Academic literature on the topic 'Local government Investments, Foreign China China'

Over the past 8 years China has been steadily holding the position in the top three global leaders of outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). Implementing the “Go Out” policy the Chinese government achieves the complex objectives of development of the national socio-economic system that is especially important in the process of its current transformation. As a major player in the capital market, China enters into complex relationships with global capital market megatrends, being influenced by them on the one hand and taking part in their formation on the other. This paper reveals the main long-term global trends in the movement of foreign direct investment such as stagnation of global investment, deglobalization and regionalization of world capital markets, restructuring of international production and global value chains and also increased investment in sustainable development goals. The study assesses the extent to which local trends of outward direct investment in the PRC are influenced by these global processes. The paper also analyzes the response of the PRC government to modern challenges provoked by the global pandemic and concludes that OFDI trends in modern conditions are sustainable. In conclusion, the forecast for the direct investment movement in the world and China in a post-COVID world is given.

There are two prevailing perspectives on how China took off. One emphasizes the role of globalization—foreign trade and investments and special economic zones; the other emphasizes the role of internal reforms, especially rural reforms. Detailed documentary and quantitative evidence provides strong support for the second hypothesis. To understand how China's economy took off requires an accurate and detailed understanding of its rural development, especially rural industry spearheaded by the rise of township and village enterprises. Many China scholars believe that township and village enterprises have a distinct ownership structure—that they are owned and operated by local governments rather than by private entrepreneurs. I will show that township and village enterprises from the inception have been private and that China undertook significant and meaningful financial liberalization at the very start of reforms. Rural private entrepreneurship and financial reforms correlate strongly with some of China's best-known achievements—poverty reduction, fast GDP growth driven by personal consumption (rather than by corporate investments and government spending), and an initial decline of income inequality. The conventional view of China scholars is right about one point—that today's Chinese financial sector is completely state-controlled. This is because China reversed almost all of its financial liberalization sometime around the early to mid 1990s. This financial reversal, despite its monumental effect on the welfare of hundreds of millions of rural Chinese, is almost completely unknown in the West.

Over the two and a half decades of economic reform in China, two types of Chinese firms have consistently outperformed their peers. In the 1980s, it was the firms at the lower levels of the industrial hierarchy, the township and village enterprises that were closely monitored by local governments. In the 1990s and beyond, the top performers have been those Chinese firms that have formal relationships with foreign investors. While many studies on the economic reforms in China have focused on the hardening of budget constraints and the transfer of technology from foreign to Chinese firms, I focus here on the stability created by relationships with local government offices and with powerful foreign investors. Where advocates of shock therapy have argued that a rapid transition to market institutions was the best path to building a market economy, I argue that the successful practices of the market are learned gradually over time, and the Chinese firms that are stabilized by attention from local government offices and relationships with foreign investors are well-positioned to successfully navigate China's emerging markets. A quantitative analysis of 81 firms in industrial Shanghai and three case studies help illuminate the mechanisms behind these relationships.

Purpose The study aims to examine whether city-level investment climate, local government effectiveness and corporate income tax rates influence the spatial distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) across cities in China. Design/methodology/approach The study uses regression analysis using city-level data sets. Findings The study finds that while city-level investment climate and effective local government influence the spatial distribution of FDI across Chinese cities, city-level tax rates have no such influence. Practical implications The results have implications for the design of policies aimed at enhancing FDI flows into emerging countries. Originality/value To date, few studies have investigated the investment location choice at the city level in a single country. The study contributes to the literature by examining the role of government in such investment decisions. It also adds to the previously limited research examining the role of investment climate at the micro level.

Since China embarked on market-oriented reform in 1979, various kinds of economic zones have been set up to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). These economic zones often compete against each other for investment, offering better policies and creating more incentives. In most local economic zones, red tape is significantly reduced because of the establishment of local zone authorities with consolidated power to oversee FDI-related matters. Foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) need to deal with much less number of government agencies in these zones than outside these zones. But on the other hand, relationship with these zone authorities becomes crucial for FIEs targeting or operating in these zones. Prior research shows FIEs in China often make their location choices based on the preferential policies offered by different regions. But a neglected factor is that how the business-government relationship might affect foreign firms??location choice between these zones within the same locality. This paper studies the impact of the bilateral FIE-zone authority relationship on FIEs??location decisions. Drawing upon location literature and using data from case studies, the paper provides evidence on the impact of business-government relationship on two levels of location choice by Korean firms in China and advances propositions for future research.

