Journal articles on the topic 'Lu, Zhi, Lu, Zhi'

NPR1 gene was transformed into Siraitia grosvenorii (Swingle) C. Jeffrey ex. A.M. Lu and Zhi Y. Zhang by germ cell in situ transformation. Ovary injection, cutting chapiter, and chapiter spreading treatments were applied in this study. The transgenic plants were selected using hygromycin screening and confirmed by PCR testing, genome integrated with NPR1 gene in transgenic plants was analyzed by Southern hybridization. Results showed that three treatments could produce transgenic plants. Some of the transgenic plants were selected for tobacco mosaic virus inoculation testing, which showed a higher level of resistance to tobacco mosaic virus than non-transgenic controls.

AbstractThis essay approaches the Silk Road as a modern narrative of China's connected past, rather than as a historical fact. The Chinese termSilk Road(sichou zhi lu; 丝绸之路) first gained currency after the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung as part of the lexicon of anticolonial solidarity. During the Cold War, China's Afro-Asian Silk Road, different from the West's Europe-Asia Silk Road, prompted new interest in the linguistic dimension of connected history. Language contact traditionally held limited significance in European and Chinese philology because linguistic divisions were understood in terms of nation or language family. For Afro-Asian scholars and writers, however, precolonial language contact became a portent of postcolonial exchange. They shifted attention from genetic word roots to historical routes (e.g., loanwords). Within a longer history of what I call “contact philology,” China's short-lived collaborations refashioned the Orient as Afro-Asia and presented an (unfinished) critique of the tropes with which we narrate the connected past.

In the late sixteenth century, thriving private maritime trade brought forth maritime trouble to the late Ming state. In times of rampant “Japanese” piracy and Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, Chinese literati composed unofficial histories and vernacular fiction on China’s foreign relations. Among them, Yan Congjian 嚴從簡 wrote Shuyu zhouzi lu 殊域周咨錄 (Records of Surrounding Strange Realms) (1574), He Qiaoyuan 何喬遠 compiled Wang Xiangji 王享記 (Records of the Emperors’ Tributes) (1597–1620), Luo Yuejiong 羅曰褧 penned Xianbin lu 咸賓錄 (Records of Tributary Guests) (1597), and Luo Maodeng 羅懋登 composed a vernacular novel Sanbao taijian xiyangji tongsu yanyi 三寶太監西洋記通俗演義 (Vernacular Romance of Eunuch Sanbao’s Voyages on the Indian Ocean) (1598). This article examines how the imminent maritime realities reminded the late Ming authors of one cross-border war and two genocides in Java and Sanfoqi during Yuan and early and mid-Ming times. These transgressions that violated Chinese official tributary order became memorable and made Sino-Java relations a definite point of comparison for the late Ming maritime piracy problems. This article argues that the cultural memory of Sino-Java military and diplomatic exchange enabled the authors to lament and condemn the executed pirates Wang Zhi and Chen Zuyi. The four authors imbue their narratives with personal anxieties and nationalistic sentiments. While the historical narratives tend to moralize and idealize China’s tributary world order, the vernacular fiction paints a more realistic picture of the late Ming state by involving heterogeneous voices of the “other.” Collectively, the four narratives represent various images of the Ming Empire, revealing the authors’ deep apprehension of the Mings’ identity, their political criticism of the state, and their divergent and even self-conflicted views toward maritime commerce, immigrants, and people of different races.

Traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) divides fracture treatment into three stages. Many TCM herbs and formulas have been used to treat fractures for thousands of years. However, research regarding the Chinese herbal products (CHPs) that should be used at different periods of treatment is still lacking. This study aims to identify the CHPs that should be used at different periods of treatment as well as confirm the TCM theory of fracture periods medicine. We used prescriptions of TCM outpatients with fracture diagnoses analyzed using the Chang Gung Research Database (CGRD) from 2000 to 2015. According to the number of days between the date of the fracture and the clinic visit date, all patients were assigned to one of three groups. Patients with a date gap of 0-13 days were assigned to the early period group; those with a date gap of 14-82 days were assigned to the middle period group; and those with a date gap of 83-182 days were assigned to the late period group. We observed the average number of herbal formulas prescribed by the TCM doctor at each visit was 2.78, and the average number of single herbs prescribed was 6.47. The top three prescriptions in the early fracture period were Zheng-gu-zi-jin-dang, Shu-jing-huo-xue-tang, and Wu-ling-san. In the middle fracture period, the top three formulas were Zheng-gu-zi-jin-dang, Shu-jing-huo-xue-tang, and Zhi-bai-di-huang-wan. In the late fracture period, the top three formulas were Shu-jing-huo-xue-tang, Gui-lu-er-xian-jiao, and Du-huo-ji-sheng-tang. The main single herbs used in the early fracture period were Yan-hu-suo, Gu-sui-bu, and Dan-shen. From the middle to the late period, the most prescribed single herbs were Xu-duan, Gu-sui-bu, and Yan-hu-suo. We concluded that the results showed that the CGRD utilization pattern roughly meets the TCM theory at different fracture periods.

The Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) modeling system obtains the aerodynamic roughness length (z0) from a land use (LU) lookup table. The effective aerodynamic roughness length (z0eff) was estimated for the island of Taiwan by considering the individual roughness lengths (z0i) of the underlying LU types within a modeling grid box. Two z0eff datasets were prepared: one using the z0i from the default LU lookup table and the other using the observed z0i for three LU types (urban, dry cropland and pasture, and irrigated cropland and pasture). The spatial variability of the z0eff distribution was higher than that of the LU table-based z0 distribution. Three WRF sensitivity experiments were performed: (1) dominant LU table-based z0 (namely, S1), (2) z0eff estimated from the default z0i (namely, S2), and (3) z0eff estimated from the observed z0i (namely, S3). Comparisons of the thermal field, temperature, and surface sensible and latent heat fluxes revealed no significant differences among the three simulations. The wind field overestimation and surface momentum flux underestimation in S1 were reduced in S2 and S3, and these improvements were more prominent over areas with highly heterogeneous land surface conditions.

Abstract The switch from fetal to adult globin gene expression occurs around birth when fetal hemoglobin (HbF) production gradually declines within a few months. Much effort is underway to clarify the molecular basis of this mechanism, since impaired hemoglobin switching leading to persistent expression of fetal globin genes in adults (HPFH) offers therapeutic potential for hemoglobinopathies (S.L. Thein. Br. J. Haematol2004; 124: 264–74). In order to identify and study regulatory factors putatively involved in γ-globin gene expression, we examined the reticulocyte mRNAs differently expressed in three siblings (one brother, 54 years-old and two sisters 35- and 37-years old, respectively). The eldest brother had been referred to Umberto I Hospital for evaluation of a severe condition of β-thalassemia intermedia on chronic transfusion therapy since 1990. Both of his sisters resulted clinically affected by a milder form of thalassemia intermedia, non-transfusion dependent, showing Hb values around 8.4 g/dL, Hb A2 levels from 6.0 to 7.9% and HbF ranging from 14.5 to 27.6%, values higher than those resulted in their brother (5.9% Hb A2 and 7.2% HbF). Molecular analysis was performed on DNA extracted from peripheral leucocytes and revealed the same β-globin gene cluster genotype for all these subjects who resulted homozygous for the β+ IVSI-6 (C→T) mutation associated to haplotype VI chromosomes. Different levels of HbF were thus presumably responsible of different clinical phenotypes. To investigate the possible causes of the variations in γ-globin gene expression, extensive sequence analysis was performed on putative regulatory regions within the β-globin gene cluster (Zhi-Hong Lu et al., Blood1996; 87: 1604–11). Results showed the same genetic background in all the siblings. It was thus supposed that genetic determinants external to the β-globin gene cluster were responsible of the different γ-globin gene expression. To explore this hypothesis, the reticulocyte transcriptome was analyzed by a differential mRNA display approach. Reticulocytes were isolated from peripheral blood and total RNA extracted for all family members. Our study revealed several bands differentially displayed in the sample from the more severely affected sibling respect to his sisters. Selected bands were cloned in a pGEM T-vector (Promega, WI) and sequenced. Comparative sequence searches were performed using the BLAST algorithm. Preliminary data gave, for two of the clones originated from bands with increased expression in the brother, a complete homology (greater than 95%) with the cDNA sequence of a cold shock domain protein, displaying features of a repressor factor for several hematopoietic genes (Horwitz M. et al. JBC1994; 269: 14130–39; P. Coles et al. Nucleic Acids Res1996; 12: 2311–17).

O poema Lu Zhai (鹿柴; “Parque dos Cervos”) do famoso poeta chinês Wang Wei (王維; 699-759) é uma de suas obras mais conhecidas e traduzidas no Ocidente. O presente artigo discute e apresenta uma nova interpretação para o verso final do referido poema.

