To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Lobbying - United States.
Journal articles on the topic 'Lobbying - United States'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Lobbying - United States.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Trofymenko, Anastasiia, and Dmytro Lubinets. "The main lobbying development trends in the United States of America." Історико-політичні проблеми сучасного світу, no. 39 (June 16, 2019): 156–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.31861/mhpi2019.39.156-163.
Full textAbstract:
The relevance of the issue of decreasing corruption in Ukraine causes the scientific interest in the study of such a political institution as lobbyism. An analysis of the global lobbying experience allows us to distinguish the lessons Ukraine can apply in this field. The article presents an analysis of the American lobbying model, since the United States was the first country to acknowledge and determine lobbying, as well as to develop the most advanced lobbying methods and technologies on the legislative level. The authors specify the main trends in the establishment and functioning of lobbying in the United States of America through studying the requirements of legislation in this field, imposed both on lobbyists and officials, considering ethical norms that lobbyists should be guided by in their work, subject-object determination of American lobbyism, and prevailing forms thereof in the state. As a result of the study carried out, it was found out that the legal framework for lobbying in the United States is based on the following: the principles of compulsory accountability and reporting of lobbyists and their clients, foreign clients, in particular; ethical standards of conduct for employees; restriction of lobbying for former civil servants; lobbying in all the branches of power; lobbying supervision and control by government agencies (these functions are entrusted to the Secretary of the Senate and Secretary of the House of Representatives) and the public, by lobbyists as well through establishing a Code of Lobbying Ethics, mediation between the client and the authorities.
Keywords: lobbyism, lobbying, American model, Association of Government Relations Professionals, Code of Lobbying Ethics, lobby register.
2
Dolgikh, Fedor I. "Lobbying in the USA as a Competitive Tool." Journal of Modern Competition 16, no. 5 (October 31, 2022): 116–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.37791/2687-0657-2022-16-5-116-129.
Full textAbstract:
The economic sphere of society in the United States is a highly competitive environment, within which there is a clash of various interest groups seeking to influence political decision-making in order to ensure the most favorable business conditions for themselves. The purpose of the study is to consider lobbying as a competitive tool for various business sectors in the United States. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks: to analyze the features of the economic sphere of US society as a competitive environment; to consider the legal basis for regulating lobbying activities in the United States; to determine the methods of lobbying; to analyze the overall structure of lobbying expenses in the United States and determine the share of business expenses in various sectors; to determine the place of the two leading political parties in the United States – Democratic and Republican – in the process of lobbying the interests of various business sectors and the reasons for such a difference. The study covers the period of the 2020 election cycle in the United States. The problem of lobbying the interests of business sectors is considered on the example of the competition between Donald Trump and Joe Biden in the 2020 US presidential election. The work is based on a dialectical research method. According to the results of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that in the structure of lobbying activities, lobbying for business interests repeatedly prevails over lobbying for the interests of the non-profit sector. Lobbying is a form of competitive struggle, one of the ways to carry out competitive actions, an instrument of competition between various business sectors for the establishment of the most favorable conditions for their sector. According to the results of the 2020 presidential election, the communications and electronics sector won in the person of its key lobbyist, Democratic candidate Joe Biden. During the election campaign, both Trump and Biden used a marketing approach, “selling” their “political product” that expressed the interests of certain business sectors, certain groups of voters whose consumer preferences would allow them to “realize” this “product”. The intersectoral competition of various business sectors harmoniously integrated into the political competition of the two leading political parties in the United States.
3
Kremyanskaya, E. A. "Legal Aspects of Regulating Lobbying in the United States of America and Canada." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(35) (April 28, 2014): 161–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-2-35-161-168.
Full textAbstract:
The author reviews history and peculiarities of the legal regulations of lobbying in USA and Canada, points out the tendencies of the legislation development. USA and Canada are among the first countries, which included legal regulations on the lobbying relations in the state government. The author explores the evolution of development of the lobbying legislation in the USA, and in particular reviews the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1976, Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as well as evolution of the Canadian legislation, where the Act on Lobbying of 1989 is in force, which had substantial changes during the last ten years. Taking into consideration the territorial form of state, the author reviews not only the federal legislation, but also laws on the level of states and provinces of these federations. Besides, the author covers the activity of the control bodies, order of registration and reporting by lobbyists of their professional activity, reveals pro and cons of the legal regulations of such institution as lobbying. In the article there is the list of information, which should be provided by lobbyists to the control bodies and the author correctly mentions that this list in USA is much wider, comparing to Canadian regulations. In the article the author reviews the liability for violations of lobbying legislation. In particular, in the USA the criminal liability is applied up to 5 years of imprisonment and financial penalties up to 200 thousand US dollars. Based on the USA and Canada experience the author reveals the key issues, which should be fixed by the legal regulations in the country and in particular: the clear definition of the lobbying and lobbyist, necessity of disclosure on the information about client and amounts paid, fixing in the control mechanisms and liability.
4
Kostyaev, Sergey Sergeevich. "Russian lobbying in the United States: stages of evolution." Journal of Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (April 23, 2012): 279–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/pa.1423.
Full text
5
Kugay, A. I., and A. B. Davydov. "Models of Lobbying Practices in Maritime Affairs of USA and European Countries." Administrative Consulting, no. 2 (March 15, 2022): 20–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/1726-1139-2022-2-20-32.
