absence of both the political will of lawmakers to create a lobbying mechanism and the will of the society to stimulate these activities with law mechanisms.
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Rush, Michael. "Registering the Lobbyists: Lessons from Canada." Political Studies 42, no. 4 (December 1994): 630–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1994.tb00302.x.
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Professional lobbying has been a growth area in recent years in countries like Britain and Canada. One reaction has been calls for the registration of lobbyists, but few countries have experience of registration. The longest and most extensive experience is found in the United States, but systemic differences mean that little attention has been paid in parliamentary systems to that experience. Concern about the hidden world of the professional lobbyist rather than evidence of significant abuse led to calls for the registration of lobbyists. Canada introduced registration in 1989 and a British proposal currently lies on the table. Canadian experience provides an opportunity to examine registration within a parliamentary context and to consider the merits of the proposed British scheme.
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Bekmuradov, K. A. "Lobbying as the main factor of influencing the process of development of parliamentary conciliation procedures." Actual Problems of Russian Law, no. 8 (September 20, 2019): 75–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2019.105.8.075-085.
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The article analyzes lobbying activities, as well as lobbying as a factor in the development of parliamentary conciliation procedures. The author examines various legal and non-legal factors influencing different institutions of constitutional law including parliamentary conciliation procedures. The article provides the provisions of normative legal acts of the Russian Federation that form the basis for institutionalization of lobbying activity in Russia. Various instruments of institutionalization of lobbying in Russia are considered. The practice of lobbying is subject to research. The auther determines specific institutions of lobbyists’ influence used by them in their activity. The paper represents opinions of scholars and practitioners whose views are directed to parliamentarism in general and lobbyism in particular. The article contains definitions of lobbying and lobbying activities. According to the results of the analysis, the author identifies the main problems of the impact the lobbying activity has on parliamentary conciliation procedures, gives proposals for improvement of the normative and legal regulation and the primary elimination of the negative impact of lobbying on parliamentary conciliation procedures.
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Kremyanskaya, E. A. "Legal Aspects of Regulating Lobbying in the United States of America and Canada." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(35) (April 28, 2014): 161–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-2-35-161-168.
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The author reviews history and peculiarities of the legal regulations of lobbying in USA and Canada, points out the tendencies of the legislation development. USA and Canada are among the first countries, which included legal regulations on the lobbying relations in the state government. The author explores the evolution of development of the lobbying legislation in the USA, and in particular reviews the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1976, Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as well as evolution of the Canadian legislation, where the Act on Lobbying of 1989 is in force, which had substantial changes during the last ten years. Taking into consideration the territorial form of state, the author reviews not only the federal legislation, but also laws on the level of states and provinces of these federations. Besides, the author covers the activity of the control bodies, order of registration and reporting by lobbyists of their professional activity, reveals pro and cons of the legal regulations of such institution as lobbying. In the article there is the list of information, which should be provided by lobbyists to the control bodies and the author correctly mentions that this list in USA is much wider, comparing to Canadian regulations. In the article the author reviews the liability for violations of lobbying legislation. In particular, in the USA the criminal liability is applied up to 5 years of imprisonment and financial penalties up to 200 thousand US dollars. Based on the USA and Canada experience the author reveals the key issues, which should be fixed by the legal regulations in the country and in particular: the clear definition of the lobbying and lobbyist, necessity of disclosure on the information about client and amounts paid, fixing in the control mechanisms and liability.
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KANG, HYOUNG-GOO, and THOMAS T. HOLYOKE. "No Exaggeration: Truthfulness in the Lobbying of Government Agencies by Competing Interest Groups." Japanese Journal of Political Science 14, no. 4 (October 30, 2013): 499–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109913000248.
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AbstractIntense competition can compel lobbyists to exaggerate the benefits the government would see in tax returns and social welfare if agency officials allocate such resources to the lobbyist's members. This incentive to misrepresent grows when information asymmetry exists between lobbyists and government officials. A large body of literature has investigated how interest groups compete and interact, but it disregards the interdependency of interests between competing groups and associated strategic behaviors of other players. Our signaling model of lobbying reveals ways in which agency officials can compel lobbyists for competing interests to lobby truthfully and what the policy implications of this compulsion can be. We also present case-study evidence of how this works in practice.
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Cohen, Erez. "The Activity of Commercial Lobbies in the Israeli Knesset During 2015–2018: Undermining or Realising the Democratic Foundations?" Parliamentary Affairs 73, no. 3 (April 26, 2019): 692–709. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsz016.
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Abstract The growth of political lobbyism in democratic countries in recent years is characteristic of Israel as well. This activity makes it possible for private and business entities to influence decision-making processes and the shaping of public policy in these countries. Side by side with its contribution to important democratic principles such as representing interests and political participation, it is also strongly criticised and said to be a real danger to democracy; due to this hazard, many countries, including Israel normally regulate this activity by means of the law. In contrast, some argue that this activity reflects one of the basic tenets of democracy, which includes freedom of occupation and equal opportunities. This study examines measures of commercial lobbying in Israel during the 20th Knesset’s term, presenting the number of lobbies, number of clients and degree of centralisation in this commercial industry and weighing the research data against democratic principles in general and Israel’s values. The research findings show an increase in Israel’s lobbyist activity during the 20th Knesset’s term (2015–2018), both with regard to the number of lobbyists and with regard to the number of clients represented by them.
