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Fatturi, Arturo. "Mundo interior e expressão: a filosofia da psicologia de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2010. https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/4778.
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Previous issue date: 2010-03-22This thesis analyzes the grammar of the psychological vocabulary with the idea that inner world (the subjectivity) and external world (the behavior) are connected by grammatical relations which must be clarified through a conceptual inquiry and not through empirical findings. To reach to the objective we analyzed the common point of view that we have of our inner world and traces the linkings between our affirmations about the inner world and how they acquire meaning from this common point of view. The following step was to analyze the conception of privacy that the common point of view attributes to the events of the inner world. After this we argue that the common conception does not could be a base for the construction of a philosophical explanation of the inner world. Therefore the objective of the common vision of our interior world is not to elaborate a scientific explanation. At the same time we conclude that our common conception of the psychological vocabulary is not a proto-theory that must be developed by the philosophical investigations. From this we open the way to present the philosophical point of view of Ludwig Wittgenstein about the psychological vocabulary. We explain this point of view to clarify our objective. Subsequently we presents the conception of language of Wittgenstein and we link his conception with the way for which he treated or understanding of the psychological vocabulary. With this explanation we show that when we are dealing with the affirmations of our inner world - our psychological vocabulary - we are not contending with a dichotomy between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Wittgenstein shows that we have another form to explain our language about the inner world. According to Wittgenstein's philosophy of the psychology our behavior is an expression of the inner world, that is, the inner if express world through the behavior despite if it does not reduce to the behavior. With such idea, Wittgenstein admits that the relation enters our affirmations on the interior world cannot be understood in isolated way of our behavior. At the same time, our behavior alone is not the criterion for understanding of the inner world, is necessary that the behavior be considered inside of a specific language game that is our use of our concepts of the psychological vocabulary.
Ao partir do princípio de que o mundo interior (a subjetividade) e o mundo exterior (o comportamento) estão ligados entre si por relações gramaticais, esta tese analisa a gramática do vocabulário psicológico. Propõe que estas relações gramaticais devem ser esclarecidas através de uma investigação conceitual, e não por investigações, empíricas. Para que alcancemos o objetivo desejado, foi analisado o ponto de vista comum que temos de nosso mundo interior. Tal visão traça as ligações entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior e como elas adquirem significado a partir deste ponto de vista comum. O passo seguinte consistiu em analisar a concepção de privacidade que o ponto de vista comum atribui aos eventos do mundo interior. Demonstramos, após estas análises, que a concepção comum não serve de base para a construção de uma explicação filosófica do mundo interior e das afirmações que dele fazemos. Isto porque o objetivo da visão comum de nosso mundo interior não é a de elaborar uma explicação científica. Ao mesmo tempo, mostramos que nossa concepção comum do vocabulário psicológico não é uma proto-teoria que deve ser desenvolvida pela Filosofia. Com isto, abrimos caminho para apresentar o ponto de vista filosófico de Ludwig Wittgenstein sobre o vocabulário psicológico. Para que este ponto de vista fosse explicativo em relação ao nosso objetivo, apresentamos a concepção de linguagem de Wittgenstein, ligando esta concepção com o modo como Wittgenstein tratou o vocabulário psicológico. Através desta análise, mostramos que, ao tratarmos com as afirmações de nosso mundo interior nosso vocabulário psicológico não estamos diante de uma dicotomia entre behaviorismo e cartesianismo. Isto, pelo fato de termos outra possibilidade de tratar nossa linguagem quando nos referimos ao mundo interior. Segundo a Filosofia da Psicologia, de Ludwig Wittgenstein, o comportamento é uma expressão do mundo interior, isto é, o mundo interior se expressa através do comportamento, ainda que a este não se reduza. A partir de tal ideia, Wittgenstein propõe que a relação entre as nossas afirmações sobre o mundo interior não podem ser compreendidas de maneira isolada de nosso comportamento. Juntemos a isto que tão somente o nosso comportamento não é critério para compreensão do mundo interior Portanto, há necessidade, de que o comportamento seja considerado dentro de um jogo de linguagem específico, que consiste no uso de nossos conceitos do vocabulário psicológico.
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Wernecke, Jörg. "Handeln und Bedeutung : L. Wittgenstein, Ch. S. Peirce und M. Heidegger zu einer Propädeutik einer hermeneutischen Pragmatik /." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016229646&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Marrou, Élise. "Solipsisme(s) : la résistance d'un problème dans la pensée de Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010712.
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L'enjeu de cette étude est double: la première partie de ce travail est consacrée à une clarification du sens du solipsisme. Elle montre comment ce spectre s'est diffracté en plusieurs figures dont on propose une typologie a partir d'une relecture des "Méditations": cinq figures sont ainsi dégagées (les trois premières - berkeleyenne, lockienne et leibnizienne - s'inscrivent dans un cadre cartésien, les deux suivantes -fichtéenne et schopenhauerienne - dans un cadre kantien). On envisage ensuite la spécificité des traitements analytiques du problème du solipsisme (ses différentes versions méthodologiques). Les limites des réponses constructionnistes conduisent a dégager l'angle depuis lequel Wittgenstein aborde ce problème en le replaçant dans Ie contexte d'une réponse aux "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik" de Frege. La seconde partie de ce travail, dont la démarche est évolutive, montre comment Wittgenstein déjoue chacune des figures traditionnelles du solipsisme pour mieux mettre en évidence la résistance d'une dernière figure inventée par Wittgenstein, celle du solipsisme logique. Dans le "Tractatus", Wittgenstein répond aux figures idéalistes du solipsisme et corrige les traitements russellien et frégéen de ce problème. L'universalisme logique étouffe en revanche la menace du solipsisme logique, qui rejaillit durant la période intermédiaire. Alors que Wittgenstein récuse les versions empiristes du solipsisme la figure machienne et le solipsisme méthodologique de l'Aujbau - la rupture avec I'intentionalisme du "Tractatus" débouche sur le fond sceptique du solipsisme logique qui n'est pas tant réfute dans les "Recherches philosophiques" que révélé pour lui-même.
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Ulive, Schnell Vicente. "Les performatifs mimétiques : enjeux et limitations." Paris 8, 2007. http://octaviana.fr/document/133382133#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.
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Notre recherche tente de cerner la polémique autour des modèles des Actes de parole (Austin, Searle, Grice) en reprenant et re-évaluant les notions avancées par Wittgenstein sur le langage. Nous pouvons identifier un fil conducteur entre les deux livres centraux du penseur viennois, le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus et les Investigations Philosophiques, qui permet d'ouvrir la porte aux découvertes en Philosophie Anthropologique proposées par Arnold Gehlen (et aussi Max Scheller et Johann G. Herder). De cette façon, nous pouvons relever l'aspect "mimétique" relatif à la production d'une locution, inhérent à la relation de '’être humain avec son environnement. Ceci permet de rafraîchir notre compréhension du fonctionnement du langage et notamment de sortir de la logique binaire proposée par les penseurs anglo-saxons, selon laquelle toute question de langage n'est plus qu'une question d'imitation / application d'un modèle dans une situation appropriée. Nous tacherons ensuite de montrer comment une lecture "mimétique", qui essaie de trouver les liens de production / reproduction d'une façon de penser, peut s'avérer intéressante pour la compréhension de la façon dont se propagent certains regards ou "formes de vie" (Wittgenstein) dans plusieurs domaines. Puisque les modèles des Actes de parole s'érigent en tant que philosophie "totale", avec une justification logique et pragmatique, politique, éthique et sociale, il est important de déceler toutes leurs implications et d'analyser la façon dont ils s'érigent en tant que philosophie d'explication et justification de notre monde contemporain. C'est pourquoi une lecture alternative, qui prend comme point de départ les propositions de Wittgenstein sur la relation entre l'homme et son langage, peut nous conduire à élargir notre regard sur cette relation et à ouvrir la porte vers une approximation où le principe finaliste d'un langage "performatif" serait écarté à faveur d'un langage "mimétique" où les instances d'appropriation, de compréhension, de production et de création de la locution prendraient une place d'envergureOur research approaches the debate surrounding the "Speech acts" models (Austin, Searle, Grice) by reevaluating the ideas advanced by Ludwig Wittgenstein concerning language. We can find a line of thought connecting his two major works: The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations that leads us to the Philosophical Anthropology proposed by Arnold Gehlen (as well as Max Scheler and Johann G. Herder). This thread takes us to the "mimetic" aspect inherent in the production of a locution, characteristic of man's interaction with his environment. This approach can help us refresh our understanding of language, noticeably by opening up the binary logic proposed by Anglo-Saxon thinkers who reduce all linguistic interaction to a question of imitation / application of a model in a given situation. In our research, we try to show how a "mimetic" approach to language, this is, an approach that tries to uncover the path of production / reproduction of a way of thinking, can be interesting in the understanding of how certain "views" or "forms of life" (Wittgenstein) are transmitted between different domains and fields. Also, since the "Speech act" models present a "total" philosophy that includes a logic and a pragmatic characteristic as well as a political, an ethic and a social approach, it is important to study these models and understand how they have become an explanation and a justification for the world we live in. This is why a different perspective, that takes into account Wittgenstein's concerns about man and his relation to language, can enlarge our understanding about how language works and help us escape the teleological "performative" language approach in favor of a "mimetic" language where variables such as appropriation, comprehension production and creation of a locution are what is essentially important
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Rapczyk, Nicolas. "Les variations infinies de la vie : relativisme culturel et rationalité des normes et des valeurs." Paris 8, 2010. http://octaviana.fr/document/157354938#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.