In this paper is presented an inquiry into some aspects of the meaning and usage of two temporal adverbs zai (再) and you (又) in Modern Standard Chinese. A decompositional analysis of the semantic encoding of the adverbs is conducted, aiming to better explain their recorded differences in usage. First, a sketch of some of the fundamental features of linguistic temporality is provided in order to model the structure of temporal semantic information encoded in the adverbs. Non-temporal (logical) meaning such as assertion and inference is also shown to be an important aspect of the semantic content of the adverbs. Adverbs zai and you are shown to encode the same semantic content except for a difference in viewpoint; the first being prospective, the second retrospective. Concrete linguistic examples reflecting the intrinsic semantic encoding of the adverbs are raised and discussed. It is then argued that through combining the decompositional analysis with ideas concerning conceptual analogy, some issues raised by Lu and Ma (1999) regarding the usage of zai and you in past and future settings may be resolved.

Shao-Fu-Zhu-Yu-Tang (SFZYT) is reportedly beneficial to sperm. In this study, we examined sperm acrosomal activity and serum free radical changes to evaluate the possible mechanism of SFZYT. A clinical study evaluated the sperm count and motility in 36 patients with chronic prostatitis before and after treatment for 60 days. The results revealed a significant increase in sperm motility after treatment as evaluated by computer-assisted semen analysis (17.27 ± 9.00 versus 28.29 ± 10.00, p < 0.01). An increase in sperm quantity and quality was observed by count and morphology with a high-powered intravital microscope. To gain an understanding of the mechanisms that caused this effect, we assessed sperm acrosin activity levels before (10.6 μ lu /106) and after medication (28.6 μ lu /106)( p < 0.01). The levels of the free radicals was relatively higher before medication, 2144, compared to a normal value of 780 after medication ( p < 0.01). In conclusion, SFZYT increased the motility and quality of human semen and this increase is related to an increase in sperm acrosin activity. SFZYT also works as a sperm antioxidant and antiaging agent.

Two species of the pygmy grasshopper genus Lamellitettigodes Günther are described: Lamellitettigodes diversifemoris Lu & Zha sp. n. from Hainan, and Lamellitettigodes sagittatus (Bolívar) from Hainan and Yunnan, PR China. Both species are photographed and compared with their allies. Taxonomic changes are proposed: Lamellitettigodes bimaculatus (Zheng) comb. nov. is transferred from Euparatettix bimaculatus Zheng, and Euparatettix tuberifemora Deng, Zheng & Wei syn. nov. is synonymized with Lamellitettigodes sagittatus. Lamellitettigodes and its allied genera, Euparatettix, Paratettix, Hedotettix, Tetrix and Ergatettix are compared with each other, and useful diagnostic characters for them are recommended. An updated species key for Lamellitettigodes is provided.

Recently, Zhu and Lu, [On the general sum-connectivity index of tricyclic graphs, J. Appl. Math. Comput. 51(1) (2016) 177–188] determined the graphs having maximum general sum-connectivity index among all [Formula: see text]-vertex tricyclic graphs. In this short note, an alternative but considerable short approach is proposed for determining the aforementioned graphs.

The purpose of this study was to analyze locative nouns (li, shang, and zhong) that may function as postpositions and therefore Mandarin language considered to have circumposition. The collected data were sentences taken from Chinese short stories by Lu Xun and the articles in the tabloid. Because the object of this study consisted of language in texts, hence observation and documentation method were needed. The analysis of data used distribution method with dissipative technic, substitution technic, and insert technic. Through dissipative and insert technic, the distribution of the adpositional phrase could be known. Through substitution technic, the distribution of the adpositional phrase and the use of preposition related tosemantic was conducted. The study shows, in some context of adpositional phrase, locative nouns li, shang, and zhong may function as postpositions, while the use of preposition zai, is optional, and the options provide the same meaning. Based on this result, Mandarin locative nouns should be considered as postpositions.

