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Journal articles on the topic 'Logiciels – Philosophie'

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Published: 12 April 2025

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1

Gauthier, Yvon. "La théorie des nombres chez Herbrand et Lautman." Articles 37, no. 1 (May 14, 2010): 149–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/039716ar.

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Résumé Dans cet article, je compare les vues de Lautman et Herbrand sur la théorie des nombres et la philosophie de l’arithmétique. Je montre que, bien que Lautman eût avoué avoir été marqué par l’influence de Herbrand, les postures fondationnelles des deux amis divergent considérablement. Alors que Lautman versait dans un réalisme platonicien, Herbrand est resté fidèle au finitisme hilbertien. Il est vrai que Lautman était philosophe et que Herbrand était avant tout arithméticien et logicien, mais il demeure que l’oeuvre de Herbrand a une portée philosophique mieux accordée à la logique et aux mathématiques contemporaines.

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2

Nadeau, Robert. "Hommage à Hugues Leblanc, philosophe logicien." Philosophiques 13, no. 1 (1986): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/203306ar.

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3

Savolle, Adrien, and Nicolas Hicher. "Pratiques et philosophies du logiciel libre à travers ses ambiguïtés." Socio-anthropologie, no. 46 (December 15, 2022): 145–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/socio-anthropologie.12830.

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4

Laronde, Thierry. "Propriété intellectuelle et brevets logiciels." Multitudes 5, no. 2 (2001): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/mult.005.0066.

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5

Higginbotham, James. "McGinn's Logicisms." Philosophical Issues 4 (1993): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522832.

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6

Gleizes, Jérôme. "Introduction au logiciel libre." Multitudes 1, no. 1 (2000): 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/mult.001.0161.

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7

Sorensen, Roy. "Fugu for Logicians." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92, no. 1 (June 4, 2014): 131–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12117.

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8

Miller, David. "Sir Karl Raimund Popper, C. H., F. B. A. 28 July 1902—17 September 1994." Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 43 (January 1997): 369–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbm.1997.0021.

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Karl Raimund Popper, the philosopher and methodologist of science, died on 17 September 1994 at the age of 92 years. Locke was a Fellow of the Royal Society, of course, and some other early Fellows, Boyle in particular, have a secure place in the history of philosophy. Whewell, an intellectual forerunner of Popper's (Medawar 1967), was elected in 1820 when the Royal Society was, according to a contemporary philosopher, ‘in a state of unstable equilibrium’; he was a mere 26, a lecturer in mathematics, and was to occupy the chair of mineralogy at Cambridge for some years before writing his exceptional studies in the history and philosophy of science. Whitehead and Russell were elected as Fellows for their mathematical work, as have been one or two more recently elected logicians. Popper is the only philosopher in modern times to have been elected a Fellow of the Royal Society primarily in recognition of his philosophical achievement.

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9

Rojek, Paweł. "Pavel Florensky’s Theory of Religious Antinomies." Logica Universalis 13, no. 4 (November 2019): 515–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00234-0.

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Abstract Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), a Russian theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, argued that the religious discourse is essentially contradictory and put forward the idea of the logical theory of antinomies. Recently his views raised interesting discussions among logicians who consider him a forerunner of many non-classical logics. In this paper I discuss four interpretations of Florensky’s views: paraconsistent, L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical. In conclusion I argue for the integral interpretation which unites these four approaches.

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Parsons, Josh. "A-theory for tense logicians." Analysis 63, no. 277 (January 2003): 4–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2003.00386.x.

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11

Sherry, David. "Formal Logic for Informal Logicians." Informal Logic 26, no. 2 (February 28, 2008): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v26i2.444.

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Classical logic yields counterintuitive results for numerous propositional argument forms. The usual alternatives (modal logic, relevance logic, etc.) generate counterintuitive results of their own. The counterintuitive results create problems—especially pedagogical problems—for informal logicians who wish to use formal logic to analyze ordinary argumentation. This paper presents a system, PL– (propositional logic minus the funny business), based on the idea that paradigmatic valid argument forms arise from justificatory or explanatory discourse. PL– avoids the pedagogical difficulties without sacrificing insight into argument.

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12

Butterworth, Charles E. "Against the Greek Logicians (review)." Journal of the History of Philosophy 38, no. 2 (2000): 273–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2005.0069.

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13

Rapaport, William J., and Raymond M. Smullyan. "Logicians who Reason about Themselves." Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, no. 2 (June 1988): 668. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274558.