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Cette thèse a pour sujet le relativisme culturel. La question est posée dans la perspective ouverte par la philosophie de Wittgenstein et dans le cadre des controverses récentes qu’elle a suscitées dans les sciences sociales et politiques. Les idées directrices de l’auteur (l’autonomie du grammatical, la relation interne entre la règle et son application, le donné des formes de vie, la normativité de la pratique…) sont confrontées aux conceptions relativistes qui tirent argument de la diversité empirique des cultures pour en conclure à une relativité axiologique généralisée. Je défends l’idée que la philosophie de Wittgenstein n’est pas relativiste, en quelque sens que ce soit (conceptuel, linguistique, épistémique…) et qu’elle permet d’opérer une dissolution (au sens d’une thérapie philosophique) du problème posé par le relativiste. Dans une première partie, je m’intéresse au statut de l’éthique et à la sémantique des propositions normatives dans les premiers écrits de Wittgenstein. La seconde partie est consacrée au ‘paradoxe de la règle’ et à la réfutation de ses interprétations sociologiques. Je me demande notamment quel est ce ‘nous’ auquel renvoie Wittgenstein lorsqu’il parle d’un accord dans nos formes de vie et dans nos jugements. Dans une troisième partie, j’examine plusieurs versions contemporaines du relativisme culturel. Puis je défends la thèse qu’une philosophie sociale inspirée par Wittgenstein et sa méthode d’une ethnographie imaginaire permet un dépassement de l’opposition entre relativisme et universalisme, mais qu’elle n’implique pas l’abandon de toute idée de l’universel si l’on conçoit celui-ci dans les termes d’une épistémologie comparativeThis thesis is about cultural relativism. The question is raised in the perspective opened by the philosophy of Wittgenstein and in the context of recent controversies it has aroused in the social and political sciences. The main ideas of the author (the autonomy of grammar, the internal relation of a rule to acts, the given of forms of life, the intrinsic normativity of the practice. . . ) are confronted with relativist views which appeal to the empirical diversity of cultures to conclude in favor of a generalized axiological relativity. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not relativistic, in any sense whatsoever (conceptual, linguistic, epistemic, and so on) and that, on the contrary, it allows for a dissolution (in the sense of a philosophical therapy) of the problem raised by the relativist. In a first section, I concern with the status of ethics and the semantics of the normative statements in Wittgenstein’s early writings. The second section is devoted to the ‘rule-following paradox’ and to refute its sociological interpretations. I wonder especially what is that ‘we’ to which Wittgenstein refers when he speaks of an agreement in our forms of life and in our judgments. In the third section, I survey several contemporary versions of cultural relativism. Then I argue that a social philosophy inspired by Wittgenstein and his method of imaginary ethnography allows overtaking the opposition between relativism and universalism but doesn’t imply a dismissal of any idea of the universal if we conceive it in terms of an epistemology of radical comparison
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Lorenzo, Mario. "Choix et composition musicale : dans l'espace des raisons." Paris 8, 2014. http://octaviana.fr/document/182418332#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.
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Notre réflexion se situe autour du choix en cours d'écriture dans la pratique de la composition musicale. À l’ère de l’interaction, où tous les acteurs de la composition musicale s’accordent, avec des nuances, sur le caractère indispensable de l’écriture dite « manuelle », le prix à payer pour un tel consentement est, à quelques exceptions près, le plus élevé : considérer le choix spontané comme la partie irrationnelle de la pratique. En effet, un bon nombre de réflexions s’obstinent à chercher, directement ou indirectement, le fondement de nos déterminations dans les théories qui, non sans un certain charme, se donnent rendez-vous au final, dans les « zones les plus obscures de l’intelligence » où le langage, s’il n’est pas privé (avec tous les non-sens que cela implique) est tout simplement de trop. À l’égard de ces recherches, il semblerait que l'on n’ait pas encore résolu ce que certains sont prêts à appeler « le problème de la créativité » ou encore « le problème de la spontanéité ». Nous pensons qu'il est tout a fait possible de donner au choix libre un « rôle structurant de premier ordre » selon une expression de Vaggione, sans le besoin d'adopter des arguments qui mettent sérieusement en cause le sens-commun. Le manque de fondement de nos choix n’est pas la trace d’une ignorance que la science, ou une certaine science, pourrait un jour nous aider à surmonter, mais la manifestation d’une confusion de grammaire qu’il convient de clarifier. Autrement dit, la difficulté n’est pas d'ordre causale mais conceptuelle. Compte tenu de la profusion de réflexions musicales actuelles faisant référence à l’espace, je propose de placer nos choix, avant toute chose, dans l’« espace des raisons », (expression prise à Wilfrid Sellars), espace qui n’excède pas la sphère de concepts. À partir de textes de Wittgenstein et plus largement, de la philosophie du langage et de la connaissance, notre objectif n’est pas d’attaquer héroïquement le problème à la racine en voulant construire une théorie de la création ou quelque chose de ce genre, mais de participer à la dissolution, (par un long travail systématique de « petits pas »), d'un certain nombre de erreurs philosophiques qui se sont installées dans les réflexions sur la composition musicale. Cette démarche achevée, nous n'arriverons pas à une théorie de l’acte d'écriture, mais devant notre grammaire, nos manières de faire. Comme le résume Jacques Bouveresse, la meilleure manière de rencontrer le nouveau est de laisser les choses dans l'état. Cela veut dire, pour nous, se retrouver devant la partition que nous sommes en train de composer sans la prétention de vouloir dire plus que nos langages nous le permettentOur research focuses around choice in the process of writing into the practice of musical composition. Even if, at the era of interaction, in which all relevant players are agreed about "manual control", this unanimous consent comes, with a few nuances, at too great a price: the spontaneous choice should be seen, in the final analysis, as the irrational part of the practice. Indeed, many research projects are seeking, directly or indirectly, the foundation of our determination in the theories that, not without charm, leave many openings through which "the most complex and mysterious factors of the intelligence may penetrate" where the language, if is not private (with all the nonsense that involves), it's simply discarded. Concerning these researches, it seems that what some composers are willing to call "the creation problem" or still "the spontaneity problem" is unresolved to date. We think that it is possible to give at free choice a "structuring role of first-rate" in the words of Vaggione, without the need to use the arguments casting doubt over seriously the common sens. The lack of theoretical foundation of our choice is not the trace of ignorance that science could just helping us to overcome it, but the expression of grammar confusions that should be clarified. In other words, the difficulty is not in a causal connexion but in a conceptual one. In view of the abundance of current musical reflections referring to space, I propose to place our choice, before anything else, in the "space of reasons" (as Wilfrid Sellars puts it). I should add this space is not exceeding the sphere of concepts. From Wittgenstein's texts and, more broadly, to the philosophy of language and knowledge, our goal is not to build a theory of act of writing or something of this kind, but to participate to dissolve (by a long and systematic piecemeal work), a certain number of philosophical mistakes which have settled in the reflections upon of musical composition. Once there, we shall reach our grammar, ours ways of making. As summarized Jacques Bouveresse, the best way to meet the newness is to let things being. This means, for us, retrieving the score we are composing, without presuming to speak more than we are allowed
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Lundgren, Lars. "Ludwig Wittgenstein som folkskollärare." Thesis, Södertörn University College, Lärarutbildningen, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-1228.
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This paper studies the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein during his years (1920–26) as an elementary school teacher in remote Niederösterreich, Austria. The paper gives a survey of his life, and also a brief account of three of his main works: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Attention is given to his alphabetical word list, Wörterbuch für Volksschulen, published for educational use in elementary schools. The study is focused on Wittgenstein’s educational practise, and establishes a connection between his experience as a teacher and his late philosophy.
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Gefwert, Christoffer. "Wittgenstein on philosophy and mathematics : an essay in the history of philosophy /." Åbo : Åbo akademic Förlag, 1994. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb357214439.
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Sales, Anthony. "Musical investigations : Ludwig Wittgenstein and music." Thesis, University of Ulster, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241998.
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Sigouin, Tara-Lynne. "W.V. Quine & Ludwig Wittgenstein, two approaches to philosophy." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ58506.pdf.
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Sigouin, Tara-Lynne. "W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein: Two approaches to philosophy." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9009.
