To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Luck.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Luck'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Luck.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Flynn, Jennifer. "Luck." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0001/MQ42615.pdf.
Full text
2
Willaby, Harold. "Luck Feelings, Luck Beliefs, and Decision Making." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/8926.
Full textAbstract:
Luck feelings have long been thought to influence decision making involving risk. Previous research has established the importance of prior outcomes, luck beliefs, and counterfactual thinking in the generation of luck feelings, but there has been no comprehensive demonstration of this system of variables that impinge on luck feelings. Moreover, the actual relationship of luck feelings and risky choice has not been directly tested. Addressing these gaps, results from five studies are presented in this thesis. Empirical work begins with an extensive validation exercise of an existing 22-item luck beliefs scale. Those 22 items are refined to a 16-item scale, comprising four luck belief dimensions that inter-relate in a compelling structural arrangement. Insights from this exercise, and a subset of the items are used throughout the remainder of the thesis. Results from two studies contradicted the counterfactual closeness hypothesis, the most prominent theory in the psychology of luck, which holds that counterfactual thinking is essential for generating lucky feelings. However, one study found that affect and luck feelings are not unitary, as evidenced by a weak form of double dissociation of affect and lucky feelings from overestimation and overplacement. Another study found lucky and unlucky feelings to be distinct. The effects of lucky feelings and unlucky feelings on risky choice differ by the nature of a prior outcome. For negative outcomes, unlucky feelings are likely to influence risky choices. For positive outcomes, lucky feelings are likely to influence risky choices. The type of risky choice most affected by lucky feelings—for positive experiences—is ambiguity tolerance in the probability distributions of prospective outcomes. The Activation Theory of Luck Feelings (ActLF) is proposed, which reconciles previous findings to those reported herein.
3
Simmons, Kianna R. "Evoking Luck." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2012. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1482.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract
Gambling is a universal activity, although not a recently studied behavior in Sociological literature. This study uses symbolic interaction, play, and illusion of control theories to examine luck rituals at casino slots. Gamblers were observed through covert participant observations over a seven-month observation period in The casino, and yielded 388 observations. Analysis of the gamblers demonstrated the fact that luck rituals do exist and are used at the slot machines in a casino setting. Luck rituals are associated with participants’ belief in their ability to control the uncontrollable. The illusion of control provides a framework through which the results are discussed. Illusions of control are particularly likely to occur in situations with a high amount of uncertainty. This study showed that more women and African Americans participate in luck rituals than men.
4
Latus, Andrew Michael. "Avoiding luck, the problem of moral luck and its significance." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0008/NQ35218.pdf.
Full text
5
Barry, Nicholas. "Defending luck egalitarianism." University of Western Australia. School of Social and Cultural Studies, 2007. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2007.0036.
Full textAbstract:
[Truncated abstract] In this thesis, I seek to determine whether luck egalitarianism is a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice. In answering this question, I challenge existing interpretations and criticisms of luck egalitarianism, and highlight its radical consequences. I propose a revised theory of luck egalitarianism, and conclude that it does represent a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice. In the first chapter, I trace the evolution of luck egalitarianism, highlighting the variety of theories that have been grouped under this label. In chapter 2, I defend the approach against an influential critique by Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that luck egalitarianism is inherently disrespectful, trapped in the distributive paradigm, and harsh in its approach towards the victims of bad option luck. I argue against these criticisms, pointing out that the harsh treatment problem will rarely arise because few inequalities result entirely from option luck, and that luck egalitarianism is not disrespectful to those it seeks to assist, nor trapped in the distributive paradigm. In chapter 3, I analyse the distinction between option luck and brute luck, which is crucial to luck egalitarianism. I argue that the option-brute distinction is inconsistent with the underlying impulse of luck egalitarianism because it allows morally arbitrary inequalities to go uncorrected and because it is insufficiently sensitive to the impact of background inequalities on individual choice. I propose a revised theory of luck egalitarianism that focuses on the extent to which a person's level of advantage has been genuinely chosen, rejecting the option-brute distinction. In chapter 4, I give a broader justification of this theory, analysing recent critiques by Susan Hurley and Samuel Scheffler, who have both questioned the moral foundations of luck egalitarianism. In chapter 5, I outline a conception of egalitarian advantage to work alongside the revised theory of luck egalitarianism. I support Cohen's claim that egalitarians should adopt a heterogeneous account of advantage, which includes resources, welfare, and midfare. ... In chapter 7, I highlight the counter-intuitive social policy applications of luck egalitarianism, arguing that the universal approach to social provision associated with the social democratic welfare state comes closer to achieving luck-egalitarian objectives than the residual and conditional provision of benefits and services that is associated with the liberal welfare state. I conclude that luck egalitarianism, in the revised form I outline in chapter 3, is a compelling interpretation of egalitarian justice.
6
Whittington, Lee John. "Metaphysics of luck." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20409.