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Hanegraaff, Marcel, Arlo Poletti, and Jan Beyers. "Explaining varying lobbying styles across the Atlantic: an empirical test of the cultural and institutional explanations." Journal of Public Policy 37, no. 4 (April 22, 2016): 459–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x16000052.
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AbstractThere is consensus in the literature that policymaking in the United States (US) and Europe generates different lobbying styles. Two explanations for these differences have been developed so far. The first posits that distinct lobbying styles reflect differentpolitical cultures. The second attributes distinct lobbying styles to variation in theinstitutionalcontext in which lobbyists operate. Studies that have analysed lobbying within the US and Europe and assessed the relative importance of these arguments are problematic because both explanations are consistent with observed differences in lobbying style. In this article, we circumvent problems of observational equivalence by focussing on European and American lobbyists who are active in a similar institutional venue – that is, international diplomatic conferences. Relying on evidence collected at World Trade Organization Ministerial Conferences and United Nation Climate Summits, we tested the relevance of alternative explanations for the variation in lobbying styles between European and American lobbyists. Our results give robust support to the institutional argument.
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Strong, Catherine, and Fran Tyler. "New Zealand media camouflage political lobbying." Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa 23, no. 2 (November 30, 2017): 144–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v23i2.96.
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Political lobbyists are a part of government decision-making processes, and many countries have stringent regulations to ensure their activities are somewhat transparent, especially as some use ethically questionable tactics. In New Zealand, however, there are no similar legislative regulations and lobbyists can stay undetected while trying to influence policymaking. More concerning, however, is that the results of this study indicates that lobbyists are also able to skirt around scrutiny in New Zealand media because of current journalism practices. This research’s content analysis indicates the media neglects to identify lobby organisations, thereby allowing them to operate without detection of their agenda, leaving the public unaware of who is influencing decision makers.
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Makse, Todd. "A Very Particular Set of Skills: Former Legislator Traits and Revolving Door Lobbying in Congress." American Politics Research 45, no. 5 (November 7, 2016): 866–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x16677274.
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In recent decades, observers of Congress have devoted increasing attention to the phenomenon of the revolving door, whereby members of Congress and staffers go on to careers in lobbying. This practice raises a number of normative concerns that are perhaps most heightened when it comes to the lobbying activities of members of Congress themselves. In this article, I examine the factors determining which former members go through the revolving door, and find that members with central network positions and highly effective legislators are more likely to become lobbyists. I then examine the extent to which members-turned-lobbyists have an impact on bills in Congress. I find evidence that lobbying by former members increases a bill’s probability of progressing and some evidence that highly effective legislators also go on to become more effective lobbyists. Taken together, these findings support conventional wisdom that former members become some of the most influential lobbyists.
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Konko, S. G. "FORMATION OF THE CONTINENTAL MODEL OF THE LEGAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN MODERN RUSSIA." Territory Development, no. 2(20) (2020): 45–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.32324/2412-8945-2020-2-45-50.
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Lobbying is essential part of a democratic society and it is impossible to deny its existence in modern Russia. Despite that fact, Russia had not officially recognized the existing phenomenon, and the relations in this area had not been regulated by law. Examine the experience of other countries and comparing it with known manifestations of lobbying in Russia, it is necessary to relate it to known models. This will make it possible to identify the state of development of this institution in our country, avoid the specific errors of the system, predict the possible direction of development and improvement of this mechanism. The study of the phenomenon of the emergence of vested interests, their place in the political system, as well as the concept of ‘lobbyism' and the mechanisms of its legal regulation led to the conclusion that a model of state corporatism has developed in Russia, and a continental model of the legal regime-regulation of lobbying. Research had revealed the need to improve and establish new institutions for the articulation of group interests, the adoption of a law on lobbying and the establishment of a public register of lobbyists.
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Rudenko, Olha. "Lobbying – political corruption or social compromise." Public administration and local government 45, no. 2 (July 23, 2020): 77–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.33287/102022.
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The article is devoted to the study of the relationship between the concepts of «lobbying» and «corruption». The author analyzes domestic scientific approaches to the definition of lobbying and an understanding of its role in finding a compromise between the interests of citizens, civil servants and representatives of the corporate sector. The identification of lobbying and corruption by a significant part of citizens, according to the researcher, is due to the lack of experience of civilized lobbying in Ukraine. But, the corporate sector realizes its interests through shadow lobbyism, which often borders on outright corruption. This gives rise to a latent social conflict, which has a number of negative consequences: low economic growth rates, the tendency of a significant proportion of citizens to break the rule of law, and the lack of political stability in our state.