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This dissertation explores the works of W. V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It provides a detailed and comprehensive discussion of their distinct conceptions of philosophy. It shows how Quine is involved in a scientific philosophy aimed at the discovery of truth and explanation. It also demonstrates how Wittgenstein's critical approach attempts to dissolve philosophical problems and theories. The main purpose of this work is to explain how a proper understanding of each philosopher's framework of study, is crucial to the understanding and criticism of their respective philosophical ideas. The only way to properly refute Quine's theories is to evaluate them in a scientific framework. Any other interpretation could change his intention and weaken his arguments. Similarly, the only way to refute Wittgenstein's claims is to interpret them in everyday language. However, this is not to say that either view can be refuted. It is simply to point out that any attempt to oppose Wittgenstein's claims from a scientific viewpoint, or Quine's from a non-scientific perspective, will be flawed since it is contrary to the way in which each view was conceived.
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Brandt, Stefan Geoffrey Heinrich. "Wittgenstein and Sellars on intentionality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0d9c1102-17bf-493b-a1a0-aa983d277717.
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The aim of the thesis is to explore Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Wilfrid Sellars’s views on intentionality. In the first chapter I discuss the account of intentionality and meaning the early Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I present his idea that sentences are pictures of states of affairs with which they share a ‘logical form’ and to which they stand in an internal ‘pictorial relationship’. I argue that Wittgenstein thought of this relationship as established by acts of thought consisting in the operation of mental signs corresponding to the signs of public languages. In the second and third chapters I discuss the later Wittgenstein’s criticism of ideas at the heart of the Tractarian account of intentionality, as well as his explanations of the phenomena that motivated it. In the second chapter I examine his rejection of the idea that thinking consists in the operation of mental signs and his criticism of the idea that meaning and understanding are mental processes accompanying the use of language. In the third chapter I turn to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that representations stand in an internal ‘pictorial relation’ to objects in the natural order that are their meaning. I illuminate his later views by discussing Sellars’s non-relational account of meaning, in particular his claim that specifications of meaning do not relate expressions to items that are their meaning, but rather specify their rule-governed role in language. I conclude with a discussion of the later Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between intentional phenomena and the objects at which they are directed. In the final fourth chapter I provide a detailed discussion of Sellars’s account of thinking. I conclude with some criticisms of Sellars’s views.
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Nunes, Jorge Luís Firmino. "A ideia de arquitectura no pensamento de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Master's thesis, Instituições portuguesas -- UTL-Universidade Técnica de Lisboa -- -Faculdade de Arquitectura, 2002. http://dited.bn.pt:80/29503.
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Tese de Mestrado em Cultura Arquitectónica Contemporânea e Construção da Sociedade Moderna,Em 1926 Margaret Stonborough propôs ao seu irmão Ludwig Wittgenstein que colaborasse com o arquitecto vienense Paul Engelmann na construção da sua futura habitação. Engelmann já tinha realizado os primeiros planos, mas desde o momento em que o filósofo assumiu as funções de arquitecto, o projecto foi revisto e os planos foram discutidos na perspectiva de uma obra comum. No entanto a forte personalidade do filósofo acabou por se impor e é o próprio Engelmann que, anos mais tarde, afirma que o resultado final da construção é mais devedor das concepções de Wittgenstein do que dos seus planos iniciais. Apesar de ser um episódio ocasional, a casa que Wittgenstein construiu entre 1926 e 1928 para a sua irmã pode ser um ponto de inflexão de um pensamento que nos anos seguintes fará uma revisão profunda dos seus pressupostos iniciais. Mais do que apresentar a obra de Wittgenstein como arquitecto, pretendemos com este trabalho, verificar até que ponto o trabalho em arquitectura constitui a origem de descobertas que determinaram sua filosofia ulterior. WITTGENSTEIN ON ARCHITECTUR
In 1926, Margaret Stonborough asked her brother Ludwig Wittgenstein to cooperate with viennese architect Paul Engelmann on the construction of her new house. Engelmann had already realized it’s first sketches but from the moment the philosopher assumed himself as an architect forth, the project itself was restudied and the plans were widely discussed in the perspective of a common work architect/philosopher. Despite the fact of working together, the philosopher’s strong will imposed itself and Engelmann himself, years later, asserted that the final construction is more a result of Wittgenstein’s concepts than of his initial drawings. Though occasional, this house that Wittgenstein built between 1926 and 1928 for his sister may be the turning point of a thought that in the following years would be broadly revised in it’s initial propositions. Rather than introducing Wittgenstein as an architect, we would like with our work to examine how it’s exertion in architecture establishes the origin of the discoveries that characterized his later philosophy.
Esta dissertação foi realizada com o apoio da FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e da Tecnologia) no âmbito do programa Praxis XXI
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Nunes, Jorge Luís Firmino. "A ideia de arquitectura no pensamento de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Master's thesis, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. Faculdade de Arquitectura, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/1723.
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Tese de Mestrado em Cultura Arquitectónica Contemporânea e Construção da Sociedade Moderna,Em 1926 Margaret Stonborough propôs ao seu irmão Ludwig Wittgenstein que colaborasse com o arquitecto vienense Paul Engelmann na construção da sua futura habitação. Engelmann já tinha realizado os primeiros planos, mas desde o momento em que o filósofo assumiu as funções de arquitecto, o projecto foi revisto e os planos foram discutidos na perspectiva de uma obra comum. No entanto a forte personalidade do filósofo acabou por se impor e é o próprio Engelmann que, anos mais tarde, afirma que o resultado final da construção é mais devedor das concepções de Wittgenstein do que dos seus planos iniciais. Apesar de ser um episódio ocasional, a casa que Wittgenstein construiu entre 1926 e 1928 para a sua irmã pode ser um ponto de inflexão de um pensamento que nos anos seguintes fará uma revisão profunda dos seus pressupostos iniciais. Mais do que apresentar a obra de Wittgenstein como arquitecto, pretendemos com este trabalho, verificar até que ponto o trabalho em arquitectura constitui a origem de descobertas que determinaram sua filosofia ulterior. WITTGENSTEIN ON ARCHITECTUR
In 1926, Margaret Stonborough asked her brother Ludwig Wittgenstein to cooperate with viennese architect Paul Engelmann on the construction of her new house. Engelmann had already realized it’s first sketches but from the moment the philosopher assumed himself as an architect forth, the project itself was restudied and the plans were widely discussed in the perspective of a common work architect/philosopher. Despite the fact of working together, the philosopher’s strong will imposed itself and Engelmann himself, years later, asserted that the final construction is more a result of Wittgenstein’s concepts than of his initial drawings. Though occasional, this house that Wittgenstein built between 1926 and 1928 for his sister may be the turning point of a thought that in the following years would be broadly revised in it’s initial propositions. Rather than introducing Wittgenstein as an architect, we would like with our work to examine how it’s exertion in architecture establishes the origin of the discoveries that characterized his later philosophy.
Esta dissertação foi realizada com o apoio da FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e da Tecnologia) no âmbito do programa Praxis XXI
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Atkinson, James. "Sub specie aeterni: The mystical in the early writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/29191.
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The aim of this thesis is to consider what reasonably follows from the hypothesis that the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be interpreted from a mystical point of view. That is, if the final passages on the mystical are considered as the conclusion of the book, how does this end follow from Ludwig Wittgenstein's claim that the Tractatus deals with the problems of philosophy?
First, I will attempt to show that Russell's method based on analysis is an inadequate means of understanding what cannot be put into words. Second, in contrast to analysis, I will consider the method Wittgenstein uses in light of the topics in the Tractatus that cannot be expressed in words. This second point is the focus of this project because, as I will show, while reality cannot be expressed in words, neither can it be considered nonsense.
Next, the thesis will examine the question of showing in three parts. First, it will demonstrate that Wittgenstein's notion of showing forms the basis for his separation from Russell's theory of types; second, it will illustrate that there is no distinction between what is shown and what shows itself, and third, it will connect Wittgenstein's notion of showing to the mystical.
Following this, the thesis is concerned with what sense we can grasp of what cannot be put into words. In dealing with the eternal and the mystical, this section will offer a view from outside language to satisfy both concerns (i.e. both reality and what cannot be expressed in words). Viewing the world in this way is the mystical.
Finally, we will discuss sense and nonsense, and the mystical from the view of other philosophers in order to show that Wittgenstein's thoughts on nonsense and the mystical cannot be interpreted from either a metaphysical point of view or an anti-metaphysical perspective.
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Fronda, Earl Stanley. "Wittgenstein from a theological point of view." Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683343.
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Cunningham, Thomas Robert. "The continuity of Wittgenstein's critical meta-philosophy." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1055.
