Relevant bibliographies by topics / Ludwig Wittgenstein s Philosophy

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Ludwig Wittgenstein s Philosophy'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 2 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Ludwig Wittgenstein s Philosophy"

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HELLMANN, GUNTHER. "Theorising praxis and practice(s). Notes on Silviya Lechner’s and Mervyn Frost’s Practice Theory and International Relations." Global Constitutionalism 9, no. 1 (March 2020): 158–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s204538171900042x.

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Abstract:Silviya Lechner’s and Mervyn Frost’s book Practice Theory and International Relations offers a new approach to theorise international relations in terms of ‘practices’. It is a welcome contribution to an intensifying debate about ‘praxis’, ‘practice’ and ‘practices’ because Lechner and Frost actually engage key authors of praxis, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, who, in IR, have often only been referenced in passing. While the rediscovery of Wittgenstein as praxis theorist is welcome, the reading of his approach to praxis is irritating because ‘internalism’ and ‘descriptivism’ – two concepts which Lechner and Frost highlight as central in both Wittgenstein’s work and their new practice theory – are interpreted in ways which are difficult to reconcile with Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. This critique offers a different reading of Wittgenstein’s approach to praxis and argues that such an alternative reading opens up an understanding of praxis which, if adopted more widely, would also free IR theorising from self-imposed strictures.
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Cabanis, M., and M. Gahr. "Die psychiatrische Diagnostik im Kontext von Ludwig Wittgensteins Sprachphilosophie." Nervenheilkunde 32, no. 08 (August 2013): 543–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1055/s-0038-1628535.

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ZusammenfassungDie Sprache erfüllt im Rahmen der psychiatrischen Diagnostik vielfältige Funktionen, zu denen neben der Dokumentation des psychopathologischen Befundes auch die intersubjektive Vermittlung subjektiven Erlebens gehört. Bei der Beschreibung subjektiver Erlebnisse spielt das psychologische Vokabular (PV) eine wichtige methodologische Rolle. Es ist deshalb wichtig, sich im psychiatrischen Bereich über die Bedeutung des PV Klarheit zu verschaffen. Schwierigkeiten ergeben sich, wenn die Bedeutung von Wörtern wie Angst, Stimmung oder Denken in der Bezeichnung “privater Episoden” gesehen wird. Ludwig Wittgenstein entwickelt in den “Philosophischen Untersuchungen” eine Gebrauchstheorie der Sprache, nach der die Bedeutung von Wörtern grundsätzlich in ihrem konkreten praktischen Gebrauch bzw. den Regeln liegt, welche die jeweiligen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten des Wortes leiten. Da demnach auch die Bedeutung von PV in dessen jeweiligem Gebrauch liegt, ist die korrekte Verwendung an objektivierbaren Kriterien des menschlichen Verhaltens zu orientieren. Die Übersichtsarbeit stellt Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie und späte Sprachphilosophie dar und diskutiert diese im Kontext der psychiatrischen Diagnostik.
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Saidel, Matías Leandro. "Form(s)-of-life: agamben's reading of Wittgenstein and the potential uses of a notion." Trans/Form/Ação 37, no. 1 (April 2014): 163–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-31732014000100009.

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Giorgio Agamben and Ludwig Wittgenstein seem to have very little in common: the former is concerned with traditional ontological issues while the latter was interested in logics and ordinary language, avoiding metaphysical issues as something we cannot speak about. However, both share a crucial notion for their philosophical projects: form of life. In this paper, I try to show that, despite their different approaches and goals, form of life is for both a crucial notion for thinking ethics and life in-common. Addressing human existence in its constitutive relation to language, this notion deconstructs traditional dichotomies like bios and zoé, the cultural and the biological, enabling both authors to think of a life which cannot be separated from its forms, recognizing the commonality of logos as the specific trait of human existence. Through an analogical reading between both theoretical frameworks, I suggest that the notion of form-of-life, elaborated by Wittgenstein to address human production of meaning, becomes the key notion in Agamben's affirmative thinking since it enables us to consider the common ontologically in its relation to Human potentialities and to foresee a new, common use of the world and ourselves.
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Poisson, Céline. "Architecture et continuité : Loos, Wittgenstein, Peirce." Recherches sémiotiques 30, no. 1-2-3 (July 15, 2014): 165–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1025931ar.