Full textAbstract:
The article is based on a comparative analysis of the most effective institutionally established models of modern lobbying practices for pursuing interests in the field of maritime activities in the developed countries of Europe and the United States. The study is carried out on several grounds: the Full Time Equivalent (FTE) of a lobbyist, the expected financial investments of organizations in lobbying activities, an assessment of the transparency of the activities of lobbying organizations. Based on the revealed correlation of FTE and expected investments, the analysis of the model’s efficiency is simplified to an estimate of the value of its total FTE of the described models. Particular emphasis is placed on the analysis of lobbying in cooperation with the European Commission. It has been determined that environmental organizations and groups of influence that are not directly related to maritime activities are particularly active in lobbying for maritime activities. When comparing the lobbying infrastructure of Western countries in the context of its effectiveness in defending national interests, there is a significant advantage of the United States over the European Union. Regarding the adoption of Western models of lobbying practices and the spread of institutionalization of lobbying on the territory of the Russian Federation, it is recognized that for Russia, its maritime policy, the most effective American model would be, based on a single legal basis, allowing taxed lobbying agents to act in concert on the domestic and global market in the interests of private companies and the nation state.
6
Landers, Steven H., and Ashwini R. Sehgal. "Health care lobbying in the United States." American Journal of Medicine 116, no. 7 (April 2004): 474–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amjmed.2003.10.037.
Full text
7
Khatib, Dania Koleilat. "Arab Gulf lobbying in the United States: what makes them win and what makes them lose and why?" Contemporary Arab Affairs 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 68–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2015.1121647.
Full textAbstract:
This research looks at attempts by Arab Gulf states to lobby the US government effectively. It explores aspects of their lobbying behaviour in order to identify the factors that lead to success and those that lead to failure from their lobbying endeavours. In this respect, it utilizes two case studies: one in which Arab Gulf state lobbying was successful, and another in which lobbying failed. For each case study, the different elements involved in lobbying are analyzed and factors that lead to success as well as to failure are inferred. In tandem with an analysis of the strategies, or lack of them, behind Arab Gulf states’ lobbying, the research examines additional relevant factors such as the organization and activism of the US Arab American community, the strategic value of the Arab Gulf to the United States, and the negative image of Arabs in America. The research considers the obstacles facing the establishment of an effective Arab Gulf lobby in the United States, mainly the absence of a grassroots base of Arab Americans that is committed to foreign policy issues.
8
Kalpakian, Jack. "Morocco and the United States: A lobbying opportunity." South African Journal of International Affairs 11, no. 2 (December 2004): 79–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220460409545468.
Full text
9
MAHONEY, CHRISTINE. "Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union." Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 1 (January 18, 2007): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x07000608.
Full textAbstract:
Scholars have avoided studying interest group influence because of the difficulty operationalising the concept. The research presented here introduces a new way of measuring lobbying success and lays out a model of its determinants. To understand why interest groups sometimes succeed and at other times fail, we must consider the institutional structure of the political system within which the advocates are operating; the characteristics of the issue at hand; and finally the characteristics of the interest group itself and their lobbying strategy. I test these factors with original data based on interviews with 149 advocates in Washington D.C. and Brussels active on a random sample of 47 policy issues. From the results, issue context emerges as a much more important determinant of lobbying success than institutional differences. The institutional differences that do emerge suggest that direct elections coupled with private campaign finance lead to winner-take-all outcomes biased in favour of wealthier business interests, while the lack of these institutional characteristics leads to more balanced policy compromises with more advocates achieving some of their policy goals.
10
Strickland, James. "America’s Crowded Statehouses: Measuring and Explaining Lobbying in the U.S. States." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 19, no. 3 (February 19, 2019): 351–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440019829408.
Full textAbstract:
Across the United States over time, numbers of registered interest groups have continued to increase, but these populations mask the total amount of lobbying that is occurring within America’s statehouses. Among registered interests, average numbers of hired lobbyists have increased markedly since the late 1980s. This study both quantifies this increase and identifies a set of causal variables. Previous studies have proposed a variety of short-term, political and long-term, institutional factors that govern rates of lobbying. Using a new data set spanning multiple decades, I find that changes in lobbying can largely be ascribed to institutional variables, including the implementation of term limits and regulations on lobbying. Lobby regulations, one-party dominance, and legislative expenditures also appear to play a role in determining rates of multiclient lobbying. Direct democracy and state spending do not affect the hiring of lobbyists by registered interest groups.
11
SOKUR, Stanislav. "TRANSFORMATION OF LOBBYING INSTRUMENTS FOR ECONOMIC STAKEHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES." Economy of Ukraine 2021, no. 5 (May 21, 2021): 78–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/economyukr.2021.05.078.
Full textAbstract:
The article examines current developments of lobbying institutionalization on the state level in European countries from 2014 to 2021, in particular, the definitions of lobbying and lobbyists, their goals, the availability of lobbying registers and the available ways for lobbying by economic stakeholders. Recent legislation on lobbying of Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania and the United Kingdom is analyzed. The dynamics of the adoption of laws on lobbying in European countries in recent years is demonstrated, given the specifics of the legal regimes of these countries. The article also shows examples of lobbying by economic stakeholders and lobbyists' reporting in accordance with the current legislation of the countries concerned. It has been proven that today the field of lobbying is on the rise, since in the last seven years eight countries in Europe have adopted laws regulating lobbying. Thus, the total growth of countries adopted lobbying regulation by European OECD member-states for the period of last 7 years constituted 67% of overall lobbying regulation by OECD member-states for the previous 75 years. These impressive numbers are expected to increase in the coming years, and it is very important that such lobbying rules to be adopted in accordance with international standards for lobbying regulation. The article also shows practical cases of lobbying and demonstrates that the range of lobbying targets in the modern world is incredibly wide. International organizations such as the United Nations, the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, etc. influences transparently policy-making in European countries. Regulation of lobbying legislation allows to influence decision-making to both non-governmental organizations and representatives of the private sector. Thus, there is an articulation and aggregation of interests in societies, which improves the quality of decisions made by public authorities.