Particular attention is paid to the study of the norms of domestic anti-corruption legislation and draft laws published by domestic researchers and politicians, that was aimed at regulating lobbying in Ukraine. It has been ascertained that in spite of the rather wide variability of approaches to developing the circle of lobbying subjects, almost all authors of draft laws determine the list of officials who cannot be subjects of lobbying under any circumstances. We are talking about representatives of the armed forces, security structures, the judiciary and the like. Moreover, given the absence of legal regulation of lobbying and the list of officials whose activities are regulated by anti-corruption legislation, the existing shadow lobbyism is appropriate to attribute to corruption.
In the process of research, the author convincingly argues that legal lobbying cannot be considered political corruption. The main difference between lobbying and corruption (in practice) is due to the ultimate goal of the process.
An analysis of the norms of anti-corruption legislation indicates that after the adoption of any of the bills proposed by the lobbyists, corruption will be considered only the format of interaction between government officials and business representatives (or other initiative groups of citizens) that was not provide by the law. According to the author, a side effect of the adoption of the law on lobbyism will be a reduction in the list of acts that can be considered corruption, and therefore – an automatic reduction in the level of corruption in Ukraine.
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Holyoke, Thomas. "By Invitation Only: Controlling Interest Group Access to the Oval Office." American Review of Politics 25 (November 1, 2004): 221–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2004.25.0.221-240.
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Does the exchange model used to explain interest group influence with Congress and the bureaucracy hold leverage over patterns of lobbyist contact with the president? In this paper I argue that there is good reason to believe that it does not. Rather, I argue that the president and his immediate staff often keep interest groups at arm’s length. Instead of being able to acquire face time with senior administration staff to press their own cases, lobbyists are largely granted access only when they are needed to build support for the president’s policy agenda in Congress or with the public. Using data drawn in part from the 1996 filings of interest groups under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, I analyze lobbyists’ contact with the White House to learn what types of circumstances appear to drive contact between interest groups and the president. The evidence suggests that the president-interest group connection is largely determined by the White House based on ideological congruence rather than a two-way flow of communication and influence.
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Ostas, Daniel T. "The Law and Ethics of K Street: Lobbying, the First Amendment, and the Duty to Create Just Laws." Business Ethics Quarterly 17, no. 1 (January 2007): 33–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq200717113.
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ABSTRACT:This article explores the law and ethics of lobbying. The legal discussion examines disclosure regulations, employment restrictions, bribery laws, and anti-fraud provisions as each applies to the lobbying context. The analysis demonstrates that given the social value placed on the First Amendment, federal law generally affords lobbyists wide latitude in determining who, what, when, where, and how to lobby.This article explores the law and ethics of lobbying. The legal discussion examines disclosure regulations, employment restrictions, bribery laws, and anti-fraud provisions as each applies to the lobbying context. The analysis demonstrates that given the social value placed on the First Amendment, federal law generally affords lobbyists wide latitude in determining who, what, when, where, and how to lobby.
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McGrath, Conor. "Lester Milbrath’s The Washington Lobbyists, 50 Years On: An Enduring Legacy." Political Studies Review 16, no. 3 (July 4, 2017): 217–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1478929917699415.
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Published in 1963, Lester Milbrath’s The Washington Lobbyists has become indispensable for understanding how lobbying operates and the societal benefits it brings. Milbrath there presented the first detailed survey of lobbying activities, and his findings have been generally affirmed by a range of later studies, although his conviction that lobbying was an essentially benign force which exerted relatively little impact on policy has been more contested. Milbrath’s theoretical model of lobbying as a communication process has enduring value to scholars and practitioners alike, and the definition of lobbying which he formulated continues to be useful. This article seeks explicitly to celebrate Milbrath’s outstanding research on lobbyists, more than 50 years after his book was published, and highlights some elements of Milbrath’s work which have not yet been fully explored by scholars.
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Newmark, Adam J. "Measuring State Legislative Lobbying Regulation, 1990–2003." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 5, no. 2 (June 2005): 182–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/153244000500500205.
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Since 1990, the American states have adopted a variety of reforms to regulate lobbying in an attempt to address a host of ethical issues. Such regulation can have important impacts on a variety of aspects of the legislative process because it typically impacts the relationships between legislators and lobbyists. How does such lobbying regulation vary across the states and over time? I have developed a measure of state lobbying regulation from 1990–2003. This measure validly captures the laws that limit relationships between lobbyists and legislators and, as such, can be used to help assess a variety of hypotheses about the legislative process.
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SHEPHERD, MICHAEL E., and HYE YOUNG YOU. "Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress." American Political Science Review 114, no. 1 (September 20, 2019): 270–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000510.