Purpose This article analyses China’s attempts at economic revival, which, starting with the Foreign Investment Law, were under way before COVID-19 but which were given extra impetus by the onset of the pandemic. Design/methodology/approach The thought is that the Foreign Investment Law lacks detail, so this article looks at the three ideas with which the State Council is seeking to underpin it: key Industries, promoting investment and equal treatment. It also considers Shanghai’s experience as the first major municipality to implement the State Council’s guidance. Findings China is committed to more transparency and to opening more of its economy to foreign investors, even if it will continue to be selective about which industries it wishes to encourage. The central government wants other regional and local jurisdictions to follow Shanghai’s lead and implement its guidance, as well as bring forward more measures to make the environment more favorable for foreign investment. At the same time, the article notes that China faces some hostility from other nations and groupings, such as the US, UK and the EU, from which it would expect to receive investment. Practical implications Investors can expect more specific reforms in the different areas of the economy that China wishes to develop while recognizing that it needs foreign expertise to do so. Originality/value Insight from experienced corporate lawyers who are resident in China and have first-hand experience of the measures aimed at economic recovery.

Purpose Although prior research has highlighted the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) on a country’s internationalization, it has largely focused on developed countries. As a result, the FDI performance of a developing country, which differs fundamentally from that of developed countries in their environment, remains unclear. Under the newly development environment, the traditional FDI theories have been challenged by the increasing investments from emerging and transition economies. The theory system needs a fresh situation’s supplement urgently. Design/methodology/approach On the basis of a literature review, this paper constructed an empirical model to further study the moderating effects of context-specific factors on the influence of inbound foreign direct investment (IFDI) on outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI). China was chosen as the representation of a developing country, and its data of mutual investments with 125 countries from 2003 to 2014 were used to carry out hypothesis testing. Findings The analysis and results of this paper suggested: first, for China, the overall influence of IFDI on OFDI is positive. That is to say, IFDI’s positive spillover effect is greater than the negative competition effect. Second, innovational distance’s effect on FDI is complicated. It can either be positive or negative, which calls for further investigation. Third, economic distance negatively affects OFDI and negatively moderates IFDI’s effect on OFDI, especially the export. To some extent, the moderating effect that resulted from the competition effect will reduce overseas investment by extruding some of the local enterprises. Fourth, cultural distance’s effect is closely related to the spillover effect that will positively moderate IFDI’s influence on OFDI. Originality/value This paper enriched the international investment theoretical system by adding a mechanism of multiway international investment of a developing country. The research also has a guiding significance for developing countries’ governments in coordinating mutual international investments. Also, these results have important implications for how policymakers promote OFDI and put forward new theoretical avenues for conceptualizing the internationalization process.

The introduction of land finance and foreign direct investment (FDI) lead to competition among provincial local governments in the background of fiscal decentralization. This paper analyzes the provincial data from 1999 to 2008 by a spatial econometric model. The main contents include the relationship between FDI policies in different provinces and the path dependence between FDI selection and land grant. The results showed that the FDI policies are significantly influenced by the similar policies of the surrounding provinces: the policy formulation and implementation is a complementary strategy between the studied province and surrounding provinces in the current year, and an alternative strategy in a lag. Land grant price significantly influent the entry of real estate. There is an obvious path dependence when FDI choose investment region. In this paper, these issues are analyzed with the actual situation in China.

