Academic literature on the topic 'Logic. Reasoning (Psychology) Thought and thinking'
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Journal articles on the topic "Logic. Reasoning (Psychology) Thought and thinking"
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De Neys, Wim, and Gordon Pennycook. "Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing." Current Directions in Psychological Science 28, no. 5 (August 7, 2019): 503–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721419855658.
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Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.
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Weinstein, Mark Leonard, and Dan Fisherman. "on the relevance of cognitive neuroscience for community of inquiry." childhood & philosophy 15 (January 30, 2019): 01–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/childphilo.2019.37513.
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Community of inquiry is most often seen as a dialogical procedure for the cooperative development of reasonable approaches to knowledge and meaning. This reflects a deep commitment to normatively based reasoning that is pervasive in a wide range of approaches to critical thinking and argument, where the underlying theory of reasoning is logic driven, whether formal or informal. The commitment to normative reasoning is deeply historical reflecting the fundamental distinction between reason and emotion. Despite the deep roots of the distinction and its canonization in current educational thought, contemporary cognitive neuroscience presents a fundamental challenge to the viability of the distinction and thus to any effort that sees education for reasonable judgment to be based on the remediation of cognition in isolation from its roots in the emotions. Cognitive neuroscience looks at the deep connections between emotion and memory, information retrieval, and resistance to refutation. This conforms with earlier studies in experimental psychology, which showed resistance to changing beliefs in the face of evidence, including evidence based on personal experience. This paper will look at the recent research including speculations from neurological modeling that shows the depth of connection between, emotions, memory and reasoning. It will draw implications for dialogic thinking within a community of inquiry including systematic self-reflection as an essential aspect of critical thinking.
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Старко, Василь. "Categorization, Fast and Slow." East European Journal of Psycholinguistics 4, no. 1 (June 27, 2017): 205–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.29038/eejpl.2017.4.1.sta.
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The title of this study is inspired by Daniel Kahneman’s best-selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow. In it, the Nobel Prize winner explains in great detail the working of two systems of human reasoning: System 1, which is fast, automatic, associative, subconscious, involuntary and (nearly) effortless, and System 2, which is slow, intentional, logical, conscious, effortful and requires executive control, attention, and concentration. This distinction applies to human categorization as well. Each of the two labels refers, in fact, to a set of systems, which is why the designations Type 1 and Type 2 processes are preferable. The default-interventionist architecture presupposes the constant automatic activation of categories by Type 1 processes and interventions of Type 2 processes if necessary. Type 1 categorization relies on the ‘shallow’ linguistic representation of the world, while Type 2 uses ‘deep’ extralinguistic knowledge. A series of linguistic examples are analyzed to illustrate the differences between Type 1 and Type 2 categorization. A conclusion is drawn about the need to take this distinction into account in psycholinguistic and linguistic research on categorization.
References
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Kahneman, D. (2015). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitutionin intuitive judgement. In: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,(pp. 49–81). T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman, (eds.). Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press.
Lakoff, G. (1973). Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts.Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 458–508.
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Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning.Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R F. (2000). Individual difference in reasoning: implications forthe rationality debate? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726.
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Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Multi-level theories of cognition–emotion relations. In: Handbookof Cognition and Emotion, (pp. 665–681). T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power, (eds.). Chichester,England: Wiley.
Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. St. B. T. (1975). Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3,141–154.
Whorf, B. L. (1956). The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In:Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, (pp. 134–159). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. (originally published in 1941)
Wierzbicka, A. (1996). Semantic Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
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Rohach, Oksana, and Iuliia Rohach. "MANIPULATION AND PERSUASION IN BUSINESS ADVERTISING." RESEARCH TRENDS IN MODERN LINGUISTICS AND LITERATURE 4 (December 23, 2021): 47–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.29038/2617-6696.2021.4.47.61.
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The article analyzes the notions of persuasion, persuasive techniques, manipulation, its types, and their application in business advertising. Advertising has covered the way from informing a target audience to asking and convincing, from convincing to working out conventional reflexes, from working our traditional reflexes to the unconscious suggestion, and from the cold advice to the projection of a symbolic image. Advertisers have been consistent in making customers perceive a picture of a promoted product consciously and then make them buy it automatically.Advertising is so powerful that it can form and change the worldview and behaviour of people. That is why professionals in many spheres study and investigate the phenomenon of manipulative potentials of advertising. The term manipulation stands for the art of managing people's behaviour and thinking with afocused impact on the social consciousness, a type of psychological influence, a hidden inducement of people to perform specific actions, an invisible socio-psychological control of a target audience.A successful manipulation requires exploiting human beings' critical weaknesses, such as the limited capability of strategic reasoning, little awareness, susceptibility to cognitive biases, or potentially indirect social pressure.As to the to the persuasive techniques, the most effective ones are lexical (descriptive adjectives, clichés, coloured words, emotive and inclusive vocabulary, colourful words and descriptive language, loaded words; associations and connotations, subtexts, anecdotes), rhetorical and stylistic (rhetorical questions, argumentation, reasoning and logic, evidence: exaggeration, hyperboles, alliteration, metaphors, repetitions, similes, irony, pun) and the visual ones (iconic signs, graphs, tables etc.). Combined together they make advertisements eye-catching, bright, memorable, informative, thought-provoking, persuasive, and manipulative.Creating advertisements by borrowing methods from psychology has been quite successful. Psychology is an inseparable part of human being activity, including advertising and business. That is why knowledge of psychology, psycholinguistics, and NLP provides a better understanding of consumers' needs, desires, and preferences and positively influences a company's image and profits. At present, advertising is, on the one hand, an organic part of modern life. With its assistance, we find out about new products, goods, shops, and services. On the other hand, advertising is a means of massmedia communication that influences people by implementing modern psychology and psycholinguistics's practical methods and tactics. To achieve their set goals, advertisers use a unique language and select lexical units that create anxiety, fear of being late or missing a chance or a sale.