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En me référant aux philosophes Charles S. Peirce et Ludwig Wittgenstein et à l’architecte Adolf Loos, je me propose de questionner le processus de création en architecture et en design dans l’esprit d’un souci de conservation et de continuité entre conception, fabrication et usage. La vue d’ensemble nécessaire à l’architecte, au designer ou à l’artisan d’expérience n’est nullement une pure construction de l’esprit. Il s’agit bien plutôt d’une pure présence de l’esprit à la réalité. Trouver la juste proposition architecturale pourrait, à bien des égards, ressembler à trouver le mot juste : une série d’essais, d’erreurs, d’idées et de propositions comparées entre elles. Un travail de la pensée qui rappelle le travail de l’artisan.
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Seneviratne, Rohana. "Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein on Grammar: A Few Observations." IRA International Journal of Education and Multidisciplinary Studies 15, no. 4 (September 24, 2019): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.21013/jems.v15.n4.p4.

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Irrespective of spatiotemporal limitations of the world's intellectual history, discussions on the language have attracted considerable attention of philosophers, linguists, and even the public. The topics of such discussions have also included the meaning, nature or function/s, and necessity of grammar while diverse arguments have been raised both in support and against even its ontic presence. Among the philosophers from all ages who attempted to analyze the foundation of those arguments, i.e. the common notion that grammar is prescriptive and fruit of pedagogical instructions, Bhartṛhari(c. 450 - 510 C.E.) stands significant because of the richness and legitimacy of his arguments at such an early age of history. More than a millennium later, Ludwig Wittgenstein as a highly influential philosopher from the last century shows some relationship with Bhartrhari in (re)confirming that our common construal of grammar cannot be valid because of its non-prescriptive nature. While attempting to examine the ways in which Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein have interpreted grammar, this paper succinctly investigates each philosopher approaches towards the language in use.
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Nubiola, Jaime. "La búsqueda de la verdad en la tradición pragmatista." Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe, no. 8-9 (June 10, 2018): 183–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.14409/topicos.v0i8-9.7412.

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La consideración de la verdad como objeto de la búsqueda científica y vital es posiblemente la manera más adecuada para comprender la tradición pragmatista. Frente al diagnóstico postmoderno de Rorty que aboga por la disolución de la filosofía en la literatura, en la conversación general de la humanidad y frente al fundacionalismo cientista de los herederos del Círculo de Viena en este trabajo se defiende un camino intermedio, con pretensiones más modestas, pero que por estar anclado en la experiencia personal de cada uno y en la experiencia colectiva de la especie humana, afronta mejor el reto de dar razón del progreso histórico de la verdad, el reto de comprender el sentido del crecimiento de los saberes y el proceso de generación de nuevos conocimientos. Se trata de la tradición pragmatista que hunde sus raíces en el pensamiento de Charles S. Peirce, cobra vigor en nuestro siglo con las reflexiones de Ludwig Wittgenstein y adquiere su mayor desarrollo en autores contemporáneos como Hilary Putnam y Susan Haack. AbstractThe consideration of the truth as object of the scientific and vital search is possibly the most adequate way to understand the pragmatist tradition. As opposed to the Rorty's postmodern diagnosis that pleads for the dissolution of the philosophy in the literature or in the general conversation of the humanity; as opposed to the scientist foundation of the inheritors of the Circle of Vienna, in this work an intermediate way with more modest pretensions is presented. Being anchored in the personal experience and in the collective experience of the human, it faced better the challenge of giving reason to the historical progress of the truth and the challenge of understanding the sense of the growth and the generation process of new knowledge. The pragmatist tradition which sinks its roots in Charles's S. Peirce's thought, increases vigor in our century with Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections and acquires its major development in contemporary authors such as Hilary Putnam and Susan Haack.
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Walker, Margaret Urban. "Ludwig Wittgenstein." International Philosophical Quarterly 33, no. 3 (1993): 370–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199333329.