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14

Detlefsen, Michael. "Poincar� against the logicians." Synthese 90, no. 3 (March 1992): 349–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00500033.

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15

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Editors. "Dialecticians/Logicians (Mingjia ) And Their Teachings." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 28, no. 1-2 (February 1, 2001): 165–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-0280102010.

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16

Fruteau de Laclos, Frédéric. "Bruno Latour (1947-2022)." Ethnologie française Vol. 54, no. 2 (July 19, 2023): 335–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ethn.232.0335.

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On rend ici hommage à Bruno Latour, récemment disparu, en restituant la trajectoire de sa pensée : partie de la théologie et revenue à la théologie, elle a traversé la philosophie, la sociologie et l’anthropologie. On s’attache au souci constant du chercheur de rendre compte de la diversité des types de pensées et de la variété, corrélative de ces types, des modes d’existence. La description ne va toutefois pas sans une évaluation critique. On se demande ainsi si Latour ne tend pas à confondre idées et réalités lorsqu’il présente des partages disciplinaires comme des régimes ontologiques. On s’interroge également sur le sens très peu logicien de sa « socio-logique » et sur sa promotion de la « force », individuo-centrée, des agencements sociaux.

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17

Turner, Ray. "A theory of properties." Journal of Symbolic Logic 52, no. 2 (June 1987): 455–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274394.

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Frege's attempts to formulate a theory of properties to serve as a foundation for logic, mathematics and semantics all dissolved under the weight of the logicial paradoxes. The language of Frege's theory permitted the representation of the property which holds of everything which does not hold of itself. Minimal logic, plus Frege's principle of abstraction, leads immediately to a contradiction. The subsequent history of foundational studies was dominated by attempts to formulate theories of properties and sets which would not succumb to the Russell argument. Among such are Russell's simple theory of types and the development of various iterative conceptions of set. All of these theories ban, in one way or another, the self-reference responsible for the paradoxes; in this sense they are all “typed” theories. The semantical paradoxes, involving the concept of truth, induced similar nightmares among philosophers and logicians involved in semantic theory. The early work of Tarski demonstrated that no language that contained enough formal machinery to respresent the various versions of the Liar could contain a truth-predicate satisfying all the Tarski biconditionals. However, recent work in both disciplines has led to a re-evaluation of the limitations imposed by the paradoxes.In the foundations of set theory, the work of Gilmore [1974], Feferman [1975], [1979], [1984], and Aczel [1980] has clearly demonstrated that elegant and useful type-free theories of classes are feasible. Work on the semantic paradoxes was given new life by Kripke's contribution (Kripke [1975]). This inspired the recent work of Gupta [1982] and Herzberger [1982]. These papers demonstrate that much room is available for the development of theories of truth which meet almost all of Tarski's desiderata.

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Saint-Jevin, Alexandre. "L’horizon numérique dans les problématiques limites : les social games." psychologie clinique, no. 45 (2018): 196–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/psyc/201845196.

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À partir d’un enrichissement de la clinique des problématiques limites grâce à la theorisation des psychoses ordinaires, nous développerons la notion d’horizon numérique à l’œuvre dans leurs pratiques des social game. Il s’agira d’appuyer la psychanalyse sur une analyse de l’objet technique qu’est l’informatique pour conceptualiser l’horizon à l’œuvre dans cette pratique. Cette analyse nous mènera à confronter les écrits sur l’horizon du logicien et philosophe de l’informatique Gérard Chazal, à la lecture lacanienne de ceux du philosophe Martin Heidegger et à la pensée clinique des game studies à la française (Michaël Stora, Serge Tisseron, Yann Leroux, Thomas Gaon, etc.). Ainsi la clinique éclaire quatre caractéristiques de la subjectivation possible par le numérique pour ces problématiques limites : le masque numérique, les paradoxes du silence, le fantasme du vidéodrome et la jouissance machinique. En prenant appui sur la conception de la machine inhérente à la psychanalyse de Sigmund Freud et Jacques Lacan, nous proposerons une approche psychanalytique du vidéoludique, prenant en compte la dimension mortifère de toute machine nécessaire au vivant pour s’inscrire dans la société des hommes.

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19

Yuan, Jinmei. "Analogical Propositions in Moist Texts." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 39, no. 3 (March 1, 2012): 404–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-03903007.

