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Journal articles on the topic 'Luck'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 30 July 2024

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1

Darke, Peter R., and Jonathan L. Freedman. "Lucky Events and Beliefs in Luck: Paradoxical Effects on Confidence and Risk-Taking." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23, no. 4 (April 1997): 378–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167297234004.

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The effects of a lucky event and irrational beliefs about luck were examined. In two experiments, some subjects experienced a lucky event, whereas others did not. All subjects then completed an unrelated decision task rated their confidence, and placed a bet. The effects of a lucky experience depended substantially on individual beliefs concerning the causal properties of luck. After the lucky event, those who believed in luck (i.e., thought of luck as a stable, personal attribute) were more confident and bet more, whereas those who did not believe in luck (i.e., thought luck was random) were less confident and bet less. A third experiment identified analogous effects using multiple-choice test questions that included a monetary penalty for errors. Increased expectations following initial luck were interpreted in terms of a lucky streak effect, whereas the paradoxical decrease in expectancy was viewed as an instance of the gamblers' fallacy.

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2

Boyd, Kenneth. "ENVIRONMENTAL LUCK AND THE STRUCTURE OF UNDERSTANDING." Episteme 17, no. 1 (May 21, 2018): 73–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.18.

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ABSTRACTConventional wisdom holds that there is no lucky knowledge: if it is a matter of luck, in some relevant sense, that one's belief that p is true, then one does not know that p. Here I will argue that there is similarly no lucky understanding, at least in the case of one type of luck, namely environmental luck. This argument has three parts. First, we need to determine how we evaluate whether one has understanding, which requires determining what I will call understanding's evaluative object. I argue that as the evaluative object of (at least a traditional conception of) knowledge is a belief in a proposition, the evaluative object of understanding is a mental representation of a relational structure. Next, I show that arguments that environmental luck is incompatible with understanding miss the mark by considering cases in which one has a belief in a proposition is lucky to be true, instead of ones in which one's mental representation of a relational structure is lucky to obtain. I agree, then, with those who argue that one can have understanding when one's beliefs are environmentally lucky to be true, but that this compatibility is not relevant when considering the question of whether one can have environmentally lucky understanding. I then present what I take to be a properly constructed case which shows the incompatibility of environmental luck with understanding.

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3

Stoutenburg, Gregory. "THE EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS OF LUCK." Episteme 12, no. 3 (January 28, 2015): 319–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.35.

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AbstractDuncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world, but does not occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. Jennifer Lackey has provided counterexamples to accounts which, like Pritchard's, only allow for the existence of improbable lucky events. Neil Levy has responded to Lackey by offering a modal account of luck which attempts to respect the intuition that some lucky events occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. But his account rejects that events which are as likely as those in Lackey's examples are lucky. Instead, they are merely fortunate. I argue that Levy's argument to this effect fails. I then offer a substitute account of the improbability condition which respects this intuition. This condition says that the relevant notion of probability for luck is epistemic.

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4

Chernyak, Alexey Z. "Knowledge and Luck." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 2 (2020): 61–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057222.

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There is a widely shared belief in contemporary epistemology that propositional knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck, most of all with so called veritic luck. A subject is veritically lucky in his or her belief that p if this belief is true not due to its foundations (for example, reasons which an agent has to believe that p) but by mere accident. The acceptance of the thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with this kind of luck led to significant modifications of a popular modern epistemological tripartite analysis of propositional knowledge according to which subject knows that p if and only if he or she believes that p is true, p is actually true, and an agent’s belief that p is true is justified. In his famous paper “Is True Justified Belief Knowledge” E. Gettier demonstrated that true justified belief may not be knowledge. The core of the problem is that in the cases described by Gettier and the like an agent’s belief, though justified, is true by accident. This gave rise to a set of theories introducing additional conditions of knowledge which could exclude veritic luck. In this paper the author critically discusses main modifications of the tripartite concept of knowledge aimed at making it independent on veritic luck, and show that they are unable to solve this problem. He agrees with those who think that the very thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with veritic luck is wrong. But he disagrees that all kinds of veritic luck are compatible with knowledge: the author supposes that good veritic luck is compatible with knowledge only when it compensates some negative effect of antecedent bad epistemic luck. According to this view original Gettier examples are not cases of knowledge whereas broken-clocks case and fake-barns case are. This account allows treating many classic cases of dependence of knowledge on luck as cases of knowledge-acquirement, but in the same time it excludes the inclusion into the class of knowledge such intuitively irrelevant outcomes as lucky guess and wishful thinking.