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Klaczynski, Paul A., and Wejdan Felmban. "Effects of Thinking Dispositions, General Ability, Numeracy, and Instructional Set on Judgments and Decision-Making." Psychological Reports 123, no. 2 (December 14, 2018): 341–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0033294118806473.
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To explore hypotheses based on Stanovich’s proposal that analytic processing comprises a reflective-level, an algorithmic level, and specific mindware, 342 participants completed measures of thinking dispositions, general ability (GA), numeracy, and probabilistic and nonprobabilistic reasoning. In a control condition, numeracy predicted probabilistic reasoning at high levels of both thinking dispositions and GA, and GA predicted nonprobabilistic reasoning at high levels of thinking dispositions. In a logic instruction condition, numeracy predicted probabilistic reasoning when GA was high, and GA affected nonprobabilistic reasoning directly. Thinking dispositions moderated neither relationship. Instead, instructions facilitated reasoning for low thinking disposition/high-ability participants, suggesting that logic instructions cued low thinking disposition individuals to engage in higher order reflective processing. The evidence is consistent with the proposals that reflective processes are essential to the allocation of algorithmic resources, and algorithmic resources are necessary for effective mindware implementation.
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Schumann, Andrew. "Creative Reasoning and Content-Genetic Logic." Studia Humana 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2018): 39–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/sh-2018-0022.
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Abstract In decision making quite often we face permanently changeable and potentially infinite databases when we cannot apply conventional algorithms for choosing a solution. A decision process on infinite databases (e.g. on a database containing a contradiction) is called troubleshooting. A decision on these databases is called creative reasoning. One of the first heuristic semi-logical means for creative decision making were proposed in the theory of inventive problem solving (TIPS) by Genrich Altshuller. In this paper, I show that his approach corresponds to the so-called content-generic logic established by Soviet philosophers as an alternative to mathematical logic. The main assumption of content-genetic is that we cannot reduce our thinking to a mathematical combination of signs or to a language as such and our thought is ever cyclic and reflexive so that it contains ever a history.
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Allott, Nicholas, and Hiroyuki Uchida. "Classical logic, conditionals and “nonmonotonic” reasoning." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32, no. 1 (February 2009): 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x09000296.
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AbstractReasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true.
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Parisi, Luciana. "Media Ontology and Transcendental Instrumentality." Theory, Culture & Society 36, no. 6 (May 22, 2019): 95–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276419843582.
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This article takes inspiration from Kittler’s claim that philosophy has neglected the means used for its production. Kittler’s argument for media ontology will be compared to the post-Kantian project of re-inventing philosophy through the medium of thought (in particular Deleuze’s Spiritual Automaton). The article discusses these views in the context of the automation of logical thinking where procedures, tasks, and functions are part of the instrumental processing of new ends evolving a new mode of reasoning. In particular, the article suggests that in constructivist logic and information theory, the temporal gap between truth and proof, between input and output, can be taken to argue that the means of thought expose the indetermination or the incomputability of proof. The automation of reasoning in logical processing coincides not with mindless correlations of data, replacing axioms with data, truths with self-validating proofs. Instead, the problem of the indeterminacy of proof within automated logic re-habilitates techne or instrumentality, and the relation between means and ends away from classical idealism and analytic realism. By following John Dewey’s argument for instrumentality, it will be argued that the task of thinking today needs to re-invent a logic of techne away from the teleological view of ends or the crisis of finality. If the post-Kantian preoccupations about the task of thinking already announced that the medium of thought could offer possibilities for a non-human philosophy (or a philosophy beyond truth), this article envisions a machine philosophy originating from within computational media.
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Tuziak, Roman. "Formal logic and natural ways of reasoning." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 16, no. 2 (December 2, 2021): 75–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.16.2.6.
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In the paper I ask the question about the relation between formal logic and the natural logic of human mind. By a natural logic I mean the ways of thinking of a person that is intelligent but untrained in formal logic. As it turns out that the laws, rules or properties of formal logic in some cases diverge from the natural ways of reasoning, I explain the causes of this divergence. Since the majority of research in this area has been carried out from the standpoint of psychology, as a logician I suggest a slight change of the angle from which we look at the problem. I argue that certain narrowing of an interdisciplinary research would be helpful in getting a better picture of natural logic, and might provide a new stimulus for formal investigations.