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This article is an effort to improve understanding between Moist and Aristotelian logics on analogy. I argue that Chinese logic can neither fit in Aristotelian deductive framework, nor completely fit in Aristotelian inductive framework. One of the major reasoning skills that ancient Chinese logicians applied is analogical reasoning. Having examined thirteen Moist analogical propositions in a Moist text, the Da Qu from the perspective of finding rationales (li ) among things, I conclude that if the rationales can be found in a changing world, then Chinese logicians seek for the “beauty of creative thinking” in the process of argumentation.

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20

Krause, Décio. "Models and Modeling in Science: the role of metamathematics." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 26, no. 1 (June 7, 2022): 39–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e86052.

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The use of models of scientific theories should not be done without qualifications about the mathematics being used to build the models. This looks obvious, at least for logicians, but generally, it is not to the philosopher of science. Thus, some details about this point seem useful for both. Since any quick revision in the literature shows that in most cases, mainly after the raising of the semantic approach (to scientific theories), the models are taken to be set-theoretical structures, in discussing the issue we shall be concerned more with set theories, the locus where the play is usually developed (yet sometimes unconsciously).

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21

Auroux, Sylvain. "Brève histoire de la proposition." Cahiers du Centre de Linguistique et des Sciences du Langage, no. 25 (April 9, 2022): 15–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.26034/la.cdclsl.2008.1387.

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La notion de proposition apparaît dès le Sophiste de Platon : pour le philosophe, il n’y a logos que si sont assemblés un onoma et un rhema. Cette découverte sera doublement réinterprétée. D’abord par Aristote et les logiciens, qui réduiront la notion de proposition à celle de discours susceptible d’être vrai, dont ils définissent la forme canonique, ensuite par les grammairiens, qui l’identifieront par la complétude du sens sans utiliser des notions comme sujets et prédicats. La généralisation de la notion de proposition (et l’apparition de notions comme «propositions incidentes», «propositions subordonnées») provient de la nouvelles logique des idées clairement formulée par les Messieurs de Port-Royal et de la grammaire générale. Les limitations de la conception traditionnelle (aristotélicienne) de la structure de la proposition ne seront clairement dépassées que par la conception fonctionnelle de Frege/Russell. Les linguistes ont majoritairement conservé, jusqu’à Benveniste, la conception traditionnelle et la prééminence du rôle de la copule.

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22

Moineau, Laurent, and Aris Papathéodorou. "Coopération et production immatérielle dans le logiciel libre." Multitudes 1, no. 1 (2000): 144. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/mult.001.0144.

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23

Richardson, Joanne. "Logiciel libre et éthique du développement de soi." Multitudes 8, no. 1 (2002): 188. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/mult.008.0188.

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24

Vittinghoff, Helmolt. "Chapter 7: Dialecticians/Logicians (mingjia) and their teachings." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 28, no. 1‐2 (January 2001): 165–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0301-8121.00041.

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25

DAVIET-TAYLOR, Françoise. "À propos deNon et Non ou Non? Entretiens entre un philosophe, un grammarien et un logicien." Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris 103, no. 1 (December 31, 2008): 457–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/bsl.103.1.2033500.

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26

Searle, John R. "The Structure and Functions of Language." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2014-0001.

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Abstract This paper will discuss the nature of language. I find the present state of the subject, the Philosophy of Language, and the present state of Lin- guistics to be both, for different reasons, unsatisfactory. The problem with the Philosophy of Language is that its practitioners tend to lose sight of the psy- chological reality of language, i.e. of speaking and writing. Historically this is because the Philosophy of Language began with Frege’s logic and has continued to the present day to be heavily influenced by considerations of formal logic. Logicians need not be interested in the psychological reality of logical systems. Frege’s logical system is much more powerful than Aristotle’s, but for all I know Aristotle may be closer to the way people actually think. It does not matter to logicians.

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27

Ashworth, E. Jennifer. "Metaphor and the Logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan." Vivarium 45, no. 2 (2007): 311–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853407x217795.

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AbstractI examine the treatment of metaphor by medieval logicians and how it stemmed from their reception of classical texts in logic, grammar, and rhetoric. I consider the relation of the word 'metaphor' to the notions of translatio and transumptio, and show that it is not always synonymous with these. I also show that in the context of commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations metaphor was subsumed under equivocation. In turn, it was linked with the notion of analogy not so much in the Greek sense of a similarity between two proportions or relations as in the new medieval sense of being said secundum prius et posterius. Whether or not analogy could be reduced to metaphor, or the reverse, depended on the controversial issue of the number of acts of imposition needed to produce an equivocal term. A spectrum of views is canvassed, including those found in the logic commentaries of John Duns Scotus.

