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Academic literature on the topic 'Luck'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 30 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Luck"

1

Darke, Peter R., and Jonathan L. Freedman. "Lucky Events and Beliefs in Luck: Paradoxical Effects on Confidence and Risk-Taking." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23, no. 4 (April 1997): 378–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167297234004.

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The effects of a lucky event and irrational beliefs about luck were examined. In two experiments, some subjects experienced a lucky event, whereas others did not. All subjects then completed an unrelated decision task rated their confidence, and placed a bet. The effects of a lucky experience depended substantially on individual beliefs concerning the causal properties of luck. After the lucky event, those who believed in luck (i.e., thought of luck as a stable, personal attribute) were more confident and bet more, whereas those who did not believe in luck (i.e., thought luck was random) were less confident and bet less. A third experiment identified analogous effects using multiple-choice test questions that included a monetary penalty for errors. Increased expectations following initial luck were interpreted in terms of a lucky streak effect, whereas the paradoxical decrease in expectancy was viewed as an instance of the gamblers' fallacy.

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Boyd, Kenneth. "ENVIRONMENTAL LUCK AND THE STRUCTURE OF UNDERSTANDING." Episteme 17, no. 1 (May 21, 2018): 73–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.18.

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ABSTRACTConventional wisdom holds that there is no lucky knowledge: if it is a matter of luck, in some relevant sense, that one's belief that p is true, then one does not know that p. Here I will argue that there is similarly no lucky understanding, at least in the case of one type of luck, namely environmental luck. This argument has three parts. First, we need to determine how we evaluate whether one has understanding, which requires determining what I will call understanding's evaluative object. I argue that as the evaluative object of (at least a traditional conception of) knowledge is a belief in a proposition, the evaluative object of understanding is a mental representation of a relational structure. Next, I show that arguments that environmental luck is incompatible with understanding miss the mark by considering cases in which one has a belief in a proposition is lucky to be true, instead of ones in which one's mental representation of a relational structure is lucky to obtain. I agree, then, with those who argue that one can have understanding when one's beliefs are environmentally lucky to be true, but that this compatibility is not relevant when considering the question of whether one can have environmentally lucky understanding. I then present what I take to be a properly constructed case which shows the incompatibility of environmental luck with understanding.

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Stoutenburg, Gregory. "THE EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS OF LUCK." Episteme 12, no. 3 (January 28, 2015): 319–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.35.

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AbstractDuncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world, but does not occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. Jennifer Lackey has provided counterexamples to accounts which, like Pritchard's, only allow for the existence of improbable lucky events. Neil Levy has responded to Lackey by offering a modal account of luck which attempts to respect the intuition that some lucky events occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. But his account rejects that events which are as likely as those in Lackey's examples are lucky. Instead, they are merely fortunate. I argue that Levy's argument to this effect fails. I then offer a substitute account of the improbability condition which respects this intuition. This condition says that the relevant notion of probability for luck is epistemic.

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Chernyak, Alexey Z. "Knowledge and Luck." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 2 (2020): 61–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057222.

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There is a widely shared belief in contemporary epistemology that propositional knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck, most of all with so called veritic luck. A subject is veritically lucky in his or her belief that p if this belief is true not due to its foundations (for example, reasons which an agent has to believe that p) but by mere accident. The acceptance of the thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with this kind of luck led to significant modifications of a popular modern epistemological tripartite analysis of propositional knowledge according to which subject knows that p if and only if he or she believes that p is true, p is actually true, and an agent’s belief that p is true is justified. In his famous paper “Is True Justified Belief Knowledge” E. Gettier demonstrated that true justified belief may not be knowledge. The core of the problem is that in the cases described by Gettier and the like an agent’s belief, though justified, is true by accident. This gave rise to a set of theories introducing additional conditions of knowledge which could exclude veritic luck. In this paper the author critically discusses main modifications of the tripartite concept of knowledge aimed at making it independent on veritic luck, and show that they are unable to solve this problem. He agrees with those who think that the very thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with veritic luck is wrong. But he disagrees that all kinds of veritic luck are compatible with knowledge: the author supposes that good veritic luck is compatible with knowledge only when it compensates some negative effect of antecedent bad epistemic luck. According to this view original Gettier examples are not cases of knowledge whereas broken-clocks case and fake-barns case are. This account allows treating many classic cases of dependence of knowledge on luck as cases of knowledge-acquirement, but in the same time it excludes the inclusion into the class of knowledge such intuitively irrelevant outcomes as lucky guess and wishful thinking.