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of China’s trade agreement and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Nigeria with special reference to the manufacturing sector utilizing the following key economic performance indicators: inflation, unemployment, income and gross domestic product, to name a few. Since the turn of the millennium, China has enjoyed a substantial presence in the African continent. In fact, the country has signed bilateral agreements with Angola, South Africa and Sudan to name a few. Recently, China established its West African trade hub in Lagos, the economic capital of Nigeria, to be strategically positioned. The results of the study revealed conclusively that although China’s investments over the years have benefited the Nigerian economy and its various firms in the manufacturing sector, the agreement signed by both countries ultimately needs to be reexamined to ensure equity. Design/methodology/approach – To thoroughly analyze the effects of China’s investments in Nigeria, this study was carried out in two phases. The first analysis of this study is anchored on a “before/after” framework based on descriptive statistical analysis of the selected economic performance indicators chosen from selected cross-national data. Accordingly, the time frame for this study runs from 1993-2012 which roughly corresponds to the era when China commenced significant investments in Nigeria. Second, employees, policymakers and individuals in the manufacturing/textile industries were interviewed. Furthermore, participation from federal as well as local government agency staff members was solicited using the Delphi technique. Findings – Empirically, the results conclusively reveal China’s dominance in the manufacturing and textile sectors in Nigeria. In other words, at face value, China’s investments are ultimately good for the Nigerian economy. However, at a micro-level analysis, the researcher examined the human factor, that is, the families of former and current employees, abandoned businesses/factories and a decaying textile industry that was once vibrant. Originality/value – To the knowledge of the researcher, this is the first study attempting to assess the impact of the rise of China on the Nigerian economy by combining key economic performance indicator in tandem with face-to-face interviews and the Delphi technique.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the acceleration of poverty alleviation through investment, projects, and foreign debt from the United States, the Netherlands, China and Japan on Indonesian Poverty in 2010-2020. The technique used in the study used panel data regression. The data used in the study of poverty variables, investment variables, projects, foreign debt. Data analysis was taken from the Central Statistics Agency in 2010-2020. Based on the Chow Test and the Hausman Test, this analysis was chosen to be the Fixed Effect Model and has passed the assumptions of the classical test. The results show that investment and projects have a significant negative effect on poverty and foreign debt has no significant effect on society, which means investment, projects, poverty in Indonesia. Based on the results of this study, the implications of this study are that the central government, local governments, Bank Indonesia and related institutions increase investment and foreign projects by establishing good relations with friendly countries, facilitating investment licensing in Indonesia, good foreign debt by prioritizing growth. Economy and poverty alleviation.

While investment incentives are increasingly employed by the developing economies, the vast amount of literature has failed to reach a consensus on the role of incentive regimes. A fundamental problem with the previous econometric studies is that they assume a mature market condition, under which the government should remain outside FDI competition. However, in reality, most developing countries lack a mature market and market-oriented regulatory institutions. This thesis adds to the conventional wisdom by examining whether and how Chinese investment incentive regimes have been successful in harnessing FDI during the last three decades. Like many developing economies, China is still in the process of building a market economy. The striking ability of China to attract FDI with numerous incentives presents a meaningful laboratory for examining the role of investment incentives. In contrast to most previous economic studies, this thesis does not attempt to examine the economic mechanisms of investment incentives. The basic presumption of this thesis is that incentive measures are instrument of state intervention with designed policy goals. A policy-oriented approach has thus been adopted, under which the role of investment incentives is examined against precisely defined policy objectives in a particular policy context. In China’s case, the efficacy of investment incentives is shown by a strategic and dynamic correlation between the investment incentive regime and its achieved development goals. In the given policy context, their functions cannot be replaced by more desirable instruments due to the political and economic constraints. Besides the economic evaluation, the study adds the legal dimension of evaluation on investment incentives. From a legal perspective, the regulatory space for developing countries is increasingly defined by the international legal regime. Investment incentives should be framed in a way to balance national interests and the level of protection required for foreign investment. The evolution of China’s incentive regime presents a good example to integrate global consensus with domestic imperatives. By unifying its income tax system, China adopted an incentive regime generally consistent with its WTO commitments and could be utilized to its advantages. However, serious problems inherent in the incentive system have already emerged in China, which may hamper its economic development in the long run. The thesis shows that the state’s capacity to channel FDI towards development goals is declining, as its intrusiveness has given way to arbitrariness. A top-down approach deprives foreign investors of their channels to communicate their opinions to the policymakers. The local arbitrariness and corruption in incentive implementation will compound the problem and hinder the inflows of high quality foreign investment. The thesis then proposes that the investment incentive regime in China needs to be upgraded into a more legalized system with non-discrimination, transparency, coherence and an effective monitoring mechanism as its central features. The legalization process would help to alleviate the negative effects of investment incentives. In the absence of a political infrastructure compatible with a rules-based system, the Chinese government needs to start with redefining the government-business relationship with a legal framework and reinforcing an independent judicial system.
published_or_final_version
Law
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy