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This thesis investigates the continuity of Wittgenstein’s approach to, and conception of, philosophy. Part One examines the rule-following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks can only be read as interesting and coherent if we see him, as urged by prominent commentators, resisting the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. There is real difficulty, however, in ascertaining what the resulting Wittgensteinian position is: whether it is position structurally analogous with Kant’s distinction between empirical realism and transcendental idealism, or whether philosophical ‘therapy’ is meant to dissolve any drive towards such idealism. I argue that both of these readings of Wittgenstein are found in the work of McDowell. Part Two argues that related issues arise in respect to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the question of realism. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. Again, I argue, it is unclear whether Wittgenstein embraces a form of transcendental idealism or, on the contrary, ultimately reveals the idealist position to be empty. Part Three connects ‘sideways-on’ glances with the threat of idealism by introducing a philosophical ‘measure’. I argue that the measure is a useful tool in assessment of the Tractatus, and shows that Wittgenstein was no idealist, but is less useful as an assessment of the Investigations. It yields the result that Wittgenstein succumbed to idealism, but in doing so may overlook the ‘therapeutic’ nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
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Sidiropoulou, Chryssi. "Wittgenstein, the self and religious life." Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683124.
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Prucka, Leslie J. "Linguistic, strategies for architectural activities : Wittgenstein, philosophy, and language." Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/21705.
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Wong, Ka Ling. "The later Wittgenstein on grammar, necessity and normativity." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2011. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1271.
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Schwan, David T. "Wittgenstein's Method in §§109-133 of the Philosophical Investigations." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1244214808.
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MagalhÃes, Tiago de Oliveira. "Os papÃis do psicolÃgico na filosofia de Wittgenstein: do tractatus Ãs investigaÃÃes." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2010. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=5140.
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nÃo hÃO presente trabalho tem como objetivo evidenciar o papel desempenhado pela reflexÃo sobre o psicolÃgico na filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, abrangendo os momentos mais relevantes do perÃodo que vai de seu primeiro livro filosÃfico atà a principal obra de sua maturidade. Com esse intuito, as principais caracterÃsticas do pensamento do autor sÃo expostas, de maneira que aà se possa identificar o lugar ocupado pela reflexÃo sobre aquele campo temÃtico. Dessa forma, o prÃprio desenvolvimento da filosofia wittgensteiniana em si mesmo à um tÃpico em destaque. O que se observa ao longo desse processo à um permanente e explÃcito cuidado em tornar clara a distinÃÃo entre o trabalho filosÃfico e qualquer forma de pesquisa cientÃfica sobre o mundo mental, acompanhado por um progressivo aumento do interesse pelo psicolÃgico enquanto tema da atividade filosÃfica. Conclui-se que ambos esses aspectos sÃo fatores fundamentais da prÃpria caracterizaÃÃo do pensamento wittgensteiniano.
The present study intends to enlighten the role that the reflection on psychological issues performs in Wittgensteinâs philosophy, embracing the most remarkable moments of the period that goes from his first philosophical book until his main mature work. In order to do it, the capital features of his thought are presented, so that it becomes possible to identify the function displayed by his awareness on that subject field. Thus, the development of the wittgensteinian philosophy itself is a highlighted topic. What can be noticed throughout this process is the philosopher permanent and explicit concern in making clear the structural distinction between the philosophical task and any form of scientific research on mental world, going along with a progressive enhancement of his interest on the psychological as matter of the philosophical activity. The conclusion is that both aspects are fundamental traits of Wittgenteinâs thought.
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Temelini, Michael. "Seeing things differently : Wittgenstein and social and political philosophy." Thesis, McGill University, 1999. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=35950.
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This thesis calls into question a currently orthodox view of Ludwig Wittgenstein's post-Tractarian philosophy. This view is that the social and political implications of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations are conservative and relativist. That is, Wittgenstein's concepts such as 'forms of life', 'language-games' and 'rule-following' defend and promote: a rule-determined and context-determined rationality; or an incomparable community-determined human understanding; or a neutralist, nonrevisionary, private or uncritical social and political philosophy.In order to challenge and correct this conventional understanding the thesis sets up as 'objects of comparison' a variety of very different examples of the use of Wittgenstein in social and political philosophy. These uses are neither relativist nor conservative and they situate understanding and critical reflection in the practices of comparison and dialogue. The examples of this 'comparative-dialogical' Wittgensteinian approach are found in the works of three contemporary philosophers: Thomas L. Kuhn, Quentin Skinner and Charles Taylor.
This study employs the technique of a survey rather than undertaking a uniquely textual analysis because it is less convincing to suggest that Wittgenstein's concepts might be used in these unfamiliar ways than to show that they have been put to these unfamiliar uses. Therefore I turn not to a Wittgensteinian ideal but to examples of the 'comparative-dialogical' uses of Wittgenstein. In so doing I am following Wittgenstein's insight in section 208 of the Philosophical Investigations: "I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. And when I do this, I do not communicate less to him than I know myself." Thus it will be in a survey of various uses and applications of Wittgenstein's concepts and techniques that I will show that I and others understand them.
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Azize, Rafael Lopes. "Paradigmas de analise conceitual em Wittgenstein." [s.n.], 2008. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280188.
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Orientador: Arley Ramos MorenoTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias
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Resumo: Este trabalho investiga a atividade filosófica de análise conceitual segundo a concebe o Wittgenstein tardio, do ponto de vista da maneira como tal análise contribui para exibir os limites casuísticos do sentido após o Tractatus. A análise conceitual é então considerada sobretudo do ponto de vista do seu escopo, i.e., do seu terminus. Três momentos são pontuados, correspondentes aos três capítulos: 1. o momento de introdução das regras como objeto de análise, no contexto dos respectivos sistemas de regras; 2. o momento de pluralização dos sistemas de regras, isto é, quando o âmbito de esclarecimento duma regra extrapola para sistemas encadeados, quando então se introduz o conceito de jogo de linguagem para dar conta do modo desse encadeamento; e por fim, 3. o momento em que a análise conceitual encontra os seus limites últimos no contexto amplíssimo e vago (die Umgebung) da forma de vida. Paralelamente a essa tripla pontuação, ressaltam-se alguns aspectos mais específicos, relativos às diferenças entre os três paradigmas de análise: 1. os diferentes procedimentos de análise, ou esclarecimento, solicitados por cada paradigma; 2. aquilo que, em cada paradigma, conta como conceito; e, por fim, 3. um movimento amplo, que se mostra numa consideração retrospectiva dos três paradigmas, de ampliação do âmbito analítico em direção ao ambiente pragmático.
Abstract: This work investigates the philosophical activity of conceptual analysis as conceived by the latter Wittgenstein, from the point of view of the way in which it contributes to exhibit the casuistic limits of sense after the Tractatus. Conceptual analysis is thus considered particularly from the point of view of its scope, of its terminus. Three moments are pinpointed, corresponding to the three chapters: 1. the moment when rules are introduced as objects of analysis, in the context of the corresponding systems of rules; 2. the moment of pluralization of the systems of rules, i.e., when the field of a rule's clarification extrapolates to chained systems, and the concept of language game is introduced to account for the mode of such continuity; and finally, 3. the moment in which conceptual analysis finds its outer boundaries in the very broad and vague context (die Umgebung) of the form of life. Parallel to this, more specific aspects are outlined, relative to the differences between the three paradigms of analysis: 1. the different procedures of analysis, or clarification, required by each paradigm; 2. what counts as a concept in each paradigm; and finally, 3. a wider movement, which is revealed in a retrospective consideration of the three paradigms, of broadening of the analytical scope, toward the pragmatic environment
Doutorado
Doutor em Filosofia
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Tavares, Francisco Renato 1981. "Metafísica e Misticismo no Tractatus de Wittgenstein." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281686.
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Orientador: Arley Ramos MorenoDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Este trabalho mostra que o misticismo do Tractatus é de fundamental importância para a compreensão da atitude de Wittgenstein perante o mundo e a vida. O místico que se mostra na estrutura do mundo e da linguagem é inefável e, é a única solução para a metafísica. O Tractatus não pretende ser uma negação positivista da metafísica, como sugerido pela interpretação dos membros do Círculo de Viena. Wittgenstein, nesta obra, inaugura uma nova postura diante da metafísica. Quando se atinge a perspectiva de contemplação do mundo sub specie aeterni, é possível perceber porque a metafísica é incapaz de expressar o que há de mais sublime. O silêncio é a única atitude lógico-filosófica de quem compreende que a linguagem esbarra em seus limites, nos limites do mundo, toda vez que queira dizer algo sublime
Abstract: This work shows that the mysticism of the Tractatus is of fundamental importance for the understanding Wittgenstein's attitude towards the world and life. The mystic which is showed in the structure of the world and language is ineffable, and is the only solution for the metaphysics. The Tractatus is not intended to be a positivist denial of metaphysics, as suggested by the interpretation of the members of the Vienna Circle. Wittgenstein, in this work, inaugurates a new attitude toward metaphysics. When one achieves the perspective of contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni, it is possible to see why the metaphysics is unable to express what is most sublime. Silence is the only logical and philosophical attitude of one who understands that language comes up against its limits, within the limits of the world, every time one wants to say something sublime
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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李鐵. "論維特根斯坦的遵守規則思想 = Wittgenstein on following a rule." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2006. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/692.