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Khalifa, Kareem. "UNDERSTANDING, GRASPING AND LUCK." Episteme 10, no. 1 (March 2013): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.6.

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AbstractRecently, it has been debated as to whether understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Those who deny this claim frequently argue that understanding, unlike knowledge, can be lucky. In this paper I argue that current arguments do not support this alleged compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. First, I argue that understanding requires reliable explanatory evaluation, yet the putative examples of lucky understanding underspecify the extent to which subjects possess this ability. In the course of defending this claim, I also provide a new account of the kind of ‘grasping’ taken to be central to understanding. Second, I show that putative examples of lucky understanding unwittingly deploy a kind of luck that is compatible with knowledge. Finally, appealing to a number of works on explanation and its attendant epistemology, I argue that alleged instances of lucky understanding that overcome these two obstacles will invariably violate certain norms of explanatory inquiry – our paradigmatic understanding-oriented practice. By contrast, knowledge of the same information is immune to these criticisms. Consequently, if understanding is environmentally lucky, it is always inferior to the understanding that a corresponding case of knowledge would provide.

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Michalek, Arthur M. "Bad Luck, No Luck, Good Luck!" Journal of Cancer Education 30, no. 2 (March 29, 2015): 205–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13187-015-0817-0.

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Deshaye, Joel. "‘Do I feel lucky?’: Moral Luck, Bluffing and the Ethics of Eastwood's Outlaw-Lawman in Coogan's Bluff and the Dirty Harry Films." Film-Philosophy 21, no. 1 (February 2017): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/film.2017.0029.

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In Coogan's Bluff (1968) and the Dirty Harry films, Clint Eastwood's characters often invoke luck when they want unpredictable others to assume some responsibility to stop violence, thereby implicating moral luck in heroism. In the famous ‘Do I feel lucky’ scene from Dirty Harry (1971), Eastwood's character might not be bluffing, but he is giving luck a role in justice. In this case and others, his character's unconventional responsibility should prompt reconsideration of his character's virtue. Viewers must also decide where the deceptive or rule-breaking policeman locates the responsibility for his actions.

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Barba, Moisés, and Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. "Collective Epistemic Luck." Acta Analytica 37, no. 1 (October 28, 2021): 99–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x.

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AbstractA platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking (suitably defined) forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason (not a conclusive one) for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.

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Chernyak, Alexey Z. "Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 4 (2021): 77–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158462.

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The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

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Teigen, Karl Halvor, and Tine K. Jensen. "Unlucky Victims or Lucky Survivors?" European Psychologist 16, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 48–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000033.

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Subjective experiences of good or bad luck appear to depend upon downward or upward comparisons with close counterfactuals. People exposed to disasters have both options: They were at the wrong place at the wrong time, but their fate could in many cases have been worse; so in a sense, they are unlucky victims, but lucky survivors. Interviews with 85 Norwegian tourists 9–11 months after they had been exposed to the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia showed good luck to be a pivotal theme in a majority of the narratives. Nobody claimed they had been unfortunate or unlucky. Moreover, downward counterfactual thoughts and downward comparisons with others occurred 10 times more often than upward counterfactuals and upward comparisons. In a follow-up 2 years later, 95% answered they had been lucky. A contextual analysis revealed several facets of luck, including its relation to gratitude, guilt, and supernatural beliefs.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Luck"

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Flynn, Jennifer. "Luck." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0001/MQ42615.pdf.

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Willaby, Harold. "Luck Feelings, Luck Beliefs, and Decision Making." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/8926.