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Kerr, Fergus. "Ludwig Wittgenstein." International Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1998): 327–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199838333.

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Harré, Rom. "Ludwig Wittgenstein." International Studies in Philosophy 26, no. 1 (1994): 126–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil199426151.

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Kostina, S. A. "Ludwig Wittgenstein, professor og philosophy." Alma mater. Vestnik Vysshey Shkoly, no. 6 (June 2017): 34–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.20339/am.06-17.034.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Ludwig Wittgenstein s Philosophy"

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Fatturi, Arturo. "Mundo interior e expressão: a filosofia da psicologia de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2010. https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/4778.

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This thesis analyzes the grammar of the psychological vocabulary with the idea that inner world (the subjectivity) and external world (the behavior) are connected by grammatical relations which must be clarified through a conceptual inquiry and not through empirical findings. To reach to the objective we analyzed the common point of view that we have of our inner world and traces the linkings between our affirmations about the inner world and how they acquire meaning from this common point of view. The following step was to analyze the conception of privacy that the common point of view attributes to the events of the inner world. After this we argue that the common conception does not could be a base for the construction of a philosophical explanation of the inner world. Therefore the objective of the common vision of our interior world is not to elaborate a scientific explanation. At the same time we conclude that our common conception of the psychological vocabulary is not a proto-theory that must be developed by the philosophical investigations. From this we open the way to present the philosophical point of view of Ludwig Wittgenstein about the psychological vocabulary. We explain this point of view to clarify our objective. Subsequently we presents the conception of language of Wittgenstein and we link his conception with the way for which he treated or understanding of the psychological vocabulary. With this explanation we show that when we are dealing with the affirmations of our inner world - our psychological vocabulary - we are not contending with a dichotomy between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Wittgenstein shows that we have another form to explain our language about the inner world. According to Wittgenstein's philosophy of the psychology our behavior is an expression of the inner world, that is, the inner if express world through the behavior despite if it does not reduce to the behavior. With such idea, Wittgenstein admits that the relation enters our affirmations on the interior world cannot be understood in isolated way of our behavior. At the same time, our behavior alone is not the criterion for understanding of the inner world, is necessary that the behavior be considered inside of a specific language game that is our use of our concepts of the psychological vocabulary.
Ao partir do princípio de que o mundo interior (a subjetividade) e o mundo exterior (o comportamento) estão ligados entre si por relações gramaticais, esta tese analisa a gramática do vocabulário psicológico. Propõe que estas relações gramaticais devem ser esclarecidas através de uma investigação conceitual, e não por investigações, empíricas. Para que alcancemos o objetivo desejado, foi analisado o ponto de vista comum que temos de nosso mundo interior. Tal visão traça as ligações entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior e como elas adquirem significado a partir deste ponto de vista comum. O passo seguinte consistiu em analisar a concepção de privacidade que o ponto de vista comum atribui aos eventos do mundo interior. Demonstramos, após estas análises, que a concepção comum não serve de base para a construção de uma explicação filosófica do mundo interior e das afirmações que dele fazemos. Isto porque o objetivo da visão comum de nosso mundo interior não é a de elaborar uma explicação científica. Ao mesmo tempo, mostramos que nossa concepção comum do vocabulário psicológico não é uma proto-teoria que deve ser desenvolvida pela Filosofia. Com isto, abrimos caminho para apresentar o ponto de vista filosófico de Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre o vocabulário psicológico. Para que este ponto de vista fosse explicativo em relação ao nosso objetivo, apresentamos a concepção de linguagem de Wittgenstein, ligando esta concepção com o modo como Wittgenstein tratou o vocabulário psicológico. Através desta análise, mostramos que, ao tratarmos com as afirmações de nosso mundo interior nosso vocabulário psicológico não estamos diante de uma dicotomia entre behaviorismo e cartesianismo. Isto, pelo fato de termos outra possibilidade de tratar nossa linguagem quando nos referimos ao mundo interior. Segundo a Filosofia da Psicologia, de Ludwig Wittgenstein, o comportamento é uma expressão do mundo interior, isto é, o mundo interior se expressa através do comportamento, ainda que a este não se reduza. A partir de tal ideia, Wittgenstein propõe que a relação entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior não podem ser compreendidas de maneira isolada de nosso comportamento. Juntemos a isto que tão somente o nosso comportamento não é critério para compreensão do mundo interior Portanto, há necessidade, de que o comportamento seja considerado dentro de um jogo de linguagem específico, que consiste no uso de nossos conceitos do vocabulário psicológico.
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Wernecke, Jörg. "Handeln und Bedeutung : L. Wittgenstein, Ch. S. Peirce und M. Heidegger zu einer Propädeutik einer hermeneutischen Pragmatik /." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016229646&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Marrou, Élise. "Solipsisme(s) : la résistance d'un problème dans la pensée de Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010712.

