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Journal articles on the topic 'Logic of collective action'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 10 February 2022

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1

Hansen, Wendy L., Neil J. Mitchell, and Jeffrey M. Drope. "The Logic of Private and Collective Action." American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 1 (January 2005): 150–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00116.x.

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2

Cutts, Alex. "ALIA and the logic of collective action." Australian Library Journal 41, no. 2 (January 1992): 133–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00049670.1992.10755612.

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3

Pecorino, Paul. "Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty." Public Choice 162, no. 3-4 (June 13, 2014): 243–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0186-y.

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4

Congleton, Roger D. "The Logic of Collective Action and beyond." Public Choice 164, no. 3-4 (July 14, 2015): 217–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0266-7.

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5

Wallerstein, Michael, and Karl Ove Moene. "Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain the Logic of Corporatism?" Journal of Theoretical Politics 15, no. 3 (July 2003): 271–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692803015003003.

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Cerny, Philip G. "Globalization and the changing logic of collective action." International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 595–625. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300028459.

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Globalization transforms collective action in domestic and international politics. As the scale of markets widens and as economic organization becomes more complex, the institutional scale of political structures can become insufficient for the provision of an appropriate range of public goods. A process of this sort occurred prior to the emergence of the modern nation-state, which itself constituted a paradigmatic response to this predicament. Today, however, a complex process of globalization of goods and assets is undermining the effectiveness of state-based collective action. Overlapping “playing fields” are developing, made up of increasingly heterogeneous—transnational, local, and intermediate—arenas. The residual state retains great cultural force, and innovative projects for reinventing government are being tried. Nevertheless, the state's effectiveness as a civil association has eroded significantly, and this may lead to a crisis of legitimacy.

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Sandell, Rickard, and Charlotta Stern. "GROUP SIZE AND THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:." Rationality and Society 10, no. 3 (August 1998): 327–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104346398010003003.

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Dragu, Tiberiu, and Yonatan Lupu. "Collective Action and Constraints on Repression at the Endgame." Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 8 (October 5, 2017): 1042–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017730077.

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How can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced? Using a simple game-theoretic model, we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest: when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful. In such scenarios, repression depends on how the leader’s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order. If and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order to repress, leaders can expect agents to disobey orders and will be less likely to order repression. This logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism for constraining repression, in addition to sanctioning (i.e., the logic of consequences) and normative mechanisms (i.e., the logic of appropriateness). We formally explore how the logic of expectations can constrain the implementation of repression and also show that the logic of expectations has the greatest potential to constrain repression in middle regimes or “anocracies.” In turn, this has broader implications for the strategies human rights advocates use in such regimes, how leaders structure their security forces, and for the study of why legal rules might be especially effective in such regimes.

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9

Ernst, Zachary, and Sara Rachel Chant. "Collective Action as Individual Choice." Studia Logica 86, no. 3 (September 18, 2007): 415–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9068-3.

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10

Bendor, Jonathan, and Dilip Mookherjee. "Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action." American Political Science Review 81, no. 1 (March 1987): 129–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1960782.

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Work by Axelrod, Hardin, and Taylor indicates that problems of repeated collective action may lessen if people use decentralized strategies of reciprocity to induce mutual cooperation. Hobbes's centralized solution may thus be overrated. We investigate these issues by representing ongoing collective action as an n-person repeated prisoner's dilemma. The results show that decentralized conditional cooperation can ease iterated collective action dilemmas—if all players perfectly monitor the relation between individual choices and group payoffs. Once monitoring uncertainty is introduced, such strategies degrade rapidly in value, and centrally administered selective incentives become relatively more valuable. Most importantly, we build on a suggestion of Herbert Simon by showing that a hierarchical structure, with reciprocity used in subunits and selective incentives centrally administered, combines the advantages of the decentralized and centralized solutions. This hierarchical form is more stable than the decentralized structure and often secures more cooperation than the centralized structure. Generally, the model shows that the logic of repeated decision making has significant implications for the institutional forms of collective action.

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11

Kahan, Dan M. "The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law." Michigan Law Review 102, no. 1 (October 2003): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3595400.

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12

Udehn, Lars. "Twenty-five Years with The Logic of Collective Action." Acta Sociologica 36, no. 3 (July 1993): 239–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000169939303600307.

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13

Pezzey, John C. V., Salim Mazouz, and Frank Jotzo. "The logic of collective action and Australia’s climate policy*." Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 54, no. 2 (April 26, 2010): 185–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8489.2010.00489.x.