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Although the majority of research on revolving-door lobbyists centers on the influence they exercise during their postgovernment careers, relatively little attention is given to whether future career concerns affect the behaviors of revolving-door lobbyists while they still work in government. We argue that the revolving-door incentivizes congressional staffers to showcase their legislative skills to the lobbying market in ways that affect policymaking in Congress. Using comprehensive data on congressional staffers, we find that employing staffers who later become lobbyists is associated with higher legislative productivity for members of Congress, especially in staffers’ final terms in Congress. It also is associated with increases in a member’s bill sponsorship in the areas of health and commerce, the topics most frequently addressed by clients in the lobbying industry, as well as granting more access to lobbying firms. These results provide the systematic empirical evidence of pre-exit effects of the revolving-door among congressional staff.
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Strickland, James. "America’s Crowded Statehouses: Measuring and Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 19, no. 3 (February 19, 2019): 351–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440019829408.
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Across the United States over time, numbers of registered interest groups have continued to increase, but these populations mask the total amount of lobbying that is occurring within America’s statehouses. Among registered interests, average numbers of hired lobbyists have increased markedly since the late 1980s. This study both quantifies this increase and identifies a set of causal variables. Previous studies have proposed a variety of short-term, political and long-term, institutional factors that govern rates of lobbying. Using a new data set spanning multiple decades, I find that changes in lobbying can largely be ascribed to institutional variables, including the implementation of term limits and regulations on lobbying. Lobby regulations, one-party dominance, and legislative expenditures also appear to play a role in determining rates of multiclient lobbying. Direct democracy and state spending do not affect the hiring of lobbyists by registered interest groups.
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Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. "Revolving Door Lobbyists." American Economic Review 102, no. 7 (December 1, 2012): 3731–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3731.
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Washington's “revolving door”––the movement from government service into the lobbying industry––is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
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Rucińska, Danuta, and Iwona Kur. "LOBBYING ON TRANSPORT ON THE EUROPEAN UNION FORUM." Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego. Ekonomika Transportu i Logistyka 70 (November 24, 2017): 13–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0010.5919.
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This article has been written to identify and analyse lobbying on transport on the European forum. The paper presents the definition of lobbying and main objectives of the EU transport policy. It describes interest representatives and their interest as well it contains analysis of the number of lobbyists and the budget spent on lobbying in transport. There are examples of lobbying in transport presented based on researches conducted in the framework of the doctoral thesis.
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Bauer, Theresa. "Responsible lobbying: an empirical study in the EU." Annals in Social Responsibility 2, no. 1 (May 3, 2016): 63–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/asr-08-2015-0009.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the awareness and practice responsible lobbying in the EU. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which responsible lobbying criteria are fulfilled and to investigate whether responsible lobbying yields concrete benefits in the political arena. Design/methodology/approach The study takes a quantitative approach combining descriptive and multivariate partial least squares (PLS) analysis based on data gained from an online survey among lobbyists in the EU. A new measurement instrument for responsible lobbying is used that grasps the multidimensional phenomenon with a formative-formative higher-order construct. Findings The study reveals that criteria of responsible lobbying are fulfilled to a large extent according to the lobbyists. The PLS analysis confirms the applicability of the multidimensional model of responsible lobbying, although there is only a weak link between Dimension (1), referring to the company’s stated corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitment and coherence with lobbying and the second-order construct responsible lobbying. Based on the information given by respondents, the analysis provides evidence for a positive impact of responsible lobbying on both lobbying success and corporate reputation, but also for the dependence of these two variables on additional factors. Originality/value Responsible lobbying as an aligned approach to CSR and lobbying is a long neglected research topic, which has been gaining interest recently. This study contributes to empirical knowledge on the awareness and practice of responsible lobbying in the EU by taking a quantitative approach based on a solid theoretical foundation.
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Timtchenko, A. N. "Lobbizm in Russia in the context of models of political decision making: is evolution possible?" Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 168–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-168-179.
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The Russian political system decision-making models are evolutionizing. Following the trend lobbying models and methods evolve from policy managing to informal practice. The analytical policy-managerial cycle model shows lowering of public and rising corporative lobbying tools. Which remove the lobbing institutionalisation problem. Russia legislative and managerial institutionalisation examples verify lobbying evolution from interest accommodation framework to obligatory tool for policy and public representatives interactions via lobbyists.
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SOKUR, Stanislav. "TRANSFORMATION OF LOBBYING INSTRUMENTS FOR ECONOMIC STAKEHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES." Economy of Ukraine 2021, no. 5 (May 21, 2021): 78–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/economyukr.2021.05.078.
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The article examines current developments of lobbying institutionalization on the state level in European countries from 2014 to 2021, in particular, the definitions of lobbying and lobbyists, their goals, the availability of lobbying registers and the available ways for lobbying by economic stakeholders. Recent legislation on lobbying of Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and the United Kingdom is analyzed. The dynamics of the adoption of laws on lobbying in European countries in recent years is demonstrated, given the specifics of the legal regimes of these countries. The article also shows examples of lobbying by economic stakeholders and lobbyists' reporting in accordance with the current legislation of the countries concerned. It has been proven that today the field of lobbying is on the rise, since in the last seven years eight countries in Europe have adopted laws regulating lobbying. Thus, the total growth of countries adopted lobbying regulation by European OECD member-states for the period of last 7 years constituted 67% of overall lobbying regulation by OECD member-states for the previous 75 years. These impressive numbers are expected to increase in the coming years, and it is very important that such lobbying rules to be adopted in accordance with international standards for lobbying regulation. The article also shows practical cases of lobbying and demonstrates that the range of lobbying targets in the modern world is incredibly wide. International organizations such as the United Nations, the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, etc. influences transparently policy-making in European countries. Regulation of lobbying legislation allows to influence decision-making to both non-governmental organizations and representatives of the private sector. Thus, there is an articulation and aggregation of interests in societies, which improves the quality of decisions made by public authorities.