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Minner, Frédéric. "Emotions, language and the (un-)making of the social world." Emotions and Society 1, no. 2 (November 1, 2019): 215–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/263168919x15663586358054.
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What are the motivational bases that help explain the various normative judgements that social agents make, and the normative reasoning they employ? Answering this question leads us to consider the relationships between thoughts and emotions. Emotions will be described as thought-dependent and thought-directing, and as being intimately related to normativity. They are conceived as the grounds that motivate social agents to articulate their reasoning with respect to the values and norms they face and/or share in their social collective. It is argued that because they are modes of thinking, emotions generate cognitive activities that relate to the making of evaluative and deontic judgements, the utterance of speech acts, the mastering of normative concepts and the building of arguments. Furthermore, each type of emotion generates its own constitutive judgements and structures normative thinking according to its own logic. The main thesis is that emotions provide sociological explanations for social agents’ thinking and speech, for emotions are precisely what motivate and, especially, structure normative reasoning and language. Being observable in language, emotions allow us to explain a) how social subjects reason and argue through norms and values, and b) how social subjects through their speech acts can contribute to the (un-)making of the social world.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Logic. Reasoning (Psychology) Thought and thinking"
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Chittleborough, Philip. "Psychological perspectives on the perception, appraisal, and production of everyday arguments /." Title page, table of contents and abstract only, 1999. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phc5441.pdf.
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Graham, Charlotte. "The relationship between inhibitory control and System 1 and System 2 processes in deductive and spatial reasoning." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Psychology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/1370.
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Dual Processing theory proposes that the ability to over ride associative (System 1) in favour of analytical (System 2) processed in deductive reasoning may depend on inhibitory control. The present study applies this association to a spatial reasoning task by adapting a mental rotation task to a multichoice format including System 1 (mirror) and System 2 (rotated image) responses. Fifty undergraduate volunteers from the University of Canterbury responded to a Stroop task as a measure of inhibitory control that was compared with System 1 and System 2 responding from a spatial and a deductive reasoning task. It was expected that people with weaker inhibitory potential would make more System 1 and fewer System 2 responses in both deductive and visual-spatial reasoning tasks. Contrary to expectation System 2 responding dominated for both tasks and correlations between both reasoning tasks and measures of inhibitory control were non-significant. The differing idiosyncratic demands of each task may have obscured any common variables associated with inhibitory control. This research initiated a test for the presence of System 1 and System 2 in spatial reasoning.
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Pierpoint, Alan S. "Logic: The first term revisited." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 1995. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/480.
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Warren, Elizabeth Anne. "Interactions between instructional approaches, students' reasoning processes, and their understanding of elementary algebra." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 1996.
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This research explored the effectiveness of various teaching strategies used for introducing early algebraic concepts. The research focused on investigating three
approaches commonly used for introducing the concept of a variable, namely, generalising from tables of data, generalising from visual patterns, and establishing the
links between algebra the structural aspects of the number system. The research also identified specific reasoning processes that interact with these strategies.
The research incorporated two investigations, an introductory and main study. One hundred and sixteen students participated in the introductory study and 379 students participated in the main study. The age of the students ranged from 12 years 6 months to 15 years and 10 months. The introductory study incorporated the development and trialing tests used for measuring students' reasoning processes, their preference for a visual or symbolic approach to solution, and their understanding of pre-algebra and early algebra ideas. These tests were reformulated for the main study. An analysis of the students' responses indicated a number of areas where more in-depth information would help identify the ways in which students reflected on basic algebraic concepts. Forty one
students were selected for a semi-structured interview.
The research employed a multiple measurement approach. The first stage consisted of a correlational analysis. This analysis teased out the relationships among the three written test. The next stage in the study entailed the use of a semi-structured interview. This phase was considered an important part of the methodology as it provided insights into the ways students think, and enabled clarification, extension, and interpretations of the
information recorded in the written responses. Implications for further research, for classroom teaching, and for curriculum development for introducing the concept of a
variable are discussed.
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Howarth, Stephanie. "Believe it or not : examining the case for intuitive logic and effortful beliefs." Thesis, University of Plymouth, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/3322.
