Academic literature on the topic 'Maʼdi (Uganda and South Sudan)'

SummaryMass drug administration has been less successful as a technique for controlling intestinal schistosomiasis (S. mansoni) than anticipated. In Uganda, the mass distribution of praziquantel has been provided to populations at risk of infection since the early 2000s, but prevalence mostly remains high. This is the case, for example, at locations in north-western and south-eastern Uganda. However, there is a remarkable exception. Among Madi fishing populations and their immediate neighbours, living close to the border with South Sudan, the rate of infection has dropped dramatically. A parasitological survey carried out at twelve fishing sites in 2013 identified only three cases of S. mansoni among 383 adults tested. This article asks: why is the prevalence of S. mansoni so low among fisherfolk in northern Uganda? Taking a biosocial approach, it suggests that the mass distribution of drugs, free of charge, has had an impact. However, the low prevalence of infection cannot be attributed to this alone. Other important factors may also have contributed to the decline in infection. These include changing fishing livelihoods, local attitudes to public health interventions, access to water and sanitation facilities, hygiene practices and the use of anti-malarial treatments. Above all, the article highlights the importance of investigating both social and biological dimensions of infection simultaneously, and of recognizing the local complexities of sustainably treating this debilitating parasitic disease.

Bemisia tabaci (Gennadius) is a polyphagous, highly destructive pest that is capable of vectoring viruses in most agricultural crops. Currently, information regarding the distribution and genetic diversity of B. tabaci in South Sudan is not available. The objectives of this study were to investigate the genetic variability of B. tabaci infesting sweet potato and cassava in South Sudan. Field surveys were conducted between August 2017 and July and August 2018 in 10 locations in Juba County, Central Equatoria State, South Sudan. The sequences of mitochondrial DNA cytochrome oxidase I (mtCOI) were used to determine the phylogenetic relationships between sampled B. tabaci. Six distinct genetic groups of B. tabaci were identified, including three non-cassava haplotypes (Mediterranean (MED), Indian Ocean (IO), and Uganda) and three cassava haplotypes (Sub-Saharan Africa 1 sub-group 1 (SSA1-SG1), SSA1-SG3, and SSA2). MED predominated on sweet potato and SSA2 on cassava in all of the sampled locations. The Uganda haplotype was also widespread, occurring in five of the sampled locations. This study provides important information on the diversity of B. tabaci species in South Sudan. A comprehensive assessment of the genetic diversity, geographical distribution, population dynamics, and host range of B. tabaci species in South Sudan is vital for its effective management.

The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organisation founded on 30 November 1999, including such member states as Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The EAC was meant as the reactivation and expansion of an earlier organisation founded in 1967 by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Unlike its predecessor (which collapsed in 1978), not only has the contemporary Community been operating stably for almost 20 years, but it has also proved to be successful in improving the economic growth of its member states. Simultaneously, it supports the internal and national security of individual member states and the stability of the entire region. In recent years, the stabilisation capabilities of the Community have been tested through the accession of South Sudan, a country driven by a domestic conflict. Republic of South Sudan contributes not only rich crude oil deposits and water resources, but also a heavy burden of political issues in the form of both domestic conflicts and unresolved international problems such as a border conflict with the Republic of (north) Sudan. Successful economic cooperation may, however, reduce poverty and boost the development of South Sudan, both with regard to its economy and within the social and political aspects. This, in turn, may translate into good governance and the formation of a civil society.

Since Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, its border with Uganda has become a hub of activity. Contrasting developments on the Ugandan side of the border with those on the South Sudanese side, the paper draws on empirical fieldwork to argue that the CPA has created new centres of power in the margins of both states. However, in day-today dealings on either side of the border, South Sudanese military actors have become dominant. In the particular case of Arua and the South Sudan-Uganda border, past wartime authority structures determine access to opportunities in a tightly regulated, inconclusive peace. This means that small-scale Ugandan traders – although vital to South Sudan – have become more vulnerable to South Sudan's assertions of state authority. The experience of Ugandan traders calls into question the broad consensus that trade across the border is always beneficial for peace-building The paper concludes that trade is not unconditionally helpful to the establishment of a peaceful environment for everyone.