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Friedman, Henry L., and Mirko S. Heinle. "Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Institutions." Management Science 66, no. 9 (September 2020): 4336–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3335.
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We examine a setting in which agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other’s lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be nonmonotonic. Our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying. We discuss implications for the regulation of financial institutions. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.
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Dvořáková, Daniela. "Lobbying in the European Union and the Czech Republic." Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis 61, no. 7 (2013): 2099–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.11118/actaun201361072099.
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Transparent lobbying is a natural and desirable part of the functioning of each democratic state. The paper analyzes the specific ways, perception and regulation of lobbying in the European Union and the Czech Republic. In the European Union it focuses mainly on two institutions which are under pressure of the lobbyists, the European Commission and the European Parliament. Furthermore, paper presents the situation in the perception and regulation of lobbying in the Czech Republic, and clarifies several unsucessful attempts to regulate lobbying. In conclusion paper compares specific lobbying environment and regulation in the European Union and the Czech Republic and formulates recommendations for the Czech lobbying practices.
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Antonucci, Maria Cristina. "Female presence in lobbying careers in Europe: A comparison of women in the lobbying workforce in three national political systems and the EU." GENDER – Zeitschrift für Geschlecht, Kultur und Gesellschaft 13, no. 1-2021 (March 15, 2021): 59–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3224/gender.v13i1.05.
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This paper investigates women in lobbying careers in Italy, the UK and France in comparison with the EU Parliament to verify the hypothesis that in political systems with a gender mainstreaming approach, it is easier for women to have access to political, institutional and politics-related careers. Given the differences between national and supranational political systems, the collected data display a fairer gender balance in the stock of registered lobbyists at the EU Parliament than in the national registers for lobbyists. The explanatory factors are the EU institutional approach towards gender mainstreaming and a fairer gender balance in EU top-political and administrative jobs. The paper argues that there is a spillover effect from fair-gendered political careers to the lobbying professions. EU lobbyists need to reflect the diversity of EU politicians and administrative staff. In this sense, the EU institutionalization of the gender mainstreaming approach goes beyond issues such as the descriptive and substantive political representation of women in politics while creating a more inclusive environment for equal opportunities in traditionally male-dominated jobs.
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Ihlen, Oyvind, Ketil Raknes, Ian Somerville, Chiara Valentini, Charlotte Stachel, Irina Lock, Scott Davidson, and Peter Seele. "Framing “the Public Interest”: Comparing Public Lobbying Campaigns in Four European States." Journal of Public Interest Communications 2, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.32473/jpic.v2.i1.p107.
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How do lobbyists get their way and what is the consequence for democracy of their strategies? It is frequently asserted that lobbyists appeal to the public interest to strengthen their proposals. This paper empirically corroborates this claim through four case studies cutting across different European cultural clusters and political systems. The paper unpacks how businesses communicatively construct a link between their private interest and the public interest. The findings illustrate the flexibility of the public interest argument and hence also the potential problem. If everything can be made out to be in the public interest, the concept becomes empty and easy to capture for special interests. At the same time, unpacking the communicative construction helps in critically evaluating lobbyists’ claims of working in the public interest.
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Groll, Thomas, and Christopher J. Ellis. "REPEATED LOBBYING BY COMMERCIAL LOBBYISTS AND SPECIAL INTERESTS." Economic Inquiry 55, no. 4 (July 4, 2017): 1868–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12473.
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Kubiak, Anna. "Lobbying in Polish law and practice." Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym 20, no. 8 (March 1, 2017): 87–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1899-2226.20.8.08.
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This article presents both the legal regulations concerning lobbying in Poland and an evaluation of lobbying practices. It refers to the results of the sociological research conducted among the members of the Polish Parliament, professional lobbyists and journalists who cover parliamentary issues. The research was conducted in cooperation with the Stefan Batory Foundation’s Anti-Corruption Programme from May to July 2008.
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Bäumlisberger, Damian. "A Rawlsian perspective on the institutional limits of lobbying the European Commission." Journal for Markets and Ethics 8, no. 1 (June 1, 2020): 13–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/jome-2020-0002.