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28

Tieszen, Richard. "Gödel's Path from the Incompleteness Theorems (1931) To Phenomenology (1961)." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4, no. 2 (June 1998): 181–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421022.

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In a lecture manuscript written around 1961 (Gödel *1961/?), Gödel describes a philosophical path from the incompleteness theorems to Husserl's phenomenology. It is known that Gödel began to study Husserl's work in 1959 and that he continued to do so for many years. During the 1960s, for example, he recommended the sixth investigation of Husserl's Logical Investigations to several logicians for its treatment of categorial intuition (Wang 1997, p. 164). While Gödel may not have been satisfied with what he was able to obtain from philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology, he nonetheless continued to recommend Husserl's work to logicians as late as the 1970s. In this paper I present and discuss the kinds of arguments that led Gödel to the work of Husserl. Among other things, this should help to shed additional light on Gödel's philosophical and scientific ideas and to show to what extent these ideas can be viewed as part of a unified philosophical outlook. Some of the arguments that led Gödel to Husserl's work are only hinted at in Gödel's 1961 paper, but they are developed in much more detail in Gödel's earlier philosophical papers (see especially 1934, *193?, 1944, 1947, *1951, *1953/59). In particular, I focus on arguments concerning Hilbert's program and an early version of Carnap's program.§1. Some ideas from phenomenology. Since Husserl's work is not generally known to mathematical logicians, it may be helpful to mention briefly a few details about his background.

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29

Chinchore, Mangala. "Some thoughts on significant contributions of Buddhist logicians." Journal of Indian Philosophy 15, no. 2 (June 1987): 155–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00159718.

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30

Wansing, Heinrich, Grigory Olkhovikov, and Hitoshi Omori. "Questions to Michael Dunn." Logical Investigations 27, no. 1 (May 27, 2021): 9–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-1472-2021-27-1-9-19.

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We present nine questions related to the concept of negation and, in passing, we refer to connections with the essays in this special issue. The questions were submitted to one of the most eminent logicians who contributed to the theory of negation, Prof. (Jon) Michael Dunn, but, unfortunately, Prof. Dunn was no longer able to answer them. Michael Dunn passed away on 5 April 2021, and the present special issue of Logical Investigations is dedicated to his memory. The questions concern (i) negation-related topics that have particularly interested Michael Dunn or to which he has made important contributions, (ii) some controversial aspects of the logical analysis of the concept of negation, or (iii) simply properties of negation in which we are especially interested. Though sadly and regrettably unanswered by the distinguished scholar who intended to reply, the questions remain and might stimulate answers by other logicians and further research.

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31

El-Rouayheb, Khaled. "“SUBJECT GENERALITY” AND DISTRIBUTION IN MEDIEVAL ARABIC SYLLOGISTIC." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 33, no. 2 (August 9, 2023): 141–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957423923000012.

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AbstractA relatively well-known medieval Latin innovation is the doctrine of distributive supposition. This notion came to be used in syllogistic theory in the late medieval and early modern periods, as Latin logicians sought to establish general rules for syllogistic productivity across the various figures. It is much less well-known that some logicians in the medieval Arabic tradition also attempted to establish general rules for the syllogism, appealing to what they called “subject generality.” In the present article, I introduce this use of “subject generality” in some influential Arabic works on logic from the thirteenth century to the sixteenth, specifically Al-ǧumal by Afḍal al-Dīn al-Ḫūnaǧī (d. 1248) and Tahḏīb al-manṭiq by Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390) and some of their commentators. I also compare this concept of “subject generality” to the Latin concept of “distribution.”

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MECHOUET, Terkia, and Farid ZIDANI. "LUKASIEWICZ’S APPROACH TO SYLLOGISTIC: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS STUDY." RIMAK International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 04, no. 04 (July 1, 2022): 491–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.47832/2717-8293.18.32.