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The overall objective of this thesis was to test the Default Interventionist (DI) account of belief-bias in human reasoning using the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (2011). DI accounts focus on how our prior beliefs are the intuitive output that bias our reasoning process (Evans, 2006), whilst judgments based on logical validity require effortful processing. However, recent research has suggested that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as previous accounts claim. In order to investigate whether belief based judgments are resource demanding we instructed participants to reason on the basis of both the validity and believability of a conclusion whilst simultaneously engaging in a secondary task (Experiment 1 - 5). We used both a within and between subjects design (Experiment 5) examining both simple and complex arguments (Experiment 4 – 9). We also analysed the effect of incorporating additional instructional conditions (Experiment 7 – 9) and tested the relationships between various individual differences (ID) measures under belief and logic instruction (Experiment 4, 5, 7, 8, & 9). In line with Handley et al.’s findings we found that belief based judgments were more prone to error and that the logical structure of a problem interfered with judging the believability of its conclusion, contrary to the DI account of reasoning. However, logical outputs sometimes took longer to complete and were more affected by random number generation (RNG) (Experiment 5). To reconcile these findings we examined the role of Working Memory (WM) and Inhibition in Experiments 7 – 9 and found, contrary to Experiment 5, belief judgments were more demanding of executive resources and correlated with ID measures of WM and inhibition. Given that belief based judgments resulted in more errors and were more impacted on by the validity of an argument the behavioural data does not fit with the DI account of reasoning. Consequently, we propose that there are two routes to a logical solution and present an alternative Parallel Competitive model to explain the data. We conjecture that when instructed to reason on the basis of belief an automatic logical output completes and provides the reasoner with an intuitive logical cue which requires inhibiting in order for the belief based response to be generated. This creates a Type 1/Type 2 conflict, explaining the impact of logic on belief based judgments. When explicitly instructed to reason logically, it takes deliberate Type 2 processing to arrive at the logical solution. The engagement in Type 2 processing in order to produce an explicit logical output is impacted on by demanding secondary tasks (RNG) and any task that interferes with the integration of premise information (Experiments 8 and 9) leading to increased latencies. However the relatively simple nature of the problems means that accuracy is less affected. We conclude that the type of instructions provided along with the complexity of the problem and the inhibitory demands of the task all play key roles in determining the difficulty and time course of logical and belief based responses.
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Chittleborough, Philip. "Psychological perspectives on the perception, appraisal, and production of everyday arguments / Philip Chittleborough." Thesis, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/19493.
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Potworowski, Georges A. "The relationship between thinking dispositions, epistemic beliefs, and disjunctive reasoning." 2004. http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources__ID=80953&T=F.
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Kilgour, A. Mark. "The creative process : the effects of domain specific knowledge and creative thinking techniques on creativity /." 2006. http://adt.waikato.ac.nz/public/adt-uow20070608.151053/index.html.
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"What if the group had not failed: the influence of counterfactual thinking and emotions on cooperation in step-level public good dilemma." 2012. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549229.
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有關在台階形的公共物品兩難(step-level public good dilemma)中集體失敗的心理影響的研究一直很少。本研究探討在集體失敗後反事實思維 (counterfactual thinking) 對群體成員情緒和隨後合作行為的影響。研究1確定了兩種會顯著增加失敗後合作行為的反事實思維：關注(1)個人的成果 或 (2) 群體的成果，並以自我為中心的向上反事實思維 (self-focused upward counterfactual thinking)。此外，內疚 (guilt)中介了反事實思維對合作行為的影響。我們在研究2中發現以自我為中心的向上反事實思維是否會增加或減少，取決於反事實思維中的結果導向(outcome orientation) 及其結構是否為加法式 (additive)，還是減法式(subtractive)。另外，內疚，不行動引起的後悔 (regret of inaction)和行動引起的後悔 (regret of action) 中介了這些反事實思維對合作行為的影響。我們的研究結果指出反事實思維和個別情緒在研究社會困境的重要性。Research on the psychological consequences of collective failure in step-level public good dilemmas has remained scant. The present research addressed how counterfactual thinking influenced group members’ emotions and subsequent cooperation after collective failure. In study 1, we identified two types of counterfactuals which significantly increased post-failure cooperation: self-focused upward counterfactuals that concerned about (1) personal outcome and (2) group outcome. Furthermore, guilt mediated the effects of counterfactual thinking on cooperation. In study 2, we demonstrated that self-focused counterfactuals predicted increase or decrease in cooperation, depending on its outcome orientation and structure (additive vs. subtractive). Guilt, regret of inaction and regret of action mediated these effects. Our findings pointed to the need of studying counterfactual thinking and specific emotions in social dilemma.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
Yam, Pak Chun.
Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-49).
Abstracts also in Chinese.
Abstract --- p.4
Chinese Abstract (摘要) --- p.5
Introduction --- p.6
Counterfactual thinking in social dilemma --- p.9
Counterfactual thinking and emotion --- p.11
“Feeling-is-for-doing“ approach of emotions in social dilemma --- p.13
Counterfactual thinking, emotions and cooperation --- p.14
Overview --- p.17
Study 1 --- p.17
Method --- p.18
Results --- p.21
Discussion --- p.25
Study 2 --- p.26
Method --- p.29
Results --- p.30
Discussion --- p.34
Chapter General Discussion --- p.35
Implications and Contributions --- p.37
Limitations and future directions --- p.39
Conclusion --- p.40
References --- p.41
Appendix1 --- p.50
Measure of regret --- p.50
Measure of guilt --- p.50
Measure of anger --- p.50
Appendix 2 --- p.51
Counterfactual manipulations used in Study 2 --- p.51
Books on the topic "Logic. Reasoning (Psychology) Thought and thinking"
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Keiko, Okada, and Guo Wanqi, eds. Luo ji si kao de ji shu: Xie zuo, jian bao, jie jue wen ti de you xiao fang fa = Logical thinking. 2nd ed. Taibei Shi: Jing ji xin chao she, 2008.