Full textAbstract:
Clare, the titular character of The Time Traveller's Wife, reflects that "Everything seems simple until you think about it." (Niffenegger, 2003, 1) This might well be a mantra for the whole of philosophy, but a fair few terms tend to stick out. "Knowledge", "goodness" and "happiness" for example, are all pervasive everyday terms that undergo significant philosophical analysis. "Luck", I think, is another one of these terms. Wishing someone good luck in their projects, and cursing our bad luck when success seems so close to our reach or failure could have so easily been otherwise, happens so often that we rarely stop to reflect on what we really mean. Philosophical reflection on the nature of luck has a rich tradition, that is by no stretch confined to the Western philosophical canon. However, it has only very recently become one of the goals of philosophy to provide a clear account of what luck actually amounts to. This, in part, is the goal of this thesis. The thesis has two primary motivations. The first is to offer and defend a general account of luck that overcomes the problems faced by the current accounts of luck that are available in the current philosophical literature. The second is to apply this general account of luck to the areas of metaethics and epistemology where luck has been a pervasive and problematic concept, and demonstrate how this account of luck may resolve or further illuminate some of the problems that the notion has generated. The thesis is roughly split into two parts. The first half of the thesis focuses on the former objective of offering an account of luck. Chapter 1 offers a selected history of the philosophy of luck that spans from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, so that we might properly situate the current work on luck as part of the broader historical importance of the concept. Chapter 2 will set out the major rival to the theory of luck that I will offer - the lack of control account of luck (LCAL). LCAL has various iterations across the literature, but is most clearly articulated by Wayne Riggs (2009) and E.J. Coffman (2006, 2009). Both Coffman and Riggs add and adapt their own conditions to LCAL specifically so that the account may overcome several problems that have been levied against it. These further conditions are not incompatible so, to provide the strongest lack of control account possible, I have combined them to form a lack of control account I have called Combined LCAL - (c)LCAL. The latter part of the chapter pits (c)LCAL against some of the problems that have been raised against LCAL. However, despite the efforts of both Riggs and Coffman, even (c)LCAL fails to counter some of these objections. For these reasons I have rejected LCAL has a viable candidate for an account of luck. Chapter 3 sets out a modal account of luck (MAL), as argued for by Pritchard (2004, 2005, 2014), where an event is lucky only if it occurs in the actual world, but not in a relevant set of nearby possible worlds. Here I further elaborate on how we should understand the modal distances using Lewisian possible world semantics, and what worlds should be taken into consideration when fixing the relevant set of nearby possible worlds. I argue that these relevant sets of worlds should be fixed according to the domain of inquiry of which the luck is being applied - this I call the type of luck. Examples of this is the current literature are resultant luck - the type of luck concerned with the results of our actions, and veritic luck - the type of luck concerned with the modal safety of our belief formation. Due to the multitude of types of luck across disciplinary areas, a general modal account of luck requires flexibility in what factors should fix the relevant sets of possible worlds. I achieve this by providing a [TYPE] function for the general modal account of luck, which is used as a mean of inserting the relevant fixing conditions for any domain of inquiry. Chapter 3, in a similar vein to Chapter 2, pits the general modal account of luck against some of the problems that have been levied against MAL, specifically the Buried Treasure problem raised by Lackey (2008) and the agent causation problem as raised by Levy (2011). More successfully, the modal account offered stands up against these criticisms. For these reasons, the modal condition understood with the [TYPE] function and Lewisian semantics concerning modal distances, will be adopted to make up one half of the conditions for my account of luck. Chapter 4 will look at the second condition for an account of luck - the significance condition. The chapter will set out the reasons for adopting a significance condition at all, and some of the ways in which the condition has been articulated by Rescher (1995), Pritchard (2005) and Ballantyne (2011). All of these current views of the significance condition will be found wanting due to their inability to make sense of certain kinds of luck in specific normative domains. For example, Ballantyne's account of significance focuses on the interests of an agent, yet for certain types of moral luck, the interests of the agent are irrelevant. Instead, I propose a relativised significance condition, where the value of the event is relative to the value of the normative domain in which the luck is being ascribed. Epistemic luck requires a focus on the epistemic significance of the event for the agent, moral luck requires a focus on the moral or ethical significance of the event for the agent, and so on. This I call the kind of luck. Similar to the [TYPE] function for the modal condition for luck, the significance condition requires a [NORMATIVE DOMAIN] function where the relevant normative domain can be inserted depending on the kind of luck. This version of the significance condition will be conjoined with the modal condition as set out in Chapter 3 to form the correct general account of luck. Chapter 5 is the first chapter of the second half of the thesis that concerns applying the account of luck set out in part 1 to more specific domains of inquiry. Chapter 5 concerns moral luck, more specifically, resultant moral luck. Moral luck has traditionally been understood in terms of lack of control. This chapter looks at how Pritchard (2005) and Driver (2014) have attempted to understand moral luck using modal conditions. However, it is argued that these attempts would be more successful if we adopted the account of luck that I have offered in previous chapters. The chapter will go on to look at two possible problems that may be faced by this modal account of luck, and how it may resolve these problems. Chapter 6, the final chapter, looks at epistemic luck, specifically how the adoption of the modal account I have offered resolves a particular problem targeted at anti-luck epistemology by Ballantyne (2013). The problem, Ballantyne argues, is that given that luck requires a significance condition, the degree of significance affects the degree of luck and that the degree of luck involved in our belief formation affects whether we are in a position to know the target proposition, that the result is that degree of significance affects our ability to know. For at least some instances of this - such as the aesthetic significance that we assign to the target proposition - the result will be that non-epistemic factors that have no relevance at all whether an agent is in a position to know will (absurdly, in Ballantyne's view) affect that agent's position to know. The resolution to this problem can be found in a two part solution. The first part is to demonstrate that any degree of veritic epistemic luck results in the agent failing to know. The second is that through the relativisation of the significance condition, any type of value will not affect an agent's position to know, only the epistemic value.With these two considerations in mind, the latter of which that can only be held through the adoption of the modal account of luck I have offered, the problem may be resolved.
7
Barry, Nicholas. "Defending luck egalitarianism /." Connect to this title, 2006. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2007.0036.
Full text
8
Harrison, Gerald Kingsley. "Free will and luck." Thesis, Durham University, 2005. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2732/.
Full textAbstract:
The problem of free will is a problem about control and luck. If causal determinism is true, then everything we do is ultimately a matter of luck, as it is if causal determinism is false. Either way we seem to lack free will of the kind needed for moral responsibility. In this thesis a case is built for a certain type of modest incompatibilist view on free will. It is argued that it makes no difference in terms of control whether determinism or indeterminism obtains. What matters is that we have a certain kind of ownership over what we do. Causal determinism rules this out, but indeterminism does not. This has the upshot that not only does free will turn out to be compatible with luck, exposure to a certain kind of luck is actually required, for unless we are exposed to this kind of luck our actions will not be truly ours. By providing luck with a positive role this thesis invites a re-evaluation of the reasons causal determinism destroys free will, and a re-evaluation of our attitudes towards luck. In short this thesis challenges the anti-luckism that lies behind the problem of free will.