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Luck feelings have long been thought to influence decision making involving risk. Previous research has established the importance of prior outcomes, luck beliefs, and counterfactual thinking in the generation of luck feelings, but there has been no comprehensive demonstration of this system of variables that impinge on luck feelings. Moreover, the actual relationship of luck feelings and risky choice has not been directly tested. Addressing these gaps, results from five studies are presented in this thesis. Empirical work begins with an extensive validation exercise of an existing 22-item luck beliefs scale. Those 22 items are refined to a 16-item scale, comprising four luck belief dimensions that inter-relate in a compelling structural arrangement. Insights from this exercise, and a subset of the items are used throughout the remainder of the thesis. Results from two studies contradicted the counterfactual closeness hypothesis, the most prominent theory in the psychology of luck, which holds that counterfactual thinking is essential for generating lucky feelings. However, one study found that affect and luck feelings are not unitary, as evidenced by a weak form of double dissociation of affect and lucky feelings from overestimation and overplacement. Another study found lucky and unlucky feelings to be distinct. The effects of lucky feelings and unlucky feelings on risky choice differ by the nature of a prior outcome. For negative outcomes, unlucky feelings are likely to influence risky choices. For positive outcomes, lucky feelings are likely to influence risky choices. The type of risky choice most affected by lucky feelings—for positive experiences—is ambiguity tolerance in the probability distributions of prospective outcomes. The Activation Theory of Luck Feelings (ActLF) is proposed, which reconciles previous findings to those reported herein.

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Simmons, Kianna R. "Evoking Luck." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2012. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1482.

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Abstract Gambling is a universal activity, although not a recently studied behavior in Sociological literature. This study uses symbolic interaction, play, and illusion of control theories to examine luck rituals at casino slots. Gamblers were observed through covert participant observations over a seven-month observation period in The casino, and yielded 388 observations. Analysis of the gamblers demonstrated the fact that luck rituals do exist and are used at the slot machines in a casino setting. Luck rituals are associated with participants’ belief in their ability to control the uncontrollable. The illusion of control provides a framework through which the results are discussed. Illusions of control are particularly likely to occur in situations with a high amount of uncertainty. This study showed that more women and African Americans participate in luck rituals than men.

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Latus, Andrew Michael. "Avoiding luck, the problem of moral luck and its significance." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0008/NQ35218.pdf.

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Barry, Nicholas. "Defending luck egalitarianism." University of Western Australia. School of Social and Cultural Studies, 2007. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2007.0036.

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[Truncated abstract] In this thesis, I seek to determine whether luck egalitarianism is a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice. In answering this question, I challenge existing interpretations and criticisms of luck egalitarianism, and highlight its radical consequences. I propose a revised theory of luck egalitarianism, and conclude that it does represent a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice. In the first chapter, I trace the evolution of luck egalitarianism, highlighting the variety of theories that have been grouped under this label. In chapter 2, I defend the approach against an influential critique by Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that luck egalitarianism is inherently disrespectful, trapped in the distributive paradigm, and harsh in its approach towards the victims of bad option luck. I argue against these criticisms, pointing out that the harsh treatment problem will rarely arise because few inequalities result entirely from option luck, and that luck egalitarianism is not disrespectful to those it seeks to assist, nor trapped in the distributive paradigm. In chapter 3, I analyse the distinction between option luck and brute luck, which is crucial to luck egalitarianism. I argue that the option-brute distinction is inconsistent with the underlying impulse of luck egalitarianism because it allows morally arbitrary inequalities to go uncorrected and because it is insufficiently sensitive to the impact of background inequalities on individual choice. I propose a revised theory of luck egalitarianism that focuses on the extent to which a person's level of advantage has been genuinely chosen, rejecting the option-brute distinction. In chapter 4, I give a broader justification of this theory, analysing recent critiques by Susan Hurley and Samuel Scheffler, who have both questioned the moral foundations of luck egalitarianism. In chapter 5, I outline a conception of egalitarian advantage to work alongside the revised theory of luck egalitarianism. I support Cohen's claim that egalitarians should adopt a heterogeneous account of advantage, which includes resources, welfare, and midfare. ... In chapter 7, I highlight the counter-intuitive social policy applications of luck egalitarianism, arguing that the universal approach to social provision associated with the social democratic welfare state comes closer to achieving luck-egalitarian objectives than the residual and conditional provision of benefits and services that is associated with the liberal welfare state. I conclude that luck egalitarianism, in the revised form I outline in chapter 3, is a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice.

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Whittington, Lee John. "Metaphysics of luck." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20409.