12
Konyshev, V. N., and E. M. Skvortsova. "Foreign lobbying as an instrument of defense cooperation between Poland and the United States." Baltic Region 12, no. 2 (2020): 4–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2020-2-1.
Full textAbstract:
Defence cooperation between Poland and the United States significantly affects the security agenda of Russia, the Baltic region, and Europe as a whole. On the one hand, Poland intends to become a key partner of the US in ensuring European security. On the other hand, it has ambitions to take the leading position in the security area among the Baltic States. The Polish leadership sees an additional advantage in expanding military cooperation with the United States, regarding it as a jumping board to accelerating its economic and technological development. This article examines a mechanism underlying defence cooperation between the US and Poland, i.e. lobbying Poland’s interests in another state. This allows Warsaw to actively promote its interests in the US. The research methodology employed includes the periodisation of Polish lobbying activities in the US and an empirical study of lobbying based on analysis of original documents, many of which have been analysed for the first time. It is shown that, under the existing party system, Poland will not abandon strategic partnership with the United States, primarily in security and defence. Over the study period, Poland quickly gained experience in promoting its interests in the US through direct lobbying, showing flexibility in negotiations, relying on the two-party support in the US Congress, successfully coordinating the activities of its governing bodies and various corporations which are submitted to tight state control.
13
Grafov, D. B. "Lobbying of Qatar's Interests in the United States and the Qatar Diplomatic Crisis." MGIMO Review of International Relations 13, no. 2 (April 28, 2020): 183–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-2-71-183-204.
Full textAbstract:
Qatar lobbied its interests in the US in order to ease tensions with the Gulf c tries which declared a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt accused Qatar of supporting terrorism, demanded to break off all ties with Iran and to close the Turkish military base on its territory. The article analyses the lobbying campaign against the blockade. It uses the facts and data disclosed by the consulting and lobbying firms according to “The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938” and “The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995”. Three main conclusions are drawn: 1) The US is not interested in settlement of dispute through the support of one party. The White House prefers the “divide and rule” strategy. 2) There is little chance of successful lobbying in the US for any state that cooperates with Iran. 3) The balance-of-power approach in analysing of the development of Qatari-Saudi crisis shows that attempt of the both parties to “buck-pass” by one superpower is uneffisient. The reason is that both Qatar and Saudi coalition act like US's clients. Although Qatar is not as powerful as its rivals, but it uses the “defensive realism” strategy, that allows it to disrupt aggressive efforts and increase the costs of the Saudi coalition.
14
Hanegraaff, Marcel, Arlo Poletti, and Jan Beyers. "Explaining varying lobbying styles across the Atlantic: an empirical test of the cultural and institutional explanations." Journal of Public Policy 37, no. 4 (April 22, 2016): 459–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x16000052.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThere is consensus in the literature that policymaking in the United States (US) and Europe generates different lobbying styles. Two explanations for these differences have been developed so far. The first posits that distinct lobbying styles reflect differentpolitical cultures. The second attributes distinct lobbying styles to variation in theinstitutionalcontext in which lobbyists operate. Studies that have analysed lobbying within the US and Europe and assessed the relative importance of these arguments are problematic because both explanations are consistent with observed differences in lobbying style. In this article, we circumvent problems of observational equivalence by focussing on European and American lobbyists who are active in a similar institutional venue – that is, international diplomatic conferences. Relying on evidence collected at World Trade Organization Ministerial Conferences and United Nation Climate Summits, we tested the relevance of alternative explanations for the variation in lobbying styles between European and American lobbyists. Our results give robust support to the institutional argument.
15
Winters, Jeffrey A., and Benjamin I. Page. "Oligarchy in the United States?" Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 4 (December 2009): 731–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592709991770.
Full textAbstract:
We explore the possibility that the US political system can usefully be characterized as oligarchic. Using a material-based definition drawn from Aristotle, we argue that oligarchy is not inconsistent with democracy; that oligarchs need not occupy formal office or conspire together or even engage extensively in politics in order to prevail; that great wealth can provide both the resources and the motivation to exert potent political influence. Data on the US distributions of income and wealth are used to construct several Material Power Indices, which suggest that the wealthiest Americans may exert vastly greater political influence than average citizens and that a very small group of the wealthiest (perhaps the top tenth of 1 percent) may have sufficient power to dominate policy in certain key areas. A brief review of the literature suggests possible mechanisms by which such influence could occur, through lobbying, the electoral process, opinion shaping, and the US Constitution itself.
16
Sergey Kostyaev. "Regime Change and Arab Countries' Lobbying in the United States." Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2013): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.1.0054.
Full text
17
Imomova, Yulduzkhan. "INFLUENCE OF LOBBYING ON THE KARABAKH CONFLICT." JOURNAL OF LOOK TO THE PAST 12, no. 3 (December 30, 2020): 48–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.26739/2181-9599-2020-12-7.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines the role and influence of ethnic lobby groups that exert pressure on decision-making processes regarding the Karabakh conflict. The lobby groups actively operate in democratic states such as the United States, Russia and Turkey and form a political position on the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which in turn may affect the consequences of the conflict
18
Sushentsov, A. A. "Perspectives of Russian lobbying in the US." Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 18. Sociology and Political Science 24, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 163–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.24290/1029-3736-2018-24-4-163-167.