9
Mylne, Colin Andrew. "Luck and moral agency." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240976.
Full text
10
Han, Rui. "Luck egalitarianism : criticisms and alternatives /." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B4413826X.
Full text
11
Voigt, Kristin. "Luck egalitarianism: choice and responsibility." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.491065.
Full textAbstract:
Luck egaiitarianism is an interpretation of equality that distinguishes between inequalities for which individuals should be held responsible (because they are the result of their own choices) and inequalities for which individuals should not be held esponsible (because they are the result of brute luck). This thesis focuses on the question of how luck egalitarians should draw the line between luck and choice, given die influence of luck on the choices people make.
12
Calvert, John Sinclair. "Luck egalitarianism and educational equality." Thesis, University of Canterbury. School of Educational Studies and Leadership, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/10438.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis investigates whether luck egalitarianism can provide a cogent and coherent interpretation of educational equality. Historically, the belief that each child should receive an equally good education has exerted a strong influence on policy makers and thus on educational practice, and this despite the vagueness of the egalitarian formula. More recently however, the ideal has been undermined in practice by the rise of neoliberalism and in theory by a number of thinkers advocating other principles of educational justice. But it is vital to be clear about what each child is owed because of the profound effects of education on a person’s life prospects. The motivation for this work is therefore to determine whether educational equality can be rescued as a desirable and animating ideal of educational justice. In order to achieve this, I examine luck egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice that has its origins in the work of John Rawls, but is now the major rival to his account of egalitarian justice. I probe at the fundamental moral intuitions underpinning luck egalitarianism and how it brings together the morally potent ideas of equality, luck and choice. I argue that these are of relevance for the education each child is owed and I propose a luck egalitarian conception of educational equality, argue that it is a cogent interpretation of egalitarian justice, and conclude that a luck egalitarian conception shows educational equality to be an ideal that is relevant, coherent and what morally matters most for justice in education.
I describe luck egalitarianism as resting on three basic moral beliefs: that distributive equality is a fundamental demand of justice; that luck undermines fair equality; and that a person’s genuine choices can sometimes, under certain background conditions, render some otherwise objectionable inequalities not unjust. I then examine whether these three beliefs are compatible with each other and what, if anything, links them. Next, I consider luck egalitarianism’s status as a theory of distributive justice and argue that far from this being a weakness, as Elizabeth Anderson (1999) has notably argued, it is a strength of the position. But to appreciate this it needs to be seen that luck egalitarianism makes no claim to being all of justice and that the equalisandum of equality is complex and egalitarianism is intrinsically pluralist in nature (with a particular understanding of what is meant by pluralist). I consider too whether it is a mistake to say that inequalities that are largely due to luck can really be thought of as unjust. Thomas Nagel (1997) has argued that it is merely misfortune, unless the result of deliberate actions or social structures for which someone is responsible. I reject that position and argue that no one has to be responsible for an inequality for it to be unjust.
Having interrogated luck egalitarianism and found it to be a sound account of egalitarian distributive justice, I turn to looking at whether it can illuminate our understanding of educational equality. Educational equality is often interpreted in terms of equality of educational opportunity. I look particularly at a conception of equality of educational opportunity, strongly influenced by Rawls, that has been thoughtfully and carefully articulated by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2008). I find their conception powerful, but flawed, and argue that a luck egalitarian conception can account for the appeal of their conception, but is an advance on it. I end by looking at a specific question of educational justice to test the luck egalitarian conception – is there anything inegalitarian about ability grouping? I conclude that, while still needing to have its implications worked out in full, particularly as regards choice, a luck egalitarian conception provides a compelling account of educational equality and reasserts that equality matters for justice in education.
13
Han, Rui, and 韩锐. "Luck egalitarianism: criticisms and alternatives." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B4413826X.
Full text
14
Athanassoulis, Nafsika. "The problem of moral luck." Thesis, University of Reading, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.325217.
Full text
15
Mulkeen, Nicola. "Socially constructed luck and exploitation." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2017. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/socially-constructed-luck-and-exploitation(aef17fb4-2236-4026-bb7a-6b4a689bb4d2).html.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis shows that exploitation can arise from a just background, via just steps, when we exercise our moral rights. The theory rests on the idea that exploitation can arise via a special category of luck, which I call socially constructed luck. By taking into account what John Rawls calls background justice and what G.A. Cohen refers to as an accumulation problem, I argue that socially constructed luck is brought about through a cumulative process of people freely exercising their moral rights in the pursuit of their own conception of the good life. Unless the negative effects of this type of luck are offset, exploitative interactions can arise where people have no reasonable alternative but to enter a particular transaction. Socially constructed luck can play a direct role in privileging some individuals at the expense of others and allows for the extraction of surplus benefits. Importantly, by showing that luck egalitarianism should be understood within a conception of exploitation, the thesis not only provides a deeper understanding of how the luck egalitarian and relational egalitarian views align, but also justifies the introduction of a basic right to a reasonable alternative.
16
Klipfel, Kevin Michael. "Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/42799.
Full textAbstract:
Luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires that we hold people accountable for the choices that they make but not the circumstances that they find themselves in. My aim in this thesis is to reject luck egalitarianism. My argument builds on the recent critique of luck egalitarianism by Elizabeth Anderson. Anderson rejects luck egalitarianism in favor of a view she calls â democratic equality.â The aim of democratic equality is to create a community in which citizens relate to one another as equals. This requires, among other things, that we provide citizens with the necessary capabilities and functionings needed in order for them to function as free and equal citizens. In this thesis I argue that Andersonâ s critique of luck egalitarianism, although successful against the standard luck egalitarian view, does not undermine a weaker version of luck egalitarianism. This position â which I call moderate luck egalitarianism â claims that we ought to apply the choice/circumstance distinction always and only when doing so does not compromise the aims of democratic equality. This is because it is always unfair, according to luck egalitarians, when some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. Since Andersonâ s view does not correct for this, we need to combine the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism in the name of fairness. I argue, however, that this is not necessary. Not all inequalities that are the result of peopleâ s unchosen circumstances are unfair or unjust; inequalities in income and wealth are unfair only to the extent that they inhibit the ability of individuals to function as free and equal citizens. Thus, luck egalitarians have given us no reason to conjoin the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism: democratic equality suffices.Master of Arts
17
Skarveli, Sotira. "Social egalitarianism, responsibility and luck." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88358/.