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Clare, the titular character of The Time Traveller's Wife, reflects that "Everything seems simple until you think about it." (Niffenegger, 2003, 1) This might well be a mantra for the whole of philosophy, but a fair few terms tend to stick out. "Knowledge", "goodness" and "happiness" for example, are all pervasive everyday terms that undergo significant philosophical analysis. "Luck", I think, is another one of these terms. Wishing someone good luck in their projects, and cursing our bad luck when success seems so close to our reach or failure could have so easily been otherwise, happens so often that we rarely stop to reflect on what we really mean. Philosophical reflection on the nature of luck has a rich tradition, that is by no stretch confined to the Western philosophical canon. However, it has only very recently become one of the goals of philosophy to provide a clear account of what luck actually amounts to. This, in part, is the goal of this thesis. The thesis has two primary motivations. The first is to offer and defend a general account of luck that overcomes the problems faced by the current accounts of luck that are available in the current philosophical literature. The second is to apply this general account of luck to the areas of metaethics and epistemology where luck has been a pervasive and problematic concept, and demonstrate how this account of luck may resolve or further illuminate some of the problems that the notion has generated. The thesis is roughly split into two parts. The first half of the thesis focuses on the former objective of offering an account of luck. Chapter 1 offers a selected history of the philosophy of luck that spans from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, so that we might properly situate the current work on luck as part of the broader historical importance of the concept. Chapter 2 will set out the major rival to the theory of luck that I will offer - the lack of control account of luck (LCAL). LCAL has various iterations across the literature, but is most clearly articulated by Wayne Riggs (2009) and E.J. Coffman (2006, 2009). Both Coffman and Riggs add and adapt their own conditions to LCAL specifically so that the account may overcome several problems that have been levied against it. These further conditions are not incompatible so, to provide the strongest lack of control account possible, I have combined them to form a lack of control account I have called Combined LCAL - (c)LCAL. The latter part of the chapter pits (c)LCAL against some of the problems that have been raised against LCAL. However, despite the efforts of both Riggs and Coffman, even (c)LCAL fails to counter some of these objections. For these reasons I have rejected LCAL has a viable candidate for an account of luck. Chapter 3 sets out a modal account of luck (MAL), as argued for by Pritchard (2004, 2005, 2014), where an event is lucky only if it occurs in the actual world, but not in a relevant set of nearby possible worlds. Here I further elaborate on how we should understand the modal distances using Lewisian possible world semantics, and what worlds should be taken into consideration when fixing the relevant set of nearby possible worlds. I argue that these relevant sets of worlds should be fixed according to the domain of inquiry of which the luck is being applied - this I call the type of luck. Examples of this is the current literature are resultant luck - the type of luck concerned with the results of our actions, and veritic luck - the type of luck concerned with the modal safety of our belief formation. Due to the multitude of types of luck across disciplinary areas, a general modal account of luck requires flexibility in what factors should fix the relevant sets of possible worlds. I achieve this by providing a [TYPE] function for the general modal account of luck, which is used as a mean of inserting the relevant fixing conditions for any domain of inquiry. Chapter 3, in a similar vein to Chapter 2, pits the general modal account of luck against some of the problems that have been levied against MAL, specifically the Buried Treasure problem raised by Lackey (2008) and the agent causation problem as raised by Levy (2011). More successfully, the modal account offered stands up against these criticisms. For these reasons, the modal condition understood with the [TYPE] function and Lewisian semantics concerning modal distances, will be adopted to make up one half of the conditions for my account of luck. Chapter 4 will look at the second condition for an account of luck - the significance condition. The chapter will set out the reasons for adopting a significance condition at all, and some of the ways in which the condition has been articulated by Rescher (1995), Pritchard (2005) and Ballantyne (2011). All of these current views of the significance condition will be found wanting due to their inability to make sense of certain kinds of luck in specific normative domains. For example, Ballantyne's account of significance focuses on the interests of an agent, yet for certain types of moral luck, the interests of the agent are irrelevant. Instead, I propose a relativised significance condition, where the value of the event is relative to the value of the normative domain in which the luck is being ascribed. Epistemic luck requires a focus on the epistemic significance of the event for the agent, moral luck requires a focus on the moral or ethical significance of the event for the agent, and so on. This I call the kind of luck. Similar to the [TYPE] function for the modal condition for luck, the significance condition requires a [NORMATIVE DOMAIN] function where the relevant normative domain can be inserted depending on the kind of luck. This version of the significance condition will be conjoined with the modal condition as set out in Chapter 3 to form the correct general account of luck. Chapter 5 is the first chapter of the second half of the thesis that concerns applying the account of luck set out in part 1 to more specific domains of inquiry. Chapter 5 concerns moral luck, more specifically, resultant moral luck. Moral luck has traditionally been understood in terms of lack of control. This chapter looks at how Pritchard (2005) and Driver (2014) have attempted to understand moral luck using modal conditions. However, it is argued that these attempts would be more successful if we adopted the account of luck that I have offered in previous chapters. The chapter will go on to look at two possible problems that may be faced by this modal account of luck, and how it may resolve these problems. Chapter 6, the final chapter, looks at epistemic luck, specifically how the adoption of the modal account I have offered resolves a particular problem targeted at anti-luck epistemology by Ballantyne (2013). The problem, Ballantyne argues, is that given that luck requires a significance condition, the degree of significance affects the degree of luck and that the degree of luck involved in our belief formation affects whether we are in a position to know the target proposition, that the result is that degree of significance affects our ability to know. For at least some instances of this - such as the aesthetic significance that we assign to the target proposition - the result will be that non-epistemic factors that have no relevance at all whether an agent is in a position to know will (absurdly, in Ballantyne's view) affect that agent's position to know. The resolution to this problem can be found in a two part solution. The first part is to demonstrate that any degree of veritic epistemic luck results in the agent failing to know. The second is that through the relativisation of the significance condition, any type of value will not affect an agent's position to know, only the epistemic value.
With these two considerations in mind, the latter of which that can only be held through the adoption of the modal account of luck I have offered, the problem may be resolved.