<p align="LEFT">The Confucians in the era of Korean Dynasty</p><p align="LEFT">have inherited and developed Zhu Xi’s ritual</p><p align="LEFT"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">study. Li Huang, composed </span></span><em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;">Shengxue Shitu </span></span></em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">based</span></span></p><p align="LEFT"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">on </span></span><em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;">Jin Si Lu</span></span></em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">, aiming at pursuing prudence and</span></span></p><p align="LEFT">morality, and putting them into practice, had</p><p align="LEFT">great impact on the development of</p><p align="LEFT">Confucianism in Korean Dynasty. Han Yuanzhen</p><p align="LEFT"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">regarded </span></span><em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;">Yili Jingzhuan Tongjie </span></span></em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">as the second</span></span></p><p align="LEFT">ritual composition made by Confucians after</p><p align="LEFT"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">Zhougong, and developed it into </span></span><em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;">Yili Jingzhuan</span></span></em></p><em></em><p align="LEFT"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;"><em>Tongjie Bu </em></span></span><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">based on Zhu Xi’s way</span></span><span style="font-family: DengXian-Regular; font-size: xx-small;" lang="JA"><span style="font-family: DengXian-Regular; font-size: xx-small;" lang="JA">，</span></span><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">attempting</span></span></p><p align="LEFT"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">at converting the </span></span><em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS,Italic; font-size: xx-small;">Yili Jingzhuan Tongjie </span></span></em><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="font-family: TrebuchetMS; font-size: xx-small;">into</span></span></p><p align="LEFT">ritual classics of the era. Li Huang’s development</p><p align="LEFT">of Zhu Xi’s ritual spirit is the localization of</p><p align="LEFT">Confucianism and Zhu Xi’s theory. And Han</p><p align="LEFT">Yuanzhen’s development of annotation of Zhu</p><p align="LEFT">Xi’s theory is the Korean Dynasty Confucians’</p><p>answer to the public issues of Confucianism.</p>

In this paper, heavy metal oxide glasses co-doped with erbium and holmium ions have been synthesized. Glass composition, based on the bismuth and germanium oxides, has been selected in terms of high thermal stability (delta T = 125 °C), high refractive index (n = 2.19) and low maximum phonon energy (hvmax = 724 cm-1). Up-conversion luminescence spectra under the 980 nm laser diode excitation have been observed as a result of radiative transitions within the quantum energy level structures of Er3+ and Ho3+ ions. Optimization of rare earth ions content has been conducted, the highest emission intensity in the visible wavelength range has been observed in glass co-doped with molar concentration 0.5 Er2O3 / 0.5 Ho2O3. Full Text: PDF ReferencesF. Zhang, Z. Bi, A. Huang, Z. Xiao, "Visible luminescence properties of Er3+?Pr3+ codoped fluorotellurite glasses", Opt. Materials 41, 112 (2014). CrossRef S. Li, S. Ye, T. Liu, H. Wang, D. Wang, "Enhanced up-conversion emissions in ZnO-LiYbO2:RE3+ (RE = Er or Ho) hybrid phosphors through surface modification", J. All. Comp. 658, 85 (2016). CrossRef J. Fu, X. Zhang, Z. Chao, Z. Li, J. Liao, D. Hou, H. Wen, X. Lu, X. Xie, "Enhanced upconversion luminescence of NaYF4:Yb, Er microprisms via La3+ doping", Opt. Laser Tech. 88, 280 (2017). CrossRef Y. Tian, R. Xu, L. Hu, J. Zhang, "2.7 ?m fluorescence radiative dynamics and energy transfer between Er3+ and Tm3+ ions in fluoride glass under 800 nm and 980 nm excitation", J. Quant. Spec. Rad. Tra. 113, 87 (2012). CrossRef M. Zhang, A. Yang, Y. Peng, B. Zhang, H. Ren, W. Guo, Y. Yang, C. Zhai, Y. Wang, Z. Yang, D. Tang, "Dy3+-doped Ga?Sb?S chalcogenide glasses for mid-infrared lasers", Mat. Res. Bul. 70, 55 (2015). CrossRef G. Yang, T. Li, "Broadband 1.53 ?m emission in Er3+-doped Ga-Bi-Pb-Ge heavy metal oxide glasses", J. Rare Earths 26, 924 (2008). CrossRef Y. Guo, Y. Tian, L. Zhang, L. Hu, J. Zhang, "Erbium doped heavy metal oxide glasses for mid-infrared laser materials", J. Non-Cryst. Solids 377, 119 (2013). CrossRef Z. Hou, Z. Xue, F. Li, M. Wang, X. Hu, S. Wang, "Luminescence and up-conversion mechanism of Er3+/Ho3+ co-doped oxyfluoride tellurite glasses and glass?ceramics", J. All. Comp. 577, 523 (2013). CrossRef X. Li, Q. Nie, S. Dai, T. Xu, L. Lu, X. Zhang, "Energy transfer and frequency upconversion in Ho3+/Yb3+ co-doped bismuth-germanate glasses", J. All. Comp. 454, 510 (2008). CrossRef S.S. Rojas, J.E. De Souza, M.R.B. Andreeta, A.C. Hernandes, "Influence of ceria addition on thermal properties and local structure of bismuth germanate glasses", J. Non-Cryst. Solids 356, 2942 (2010). CrossRef M.S. Ebrahim, Irina, Mid-infrared coherent sources and applications, Springer (2008). CrossRef T. Ragin, J. Zmojda, M. Kochanowicz, P. Miluski, P. Jelen, M. Sitarz, D. Dorosz, "Enhanced mid-infrared 2.7 ?m luminescence in low hydroxide bismuth-germanate glass and optical fiber co-doped with Er3 +/Yb3 + ions", J. Non-Cryst. Solids 457, 169 (2017). CrossRef K. Biswas, A.D. Sontakke, R. Sen, K. Annapurna, "Enhanced 2 ?m broad-band emission and NIR to visible frequency up-conversion from Ho3+/Yb3+ co-doped Bi2O3?GeO2?ZnO glasses", Spectr. Acta. Part A, Mol. Biomol. Spectr. 112, 301-308 (2013). CrossRef R.S. Romaniuk, D. Dorosz, J. Żmojda, M. Kochanowicz, W. Mazerski, "Upconversion luminescence in tellurite glass codoped with Yb3+/Ho3+ ions", Proc. of SPIE 8903, 890307 (2013). CrossRef