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5

Khalifa, Kareem. "UNDERSTANDING, GRASPING AND LUCK." Episteme 10, no. 1 (March 2013): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.6.

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AbstractRecently, it has been debated as to whether understanding is a species of explanatory knowledge. Those who deny this claim frequently argue that understanding, unlike knowledge, can be lucky. In this paper I argue that current arguments do not support this alleged compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. First, I argue that understanding requires reliable explanatory evaluation, yet the putative examples of lucky understanding underspecify the extent to which subjects possess this ability. In the course of defending this claim, I also provide a new account of the kind of ‘grasping’ taken to be central to understanding. Second, I show that putative examples of lucky understanding unwittingly deploy a kind of luck that is compatible with knowledge. Finally, appealing to a number of works on explanation and its attendant epistemology, I argue that alleged instances of lucky understanding that overcome these two obstacles will invariably violate certain norms of explanatory inquiry – our paradigmatic understanding-oriented practice. By contrast, knowledge of the same information is immune to these criticisms. Consequently, if understanding is environmentally lucky, it is always inferior to the understanding that a corresponding case of knowledge would provide.

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6

Michalek, Arthur M. "Bad Luck, No Luck, Good Luck!" Journal of Cancer Education 30, no. 2 (March 29, 2015): 205–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13187-015-0817-0.

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7

Deshaye, Joel. "‘Do I feel lucky?’: Moral Luck, Bluffing and the Ethics of Eastwood's Outlaw-Lawman in Coogan's Bluff and the Dirty Harry Films." Film-Philosophy 21, no. 1 (February 2017): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/film.2017.0029.

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In Coogan's Bluff (1968) and the Dirty Harry films, Clint Eastwood's characters often invoke luck when they want unpredictable others to assume some responsibility to stop violence, thereby implicating moral luck in heroism. In the famous ‘Do I feel lucky’ scene from Dirty Harry (1971), Eastwood's character might not be bluffing, but he is giving luck a role in justice. In this case and others, his character's unconventional responsibility should prompt reconsideration of his character's virtue. Viewers must also decide where the deceptive or rule-breaking policeman locates the responsibility for his actions.

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8

Barba, Moisés, and Fernando Broncano-Berrocal. "Collective Epistemic Luck." Acta Analytica 37, no. 1 (October 28, 2021): 99–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x.

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AbstractA platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking (suitably defined) forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason (not a conclusive one) for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.

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9

Chernyak, Alexey Z. "Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 4 (2021): 77–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158462.

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The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

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10

Teigen, Karl Halvor, and Tine K. Jensen. "Unlucky Victims or Lucky Survivors?" European Psychologist 16, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 48–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000033.

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Subjective experiences of good or bad luck appear to depend upon downward or upward comparisons with close counterfactuals. People exposed to disasters have both options: They were at the wrong place at the wrong time, but their fate could in many cases have been worse; so in a sense, they are unlucky victims, but lucky survivors. Interviews with 85 Norwegian tourists 9–11 months after they had been exposed to the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia showed good luck to be a pivotal theme in a majority of the narratives. Nobody claimed they had been unfortunate or unlucky. Moreover, downward counterfactual thoughts and downward comparisons with others occurred 10 times more often than upward counterfactuals and upward comparisons. In a follow-up 2 years later, 95% answered they had been lucky. A contextual analysis revealed several facets of luck, including its relation to gratitude, guilt, and supernatural beliefs.

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11

ELVIDGE, SEAN. "THE LUCK IN “TALENT VERSUS LUCK” MODELING." Advances in Complex Systems 23, no. 03 (May 2020): 2050007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219525920500071.

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This paper further investigates the Talent versus Luck (TvL) model described by [Pluchino et al. Talent versus luck: The role of randomness in success and failure, Adv. Complex Syst. 21 (2018) 1850014] which models the relationship between ‘talent’ and ‘luck’ on the impact of an individuals career. It is shown that the model is very sensitive to both random sampling and the choice of value for the input parameters. Running the model repeatedly with the same set of input parameters gives a range of output values of over 50% of the mean value. The sensitivity of the inputs of the model is analyzed using a variance-based approach based upon generating Sobol sequences of quasi-random numbers. When using the model to look at the talent associated with an individual who has the maximum capital over a model run it has been shown that the choice for the standard deviation of the talent distribution contributes to 67% of the model variability. When investigating the maximum amount of capital returned by the model the probability of a lucky event at any given epoch has the largest impact on the model, almost three times more than any other individual parameter. Consequently, during the analysis of the model results one must keep in mind the impact that only small changes in the input parameters can have on the model output.