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14

Gang, C. "The Kyoto Protocol and the Logic of Collective Action." Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, no. 4 (January 1, 2007): 525–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pom008.

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15

Kornberger, Martin, Stephan Leixnering, and Renate E. Meyer. "The Logic of Tact: How Decisions Happen in Situations of Crisis." Organization Studies 40, no. 2 (December 7, 2018): 239–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0170840618814573.

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The mass migration of refugees in the fall of 2015 in Europe posed an immense humanitarian and logistical challenge: exhausted from their week-long journeys, refugees arrived in Vienna in need of care, shelter, food, medical aid, and onward transport. The refugee crisis was managed by an emerging polycentric and intersectoral collective of organizations. In this paper, we investigate how leaders of these organizations made decisions in concert with each other and hence sustained the capacity to act as collective. We ask: what was the logic of decision-making that orchestrated collective action during the crisis? In answering this question, we make the following contribution: departing from March’s logics of consequences and appropriateness as well as Weick’s work on sensemaking during crisis, we introduce an alternative logic that informed decision-making in our study: the logic of tact. With this concept (a) we offer a better understanding of how managers may make decisions under the condition of bounded rationality and the simultaneous transgression of their institutional identity in situations of crisis; and (b) we show that in decision-making under extreme pressure cognition is neither ahead of action, nor is action ahead of cognition; rather, tact explicates the rapid switching between cognition and action, orchestrating decision-making through their interplay.

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Haig, David, and Jon F. Wilkins. "Genomic imprinting, sibling solidarity and the logic of collective action." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 355, no. 1403 (November 29, 2000): 1593–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2000.0720.

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Genomic imprinting has been proposed to evolve when a gene's expression has fitness consequences for individuals with different coefficients of matrilineal and patrilineal relatedness, especially in the context of competition between offspring for maternal resources. Previous models have focused on pre–emptive hierarchies, where conflict arises with respect to resource allocation between present and future offspring. Here we present a model in which imprinting arises from scramble competition within litters. The model predicts paternal–specific expression of a gene that increases an offspring's fractional share of resources but reduces the size of the resource pool, and maternal–specific expression of a gene with opposite effects. These predictions parallel the observation in economic models that individuals tend to underprovide public goods, and that the magnitude of this shortfall increases with the number of individuals in the group. Maternally derived alleles are more willing than their paternally derived counterparts to contribute to public goods because they have a smaller effective group size.

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SCHUMANN, ANDREW, and ANDY ADAMATZKY. "PHYSARUM SPATIAL LOGIC." New Mathematics and Natural Computation 07, no. 03 (September 2011): 483–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793005711002037.

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Plasmodium of Physarum polycephalum is a large single cell capable for distributed sensing, information processing, decentralized decision-making and collective action. In the paper, we interpret basic features of the plasmodium foraging behavior in terms of process calculus and spatial logic and show that this behavior could be regarded as one of the natural implementations of spatial logic without modal operators.

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Tamminga, Allard, and Frank Hindriks. "The irreducibility of collective obligations." Philosophical Studies 177, no. 4 (January 12, 2019): 1085–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-01236-2.

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Abstract Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism.

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19

Pernicka, Susanne, and Astrid Reichel. "An institutional logics approach to the heterogeneous world of highly skilled work." Employee Relations 36, no. 3 (April 1, 2014): 235–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/er-02-2013-0023.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship of highly skilled work and (collective) power. It develops an institutional logics perspective and argues that highly skilled workers’ propensity to join trade unions varies by institutional order. Design/methodology/approach – Data from two occupational fields in Austria, university professors and management consultants, representing two different institutional orders were collected via questionnaires. Stepwise logistic regression analysis was employed to test the hypotheses. Findings – The results show that over and above organisational level variables, individual's background and employee power variables institutional logics significantly add to explaining trade union membership of highly skilled workers. Prevalence of a professional logic in a field makes collective action more likely than market logic. Originality/value – Highly skilled workers are overall described as identifying themselves more with the goals of their employer or client and with their professional peers than with other corporate employees or organised labour. They are thus expected to develop consent rather than conflict orientation vis-á-vis their employers and clients. This paper supports a differentiated view and shows that within highly skilled work there are groups engaging in collective action. By developing an institutional logics perspective it provides a useful approach to explain heterogeneity within the world of highly skilled work.