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Carvalho, Marcelo Silva de. "Imagem e dissolução: entre as Investigações e Da certeza." Universidade de São Paulo, 2007. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-27112009-115332/.
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As Investigações Filosóficas são apresentadas por Wittgenstein como uma crítica e contraposição à imagem agostiniana da linguagem. O que não costuma ser evidenciado pela leitura do texto é que essa imagem é o grande interlocutor de Wittgenstein nas Investigações e que garante a unidade de seu trabalho. Fala-se de imagem por se tratar de uma concepção geral sobre a linguagem, não de uma teoria, que se apresenta como matriz das mais diversas abordagens sobre o tema. Pretende-se apresentar esse conceito de imagem e a contraposição de Wittgenstein à imagem agostiniana, bem como delinear a imagem alternativa que contrapõe a ela. Nesse percurso parece configurar-se, em particular em meio ao debate sobre jogos de linguagem e regras, que Wittgenstein recusaria a concepção de que se possa sustentar a existência de uma necessidade lógica. A leitura dos textos finais de Wittgenstein, em particular de Da certeza, onde se formula de maneira mais ampla os conceitos de jogos de linguagem, lógica e formas de vida, bem como as relações entre eles, revela-se esclarecedora desse debate. Nesse novo conjunto de textos, que não têm mais como contraponto a imagem agostiniana da linguagem ou o Tractatus, mas sim o idealismo ou ceticismo aos quais os textos de Moore (que dão início a essas reflexões) também se opunham, encontramos uma exposição longa e articulada dos conceitos de jogos de linguagem, e lógica, que complementam as posições anteriormente expostas nas Investigações. Esse percurso possibilita uma perspectiva reveladora da maneira como se constrói a reflexão wittgensteiniana sobre a linguagem e a alternativa, em certo sentido kantiana, que oferece à contraposição entre realismo e convencionalismo, não se comprometendo com nenhum deles (ao contrário do que dizem muitos de seus comentadores) e estabelecendo um terreno extremamente fértil, que estabelece novos contextos para os conceitos de prática e ação, em meio ao qual parte da filosofia contemporânea se estabelece.Wittgenstein presents the Philosophical Investigations as a critic and contraposition to the augustinian image of language. Instead of it, the readings of the text do not use to put in evidence that this image is Wittgensteins principal interlocutor in the text and that it is what gives its unit. The reference to an image is an indication that the Wittgensteins concern is with a general conception about language, presented as the matrix of different treatments of the subject, and not with a particular theory. We discuss here this concept of image and Wittgensteins contraposition to the augustinian image, and also the main lines of the alternative image presented in contraposition to this one. In this way, particularly in the consideration of the debate about language games and rules, it becomes clear that Wittgenstein refuses the conception that there is logical necessity. The reading of Wittgensteins last writings, particularly of On Certainty, where the concepts of language game, logic and forms of life, as well as their relationships, are presented in a more extended way, puts this debate under a new light. This set of writings, which do not have as a counterpoint nor the augustinian image of language nor the Tractatus, but the idealism or skepticism to which Moores writings (which gives the opportunity to these reflexions of Wittgenstein) oppose themselves, presents a long and articulated exposition of the concepts of language games and logic which are a complement to the positions previously presented in the Philosophical Investigations. This way makes possible a new perspective which show how the wittgensteinian reflexion about language is structured and which is his alternative, which may be called in a certain sense kantian, offered against the contraposition between realism and conventionalism, do not engaging with any of them (differently of what is said by various readers). This work delimitates an extremely fertile soil, with new contexts to the concepts of practice and action, where part of the contemporary philosophy is landed.
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Heyes, Cressida J. "'Back to the rough ground!' : Wittgenstein, essentialism, and feminist methods." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ36981.pdf.
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Last, Nana D. "Images of entanglement : Wittgensteinian spatial practices between architecture and philosophy." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9673.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture and Planning, February 1999.Includes bibliographical references (p. 217-218).
This thesis explores the deep spatio-linguistic relationship between the Austrian born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's practices of philosophy and of architecture. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is notable for its sharply distinguished early and late work: with the early work most strongly associated with his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) and the later frequently designated by his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations (1953). Following the completion of the early work Wittgenstein abandoned philosophy for a period of ten years, spending the years from 1926 to 1929 engaged in the design and construction of a house in Vienna for his sister Margarethe Stonborough. The thesis considers the ways in which the intervening practice of architecture infiltrated, altered, influenced and manifested itself in the later philosophy by focusing on the spatial. temporal. conceptual and cognitive gaps in the philosophy. The importance and the prevalence of the practice of architecture for Wittgenstein's later philosophy are exhibited in a variety of ways that together broaden, reconceive and resituate the functioning of language and philosophy. The thesis considers these developments in the philosophy as they are revealed in the visual and spatial language, thinking and construction of the philosophical texts. This analysis reveals a shift from the removed, idealized and flattened picture theory of the Tractatus to the production of the spatially complex and ambiguous images of entanglement in the Investigations. The Stonborough house, itself, is analyzed through its production of cognitive and spatial practices and problematics. Wittgenstein's practice of architecture is shown to utilize. develop, challenge and reveal related spatial concepts found in the philosophy. These include the ideas of limits, boundaries, inner/outer dichotomies, the relationship between showing and saying, the idea of correspondence and the practices of representation, assembly. resemblance, construction, building and rearrangement.
by Nana D. Last.
Ph.D.
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Carroll, Michael Scott. "Action, authority and approach : treatises on "Zen"/"Chan", radical interpretation, and the Linji Lu /." View the Table of Contents & Abstract, 2007. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B38294242.
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Yokoyama, Fernando Sposito 1989. "A noção de 'realidade' no Tractatus de Wittgenstein." [s.n.], 2014. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279658.
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Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida MarquesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Em seu Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein procura explicar o modo pelo qual as proposições da linguagem adquirem o sentido que expressam. A abordagem desse tema, no plano da obra, ganha a forma de uma investigação acerca da natureza essencial da representação, pois, segundo o Tractatus, uma proposição expressa um sentido na medida em que ela representa uma situação na realidade. Ao oferecer uma teoria acerca da essência da representação, Wittgenstein acaba por enunciar teses acerca das propriedades essenciais da realidade representada. Nesse ponto, existe um conflito na literatura secundária da obra entre as leituras denominadas realista e antirrealista, que divergem acerca do modo de conceber essas teses. O objetivo deste trabalho é examinar esse conflito, explicando as diferentes interpretações apresentadas por essas leituras opostas. De acordo com a leitura denominada realista, essas teses dizem respeito a uma realidade concebida como um domínio independente de sua representação linguística. Poder-se dizer então que essa linha interpretativa atribui ao Tractatus teses que podem ser tomadas como ontológicas ou metafísicas, no sentido de que elas enunciariam as propriedades últimas de um domínio real independente. Já os proponentes da leitura denominada antirrealista sustentam que essas teses dizem respeito exclusivamente à ordem lógica essencial dos nossos sistemas de representação. Por conseguinte, eles recusam que o Tractatus contenha teses que possam ser consideradas ontológicas, uma vez que a ordem lógica da linguagem teria sido o começo e o fim de todas as investigações de Wittgenstein nesta obra. Procuraremos delinear os aspectos centrais dessas duas leituras, tentando mostrar, se possível, as vantagens e desvantagens de cada uma delas no que diz respeito à sua adequação à teoria semântica desenvolvida por Wittgenstein no Tractatus
Abstract: In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein seeks to explain the way in which the propositions of language acquire the meaning they express. The approach to this subject, in the framework of the book, assumes the form of an inquiry into the essential nature of representation, since, according to the Tractatus, a proposition expresses a sense insofar as it represents a situation in reality. By offering a theory of the essence of representation, Wittgenstein ultimately states theses about the essential properties of the reality that is represented. At this point, there is a conflict in the secondary literature between the so-called realist and anti-realist readings, which differ on how to conceive such theses. The aim of the present work is to examine this conflict, by explaining the different interpretations put forward by these opposite readings. According to the so-called realist reading, these theses relate to a reality conceived as a domain that is independent of its linguistic representation. One can say that this reading attributes to the Tractatus theses that can be taken as ontological or metaphysical, in the sense that they would state the ultimate properties of an independent reality. On the other hand, the proponents of the so-called anti-realist reading maintain that these thesis relate only to the essential logical order of our systems of representation. Therefore, they refuse that the Tractatus contains theses that could be considered as ontological, since the logical order of language would be the beginning and the end of all Wittgenstein¿s investigations in this work. We will try to outline the main aspects of these two readings, trying to show, if possible, the advantages and disadvantages of each one with regard to their adequacy to the semantic theory developed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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Jancsó, Daniella. "Excitements of reason the presentation of thought in Shakespeare's plays and Wittgenstein's philosophy." Heidelberg Winter, 2006. http://d-nb.info/98605559X/04.