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Barry, Nicholas. "Defending luck egalitarianism /." Connect to this title, 2006. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2007.0036.

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Harrison, Gerald Kingsley. "Free will and luck." Thesis, Durham University, 2005. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2732/.

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The problem of free will is a problem about control and luck. If causal determinism is true, then everything we do is ultimately a matter of luck, as it is if causal determinism is false. Either way we seem to lack free will of the kind needed for moral responsibility. In this thesis a case is built for a certain type of modest incompatibilist view on free will. It is argued that it makes no difference in terms of control whether determinism or indeterminism obtains. What matters is that we have a certain kind of ownership over what we do. Causal determinism rules this out, but indeterminism does not. This has the upshot that not only does free will turn out to be compatible with luck, exposure to a certain kind of luck is actually required, for unless we are exposed to this kind of luck our actions will not be truly ours. By providing luck with a positive role this thesis invites a re-evaluation of the reasons causal determinism destroys free will, and a re-evaluation of our attitudes towards luck. In short this thesis challenges the anti-luckism that lies behind the problem of free will.

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Mylne, Colin Andrew. "Luck and moral agency." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240976.

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Han, Rui. "Luck egalitarianism : criticisms and alternatives /." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B4413826X.

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Books on the topic "Luck"

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1970-, Williams Lisa, ed. Bad luck, Lucy! London: Franklin Watts, 2007.

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Graves, Sue. Bad luck, Lucy! New York, NY: Crabtree Pub. Co., 2008.

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Carter, Sam. Good luck, bad luck. London: Franklin Watts, 2009.

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Perillo, Lucia Maria. Luck is luck: Poems. New York, NY: Random House, 2004.

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Schlachter, Rita. Good luck, bad luck. Mahwah, N.J: Troll Associates, 1986.

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ill, James Lillie, ed. Good luck bad luck. New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Viking, 1991.

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Chilton, Irma. Luck. s.l: Cassell, 1997.

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Faust, Frederick Schiller. Luck. New York: Dorchester Publishing Co., Inc., 2009.

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Hofmann, Gert. Luck. London: Vintage, 2003.

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Barfoot, Joan. Luck. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006.

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Book chapters on the topic "Luck"

1

Rescher, Nicholas. "Luck." In Philosophical Clarifications, 173–89. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15269-7_12.

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Fraser-Reid, Bert. "“Luck?”." In From Sugar to Splenda, 59–62. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22781-3_6.

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Teigen, Karl Halvor. "Luck." In Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research, 3731–33. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_1712.

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Szenberg, Michael, and Lall Ramrattan. "Luck." In Economic Ironies Throughout History, 119–20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137450821_11.

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Teigen, Karl Halvor. "Luck." In Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69909-7_1712-2.

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Church, Ian M., and Robert J. Hartman. "Luck." In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck, 1–10. Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351258760-1.

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Teigen, Karl Halvor. "Luck." In Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research, 4037–40. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17299-1_1712.