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Abstract In the process of drafting European Union (EU) legislation and supervising its effective national implementation, the European Commission has to cooperate with lobbyists. This exchange involves the risk of arbitrary lobby influence on its decisions at the expense of other EU citizens. Against this backdrop, this article addresses the research question of which normative principles should constrain the Commission’s interaction with lobbyists. Based on the contractarian approach from Rawls’ Law of Peoples, it identifies eight criteria of a Rawlsian lobby consultation system for the Commission, which representatives of EU countries could accept from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance and in view of the fundamental interest of their people. These normative criteria can be supervised by independent institutions like the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. They constitute a procedural approach to the political supervision of the Commission’s interaction with lobbyists that can be enforced without compromising its necessary institutional independence.
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Gul, Shabnam, and Muhammad Faizan Asghar. "Propaganda and Lobbying against the Future Prospect of Pakistan: Causes, effects and its Implications." Global Mass Communication Review V, no. III (September 30, 2020): 155–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gmcr.2020(v-iii).13.
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The concept of propaganda and lobbying is not new to researchers. Historically, propaganda was used by many states to manipulate policies in their own favors and to oppose the other states. During WW1, WW2 and the Cold war, media was used as a propaganda tool to demoralize opponents. Gradually lobbying was initiated as foreign policy tools. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Russia was the most powerful lobbyist in the USA. Indian lobbyist started an anti-Pakistan campaign in the USA based on rivalry since the creation of Pakistan. This is true focuses on destabilization of the US-Pakistan relationship and to weaken the strong lobbyism between the US and Pakistan.
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Bradley, Katharine W. V., and Jake Haselswerdt. "Who lobbies the lobbyists? State Medicaid bureaucrats’ engagement in the legislative process." Journal of Public Policy 38, no. 1 (December 13, 2016): 83–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x16000246.
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AbstractResearch on bureaucratic power typically focusses on rulemaking and policy implementation, while bureaucrats’ participation in the legislative process remains underexplored. We theorise and test a specific mechanism by which bureaucrats attempt to sway legislative outcomes, which we term indirect bureaucratic lobbying. Using a novel survey of state-based health lobbyists in 25 states, we show that state Medicaid agency staff routinely request lobbying assistance from provider associations and consumer advocates. We also provide the first systematic evidence of the conditions under which indirect bureaucratic lobbying is likely to occur. Our results suggest that individual-level policy agreement interacts with institutional factors, most notably agency performance and gubernatorial power, to increase the likelihood that bureaucrats will use this strategy to attempt to influence legislative deliberations.
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Hodgkin, Douglas I., and Alan Rosenthal. "The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 23, no. 2 (1993): 116. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3330865.
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Benjamin, Gerald, and Alan Rosenthal. "The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States." Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 1 (1994): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2151682.
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Thomas, Clive S., and Ronald J. Hrebenar. "Understanding interest groups, lobbying and lobbyists in developing democracies." Journal of Public Affairs 8, no. 1-2 (February 2008): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pa.287.
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Stratford, Jean Slemmons, Juri Stratford, and Robert V. Labaree. "The third house: Lobbyists and lobbying in the states." Journal of Government Information 21, no. 3 (May 1994): 281–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1352-0237(94)90006-x.
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Wright, John R. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." American Political Science Review 84, no. 2 (June 1990): 417–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963527.
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Lobbying efforts and campaign contributions from coalitions of groups are used to explain representatives' voting decisions within the U.S. House Ways and Means and Agriculture Committees. Information about which groups worked together on two controversial issues and which representatives they lobbied was obtained through personal interviews and a mail survey of professional lobbyists. The analysis reveals that committee-level voting, particularly in the Ways and Means Committee, is best explained by the total number of lobbying contacts representatives received from groups on each side of the issue. Campaign contributions proved somewhat useful for explaining groups' lobbying patterns; but it appears to be lobbying, not money, that shapes and reinforces representatives' policy decisions.
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Crepaz and Raj Chari, Michele. "The EU’s initiatives to regulate lobbyists: good or bad administration?" Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, no. 51 (October 31, 2014): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.18543/ced-51-2014pp71-97.
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<p>El Registro conjunto de transparencia (JTR) representa un cambio positivo con respecto a sus predecesores que puede explicarse basándose en el “aprendizaje de normas/legislaciones”. En este artículo apoyamos dicho argumento, proporcionando resultados en dos dimensiones: en primer lugar, midiendo la fuerza de la ley de ‘lobbying’ en la UE en comparación con otros sistemas políticos donde se ha promulgado dicha ley. Nuestro estudio indica que los intentos iniciales de la UE para regular el ‘lobbying’ en el Parlamento Europeo (1996) y en la Comisión (2008) son menos robustos y eficaces. En segundo lugar, analizando la evolución de los registros de grupos de presión entre 2008 y 2013, así como la de los sectores del automóvil, líneas aéreas y electricidad, poniendo de relieve la voluntad de las distintas compañías para registrar y dar a conocer abiertamente los gastos asociados al ‘lobbying’. El artículo concluye considerando los desafíos futuros que el JTR necesita afrontar, antes de que pueda ser considerado como un ejemplo de “buena administración”.<em> </em></p><p><strong>Recibido</strong>: 10.04.2014<br /> <strong>Aceptado</strong>: 10.06.2014</p>
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SCHNAKENBERG, KEITH E., and IAN R. TURNER. "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policy-making." American Political Science Review 113, no. 3 (April 16, 2019): 762–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000169.