Foreign direct investment (FDI) was unknown to Chinese people before the opening policy in 1979, but since then China's economy has been surging ahead in the past twenty eight years. As one aspect of the FDI policy, I focused on the corporate taxation field to be my research interest, and the topic of my thesis. In the thesis, the reader will learn how FDI developed in China and degree of FDI development. Also, I provide the reader with China's tax system and policy-oriented in as much detail as possible, most of which is the tax incentive policy towards the FDI in China. However, the policies and incentives raise some issues. As the result of offering FDI tax preference, Chinese government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has been declining steadily. Problems such as tax avoidance and evasion, and local "fake" FDI entities are getting serious. The new Corporate Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China (CIT Law) was passed by the PRC National People's Congress on March 16 2007 and will take effect on January 2008. When China entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, compliance with the general rules required China improve its tax system as soon as possible. The CIT law section in the thesis includes the policy-changing behind the legislation and expected influence on the FDI in China in the future. As a result of the changes to be brought about by the CIT Law, foreign and domestic business in China must adapt to the new tax regime, and I offer some recommendations in that regard.
Law, Peter A. Allard School of
Graduate

This dissertation seeks to enhance the understanding of the agenda setting process of Hong Kong government by analysis of the immigration policy on non-local students in the post-colonial era. With the government’s determination for developing Hong Kong to become a regional education hub, a general relaxation of immigration policy on non-local students is observed since 2004. By adopting John Kingdon’s policy streams theory as analytical framework, mixed with Cohen et al’s garbage can model and Lindblom’s incrementalism theory, the influential factor on the problem, policy and political streams are identified and the findings suggest that events in political streams, such as the change in national mood and change in administration have great impacts on the agenda whilst the problem and policy streams remain relatively stable. The impact of the policy entrepreneur is also discussed during the course of research.
published_or_final_version
Politics and Public Administration
Master
Master of Public Administration

Local governments in China operate within a hierarchical system of bureaucratic control in which each level of government has to be accountable to the next higher level, and provincial governments must accept the unified leadership of the State Council. The system is buttressed by the Party's nomenclatura system tightly controlling the appointments of officials at all levels. Local governments officials do not have to be answerable to voters, but they have to undergo detailed performance assessments annually by their superiors within the Party state. Local governments in China, assume a significant role in economic development. They own enterprises and also compete against each other, for example, they all try to attract more foreign investment. Chinese people are increasingly concerned with environmental pollution, food security, health care reforms, education reforms, etc. These are the new tests for local government leaders.

Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are playing an increasingly vital role in the daily lives of all communities by revolutionizing their working procedures and rules of governance. ICTs offer a unique opportunity for governing elite to overcome the crisis of representative democracy, as ICT and the Internet empower civil society to play its role more effectively and facilitate the performance of governments’ main function-serving the people who elect them (Misnikov, 2003). In the realm of government, ICT applications are promising to enhance the delivery of public goods and services to common people not only by improving the process and management of government, but also by redefining the age-old traditional concepts. Community networking groups and local government authorities are well placed to campaign for greater inclusion for all members of the community in the information society. Possible areas to target include the provision of technology at low or no cost to groups through community technology centres or out of hours school access. There are many possibilities and local government must take a significant role in these activities (Young, 2000). Information society is based on the effective use and easy access of information and knowledge, while ICT for development (or ICTD) is not restricted to technology itself but focusing on manifold development and diverse manifestations for the people to improve their well-being. ICTD has deep roots in governance, is part of governance and has effects on governance patters and practices at both central and local level. By recognizing these facts, UNDP focuses on technologies to end poverty at WSIS Cyber Summit 2003, and emphasizes on ways that new technologies can help lift more than one billion people out of extreme poverty (UNDP, 2003). Apart from the four Asian IT giants (Korea, Rep., Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, China, and Japan), most of the Asian countries have fallen under the “low access” category of the Digital Access Index. This has also been referred in the WSIS Cyber Summit 2003, until now, limited infrastructure has often been regarded as the main barrier to bridging the digital divide (ITU, 2003). Among the countries with ICT spending as share of their GDP, Sweden, UK, The Netherlands, Denmark, and France (8.63, 7.97, 7.39, 7.19, and 6.57% respectively during 1992-2001) remain at the top (Daveri, 2002, p. 9), while countries like Bangladesh, Greece, Mexico, Niger, and many more remain at the bottom (EC, 2001; ITU, 2003b; Miller, 2001; Piatkowski, 2002). In a similar research it has been found that in terms of average share of ICT spending GDP, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, USA, and UK (9.3, 8.4, 8.1, 8.1, and 7.8% respectively during 1992-1999) were among the highest (Pohjola, 2002, p. 7), though most of the countries in the Asian and African regions remain below the average of 5%. The disadvantaged communities in the countries staying below average in ICT spending seem to be lagging in forming appropriate information-based economy and eventually fall behind in achieving proper e-government system. The e-government system in those countries need to enhance access to and delivery of government services to benefit people, help strengthen government’s drive toward effective governance and increased transparency, and better management of the country’s social and economic resources for development. The key to e-government is the establishment of a long-term dynamic strategy to fulfill the citizen needs by transforming internal operations. E-government should result in the efficiency and swift delivery and services to citizens, business, government employees and agencies. For citizens and businesses, e-government seems the simplification of procedures and streamlining of different approval processes, while for government employees and agencies, it means the facilitation of cross-agency coordination and collaboration to ensure appropriate and timely decision-making. Thus, e-government demands transformation of government procedures and redefining the process of working with people and activities relating to people. The outcome would be a societal, organizational, and technological change for the government and to its people, with IT as an enabling factor. E-government should concentrate on more efficient delivery of public services, better management of financial, human and public resources and goods at all levels of government, in particular at local level, under conditions of sustainability, participation, interoperability, increased effectiveness and transparency (EU, 2002). ICT brings pertinent sides more closely by prioritizing partnerships between the state, business and civil society. A few East European countries have became economically liberal with the high level of foreign direct investment per capita and at the same time became ICT-advanced regional leaders in terms of economic reform. These countries also present the region’s most vivid examples of partnerships and collaboration. They have clearly manifested the importance of the public-private partnerships, transparent bottom-up strategies, involvement of all stakeholders, total governmental support, capturing economic opportunities, and enabling electronic mediated businesses, responding to the challenges of globalization.

This chapter evaluates lessons from development thinking and experience and identifies the main reasons why past intellectual and policy frameworks failed to yield the expected results. It offers a pragmatic blueprint for allowing low-income countries to ignite and sustain economic growth without preconditions. With the liberalization of trade in the 1980s and 1990s, many domestic manufacturers could not face competition and were wiped out. Early deindustrialization became a trend in most developing countries. However, when developing-country governments leverage export-processing zones to attract the relocation of export-processing light manufacturing from more advanced economies with rising wages, as the East Asian tiger did in the 1960s and China did in the 1980s, they were able to leap into the global market immediately. By attracting foreign direct investment and foreign firms in export-processing zones, poor countries can improve their trade logistics, benefit from knowledge transfer, and make their local firms gradually competitive in domestic and global markets.