Full textAbstract:
My thesis engages with the question about what it means to treat each other as equals, as this has been approached by luck and social egalitarians. Luck egalitarians maintain that luck inequalities should be equalized, while inequalities that are due to people’s choices should be left as they stand. This further implies that the scope of egalitarian justice is universal. Social egalitarians criticize luck egalitarianism for failing to provide a proper understanding of the value of equality. Equality is a relational ideal regarding how people should relate to each other as social and political equals, which properly understood requires that they relate to each other in a nondominating way. Given this, they argue, first, that luck egalitarian principles of justice violate the requirements of non-domination, since responsibility may conflict with the latter; and secondly, that strongly egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of morally significant forms of existing relationships, thus the scope of egalitarian justice is not universal. In my dissertation, I argue that Dworkin—who has traditionally been considered to be a luck egalitarian—shares the two social egalitarian commitments, namely that equality is a relational value and that strong egalitarian duties are generated in virtue of morally significant forms of existing relationships. Given this I defend two theses, both of which constitute an original contribution to our better understanding of the demands of social and political equality: a) Dworkin’s theory of equality properly understood is not only attentive to the social egalitarian requirement of non-domination, but it provides a better understanding of it precisely because it builds upon a conception of personal and consequential responsibility that is constitutive of non-domination. b) I challenge both Dworkin’s and social egalitarians’ view of the scope of egalitarian justice by arguing that properly understood the ideal of social and political equality tells us that we should relate to each other as equals, not that existing relationships are necessary for justice-based duties to be triggered.
18
Luck, Stephan [Verfasser]. "Essays on Financial Stability / Stephan Luck." Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1084760053/34.
Full text
19
Walker, Kyle. "Moral Responsibility "Expressivism," Luck, and Revision." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/119.
Full textAbstract:
In his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment," Peter Strawson attempts to reconcile incompatibilism and compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. First, I present the error committed by the proponents of both these traditional views, which Strawson diagnoses as the source of their standoff, and the remedy Strawson offers to avoid the conflict. Second, I reconstruct the two arguments Strawson offers for a theory of moral responsibility that is based on his proposed remedy. Third, I present and respond to two proposed problems for the Strawsonian theory: moral luck and revisionism. I conclude with a summary of my defense of Strawsonian “expressivism” about moral responsibility, and offer suggestions for further research.
20
Rogasner, Gabriel. "International Luck Egalitarianism: A Legislative Approach." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/107.
Full textAbstract:
If morally arbitrary features (that is, blind brute luck) should have no impact on the distribution of wealth, then the vast inequality and the disparity in life prospects between countries is a moral catastrophe; birthplace is completely based on luck, and yet has an enormous impact on life prospects. I contend that those in affluent countries, who have benefited from the luck of birthplace, ought to work towards a more egalitarian world, in which luck plays as little a role in life prospects as possible.
21
Mueller, Michaela. "Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Agency, and Skepticism." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194139.
Full textAbstract:
In my dissertation I develop an account of perceptual knowledge through thinking about epistemic luck, epistemic agency, and skepticism. Two conditions are, as I claim, necessary and sufficient to render a true belief an instance of perceptual knowledge. These conditions are the luck-precluding condition and evidence-based justification. The luck-precluding conditions are external conditions, consisting in physical regularities in the world that allow us to arrive through our evidence at the truth in a systematic way. I claim that these luck-precluding conditions also allow us to avoid Gettier cases. Evidence-based justification requires evidence as an internal condition. However, there are some external constraints as to when our evidence can reasonably be expected to lead to the kind of justification required for perceptual knowledge. This account of perceptual knowledge blends together internal and external requirements. The claim is that only given this match of internal and external requirements can we argue that the resulting set of necessary conditions is also sufficient for perceptual knowledge in that it allows us to avoid all problematic forms of epistemic luck.
22
Woodford, Nicole Frances. "Moral luck : control, choice, and virtue." Thesis, University of Hull, 2016. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:15196.
Full textAbstract:
In this thesis I propose a solution to the problem of moral luck. It is sometimes assumed that luck has no bearing on morality. However, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, in their papers entitled ‘Moral Luck’, show how this assumption could be erroneous. When making moral judgements it is usually thought that we abide by the ‘Control Principle’. This principle requires any moral judgements about an individual to be made only in cases where they were in control of their actions. The problem of moral luck arises because many moral judgements appear to contradict the Control Principle. My aims in this work are two-fold. First, I disambiguate concepts of luck and moral luck by conceptualising both in light of a Hybrid Account of Luck (HAL). In order to understand moral luck, the concept of luck itself needs to be understood. I begin by distinguishing luck from similar concepts and go on to defend a particular version of HAL that can be adapted to identify genuine cases of moral luck. Second, I propose a possible solution to the problem of moral luck based primarily on a critique of some of Nagel’s basic presuppositions regarding the issue in conjunction with a defence of Terence Irwin’s interpretation of Aristotle’s complex theory of moral responsibility. By giving a number of examples, I hope to establish that there is circumstantial moral luck and resultant moral luck, and that Aristotle’s conditions for moral responsibility can provide an adequate justification for praise and blame in these cases.
23
Ho, Emilie. "Can We Really Claim ‘Full Responsibility’? The Problem With Normative Luck Egalitarianism in a Luck-Pervasive World." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/824.