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Lobbying is a potential source of corruption but is also a valuable source of information for policy-makers. We analyze a game-theoretic model that shows how the threat of corruption affects the incentives of noncorrupt politicians to enlist the help of lobbyists to make more informed decisions. Politicians face a dilemma because voters cannot always tell whether a politician allows access to lobbyists to solicit corruption or to seek information. Thus, a noncorrupt politician may deny access to lobbyists to signal that she is noncorrupt even though doing so impedes her ability to make good policy. This signaling may decrease the welfare of the voters depending on the value of the lost policy information relative to the value of screening out corrupt politicians.
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Crepaz, Michele. "To inform, strategise, collaborate, or compete: what use do lobbyists make of lobby registers?" European Political Science Review 12, no. 3 (June 5, 2020): 347–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773920000156.
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Governments claim to establish lobbying registers with the intent of giving citizens and the media the opportunity to see who is lobbying whom and for what purpose. This external scrutiny is expected to help prevent undue influence and corruption. Scholars, however, have noted that transparency might also serve internal scrutinizers by providing information to the lobbyists themselves. This study employed a survey of more than 300 interest groups in Ireland to test this alternative to the ‘armchair scrutiniser’ assumption, whereby transparency serves the purpose only of public scrutiny. The analysis found that a small but well-defined group of organizations routinely accesses the website of the Irish lobbying register and ‘consumes’ the information during the advocacy process. Interest-group characteristics, such as group type and material resources, help explain these trends. This study is relevant for scholars interested in the effects of transparency and how the availability of information is linked to lobbying strategies.
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Wood, David M. "The Conservative Member of Parliament as Lobbyist for Constituency Economic Interests." Political Studies 35, no. 3 (September 1987): 393–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1987.tb00196.x.
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Interviews undertaken in the House of Commons with 70 backbench Conservative MPs in 1983–84 examined the extent to which they pursue their own localized industrial policy strategies as part of their efforts to maintain constituency electoral support. This involves lobbying efforts directed toward ministers in support of local industries, either in defence of jobs, in promotion of new jobs, or in a variety of quests for government benefits or relaxation of restrictions. It was found that 36 of the 70 Conservative MPs could be classified as ‘constituency lobbyists’, reflecting interview evidence that they consider lobbying on behalf of local industries to be a normal and important part of their representative rôle as MPs. The hypothesis that vulnerable constituencies—vulnerable in both political and economic terms—would be represented by constituency lobbyists was tested through the construction of an index of constituency ‘security’. It was found that the more secure the constituency, the less likely is the MP to lobby on behalf of local industrial interests.
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PAYSON, JULIA A. "The Partisan Logic of City Mobilization: Evidence from State Lobbying Disclosures." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (June 18, 2020): 677–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000118.
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Why do local governments sometimes hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? I argue that such mobilization efforts depend in part on the policy congruence between localities and their elected delegates in the legislature. I provide evidence consistent with this theory by examining how municipal governments in the United States respond to partisan and ideological mismatches with their state legislators—a common representational challenge. Using almost a decade of original panel data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states, I employ difference-in-differences and a regression discontinuity design to demonstrate that cities are significantly more likely to hire lobbyists when their districts elect non-co-partisan state representatives. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental mobilization in which local officials purchase advocacy to compensate for the preference gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel government.
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ELLIS, CHRISTOPHER J., and THOMAS GROLL. "Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy." American Political Science Review 114, no. 1 (October 25, 2019): 179–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000595.
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We analyze the strategic considerations inherent in legislative subsidies and develop an informational lobbying model with costly policy reforms. In contrast to other models of informational lobbying, we focus on the implications of a policymaker’s and a lobby’s resource constraints for lobbying activities. We allow both a policymaker and a lobby to gather information, and each can either fund or subsidize policymaking. Our analysis highlights that legislative subsidies are both chosen strategically by lobbyists and strategically induced by policymakers, dependent on the circumstances. These involve which resource constraints bind the policymaker’s prior beliefs, the salience of policy, and the policymaker’s and lobby’s expertise in information gathering. Our results highlight five distinct motives for informational lobbying and demonstrate that for both a lobby and policymaker, there can be strategic advantages arising from being resource-constrained.
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DOUGLAS, JUSTIN. "Translating the Blueprint for Financial Deregulation: The American Bank Lobby’s Unyielding Quest for Legislative Profits, 1968–1982." Enterprise & Society 20, no. 2 (September 3, 2018): 281–327. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/eso.2018.27.