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FLORES-MACÍAS, GUSTAVO A. "Making Migrant-Government Partnerships Work: Insights from the Logic of Collective Action." Political Science Quarterly 127, no. 3 (September 2012): 417–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165x.2012.tb00733.x.

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21

Suhrke, A. "Burden-sharing during refugee emergencies: the logic of collective versus national action." Journal of Refugee Studies 11, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): 396–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrs/11.4.396.

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22

Weimann, Joachim, Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Timo Heinrich, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, and Claudia Keser. "Public good provision by large groups – the logic of collective action revisited." European Economic Review 118 (September 2019): 348–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.019.

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23

Reshef, Yonatan, and Charles Keim. "Topics a Union President Visited to Mobilize Members." Articles 73, no. 2 (June 18, 2018): 274–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1048571ar.

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We analyze four calls to action issued by the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) president, Jim Iker. These appeals sought to mobilize members during the 2013-2014 collective bargaining that pitted the BCTF against the British Columbia government and the direct employer, the British Columbia Public School Employers’ Association. We apply a “theory of rhetoric” developed by Chaim Perelman to locate and analyze the topics the BCTF president used to persuade his members to adhere to his arguments about the merit of collective action.We argue that the president constructed his rhetoric by visiting five topics—urgency, fairness, futility, agency, and integrity. The first three promoted a utilitarian logic for collective action. Iker used them to persuade teachers, and other stakeholders, that collective action was necessary for addressing the problem—the futility of the bargaining process to produce a negotiated fair agreement due to the government’s reluctance to bargain in good faith. The last two topics—agency and integrity—comprised a rhetoric of comfort and reassurance offering an affective logic for acting collectively. At least some union members, as well as other stakeholders, might have felt that teachers are expected to care for their charges in the classroom rather than on the picket line, by withdrawing services they monopolize. Iker used the topics of agency and integrity to remind everyone that defending students, young teachers, the teaching profession, and the education system was commendable, and reassured them that collectively they would not be ignored and nor would they fail.In short, we have pointed out five topics that the president visited to mobilize his members to collective action. They highlight a unique rhetoric that aimed to persuade teachers to become agents of protest. Our case study methodology did not allow us to generalize our findings, which more research is, thus, needed to corroborate.

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Khneisser, Mona. "The marketing of protest and antinomies of collective organization in Lebanon." Critical Sociology 45, no. 7-8 (September 10, 2018): 1111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0896920518792069.

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With the onset of the garbage crisis in Lebanon in July 2015, the unbearable odors and mounting heaps of waste presented the tipping point for people’s growing anger and resentment against self-serving political elites, debilitating public services, and deteriorating socio-economic conditions. In response, the socio-political scene witnessed significant developments following the eruption of popular discontent, with the multiplication of media-savvy protest groups, followed by the rise of “independent” municipal electoral campaigns and, most recently, the emergence of a “non-traditional” “political party experiment.” Running under the elusive banner of “civil society,” emerging collective actions have all been attempting to advance “alternative” forms of organization and political participation. Examining three contentious and intriguing developments that have captured public attention, namely Al-Hirak, Beirut Madinati, and Sabaa, this article explores the antinomies of collective organization and action in the building of political “alternatives.” The research makes use of a thorough content analysis of Facebook campaigning posts and interview data and engages with literature on “new” social movements, digital activism, and collective organization to explore collective actors’ contending relations to “the political” at the organizational level. The research concludes that rather than reconcile individuals with political participation through lasting organizational frameworks and coherent political “alternatives,” novel forms of collective organization increasingly conform to a global neoliberal logic of action that is increasingly fragmentary, individualizing and commercializing, and a fleeting logic of organization that is mostly unaccountable and unrepresentative.

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Eskola, Antti, and David Kivinen. "Cooperation and the Logic of Action." Meta 35, no. 2 (September 30, 2002): 370–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/003321ar.