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There is no theory which has received a big interest historically as Aristotelian syllogistic, despite the criticisms to which the theory was exposed by philosophers and logicians like Francis Bacon and Jean Stuart mill in their philosophical and logical works, they considered it as an epistemological obstacle to the development of scientific knowledge, and there is a need to get over it to new method and process, but It is still an interesting subject of study and updated by many logicians to nowadays. The most prominent attempts: the Intentional approach opposite to the comprehensive one, then the approach of the logician and philosopher Ian Łukasiewicz, who tried to read the syllogistic theory with the use of accurate and rigorous analysis tool in classical logic, which is the calculi of propositions where he considered the real form of Aristotelian syllogism moods is conditional (If ... so), i.e., as computable logical laws not inferential rules (If ... then). In order to reach this purpose Łukasiewicz present his hypotheses, some of them are verified for the others he have had to make several interpretations to make his theory consistent. These interpretations took him away from the spirit of the theory and from the essence of what did Aristotle. This made his approach the subject of numerous and harsh criticisms. This is what we will try to show it through a critical analysis to some hypotheses which he presented in his book “Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the standpoint of Modern Formal Logic”.

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33

Zimmermann, Francis. "Le sens des mots selon les logiciens (l'analyse du padārtha)." Histoire Épistémologie Langage 20, no. 1 (1998): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/hel.1998.2692.

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34

Woleński, Jan. "Polish Logicians on Social Functions of Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic 45, no. 1 (January 2, 2024): 70–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2280504.

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35

Maziarz, Edward A. "LOGICAL PRAXIS AND LOGICAL THEORY: SELECTED ROLES OF LOGICIANS." Philosophia Mathematica s2-2, no. 1 (1987): 48–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/s2-2.1.48.

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Nubiola, Jaime. "Juan Luis Vives y Charles S. Peirce." Anuario Filosófico 26, no. 1 (October 4, 2018): 155–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.15581/009.26.29938.

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Connections between J.L. Vives and C.S. Peirce are shown. Not only is reflection on language and meaning central in both thinkers, but Peirce also knew Vives' thought especially through W. Hamilton and the Scottish common sense school. Peirce credited Vives with being a forerunner of the use of diagrams in logic, and both share a critical view of late medieval nominalistic logicians and a social and hierarchical conception of knowledge.

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37

Benis-Sinaceur, Hourya. "Ars inveniendi et théorie des modèles." Dialogue 27, no. 4 (1988): 591–613. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300020242.

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Dans son article nécrologique sur Abraham Robinson, Simon Kochen consignait une impression de Gödel qui ne manquera pas d'intéresser un grand nombre de spécialistes de Leibniz. Gödel, dont il faut rappeler l'intérêt particulier pour les travaux philosophiques de Leibniz, pensait en effet que, de tous les logiciens modernes, Abraham Robinson était celui qui avait le mieux réalisé l'idéal leibnizien d'une logique constituée en ars inveniendi pour les mathématiques. Nous voudrions examiner ici à quel aspect de l' ars inveniendi selon Leibniz ce jugement rend justice et quelle caractéristique de la logique contemporaine il fait ressortir. S'agissant des travaux d'Abraham Robinson, nous nous intéresserons surtout au secteur de la théorie des modèles, bien que celui-ci n'ait pas l'exclusivité de mettre en oeuvre l'idée que les résultats logiques sont propres à faciliter la découverte mathématique.

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38

Read, Stephen, and A. Broadie. "The Circle of John Mair. Logic and Logicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland." Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 146 (January 1987): 120. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220071.

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39

Бажанов, Валентин Александрович, and Irving H. Anellis. "Image of Soviet and Russian logic in the West. Latter Half of the XXth Century." Logical Investigations 27, no. 2 (December 19, 2021): 133–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-1472-2021-27-2-133-152.

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The article attempts to overview Western scientific knowledge of research in mathematical logic and its history in the USSR and Russia in the first half of the 20th century. We claim that Western scholars followed and were generally aware of the main works of their Soviet and Russian colleagues on mathematical logic and its history. It was possible, firstly, due to the fact that a number of Western scientists knew the Russian language, and, secondly, because Soviet and Russian logicians published their works in English (sometimes in German) in the original journals of mathematical logic or Soviet publishing houses (mainly Mir Publishers) translated Soviet authors into English. Thus, the names of A.G. Dragalin, Yu.L. Ershov, A.S. Karpenko, A.N. Kolmogorov, Z.A. Kuzicheva, Yu.I. Manin, S.Yu. Maslov, F.A. Medvedev, G.E. Mints, V.N. Salii, V.A. Smirnov, A.A. Stolyar, N.I. Styazhkin, V.A. Uspensky, I.M. Yaglom, S.A. Yanovskaya, A.P. Yushkevich, A.A. Zinov’ev were quite known to their Western counterparts. With the dawn of perestroika, contacts of Soviet / Russian logicians expanded significantly. Nevertheless, the analysis of Western works on mathematical logic and the history of logic suggests that by the end of the 20th century the interest of Western scientists in the works of their Russian colleagues had noticeably waned.