Full textAbstract:
Despite the panic in the American media surrounding Russian interference in American affairs, today Russia does not have its own full-fledged lobby in the United States. Russian experts are excluded from the American foreign policy debate, even in those matters that affect Moscow directly. Speakers invited to the Congress spoke, as a rule, with criticism of the Russian government. Meanwhile, in the United States exists a request for an alternative opinion of experts from Russia. Americans ignore weak arguments and propaganda, but are ready to accept useful criticism and discussion. The key to the success of Russia’s lobbying aspirations may be the creation in Washington of a respectable analytical center expressing the interests of Moscow and actively participating in American foreign policy discussion.
19
Gorovaya, Ya I., and E. A. Kremyanskaya. "Lobbying: Its Role in and Impact on the US Government System." Journal of Law and Administration 18, no. 1 (April 2, 2022): 63–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2073-8420-2022-1-62-63-72.
Full textAbstract:
Introduction. The article provides an overview of lobbying regulations in the United States. The US lobbying legislation is an integral part of the whole country legislation system, with its regulations helping, in particular, to make the influence exerted by lobbyists on the decision-making process transparent. The statusquo of lobbying anywhere except the US, Canada and the European Union is nonidentical as there still have not been enacted any direct laws and statutory instruments regulating this field elsewhere [8].Lobbying is thus apt to be misinterpreted due to its misperceiving and insufficient awareness. Consequently, the myth that “bribing” is an equitable sobriquet for “lobbying” is still going strong and has yet to be dissected. The author delves into the origins and history of lobbying in the US, tracing its enhancement and indicating legal loopholes still remaining despite seemingly exhaustive disclosure required. The author equally inquiries into theoretical justifications for regulating lobbying from deliberative democratic theory. “Grassroots lobbying” and “shadow lobbying” constitute likewise matters of concern to the article.Materials and methods. The author employs both general and specialized scientific methods in the study. The issue of US lobbying development is addressed by means of historical method. In detecting legal loopholes and propounding other approaches used in relation to them either on federal level or in certain states, a comparative legal analysis and a logical method are combined.Study results. The research has revealed that lobbying activities in general and lobbying practices in particular unfold at every level of government. The acts adopted throughout the US lobbying history provide a range of definitions for the terms “lobbyist” and “lobby groups”, clarify the status of lobbyists and circumscribe the cases of obligatory disclosure of lobbying activities. Lobbying appears to be a thriving field due to it exerting immense influence on legislative process, as well as the outcome of the elections. Last but not least, the study has ascertained the US lobbying system as the one attempting not to leave any of lobbying activities opaque from public perspective by means of eliminating legal loopholes. Thus, lobbying regulations significantly contribute to fostering transparency and democracy overall.Discussion and conclusion. From our perspective, lobbying exists even when unregulated, hence not only its regulations do not constitute corruption, but they can also serve as a means of outlawing the latter by bringing policy makers under close scrutiny, i.e. establishing certain limitations pertaining their interactions with lobbyists and lobby groups hence the decision-making process. With the aforesaid aim, as well as with the aim of keeping the decision-making process transparent in general, lobbying legislation in the US has been gradually developing in scale and sophistication to eventually encompass the vast number of lobbying interactions.
20
Lits, Brieuc. "Detecting astroturf lobbying movements." Communication and the Public 5, no. 3-4 (September 2020): 164–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057047320969435.
Full textAbstract:
Astroturf lobbying refers to the simulation of grassroots support for or against a public policy. The objective of this tactic is for private interests to pretend they have public support for their cause. However, omitting to disclose the real sponsor of a message renders the communication unauthentic and undermines democratic and pluralist values. This article seeks to develop a method to detect astroturf movements based on emphasis framing analysis. The hypothesis is that astroturf groups employ different frames than genuine grassroots movements to comply with the private interests they truly represent. The results of the case study on the shale gas exploration debate in the United States show that astroturf groups used frames that differed significantly from authentic non-governmental organizations, which allowed their detection.
21
Turner, William B. "Lesbian/Gay Rights and Immigration Policy: Lobbying to End the Medical Model." Journal of Policy History 7, no. 2 (April 1995): 208–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030600004243.
Full textAbstract:
On 3 June 1977, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied an immigrant visa to a Filipino woman, Zenaida Porte Rebultan, when she acknowledged that she was a lesbian. Rebultan qualified as a second-preference alien for purposes of immigration because every other member of her immediate family had already moved permanently to the United States. The INS declared her excludable, however, under section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, according to which “aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect” were “ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States.”
22
Drope, Jeffrey M., and Wendy L. Hansen. "Does Firm Size Matter? Analyzing Business Lobbying in the United States." Business and Politics 8, no. 2 (August 2006): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1160.
Full textAbstract:
In the study of corporate political activity in the United States, scholars have consistently relied on samples comprised entirely or principally of large firms. While scholars have raised the issue of bias in these samples, there have been no systematic examinations of the consequences for causal inference. We address this issue directly by comparing the results of comprehensive models that examine corporate lobbying using both large-firm and randomly-generated samples. We find that while there are some notable differences, they are certainly not so large as to lead us to question fundamentally the results of decades of scholarship. In short, the results generated using a random sample lead to causal inferences largely consistent with those in the theoretical and empirical literature. In particular, firms' resources and interactions with government condition both their decisions to lobby and the level of their activity.
23
Moon, Chung-in. "Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States." International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600413.
Full text
24
Lee Cochran, Christopher. "Sources: Guide to Interest Groups and Lobbying in the United States." Reference & User Services Quarterly 51, no. 3 (March 1, 2012): 294–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/rusq.51n3.294.
Full text
25
Harvey, Anna L. "The Political Consequences of Suffrage Exclusion." Social Science History 20, no. 1 (1996): 97–132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0145553200021556.