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Abstract This study has two purposes. As a social-psychological contribution to the theory of translation, it points to some of the advantages and drawbacks of the researcher's participation in the translation of scientific texts. As a contribution to social-psychological theory, it wishes to demonstrate that forms of cooperation cannot be planned in abstracto, without taking the overall social activity of the actors into account, of which participation in cooperation is only one part. One of the most original and ingenious inventions in the social sciences dates back to the early 1950's: the game known as the Prisoner's Dilemma (see Rapoport 1982). With perplexing accuracy, it puts it quite plainly that, first, action taken by individuals upon perfectly rational deliberation does not necessarily lead to collective rationality. Also, showing how a social structure may produce forces motivating the individual, the Prisoner's Dilemma has something to give to social psychologists. Even in the event that the prisoners have had the opportunity to discuss different strategies and jointly decide on adopting one, each is tempted to betray the other - and both are afraid that they will be betrayed. Psychological motives, the temptation and the fear, arise out of the logic of the social situation. Our intention has been to show that translation as a social activity involves motivating forces, assumptions to do with competence, and restrictive factors that all shape the scientist-translator cooperation irrespective of their deliberate pursuits. Therefore, rather than planning it oh an abstract basis, the working method has to be deduced from the logic of action. In doing so, we will see that cooperation cannot be symmetric; the weight is necessarily on the translator's role. The scientist, then, comes into the picture when the translator needs help; he does not have to be prepared for regular and face-to-face interaction with the translator, but only to make sure that the message of his text is conveyed (provided that he has the competence in the target language). Cooperation between translator and editor, in turn, is much more dependent on face-to-face interaction.

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Kyriacou, Andreas P. "Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action: The Impact of Selective Incentives." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 69, no. 2 (April 2010): 823–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2010.00722.x.

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Pyle, William. "Collective action and post-communist enterprise: The economic logic of Russia's business associations." Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 4 (June 2006): 491–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130600652068.

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Smirnov, Oleg, Christopher T. Dawes, James H. Fowler, Tim Johnson, and Richard McElreath. "The Behavioral Logic of Collective Action: Partisans Cooperate and Punish More Than Nonpartisans." Political Psychology 31, no. 4 (April 23, 2010): 595–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00768.x.

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29

Constantinides, Panos. "The development and consequences of new information infrastructures: the case of mashup platforms." Media, Culture & Society 34, no. 5 (July 2012): 606–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0163443712442704.

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The advent of Web 2.0 has led to the development of new information infrastructures, where the logic of collective action is becoming more heterogeneous and multilayered, derived not from a single core structure (e.g. a corporation), but from networked interdependencies. Although lay users and expert user-developers act collectively towards commonly shared goals (e.g. producing, mixing, ripping and sharing digital content), their actions are not collective but rather are instigated under complex motivational structures whereby no single individual or group of individuals has complete information regarding all likely combinations of future events. This article explores the complex interactions of distributed networks of lay users, expert developers and owners of new information infrastructures such as Flickr. The article then focuses on the challenge of governing the consequences of these new information infrastructures and concludes with implications for further research.

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Johnson, James. "Rationality and Revolution: A Response to Holmstrom on the Logic of Working Class Collective Action." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (March 1987): 167–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10715907.

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In ‘Rationality and Revolution’ Nancy Holmstrom addresses an issue that has gained considerable currency among social and political theorists. She asks what insight, if any, Marxists might glean from rational choice accounts of radical working class collective action. The purpose of this comment is to argue that Holmstrom’s unfavorable estimation of rational choice accounts is ill-conceived.Holmstrom raises two basic objections to rational choice explanations of working class collective action. First, she contends that such accounts are limited, inadequate or incomplete and indicates several manifestations of this purported deficiency. Second, Holmstrom alleges that rational choice accounts are ideologically suspect and, as such, fundamentally at odds with Marxist explanations of revolutionary action. Holmstrom appears to believe that this second line of criticism ‘follows’ (309, 318) in some sense upon the first. H so, it would be sufficient to establish the error of her initial line of argument. Because neither of her criticisms can withstand scrutiny, however, independent reasons will be advanced for rejecting each.

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Brown, Richard S. "Franchise systems and lobbying: implications for Olsonian collective action theory." Management Decision 56, no. 11 (November 12, 2018): 2357–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-11-2017-1080.

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Purpose Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities. Design/methodology/approach Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity. Findings Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported). Originality/value This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.

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van Waarden, Frans. "Emergence and Development of Business Interest Associations. An Example from The Netherlands." Organization Studies 13, no. 4 (October 1992): 521–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/017084069201300402.

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This paper describes and analyzes the emergence and development of Dutch business interest associations (BIAs), combining the approaches of corporatism and Olsonian logic of collective action. Various factors facilitating the emergence of BIAs are identified. The development of BIAs from representative to control organizations is described on a number of dimensions. The emergence and development of BIAs can only be explained by looking at both the 'logic of membership' and the 'logic of influence' which denote the exchange relations with members and interlocutors. Crises and conflicts in these environments were important. Hence separately, Olsonian logic (referring to the logic of member ship) and corporatism (referring to the logic of influence) stop short of explaining BIAs. Their combination is required.