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Sandra, Parks, ed. Building thinking skills. Pacific Grove, CA: Critical Thinking Press & Software, 1987.
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Handbook of mathematical induction: Theory and applications. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2011.
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Black, Howard. Building thinking skills.: Lesson plans & teacher's manual. Pacific Grove, CA: Critical Thinking Press & Software, 1986.
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Muller, Mirza Nathalie, and Perret-Clermont Anne Nelly, eds. Argumentation and education. New York: Springer, 2009.
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Thinking logically: Basic concepts for reasoning. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1988.
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Thinking logically: Basic concepts for reasoning. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1993.
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J, Fogelin Robert, ed. Introduction to logic and critical thinking. 2nd ed. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.
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Introduction to logic and critical thinking. 4th ed. Australia: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Logic. Reasoning (Psychology) Thought and thinking"
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Evans, Jonathan St B. T. "The psychology of deductive reasoning: Logic." In Thinking in Perspective, 90–110. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003349679-5.
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Schroyens, Walter. "Logic and/in psychology: The paradoxes of material implication and psychologism in the cognitive science of human reasoning." In Cognition and ConditionalsProbability and Logic in Human Thinking, 69–84. Oxford University Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233298.003.0004.
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Summerfield, Christopher. "The language of thought." In Natural General Intelligence, 61—C3N94. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192843883.003.0003.
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Abstract This chapter begins by introducing the distinction between thinking and knowing, and the pivotal role that it has played in theories of artificial intelligence (AI) development. This distinction is traced back to the work of early theorists such as Hebb and Cattell. Then, focussing on the theories of ‘thinking’, the chapter follows the trajectory of twentieth-century thinking about the nature of thought. The chapter considers early approaches to building AI as systems that reasoned over logical premises, or language-like mental representations. The chapter considers the early approaches to understanding the mental models proposed by Craik, Tolman, and Kohler. It discusses the convergence of psychology and AI research in the 1970s, the development of expert systems, and finally the emergence of Bayesian models for probabilistic reasoning.
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Picardi, Eva. "A Note on Dummett and Frege on Sense Identity." In Frege on Language, Logic, and Psychology, edited by Annalisa Coliva, 217–28. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198862796.003.0009.
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Abstract This chapter engages with Michael Dummett’s work on Frege’s notion of sense identity and the role of the context principle. It is argued that sense identity plays a crucial role in the justification of Frege’s foundational programme. Two features of this programme made it desirable to have stringent criteria for sense identity. The first is the claim that deductive reasoning and pure conceptual thought unaided by intuition can enlarge our knowledge; the second is the thesis that arithmetical propositions are analytic, if they can be shown to be derivable from purely logical axioms by means of definitions of arithmetical concepts and rules of a purely logical nature. Special emphasis is given to Frege’s idea that arithmetical propositions are contained in logical axioms as plants are contained in a seed and not as bricks are contained in a house. If this is correct, then what needs explaining is (a) the mechanism of deductive inference—that is, the peculiar mode of containment of the conclusion in the premises of a deductive argument, in such a way as to account for its validity and fruitfulness; and (b) the status of definitions.
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"validity of adopting the outcome suggested. In the court room, both parties put forward arguments and the judge chooses the argument that is either the most persuasive or that is the closest to the judge’s own belief concerning the outcome of the case. So far, in this text, there have been opportunities to read judgments and the judges have presented their decisions in the form of reasoned responses to the questions posed by the case. In the classroom, students are constantly called upon to practise and refine their skills in legal problem solving by engaging in reasoning processes leading to full scale argument construction. For the practising lawyer, a valid argument is of the utmost importance. Decisions as to right action can only be made by people who are able to distinguish between competing arguments and determine that, in a given set of circumstances, one argument is more valid than another. Judges are, of course, the ultimate arbiters of the acceptable decision. Sometimes, this decision is quite subjective. 7.7.1 Logic It is generally believed that academic and professional lawyers and, indeed, law students, are well skilled in the art of reasoning. Furthermore, it is believed that they are people who argue ‘logically’. To most, the term ‘logical’ indicates a person who can separate the relevant from the irrelevant, and come to an objective view, based often on supposedly objective formula. Colloquially, people accuse others, who change their mind or who are emotional in their arguing, of allowing their emotions to get the better of them, of ‘not being logical’. The dictionary defines logic as the science of reasoning, thinking, proof or inference. More than that, logic is defined as a science in its own right—a subsection of philosophy dealing with scientific method in argument and the uses of inference. Hegel called logic the fundamental science of thought and its categories. It certainly claims to be an accurate form of reasoning: its root is found in the Greek word logos meaning reason. Figure 7.7: a definition of logic." In Legal Method and Reasoning, 227. Routledge-Cavendish, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781843145103-172.
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Dasgupta, Subrata. "Very Formal Affairs." In The Second Age of Computer Science. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190843861.003.0009.