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Delfin, Solveig. "Wittgenstein´s Language Theory of 1930, Part 2: Consequences of an Overview." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-409981.
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Poukhaev, Andrej. "Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hans Urs von Balthasar faith and reason in the postmodern age /." Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2004. http://www.tren.com.
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MARINHO, NEY COUTO. "REASON AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE CASE OF SCHREBER (FREUD,1911), REVISITED FROM THE MARCIA CAVELL´S AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN S CONTRIBUTIONS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=8964@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROEsta tese representa a segunda parte da pesquisa: Razão e Psicanálise. A pesquisa tem por objetivo investigar, no âmbito do contemporâneo debate epistemológico anglo-saxão, os fundamentos epistemológicos da teoria psicanalítica e se a mesma se apresenta como um competente instrumento de investigação para o fenômeno da loucura. A primeira parte da tese corresponde a um resumo atualizado de diversas avaliações filosóficas da psicanálise, na tradição em que se desenvolve a pesquisa. São apresentadas as avaliações de: Karl Popper, Adolf Grünbaum, Gregório Klimovsky e a crítica e alternativa de Larry Laudan acerca dos impasses da epistemologia anglo-saxã. Segue-se a avaliação de Marcia Cavell, já no âmbito da moderna filosofia da linguagem, iniciando-se assim a segunda parte da pesquisa. Em seguida discutimos: Wittgenstein e a Psicanálise - sua complexa relação com a proposta freudiana, seu entusiasmo e crítica. Fazemos uma avaliação própria da contribuição de Wittgenstein, articulando-a com um desenvolvimento da psicanálise: a teoria de relações de objeto. Dentro desta, tomamos a vertente kleiniana como referencial e, em particular, as contribuições de W. R. Bion. O Caso Schreber (Freud,1911) é apresentado e discutido como um estudo de caso, com o objetivo de avaliar a validade das noções filosófica e psicanalíticas expostas anteriormente; especialmente as noções de irracionalismo interno (em Cavell) e as de formas de vida e certeza (em Wittgenstein). A tese propõe que se veja o delírio (como paradigma da loucura) como: uma bizarra forma de vida, sugerindo também alguns candidatos a invariantes para o fenômeno da loucura nos diversos contextos. Discutimos sumariamente a relação: terapia filosófica e psicanálise. A tese tem como pano de fundo o que se denominou: a crise da psicanálise, a qual inserimos em outra, mais ampla e de longa duração: a crise da modernidade. A tese privilegia a dimensão clínica do projeto psicanalítico, propondo novas perspectivas para o mesmo, sobretudo, através de sua dimensão de crítica da cultura, chamando a atenção para os dois aspectos - clínico e cultural - na obra de Freud e a importância de estabelecer suas diferenças e relações.
This thesis represents the second part of the research: Reason and Psychoanalysis. The research aims to investigate, within the contemporary Anglo- Saxon debate, the epistemological foundations of psychoanalytical theory and whether it presents itself as an adequate tool for investigating madness and its manifestations. The first part of the thesis corresponds to a current summary of philosophical appraisals of psychoanalysis, in the traditional field of research development. It presents the following appraisals: Karl Popper s, Adolf Grünbaum s, Gregorio Klimovsky´s and Larry Laudan s criticism and alternative regarding Anglo-Saxon epistemology. The next appraisal is Marcia Cavell s one, already in the scope of the modern philosophy of language, initiating the second part of research. The next topic is: Wittgenstein and Psychoanalysis - his complex relation to the Freudian proposal, his enthusiasm and criticism. We show our own appraisal of Wittgenstein s contribution, linking it to a development of psychoanalysis: the object-relation theory. From the latter we took the Kleinian vision as referential and particularly W. R. Bion s contributions. The Case of Schreber (Freud,1911) is presented and investigated as a case study, with the aim of evaluating the validity of the philosophical and psychoanalytic notions previously exposed; particularly the notions of internal irrationalism (Cavell) and ways of living and certainty (Wittgenstein). The thesis suggests that delusion (taken as a paradigm of madness) may be seen as: a bizarre way of living, also suggesting some candidates as invariants for madness and its manifestations in varied contexts. We briefly discuss the relation between philosophical therapy and psychoanalysis. The background to the thesis is identified as what is known as the crisis of psychoanalysis, which we have placed within another, more comprehensive and durable one, the crisis of modernity. The thesis favours the clinical dimension of psychoanalytic project, suggesting new perspectives for it, through its dimension as a critique of culture. It calls attention to the two facets - clinical and cultural - of Freud´s work and the importance of establishing their differences and relations.
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Podlaskowski, Adam C. "Rule-following and recursion rethinking projection and normativity /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1155659434.
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Magalhães, Tiago de Oliveira. "Os papéis do psicológico na filosofia de Wittgenstein: do tractatus às investigações." www.teses.ufc.br, 2010. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/6528.
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MAGALHÃES, Tiago de Oliveira. Os papéis do psicológico na filosofia de Wittgenstein: do tractatus às investigações. 2010. 120f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2010.Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-07T14:20:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010-DIS-TOMAGALHAES.pdf: 968870 bytes, checksum: 91c6ca45e20937aeffd00d541bcb12fe (MD5)
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The present study intends to enlighten the role that the reflection on psychological issues performs in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, embracing the most remarkable moments of the period that goes from his first philosophical book until his main mature work. In order to do it, the capital features of his thought are presented, so that it becomes possible to identify the function displayed by his awareness on that subject field. Thus, the development of the wittgensteinian philosophy itself is a highlighted topic. What can be noticed throughout this process is the philosopher permanent and explicit concern in making clear the structural distinction between the philosophical task and any form of scientific research on mental world, going along with a progressive enhancement of his interest on the psychological as matter of the philosophical activity. The conclusion is that both aspects are fundamental traits of Wittgentein’s thought.
O presente trabalho tem como objetivo evidenciar o papel desempenhado pela reflexão sobre o psicológico na filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, abrangendo os momentos mais relevantes do período que vai de seu primeiro livro filosófico até a principal obra de sua maturidade. Com esse intuito, as principais características do pensamento do autor são expostas, de maneira que aí se possa identificar o lugar ocupado pela reflexão sobre aquele campo temático. Dessa forma, o próprio desenvolvimento da filosofia wittgensteiniana em si mesmo é um tópico em destaque. O que se observa ao longo desse processo é um permanente e explícito cuidado em tornar clara a distinção entre o trabalho filosófico e qualquer forma de pesquisa científica sobre o mundo mental, acompanhado por um progressivo aumento do interesse pelo psicológico enquanto tema da atividade filosófica. Conclui-se que ambos esses aspectos são fatores fundamentais da própria caracterização do pensamento wittgensteiniano.
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Chan, Kai-yan. "A critique of Kripke's theories of proper names and names of natural kinds : an application of the later Wittgenstein's methodology /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1997. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B19019385.
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Fultner, Barbara. "Rules in context : a critique of Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein." Thesis, McGill University, 1989. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=59391.
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The rule-following problem can be condensed into the paradox that a rule cannot determine any course of action because every course of action can be made to accord with that rule. In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke sees this paradox as potentially leading to a radical semantic scepticism that renders meaning itself meaningless, and attributes a sceptical solution of the problem to Wittgenstein. After a critical examination of Kripke's work, I conclude that this solution fails on account of allowing neither for a normativity beyond the subjection of the individual to correction by others in her community, nor for a non-interpretive conception of the understanding. Finally, I propose an alternative solution that incorporates the notion of communal background understanding into that of a form of life and thus preserves the normativity of rule-following and of language.
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Silva, Paulo Pirozelli Almeida. "Thomas Kuhn e a concepção semântica de incomensurabilidade." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-08112013-095120/.
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Thomas Kuhn foi um dos mais importantes filósofos da ciência do século XX. Entre suas principais contribuições, destaca-se a tese da incomensurabilidade das teorias científicas. O presente trabalho visa mostrar como tal tese, apresentada originalmente no livro A estrutura das revoluções, de 1962, foi modificada por Kuhn ao longo dos anos, com foco em seus últimos artigos, escritos entre as décadas de 1980 e 1990. A incomensurabilidade é reduzida então a uma relação semântica restrita a certos pontos da linguagem (incomensurabilidade local). A fim de explicar como isso é possível, Kuhn é levado a pensar, em primeiro lugar, no aprendizado e funcionamento dos conceitos, e como se organizam em estruturas taxonômicas. Em seguida, elabora outros aspectos de uma filosofia da linguagem, como significado e verdade, que lhe permitem responder às principais críticas que haviam sido dirigidas à noção de incomensurabilidade originalmente exposta.Thomas Kuhn was one of the most important philosophers of science of the twentieth century. Among his major contributions, there is the thesis of incommensurability of scientific theories. This work aims to show how this theory, originally presented in the book The Structure of Revolutions, from 1962, was modified by Kuhn over the years, focusing on his last articles, written between the 1980s and 1990s. The incommensurability is then reduced to a semantic relation restricted to certain portions of language (local incommensurability). To explain how this is possible, Kuhn is led to think, firstly, in the learning and operation of the concepts, and how they are organized in taxonomic structures. After that he elaborates other aspects of a philosophy of language, as meaning and truth, which allow him to answer the main criticisms which had been directed to the notion of incommensurability originally exposed.