This chapter first surveys the close historical ties between the governments of China and Cambodia, as well as between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). It then presents data on Cambodia’s dependence on Chinese “aid” and other forms of capital, including foreign direct investment (FDI). It argues that both the relatively high levels of Chinese funding as well as the “no strings attached” nature of that funding, which lacks the conditions for political and economic reforms often attached to foreign aid by other governments and multilateral institutions, provide additional leverage for China over Hun Sen’s government. The chapter shows how China uses this leverage both to help its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) overcome the high risk in Cambodia’s investment environment for their very specific (immobile) assets and to gain the support of the Cambodian government on issues vital to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, including its territorial claims in the South China Sea. The chapter specifically analyses cases of Chinese investments in Cambodian hydropower projects and shows how Chinese influence over the Cambodian government helps overcome domestic opposition to these projects and secures long-term guarantees for the profitability of investments in this sector.

Every economy across the globe is developing at a rapid pace. Offshore investment opportunities have not only transformed some of the business sectors like infrastructure, technology, media, and telecommunication, but it has also brought some dynamic changes in the life style and shopping preference of the consumers. One such sector that has diverted the attention of the mass is the retail sector. Over the last few years, retail sector has experienced drastic transformation. Some countries are well developed while others are emerging in the retail sector. India and China are among the top developing countries attracting huge foreign direct investment. China follows open investment policy and has liberalized the investment for foreign players while India adopted conservative investment policy with strong government involvement. Retail growth in India is very slow as compared to China. Therefore, this chapter attempts to highlight the economy of India and China and has compared some of the parameters of the economy to reflect the difference in the growth in India and China.

China has rapidly expanded outward foreign direct investments through its remarkable economic growth and the ‘go global' policy. The country has extended aids to developing countries particularly in Africa. The Chinese approach for aid in the region is built on the principles of unconditionality, which do not explicitly require political openness, strong economic and management practices, good human rights performance, or environmentally responsible policies on the part of recipient governments. Such principles are welcomed by the African states. However, their overall successful development is linked to the long-term substantial institutional reforms. This chapter addresses the rising debates on the Chinese approach to aid and investment in Africa. The chapter includes discussion on the political economy of China and its motivations for investment in the continent, the bargaining process for investment opportunities between the two governments, and the dilemmas of Chinese engagement in Africa. Implications for managers and policy makers are provided in the last section.

Since the 1960s, developing Asia has been going through a historically unprecedented process of urbanization and industrialization. This process, which began in East Asia with Japan after World War II (Johnson 1982), then spread first to Korea (Amsden 1989; Rock 1992; Westphal 1978), Taiwan Province of China (Wade 1990), Hong Kong, China (Haggard 1990), and Singapore (Huff 1999) and subsequently to Indonesia (Hill 1996), Malaysia (Jomo 2001), Thailand (Pongpaichit 1980; Rock 1994), and China has spawned enormous interest. While most of the debate surrounding the East Asian development experience has centered on the proximate causes of its development trajectory and the economic and political consequences of this trajectory for the East Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs), because Asia looms so large in the global economy and ecology, interest has belatedly turned to the environmental consequences of East Asia’s development path and to the political economy of governmental responses to deteriorating environmental conditions in the region (Brandon and Ramankutty 1993; Rock 2002a). The focus on the environment came none too soon. Rapid urbanization, industrialization, and globalization in the East Asian NIEs, when combined with ‘grow first, clean up later’ environmental policies, have resulted in average levels of air particulates approximately five times higher than in OECD countries and twice the world average (Asian Development Bank 1997). Not surprisingly, of the 60 developing country cities on which the World Bank (2004: 164–5) reports urban air quality, 62% (10 of 16) are in developing East Asia, all but one of the rest are in South Asia. Measures of water pollution in East Asia, such as biological oxygen demand (BOD) and levels of suspended solids are also substantially above world averages (Lohani 1998). With the prospect for further rapid urban-industrial growth rooted in the attraction of foreign direct investment and the export of manufactures in East Asia, the rest of Asia, and the rest of the developing world as the East Asian ‘model of development’ spreads, local, regional, and global environmental conditions may well get worse before they get better (Rock et al. 2000). At the core of this environmental challenge in East Asia is rapid urban industrial growth.