Full textAbstract:
By the close of the first decade following ratification of constitutional female suffrage in the United States, it had become commonplace to read of female political leaders bemoaning the inefficacy of women's lobbying organizations, which despite their lobbying efforts did not engage in any electoral activity such as the mobilization of female voters (see, for example,NYT10 March 1928: 3;NYT31 March 1931: 22). That this should have been the case raises an interesting question: Why not? That is, given the likelihood that women's votes would have increased the efficacy of these lobbying efforts, why weren't the leaders of women's lobbying organizations, in particular those of the former suffrage machine, the National League of Women Voters (NLWV), pursuing those votes?
26
Fields, David P. "The Rabbi, the Lawyer, and the Prophet." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 22, no. 4 (November 26, 2015): 291–314. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02204001.
Full textAbstract:
Using the personal papers of Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea, as a starting point, this essay examines the lobbying activities from 1919 to 1922 of Korean independence activists in the United States from the perspective of three Americans who became supporters of the Korean cause. It reveals how these activists used the “American Mission”—a particular genus of American exceptionalism asserting that the United States has a national destiny to promote universal values abroad—to build a small but formidable constituency of u.s. supporters. These advocates were instrumental in publicizing Korea’s plight and in bringing many Americans into sympathy with the Korean independence movement. Their involvement casts a long shadow in u.s.-Korean relations because they provided Rhee with a base of moral support during his 35-year exile in the United States that he used to advance the Korean independence movement and his personal political ambitions. Their lobbying campaign also calls into question received wisdom about who employs American exceptionalism and why.
27
Tyrrell, Ian. "The Regulation of Alcohol and other Drugs in a Colonial Context: United States Policy towards the Philippines, C. 1898–1910." Contemporary Drug Problems 35, no. 4 (December 2008): 539–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009145090803500405.
Full textAbstract:
The article compares attitudes towards and laws regulating the use of alcohol and opium in the United States (US) colonial possession of the Philippines. Forces within the United States and missionary groups in the field in the Philippines fought to have the supply of alcohol to American troops restricted by abolition of the military canteen system, and to eliminate use of alcohol among the indigenous population. To achieve these aims, they developed highly skilled networks of political lobbying led by Wilbur Craft's International Reform Bureau. Temperance, church and missionary groups differed among themselves over the relative seriousness of the two drugs’ impact in the Philippines, but skillfully adapted their tactics in the light of experience in the colony to focus on opium. They developed a tacit coalition with the US government, using the Philippines opium policy to distinguish the United States as a morally superior colonial ruler. By lobbying the government to oppose opium use in the East Asia region, they served to promote an American regional hegemony, and provided an important departure point for modern US drug poalicies.
28
Grafov, D. B. "Comparison of the Influence of the Chinese Lobby and the Israeli Lobby in the United States." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 5(44) (October 28, 2015): 84–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-5-44-84-98.
Full textAbstract:
The article is about how pro-Israel and pro-China interest groups try to lobby on the ground of Capitol, White House and executive branch. The study of the lobbying results is based on «General theory of action» T. Parsons. It is concluded that for lobbying interests the main point will be the representation of the interests in the political and public spaces and the creating of advocacy and lobbying infrastructure. The ability of the Israeli lobby to achieve the goal can be explained, firstly, by political inclusion in the decision-making process, and, secondly, by almost axiomatic representation Israel interests through the national interests of the United States. The Israeli lobby can be considered as the religious lobby. It can use the possibilities of Jewish religious organizations in grass root action. Also this gives the opportunity to avoid the requirements of the LDA. From the point of view of the theory of Talcott Parsons, the success of the Israeli lobby is the cause of the action of a large number of actors that may form in large groups. Another advantage of the Israeli lobby is the ability of its members to get relevant information about the current situation in different spheres of political life in the U.S. The objective of the present study was to reveal the ways in which China lobby succeeds. The influence of China lobby on decision-making process in the United States can be explained through strong economic ties between American corporations and the Chinese market. When lobbying China uses numerous Chinese Diaspora in many States, as well as trying to interest of the former high-ranking American officials, granting them special privileges for doing business in China. In comparison to the Israeli lobby, the Chinese lobby has weaknesses. Chinese interest groups are not included in the political system of the USA and this is the disadvantage of the Chinese way of lobbying. Unlike Israel lobby Chinese one is external. The interests of the chinese pressure groups do not coincide with American national interests. Their actors are not rooted in the American political system.
29
Liu, Chelsea, Chee Seng Cheong, and Ralf Zurbruegg. "Rhetoric, Reality, and Reputation: Do CSR and Political Lobbying Protect Shareholder Wealth against Environmental Lawsuits?" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55, no. 2 (January 18, 2019): 679–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000073.
Full textAbstract:
We investigate whether firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputations and environmental lobbying efforts protect shareholder wealth in the event of environmental lawsuits. Using a sample of lawsuits filed in United States Federal Courts, we find that firms with superior CSR reputations suffer worse market reactions to environmental allegations. In contrast, lobbying cushions filing-date valuation losses, providing insurance-like protection against lawsuits. Our results are robust to subsample analyses, a falsification test, propensity score matching, and alternative empirical proxies and model specifications.
30
Weymouth, Stephen. "Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach." Business and Politics 14, no. 4 (December 2012): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bap-2012-0030.