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12

Herdova, Marcela, and Stephen Kearns. "Get lucky: situationism and circumstantial moral luck." Philosophical Explorations 18, no. 3 (April 9, 2015): 362–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2015.1026923.

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13

Kneer, Markus, and Edouard Machery. "No luck for moral luck." Cognition 182 (January 2019): 331–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.09.003.

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14

Afandi, Irfan. "PENDIDIKAN KEBERUNTUNGAN (Pemahaman Qs. Al-Mu’minun : 1-9 dalam Perspektif Tafsir Tarbawy)." INCARE, International Journal of Educational Resources 3, no. 1 (June 30, 2022): 094–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.59689/incare.v3i1.391.

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This study tries to understand how to be a lucky person in life in the perspective of tarbawy interpretation. Thus, luck can be something that man can achieve in his mortal life. The approach used in this article is a contextual approach, namely the context of the interpreter in which the context exists and surrounds the current reader. The results of the study stated that actually lucky people are people who are in a situation of low self-control. This has to do with the power of Allah Almighty, who is almighty of all things. Allah Almighty mentioned in Qs. al-Mu'minun that the mu'min person was lucky because he did 6 (six) things, namely khusyu prayer', leaving useless things, fulfilling zakat, Keeping the pubic, Keeping the mandate / Promise, Keeping the prayer time. So, the purpose of Luck education in this article is education by referring to students understanding, loving and doing these 6 (six) things in order to become lucky people.

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15

Stanley, Corinne. "Luck." Feminist Studies 30, no. 3 (October 1, 2004): 589. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20458985.

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16

Sears, Alexis. "Luck." Hopkins Review 14, no. 4 (2021): 487. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/thr.2021.0095.

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17

Worley, Jeff. "Luck." College English 55, no. 4 (April 1993): 430. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/378653.

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18

Shearin, Faith. "Luck." Chicago Review 39, no. 2 (1993): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25305688.

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19

Epstein, Richard A. "Luck." Social Philosophy and Policy 6, no. 1 (1988): 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002661.

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John Donne's song was hardly written in the tradition of political philosophy, but it has a good deal to say about the theme of luck, both good and bad, which I want to address. There is no doubt but that bad luck has bad consequences for the persons who suffer from it. If there were a costless way in which the consequences of bad luck could be spread across everyone in society at large, without increasing the risk of its occurrence, then most of us would pronounce ourselves better off for the change. In this sense it can be said, for example, that there is a utilitarian grounding for a moral obligation to care and provide for those persons who suffer the fortunes of bad luck. For the sake of argument I do not wish to contest this particular starting point, although there are many who would. Instead, I want to ask the question of whether this moral obligation should be converted into a legal obligation, backed by public force. The dominant answer to that question today is yes. Even those who think that markets should determine decisions on production find that the state has a proper role to reduce the adverse consequences of bad luck. My cast of mind is more skeptical. In life, or, in this instance, politics, “come bad chance, and we do join to it our strength.” In general the effort to use coercion to counter the adverse effects of luck tends only to make matters worse.

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20

Rescher, Nicholas. "Luck." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64, no. 3 (November 1990): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3130073.

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21

Rosenfeld, Richard M. "Luck." Otolaryngology–Head and Neck Surgery 145, no. 6 (November 30, 2011): 883–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0194599811428058.

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22

Gibbon, Bernard. "Stroke of luck Stroke of luck." Nursing Standard 16, no. 2 (September 26, 2001): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/ns2001.09.16.2.29.b108.

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23

Wilkenfeld, Daniel A., Dillon Plunkett, and Tania Lombrozo. "FOLK ATTRIBUTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING: IS THERE A ROLE FOR EPISTEMIC LUCK?" Episteme 15, no. 1 (November 22, 2016): 24–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.38.