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Cain, James. "The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity." Religious Studies 25, no. 2 (June 1989): 141–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500001761.

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The doctrine of the Trinity says that there is just one God and three distinct divine persons, each of whom is God. This would seem to imply that there are three divine persons, each a different person the other persons but the same God as the other persons. If we accept what I believe is the most popular account of identity current among logicians then we must hold that this apparent consequence is contradictory. We see this as follows (it will suffice to consider just the relation of Father and Son): logicians generally treat relativized identity expressions of the form ‘is the same A as’ (here ‘A’ stands in for a term which relativizes the identity) as being analysable in terms of absolute (or unrelativized) identity according to the following equivalence schema, (E):(E) a is the same A as b if and only if a is identical to b and a is an A and b is an A.The view under consideration affirms the following three sentences:(1) The Father and the Son are persons.(2) The Father is not the same person as the Son.(3) The Father is the same God as the Son.

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Kollárik, Tomáš. "Do We Really Not Know What Toulmin’s Analytic Arguments Are?" Informal Logic 43, no. 3 (September 13, 2023): 417–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i3.7263.

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The aim of this paper is to challenge the idea that Toulmin’s main focus in The Uses of Argument is to critique formal deductive logic. I first try to challenge the argument that, on the basis of what Toulmin says about analytic arguments, it is impossible to determine exactly what they are. I will then attempt to determine the basic contours of analytic arguments. Finally, I will conclude that the concept of an analytic argument involves epistemological assumptions to which formal logicians are in no way committed by the nature of their discipline.

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Bourdeau, Michel. "La nature des constantes logiques dans le Tractatus." Dialogue 32, no. 4 (1993): 703–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300011343.

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Plusieurs raisons invitent à s'interroger sur la nature des constantes logiques. La première, et assurément la plus importante, tient à la place éminente que ces syncatégorèmes, qu' Aristote a été le premier à isoler dans le discours, occupent en logique. Si donc, par exemple, un logicien veut savoir ce qu'il fait, il lui sera difficile de ne pas se demander, à un moment ou à un autre, ce qu'est une constante logique, et la vive controverse qui oppose aujourd'hui encore les partisans de la logique classique et les intuitionnistes montre que la question n'est toujours pas résolue. Mais pour qui est plus familier avec la philosophie et son histoire, le problème se laisse encore aborder par un autre biais. Tous ceux qui ont approché Wittgenstein ont été frappés par le don qui était le sien de discerner ce qui est essentiel dans un problème. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que, dans son projet de refonte de la logique, l'auteur du Tractatus ait pris comme fil conducteur le thème des constantes logiques. Au paragraphe 4.0312 nous lisons en effet: «Mon idée principale, c'est que les constantes logiques ne représent rien». C'est de cette deuxième approche, historique, qu'il sera exclusivement question ici.

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Maziarz, Edward A. "LOGICAL PRAXIS AND LOGICAL THEORY PART II: SELECTED ROLES FOR LOGICIANS." Philosophia Mathematica s2-3, no. 2 (1988): 21–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/s2-3.2.21.

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Woleński, Jan. ""Polish Logicians in the Years 1918-1948 on Social Functions of Logic"." Filozofia Nauki 30, no. 1 (March 31, 2022): 67–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2022.0006.

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MALINK, MARKO, and ANUBAV VASUDEVAN. "THE PERIPATETIC PROGRAM IN CATEGORICAL LOGIC: LEIBNIZ ON PROPOSITIONAL TERMS." Review of Symbolic Logic 13, no. 1 (November 6, 2018): 141–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020318000266.