Full textAbstract:
In the last four decades, luck egalitarianism has emerged as a hotly debated theory of distributive justice. The tenet, in its most normative sense, calls for distribution or assistance when circumstances of disadvantage arise from bad luck that is independent of human influence. Disadvantages that can be traced back to individual choice and responsibility, on the other hand, are left for the sufferer to bear. In this paper, I argue that luck egalitarianism should be abandoned as a standard for determining whether a disadvantage should be addressed, because the assumption that there are instances of disadvantage completely attributable to individual choice is flawed. Brute luck, or luck that emerges from beyond human control, influences most human outcomes, making it difficult to confidently attribute outcomes to option luck, or luck that stems from human choice. Without option luck, luck egalitarianism becomes obsolete as the principle rests on the distinction between brute and option luck.
24
Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando. "Luck and the control theory of knowledge." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Girona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/129460.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis presents a diagnosis of the problem of luck in epistemology and an analysis of the
concept of knowledge. Part I gives an account of the ordinary concept of luck. Part II gives an
account of the philosophical notion of epistemic luck and develops an original account of the
concept of knowledge: the control theory of knowledgeAquesta tesi presenta un diagnòstic del problema de la sort en epistemologia i una anàlisi del concepte de coneixement. La primera part ofereix una teoria del concepte ordinari de sort. La segona part ofereix una teoria de la noció filosòfica de sort epistèmica i desenvolupa una teoria original del concepte de coneixement: la teoria del control
25
Petrovic, Ljiljana. "Making moral decisions, reason, emotion and luck." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ47776.pdf.
Full text
26
Kent, Leanne E. "Tragic Dilemmas, Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1225468182.
Full text
27
Golchin, Simin. "The Process of Identity Formation in Amy Tan's The Joy Luck Club : Amy Tan´s The Joy Luck Club." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Avdelningen för humaniora, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-10648.
Full textAbstract:
Like most ethnic and multicultural narratives, Amy Tan’s The Joy Luck Club revolves around the development of an identity in which immigrant experience and all the questions of ethno- cultural identity that attend to it play central roles. The aim of this essay is to investigate the process of identity formation of the second-generation Chinese immigrant daughters who encounter Chinese culture at home while having the immediate experience of living in America, with a focus on the cultural, language and generational gaps that exist between the Chinese mothers and their American- born daughters. This study is guided by a theoretical framework that combines postcolonial theory and a number of established theories of identity construction including the concept of hybrid identity in order to analyze and explore the American-born daughters’ identity creation. Based on this analysis, this paper presents evidence that an identity formation process that involves cultural hybridization has occurred and the outcome of this identity formation is that of a hybrid identity.
28
Jomer, Emelie. "Performance of UK Pension Funds : Luck or Skill?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-205730.
Full textAbstract:
Pension funds play a large role in the UK pension system since the returns of the funds determine how large the total pension will be. The future retirees can choose between active and passive fund management where the active management often is more expensive. In this study 102 actively managed UK equity pension funds are analyzed in order to see if managers have sufficient skill to generate risk adjusted return to cover the cost imposed on the investors. The result implies that the active pension funds in aggregate, before expenses, hold a portfolio that imitates market returns during 2000 to 2012. Bootstrap simulations suggest that only eight funds out of the sample of 102 have skilled managers and six of these managers are skilled enough to produce risk adjusted excess return large enough to cover the expenses imposed on the investor.
29
Lam, Man-on, and 林文安. "Exploitation and luck in capitalism: a philosophical analysis." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1997. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31214253.
Full text
30
Dickenson, Donna. "Moral luck in medical ethics and practical politics." Thesis, Open University, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.329198.
Full text
31
Liu, Chengwei. "Essays on luck, counterfactual thinking, and entrepreneurial cognition." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.609501.
Full text
32
Yadipur, M. (Mahdi). "Hedge fund performance due to skill or luck?" Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2014. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201404241298.
Full textAbstract:
In this study we examine the proportion of false discovery rate exists amongst the individual funds in Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database. Applying the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model in a time series regression along with a statistical false discovery rate methodology construct the main framework of this study. False discovery rate helps to measure the proportion of lucky funds among hedge funds that have statistically significant alphas and explains how many percentages of funds with significant alphas would be achieved due to luck compared to skill.
Even after adjusting for the backfill bias, the proportion of false discovery rate states that the hedge funds outperform due to skill compared to luck and underperforms due to be unlucky compared to be unskilled. Results for strategies demonstrate that the proportion of false discovery rate in Event Driven, Relative Value, and Multi Strategy is very low in the right tail respectively and the manager has skill compared to luck. In contrast, strategies such as CTA, Relative Value, and Short Bias have the lowest proportion of false discovery rate in the left tail respectively which implies the manager is more unskilled compared to be unlucky in his performance. The proportion of false discovery rate for small funds is greater than large funds in the right tail of the distribution and it implies that for small funds the manager outperforms mostly by luck compared to skill. Contrarily, the proportion of false discovery rate for large funds is greater than small funds in the left tail of the distribution and it implies that for large funds the manager is more unlucky compared to be unskilled to outperform in the market.
33
Mendoza, Waldo. "The Peruvian Miracle: Good luck or good policies?" Economía, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/117224.
Full textAbstract:
The Peruvian economy has performed extraordinarily over the last 10 years. The 2012 per capita GDP is 66 percent above that of 2002, and more than double its 1992 level. In a long term perspective, the cumulative growth of GDP per capita recorded in the last 10 years has been the strongest since 1900. This is the «Peruvian miracle». This paper aims to find the determinants of the Peruvian miracle. In theory, countries’ macroeconomic performance can be determined by two factors: i) the «good (bad) luck effect» that relates to the international context, which may be favorable or unfavorable, and ii) the «good (bad) policies effects», associated with short-term macroeconomic policies or structural reforms,which are policies that alter the current development model. The hypothesis of this work is that the Peruvian miracle of the last 10 years has much to do with good luck, and, in part, with good short-term macroeconomic policies.La economía peruana ha tenido un desempeño extraordinario en los últimos diez años. El PBI per cápita de 2012 está un 66% por encima del de 2002 y es más del doble de su nivel de 1992. En una perspectiva de largo plazo, el crecimiento acumulado del PBI per cápita registrado en los últimos diez años ha sido el más vigoroso desde 1900. Este es el «milagro peruano». Este artículo tiene como propósito encontrar los factores determinantes del milagro peruano. En teoría,el desempeño macroeconómico de los países puede estar determinado por dos razones: i) el «efecto buena (mala) suerte» que tiene que ver con el contexto internacional que puede ser favorable o desfavorable; y ii) el efecto «buenas (malas) políticas», asociado a las políticas macroeconómicas de cortoplazo o a las reformas estructurales, que son políticas que alteran el modelo de desarrollo vigente. La hipótesis de este trabajo es que el milagro peruano de los últimos diez años tiene mucho que ver con la buena suerte y, en parte, con las buenas políticas macroeconómicas de corto plazo.