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In 1968, facing a tumultuous banking environment, commercial bankers framed bank lobbying as the act of translating the complex U.S. financial and economic systems for legislators and regulators. Inspired by Science and Technology Studies research, this article demonstrates that the translations of the U.S. financial system offered by bank lobbyists were not merely descriptions of the complex banking system. Instead, their translations reflected a process that sought to create networks of congressional and public support and enroll other actors as spokespersons for these translations. The article details how the acceptance for these translations proved to be a long process of reformulations, reconfigurations, and failures. There were three primary lobbying strategies used by large U.S. commercial banks: maintaining close relationships with high-ranking decision makers, making public statements to gain public support for their translations of the economy, and advocating for long and expert studies with heavy bank consultation. The article also highlights the techniques used by bank lobbyists during this period to alter the banking environment: legislation drafting, editorial writing, letter writing, report writing, private consultations, meetings with reporters, and public statements. These lobbying techniques and strategies were instrumental in establishing the Hunt Commission and translating and actualizing the blueprint for financial “deregulation.”
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Rheault, Ludovic. "Corporate Lobbying and Immigration Policies in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 46, no. 3 (August 28, 2013): 691–722. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423913000644.
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Abstract. This study examines the enduring claim that firms exert influence on immigration policies, prompting governments to open the doors to foreign labour. Although intuitively appealing, this claim has received little empirical support so far, the actual channels of influence from special interests to policy makers being usually opaque to public scrutiny. To address this problem, I rely upon the vector autoregression methodology and make use of fine-grained quarterly data on lobbying, skills-based immigration and temporary workers in Canada, between 1996 and 2011. A key result is the positive and robust response of temporary worker inflows to the intensity of corporate lobbying, even after accounting for labour market conditions. In contrast, there is no conclusive evidence that lobbyists carry weight when it comes to permanent migrants.Résumé. Cette étude examine la thèse voulant que le secteur privé exerce une influence sur les politiques d'immigration, poussant les gouvernements à accroître le nombre d'immigrants. Malgré son attrait, cette thèse n'a reçu qu'un soutien empirique très limité à ce jour, notamment puisque l'influence des groupes d'intérêt s'exerce souvent à huis clos. Afin de surmonter ce problème, je recours à la méthode des vecteurs autorégressifs et utilise des données trimestrielles détaillées sur le lobbying, l'immigration économique et les travailleurs temporaires au Canada entre 1996 et 2011. Un résultat clé est la réponse positive des influx de travailleurs temporaires à l'intensité du lobbying des entreprises, même après avoir pris en compte les conditions du marché du travail. En comparaison, la conclusion que les lobbyistes influencent les niveaux d'immigration permanente apparaît peu robuste.
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HALL, RICHARD L., and ALAN V. DEARDORFF. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." American Political Science Review 100, no. 1 (February 2006): 69–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055406062010.
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Professional lobbyists are among the most experienced, knowledgeable, and strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice of politics. Nonetheless, their behavioral patterns often appear anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories. We revisit these anomalies in search of an alternative theory. We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators. The proximate political objective of this strategy is not to change legislators' minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives. The theory is simple in form, realistic in its principal assumptions, and counterintuitive in its main implications. Empirically, the model renders otherwise anomalous regularities comprehensible and predictable. In a later section, we briefly bring preferences back in, examining the important but relatively uncommon conditions under which preference-centered lobbying should occur.
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WOLL, CORNELIA. "Leading the Dance? Power and Political Resources of Business Lobbyists." Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 1 (January 18, 2007): 57–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x07000633.
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Studies of lobbying try to determine the influence and power of non-governmental actors on public policy. Although influence is very difficult to measure empirically, many continue to push for better research design to solve the problem. Through case studies of business-government relations in the United States and the European Union, this article argues that the difficulties with power and influence concern not only their operationalisation, but they also reflect conceptual confusions. Trying to determine the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of a policy issue can be misleading, since power also structures apparently harmonious exchange relationships. The perceived success of business lobbying in the cases studied depended on the governments' receptiveness to their demands, which in turn depended on strategic advantages they saw for themselves in international negotiations. Even when business appears to lead the dance, it is more promising to look at resource distribution and the interdependence of both sides, instead of assuming the domination of business power over policy outcomes.
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Stoilova, Veronika. "The Role of Lobbying in the Decision-Making Process in the European Union." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 27, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 219–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/kbo-2021-0077.
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Abstract Lobbying in the modern world is becoming part of decision-making processes at the local, state, supranational and global levels. The lobbying process is characterized by the use of various techniques and tools, which is why there are many definitions. In the European Union, it is perceived as a European representation of interests, through which different groups try to influence the decision-making process in the various institutions. Lobbying is often referred to when it is necessary to describe a particular political process, event or phenomenon that has not reached the general public or has remained opaque due to its specific nature. As lobbying becomes increasingly important, this article aims to clarify what lobbying is and what its legitimate and acceptable forms are. It is not without reason that there is a general distrust of the lobbying process and, in particular, of the real intentions of lobbyists. Therefore, many people believe that such activities distort the political process in terms of transparency, integrity and influence. Given the sensitive nature of the topic of lobbying, some good practices from existing lobbying rules at European level will also be considered.