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L'enjeu de cette étude est double: la première partie de ce travail est consacrée à une clarification du sens du solipsisme. Elle montre comment ce spectre s'est diffracté en plusieurs figures dont on propose une typologie a partir d'une relecture des "Méditations": cinq figures sont ainsi dégagées (les trois premières - berkeleyenne, lockienne et leibnizienne - s'inscrivent dans un cadre cartésien, les deux suivantes -fichtéenne et schopenhauerienne - dans un cadre kantien). On envisage ensuite la spécificité des traitements analytiques du problème du solipsisme (ses différentes versions méthodologiques). Les limites des réponses constructionnistes conduisent a dégager l'angle depuis lequel Wittgenstein aborde ce problème en le replaçant dans Ie contexte d'une réponse aux "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik" de Frege. La seconde partie de ce travail, dont la démarche est évolutive, montre comment Wittgenstein déjoue chacune des figures traditionnelles du solipsisme pour mieux mettre en évidence la résistance d'une dernière figure inventée par Wittgenstein, celle du solipsisme logique. Dans le "Tractatus", Wittgenstein répond aux figures idéalistes du solipsisme et corrige les traitements russellien et frégéen de ce problème. L'universalisme logique étouffe en revanche la menace du solipsisme logique, qui rejaillit durant la période intermédiaire. Alors que Wittgenstein récuse les versions empiristes du solipsisme la figure machienne et le solipsisme méthodologique de l'Aujbau - la rupture avec I'intentionalisme du "Tractatus" débouche sur le fond sceptique du solipsisme logique qui n'est pas tant réfute dans les "Recherches philosophiques" que révélé pour lui-même.
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Ulive, Schnell Vicente. "Les performatifs mimétiques : enjeux et limitations." Paris 8, 2007. http://octaviana.fr/document/133382133#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.