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AbstractGreek antiquity saw the development of two distinct systems of logic: Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and the Stoic theory of the hypothetical syllogism. Some ancient logicians argued that hypothetical syllogistic is more fundamental than categorical syllogistic on the grounds that the latter relies on modes of propositional reasoning such asreductio ad absurdum. Peripatetic logicians, by contrast, sought to establish the priority of categorical over hypothetical syllogistic by reducing various modes of propositional reasoning to categorical form. In the 17th century, this Peripatetic program of reducing hypothetical to categorical logic was championed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In an essay titledSpecimina calculi rationalis, Leibniz develops a theory of propositional terms that allows him to derive the rule ofreductio ad absurdumin a purely categorical calculus in which every proposition is of the formA is B. We reconstruct Leibniz’s categorical calculus and show that it is strong enough to establish not only the rule ofreductio ad absurdum, but all the laws of classical propositional logic. Moreover, we show that the propositional logic generated by the nonmonotonic variant of Leibniz’s categorical calculus is a natural system of relevance logic known as RMI$_{{}_ \to ^\neg }$.

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Rosenblatt, Lucas. "Maximal Non-trivial Sets of Instances of Your Least Favorite Logical Principle." Journal of Philosophy 117, no. 1 (2020): 30–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil202011712.

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The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. On the basis of this it is argued that the idea of classical recapture, which plays such an important role for non-classical logicians, can only be pushed so far.

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Russinoff, I. Susan. "The Syllogism's Final Solution." Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5, no. 4 (December 1999): 451–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421118.

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In 1883, while a student of C. S. Peirce at Johns Hopkins University, Christine Ladd-Franklin published a paper titled On the Algebra of Logic, in which she develops an elegant and powerful test for the validity of syllogisms that constitutes the most significant advance in syllogistic logic in two thousand years. Sadly, her work has been all but forgotten by logicians and historians of logic. Ladd-Franklin's achievement has been overlooked, partly because it has been overshadowed by the work of other logicians of the nineteenth century renaissance in logic, but probably also because she was a woman. Though neglected, the significance of her contribution to the field of symbolic logic has not been diminished by subsequent achievements of others.In this paper, I bring to light the important work of Ladd-Franklin so that she is justly credited with having solved a problem over two millennia old. First, I give a brief survey of the history of syllogistic logic. In the second section, I discuss the logical systems called “algebras of logic”. I then outline Ladd-Franklin's algebra of logic, discussing how it differs from others, and explain her test for the validity of the syllogism, both in her symbolic language and the more familiar language of modern logic. Finally I present a rigorous proof of her theorem. Ladd-Franklin developed her algebra of logic before the methods necessary for a rigorous proof were available to her. Thus, I do now what she could not have done then.

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Wagner, Henri. "L'argument de Quine contre les logiques déviantes." Dialogue 62, no. 1 (April 2023): 113–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217323000057.

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RésuméL'ambition de cet article est de restituer la radicalité de l'argument central contre les logiques déviantes que W.V.O. Quine déploie dans Philosophy of Logic. Cet argument a pour objet de mettre au jour l'inanité du concept de logique déviante, c'est-à-dire son caractère dénué de sens. En rendre compte requiert alors de prendre la mesure de sa dimension anti-psychologiste. Nous tâchons ainsi de montrer que le défi le plus radical de Quine ne consiste pas à opposer au logicien déviant que changer de lois logiques, c'est changer la signification des termes de constantes logiques.

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Perälä, Mika. "Affirmation and Denial in Aristotle’s De interpretatione." Topoi 39, no. 3 (September 20, 2019): 645–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09669-y.

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Abstract Modern logicians have complained that Aristotelian logic lacks a distinction between predication (including negation) and assertion, and that predication, according to the Aristotelians, implies assertion. The present paper addresses the question of whether this criticism can be levelled against Aristotle’s logic. Based on a careful study of the De interpretatione, the paper shows that even if Aristotle defines what he calls simple assertion in terms of predication, he does not confound predication and assertion. That is because, first, he does not understand compound assertion in terms of predication, and secondly, he acknowledges non-assertive predicative thoughts that are truth-evaluable. Therefore, the implications of Aristotle’s ‘predication theory of assertion’ are not as devastating as the critics believe.

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MCLARTY, COLIN. "FOUNDATIONS AS TRUTHS WHICH ORGANIZE MATHEMATICS." Review of Symbolic Logic 6, no. 1 (May 9, 2012): 76–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020312000159.

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The article looks briefly at Feferman’s most sweeping claims about categorical foundations, focuses on narrower points raised in Berkeley, and asks some questions about Feferman’s own foundations. Among many different senses of foundations, the one that mathematics needs in practice is a recognized body of truths adequate to organize definitions and proofs. Finding concise principles of this kind has been a huge achievement by mathematicians and logicians. We put ZFC and categorical foundations both into this context.

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