Since they were first excavated in 1983, the early Han dynasty texts discovered in Tomb M247 at Zhangjiashan have been the subject of much scholarly research. This paper focuses on theGai Lu, the only military text excavated at this site, and one that continues to pose many problems. Although the manuscript of theGai Luappears to have been written at the very beginning of the Western Han dynasty, the text is highly corrupt and is likely to have gone through many recensions prior to being buried in this tomb. The antiquity of this text is entirely consistent with its status as an early example of a yin-yang military text, an important branch of strategic thought in early China which is recorded in the “Yiwen zhi” chapter of theHan shu, but which is now survives only through archaeological material. These have allowed scholars to interpret transmitted military texts in an entirely new light. TheGai Lurepresents an extremely important example of such a yin-yang text, and also forms part of a major early Chinese literary genre: writings connected with the conflict between the kingdoms of Wu and Yue.

Nasopharyngeal carcinoma (NPC) is a head and neck cancer involving epithelial squamous-cell carcinoma of the nasopharynx that mainly occurs in individuals from East and Southeast Asia. We investigated whether Chinese herbal medicine (CHM) as a complementary therapy offers benefits to these patients. We retrospectively evaluated the Taiwan Cancer Registry (Long Form) database for patients with advanced NPC, using or not using CHM, between 2007–2013. Cox proportional-hazard model and Kaplan‒Meier survival analyses were applied for patient survival. CHM-users showed a lower overall and cancer-related mortality risk than non-users. For advanced NPC patients, the overall mortality risk was 0.799-fold for CHM-users, after controlling for age, gender, and Charlson comorbidity index (CCI) score (Cancer stages 3 + 4: adjusted hazard ratio [aHR]: 0.799, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.676–0.943, p = 0.008). CHM-users also showed a lower cancer-related mortality risk than non-users (aHR: 0.71, 95% CI: 0.53–0.96, p = 0.0273). Association rule analysis showed that CHM pairs were Ban-Zhi-Lian (BZL; Scutellaria barbata D.Don) and For single herbs, Bai-Hua-She-She-Cao (Herba Hedyotis Diffusae; Scleromitrion diffusum (Willd.) R.J.Wang (syn. Hedyotis diffusa Willd.) and Mai-Men-Dong (MMD; Ophiopogon japonicus (Thunb.) Ker Gawl.), and Gan-Lu-Yin (GLY) and BHSSC. Network analysis revealed that BHSSC was the core CHM, and BZL, GLY, and Xin-Yi-Qing-Fei-Tang (XYQFT) were important CHMs in cluster 1. In cluster 2, ShengDH, MMD, Xuan-Shen (XS; Scrophularia ningpoensis Hensl.), and Gua-Lou-Gen (GLG; Trichosanthes kirilowii Maxim.) were important CHMs. Thus, as a complementary therapy, CHM, and particularly the 8 CHMs identified, are important for the treatment of advanced NPC patients.