Full textAbstract:
A large literature examines corporate political activity in the United States, but much less is known about firms’ lobbying activities and policy influence in developing countries. I argue that firm-level heterogeneity helps explain firms’ political behavior, while political institutions shape policymakers’ incentives to respond to business interests. The empirical analysis relies on the World Bank's Enterprise Survey, which covers over 20,000 firms operating in 42 developing and transition countries, to examine the determinants of lobbying and perceived policy influence. Multilevel estimates support the hypotheses that lobbying and influence increase with the firm's size and market power. Additionally, I find that firms report greater policy influence in democracies than in non-democracies.
31
Caldeira, Gregory A., and John R. Wright. "Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests Supreme Court Nominations, and United States Senate." American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 2 (April 1998): 499. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2991768.
Full text
32
Jensen, Jennifer M. "Intergovernmental Lobbying in the United States: Assessing the Benefits of Accumulated Knowledge." State and Local Government Review 50, no. 4 (December 2018): 270–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160323x18824514.
Full text
33
Sacks, G., B. Swinburn, and B. Loff. "The broad nature of multinational food company lobbying in the United States." Obesity Research & Clinical Practice 6 (October 2012): 90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orcp.2012.08.185.
Full text
34
Lin, Woon. "Do Firm’s Organisational Slacks Influence the Relationship between Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Financial Performance? More Is Not Always Better." International Journal of Financial Studies 7, no. 1 (December 28, 2018): 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijfs7010002.
Full textAbstract:
A political involvement in any organisation has often proved to be profitable for such firms that are seeking support and favourable regulatory conditions. Though many studies have investigated the effect of the corporate lobbying activities on the organisations, no clear results have been achieved. In this study, we have investigated the lobbying expenditure of some of the most famous United States (US)-based companies, which support the U.S. government during 2007–2016. Primarily, we tested the relationship between the corporate lobbying and the Corporate Financial Performance (CFP), with the help of a dynamic panel data analysis, which is based on the System Generalised Methods of the Moment (SYS-GMM). The results of this study indicated that the corporate lobbying did not increase the probability of gaining more support from the government in comparison to the firms that did not use any lobbying techniques. Furthermore, the findings showed that corporate lobbying is a component of the zero-sum political agenda that cannot be accurately evaluated and does not contribute towards the improvement of the CFP. This study introduced the important component of organisational slack and noted that the corporate lobbying could significantly destroy the CFP if the organisational slack was high.
35
Furnas, Alexander C., Michael T. Heaney, and Timothy M. LaPira. "The partisan ties of lobbying firms." Research & Politics 6, no. 3 (July 2019): 205316801987703. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2053168019877039.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines lobbying firms as intermediaries between organized interests and legislators in the United States. It states a partisan theory of legislative subsidy in which lobbying firms are institutions with relatively stable partisan identities. Firms generate greater revenues when their clients believe that firms’ partisan ties are valued highly by members of Congress. It hypothesizes that firms that have partisan ties to the majority party receive greater revenues than do firms that do not have such ties, as well as that partisan ties with the House majority party lead to greater financial returns than do partisan ties to the Senate majority party. These hypotheses are tested using data available under the Lobbying Disclosure Act from 2008 to 2016. Panel regression analysis indicates that firms receive financial benefits when they have partisan ties with the majority party in the House but not necessarily with the Senate majority party, while controlling for firm-level covariates (number of clients, diversity, and organizational characteristics). A difference-in-differences analysis establishes that Democratically aligned lobbying firms experienced financial losses when the Republican Party reclaimed the House in 2011, but there were no significant differences between Republican and Democratic firms when the Republicans reclaimed the Senate in 2015.
36
Kim, Sung Eun, Johannes Urpelainen, and Joonseok Yang. "Electric utilities and American climate policy: lobbying by expected winners and losers." Journal of Public Policy 36, no. 2 (March 3, 2015): 251–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x15000033.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractWhen and why do individual companies lobby on environmental policies? Given the structural strength of business interests, the answer to this question is important for explaining policy. However, evidence on the strategic lobbying behaviour of individual companies remains scarce. We use data from lobbying disclosure reports on all major climate bills introduced during the 111th Congress (2009–2010). We then link the lobbying disclosure reports to detailed data on the fuel choices of all electric utilities in the United States along with socioeconomic, institutional and political data from the states where the utilities operate. The expected winners (renewable energy, natural gas users) from climate policy are much more likely to lobby individually on federal legislation than the expected losers (coal users). We find that expected winners lobby for specific provisions and rents as a private good, whereas expected losers concentrate their efforts on collective action through trade associations and committees to prevent climate legislation. The results suggest that the supporters of climate policy believed the probability of federal climate legislation to be nontrivial.
37
Korey, William. "The United States and the Genocide Convention: Leading Advocate and Leading Obstacle." Ethics & International Affairs 11 (March 1997): 271–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1997.tb00032.x.
Full textAbstract:
While the United States is now an international leader in the fight against genocide and human rights abuses, it only recently ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide– forty years after the convention's unanimous adoption by the UN General Assembly. Korey provides a description of the long struggle for ratification of the Genocide Convention, detailing decades of work by a committee of fifty-two nongovernmental organizations lobbying the Senate and the American Bar Association, the treaty's key opponent. Despite the public support for the United Nations and human rights by the United States, failure to ratify the Genocide Convention stemmed primarily from the fear that international covenants were threats to U.S. sovereignty. The United States finally overcame this fear with the ratification of the Genocide Convention in 1988, which opened the door for U.S. leadership.
38
Zhu, Zhiqun. "Battle Without Gunfire: Taiwan and the PRC’s Lobbying Competition in the United States." Asian Perspective 24, no. 1 (2000): 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/apr.2000.0036.
Full text
39
Grafov, Dmitriy. "Lobbying of the internal Libyan conflict actors in the United States (comparative analysis)." Asia and Africa today, no. 7 (2020): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750010109-1.