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AbstractAs a strategy for exploring the relationship between understanding and knowledge, we consider whether epistemic luck – which is typically thought to undermine knowledge – undermines understanding. Questions about the etiology of understanding have also been at the heart of recent theoretical debates within epistemology. Kvanvig (2003) put forward the argument that there could be lucky understanding and produced an example that he deemed persuasive. Grimm (2006) responded with a case that, he argued, demonstrated that there could not be lucky understanding. In this paper, we empirically examine how participants' patterns of understanding attributions line up with the predictions of Kvanvig and Grimm. We argue that the data challenge Kvanvig's position. People do not differentiate between knowing-why and understanding-why on the basis of proper etiology: attributions of knowledge and understanding involve comparable (and minimal) roles for epistemic luck. We thus posit that folk knowledge and understanding are etiologically symmetrical.

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24

Gauriot, Romain, and Lionel Page. "Fooled by Performance Randomness: Overrewarding Luck." Review of Economics and Statistics 101, no. 4 (October 2019): 658–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00783.

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We provide evidence of a violation of the informativeness principle whereby lucky successes are overly rewarded. We isolate a quasi-experimental situation where the success of an agent is as good as random. To do so, we use high-quality data on football (soccer) matches and select shots on goal that landed on the goal posts. Using nonscoring shots, taken from a similar location on the pitch, as counterfactuals to scoring shots, we estimate the causal effect of a lucky success (goal) on the evaluation of the player's performance. We find clear evidence that luck is overly influencing managers' decisions and evaluators' ratings. Our results suggest that this phenomenon is likely to be widespread in economic organizations.

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25

Prasad, G. V. Ramesh. "Medical good luck and medical bad luck." Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 26, no. 2 (April 2020): 465–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jep.13284.

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26

Borges, Rodrigo. "Bad Luck for the Anti-Luck Epistemologist." Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, no. 4 (December 2016): 463–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12200.

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27

Miščević, Nenad. "Armchair luck: Apriority, intellection and epistemic luck." Acta Analytica 22, no. 1 (December 2007): 48–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02866210.

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28

Levy, Neil. "Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck." Midwest Studies In Philosophy 43, no. 1 (July 11, 2019): 59–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/misp.12104.

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29

Pulford, Briony D., and Poonam Gill. "Good luck, bad luck, and ambiguity aversion." Judgment and Decision Making 9, no. 2 (March 2014): 159–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500005520.

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AbstractWe report a series of experiments investigating the influence of feeling lucky or unlucky on people’s choice of known-risk or ambiguous options using the traditional Ellsberg Urns decision-making task. We induced a state of feeling lucky or unlucky in subjects by using a rigged wheel-of-fortune game, which just missed either the bankrupt or the jackpot outcome. In the first experiment a large reversal of the usual ambiguity aversion effect was shown, indicating that feeling lucky made subjects significantly more ambiguity seeking than usual. However, this effect failed to replicate in five refined and larger follow-up experiments. Thus we conclude that there is no evidence that feeling lucky reliably influences ambiguity aversion. Men were less ambiguity averse than women when there were potential gains to be had, but there were no gender differences when the task was negatively framed in terms of losses.

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30

Sauder, Michael. "A Sociology of Luck." Sociological Theory 38, no. 3 (August 19, 2020): 193–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0735275120941178.

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Sociology has been curiously silent about the concept of luck. The present article argues that this omission is, in fact, an oversight: An explicit and systematic engagement with luck provides a more accurate portrayal of the social world, opens potentially rich veins of empirical and theoretical inquiry, and offers a compelling alternative for challenging dominant meritocratic frames about inequality and the distribution of rewards. This article develops a framework for studying luck, first by proposing a working definition of luck, examining why sociology has ignored luck in the past, and making the case for the value of including luck in sociology’s conceptual repertoire. The article then demonstrates the fertile research potential of studying luck by identifying a host of research questions and hypotheses pertaining to the social construction of luck, the real effects of luck, and theoretical interventions related to luck. It concludes by highlighting the distinctive contributions sociology can make to the growing interdisciplinary interest in this topic.

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31

Bognar, Greg. "CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM." Economics and Philosophy 35, no. 02 (August 30, 2018): 259–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267118000226.

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Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

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32

Schoonover, S. B., and Ivan Guajardo. "Why C-luck really is a problem for compatibilism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 1 (February 2019): 48–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1531464.

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AbstractSome philosophers have recently argued that luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists and libertarians alike. But conceptual ambiguity regarding deterministic luck at the time of decision – henceforth C-luck – has obscured recognition of the problem C-luck poses to compatibilism. This paper clarifies C-luck and distinguishes it from present luck, showing that the former arises from contingent factors at the time of decision instead of presupposed free will requirements. We then argue that empirical findings confirm the existence of C-luck thereby raising a fundamental challenge to compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility.