Introdução: Os ossos nasais são os mais proeminentes do esqueleto facial, tornando esses os mais frequentes nas fraturas faciais, sendo o terceiro osso mais comumente fraturado do esqueleto humano. Objetivo: Apresentar um relato de caso de fratura nasal em um paciente pediatrico tratado com redução incruenta. Método: Estudo descritivo com um paciente que apresentou diagnóstico clínico/imaginológico de fratura nasal. Conclusão: O tratamento através de redução incluenta mostrou-se adequado em pacientes pediatricos. A ocorrência de traumatismos e lesões associadas a fraturas nasais reforça a importância de uma abordagem multidisciplinar.Descritores: Fraturas Ósseas; Osso Nasal; Traumatismos Faciais.ReferênciasMa L, Shen SH, Hu P, Wu ZQ. The observation of curative effect on closed reduction of nasal bone fracture under ultrasound guidance: report of 38 cases. Zhonghua Er Bi Yan Hou Tou Jing Wai Ke Za Zhi. 2017;52(12):933-35.Schoinohoriti O, Igoumenakis D, Rallis G. Fractures of the nasal bones: is external splinting really warranted? J Craniofac Surg. 2017;28(8):e760-e63.Kang CM, Han DG. Correlation between Operation Result and Patient Satisfaction of Nasal Bone Fracture. Arch Craniofac Surg. 2017;18(1):25-9.Kyung H, Choi JI, Song SH, Oh SH, Kang N. Comparison of postoperative outcomes between monitored anesthesia care and general anesthesia in closed reduction of nasal fracture. J Craniofac Surg. 2018;29(2):286-88.Nishioka H, Kondoh S, Yuzuriha S. Convex bone deformity after closed reduction of nasal bone fracture. J Plast Reconstr Aesthet Surg. 2018;71(1):85-9.Lu GN, Humphrey CD, Kriet JD. Correction of Nasal Fractures. Facial Plast Surg Clin North Am. 2017;25(4):537-546.Kim SW, Park B, Lee TG, Kim JY. Olfactory Dysfunction in Nasal Bone Fracture. Arch Craniofac Surg. 2017;18(2):92-6.Davidson J, Nickerson D, Nickerson B. Zygomatic fractures: comparison of methods of internal fixation. Plast Reconstr Surg. 1990;86(1):25-32.Yabe T, Tsuda T, Hirose S, Ozawa T. Comparison of pediatric and adult nasal fractures. J Craniofac Surg. 2012;23(5):1364-6.Murphy RX Jr, Birmingham KL, Okunski WJ, Wasser TE. Influence of restraining devices on patterns of pediatric facial trauma in motor vehicle collisions. Plast Reconstr Surg. 2001;107(1):34-7.

Introdução: O câncer é definido como uma proliferação descontrolada de células malignas em um hospedeiro e considerado uma das principais causas de morte em todo o mundo. No Brasil, o câncer colorretal é a segunda causa de morte mais comum entre mulheres e a terceira mais prevalente em homens. Muitas estratégias têm sido estudadas para auxiliar o tratamento antineoplásico. Dentro desse contexto, a ingestão de probióticos, representa uma nova opção terapêutica relevante no âmbito da nutrição. Objetivo: Realizar uma revisão sobre o uso dos probióticos no tratamento de pacientes com câncer colorretal. Material e Método: Trata-se de uma revisão realizada em 2018, utilizando-se 10 artigos, pesquisados nas bases indexadas BVS e PubMed e na ferramenta de pesquisa Google acadêmico. A pesquisa incluiu artigos em português e inglês publicados no período de 2010 a 2017. Resultados: O uso de probióticos demonstrou trazer efeitos positivos ao tratamento de pacientes com câncer colorretal, trazendo benefícios como: a diminuição de enterobactérias e enterococos, melhora na modulação da imunidade local, melhora dos sintomas intestinais, recuperação da função intestinal, entre outros. Conclusão: Conclui-se que apesar dos resultados positivos observados, há a necessidade de futuros estudos de longa duração para elucidar melhor essa relação.Descritores: Neoplasias Colorretais; Nutrientes; Probióticos.ReferênciasKahouli I, Malhotra M, Westfall S, Alaoui-Jamali MA, Prakash S. Design and validation of an orally administrated active L. fermentum-L. acidophilus probiotic formulation using colorectal cancer Apc Min/+ mouse model. Appl Microbiol Biotechnol. 2017;101(5):1999-2019.Oliveira RC, Rêgo MAV. Mortality risck of colorectal câncer in Brazil from 1980 to 2013. Arq Gastroenterol 2016;53(2)76-83.Instituto Nacional de Câncer (INCA). Tipos de câncer: colorretal. 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Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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