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Notre recherche tente de cerner la polémique autour des modèles des Actes de parole (Austin, Searle, Grice) en reprenant et re-évaluant les notions avancées par Wittgenstein sur le langage. Nous pouvons identifier un fil conducteur entre les deux livres centraux du penseur viennois, le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus et les Investigations Philosophiques, qui permet d'ouvrir la porte aux découvertes en Philosophie Anthropologique proposées par Arnold Gehlen (et aussi Max Scheller et Johann G. Herder). De cette façon, nous pouvons relever l'aspect "mimétique" relatif à la production d'une locution, inhérent à la relation de '’être humain avec son environnement. Ceci permet de rafraîchir notre compréhension du fonctionnement du langage et notamment de sortir de la logique binaire proposée par les penseurs anglo-saxons, selon laquelle toute question de langage n'est plus qu'une question d'imitation / application d'un modèle dans une situation appropriée. Nous tacherons ensuite de montrer comment une lecture "mimétique", qui essaie de trouver les liens de production / reproduction d'une façon de penser, peut s'avérer intéressante pour la compréhension de la façon dont se propagent certains regards ou "formes de vie" (Wittgenstein) dans plusieurs domaines. Puisque les modèles des Actes de parole s'érigent en tant que philosophie "totale", avec une justification logique et pragmatique, politique, éthique et sociale, il est important de déceler toutes leurs implications et d'analyser la façon dont ils s'érigent en tant que philosophie d'explication et justification de notre monde contemporain. C'est pourquoi une lecture alternative, qui prend comme point de départ les propositions de Wittgenstein sur la relation entre l'homme et son langage, peut nous conduire à élargir notre regard sur cette relation et à ouvrir la porte vers une approximation où le principe finaliste d'un langage "performatif" serait écarté à faveur d'un langage "mimétique" où les instances d'appropriation, de compréhension, de production et de création de la locution prendraient une place d'envergure
Our research approaches the debate surrounding the "Speech acts" models (Austin, Searle, Grice) by reevaluating the ideas advanced by Ludwig Wittgenstein concerning language. We can find a line of thought connecting his two major works: The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations that leads us to the Philosophical Anthropology proposed by Arnold Gehlen (as well as Max Scheler and Johann G. Herder). This thread takes us to the "mimetic" aspect inherent in the production of a locution, characteristic of man's interaction with his environment. This approach can help us refresh our understanding of language, noticeably by opening up the binary logic proposed by Anglo-Saxon thinkers who reduce all linguistic interaction to a question of imitation / application of a model in a given situation. In our research, we try to show how a "mimetic" approach to language, this is, an approach that tries to uncover the path of production / reproduction of a way of thinking, can be interesting in the understanding of how certain "views" or "forms of life" (Wittgenstein) are transmitted between different domains and fields. Also, since the "Speech act" models present a "total" philosophy that includes a logic and a pragmatic characteristic as well as a political, an ethic and a social approach, it is important to study these models and understand how they have become an explanation and a justification for the world we live in. This is why a different perspective, that takes into account Wittgenstein's concerns about man and his relation to language, can enlarge our understanding about how language works and help us escape the teleological "performative" language approach in favor of a "mimetic" language where variables such as appropriation, comprehension production and creation of a locution are what is essentially important
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Rapczyk, Nicolas. "Les variations infinies de la vie : relativisme culturel et rationalité des normes et des valeurs." Paris 8, 2010. http://octaviana.fr/document/157354938#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.

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Cette thèse a pour sujet le relativisme culturel. La question est posée dans la perspective ouverte par la philosophie de Wittgenstein et dans le cadre des controverses récentes qu’elle a suscitées dans les sciences sociales et politiques. Les idées directrices de l’auteur (l’autonomie du grammatical, la relation interne entre la règle et son application, le donné des formes de vie, la normativité de la pratique…) sont confrontées aux conceptions relativistes qui tirent argument de la diversité empirique des cultures pour en conclure à une relativité axiologique généralisée. Je défends l’idée que la philosophie de Wittgenstein n’est pas relativiste, en quelque sens que ce soit (conceptuel, linguistique, épistémique…) et qu’elle permet d’opérer une dissolution (au sens d’une thérapie philosophique) du problème posé par le relativiste. Dans une première partie, je m’intéresse au statut de l’éthique et à la sémantique des propositions normatives dans les premiers écrits de Wittgenstein. La seconde partie est consacrée au ‘paradoxe de la règle’ et à la réfutation de ses interprétations sociologiques. Je me demande notamment quel est ce ‘nous’ auquel renvoie Wittgenstein lorsqu’il parle d’un accord dans nos formes de vie et dans nos jugements. Dans une troisième partie, j’examine plusieurs versions contemporaines du relativisme culturel. Puis je défends la thèse qu’une philosophie sociale inspirée par Wittgenstein et sa méthode d’une ethnographie imaginaire permet un dépassement de l’opposition entre relativisme et universalisme, mais qu’elle n’implique pas l’abandon de toute idée de l’universel si l’on conçoit celui-ci dans les termes d’une épistémologie comparative
This thesis is about cultural relativism. The question is raised in the perspective opened by the philosophy of Wittgenstein and in the context of recent controversies it has aroused in the social and political sciences. The main ideas of the author (the autonomy of grammar, the internal relation of a rule to acts, the given of forms of life, the intrinsic normativity of the practice. . . ) are confronted with relativist views which appeal to the empirical diversity of cultures to conclude in favor of a generalized axiological relativity. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not relativistic, in any sense whatsoever (conceptual, linguistic, epistemic, and so on) and that, on the contrary, it allows for a dissolution (in the sense of a philosophical therapy) of the problem raised by the relativist. In a first section, I concern with the status of ethics and the semantics of the normative statements in Wittgenstein’s early writings. The second section is devoted to the ‘rule-following paradox’ and to refute its sociological interpretations. I wonder especially what is that ‘we’ to which Wittgenstein refers when he speaks of an agreement in our forms of life and in our judgments. In the third section, I survey several contemporary versions of cultural relativism. Then I argue that a social philosophy inspired by Wittgenstein and his method of imaginary ethnography allows overtaking the opposition between relativism and universalism but doesn’t imply a dismissal of any idea of the universal if we conceive it in terms of an epistemology of radical comparison
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Lorenzo, Mario. "Choix et composition musicale : dans l'espace des raisons." Paris 8, 2014. http://octaviana.fr/document/182418332#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.