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If social and behavioral scientists have harbored “physics envy” as some have wryly claimed—envy of its explanatory and predictive success— then computer scientists may be said to have suffered from “mathematics envy.” Interestingly, this envy was less a characteristic of the pioneers of digital computing of the 1940s and 1950s, the people who shed first light on the design of digital electronic computers, the first programming languages, the first operating systems, the first language translators, and so on—though most of them were trained as mathematicians. They were too busy learning the heuristic principles of computational artifacts. Rather, it was in the 1960s when we first find signs of a kind of mathematics envy, at least in some segments of the embryonic computer science community. It was as if, having discovered (or invented) the heuristic principles of practical computational artifacts, some felt the need to understand the underlying “science” of these artifacts—by which they meant its underlying mathematics and logic. Mathematics envy could be assuaged only by thinking mathematically about computational artifacts. Computer science would then be raised to the intellectual stature of, say, physics or indeed of mathematics itself if computer scientists could transform their discipline into a mathematical science. One cannot blame computer scientists who thought this way. The fact is, there is something about mathematics that situates it in a world of its own. “Mathematics is a unique aspect of human thought,” wrote hyperprolific science (fact and fiction) writer Isaac Asimov. And Asimov was by no means the first or only person to think so. But wherein lies the uniqueness of mathematical thinking? Perhaps the answer is that for many people, mathematics offers the following promises:The unearthliness of mathematical objects. The perfectness and exactness of mathematical concepts. An inexorable rigor of mathematical reasoning. The certainty of mathematical knowledge. The self-sufficiency of the mathematical universe. These promises are clearly enviable if they can be kept; usually, they are kept.
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Clivio, Caterina, and Marcel Danesi. "Existential Graphs and Cognition." In Advances in Multimedia and Interactive Technologies, 62–70. IGI Global, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-5622-0.ch004.
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When looked at cumulatively, it can be said that American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce strove to understand cognition via his sign theory and especially his notion of existential graphs. Peirce put forth ideas for a discipline that would incorporate notions of psychology and semiotics into a unified ontological and epistemological theory of mind. The connecting link was his system of diagrammatic logic, called “existential graphs.” For Peirce a graph was more powerful than language as a means of understanding because it showed how its parts resembled relations among the parts of cognitive acts. Existential graphs show that cognition cannot be extracted from a linear or hierarchical succession of structures, but the very process of thinking itself in actu. In fact, Peirce called his graphs “moving pictures of thought” because they allow us to see how are thoughts are unfolding. In short, as Kiryuschenko (2012) puts it, “Graphic language allows us to experience a meaning visually as a set of transitional states, where the meaning is accessible in its entirety at any given here and now during its transformation” (p. 122).
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Wertsch, James V. "A Conceptual Tool Kit." In How Nations Remember, 31–86. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197551462.003.0002.
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The chapter begins with a section on methods and forms of evidence that outlines the difference between top-down and bottom-up analyses of national memory and notes that the latter will be given more emphasis in this book than is the case in many studies of national identity and memory. The section also argues that by understanding how narrative tools can “co-author” individuals’ speaking and thinking, it is possible to avoid misguided notions of “primordialism” that are part of the rhetorical claims of nationalists. The next section examines the sense in which national memory is memory and argues for the need to focus on remembering individuals as members of groups. This involves a review of ideas from figures such as Maurice Halbwachs and Frederic Bartlett on collective and individual memory. This is followed by a section on “Flashbulb Memories as Memory in the Group,” which uses a body of literature in psychology to develop a conceptually grounded notion of national memory that includes the observation that Bartlett’s notion of schema underpins much of the entire discussion. The next section, on “symbolic mediation,” reviews the origins of this idea in the writings of several European and Russian scholars and goes into the case of literacy as an illustration as outlined in empirical studies by Luria and Vygotsky. It then poses an analogous line of reasoning for narratives as symbolic mediation. This includes a discussion of the “inner logic” of narrative tools, “narrative truth,” and two levels of narrative analysis (“specific narratives” and “narrative templates”).
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Arthur, W. Brian. "Cognition: The Black Box of Economics." In Perspectives on Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Oxford University Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195162929.003.0021.