This British Academy/Leverhulme-funded research investigated the health and justice service responses to the needs of South Sudanese refugees living in refugee settlements in Northern Uganda who had been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and torture. It involved the collection and thematic analysis of the narratives of 20 men and 41 women who were refugee survivors of SGBV and torture, including their experiences in South Sudan, their journeys to Uganda and experiences in refugee settlements, in particular their access to health and justice services. Thirty-seven key stakeholders including international, government, non-government organisations and civil society organisations were also interviewed regarding their experiences of providing health and justice services to refugees. All refugees had survived human rights abuses mainly carried out in South Sudan but some had also occurred on route to Uganda and within Uganda. Despite the significant impact of their experiences, the analysis indicated that there was limited service response in refugee settlements in Northern Uganda once the immediate humanitarian crisis ended. The thematic analysis indicated five main themes coming from the interviews. These included: the nature of refugee experiences of SGBV and torture, including domestic violence and child abduction and forced marriage; issues associated with service provision such as lack of adequate screening and under resourcing of health and justice services; a lack of gender sensitivity and specialist services, particularly for men; the sustained involvement of civil society organisations and local non-governmental organisations in providing counselling and offering emotional support and hope to survivors; and enhancing health and justice responses and services to improve refugee recovery, dignity and resilience. The authors recommend that integrated gendered and culturally sensitive service provision should be adopted, which brings together formal and informal health, justice services and survivor support programmes.

Since Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, its border with Uganda has become a hub of activities. These economic activities have been enhanced by ethnic and political relations, but also by diplomatic relations between the two countries. Contrasting developments on the Ugandan side of the border with those on the South Sudanese side, this research draws on empirical fieldwork to examine the impact of diplomatic relations on the development between both countries since 2005, with international trade as the main aspect of development. The study sets out to show how trade between both countries has been affected by the diplomatic relations between them. The post-CPA demand for goods and state-building processes created a range of economic opportunities for traders. This was particularly the case for Ugandan large-scale traders who, as a result, became an important and empowered group. These factors have further been enhanced by good diplomatic relations between both countries, and as a result South Sudan has become Uganda’s most important trading partner as well as a destination for many Ugandans to conduct their trade. Simultaneously, post-conflict problems have emerged in South Sudan such as insecurity, weak government institutions run by incompetent officials, corruption, high foreign exchange rate, cultural diversity, mistrust and poor infrastructure. These problems have emerged as major challenges to trade and investment by Ugandan traders in South Sudan with traders as well as government officials agreeing that these challenges present major setbacks to trade and investment in South Sudan. Ugandan small-scale traders in particular have become more vulnerable to expressions of authority on the part of South Sudan’s post-CPA state, in which state or individual military might is used effectively to control trade. The current conflict, which began in December 2013, has added a new dimension to the list of impediments to trade as insecurity and economic instability have precipitated an atmosphere of uncertainty among many traders and investors. Despite all those challenges, Ugandan traders as well as government officials still view South Sudan as a business destination of choice. Overall, the study confirms that diplomatic relations have enhanced international trade between South Sudan and Uganda by way of solving trade disputes, investment promotion and influencing leadership on policy matters.

Internal displacement is one of the most significant challenges in the world today, and violence, conflict, and climate-related disasters have engendered millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) on the globe. Despite this, the IDP-population is a marginalised group on the international agenda and stay primarily under governmental protection and assistance. This makes the adequacy and durability of solutions and governmental management of IDPs crucial. The number of IDPs continues to rise every year, and many nations have evident difficulties in IDP-management, negatively affecting prospects for sustainable peace. Previous research has primarily focused on singular aspects of IDPs and solutions of such. Less has been written in terms of a broader and more comprehensive understanding of government management of internal displacement. Several scholars, researchers, and experts have stressed the urgency to pay more attention to the issue and consider IDPs a concern beyond humanitarian responsibility. This study seeks to increase the understanding of governmental management of IDPs from a broader and more holistic point of view. This by comparing two cases that have faced high numbers of IDPs in a "post-conflict" context (Uganda and South Sudan) and applying the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs as a guide and analytical tool for comparison. The study finds that the governments have managed the situation with similarities and dissimilarities but have both faced difficulties in providing durable solutions and adequate response to IDPs' plight. Accentuated is also the insufficiency of establishing national instruments covering durable solutions when the political will or national capacity is absent. Reflected in the IDP-situations and trajectories examined, the primary obstacles for adequate response and management have been solely or a combination of such. The study also accentuates the interconnection of IDP-management and peace processes. For peace to be sustainable, and for solutions for IDPs to be durable, simultaneous progress of peace processes and IDP-management is crucial.