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Notre réflexion se situe autour du choix en cours d'écriture dans la pratique de la composition musicale. À l’ère de l’interaction, où tous les acteurs de la composition musicale s’accordent, avec des nuances, sur le caractère indispensable de l’écriture dite « manuelle », le prix à payer pour un tel consentement est, à quelques exceptions près, le plus élevé : considérer le choix spontané comme la partie irrationnelle de la pratique. En effet, un bon nombre de réflexions s’obstinent à chercher, directement ou indirectement, le fondement de nos déterminations dans les théories qui, non sans un certain charme, se donnent rendez-vous au final, dans les « zones les plus obscures de l’intelligence » où le langage, s’il n’est pas privé (avec tous les non-sens que cela implique) est tout simplement de trop. À l’égard de ces recherches, il semblerait que l'on n’ait pas encore résolu ce que certains sont prêts à appeler « le problème de la créativité » ou encore « le problème de la spontanéité ». Nous pensons qu'il est tout a fait possible de donner au choix libre un « rôle structurant de premier ordre » selon une expression de Vaggione, sans le besoin d'adopter des arguments qui mettent sérieusement en cause le sens-commun. Le manque de fondement de nos choix n’est pas la trace d’une ignorance que la science, ou une certaine science, pourrait un jour nous aider à surmonter, mais la manifestation d’une confusion de grammaire qu’il convient de clarifier. Autrement dit, la difficulté n’est pas d'ordre causale mais conceptuelle. Compte tenu de la profusion de réflexions musicales actuelles faisant référence à l’espace, je propose de placer nos choix, avant toute chose, dans l’« espace des raisons », (expression prise à Wilfrid Sellars), espace qui n’excède pas la sphère de concepts. À partir de textes de Wittgenstein et plus largement, de la philosophie du langage et de la connaissance, notre objectif n’est pas d’attaquer héroïquement le problème à la racine en voulant construire une théorie de la création ou quelque chose de ce genre, mais de participer à la dissolution, (par un long travail systématique de « petits pas »), d'un certain nombre de erreurs philosophiques qui se sont installées dans les réflexions sur la composition musicale. Cette démarche achevée, nous n'arriverons pas à une théorie de l’acte d'écriture, mais devant notre grammaire, nos manières de faire. Comme le résume Jacques Bouveresse, la meilleure manière de rencontrer le nouveau est de laisser les choses dans l'état. Cela veut dire, pour nous, se retrouver devant la partition que nous sommes en train de composer sans la prétention de vouloir dire plus que nos langages nous le permettent
Our research focuses around choice in the process of writing into the practice of musical composition. Even if, at the era of interaction, in which all relevant players are agreed about "manual control", this unanimous consent comes, with a few nuances, at too great a price: the spontaneous choice should be seen, in the final analysis, as the irrational part of the practice. Indeed, many research projects are seeking, directly or indirectly, the foundation of our determination in the theories that, not without charm, leave many openings through which "the most complex and mysterious factors of the intelligence may penetrate" where the language, if is not private (with all the nonsense that involves), it's simply discarded. Concerning these researches, it seems that what some composers are willing to call "the creation problem" or still "the spontaneity problem" is unresolved to date. We think that it is possible to give at free choice a "structuring role of first-rate" in the words of Vaggione, without the need to use the arguments casting doubt over seriously the common sens. The lack of theoretical foundation of our choice is not the trace of ignorance that science could just helping us to overcome it, but the expression of grammar confusions that should be clarified. In other words, the difficulty is not in a causal connexion but in a conceptual one. In view of the abundance of current musical reflections referring to space, I propose to place our choice, before anything else, in the "space of reasons" (as Wilfrid Sellars puts it). I should add this space is not exceeding the sphere of concepts. From Wittgenstein's texts and, more broadly, to the philosophy of language and knowledge, our goal is not to build a theory of act of writing or something of this kind, but to participate to dissolve (by a long and systematic piecemeal work), a certain number of philosophical mistakes which have settled in the reflections upon of musical composition. Once there, we shall reach our grammar, ours ways of making. As summarized Jacques Bouveresse, the best way to meet the newness is to let things being. This means, for us, retrieving the score we are composing, without presuming to speak more than we are allowed
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7