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Bennett, Robert J. "The Logic of Local Business Associations: an Analysis of Voluntary Chambers of Commerce." Journal of Public Policy 15, no. 3 (September 1995): 251–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00010047.

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ABSTRACTThis paper seeks to assess how far local business organisations, such as Chambers of Commerce, are maintained chiefly by the factors hypothesised by Mancur Olson as the forces being behind collective action: the costs and benefits of business services. The paper reviews the theoretical arguments to support this hypothesis and then assesses the case of UK Chambers of Commerce using empirical evidence from surveys of businesses and Chambers. The UK Chambers are a purely private law voluntary structure, unlike many European counterparts. The analysis demonstrates that in such a system the overwhelming motive for business membership is to access services with specific rather than collective benefits. In turn Chamber managers tend to respond by financing services chiefly through service fees rather than flat rate subscriptions. In an Olsonian world with purely voluntary Chambers, few businesses will pay for general collective goods (such as lobbying, representation or support to government) that others can consume at no cost. The paper also demonstrates strong differences between types of Chambers: large Chambers being largely service and fee oriented, small Chambers being more often collective action bodies. Overall, however, local Chambers have features common to other business organisations of being variable in size and resources, most are small, and the structure is fragmented. Conclusions are drawn from these findings for government policy.

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Rich, Richard C. "A Cooperative Approach to the Logic of Collective Action: Voluntary Organizations and the Prisoners' Dilemma." Journal of Voluntary Action Research 17, no. 3-4 (July 1988): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0899764088017003-402.

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A reexamination of certain tenets of Olson's logic of collective action suggests that it fails to explain some types of behavior found in voluntary organizations, especially mutual assistance groups. Specifically, Olson fails to account for non-coercive and non-individualistic factors and gives insufficient attention to the social context of voluntary organization life. A fresh applications of the prisoners' dilemma and the introduction of the concept of community expand our understanding of behaviors heretofore unexplained. Implications are discussed for the design and management of voluntary organizations under certain conditions.

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Rich, Richard C. "A Cooperative Approach to the Logic of Collective Action: Voluntary Organizations and the Prisoners’ Dilemma." Journal of Voluntary Action Research 17, no. 3-4 (July 1988): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/089976408801700302.

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A reexamination of certain tenets of Olson's logic of collective action suggests that it fails to explain some types of behavior found in voluntary organizations, especially mutual assistance groups. Specifically, Olson fails to account for non-coercive and non-individualistic factors and gives insufficient attention to the social context of voluntary organization life. A fresh applications of the prisoners’ dilemma and the introduction of the concept of community expand our understanding of behaviors heretofore unexplained. Implications are discussed for the design and management of voluntary organizations under certain conditions.

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36

Lupia, Arthur, and Gisela Sin. "Which Public Goods are Endangered?: How Evolving Communication Technologies Affect The Logic of Collective Action." Public Choice 117, no. 3/4 (December 2003): 315–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:puch.0000003735.07840.c7.

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37

Jones, Philip. "The Logic of Expressive Collective Action: When will Individuals ‘Nail their Colours to the Mast’?" British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9, no. 4 (November 2007): 564–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2006.00262.x.

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Giraud, Baptiste. "The changing face of union action put to the test by neo-liberal reforms in France." Tempo Social 32, no. 1 (April 15, 2020): 137–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/0103-2070.ts.2020.164063.

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This article reviews how French trade union are coping with the neo-liberal policies since the early 1980s. It shows their divergent reactions, and how these liberal reforms are implemented in a context of transformation of trade union action: the use of strikes is more difficult at the same time as the relationship between trade unions and collective bargaining is transformed in a logic of depoliticizing their strategies of action. These developments did not prevent a resurgence of strikes in the 2000s. It reveals the limits of the trade unions’ power of political influence, that implies the use of collective action. However, strikes have declined further in recent years, revealing the weakening of trade union mobilisation power.

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DOCTOR, MAHRUKH. "Business and Delays in Port Reform in Brazil." Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 22, no. 2 (June 2002): 273–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572002-1013.