Full text
40
Rush, Michael. "Registering the Lobbyists: Lessons from Canada." Political Studies 42, no. 4 (December 1994): 630–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1994.tb00302.x.
Full textAbstract:
Professional lobbying has been a growth area in recent years in countries like Britain and Canada. One reaction has been calls for the registration of lobbyists, but few countries have experience of registration. The longest and most extensive experience is found in the United States, but systemic differences mean that little attention has been paid in parliamentary systems to that experience. Concern about the hidden world of the professional lobbyist rather than evidence of significant abuse led to calls for the registration of lobbyists. Canada introduced registration in 1989 and a British proposal currently lies on the table. Canadian experience provides an opportunity to examine registration within a parliamentary context and to consider the merits of the proposed British scheme.
41
Baron, David P. "Commentary on “Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure”." Business and Politics 4, no. 2 (August 2002): 205–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1039.
Full textAbstract:
The Center for Responsive Politics reports that U.S. lobbying expenditures substantially exceed interest group campaign contributions, without including the lobbying that is not required to be reported to the government. Although it has grown in Europe, particularly with respect to the European Union, lobbying is less important than in the United States. Bennedsen and Feldmann (BF) provide an important and insightful explanation for the difference in terms of the institutional structure of governments. They present a model of informational lobbying in client politics where an interest group provides information to a majority-rule (three-member) legislature. The legislature chooses the scale of a program whose benefits can be distributed among legislative districts. The legislative agenda setter has a vote buying problem and allocates benefits to one other legislator to obtain her vote. BF compare legislatures operating with and without a confidence procedure that allows the agenda setter to tie passage of its proposal the continuation of the government. This commentary considers the method for comparing these two institutions, assesses the implications of the theory, and considers future research related to the theory.
42
WILLIAMS, GARY. "Brief Encounter: Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's Visit to Washington." Journal of Latin American Studies 34, no. 3 (August 2002): 659–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x02006478.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines the visit of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop to Washington DC in June 1983. Scholars have speculated that the visit was motivated by a desire to normalise Grenada's troubled relations with the United States or, alternatively, that it was a public relations and lobbying exercise. This article concludes that Grenadian government officials variously viewed the visit as a public relations exercise, an opportunity for dialogue and an opportunity to gain economic support. For the United States the prospect of Bishop's visit prompted a reassessment of its Grenada policy and, after Bishop met senior US officials, resulted in a hardening of existing policy.
43
Beyers, Jan, Dirk De Bièvre, Arlo Poletti, and Marcel Hanegraaff. "International Institutions and Interest Mobilization: The WTO and Lobbying in EU and US Trade Policy." Journal of World Trade 50, Issue 2 (April 1, 2016): 289–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2016014.
Full textAbstract:
What affects lobbying patterns in trade policymaking? Existing explanations focus mainly on economic determinants, like the rise of intra-industry trade. We argue that the international trade institutions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) themselves are also key for understanding which type of interest mobilization is likely to arise. We contend that the institutional setting of issue-linkage based trade negotiations creates incentives for firms to work through broad sector-wide lobbying organizations, while judicial adjudication and enforcement in WTO dispute settlement stimulates de-linkage, leading to product-specific interest mobilization. We illustrate how these two arguments can explain the coexistence of both sector-wide and product-specific lobbying in the contemporary international trade regime. We provide evidence on interest mobilization for United States (US) and European Union (EU) initiated WTO disputes, and on EU and US domestic interest organizations that mobilize during multilateral trade rounds or are present at WTO ministerial conferences.
44
Jones, Gregory H., Michael A. Carrier, Richard T. Silver, and Hagop Kantarjian. "Strategies that delay or prevent the timely availability of affordable generic drugs in the United States." Blood 127, no. 11 (March 17, 2016): 1398–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1182/blood-2015-11-680058.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract High cancer drug prices are influenced by the availability of generic cancer drugs in a timely manner. Several strategies have been used to delay the availability of affordable generic drugs into the United States and world markets. These include reverse payment or pay-for-delay patent settlements, authorized generics, product hopping, lobbying against cross-border drug importation, buying out the competition, and others. In this forum, we detail these strategies and how they can be prevented.
45
Brook, Douglas A. "Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Imports Case." Business and Politics 7, no. 1 (April 2005): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1094.
Full textAbstract:
In 1998, the domestic steel industry in the United States devised and executed a complex and sophisticated effort to achieve an effective non-market response to a sudden, persistent, and damaging surge of imported steel. This campaign lasted until 2002, when President George W. Bush invoked Section 201 of the U.S. trade laws to impose tariffs on imports of most steel products. This case of the steel industry's trade policy campaign provides an opportunity to examine selected models of protection-seeking industries and lobbying to ask why and how the steel coalition achieved this extraordinary governmental response. These questions are explored though a descriptive case of the steel industry's protection-seeking campaign followed by a comparative examination of previous models of protection-seeking firms, and lobbying to achieve protectionist policies. A comparison with selected models of the determinants of protection-seeking and factors affecting lobbying strategies show that most, almost all, were present in the steel case. In fact, a meta-strategic approach that transcends the customary understanding of lobbying is suggested in a complex policy environment. Such an environment can be characterized by: the need to influence multiple governmental entities – legislative, regulatory, executive; the desire for multiple outcomes with varying levels of specificity – laws or resolutions, administrative rulings, policy choices; interactions between different levels and branches of government; employment of coordinated interrelated lobbying techniques; and simultaneity of these factors.