34
Lam, Man-on. "Exploitation and luck in capitalism : a philosophical analysis /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1997. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B18611904.
Full text
35
Ranieri, Andrea Yvonne. "How luck and fortune shape risk-taking behaviors." Scholar Commons, 2015. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/5560.
Full textAbstract:
The current study uses a lottery-based paradigm to examine how risk taking is affected by two specific types of good and bad experiences, luck and fortune. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, we suggest that they refer to two separate aspects of risk. Fortune refers to the overall positivity or negativity of the overall context, whereas luck refers to the probability of a better or worse outcome. To make the lottery context fortunate or unfortunate, a set of mixed-valence control lotteries were surrounded by all gain (good fortune) or all loss lotteries (bad fortune). To make the lotteries lucky or unlucky, the proportion of better outcomes received was fixed to be well above (good luck) or well below (bad luck) 50%. Results of the study suggest that, fortune, but not luck, had a significant influence on risk taking behaviors. Participants who experienced good fortune decreased risk taking, and those who experienced bad fortune increased risk taking. When asked, however, participants were unable to differentiate between the luck and fortune manipulations. Gains and losses due to fortune were undifferentiated from gains and losses due to luck. Yet, it was found that the number of gain outcomes received, which was determined by the luck-fortune combination, largely determined subjective experiences of luck and fortune. Consistent with the somatic marker and hedonic editing hypotheses, more gain outcomes led to a heightened sense of good luck and good fortune. Following on SPA (security/ potential aspiration) theory, we suggest that these differences in risk taking behavior in response to fortune may be due to increased attention to goals emphasizing security versus potential.
36
Wahlberg, Linus. "Visar Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser lika hänsyn och respekt för alla medborgare? : En analys av Elizabeth S. Andersons kritik mot “luck egalitarianism”, applicerad på Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för praktisk filosofi, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-446937.
Full textAbstract:
I uppsatsen presenterar jag “luck egalitarianism” och specifikt Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser. Målet med Dworkins teori är att sammanväva de två till synes motstridiga principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt. Dworkin försöker föra samman principerna genom att nå en fördelning som är ambitions-känslig samtidigt som den är talang-okänslig. Han försöker uppnå detta ideal genom att kombinera en fri marknad som visar lika respekt för medborgarnas valfrihet och ansvar, med en försäkringsmarknad som visar lika hänsyn till medborgarna genom möjligheten att teckna försäkring mot oförutsägbara konsekvenser under lika möjlighet och lika risk. Elizabeth S. Anderson påstår att Dworkins teori misslyckas i att kombinera principerna om lika hänsyn och lika respekt på ett rimligt sätt och presenterar två övergripande invändningar: hårdhetsinvändningen och förnedringsinvändningen. Den första invändningen (hårdhetsinvändingen) påstår att teorins ramverk för att fastslå vilka av de utsatta som har rätt till kompensation inte visar lika hänsyn till alla som är utsatta. Den andra invändningen (förnedringsinvändingen) påstår att grunderna för kompensation är förnedrande och inte visar lika respekt för alla medborgare. Målet med uppsatsen är att analysera Dworkins teori och undersöka om den vederläggs av Andersons invändningar. Den slutsats jag skall försvara är att så inte är fallet. Forskningsfrågan är följande: Påvisar Andersons invändningar att Dworkins teori om jämlika resurser inte visar lika hänsyn och respekt för alla medborgare?
37
Carter, Joseph Adam. "Value of knowledge and the problem of epistemic luck." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/5810.
Full textAbstract:
Imagine that you’ve just spent the last several months reading Don Quixote—and that you’re all but fifty pages away from finishing. Unfortunately for you, the book was due back before you could finish, and so begrudgingly, you turn it back in, having not known what happens in the end. Riddled with curiosity, you make your best guess about Quixote’s eventual fate and suppose it is the most likely scenario. Entirely unbeknownst to you, it turns out that you were right; Quixote’s ultimate destiny was just what you had supposed it would be! What luck! Quite naturally, we would say that (despite how impressed we are that you rightly anticipated Cervantes), when all is said and done, knowing what happens to Don Quixote in the end is surely better than merely believing truly what happens in the end—the predicament you find yourself in having not actually finished the book. After all, it was just by dumb luck that you guessed the ending right—a point you could deny only on the pain of some embarrassing claim of clairvoyance. We might put the idea more generally by saying that from a purely cognitive standpoint, it is better to know the truth than to stumble upon it by luck. This general idea betrays two distinct insights about knowledge. The first is the insight that while true belief is valuable, knowledge is distinctively so—knowing the truth is valuable in a way that merely having a true (but not-known) belief is not. The second insight here is that you lack knowledge if it’s just by dumb luck that the belief you have is true. Call these the value insight and the anti-luck insight: Value insight: Knowledge is distinctively valuable. Luck insight: Knowledge excludes luck. In contemporary epistemology, and especially over the past five years, separate projects have arisen in correspondence with these distinct intuitions: value-driven epistemology is concerned with issues surrounding the first insight, and projects under the description of anti-luck epistemology have arisen out of the second. Now we might reasonably suppose that whatever it is that makes knowledge relevantly un-lucky would be something we could cite in accounting for what makes knowledge distinctively valuable. This natural idea reflects the thought that the insights about value and luck should not be entirely disconnected. There is a problematic tension though between this reasonable expectation and the resources epistemologists have provided for us to accommodate it. What explains the tension is the fact that value-driven and anti-luck projects in epistemology have by and large been developed apart from each other, each focused on one of our two guiding insights at the expense of the other. Consequently, value-driven epistemology’s focus on the normative but not modal properties of knowledge leaves these two aspects of knowledge disconnected much in the way that anti-luck epistemology’s focus on the modal but not the normative properties of knowledge leaves these same aspects disconnected. The lacuna here between what value driven epistemologists tell us about what makes knowledge valuable and what the anti-luck epistemologists tell us about what makes knowledge exclude luck is troubling. We may resist that there should be such a disconnect if we avoid the common flaw shared by each of these projects pursued in isolation from the other. The flaw here is essentially one of naivety: that of supposing that we can give an account of knowledge exclusively in terms of conditions that would accommodate one of the two insights, while still managing to account for the other insight—which itself we did not appeal to directly in our theory of what knowledge is—e.g. in the analysis provided of it. This is the flaw behind the value-driven approaches that think about knowledge in terms of valuable properties they can’t explain to ensure modal robustness and the anti-luck projects that think of knowledge in terms of modal properties into which we can’t well smuggle the normativity needed to explain its value. To avoid this flaw, then, we should let both of these insights dictate the conditions our analysis offers as essential to knowing. The project with which I’ll be engaging here develops substantially on this widely overlooked and promising idea.