The main purpose of this thesis is to test a communications solution for the second to largest refugee settlement in the world, Bidi Bidi. A solution where it is possible to inform the refugees with necessary information, for example that the water at a specific location is currently contaminated or that food is provided at another location. The idea is to use nRF24L01+ modules which operate in the 2.4 GHz frequency band and send information through various ways. This includes turning LEDs' on and off, sending text Strings and streaming audio. The results showed that the modules are too unreliable for a refugee settlement. They also showed that it is not possible to send other types' of data while streaming audio, but there could be workarounds. It is clear that more knowledge and further investigations are needed.

Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006.
Since the end of the Cold War, China has displayed a reinvigorated interest in the African continent. There are differing viewpoints as to whether China’s increasing involvement in Africa is beneficial to the African continent, or whether there are negative consequences. This assignment attempts to answer this question by exploring the nature of China’s political, economic, and aid relationships with the African continent, by highlighting examples from four countries: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Sudan. China’s interests in Africa are motivated primarily by economics and diplomacy. In other words, Africa is important to China as a vast source of resources to feed its growing manufacturing base, as well as a source of energy security. In addition, China sees Africa as an important destination for its affordable manufactured goods. China’s interests in Africa, however, are not only confined to economics, but extend to diplomacy as well. China is attempting to position itself as an important power in the international system and, in so doing, promote its own views and policies within international multilateral organisations. Africa plays an important role in this regard, particularly in institutions with ‘one-country, one vote’ arrangements. Thus, China attempts to court African governments in order to secure access to Africa’s vast resources, as well as to garner support for its policies in the international arena. After an in-depth examination of the evidence, it is concluded that China’s engagement with Africa is based on strategic political and economic considerations and fits within a Realist explanatory framework. It is therefore contended that China’s presence on the African continent presents both opportunities as well as threats, although African governments need to be pro-active in order to exploit the potential opportunities. Furthermore, it is concluded that the negative consequences of China’s involvement in Africa are not only attributable to China’s behaviour in Africa, but some of the blame should also be shifted to corrupt African governments and elites who operate within a framework of neo-patrimonial politics which exacerbates corruption and mal-governance on the continent. Such behaviour stalls efforts emanating from ‘responsible’ African leaders to promote good governance and democracy on the continent, for example through institutions such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) and the African Union (AU).

Abstract This chapter examines the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its intersections with two widespread domestic conflict resolution processes in Africa: national amnesties and peace negotiations. In doing so, it connects to two overarching scholarly and policy debates, namely the appropriateness and legality of amnesties as opposed to prosecutions for suspected perpetrators of international crimes, and the “peace versus justice” debate over whether the threat of prosecution imperils peace negotiations that involve high-level atrocity suspects. This chapter focuses on the ICC’s first two—and therefore most developed—situations in northern Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with secondary reference to Rwanda, South Sudan, and other conflict-affected states in Africa. The chapter concludes with some lessons from the ICC’s interventions for recrafting international criminal justice in support of the wider pursuit of peace.

South Sudan is situated in north-eastern Africa bordered by Sudan, Ethiopia, Central Africa Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Kenya. It is 619,745 square kilometres (km) and has a population of 12.58 million. South Sudan gained independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011, making it the most recently recognized independent country. South Sudan, which is officially known as the Republic of South Sudan, comprises the three former southern provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile in their boundaries as they stood on 1 January 1956 and the Abyei Area, as defined by the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal Award of July 2009. The capital of South Sudan is Juba.