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REBELLO, SILVIA TEIXEIRA BARROSO. "ON THE STATUTE OF PROPER NAMES IN THE POETICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AND IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL POETRY OF SAMUEL BECKETT." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2011. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=20593@1.
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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICOEste trabalho se debruça sobre o estatuto de termos metalinguísticos, com especial interesse sobre os nomes próprios. Assim como percebida pelo senso comum, esta classe de palavras se presta com especial docilidade a reforçar uma visão representacionista da linguagem: aqui o nome, ali o nomeado. A recorrente constatação contemporânea da falência dessa visada representacionista convida a reflexões alternativas sobre o vocabulário metalinguístico e sobre os nomes próprios em especial — pois as tentativas de lançar um novo olhar sobre a compreensão da significação linguística esbarram na persistência de um vocabulário que traz consigo marcas da longa hegemonia daquela compreensão de linguagem. A reflexão aqui proposta é desenvolvida a partir dos escritos de Ludwig Wittgenstein e de Samuel Beckett, concentrando-se especialmente nos textos daquele que ficou conhecido como o segundo Wittgenstein e em quatro romances de Beckett — Watt, Molloy, Malone Morre e O inominável. A escolha de tais autores e textos é sensível, por um lado, à fertilidade contemporânea das aproximações entre filosofia e literatura e, por outro, à especial atenção dedicada pelos dois à questão dos nomes próprios. Examina-se um conjunto de passagens relevantes na escrita madura de Wittgenstein, de modo sensível ao que ele diz em Cultura e valor (p. 24): a filosofia realmente deveria ser escrita apenas como uma composição poética. Nos romances de Beckett, por sua vez, focalizam-se tanto as suas singulares provocações onomásticas, quanto momentos metalingüísticosem que personagens endereçam de forma explícita a questão dos nomes próprios. Mostra-se que, tomadas como contra-signos, as escritas desses dois autores, dando a ver a um só tempo a errância dos nomes próprios e o seu paradoxal conservadorismo, acenam com a promessa de caminhos por onde diminuir o abismo que parece ainda separar compreensões intelectuais da linguagem como práxis desprovida de fundamentos e a sua efetiva vivência como tal.
This work focuses on the statute of metalinguistic terms, with special interest in proper names. As perceived by common sense, this class of words is particularly useful to reinforce a representationistic view of language: here the name, there the named. The contemporary and recurring evidence of failure of this representationistic view invites to alternative reflections on the metalinguistic vocabulary and especially on proper names because the attempts to bring a new insight on the understanding of linguistic significance collide with the persistence of a vocabulary marked by a long hegemony of that language comprehension. The argument proposed here is developed from the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Samuel Beckett, especially focusing on the texts of the second Wittengstein and in four Beckett’s novels: Watt, Molloy, Malone Dies and The Unnamable. The choice of these authors and texts has to do with the contemporary richness of approaches between philosophy and literature and also with the special attention both authors dedicated to the question of proper names. It examines a set of relevant texts of Wittgenstein’s mature writings and agrees with his words in Culture and Value (1989, p. 24): philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry. On the other hand, from Beckett’s novels this work focuses both the unique onomastic challenges and metalinguistic moments in which characters explicitly deal with the issue of proper names. It is demonstrated that the writings of these two authors, taken as countersigns showing at the same time the wandering of proper names and their paradoxical conservativeness, beckon with the promise of ways to reduce the gap that still seems to separate intellectual understandings of language as a praxis without basis and its effective experience as such.
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Oliveira, Kleber Lopes de. "A linguagem estética das "investigações filosóficas" de Ludwig Wittgenstein e o curso de filosofia da UFBA : um diálogo entre a obra e um caso aula." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFBA, 2006. http://www.repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/10260.
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Uma investigação sobre acontecimentos em aulas do curso de Filosofia da UFBA, através da observação de estudantes sob a regência do educador Dante Augusto Galeffi na disciplina Metodologia e Prática de Ensino em Filosofia-I, do semestre 2003.2, na FACED - Faculdade de Educação/UFBA, e o diálogo entre as linguagens achadas nas aulas com a obra Investigações Filosóficas, do filósofo austríaco Ludwig Wittgenstein. Entretanto, não apenas com esta obra, mas também com outras obras esclarecedoras de epistéme, de competência estabelecida e requerida pela tradição filosófica moderna, sendo que para Wittgenstein, especificamente, a Filosofia não precisa ficar aprisionada em tradições autoritárias de verdades, pois elas, as verdades, são circunstanciais, são perspectivísticas. Além disto, diante as observações feitas na linguagem dos estudantes citados acima, um autoritarismo tradicional no processo do educar em Filosofia na UFBA parece se estabelecer enquanto cultura vigente. Há uma urgência, percebe-se, em se rever conceitos historicamente postos do que seja Filosofia, esta podendo ser, dentre outras formas libertárias e concretas, a relação entre mestres-aprendizes; o próprio filosofar, com os textos; com a vida, no intuito de se gerar pensamentos que ainda não foram pensados.
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Lee, Steven James. "On first principles & general theories." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2008. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p015-0474.
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Bozatski, Maurício Fernando [UNESP]. "Entre o humano e a linguagem: um estudo sobre a filosofia de Wittgenstein." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/91797.
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bozatski_mf_me_mar.pdf: 850559 bytes, checksum: e97863cf099ca1ae60ffd92574f52040 (MD5)Procuramos delimitar o âmbito de interação do humano com a realidade a partir da teoria lingüística expressa no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e nas Investigações Filosóficas. A partir da identificação deste âmbito ontológico-lingüístico da ação humana, representadas pela tríade agir/sentir/pensar, demonstraremos como a linguagem representa a realidade a partir da afiguração. Através de contextualizações e aproximações das teorias wittgensteinianas com noções filosóficas tradicionais busca-se demonstrar a inovação do método wittgensteiniano e suas possibilidades de aplicação ao exercício filosófico contemporâneo.
We have tried to delimit the ambit of the human's interaction with the reality starting from the linguistic theory expresses in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in the Philosophical Investigations. Starting from the identification of this ontological-linguistic ambit of the human action, represented by the triad to act/to feel/to think, we will demonstrate as the language it represents the reality starting from the representation. Through contextualize and approaches of the Wittgenstein’s theories with the traditional philosophical notions, we aim for to demonstrate the innovation of the Wittgenstein’s method and your application possibilities to the contemporary philosophical exercise.
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Decauwert, Guillaume. "L'articulation des aspects logique et "mystique" du Tractatus de Wittgenstein : forme et origines de la distinction entre dire et montrer." Thesis, Grenoble, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENP003.
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La présente thèse de doctorat propose une interprétation du Tractatus logico-philosophicus qui prend pour fil directeur l'analyse de la distinction opérée par Ludwig Wittgenstein entre « ce qui peut être dit » et « ce qui se montre ». Il s'agit, à partir d'une étude de la relation entre les développements logiques du Traité et son aspect « mystique » (c'est-à-dire ses considérations concernant la notion de valeur absolue), de poser le problème de son unité structurelle. L'unité du premier ouvrage de Wittgenstein s'avère étroitement liée à la distinction entre dire et montrer en laquelle résident selon l'auteur l'« argument principal » de son livre et le « problème cardinal de la philosophie ». Afin d'expliquer l'unité du Tractatus, ce travail de recherche s'efforce d'élucider la nature de la distinction dire/montrer, d'abord par une analyse de ses applications dans les remarques dont le Traité est composé, puis par une enquête sur ses origines dans les œuvres de Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, William James et Léon Tolstoï. Selon la lecture du texte ici présentée, tous les emplois de cette distinction participent d'une forme commune qui est liée à la notion de réflexivité (ou d'autoréférence)This PhD thesis deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and intends to construct an interpretation of the book by using the distinction between ‘what can be said' and ‘what shows itself' as a central thread. Starting from a study of the relationship between the logical developments of the treatise and its ‘mystical' aspect (i.e. its remarks on the idea of an absolute value), the thesis raises the problem of the structural unity of Wittgenstein's early work. It appears that this unity is intimately related to the distinction between saying and showing, which is, according to Wittgenstein, the ‘main point' of his book and ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy'. To explain the unity of the Tractatus, the present work tries to elucidate the nature of the say/show distinction—first, through an analysis of its use in the book, and second, through an investigation into its origins in the works of Frege, Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Weininger, James, and Tolstoy. According to the reading presented here, all the uses of this distinction pertain to a common form, which is linked to the concept of reflexiveness (or self-reference)
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Smith, Ethan D. "The Praise of Glory: Apophatic Theology as Transformational Mysticism." University of Dayton / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=dayton1502133638523313.