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33

Ziółkowski, Adrian. "FOLK INTUITIONS AND THE NO-LUCK-THESIS." Episteme 13, no. 3 (September 7, 2015): 343–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.49.

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ABSTRACTAccording to the No-Luck-Thesis knowledge possession is incompatible with luck – one cannot know that p if the truth of one's belief that p is a matter of luck. Recently, this widespread opinion was challenged by Peter Baumann, who argues that in certain situations agents do possess knowledge even though their beliefs are true by luck. This paper aims at providing empirical data for evaluating Baumann's hypothesis. The experiment was designed to compare non-philosophers’ judgments concerning knowledge and luck in one case that Baumann takes to be in favor of his claim and other cases where, according to him, absence of knowledge coincides with luck. The results show that the cases do not differ in a significant way between each other with respect to verdicts regarding knowledge and luck. In all cases subjects were more reluctant to judge that the ‘Gettierized’ belief is knowledge and more likely to judge that it is true by luck in comparison to a belief that is an uncontroversial instance of knowledge. However, the negative relationship between knowledge and luck ascriptions predicted by the No-Luck-Thesis was almost absent. The data raise some doubts about the No-Luck-Thesis, but the reasons for doubt are different than what Baumann expected.

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34

Kitano, Christine. "Dumb Luck." Journal of Asian American Studies 24, no. 1 (2021): 89–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jaas.2021.0011.

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35

Sellars, John. "Tough luck." Philosophers' Magazine, no. 55 (2011): 72–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tpm201155109.

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36

Kiely, Kevin, Umberto Eco, Liberato Santoro-Brienza, Trevor L. Williams, Dillon Johnston, Vincent J. Cheng, and J. D. O'Hara. "Prospector's Luck." Books Ireland, no. 216 (1998): 261. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20623710.

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37

Pritchard, Duncan. "Epistemic Luck." Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004): 191–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr_2004_18.

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38

Zagzebski, Linda. "Religious Luck." Faith and Philosophy 11, no. 3 (1994): 397–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199411349.

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39

Bates, Jane. "Pot luck." Nursing Standard 16, no. 12 (December 5, 2001): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.7748/ns.16.12.23.s38.

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40

Edwards, Rem B. "Moral Luck." International Studies in Philosophy 17, no. 1 (1985): 111–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil198517175.

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41

Greene, Richard, and Rachel Robison. "Epistemic Luck." Polish Journal of Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2008): 163–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pjphil20082112.

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42

F. Recher, Harry. "Good Luck." Pacific Conservation Biology 15, no. 4 (2009): 230. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/pc090230.

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On last night?s (11 November 2009) ABC Television, I watched Sir David Attenborough being interviewed for the 7.30 Report by Kerry O?Brien. Sir David is a household name throughout the English speaking world, if not universally. Since the beginnings of television, David Attenborough has brought the world of nature into our homes. He has probably seen more of the Earth?s wild animals and untamed places than any known traveller in modern history; a compassionate, intelligent, thoughtful and articulate man, Sir David?s views on the future of the wild planet merit respect and careful consideration. In this interview, three things stood out.

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43

Banerian, James, Vü Trong Phung, Peter Zinoman, Nguyên Nguyêt Câm, and Peter Zinoman. "Dumb Luck." World Literature Today 77, no. 2 (2003): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40158038.

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Dings, Fred, and Sam Hamill. "Dumb Luck." World Literature Today 77, no. 3/4 (2003): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40158224.

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Geminder, Emily. "Deer Luck." Colorado Review 43, no. 1 (2016): 113–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/col.2016.0016.

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Grünbein, Durs, Via Lewandowsky, and Daniel Slager. "Good Luck!" Grand Street, no. 70 (2002): 236. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25008623.

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Castillo, Jorge Olivera. "Bad luck." Index on Censorship 41, no. 1 (March 2012): 168–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306422012439645.

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Leithauser, Hailey. "Dumb Luck." Ecotone 9, no. 1 (2013): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ect.2013.0054.

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Maffeo, Richard. "Good Luck." Journal of Christian Nursing 15, no. 1 (1998): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00005217-199815010-00018.

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Schreiber, Melvyn H. "Good Luck." Investigative Radiology 28, no. 8 (August 1993): 778. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00004424-199308000-00024.

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