Many foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) focus on legal compliance and charity in their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs in China. The strategic approach of CSR requires many innovations that are new to the organizations adopting them. The key barriers for the strategic approach of CSR are the apathy attitude of many executives toward CSR and the shortcomings of the institutional framework in China. This chapter describes a few innovative CSR initiatives being utilized within an industrial association and within partnerships between local non-government organizations. It also explores institutional incentives for managing the process by using the social movement theory. It may inspire foreign MNEs to improve the CSR practices of their affiliated companies and their suppliers in China through a few social innovations. Corporations also learn how to engage in social change through their CSR programs in China.

Xi’an Jiaotong–Liverpool University (XJTLU) is a young Sino-English university in Suzhou, China. It is a pioneer in making China rather than foreign universities the center of China’s internationalization process. The chapter discusses the background of XJTLU’s location and successful development, measured in terms of breadth of teaching experience, quality of research and teaching, and rising international reputation. For personal and internationalization reasons, there is special attention given to the International Business School Suzhou (IBSS) as the most important department of XJTLU. We analyze long-term demographic challenges facing all Chinese institutes of higher education, followed by a discussion of XJTLU-specific organizational challenges (regarding mutual dependencies, human resources, and correct incentives) and cooperation challenges (relative to its parent institutions and local government).

How successful are multinational corporations (MNCs) in extending their firm-based environmental standards to their wholly owned subsidiaries and local suppliers, particularly the small and medium sized firm suppliers in developing economies who operate as part of the global production networks of MNCs? Three developments suggest this is not an idle question. To begin with, the economic influence of MNCs is simply staggering. As Dowell et al. (1999: 4) state, the intra-firm transactions of the more than 40,000 MNCs with approximately 250,000 affiliates worldwide account for about 40% of world trade; foreign direct investment is roughly five times official development assistance, and the sales of the ten largest MNCs are larger than the GNP of the 100 poorest countries. This suggests that MNCs along with their affiliates and their suppliers have the potential for exerting substantial influences on local, national, regional, and global environments. Because most of the value added and employment in industry in most developing countries, including the developing economies of East Asia, is accounted for by small and medium sized firms that lie beyond the reach of most governments’ environmental regulatory agencies and because we suspect that the most viable path to technological upgrading and environmental improvement in the low income economies lies in finding ways to increase the participation of indigenous small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the global value chains of multinationals, it is important to ask whether an upgrading strategy based on linking indigenous SMEs to the global value chains of MNCs can also be used to affect the environmental performance of SMEs. While not all the SMEs in any one developing economy are ever likely to be reached through the supply chains of MNCs, there is substantial evidence that governments working in concert with MNCs in vendor development programs linking SMEs to MNCs in some places such as Taiwan Province of China, Malaysia, and Singapore have affected the technological upgrading activities of indigenous small and medium sized firms. To date, there is little rigorous evidence to suggest that these vendor development programs have affected the environmental behavior of small and medium sized firms in the East Asian newly industrializing economies.

Nowadays, with globalization sweeping across cities, more and more cities tend to develop in the same way, while the sense of existence of local identity becomes weaker. It is often the preferred choice of the city government to construct distinctive characteristics with the help of urban design. Historical blocks have their own unique cultural connotations. How to make them retain their own traditional context in the rapid urban renewal and maintain vitality with the development of the city is an urgent problem to be solved in urban design. In this paper, the research objects are two historical blocks in Harbin which is a representative historical city located on the Northeast China. One of objects is the Central Street of Harbin, which attracts countless foreign visitors every year as a popular tourist area. The other object is the Chinese Baroque Historical Block, which is deserted after renovation and planning. On the basis of urban design, this paper makes a comparative analysis of two historical blocks from the perspective of social humanities, and puts forward the humanistic technology of urban design. Humanistic technology are divided into two technical routes: human and culture. The study of human includes the living needs of local residents, the behavioural feelings of foreign users, the control and management of government development and the distribution of interests of investors. The study of culture includes the combing of the history and culture of the block, the embodiment of space culture and the promotion of value culture. This paper attempts to build a universal theory framework. Humanistic technology will be used as research foundation for urban design in the renovation and conservation planning of cultural heritage.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.