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ABSTRACT The case of port modernization reform in Brazil encapsules the problems Brazilian reformers face. Although reform legislation was passed in 1993 (Law 8.630/93), many obstacles remain for full implementation of its provision. This article focuses on how business attitudes and actions deferred reform, and demonstrates how business is unable to contribute to reform implementation because of institutional obstacles and collective action problems. It then suggests a mechanism to overcoming these difficulties; specifically, it examines the evolution of corporatism and the value of constructing democratic close-knit policy communities meeting the needs of each sector. The empirical work is complemented with an unusual combination of three theoretical approaches to explain the political economy of institutional modernization: institutional economics as developed by Douglass North, the logic of collective action as elaborated by Mancur Olson, and policy network analysis as developed by Marsh and Rhodes, Jordan and Richardson.

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Kjeldgaard, Dannie, Søren Askegaard, Jannick Ørnstedt Rasmussen, and Per Østergaard. "Consumers’ collective action in market system dynamics." Marketing Theory 17, no. 1 (September 16, 2016): 51–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470593116658197.

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This article examines how consumers may work strategically to alter market dynamics through formally organized activities. We address this issue in the context of the Danish beer market and its evolution over the last two decades, with a specific empirical focus on the role of a formally organized consumer association. We draw on key tenets of recent advances in sociological field theory, which views social order as comprising multiple and related strategic action fields. From this perspective, we describe the Danish beer market and its transformation, with an emphasis on how Danish beer enthusiasts played a significant role in altering the logics of competition in the market, but also played a significant institutionalized role within the field itself. We theorize this activity as consumers’ collective action.

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Jankovic, Ivana. "Collective decision making in complex systems." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 2 (2017): 101–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1702101j.

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This paper aims to offer arguments in support of epistemic value of collective decision-making, as well as to identify factors that contribute to its success. Given that this form of decision-making is present in various fields of human action, we will present the parallels between decision-making in the economic organizations and in democratic theory. Noting the similarities in the development of decision-making theory in those two areas and the general shift from individual to collective cognitive competencies, we will argue that the specific insights of organizational theory came should be applied to democratic decision-making if we are to improve it. More specifically, we will argue that the Page?s cognitive model of collective decision-making, that came from modern organizational theory, based on the logic of diversity, can well be justified and applied to the democratic, especially deliberative institutions for solving political problems.

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Heath, Joseph. "Is Language a Game?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 1 (March 1996): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717442.

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Recent developments in game theory have shown that the mathematical models of action so widely admired in the study of economics are in fact only particular instantiations of a more general theoretical framework. In the same way that Aristotelian logic was ‘translated’ into the more general and expressive language of predicate logic, the basic action theoretic underpinnings of modern economics have now been articulated within the more comprehensive language of game theory. But precisely because of its greater generality and expressive power, game theory has again revived the temptation to apply formal models of action to every domain of social life. This movement has been fuelled by some notable successes. Game theory has provided useful insights into the logic of collective action in the theory of public goods, and strategic models of voting have illustrated important aspects of institutional decision-making. But this extension of formal models into every area of social interaction has also encountered significant difficulties, despite the fact that contemporary decision theory has weakened its basic assumptions to the point where it teeters constantly on the brink of vacuity.

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DOCTOR, MAHRUKH. "Institutional Modernisation and the Legacy of Corporatism: The Case of Port Reform in Brazil." Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 2 (May 2003): 341–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x03006783.

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This article analyses some of the difficulties of institutional modernisation based on a study of Brazilian port reform in the 1990s. It explains how and why Brazilian business managed to organise collective action for dramatic reform of the port structure and labour regime, but was unable to maintain the consensus to ensure full implementation. It emphasises how the formal rigidities and informal outcomes of the corporatist institutional structure hampered an efficient pace of modernisation. The analysis applies two complementary theoretical approaches, institutional analysis and the logic of collective action, to illuminate the evolution of Brazilian corporatism in the context of a more democratic society and open market economy.

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Lawrence, Andrew. "From collective action to institutionalized labor rights: parallel and diverging logics of collective action in Germany and South Africa." New Political Science 26, no. 2 (June 2004): 189–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0739314042000217052.

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Mixon, Franklin G., Steven B. Caudill, Jon M. Ford, and Ter Chao Peng. "The rise (or fall) of lottery adoption within the logic of collective action: Some empirical evidence." Journal of Economics and Finance 21, no. 1 (March 1997): 43–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02929021.