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Allison, Scott T. "Heroism, Good Luck, and Bad Luck." In Encyclopedia of Heroism Studies, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17125-3_540-1.

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Wollner, Gabriel. "Luck Egalitarianism." In Handbuch Gerechtigkeit, 249–54. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05345-9_39.

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Kvalnes, Øyvind. "Moral Luck." In Moral Reasoning at Work, 31–37. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15191-1_4.

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Conference papers on the topic "Luck"

1

Wu, Cuifeng, and Linru Nie. "Can Lucky Dividends Really Bring Luck to Listed Companies?" In ICEBA 2021: 2021 7th International Conference on E-Business and Applications. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3457640.3457671.

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Blanchard, Collin A., Holly A. Buff, Travis D. Cook, Raquel E. Dottle, Gideon B. Luck, Alani L. Peters, Virginia L. Pettit, Isaak Matthew Ramirez, and Jessica E. Wininger. "Print (“Good Luck!”)." In CHI '18: CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3170427.3180287.

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Milutinovic, Mitar, Warren He, Howard Wu, and Maxinder Kanwal. "Proof of Luck." In Middleware '16: 17th International Middleware Conference. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3007788.3007790.

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Tan, Hans. "No Such Luck." In C&C '17: Creativity and Cognition. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3059454.3059504.

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Prais, Michael G., and Nanette Suitts. "Seven years good luck." In the 24th annual ACM SIGUCCS conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/262051.262098.

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Aoki, Raquel Y. S., Renato M. Assuncao, and Pedro O. S. Vaz de Melo. "Luck is Hard to Beat." In KDD '17: The 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3097983.3098045.

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Korpole, P. "Not a Stroke of Luck!" In American Thoracic Society 2023 International Conference, May 19-24, 2023 - Washington, DC. American Thoracic Society, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1164/ajrccm-conference.2023.207.1_meetingabstracts.a3534.

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Chernyak, Alexey. "Egalitarian Distributive Justice and Reasoning Luck." In 2016 International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/iccessh-16.2016.152.

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Yendler, Boris. "Satellite Rescue- Luck of Skillful Application of Technology." In AIAA SPACE 2012 Conference & Exposition. Reston, Virigina: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/6.2012-5287.

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Mitra, Gargi, Prasanna Karthik Vairam, Patanjali Slpsk, Nitin Chandrachoodan, and Kamakoti V. "Depending on HTTP/2 for Privacy? Good Luck!" In 2020 50th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/dsn48063.2020.00044.

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Reports on the topic "Luck"

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Benhabib, Jess, and Shenghao Zhu. Age, Luck, and Inheritance. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14128.

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Seybold, Patricia. Culture Nurtures Innovation at Luck Stone. Boston, MA: Patricia Seybold Group, April 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1571/cs04-24-14cc.

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Davis, Lucas, and Catherine Hausman. Are Energy Executives Rewarded For Luck? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25391.

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Frisancho, Verónica, Kala Krishna, Sergey Lychagin, and Cemile Yavas. Better Luck Next Time: Learning Through Retaking. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19663.

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Yavas, Cemile, Kala Krishna, Verónica Frisancho, and Sergey Lychagin. Better Luck Next Time: Learning through Retaking. Inter-American Development Bank, January 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011536.

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Abstract:

This paper provides some evidence that repeat taking of competitive exams may reduce the impact of background disadvantages on educational outcomes. Using administrative data on the university entrance exam in Turkey, the paper estimates cumulative learning between the first and the nth attempt while controlling for selection into retaking in terms of observed and unobserved characteristics. Large learning gains measured in terms of improvements in the exam scores are found, especially among less advantaged students.

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Green, Robert, and Michael Linnington. Sadat & The Yom Kippur War: Luck or Brilliance? Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada442409.

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Buchanan, Ian. Australia avoids the crisis, by luck and good management. East Asia Forum, December 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1261605649.

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Beaty, James E. Luck Is Not a Strategy: Inefficient Coercion In Operation Allied Force. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1009082.

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Easterly, William, Michael Kremer, Lant Pritchett, and Lawrence Summers. Good Policy or Good Luck? Country Growth Performance and Temporary Shocks. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4474.

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Leung, Suiwah. Vietnam’s economy weathers the COVID-19 storm — good policy or luck? East Asia Forum, October 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1602021634.

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