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John Holland's ideas have always been marked by a deep instinct for the real—for what works. Thus, in his design of computer algorithms, he avoids mathematical formalisms and goes instead to deeper sources—to mechanisms drawn from biology. In his investigation of human cognitive thinking, he avoids frameworks based on deduction, logic, and choices over closed sets; and goes instead to induction, generative creation, and choices over open-ended possibilities. Running through all Holland's work, in fact, is an instinct for the generative and for the open-ended. Holland's worlds are ones where new entities are constantly created to be tested in the environment, and where these are not drawn from any closed and labeled collection of predetermined possibilities. This makes his science algorithmic rather than analytical, evolutionary rather than equilibriumbased, and novelty-generating rather than static. It makes his science, in a word, realistic. Insofar as the standard sciences are analytical, equilibrium-based, and nongenerative in their possibilities, Holland's thinking offers them a different approach. Here I want to see what a John Holland approach has to offer economics. My involvement with Holland's ideas began in the late summer of 1987. He and I were the first Visiting Fellows of the newly formed Santa Fe Institute, and we shared a house. I had taken up Holland's fascination with evolutionary algorithms, and, by 1988, John and I were attempting to design what was to become the first artificial stock market. It took me some time to realize that John Holland had thought deeply about a great deal more than evolutionary algorithms, and that he had interesting ideas also in psychology. Over the next thirteen years, I found myself applying Holland's thinking about cognition to problems within economics. At first it appeared that Holland's approach—based largely on induction—applied best to specific problems, and I tried to think of the simplest possible problem in economics that would illustrate the need for induction. The result was my El Farol bar problem. Later I began to realize that economics does not need inductive approaches to specific problems as much as it needs to reexamine the foundations of its assumptions about decision making.
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Ilyin, Mikhail. "CARTESIAN MOMENT. NEW DISCOURSE ON STYLES AND METHODS IN THE OLD-FASHIONED MANNER OF DESCARTES." In METOD, 22–76. INION RAN, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31249/metod/2020.10.02.
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The author explains the purport of the article. He intends to emulate the style of Descartes to the extent possible in the contemporary setup. In his 10 meditations the author attempts to grasp vital capacities of Descartes’ method and to that effect to better understand his intellectual achievements and their current relevance. Cartesian moment or creative impact of Descartes upon dynamics of intellectual advancement is a key moment (point in time) that separates old scholastic ways of reasoning from modern ones as Martin Heidegger amply affirmed in his «The Age of the World Picture». Modern way not only relies on ratio but also on individual creative abilities and personal authorship of an investigator. Hence the author explores creative capabilities of a modern researcher typified by Descartes. The author defines Cartesian methodological practice (style, manner) as distinctly personalized and to that effect subjective or self-centered. This novel methodological artifice of Descartes is coupled with typically modern distinction between subjective (personally biased) and subjectival (pertaining to an independent agency of emancipating personality or subject). Investigating self of Descartes intentionally exploits typically modern cognitive and social property of being a free cognitive agent. It may be called cognitive agency or subjectness ( субъектность , subjectnost’ ) as a counterpart to subjectivity ( субъективность , subjectivnost’ ). Respectively Heidegger while discussing unique Cartesian achievement introduces along a casual notion of subjectivity self-coined terms of Subjektsein (subject-object relations, Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung) and Subjektität (resolute self-awareness, unbedingtes Sichwissen). It is characteristic that Heidegger carefully discriminates spontaneous personally biased Ichheit and Egoismus from consistently individually conceived Ichhaft. The article examines two epitomes of subjectness: the initial Cartesian archetype and recent Wittgensteinian prototype. While Descartes instrumentally uses it to reshape scholastic thought into a modern metaphysics (cf. «Meditationes de Prima Philosophia» of 1641 or its authorized French translation of 1647 «Les méditations métaphysiques» ), Wittgenstein respectively elaborates his own brand of philosophy of logic (cf. « Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung » of 1921). With Descartes his actual person is nothing but ‘being on his own’ ( ens per se ). Pragmatically this difference transmutes into operation of the actual whole self of the researcher ( me totum ) with development of polar metaphysical abstractions of non-bodily and non-extensive res cogitans and bodily and non-thinking res extensa . With Wittgenstein the equally pivotal personality of researcher reduces into an intermediator (border, Grenze ) between the world and the transcendental logic. As a result, metaphysical subject (metaphysisches Subjekt) or solipsist me (Ich des Solipsismus) shrinks into a non-extensive dot (Punkt) or eye (Auge) observing the world from outside. While new-born Cartesian cognitive agent has to split within itself into res cogitans and res extensa Descartes’ disciples and followers simply ignore bodily dimension. They radically reduce the investigating self to a detached all-powerful Reason turning subjectival Cartesianism of its founder into a non-subjectival version of Cartesianism, supposedly objective and rational. Wittgenstein helps the investigator (his personal self) come back again but at the expense of limiting himself to a border between the logic and the world able to reconstruct both the logic and the world with incessant language games. In his fifth meditation the author emulates both the style and the way of reasoning typical for Descartes. He remembers his student years in Moscow Lomonosov University. First he has mastered phonological principle of distinctive features and then successfully extended its use beyond linguistics into social studies and political science. Being taught dual - fast and slow reading he learnt to skip and then to restore details. The third personal cognitive discretion utilized in investigation of any scholarly issue is the focus on its emergence, further metamorphoses and evolution. The first two have clear Cartesian formation, while the third helps them both to gain dynamism and discretions. Next meditation deals with Descartes’ idea of the (definite article) method and specific rules for applying inherent inventiveness ( rēgulae ad directionem ingenii ). This Cartesian link implies essential affinity between universal instrumentality (organon) of scientific exploration and fundamental (primeval and primitive) cognitive abilities of humans and other species. Such a polarized dual distinction has helped the Center of advanced methodologies to identify three complex transdisciplinary organons (metretics, morphetics and semiotics) rooted in the elementary cognitive abilities to tell intensity of sensations, to recognize patterns and to grasp functional relevance, potentially meaning. Simplex-complex transformations devised by the Center are instrumental in linking the utmostly complex phenomena to equally simple ones through the range of intermediate manifestations and forms. The results of the analytical transformations can be revealed in the sequences of modules related to a master prototype model. The concluding two meditations deal with cognition and its modes as well as the issue of overcoming of Cartesian dualism. The author insists that cognitive scholars’ ambitions to overcome Cartesian dualism are vain. It is Descartes’ method and style - as far as we can grasp them - that can help to overcome fatal schemes ascribed into notorious mind - body problem. The core of Descartes’ thinking is the continuous preoccupation with embodiment of the rational and emotional aspects of his whole self (total me) and disembodiment of its material aspects.
