Academic literature on the topic 'Macedonian Hegemony'

When we think of ancient Athens, the image invariably coming to mind is of the Classical city, with monuments beautifying everywhere; the Agora swarming with people conducting business and discussing political affairs; and a flourishing intellectual, artistic, and literary life, with life anchored in the ideals of freedom, autonomy, and democracy. But in 338 that forever changed when Philip II of Macedonia defeated a Greek army at Chaeronea to impose Macedonian hegemony over Greece. The Greeks then remained under Macedonian rule until the new power of the Mediterranean world, Rome, annexed Mac

This work examines how politicians in late classical Athens made persuasive use of the city’s past when addressing mass citizen audiences, especially in the law courts and Assembly. It focuses on Demosthenes and Aeschines—both prominent statesmen, and bitter rivals—as its case-study orators. Recent scholarly treatments of how the Athenians remembered their past tend to concentrate on collective processes; to complement these, this work looks at the rhetorical strategies devised by individual orators, examining what it meant for Demosthenes or Aeschines to present particular ‘historical’ exampl

After a survey of Athens at the height of its power in the Classical period, the chapter focuses on the rise to power of Philip II of Macedonia, how he expanded his kingdom, his relations with Athens, and his eventual military establishment of hegemony over Greece. Conditions in the city, especially during the Lycurgan era, are covered. On Philip’s death, that hegemony continued under his son, Alexander the Great. When Alexander died, the Greeks, led by Athens, revolted against Macedonian rule in what is called the Lamian War. The Macedonian general Antipater re-established Macedonian control, and punished Athens, including installing a garrison in the city, curtailing democracy, and reducing the number of citizens. This was the start of the Hellenistic era, commonly seen as a slump in Athens’ fortunes.

The chapter breaks from the main narrative to discuss and explain various key political and civic institutions, shedding light on how different Athens was politically in the Hellenistic period. There is a survey of Classical Athenian radical democracy to show what the constitution used to be like, followed by a consideration of the restrictions on the constitution and political participation under Macedonian hegemony and Roman rule. There is also a discussion of two major civic institutions: the ephebeia and the guilds.

Chapter 6 discusses the ‘Crown trial’ of 330 BC, the other major court clash between Aeschines (prosecutor) and Demosthenes (defending his associate Ctesiphon) for which we have extant speech texts from each side. The chapter shows that part of the success of On the Crown lies in Demosthenes’ ability to find ways to capitalize on the strategic error Aeschines had made in assuming that reviving the modes of accusation used in the Embassy trial could work in a context where the direction Demosthenes helped take Athens in nearly a decade earlier still apparently commanded broad popular approval, despite the fact that it had led to Macedonian hegemony. Demosthenes builds on this in On the Crown with an optimistic strategy—in which historical material plays a crucial role—which gives his audience much better versions of their past, present, and future to believe in than those assumed by Aeschines. After an introduction and overview in Chapter 6.1, which includes an assessment of the nature of our speech texts and some contextualization of Demosthenes’ strategies within those of his political group (especially Hyperides), Chapters 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 show Demosthenes confronting Aeschines’ historically related set pieces with a series of set pieces of his own which cover the same thematic ground and act as persuasive usurpations of the originals, seeking to upstage them. Chapter 6.5 offers a succinct conclusion.

The attack by the United States on Iraq in March 2003 was atypical of contemporary conflicts. While the attempt to kill Saddam Hussein on March 19 marked the opening of hostilities and was broadcast worldwide instantaneously, a much more destructive conflict that had raged for five years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to receive hardly any notice. The war to depose the Hussein regime resulted in fewer than 12,000 dead (122 U.S. and U.K. troops, 6,000–7,000 civilians, and about 5,000 Iraqi military casualties). The civil wars in the Congo (formerly Zaire) since 1998 have resulted in 3.1 to 4.7 million dead, with 250,000 killed in the fighting near Bunia (eastern Congo) in 2002–2003. Conflict directly caused 300,000 deaths worldwide in 2000, more than half of them in Africa. Conflict directly accounts for 0.5% of all global deaths; the indirect effects are significantly larger. These gruesome comparative statistics on casualties illustrate well the main themes of this chapter about post–Cold War conflicts. First, contemporary wars are disproportionately civil conflicts; only a handful of interstate wars have occurred in the last decade. Second, the United States has been disproportionately involved in both interstate and civil wars, either directly by attacking another country (Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1991, Yugoslavia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003) or indirectly by supporting governments that are under pressure from rebels (e.g., Haiti, Pakistan, Colombia, Israel, Turkey, the Philippines, Macedonia, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia). Third, civil wars are lasting longer than ever before; the average length is now eight years. Fourth, civil wars are much more destructive of life and property than interstate wars, partly because international structures and rules are either unavailable or ignored. More mechanisms exist to resolve interstate disputes. Fifth, overwhelming U.S. military power and a growing disparity with its opponents have resulted increasingly in asymmetric use of force and “risk-transfer wars.” Tiny U.S. casualties stand in sharp contrast to large numbers of civilian and military deaths in the countries under attack. The gap is expected to grow as U.S. military expenditures soon equal those of all other countries combined and new high-tech weaponry is rushed into production.