Uganda is a landlocked country situated in East Africa and is bordered by Congo, the Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda. Lake Victoria forms part of the southern border. The country’s land area is 241,037 square kilometre (km) with a population of approximately 42.27 million, according to 2019 estimates. Kampala is the capital and by far the largest city in Uganda, with a population around 1.66 million. Kira Town lies approximately 14 km north-east of Kampala. The town is the second largest urban centre of Uganda after Kampala. The Kampala Industrial Business Park is situated at the south-eastern end of Kira town. Nansana, located 13 km northwest of Kampala, serves as a dormitory town to the city of Kampala and there are plans to transform the town into a commercial hub although currently small informal markets dominate the economy. Mbarara in the western region is the capital and main administrative hub and commercial centre of the Mbarara District. It is also the largest industrial town second to Kampala and crucial transportation hub for goods in transit to Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other main cities include Gulu and Lira in the northern region, and Jinja in the eastern

This chapter details the collaboration scenario of the University libraries of Makerere University in Uganda and the University of Bergen in Norway for over a decade. This chapter highlights the multiplier effect of the collaboration leading to new partners at the University of Juba in South Sudan, the East African School of Library and Information Science (EASLIS) at Makerere and the Norwegian School of Librarianship. The new partners implemented the Juba University Library Automation Project (JULAP) funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. JULAP aimed to rebuild the Juba University Library closed due to 1985 war. The project includes library automation, training and sponsoring young Sudanese for a Bachelor’s degree in Librarianship at EASLIS. Staff training is conducted by EASLIS, while the practical component was handled by previously trained Makerere University Library staff. Activities, challenges faced and addressed, achievements and future plans of the project are outlined.

For the past two decades, following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Great Lakes Region of Africa has become a conflict-ridden zone marked by mass violations of human rights and political instabilities. Part of these instabilities and violence is due to the lack of strong and stable political leadership and institutions in many of the countries in the region. In 1996, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was plagued by the uprising of the rebel movement called the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre. This movement was a coalition of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, along with Congolese people. However, the AFDL victory was short-lived since the coalition parties broke up their alliance in 1998, which led to a new cycle of conflict which continued to destabilize the DRC to date with its Eastern provinces being most affected. In addition to conflict within the DRC, political instability and crisis of legitimacy of political leadership in South Sudan, Burundi, and the Central African Republic have also exacerbated the instability in the region. In this chapter, the author argues that peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region of Africa would depend on how best several facets of policies are integrated into one operational framework for peace and stability.

This chapter examines how opposition political parties have sought to overcome repressive practices in four of the six East African Community Member States: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Sudan. Opposition political parties and politicians from these countries have prodded the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) to use a treaty remedy for violations of rules governing the elections of members to the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in each of these countries. They have done so by pursuing a judicial remedy in the EACJ to resolve a coordination problem that opposition parties face when their opportunity to participate in an above-board election is compromised. These cases show how challenging the electoral malpractices of dominant parties in the EACJ facilitate opposition mobilization in ways that are not always possible, or even anticipated, in their home country. The EACJ has facilitated this coordination by consistently affirming that above-board elections are the only permissible mode of electing members of the EALA. This has helped opposition political parties to know when they have a factual basis with a likelihood of success so they could bring cases against dominant political parties in the EACJ. By contrast, the lack of cases from Burundi and Rwanda shows that the clamp down on organizational rights in these countries have made it impossible for opposition parties and politicians to bring election cases before the EACJ.

Covid-19 and the response and mitigation efforts taken to contain the virus have triggered a global crisis impacting on all aspects of life. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic for forcibly displaced persons (refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers) extends beyond its health impacts and includes serious socioeconomic and protection impacts. This rapid review focuses on the available evidence of the socioeconomic impacts of the crisis on forcibly displaced persons, with a focus where possible and relevant on examples from countries of interest to the Covid Collective programme: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, Iraq, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, Rwanda, South Sudan, Syria, Uganda, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.