Lundgren, Lars. "Ludwig Wittgenstein som folkskollärare." Thesis, Södertörn University College, Lärarutbildningen, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-1228.

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This paper studies the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein during his years (1920–26) as an elementary school teacher in remote Niederösterreich, Austria. The paper gives a survey of his life, and also a brief account of three of his main works: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Attention is given to his alphabetical word list, Wörterbuch für Volksschulen, published for educational use in elementary schools. The study is focused on Wittgenstein’s educational practise, and establishes a connection between his experience as a teacher and his late philosophy.

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Gefwert, Christoffer. "Wittgenstein on philosophy and mathematics : an essay in the history of philosophy /." Åbo : Åbo akademic Förlag, 1994. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb357214439.

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Sales, Anthony. "Musical investigations : Ludwig Wittgenstein and music." Thesis, University of Ulster, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241998.

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Sigouin, Tara-Lynne. "W.V. Quine & Ludwig Wittgenstein, two approaches to philosophy." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ58506.pdf.

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Books on the topic "Ludwig Wittgenstein s Philosophy"

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Simon, Summers, ed. Wittgenstein among the sciences: Wittgensteinian investigations into the "scientific method". Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein: Leben, Werk, Wirkung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O'Mahony, eds. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein, architect. London: Thames and Hudson, 1994.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein, architect. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994.

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Wiener Ausgabe. Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1993.

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Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

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Chauviré, Christiane. Wittgenstein: Expérience(s). Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2010.

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Fogelin, Robert J. Wittgenstein. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1999.

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Wittgenstein. 2nd ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.

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Book chapters on the topic "Ludwig Wittgenstein s Philosophy"

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Patterson, Dennis. "Wittgenstein, Ludwig." In Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1–5. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_656-1.

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Hamilton, Andy. "Ludwig Wittgenstein." In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, 546–56. 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2017. |: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-47.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O’Mahony. "Philosophy." In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy, 187–241. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0_5.

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Howard, Alex. "Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)." In Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 313–26. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04644-4_30.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O’Mahony. "Introduction." In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy, 3–76. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0_1.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O’Mahony. "The Amanuensis Matters." In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy, 77–99. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0_2.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O’Mahony. "The Pink Book." In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy, 103–47. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0_3.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O’Mahony. "“Communication of Personal Experience”." In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy, 149–85. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0_4.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O’Mahony. "Visual Image in His Brain." In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy, 243–54. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0_6.

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Gibson, Arthur, and Niamh O’Mahony. "The Norwegian Notebook." In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Dictating Philosophy, 255–68. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36087-0_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Ludwig Wittgenstein s Philosophy"

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Zhelyazkova, Denitsa. "Тhe semantic ontology in Wittgenstein’s philosophy." In 130 years Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-2019). Center for Open Access in Science, Belgrade, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32591/coas.e-book.001.05.

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