46
Han, Jung Taek, and Seo Yeon Kim. "Debunking myths about oil: A case study of oil subsidies." International Area Studies Review 22, no. 2 (April 5, 2019): 186–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2233865919838435.
Full textAbstract:
Despite increasing demands for the reform of oil subsidies, the United States government fails to enact substantial reform policies on the issue. The paper visits the biggest unresolved cleavage in the environmental policy literature where there have been no attempts to quantitatively assess the influence of lobbying and mass participation on the policy-making process. It thus attempts to quantify and examine various factors behind legislators’ votes, and the results are hard to square with a pure lobbying model. While the role of lobbying is certainly not ruled out of the explanatory model per se, this paper observed that congressional preferences may instead also be driven by the voter perception towards environmental regulation in each state. The thrust of the argument is that lobbying, while being a decisive factor, may not be the only one influencing legislators’ decisions for the oil subsidy reform bills. This study hypothesizes that the exchange model theory might not fully provide an explanation of why oil subsidies continuously fall through. It suggests that oil politics may instead follow the neo-pluralist model: While lobbying is an important factor in voting results, legislators are mindful of voters’ perspectives in spite of the fact that they are unorganized—and that they might in fact be even more powerful determinants than the lobby variable.
47
Podhorzer, Michael, Lorraine Driscoll, and Edwin S. Rothschild. "Unhealthy Money: The Growth in Health Pacs' Congressional Campaign Contributions." International Journal of Health Services 23, no. 1 (January 1993): 81–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/jm8f-cjm1-n9me-flhx.
Full textAbstract:
The health and insurance industries have launched a massive lobbying and public relations effort to undermine popular support in the United States for a national health care system. As part of their campaign, these industries have increased dramatically their PAC contributions to members of Congress. This article provides a detailed account of these PAC contributions to congressional incumbents and candidates, and discusses additional information on the health insurance industry's advertising campaigns.
48
Thomas, Jack Ward. "Trends in forest management in the United States." Forestry Chronicle 70, no. 5 (October 1, 1994): 546–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5558/tfc70546-5.
Full textAbstract:
Changes in forestry practices in the United States have been dramatic over the past decade. These changes have been brought about largely through government regulations promulgated in response to pressure from environmental and other groups at both federal and state levels. Historically, the federal government has taken leadership in forest stewardship, though some states have demonstrated strong initiatives over the years. Two separate, but intertwined, factors combined to alter the practice of forestry over much of the United States. There were the interactive consequences of obedience to national environmental laws, passed in the 1960s and 1970s, and a rising environmental consciousness among the majority of the minority of the citizenry who care about natural resource issues. Rising public concern was focussed in challenges in the federal courts to government forest management activities, and in terms of public relations campaigns using lobbying, demonstrations, and manipulation of the mass media. In July of 1993, President Clinton selected an option for management of federal forests in the Pacific Northwest section of the United States that dedicated 9.28 million acres (3.75 million hectares) of federal forests to reserves to be managed for late-successional/old-growth ecosystem function and riparian/fisheries protection. This reduced the anticipated timber sale levels from the 2.4 billion board feet (5.7 million m3) cut annually in 1990-1992, to 1.2 billion board feet (2.8 million m3) projected for 1994. There is an ongoing shift in management philosophy toward "ecosystem management" of forested lands with increasing attention to aesthetics and more benign environmental effects of timber management.
49
PAYSON, JULIA A. "The Partisan Logic of City Mobilization: Evidence from State Lobbying Disclosures." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (June 18, 2020): 677–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000118.
Full textAbstract:
Why do local governments sometimes hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? I argue that such mobilization efforts depend in part on the policy congruence between localities and their elected delegates in the legislature. I provide evidence consistent with this theory by examining how municipal governments in the United States respond to partisan and ideological mismatches with their state legislators—a common representational challenge. Using almost a decade of original panel data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states, I employ difference-in-differences and a regression discontinuity design to demonstrate that cities are significantly more likely to hire lobbyists when their districts elect non-co-partisan state representatives. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental mobilization in which local officials purchase advocacy to compensate for the preference gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel government.
50
Ivanova, Nadezhda Andreevna. "The Jewish Lobby and U.S. Policy Toward Israel in 1952-1954." Исторический журнал: научные исследования, no. 6 (June 2022): 135–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2022.6.39428.
Full textAbstract:
The article is dedicated to the study of the Jewish lobby and its influence on the U.S. foreign policy decision-making in 1952-1954. The methods applied by Jewish lobbyists to defend the interests of Israel in the U.S. administration and Congress during the stated period are revealed. The assessment of the effectiveness of these methods as the ruling party changed was carried out. The research starting point is 1952, when the U.S. presidential election took place, D. Eisenhower won and that created the need for the Jewish lobby to adapt itself to the new administration. The upper research limit was 1954, a period when relations between the countries cooled down because of the desire of the U.S. to establish a dialogue with Arab states, as well as the aggressive foreign policy of Israel itself. The article analyzes the materials of the State Archive of Israel, which were not previously used by Russian historians in the study of this topic. Conclusions are drawn that in 1952-1954 the Jewish lobby only entered the stage of its consolidation as response to the changes in the US foreign policy agenda. Previously, it was represented by disparate organizations, in which only the leaders, due to common interests, used a single approach to lobbying. The Israeli government used the lobby for informal contact with the American side in case of conflict situations with Arab countries, as well as to defend its interests in matters related to financial and military assistance provided by United States. The emerging crisis in relations between Israel and United States in 1954 showed that under the administration of D. Eisenhower the Jewish lobby had to transform the lobbying mechanism to effectively demonstrate that cooperation with Israel was more in line with US foreign policy interests in the region.