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Di, Rocco Valdecantos Florencia. "La métaphysique comme branche de la littérature fantastique : une lecture wittgensteinienne de Borges." Thesis, Paris 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA01H230/document.
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La métaphysique comme branche de la littérature fantastique : une lecture wittgensteinienne de Borges. L'une des formules de Borges tient que la "métaphysique" n'est qu'une branche de la littérature fantastique. Caractérisant la logique borgésienne d'une "ludique" herméneutique - celle de lire les textes philosophiques à partir des narrativités qu'ils autorisent- cette remarque semble pourtant soulever une question proprement philosophique : celle du statut de notre concept ordinaire d'objet. D'après la proposition wittgensteinienne, notre concept d'objet physique n'est qu'un concept "logique". La question demeure ainsi de savoir si nos jeux de langage ordinaire épuisent sa grammaire, et dans quelle mesure les fictions et les essais de Borges, qui jouent avec celle-ci, devraient être considérés comme un élargissement, ou bien comme une distorsion de la grammaire ordinaire de l'objet. Il s'agira ainsi d'interroger, d'un côté, si les textes borgésiens tolèrent une lecture analytique ; d'un autre, de démontrer comment la fiction, en recadrant à chaque fois le partage entre dire et montrer, permet d'en détourner, ou bien d'en dépasser la "logique"Metaphysics as a branch of fantastic literature: a Wittgensteinian reading of Borges. One of Borges' slogans holds that "metaphysics" is only a branch of fantastic literature. Characterizing the Borgesian logic behind a playful hermeneutics -i.e., the possibility to read philosophy througout the narrativities it authorizes- this remark seems to raise a strictly philosophical question, namely that of the status of our ordinary concept of object. According to Wittgenstein, our concept of physical object is just a "logical" concept. The question thus remains whether our ordinary language games exhaust its grammar, and to what extent Borges' fictions and essays, as an attemp to play with it, should be regarded as an extension, or rather as a distortion of the ordinary grammar of the object. It will thus be necessary to inquiry, on the one hand, whether the Borgean texts tolerate an analytic reading; on the other, to show how each fiction, by reframing all over again the split between saying and showing, makes it possible to divert or rather to go beyond its "logic"
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Wright, James K. "Schoenberg, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna circle : epistemological meta-themes in harmonic theory, aesthetics, and logical positivism." Thesis, McGill University, 2001. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38438.
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This study examines the relativistic aspects of Arnold Schoenberg's harmonic and aesthetic theories in the light of a framework of ideas presented in the early writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the logician, philosopher of language, and Schoenberg's contemporary and Austrian compatriot. The author has identified correspondences between the writings of Schoenberg, the early Wittgenstein (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in particular), and the Vienna Circle of philosophers, on a wide range of topics and themes. Issues discussed include the nature and limits of language, musical universals, theoretical conventionalism, word-to-world correspondence in language, the need for a fact- and comparison-based approach to art criticism, and the nature of music-theoretical formalism and mathematical modeling. Schoenberg and Wittgenstein are shown to have shared a vision that is remarkable for its uniformity and balance, one that points toward the reconciliation of the positivist-relativist dualism that has dominated recent discourse in music theory. Contrary to earlier accounts of Schoenberg's harmonic and aesthetic relativism, this study identifies a solid epistemological core underlying his thought, a view that was very much in step with Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, and thereby with the most vigorous and forward-looking stream in early twentieth century intellectual history.
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Erson, Eva. ""Det är månen att nå- " : en studie i några datorintresserade pojkars språk och föreställningsvärld." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Litteraturvetenskap och nordiska språk, 1992. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-65819.
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The aim of this thesis is to describe some central conceptual ideas expressed in the language of six computer interested boys. The starting-point is the philosophy of language of Ludwig Wittgenstein, where language is seen as something deeply integrated in our practices, traditions and culture. The use of our language shows its meaning. The material consists of 18 months of observations in the computer room of a secondary school and a series of three deep-interviews with each one of the boys over a period of three years. The computer has a central function in their identity work. Within our culture, this object - with its structure and its ways of operating - has become a metaphor for human thinking. It offers freedom and control. The discussions involved in this work and its form of representation problemize some of the fundamental assumptions of linguistics and the humanities. The three portraits (chapters 3-5) are to be understood as meaningful examples, while the persons portrayed are to be seen as symbols, inviting the reader to reflect over our culture and our practices. The fostering into the computer world and the ways of looking at the world are shown through the "personal voice", each followed by an interpretation linked to the theories and results of other researchers. In the boys' ways of using language there are differences and similarities. Learning, growing, creating, signifying 'freedom', can be seen as central notions in the identity work of one of them. With another of the boys there is a strong resemblance in his talking of computers and of his personal God; he "fixes" the world through dividing-lines, strong recommendations, further emphasized through the frequent use of the verb ska (shall, should). In the third portrait it is evident that the boy's abundance of words and narrative-making is a strategy of preventing nearness and to be able both to control the interview situation and to intensify the here and now. "Going deep" into computers make certain assumptions about the world more essential than others. Central concepts explicit in their common language game are logic, power and control (chapter 7). There is a common tendency to hierarchize and dichotomize the world; upper/under world, outer/inner world, logic/feeling, we/they, right/wrong. Stability can be seen as a summarizing notion. The deeper significance of their feeling of safety and control in the computer world is a fostering both into male dominance and into a dominant way of thinking about knowledge as something primarily logical, controllable and possible to account for. This masculinist language game is confirmed in different ways: individually, in the group and at a more subtle and symbolic level.Diss. Umeå : Univ., 1992
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Tomm, Davi Alexandre. "Paradoxos ficcionais : literatura, solipsismo e esquizofrenia em Wittegenstein's mistress." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/140283.
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Esta dissertação apresenta um estudo do livro Wittgenstein‟s mistress (1988), do escritor estadunidense David Markson (1927 – 2010), cujo texto é narrado em primeira pessoa por uma mulher que se autodenomina Kate e que se apresenta como sendo o último ser humano sobrevivente no mundo. Habitando uma casa em alguma praia, ela senta-se diante da máquina de escrever e divaga sobre suas lembranças e viagens, misturando memória e imaginação, de forma a deixar-nos, nós, os leitores, sem um lastro firme para identificar o que é realidade e o que é ilusão. A análise aqui realizada aborda a estrutura paradoxal desse texto, que não consegue estabelecer de modo concreto um mundo ficcional no qual a personagem narradora habita, ou seja, não podemos saber o que realmente acontece ou não com ela. Esse efeito se dá principalmente por um estilo esquizofrênico que será relacionado com as reflexões e observações que o filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein denomina ―doenças do intelecto‖, as quais, segundo o professor de psicologia clínica e escritor Louis A. Sass, aproximam-se da esquizofrenia. O objetivo desta pesquisa é examinar a maneira como se imbricam as relações entre a linguagem ficcional do livro de Markson e a realidade extratextual, através de uma visão wittgensteiniana que coloca a linguagem imersa na nossa forma de vida, ancorada sempre nas práticas e costumes compartilhados pela sociedade. A análise mostrará que mesmo em um texto onde predomina esse estilo esquizofrênico que faz a linguagem se fechar no mundo interior da personagem, e também no mundo intratextual, ainda há a possibilidade de rompimento deste solipsismo textual, conectando essa linguagem à esfera intersubjetiva e comunitária. Esse rompimento só é possível através da apresentação (ou exteriorização) de vivências, que depende de uma confiança na linguagem como prática social e imersa na nossa forma de vida, assim como de uma confiança na prática de contar histórias.This M.A. thesis analyses Wittgenstein‟s Mistress (1988), a book written by the American author David Markson (1927-2010), whose text is narrated, in the first person, by a woman who calls herself Kate. Declaring that she is the last remaining person alive in the world, Kate sits in front of her typewriter, in a house on a beach somewhere, revisiting her recollections and her travels. Memory and imagination are mixed in such a way that Kate leaves us, the readers, without a solid basis to separate reality from delusion. The focus of my research is the analysis of the paradoxal structure of this text that cannot sets up a fictional world in a concrete way. We cannot find a fictional world in which the narrator lives and so we cannot really know what happens or not happens to her. This effect exists mainly in a schizophrenic style which will be related to the reflections and observations made by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein about the ―sicknesses of the understanding‖ – which according to professor of clinical psychology and writer Louis A. Sass, come close to the realm of schizophrenia. The aim of this research is to examine the imbrications respecting the fictional language of Markson‘s book and the extratextual reality. This will be done through a Wittgensteinian perspective of language as something absorbed in our form of life, and grounded in practices and mores shared by society. The analysis will show that even in a text in which that schizophrenic style prevails, which makes language close itself in the internal world of the character and the text, there is still the possibility to break with this textual solipsism and connect language to the intersubjective and communal sphere. This break can only occur through the presentation (or exteriorization) of experiences that depend on a trust in language as a social practice immersed in our form of life, and on the trust in the practice of telling stories.