Conference papers on the topic "Logic. Reasoning (Psychology) Thought and thinking"
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Tvrdíková, Linda. "Do Not Ignore the Elephant... Exploring the Role of Intuition and Experience in Judicial Decision-Making." In Argumentation 2021. Brno: Masaryk University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cz.muni.p210-9972-2021-2.
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If we look at the literature about judicial decision-making and interpretation of law, we can find many texts which are dedicated to legal arguments, logic and legal reasoning – in those texts the rationality, analytical and logical thinking is glorified and an interpretation seems ‘just’ as a logical operation where judges subsume certain facts under general legal norm or norms, those norms are formulated linguistically, so it seems that the whole job of judges is to analyze texts. What we can see more rarely are discussions and texts exploring the role of intuitions, feelings and emotions and their role in judicial decision-making – at least in the Czech Republic. Those of our faculties are seen as the source of bias and distortion. Even if we look to the past, those themes are not so common among legal theorists and philosophers – especially in our tradition where we are still influenced by Hans Kelsen and František Weyr and their normative theory – but we can find exceptions and those are the American legal realists. In this paper, we will show that their observations and insights seem to be right. How can we know it? Because in last decades cognitive scientists have made big progress in the area of decision-making and it seems that we are not so rational as we thought us to be. They have explored that our thinking does not take place only through the deliberative system but, surprisingly, there is also another one system which influences our decisions. This system is automatic, fast, and intuitive – some call this system S1, Seymour Epstein an experiential system. This automatic system is more influential than our deliberative system because it is always heard – we can use Jonathan Haidt’s metaphor of an elephant and a rider. S1, the intuitive, experiential system, is an elephant and S2, the deliberative, analytical system is the rider – in legal theory, we have talked about the rider a lot but we do not explore the elephant sufficiently. This paper will try to uncover the nature of the elephant.
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Valentim, Juliana. "Participatory Futures Imaginations." In LINK 2021. Tuwhera Open Access, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/link2021.v2i1.111.
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The contemporary conjuncture of widespread ecological and social crises summons critical thinking about significant cultural changes in digital media design. The selection and classification practices that marked the history of slavery and colonization now rely on all types of nanotechnologies. On behalf of the future, bodies became expanded territory to sovereign intervention, where the role of contemporary powers enable extraction and mining of material, plumbed from the most intimate sphere of the self. This logic requires the state of exception to become the norm, so that the crisis is the digital media’s critical difference: they cut through the constant stream of information, differentiating the temporally valuable from the mundane, offering users a taste of real-time responsibility and empowerment. Thereby, this research aims to explore the dynamic transformations of the mediatic environment and their impacts on the fundamental relationships of human beings with the world, the self, and objects. It unfolds concerns around neocolonial assaults on human agency and autonomy that resonate from structuring patterns emerging from the digital infrastructure of neoliberalism and the relationships of human beings with the world. It disputes the imaginaries, representational regimes, and the possibilities of reality perceptions with universal, patriarchal, and extractive representations. This research also seeks alternative forms of media education and political resistance through its collaborative practice, pursuing an attentive and open-ended inquiry into the possibilities latent for designing new communication and information tools within lived material contexts: How might we represent invisible media infrastructures? How to produce knowledge about this space and present it publicly? How can these representations be politically mobilized as ecological and social arguments to establish a public debate? How can artistic sensibilities, aesthetics and the visual field influence what is thought of this frontier space? Finally, how can art, play and research intervene and participate? For this, the project involves participatory methods to create spaces for dialogue between different epistemologies, questioning the forms of ethical and creative reasoning in the planetary media and communication systems; for fostering the techno-politics imagination through playful, participatory futures and transition design frameworks as an ethical praxis of world-making; and for a reconceptualization of autonomy as an expression of radical interdependence between body, spaces, and materiality. The research aims to provide a framework for designing media tools, which incorporates core design principles and guidelines of agency and collective autonomy. It also engages with the transnational conversation on design, a contribution that stems from recent Latin American epistemic and political experiences and struggles, and the wider debate around alternative forms of restoring communal bonds, conquering public discussion spaces, and techno-political resistances through collaborative research practices and participatory methods.