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Heckelman, Jac C. "Guest editor’s introduction to the symposium on the 50th anniversary of Olson’s Logic of Collective Action." Public Choice 164, no. 3-4 (August 18, 2015): 191–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0286-3.

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Risse, Thomas. "Global Governance and Communicative Action." Government and Opposition 39, no. 2 (2004): 288–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00124.x.

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AbstractThis article discusses arguing and communicative action as a significant tool for non-hierarchical steering modes in global governance. Arguing is based on a logic of action that differs significantly from both the rational choice-based ‘logic of consequentialism’, and from the ‘logic of appropriateness’ theorized by sociological institutionalism. Arguing constitutes a learning mechanism by which actors acquire new information, evaluate their interests in light of new empirical and moral knowledge, and – most importantly – can reflexively and collectively assess the validity claims of norms and standards of appropriate behaviour. As a result, arguing and persuasion constitute tools of ‘soft steering’ that might improve both the legitimacy problems of global governance by providing voice opportunities to various stakeholders and the problem-solving capacity of governance institutions through deliberation.

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Sarkar, Sukumar, and Biswajit Ray. "Collective Action and Tragedy of Tank Water." Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice 19, no. 2 (October 10, 2019): 224–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0976747919868696.

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Tank irrigation is important in agriculture-dependent developing economies such as India. Since tank water is a common pool resource, managing tanks cost-effectively through collective action (CA) is a challenge. This notion raises the following principal questions on the tank commons: What is the relationship between transaction costs (that is, cost of cooperation) and CA? And what drive the use of tank water for irrigation? For satisfactory answers, we carried out field studies on 127 farmers of seven tank villages in the districts of Bardhaman and West Midnapore in West Bengal, India between September 2015 and May 2017. Interesting findings have emerged from our study. We notice that CAs are inversely correlated with transaction costs in the study sites. Regarding the factors influencing tank water use (WU) we find based on Logit models that CA matters in WU significantly and positively. This impact of CA on WU is also robust irrespective of the model specifications. However, low income households participate more by offering labour than money but unfortunately they seem to have no primary motives for tank reconstruction. Moreover, in communities where tanks are large, local people’s participation more in terms of labour and such participation in reconstruction of the tanks is their primary motive, and also where the institutional arrangements are both formal and informal, people tend to use tank water more. The practical implication is that the absence of Water User Association and hence proper collaborative management coupled with weak nestedness between the village people and the State is one of the major causes of inadequate tank WU, leading to the decline of the tank commons. JEL: Q01, Q25

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Dunin-Kęplicz, Barbara, Rineke Verbrugge, and Michał Slizak. "TEAMLOG in action: A case study in teamwork." Computer Science and Information Systems 7, no. 3 (2010): 569–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/csis100209016d.

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This article presents a case study of a theoretical multi-agent system designed to clean up ecological disasters. It focuses on the interactions within a heterogeneous team of agents, outlines their goals and plans, and establishes the necessary distribution of information and commitment throughout the team, including its sub-teams. These aspects of teamwork are presented in the TEAMLOG formalism [20], based on multimodal logic, in which collective informational and motivational attitudes are first-class citizens. Complex team attitudes are justified to be necessary in the course of teamwork. The article shows how to make a bridge between theoretical foundations of TEAMLOG and an application and illustrates how to tune TEAMLOG to the case study by establishing sufficient, but still minimal levels for the team attitudes.

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Zuurbier, Peter. "Contestation, a Deeper Seduction." Stream: Interdisciplinary Journal of Communication 5, no. 1 (January 13, 2014): 45–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.21810/strm.v5i1.80.

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Individual media events, from the extraordinary to the mundane, as well as the logic they present, have transcended society. Media events no longer happen in isolation, they are intertextually and extratextually linked and mixed together. The ability to view, create, join in, and affect the shape of media events has caused a profound shift in the conception of what they are. What Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz refer to as individual media events, Guy Debord, Michel Foucault and Douglas Kellner consider collectively as spectacle. Their work on media events and spectacle features a debate on the role of contestation within it. Live audience members have an opportunity to impact media events and the spectacle either through individual or collective action. This action can go along with the intents ascribed to the media event and spectacle, or it can oppose them. Contestation often takes the form of an oppositional interruption of the linear messaging promoted within media events and spectacle. Contestation is typically a strategy used by voices that feel marginalized by the images of the spectacle. But contestation of media events and spectacle through their own logic becomes a means of deeper seduction.

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