38
Bamford, Douglas D. "Egalitarian taxation : equality of resources, market luck and leisure." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2013. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/57595/.
Full text
39
Armitage, Faith. "The ideal of equality : luck egalitarianism and its critics." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2007. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2718/.
Full textAbstract:
Luck egalitarianism is an influential theory of justice that holds that arbitrary distributions of native abilities and social circumstances produce objectionable inequalities between persons, but responsible choices excuse some inequalities. It has recently been strongly criticised by self-described egalitarians. At the same time, however, mutual engagement between feminists and luck egalitarians has been minimal, in contrast to Rawlsian and feminist debates about the application of his theory to gender injustice. My research has two interrelated aims: (1) to contribute to the mainstream critical evaluation of luck egalitarianism by (2) developing an analysis that focuses on the implicit feminist content in those critiques. Luck egalitarians offer different versions of the theory, but these are underpinned by commonalities, including the aim to make distributions reflect agents' responsible choices; the presupposing of particular institutions; and an individualistic ontology that misrepresents the social causes of inequality. The heavy significance luck egalitarianism attaches to choice effectively licenses the traditional sexual division of labour since many agents continue to make choices, in accordance with prevailing social norms, which reproduce it. Respect and recognition are goods that luck egalitarianism requires some individuals to forfeit in exchange for material aid. This trade-off is unacceptable, highlighting the need for a satisfactory egalitarianism to be pluralistic in its understanding of human goods. Luck egalitarianism is compatible with the political marginalisation of certain social groups due to its emphasis on equality as an ideal about distributions, rather than relations between citizens. The need for egalitarianism to be sensitive to inequalities in multiple domains, not just the material, is underlined. Rival theories to luck egalitarianism invoke people's basic needs and citizens' obligations to one another as alternative bases for determining fair distributions. These more complex accounts of social justice engage the full array of human concerns to which egalitarianism traditionally responds.
40
Allan, Ian B. "The life and work of Herbert Luck North 1871-1941." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.250293.
Full textAbstract:
H.L. North was an architect so little known in 1980 that the research aimed at first to establish the nature and quality of his work before proceeding to locate him historically. The historical picture which was constructed, and which is described here, was the main achievement of the work undertaken. North was thirty in 1901. His spheres of architectural achievement are in the movements of that time: the arts and crafts cottage house, the arts and crafts church, and the school of Anglo-Catholic church furnishing founded by Ninian Comper. As part of his personal idiom for the cottage house, Gothic tone and character set him apart. His churches (and private chapels) were built late, and renounce his early designs of a more detailed and familiar Gothic type for a forceful structural simplicity which aligns him with \aI.R. Lethaby and E.S. Prior. In church furnishing he made original use of the example of Comper throughout his life, and installed what was probably the first 3nglish altar in \-lalesas early as 1903. The output of North's country practice was modest, and almost all of it was imbued in some way with Gothic character. He was not a church architect who also built houses. He was a Gothic architect both in his own estimation and in almost all aspects of his work. This gives him a special position in the history of architecture in Britain in the early t\ofentieth century. In Wales, North was the leading figure in his day in the development of the taste for old Welsh building, as described in chapters twelve and thirteen, which are located so that this aspect of his achievements can be met with subsequent to the account of his architectural career. There was no arts and crafts movement in ,.,Tales.North's role in his house work there was to assimilate continuing vernacular methods of construction to the advanced idiom he had started to learn with Lutyens. His success gave him the false reputation with posterity of actually being the leader of the arts and crafts movement in \o/ales. His real significance is better seen at a less provincial level. It shows him conspicuous as a Goth with a particular feeling for what he called early Pointed, and with a corresponding economical style, at a time when the Gothic revival had been repudiated, and when classical and neo-Georgian were becoming increasingly the idioms of the day.
41
Douglas, Cameron (Cameron David). "Luck and skill in professional League of Legends (E-sports)." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119960.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis: S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering, 2018.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-36).
As professional gaming (e-sports) develops a greater global infrastructure, it will be critical to create league systems in which skill and luck balance to create competitive, exciting, and fair environments. This study uses the most developed e-sport leagues, found in the game League of Legends (LoL), to examine early efforts at crafting such environments. The use of "winning persistence" and Bayesian statistical analyses reveal that best-of-one matches in LoL demonstrate an overall luck-skill ratio similar to professional baseball (MLB) and football (NFL). Best-of-three matches exhibit an understandably higher ratio of skill, similar to professional basketball (NBA). With both match lengths exhibiting viable but significantly different luck-skill ratios, LoL creator, Riot Games has the tools to control how much luck and skill exist in their matches and leagues, setting an important precedent for future leagues and organizations.
by Cameron Douglas.
S.B.
42
Luck, Verena Katharina [Verfasser]. "»Alles oder Nichts« – Die Freigrenze im Steuerrecht. / Verena Katharina Luck." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1238432298/34.
Full text
43
Lundquist, Caroline. "Impossible and Necessary: The Problem of Luck and the Promise of Kindness." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/13341.
Full textAbstract:
My dissertation explores the promise of kindness as a response to the problem of luck which confronts both ancient and modern visions of the moral life. A rich articulation of kindness in the light of historical moral theory reveals that, far from being a trifling, merely and purely sentimental phenomenon, kindness involves many of the key ethical commitments that distinguish both Aristotelian ethics and Kantian morality. More importantly, at the level of individuals kindness has the power to mitigate the toll of bad luck on agents and to yield the types of judgments that dissolve the problem of moral luck. Where it finds expression at the institutional level kindness has tremendous ameliorative potential. I therefore contend that kindness is to be esteemed above all other modes of comportment; in a world that is not up to us, our greatest hope for flourishing lies in being kind and in remaining graciously open to the kindness of others.
44
Casas, i. Klett Tomas. "K-efficiency theory of entrepreneurship : random payoffs, biases and bounded luck /." [St. Gallen] : [s.n.], 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/503222127.pdf.
Full text
45
Stemplowska, Zofia. "The concepts of luck and responsibility in contemporary theories of justice." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.439320.
Full text
46
Moreira, Paulo Gabriel Góis. "Manager skill or luck? Assessing active management decisions through attribution analysis." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/19784.
Full textAbstract:
Mestrado em Mathematical FinanceÉ dito que negociar é semelhante a apostar em jogos de casino: pode haver certas técnicas, mas o fator mais importante é a sorte. Já me deparei com um conjunto de pessoas que pensam dessa forma. Como pode haver gerentes (managers) de portfólios como Blackrock ou J.P. Morgan com tanta reputação e clientes? Como é que eles alcançam melhores resultados do que outros gerentes, consistentemente ao longo do tempo? Este relatório não fornece uma resposta direta à pergunta acima. Porém, apresenta uma compilação do conhecimento adquirido durante um estágio de três meses na Mercer relacionado com medição do desempenho e o seu uso para analisar as fontes de excesso de retorno em relação a um índice de referência. Esta dissertação foi escrita com a crença de que um excess de retorno positivo consistente ao longo do tempo é um indicador da habilidade do gerente (Christopherson et al., 1998). Em termos práticos, os cálculos diários das medidas de desempenho e risco forneceram uma compreensão mais profunda da teoria financeira e dos métodos reais usados num contexto profissional. Neste documento, o capítulo 1 apresenta os conceitos básicos sobre o estágio e a sua finalidade. O capítulo 2 apresenta uma descrição das tarefas realizadas na Mercer e a teoria financeira por trás delas. O capítulo 3 contém um caso prático de análise de atribuição. O capítulo 4 contém as principais conclusões.
Some say trading is just like gambling in a casino: there can be certain techniques, but the most important factor is luck. I have come across more than a handful of people stating similar assertions. How can there be portfolio managers such as Blackrock or J. P. Morgan with such reputation and so many clients? How is it that they reach better results than other managers do, consistently over time? This report does not provide a direct answer to the above question. However, it compiles the knowledge acquired over a three-month internship at Mercer related to performance measurement and its use to analyze the sources of excess return relative to a benchmark. The following dissertation has been written with the belief that a consistent positive excess return over time is an indicator of manager skill (Christopherson et. al., 1998). In practical terms, daily calculations of performance and risk measures provided a deeper understanding on the financial theory and the actual methods used in a professional environment. In this document, Chapter 1 introduces the basics about the internship and its purpose. Chapter 2 presents a description of the tasks undertaken at Mercer and the financial theory behind them. Chapter 3 contains a practical case of attribution analysis. Chapter 4 holds the main conclusions.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
47
Luck, Catharina [Verfasser]. "Erstellung und Auswertung einer Endometriosedatenbank mit Follow-up / Catharina Julia Luck." Gießen : Universitätsbibliothek, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1209159694/34.
Full text
48
Hankins, Keith. "Embracing Moral Luck: Accidents, Apologies, and the Foundations of Social Cooperation." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/560948.
Full textAbstract:
The norms that mediate our responses to accidents play a critical role in facilitating social cooperation. My dissertation explores these norms with an eye towards what they can tell us about the nature of moral responsibility. Drawing on Adam Smith's brief, but important discussion of moral luck, I argue that our responses to accidents reveal the extent to which the obligations we incur and the moral appraisals we make of one another are often appropriately influenced by fortune. In particular, I show how making sense of these responses requires us to embrace the idea that we can sometimes be morally responsible for things without being culpable, and I argue that doing so need not do violence to our moral intuitions.
49
Luck, Catharina Julia [Verfasser]. "Erstellung und Auswertung einer Endometriosedatenbank mit Follow-up / Catharina Julia Luck." Gießen : Universitätsbibliothek, 2020. http://d-nb.info/1209159694/34.
Full text
50
Luck, A. J. "The application of new technology to colorectal surgery / by Andrew James Luck." c1999, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/38360.
Full textAbstract:
Includes bibliography (leaves 249-291).xxiv, 291, [52] leaves :
Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library.
Discusses and evaluates the role of intra-operative ultrasound in colorectal surgery ; techniques of laparoscopic surgery and the impact on the incidence of hypothermia during surgery ; advanced prognostic techniques in colorectal cancer ; the impact of ambulatory anorectal surgery ; and, the potential of an information video to decrease the anxiety of patients through imparting essential information to patients.
Thesis (M.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Surgery, 1999